



Towards a Framework for Assessing Family Policies in the EU

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Publication date: 2009

Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Citation for published version (APA): Rostgaard, T. (2009). Towards a Framework for Assessing Family Policies in the EU. SFI - Det nationale Forskningscenter for Velfærd.

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Towards a Framework for assessing family policies

in the EU

Final Report

April 2009

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This report is part of a project initiated by the EU Government Expert Group on Demographic Issues to evaluate national family policies. The report provides a first attempt at a framework for assessing the performance of national family policies. The idea behind the framework is that it allows individual countries to compare their overall performance in the area of family policies and outcomes with the performance of other countries. This report focuses on policies for families with smaller children.

Improving policy performance ideally has to start with the measurement of its effects while accounting for the context in which it operates. Thus a set of indicators of context and outcome as well as policy dimensions are needed that should preferably also be comparable so that a country can see where it stands relative to other countries. By providing a set of indicators we hope to foster international discussion about the most important elements of family policy, and the contexts and outcome dimensions that should be used to measure them. For this purpose, our framework provides a set of cross-nationally comparable indicators on contexts, policies, and outcomes, organized on a systematic basis. The indicators build upon, inter alia, previous work by the OECD in various studies on family-friendly policies carried out on a cross-national basis using different sets of indicators. Most of these indicators are today available in the OECD Family Database. Where the OECD Family Database contains indicators for the majority of EU Member States and OECD countries, these data have been used in the present study. Otherwise data from other cross-national databases have been included.

The indicators have been selected according to their importance and relevance for three overall policy goals: child wellbeing, gender equality, and balancing work and family life (see Chapter 2 for further elaboration of these goals). Each indicator in this framework is presented as a standalone indicator in the absence of consensus on different aggregation weights. No ranking of countries has been made, but the relative position of countries has been indicated using standard deviation scores. This position therefore does not indicate a desired position, but merely how a country compares to other countries.

Since the report focuses on EU policy goals, the countries included are all present EU member states, but also as far as possible also OECD countries, in order to evaluate the EU Member States within a larger setting.

The choice of indicators in the framework does not reflect the idea that there is a direct statistical causal relationship between context, policy measures, and outcomes. This would require extensive further testing. However, the framework presents information on a number of important indicators to be taken into consideration when assessing policy settings, and thus provides a summary illustration of national family (policy) situations. As part of the present study, national scorecards for three different countries have been created as illustrative examples enabling these countries to assess their positions regarding the three policy goals relative to the other countries. The approach of the scorecards is a first attempt that needs to be tested further and proven with respect to its practicability and effectiveness.

The report is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 provides an overview of goals for family policy, in particular for the EU countries. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical and methodological perspectives for the establishment of the framework for assessing the performance of national family policies. In Chapter 4, the context and outcome indicators are presented for the topics of demography, parental labour market and income position, gender equality, child wellbeing and values, preferences, and satisfaction. Chapter 5 provides an overview of family policy indicators relevant to an assessment of leave schemes, early childhood education and care, family benefits, and workplace policy. In Chapter 6, assessments of the Member states are provided in the form of scorecards. Chapter 7 concludes the report.

CHAPTER 2

POLICY GOALS IN THE FIELD OF FAMILY POLICIES

As a result of demographic change in the industrialised world, familyfriendly policies are becoming an increasingly central issue in many EU, OECD, and also non-OECD countries, and many countries have already established policies in this field. Some of these policies and the goals behind them are very similar across countries, while other differ in their specificities. On the supranational level as well, various political actors have set goals in the context of family policy. In this chapter, we discuss the policy goals of the EU, one of the key political actors on the supranational level, keeping in mind that its goals are the result of consensus among the Member States. We also add a short description of UN goals in this field, since the UN includes more OECD Member States than just those in the EU.

In regard to EU family policies, there are several initiatives that are important to include when considering family policy goals. First of all, the European Alliance for Families has been influential in the development of a common EU approach to family policies in recent years. This initiative goes back to the year 2007, when the EU heads of state and gov-

ernment decided at the European Summit of 8 and 9 March 2007, to establish a European Alliance for Families. The Alliance hopes to create impulses for more family-friendly policies through exchanges of ideas and experience in the various Member States and to foster cooperation and fruitful learning from each other in the European Union. In May 2007, the Permanent Representatives Committee submitted its "Conclusions of the Council on 'Alliance for Families'" to the Council for adoption. Here, tools and targets of the European Union, as well as opinions on issues related to family-friendly policies, are summarised and discussed. The paper represents the EU's first step towards a European "family policy" developed in cooperation with its Member States. Thus, the European Alliance for Families constitutes one tool in a set of various family-related approaches on the EU level. The Commission has stated that this alliance "will first of all take the form of a platform for exchanges and knowledge concerning pro-family policies and best practices in the Member States" (European Commission 2007a: 7). The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) presupposes that Member States should define certain policy targets as a "common concern," whereas the actual choice of policies remains a national responsibility" (Scharpf 2001). The procedure involves the participation of the Member States by the formulation of national action plans, and is seen as a method of best practice. This is a new approach applied by the EU to "achieve growth, modernisation and welfare, and is about policy learning instead of binding law" (Lindén 2007: 9). Thus, the structure of European family policies will be dominated by the OMC and best practices among the Member States in order to establish this "EU family policy."

In general, the European Union views families as a source of economic prosperity, and encourages the Member States to incorporate family policies into their broader economic and social policies. Before the establishment of the European Alliances for Families, some targets and tools of the European Union in this context had been formulated in the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. These aims were described as important for improved reconciliation of family and working life and for the development of policy responses to demographic change (European Council 2007: 4). One aim set by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 was to increase the proportion of women in employment to more than 60% by 2010. In 2001, the Stockholm European Council proposed the development of indicators for the services provided by care facilities for children and other dependents and by family benefit systems. In 2002, the Barcelona European Council advocated that by 2010, countries should provide childcare to at least 90% of children between 3 and 6 years old and to at least 33% of children under 3 years old. In 2006, the Spring European Council emphasized the necessity to significantly reduce child poverty and to provide all children equal opportunities, regardless of their social background. The European Council of 2007 concluded that it is necessary to emphasise sustainable family policies in order to improve social cohesion, and their decision outlines areas of importance to family policies. Yet the European Union has stated explicitly that its Member States themselves are responsible for formulating appropriate, sustainable family policies. Hence the EU targets for family policies are merely suggestions and guidelines that the Member States should consider in setting their own policies.

In its guidelines, the European Union addresses different aspects of family policy. First, improving the social infrastructure for families plays an important role, since it enables parents to enter and stay in employment. It is important to provide affordable and accessible care services for children and other dependents, which includes parental education, training for care providers and daycare workers, and leisure-time facilities for young people (European Council 2007: 6). Second, family policies should focus on providing support for families that helps to compensate for the costs of raising children, especially during the period immediately after birth, and that takes into account the specific needs of single-parent families and of families with a large number of children (European Council 2007: 6). A final suggestion by the Council is directed at reconciliation: "a better balance between employment and security ("flexicurity") over the life cycle to the benefit of family life, including in particular appropriate arrangements for parental and care leave for both women and men, better access to lifelong learning, and ensuring gender equality in employment" (European Council 2007: 6).

Taking a look at the content of EU goals in a more structured way, there are three key dimensions summarising the Commission's and thus also the Member States' family policy goals: These three dimensions, which we call "aims" in the following, are (1) child wellbeing, (2) gender equality, and (3) balancing work and family life. The three aims are, however, interrelated, and development in one area often depends on development in another. There is empirical evidence that a good balance between work and family life improves child wellbeing, as the life satisfaction of parents improves if they can achieve their preferred balance between family life and work. Moreover, one could argue that there is a fourth dimension: namely, the need to increase fertility. But looking at explicitly stated EU goals, none of them deal directly with this issue. Much the same is true on the national level. Although many EU Member States have low fertility rates and are aware of their consequences, only a few countries have made the aim of increasing fertility an explicit and official policy goal.¹ This might be due to the difficulty finding evidence of clear and direct correlations between family policy and birth rates, and particularly in demonstrating that increased family benefits (e.g., taxes and transfers) actually increase fertility.

¹ As a means of adressing fertility, the Green Paper on "Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations" suggests that Europe pursue three priorities to address demographic change, among them birth rates, which are supported by the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty as well as a variety of innovative measures (European Commission 2005b: 10).

The first dimension of EU family policy, child wellbeing, focuses on children as family members. The European Union regards an increase in the wellbeing of children and young people as a means of helping future generations to develop to their full potential and of enabling them to contribute more to society and to the economy (European Commission 2008a: 111). An important EU objective is to reduce child poverty, since "despite overall progress in the labour market, this figure (at 19% the risk of poverty among children in the EU is higher than that of the general population) has remained unchanged since 2000" (European Commission 2008a: 112). However, the EU has also addressed child health and development, as described in the WHO European strategy for child and adolescent health and development. Furthermore, in the framework of the programme Education and Training 2010, the Member States have committed themselves to reducing the school dropout rate in the EU to a maximum of 10% by 2010 (European Commission 2008a: 26). The European Commission has stated that the best means of overcoming child poverty is by "addressing the issue on all fronts and striking the appropriate balance between targeting the family and the child in its own right. This entails combining strategies to increase parents' access and attachment to employment with enabling services and with income support that minimise the risk of creating trap effects"(European Commission 2008a: 112). Hence, the EU advises all of its Member States to apply a balanced policy mix.

The second dimension, gender equality, is a top priority of the European Union. The EU monitors and promotes gender mainstreaming, and it tackles the gender pay gap explicitly through such initiatives as the analysis of current legislation in order to urge the Member States to implement existing legislation on the provision of information about equality measures and to raise awareness about existing laws (European Commission 2007b: 8). The Commission has released two communications, both outlining targets for equal opportunity. The 2002 Barcelona

targets state that efforts should be made to increase daycare services to enable women and men to reconcile work and family life. Yet this will also involve parental leave policies. Here, the services available on the market are adapting too slowly to a situation in which both men and women work. The Roadmap for equality of women and men (2006-2013) states that "fewer men take parental leave or work part-time (7.4% compared to 32.6% for women) and women remain the main carers of children and other dependents" (European Commission 2006: 5). The EU aims to encourage men to take parental leave as well. Lindén points out that as strategy the EU encourages its Member States to refer to those Member States "that have developed successful policies in this area, for instance the Swedish parental leave system and its father's quota, and thus indirectly give direction" (Lindén 2007: 11). This is supported by the Parental Leave Directive (96/34/EC) of the European Council, which states that male and female workers have individual entitlement to parental leave (see also Chapter 5). In its consultation with workers and employers for a better work-life balance, the Commission identified certain areas where the Pregnant Workers Directive (1992) could be improved. The Pregnant Workers Directive is one of the few EU laws in the field of social policy (Lindén 2007: 10). This Directive provides provisional measures to protect workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding against the risks related to chemical, physical and biological agents . Additionally, the Directive contains specific provisions regarding night work, maternity leave, pre-natal examinations, employment rights, and protection against discriminatory dismissal (Council Directive 92/85/EEC). The Pregnant Workers Directive could be improved regarding the duration of leave, the level of payment, and the protection of women returning from maternity leave to work. The consultation document also identifies six areas where the provisions for parental leave could be improved, providing suggestions for action on the following aspects (European Commission 2007c): (1) Incentives for fathers to take parental leave, (2) Employment rights and prohibiting

discrimination (making sure workers who take parental leave do not encounter less favourable working conditions), (3) Duration of parental leave, (4) Flexibility in relation to the taking of leave (the possibility to take leave in a piecemeal way), (4) The age-bracket of the child for which parental leave can be taken (increasing the age limit to cover the entire primary school cycle) and (5) Payment during parental leave (linking payment on parental leave to a workers' salary).

In September 2008, the social partners at the European level launched negotiations on parental leave with a view to revising the existing EU legislation based on a framework agreement concluded by European employer and trade union representatives (European Commission 2008b). Additionally, in October 2008, the EU Commission proposed a change in maternity leave revising the Pregnant Worker's Directive (European Commission 2008b).

As part of the EU's gender equality tools, the Commission promotes equal participation of women and men in decision-making; for example, women's participation in politics or in economic decision-making through transparency in promotion processes, flexible working arrangements, and availability of care facilities (European Commission 2006: 6). Furthermore, the EU has stressed the importance of eradicating genderbased violence, focusing on gender equality targets, and also eliminating gender stereotypes in society. According to the EU, gender stereotypes occur in education, in the labour market, and in the media (European Commission 2006: 8). The Commission emphasises the need to increase public awareness of this issue, and encourages young women and men to pursue non-traditional educational paths. To overcome the segregation in the labour market, the EU suggests that anti-discrimination laws be enforced and that incentives be offered for employment. The media should present a realistic picture of the skills and potentials of women and men in society (European Commission 2006: 8).

With respect to the third dimension, balancing work and family life, the EU uses reconciliation policies to strengthen parental labour market positions. Parental employment is a major component of family policies and is clearly intertwined with targets for gender equality. The employment targets formulated in the Lisbon Strategy are thus assigned to the Member States, who are expected to develop corresponding policies to achieve them. The European Commission addresses a variety of other family issues indirectly-for example, by setting key policy priorities for eradicating poverty and social exclusion. The indicator of parental labour market position may also reflect family poverty and/or child poverty, and is thus directly related to the EU's stated goals of improving social inclusion and providing equal opportunities. The EU describes an increase in labour market participation as an important priority to overcome poverty, but also as a useful step to balance work and family life. Family poverty should be eradicated by modernising social protection systems. Providing family benefits, both universal and targeted benefits, is a key tool in combating poverty. These policies could be implemented usefully by expanding childcare facilities, providing flexible or part-time working arrangements, and offering financial support to families with young children. Again, the European Commission does not explicitly state policies or set targets for the Member States to meet, but it does suggest the method of OMC (Lindén 2007: 14). Furthermore, balancing work and family life also implies improved education and wellbeing for all family members. By fostering educational attainment, social exclusion problems are tackled in line with the overall European Commission goal of reducing disadvantages in education and training. This particular goal is also one of the seven key policy priorities (European Commission 2005a: 6-7). The EU also advocates that its Member States prevent early departures from formal education and training.

Apart from this, subjective wellbeing is intertwined with EU goals to improve working and living conditions of EU citizens and to strengthen

the Union's economic and social cohesion. The Quality of Life Report 2003 refers to national action plans for employment and social inclusion that aim at improving living and working conditions for disadvantaged groups. Subjective wellbeing of family members is not explicitly targeted by EU policies, yet the "social policy agenda of the EU is concerned with enhancing life chances for those who are disadvantaged, such as poor, unemployed, or disabled people" (European Foundation 2003: 65). Analogously to the EU targets mentioned above-child wellbeing, gender equality, and balancing work and family life-the non-EU OECD countries as well as the European countries are following the Beijing Platform for Action developed by the UN during the Fourth World Conference on Women (UN 1995). The Platform for Action pursues the empowerment of women. It aims at abolishing the obstacles to women's participation in public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making. This emphasises the principle of shared responsibility between women and men at home, in the workplace and in the wider communities. Particular interest in balancing work and family life is expressed in strategic objective F.6, which is to "Promote harmonization of work and family responsibilities for women and men" under the topic Women and the Economy (UN 1995). Another objective advocated by the UN, as well as by the EU, is equality of opportunity. The majority of non-European OECD countries also support the reconciliation of work and private life following the UN Platform for Action established in Beijing. Apart from this, it should be kept in mind that every country has its own approaches to family policy, which is true of both EU Member States as well as non-EU countriesfor example, Japan, whose focus is on the relatively low Japanese fertility rate, and Canada, whose specific focus is on legislation to improve policies on the employer/firm level (OECD 2008a).

CHAPTER 3

APPROACHES TO THE ASSESSMENT OF FAMILY POLICIES

This chapter provides an overview of some theoretical and empirical observations and approaches to assessing family policy in order to help understand the variety of policy goals and the use of family policy instruments across national contexts. It also outlines the elements of a more practical approach that countries can use to assess family policies at the national level.

3.1. FAMILY POLICY VARIATION ACROSS CONTEXTS — THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS

Theoretical analysis of family policy programs generally supports the general division of countries into universalist (social democrat), residual (liberal economic), and social insurance (conservative) welfare regimes as originally formulated and further developed by Esping-Andersen (1997) (see also Gauthier 2002). These groupings often correspond to regional country clusters.

The universalist welfare regime is known for its universal state support for families, high commitment to gender equality in work and care, and strong support for working parents. The Nordic countries are examples of this welfare regime. The social insurance regime is characterized by a medium level of support for families, mainly in the form of cash benefits that are often related to working status. This regime tends to support a traditional male breadwinner model, where the man works full-time and the woman is responsible for the domestic sphere. Countries traditionally belonging to this model include, for example, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. In the residual welfare regime, we find low support for families, and the few policies that do exist are mainly targeted at groups in the population with special needs. The state is not supposed to interfere in private matters, and there is wide support for market solutions. In this welfare regime, we find UK, Australia, the United States, and Switzerland.

In addition, there may also be a fourth model comprising the southern European countries. This model is characterized by fragmentation along occupational lines, and by a combination of universal and private services and benefits. There is usually no national guaranteed statutory minimum income scheme (Gauthier 2002).

In regard to the eastern European countries, there is no general agreement on a predominant model, given the wide variation in the institutional structure of social security programmes and the different levels of social and economic performance among countries (Kangas 1999, Manning 2004). Some would, however, argue that a separate East European/post-socialist model is emerging, which does not fall into Esping-Andersen's categorisation of welfare models but has characteristics of both the liberal and conservative corporatist regimes, as well as some distinct features of its own, such as a mixture of insurance-based but universally covered schemes, high-take up rates but low benefits (Kaariainen & Lehtonen 2006, van Oorschots & Arts 2005).

Although the main characteristics of the welfare regimes seem to persist, since the 1970s there seems to be some common response among countries to demographic changes and diversifying family forms, constrained budgets, increasing EU coordination of policies, and global economic integration (Gauthier 2002). The demographic changes that have emerged with aging populations and falling fertility rates thus seem to have become influential drivers of policy change with regard to the need to reconsider family policy and its role in helping men and women start families. Most countries within the EU are today promoting the adult worker model, in which men and women are assumed equally employable, in order to improve economic growth, promote social inclusion, combat problems of a shrinking labour force, and tackle poverty. The adult worker model assumes a new understanding of optimal ways of sharing paid work and care work, not only between state, market, and family, but also between men and women. Gender equality is also one of the policy drivers, but is seen by some as a largely rhetorical goal, especially outside the Nordic countries (Stratigaki 2000). The adult worker model has accentuated the need to promote policies that can help men and women balance work and family life. Also, among all these models, there seems to be more attention to children overall, but the investments focus mainly on children as future workers, ensuring that they acquire the skills and competencies they will need on the job market, or as Lewis (2008: 10) phrases it, more in their "ability of becoming than being."

This has not resulted in full convergence among different countries' national family policies, but there has been an increase in public support for working parents across countries, attempting to make it easier for them to reconcile work and family life. There has also been a greater

focus on children's outcomes and investments in the services provided for them.

Regarding the approach to daycare, parental leave, and family policies on the employer/firm level, Bennett (2008) outlines that in the universalist countries of northern Europe there seems to be a societal approach to daycare that encompasses the full-employment paradigm (at least after a leave period), so that the state provides parental leave, early childhood education and care (ECEC), and family-friendly jobs. In the central European countries, there is a belief that the young child is better off being cared for in the family, and consequently, leave schemes are relatively long but in general with low or no pay. Germany, however, has been in transition since the introduction of parental leave with a wage replacement benefit (Spiess & Wrohlich 2008). In many of the former communist countries of eastern Europe, where daycare used to be provided to the majority of children, daycare services have been replaced by extended leave schemes (Rostgaard 2004). In countries belonging to the residual welfare regime, female labour force participation is encouraged just as in other countries, but no public and/or subsidized daycare is provided.

3.2. PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT OF FAMILY POLICY

How are countries assessed in practice in most family policy models? Gauthier (2002) notes that the literature contains two main approaches: first, the family type approach assesses the impact of family policy in variations of family types, across a number of countries. This approach has been used by Bradshaw and others (e.g., Bradshaw and Finch 2002) in a series of studies of European countries. Their analysis showed considerable differences between countries, but also suffered from the problem of the need to constantly update data. A second approach, which has been applied, for example, by Kamerman & Kahn (1997), and Pampel & Adams (1992), compares aggregate data such as social expenditure data. This approach cannot take into account the variation in family types, and is vulnerable, for example, to fluctuations in GDP. On the other hand, it enables studies across a number of years.

One may add to this approach the study by Gornick and Meyers (2003) assessing countries on the basis of their respective family policy designs. The authors developed a quantitative family policy index in which elements of policies were evaluated and weighted according to their supposed importance—for example, compensation rates for parental leave or parental payment of daycare services. These policy indicators were supplemented with data on, for example, social expenditure. In this way, the important institutional differences among policy programs were acknowledged while also employing aggregate data.

Overall, the various attempts in the literature to assess family policy depend heavily on the research interests of the team developing the respective approach. These research interests are embedded in various disciplines, such as sociology, economics, political science, and thereby differ in approach and focus. Some approaches may also be designed to promote a particular policy model, and the selection of indicators may reflect this.

Studies assessing family policies sometimes result in a specific weighting of particular measures or indicators. Based on this weighting, overall scores can be calculated. (It is important to keep in mind, however, that even a non-weighted summary score of various indicators implicitly assumes that all measures have the same weight.) Finally, data availability also shapes the scientific approach and conceptualisations of family policy. This report combines previous approaches with an approach that should provide a transparent and up-to-date analysis of the data. Overall, the writing of the report is driven by the ambition of the EU Commission to develop a framework to assess family policies independent of particular research approaches and—as much as possible—independent of particular policy preferences, but at the same time, using a straightforward and transparent approach. Moreover, the idea is that in the medium run, this framework should be entirely based on the OECD Family Data Base (see below).

On the one hand, our approach combines former approaches in looking at outcomes for family types and in looking at expenditure data. On the other hand, our main emphasis is on the different dimensions of family policy goals or aims, and on the measures of family policy. Also, in this report we identify the aims and measures of family policies, quantify and compare them, but in comparison to the Gornick and Meyers (2003) approach, for instance, we do not calculate aggregate scores based on weights. Nevertheless, we are aware of the fact that even a non-weighted summary score of various indicators implicitly assumes that all measures have the same weight. In this respect, our approach can be considered as "normative" as well.

Given the variety of available indicators, the following search strategy has been used: the primary data was the current OECD Family Data Base (see Box 3.1). In the case that no information was available or in the case of missing information for some countries, further efforts were made to find other sources offering appropriate information. Detailed information was available in some cases, and in some other cases no information could be found at all.

Box 3.1 The OECD Family Database

The OECD Family Database is a collection of cross-national indicators on family outcomes and family policies². The focus of the database is on *families with children*. It does not include indicators on the position and care needs of elderly family members. The development of the database was started in 2006. The aim is to provide data covering a broad range of topics categorized into four thematic fields. Each of the fields is sub-divided into three or four topics. The development of the database is an on-going process. It is intended to provide *full information on 54 indicators by mid-2009*. In March 2009, 37 indicators were available.

The database is structured in the following way:

- The structure of families (SF)
- The labour market position of families (LMF)
- Public policies for family and children (PF)
- Child outcomes (CO)

For each of the topics, the database provides between two and six *indicators* that originate from different sources. Most of the indicators are taken from other OECD databases (e.g., the OECD Social Expenditure Database, the OECD Benefits and Wages Database or the OECD Education Database) or from databases maintained by other (international) organisations (e.g., Eurostat, UN). Each indicator combines a variety of statistics (e.g., the indicator SF1 on family size and composition provides information on the size of households by household type, the distribution of households by type, the share of households with children by household type, and the distribution of households by number of children). Most of the information is provided in cross-sectional perspective. Usually data on the latest year available is reported. For some topics longitudinal information is also available. It is intended to provide information on 38 countries, i.e., all OECD countries and all non-OECD EU Member States. However, not all statistics are available for the full country sample. Some statistics cover less than 15 countries. All information is provided online. The presentation of the indicators differs (charts, tables and description of transfer and care systems).

² See <u>http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,2340,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_00.html</u> (April 22 2009).

The framework is structured according to context, outcome, and policy measure indicators. It is important to have information on the context in which family policy is assessed, as it is obvious that family policy depends on the overall socio-demographic and socio-economic context of a country. Furthermore, the family policy of a country can be assessed by analysing various outcome indicators. It is, however, worth keeping in mind that the distinction between context and outcome indicators may seem arbitrary or at times even irrelevant, for example, whether to treat labour force participation or fertility as an outcome or a context indicator. Most important, family policy should be assessed by analysing measures in particular policy fields. Based on the OECD approach of "Babies and Bosses" (OECD 2007), we distinguish four fields of policy measures: parental leave policies, early childhood education and care, family benefits, and policies on the employer/firm level. Various indicators have been selected to describe all four policy measurement fields as well as the outcomes and contexts.

Since a *practical* approach to assessing family policy should not cover all indicators, mainly for the reason of "practicability", we selected a certain number of indicators in each field. We propose to work with a limited number of indicators for a **core assessment of family policy**. Ideally, such a core assessment should be based on indicators that are available for a maximum number of countries and most current years. However, theses two criteria still leave a large number of indicators to be analysed, at least if the focus is on the context or the outcomes. Therefore, further selections had to be made. For each field we propose a selection based on the current research literature, meaning that we select those indicators that were used most often in the literature. This allowed us to develop a core framework of indicators. If a core assessment turns out to be too limited, a broader set of indicators may be used. The OECD family database and other sources offer additional indicators and thus might be useful for a more extensive assessment of family policy.

Once the indicators have been selected for a core assessment of family policy, we will need a method to analyse them. We base our method on the earlier work of the OECD in the "Babies and Bosses" reports (OECD 2007): in the chapters presenting the context, outcome, and indicators on policy measures, the indicators of a country will be assessed based on the **standard deviations** of the particular indicators. Given these standard deviations, countries can be divided into three groups: (1) $\leq = -\frac{1}{2}$ of the standard deviation (2) $-\frac{1}{2}$ to $+\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation and (3) $\geq = +\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation. Thus, for each indicator, countries are grouped according to their position in the overall distribution of countries. For reasons of simplicity, three different symbols are used in the tables to identify the countries: Group (1): <, Group (2): 0, Group (3): >. Given these groupings, different countries' family policies in each field can be described in comparison to the other countries.

CHAPTER 4

CONTEXTS AND OUTCOMES OF FAMILY POLICIES

Knowledge of national contexts is crucial for understanding the possible implications of demographic trends and for identifying where family policy interventions are needed. Policy-making requires an understanding of demographic factors, since changes in the size, composition, and growth rate of the population can have an impact on many life domains, both social and economic. This chapter outlines what we consider to be the most important socio-demographic and socio-economic indicators to describe and assess the contexts of family policy.

Apart from context indicators, a family policy assessment framework should also provide an overview of the outcomes of existing policies in order to determine what needs to be changed or improved. However, drawing a clear distinction between context and outcome indicators is often possible only from a short-term perspective. In the long run—or even in the medium term—context measures may change and in fact become outcome measures. Outcome indicators, on the other hand, may be context indicators in the short run. The example of fertility may make this clearer. In the short run, it is obvious that fertility rates are part of the indicators describing the context of national or even supranational family policies. In the long run, however, policy measures might affect fertility rates either negatively or positively. Although there is no clear empirical evidence on the direction of the influence of family policy, it can be argued that fertility rates are an outcome indicator for a country's family policy. Figure 4.1 illustrates this interdependence.

Figure 4.1 Interdependence of context, outcomes and policy measures



Given the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between context and outcome indicators, we group potential context and outcome indicators instead according to the subject of the indicators, such as demography, parental labour market and income positions, gender equality, child outcomes and values, preferences, and life satisfaction.

4.1 SELECTION OF INDICATORS

The selected indicators can mainly be found in the OECD Family Database.³ It is indicated if the indicator refers to other sources. In the following we briefly discuss the selection of the indicators and describe them individually. For each group, we start with a summary of the respective indicators in a box.

³ In the tables covering the indicators, the tag is reported in parentheses.

Box 4.1.1 Indicators for core assessment: demography

- Life expectancy
- Fertility rate
- Teenage births
- Women's average age at first child birth
- Out-of-wedlock births
- Lone-parent households
- Average household size
- Proportion of families with no children

The most debated demographic trend in developed countries is without doubt declining population growth, which causes societal aging. Most countries are experiencing declining population growth because the number of children being born is lower than the number of people dying. One of the causes of the societal aging is that people are living longer. Low mortality levels and thus increasing life expectancy trigger population aging. **Life expectancy** is one of the first indicators presented in this chapter to describe the variation in contexts across the countries. Life expectancy at birth is calculated as the average number of years a person is expected to live, subjected to current mortality trends. Over time, life expectancy has been increasing in most countries, faster for women than for men. Generally, however, the gap between men and women is narrowing, at least in Europe (Council of Europe 2004).

Among the causes of population decline is the declining number of births, which has been experienced in all of the OECD countries over the past several decades. The **fertility rate** is an indicator that explains variation in reproduction between countries taking into account current fertility levels. The decline in fertility is often associated with women's higher educational attainment and increasing labour market participation. In turn, as a result of the higher female involvement to the labour force, the opportunity cost of foregone wages is assumed to women's desire to have children. Although the fall in fertility rates has been seen in all of the countries under examination here, the pace of the decline and the present levels vary between countries. The decline in fertility rates started early in the Nordic countries, in the 1960s, but stabilised around 1.8 in the early 1990s, whereas the southern European countries, for example, experienced a decline beginning in mid-1970s leading to currently very low figures. Fertility rates are often calculated as the period total fertility rate (TFR), which is the total number of children born per woman over her life cycle if current fertility rates remained constant at each age. Total period fertility rates are sensitive to the timing of births, that is, fertility rates may decline in severe economic periods. Should a couple decide to postpone having a child, the total fertility rate will immediately be affected, whereas the completed fertility rate may stay the same if the couple ends up having the originally intended number of children. Total fertility rates are, however, often used in international comparisons as they are more widely available and allow tracking of recent changes (e.g., d'Addio & d'Ercole 2005). The age group considered for the calculation of fertility is, in all OECD countries, from 15-49 years. It is, however, worth noting that some women give birth after their 50th birthday due to the recent advancement in fertility-enhancing therapies (d'Addio & d'Ercole 2005), which is why age-grouped fertility rates may be preferable.

Special attention is often paid to the rate of **teenage births**, as these are women who will often face problems taking up education or gaining a foothold in the labour market after giving birth, and the teenage birth rate is reported as an indicator.

One of the main determinants of declining fertility rates is that women are postponing having their first child, and this tendency is considered to be the most important factor behind the so-called "second demographic transition" in the OECD countries (van de Kaa 1987). **Women's average age at first birth** will be used as an indicator in this report to underscore the sensitivity of the total fertility rate, but also to emphasize what are believed to be the associated risks in terms of childlessness and higher health risks for mothers and children (d'Addio & d'Ercole 2005).

Among the countries where **out-of-wedlock births** are more frequent, statistics suggest that fertility rates are also lower (d'Addio & d'Ercole 2005).

Another crucial indicator, usually referred to as a context indicator, is the number of single-person households. Data from the OECD shows that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, we have witnessed an increase in the population share of single-person households (OECD 1999). Not all of these singles have dependant children, and some of them are young and elderly persons who for various reasons live without a partner. However, we have also witnessed an increase in the number of lone-parent families in the last 40 years (OECD 2007). The share of lone-parent households as a proportion of all households with children is used here to report the proportion of children who grow up in a household with only one breadwinner, which can be an important indication of how many children risk living in an economically vulnerable family. Across the OECD countries in general, poverty risks are proportionally much higher among children living in single-parent households than for children living in two-parent households, whether or not the parents are working (OECD 2007).

The decline in fertility also results in smaller average numbers of persons overall in households, and in a tendency to have a smaller number of children per household. We suggest using the **average household size** and also the **proportion of households with no children** to describe the context. Both indicators are sensitive to the age composition of the population, as societal aging means that a larger proportion of persons presumably live without children under 18 years. Also, changing family structures with couples divorcing or separating results in a larger proportion of households without dependent children. However, both can be used as crude indicators of the tendency for more and more men and women to have fewer children and of the tendency for some of them to remain childless. At this stage, we do not include the number of households with children, as most data on this are divided according to the number of children and thus would require substantially more space to report.

Box 4.1.2 Indicators of core assessment: parental labour market and income position

- Maternal employment rates
- Part-time and full-time employment for women
- Part-time and full-time employment for men
- Statutory maximum of working hours
- Average number of actual working hours
- Current vs. preferred working hours of parents
- Family poverty

Another set of indicators that can be characterised as context indicators in the short run and outcome indicators in the long run refer to the labour market position of parents and the income position of families. The obstacles parents may face in combing work obligations and childcare responsibilities are diverse in the sense that working permits parents to maintain a certain living standard that contributes positively to child development, yet working time deprives children of time spent with their parents. With respect to the two policy aims of promoting child wellbeing and enabling parents to balance work and family life, countries that want to assess their family policy should look at indicators reporting parental labour market and income positions.

Given that mothers still hold the main caregiving responsibility for younger children, it is crucial to analyse **maternal employment rates**. The indicator we refer to covers mothers with children up to the age of 16. A more detailed analysis should use more specific maternal employment rates: Usually employment rates are available for mothers of children up to the age of three, three to six, and six and older. Employment rates usually increase with the age of the child, which is a result of maternal or paternal preferences for employment, the demand side of the labour market, leave regulations, daycare provision, and so on. Apart from maternal employment, the type of employment is important. Part-time work is one of the most important means of balancing work and family life. Still, part-time workers are mainly women and especially mothers. Thus, one indicator for assessment should be the part-time employment of women. Again, a deeper analysis could differentiate between the parttime employment rates of women without children and those of women with children in different age groups. Moreover, part-time employment rates could also differ by the number of average hours working part-time. This reflects the broad variety of part-time work. Such indicators could also indicate whether part-time work substantially increases the financial resources of families. This is important as parental employment can contribute to the aim of reducing child poverty. Part-time employment rates for men show that this is still not a widely used tool for taking on childcare responsibilities. Men usually work full-time and do not adjust their working hours for family reasons. However, country differences in part-time employment rates for men might show differences in the outcomes of different family policies. The same differences might be useful for the analysis of full-time employment rates of women and men, respectively.

Apart from adjusting working hours by switching to part-time employment, the **statutory maximum and the average number of actual working hours** are indicators that make it possible to assess a country's overall policy with regard to work-life balance concepts. They give a good picture of the overall statutory framework and real outcomes. Statutory working time requirements protect employees from being required to work beyond legal limits, but also provide information on time allocation by employees with care responsibilities. If their statutory maximum work-
ing time is already high, employees with care responsibilities could face greater difficulties combining work and family life. The actual working hours also give hints as to how parents' work-life balance is affected by overtime or other unplanned work schedules.

While all indicators reported so far deal with working time arrangements and regulations, they do not account for time allocations of employees during the day. Working parents and employees with care obligations are often required to organise their duties around their working time. Therefore, it could be informative to assess the quality of the work-life balance by comparing the actual hours parents worked to their preferred hours of work. A gap could indicate a need for different policies allowing parents to fulfil their care obligations as well as their working arrangements. This indicator of **differences between preferred and actual hours** of work could demonstrate how the combination of national level support and firm-level practices enables parents to target their preferred distribution of work and care. The respective indicators are not yet available in the OECD Family Database but are planned for future inclusion.

Both the income position and the employment status of parents influence the poverty risks of their children. Parental income is another indirect indicator of child wellbeing and thus useful for the assessment of family policy. Parental income positions can be assessed using an indicator of **poverty in households with children**. This indicator is part of the OECD Family Database, and presents figures on the percentage of all households with children and a working-age household head facing poverty. A household is regarded to be poor if the equivalised income of all household members lies below the 50 % median threshold.⁴ The percentage of families living in poverty tends to be slightly lower than the percentage of children living in poverty. The interplay between parental living

⁴ It should be mentioned that the broad poverty literature offers various concepts for measuring poverty. Given the range of measurment concepts available, there are also various indicators available, which should be interpreted with care.

arrangements and employment status is revealed when considering the possible relationship between mothers in paid work and child poverty. The OECD reports that countries with a larger proportion of maternal employment report lower poverty rates among children (OECD 2008b). This indicator differs from child poverty slightly with regard to the unit of measurement. Poverty of households with children refers to all individuals in the family living below the poverty line—adults and children.

Box 4.1.3 Indicators for core assessment: gender equality

- Gender gap of employment
- Gender wage gap

With respect to gender equality, we suggest that countries assess the **gender gap of employment** reported by the OECD Family Database. The gender gap of employment indicates percentage point differences between employment rates for men and women of the same age. Here, the OECD refers to the population aged 25 to 64. The value countries assess thus measures how many women relative to men are in full-time employment. A high value indicates that fewer women than men are working full-time.

The gender gap that has received the most attention, however, is the difference in reported earnings for men and women. Countries should therefore also consider the **gender pay gap** when evaluating gender equality. Across the OECD countries, fewer women than men are employed, on average, and they are paid less than their male colleagues (OECD 2008b). Thus, the EU and the UN both have addressed the gender pay gap explicitly in an attempt to achieve equality between women and men. The gender wage gap is calculated as the ratio of median earnings of female employees relative to male employees. The earnings used refer to gross fulltime wage and salary workers (OECD 2008b).

Box 4.1.4 Indicators for core assessment: child outcomes

- Child poverty
- Children in families by employment status*
- Infant mortality rate
- Low birth weight
- PISA scores
- Literacy scores, age nine*
- Young people not in education
- * Indicator planned to be included in the OECD Family Database.

Child outcome indicators in various fields can be analysed: outcome measures with respect to material outcomes and with respect to health and child development (for such an approach, see, for instance, UNICEF 2007). All of these could, in principle, be further differentiated according to a child's age.

One of the main indicators with regard to material resources is child poverty. Child poverty, like poverty in households with children, captures the percentage of children living below the poverty line using 50 % of the median equivalised income as a threshold. Children living in poor families face obstacles to their development. If countries want to assess their performance in improving child wellbeing, they should consider the indicator **child income poverty**.⁵ The reduction of child poverty is an important objective, especially among EU Member States. However, UNICEF states that such poverty measures are necessary, but not sufficient indicators of children's material wellbeing since all such measurements are based on household income (UNICEF 2007). In contrast to poverty of households with children, only children are counted in measures of child poverty. This can lead differences between child poverty rates and family poverty rates in the same country. Children sometimes outnumber the number of

⁵ The same caveats we refer to in the context of family poverty also apply to child poverty.

adults per household. This is true for households that face a high risk of poverty, that is, single-parent households or households with more than three children.

Furthermore, countries can evaluate child wellbeing by using a set of health indicators collected on the health of babies and newborns. These health measures are of particular importance because they indicate whether children had a good start in life and thus had good opportunities for appropriate development. The most frequently used indicators in this context are **infant mortality rates** and **low birth weights** (see, e.g., UNICEF 2007).

With respect to indicators of child development, for older children, literacy scores at age nine and PISA scores can be assessed. Young adolescents are evaluated according to their school performance. PISA scores enable countries to assess quality and performance of their educational system. Moreover, equality of opportunity means making a high-quality education equally accessible to all children. Furthermore, the transition from education to working life has become difficult in recent times. The high proportion of young people not in education in many countries illustrates the problems surrounding school-to-work transitions. The percentage of young people not in education also makes it possible to infer possible social exclusion. It indicates that young adolescents lack relevant skills and qualifications to earn a living later in life. Thus, for the assessment of educational attainment, we report the percentage of young people not participating in education. For children before the compulsory school age, there are hardly any internationally comparable skill indicators available. Thus, no skill indicators could be assessed for these early age groups.

Box 4.1.5 Indicators for core assessment: values, preferences, and satisfaction

- Childbearing preferences of childless women
- Mean actual and ideal number of children
- Reasons for not fulfilling stated childbearing desires
- Life satisfaction

Apart from more objective indicators, a successful assessment of family policies should take subjective indicators into account as well. Values, preferences, and life satisfaction indicators should be assessed as context indicators in the short run and outcome measures in the long run.

In addition to women's higher take-up of education and increasing participation in the labour market, another contributory factor to the decline in fertility rates is also believed to be changes in women' values and attitudes towards childbearing and gender roles (Gilbert 2005, Hakim 2003). Here, we propose assessing the **childbearing preferences of childless women**.

Often, however, there is discrepancy between the number of children that women want to have and their actual childbearing behaviour. This indicates that women (and men) face difficulties fulfilling their ideals for family life or for a balance between work and family life. Here, we propose using the difference between the **mean actual and ideal number of children** and some of the associated **reasons for not fulfilling stated childbearing desires**.

In order to assess subjective wellbeing, countries should use the **mean of life satisfaction** as an important overall indicator for the wellbeing of all the individuals in a family. For an extended assessment of subjective wellbeing of family members, the indicator **satisfaction with family life** could be used. This indicator is reported in EurLIFE,⁶ a database on the quality of life in Europe. It offers data from the European Foundation's own surveys and from other published sources. The indicator on satisfaction with family life measures how content each family member is with his or her family life.

4.2. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

In Tables 4.1.1 to 4.1.5, we present an overview of available indicators for the five context/outcome categories discussed above: demography, parental labour market position, gender equality, child outcomes and values, preferences, and life satisfaction.

In general, information is available for all countries but it differs from indicator to indicator. Hence, we discuss OECD and EU averages of the individual indicators referring to averages computed on the basis of different sample sizes.

Indicators depicting the demographic situation are presented in Table 4.1.1. In regard to average life span, **life expectancy at birth** for men and women in total is slightly higher on average among the OECD countries, at 78.2 years, than in the EU-27, at 77.1 years. Among the countries in the study, the lowest average life expectancy is found in Greece, with 69.5 years, and highest in Japan, at 82.1 years. The OECD countries listed are widely distributed across the three SD-groups (SD stands for Standard Deviation), with no particular regional clustering. The countries above the high SD, at 79.2, include the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Korea, whereas the middle SD contains mainly Scandinavian and eastern European countries. The low SD, at 72 years, includes most of southern Europe together with various countries from other parts of Europe.

⁶ http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/index.php

The total **fertility rate** in the OECD countries is 1.64 children per woman overall and 1.51 in the EU-27. The only two countries above the fertility replacement level, at 2.1, are Turkey at 2.19 and Mexico at 2.2 children per women. Asia, most of the East European countries, and the southern European countries place below the low SD at 1.43. The western European countries are spread across all three SD groups, with Germany, for example, at 1.32 below the low SD and France in the high SD at 1.74. The northern European countries are all to be found above the high SD, together with Australia, New Zealand, the US, and the UK.

The percentage of **births outside marriage** as a share of all births varies significantly, with Korea having the lowest percentage (1.3%) and Iceland the highest (65.6%). All southern European countries placed below the EU-27 average of 34.4%, whereas all northern European countries placed above, except Ireland at 33.2% and Lithuania at 29.6%. The average among the OECD countries is 33%

The **teenage birthrate** has an OECD average of 14.4 per 1,000 births. Countries with low teenage birth rates are the Asian countries, Italy, and the western European countries. The high SD group includes New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the three deviating countries Turkey, with 41.4, and the US, with 50.3.

Average household size varies, with the lowest found in Latvia (one person on average) and the highest in Turkey (4.1 persons on average). Across the EU-27 countries, average household size is 2.5 persons per household and slightly higher among OECD countries, at 2.6.

The OECD average for **households with no children** as a percentage of all households is 64.5% and the EU-27 average is 64.6%. In the high SD at 69% are mainly western and northern European countries. In the low SD, which is defined at 60%, we find southern and eastern European countries, including Ireland, which is isolated at 45%. A number of countries do not, however, have data for this indicator.

The mean age for women at first birth has an OECD average of 27.8 years and an EU-27 average of 27.4 years. In the low SD group, at 26.4 years, we find mainly eastern European countries, the Baltic countries plus the US, Ireland, and Iceland. The Netherlands has the lowest mean age at 21.3 years. The western and northern European countries place in the middle and high SD group, which ranges from 27 to 28 years. In these two SD groups, we also find Asia and New Zealand, the latter having the highest mean age at 30.7 years.

The OECD average for **lone-parent households as a proportion of all households with children** is 15.4% and is somewhat lower for the EU-27, at 12.1%. In the low SD group, at 11% of all households, we find all of the southern European countries for which data is available, and the lowest proportion is found in Greece at 5%. The US, Australia, New Zealand , and the United Kingdom are represented in the high SD group.

Indicators depicting **parental labour market and income positions** are presented in Table 4.1.2. **Employment rates of women** with children aged 0-16 are on average 61.6% among the OECD countries. The average labour market participation of mothers is slightly lower among the EU-27 (59.5%). For new EU members, information is only available for Slovakia (48.4%) and the Czech Republic (52.8%).

Part-time and full-time employment rates are stated for men and women separately. Most men work full-time, and the averages of the OECD and EU-27 countries are nearly the same. Among the OECD countries, 96.2% of males are employed full-time (in the EU 96.4%), whereas only 7.2% of men are employed part-time in the OECD Member States (6.3% for the EU-27). The employment rates for women differ, as the full-time employment rate on average is above 60% in both country groupings. Female full-time employment averages 77.1% in the OECD countries, and is slightly higher in the European countries (78.1%). Part-time employment rates of women are, on average, three times higher than

for male employees. In Europe, 24.1% of women are employed part-time, whereas among OECD countries female employment averages 25.6%. Yet, not in all countries is male part-time employment below 10%. The Netherlands report 16.2% of total male employment as part-time work, and in Norway (11.2%) and Australia (12.4%) also large percentage of men are working part-time.

Concerning statutory working hours, the following can be stated. The **maximum working time** per week amounts to 44.4 hours in the OECD countries and to 44.1 hours per week among the European countries. This indicates that working time is regulated similarly among all countries covered in the tables. With respect to working time assessments, **collectively agreed working time** is considered in our table given the wide-spread use of collective bargaining in Europe. The collectively agreed number of working hours per week is the same for both country groupings. In Europe an average working week is 38.2 hours, and in the OECD countries it is 38.3 hours.

Statutory rights relate only to the maximum number of working hours per week, but do not account for how many hours employees actually do work—or would like to work. Therefore, we also state differences between preferred and actual hours by gender. This sample, however, is only available for the EU-15 and hence, the OECD average could only be computed for its European members. Thus, we discuss only European averages for the indicators of **actual and preferred time allocations**. The average current number of working hours for men with children is 42.5 hours per week, which indicates that a majority of men work full-time. The average current number of working hours for women with children is 32.5 hours a week. Men's preferred number of hours would reduce their working time more than women's preferred number of hours. Men prefer a working time of 38.3 hours per week on average, whereas women prefer 29.3 hours per week. Table 4.1.2 also reports **poverty rates for households with children** for all countries, as parental income is one indicator of child wellbeing. Family poverty rates are available for all OECD Member States, and only eight countries are not included in our sample. The OECD average is 10.6%, indicating that 11% of all households with children and a working household head face poverty. For the European countries, family poverty is slightly below the OECD average at 9.9%. In Mexico and Poland, the family poverty rate is 19%. In Turkey it is as high as 20%.

Indicators that permit assessment of gender equality among the countries are stated in Table 4.1.3. Here, we report two indicators of a gender wage gap. The European source only reports data on the EU-24. We therefore discuss the OECD average reported by the OECD database and the EU average taken from the European source. On average, the gender wage gap in the OECD countries amounts to 18.8%. For Europe, the gender wage gap averages 14.5%.7 For the OECD countries, the gender wage gap indicates a high gender inequity in Japan (33%) and Korea (38%), whereas in Europe, Germany (22%) and Slovakia (22%) are more discriminatory in terms of gender payment than other EU Member States such as Belgium (7%). Another indicator referring to gender equality is the gender gap of employment. It indicates percentage point differences between male and female employment rates for people of the same age group. The OECD countries' gender gap of employment averages 18.6%, whereas in Europe it adds up to 16.8%. Here, southern Mediterranean countries such as Greece (32%) and Turkey (51%) stand out.

In Table 4.1.4 we depict different indicators related to child outcomes. In addition to family poverty, we also report **child poverty**. On average, child poverty is higher than family poverty in all countries. In the OECD countries, child poverty averages 12.4%, whereas in Europe the average is 11.4%. And in many countries, child poverty is even worse: the highest

⁷ Please note that the difference might be caused by different sample sizes and sources.

rates are found in Mexico (22.2%) and Poland (21.5%). Yet, among the developed western countries, US child poverty rates are extremely high, with 20.6% of all children living in households below the poverty line.

Furthermore, Table 4.1.4 reports a number of health indicators that can be used to assess child outcomes. Particularly for young children, health measures are important as they indicate whether children have good chances of healthy development. The **infant mortality rate** is the number of deaths during the first year of a child's life expressed per 1,000 live births. On average, 5.5 deaths per 1,000 live births occur in the OECD countries, whereas in Europe the average amounts to 4.3 deaths. Infant mortality rates are the highest in Turkey (23.6 deaths) and Mexico (18.8 deaths), but in the US infant mortality rates are also relatively high at 6.8 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Low birth weight is also reported as a health indicator in Table 4.1.4. Among the OECD and European countries, 6.5% of newborns weigh less than 2500 grams. Low birth weight rates range up to a high of 8.1% in the US or 7.8% in Belgium.

Finally, child outcomes can also be assessed by educational indicators. For this purpose, we discuss **the percentage of young people not in educa-tion** by gender as well as the **PISA scores** for each country. Only 6.9% of young males are not in education in the OECD countries, and about 6.3% in Europe. For young females, the average among the OECD members is higher than for males given the high percentage of women not enrolled in education in countries such as Turkey (47.1%). The average percentage of young females not participating in the educational system is 8.5% in the OECD countries and about 6.3% in Europe. PISA scores range from 410 (Mexico) to 527 (Finland). The averages between OECD and European countries are quite close. PISA scores average 499 points for the OECD states and an average of 497 points among the EU Member States.

The indicators reported in Table 4.1.5 enable countries to assess values, preferences, and life satisfaction.

In regard to the **childbearing preferences** of childless women between the ages of 15 and 39, on average 12.3% of these women in the OECD countries and 9.6% in the EU-27 countries state that they have no desire to have children. The proportion is lowest in Iceland, where virtually all childless women express a desire to have children at some point in their lives, and highest in Finland, where 21% of childless women have no desire to have children.

Among all women—both with and without children—there exists a discrepancy between the desired number of children and the actual number of children that these women give birth to when they are of childbearing age (15-55). The highest difference is found in Cyprus, where women generally want to have 1.1 more children than they actually have during their fertile years, and lowest in in Malta at 0.36 and Turkey at 0.37. Thus, in the latter countries, women are closer to achieving their desired number of children. Among the OECD and EU-27 countries, there is an average discrepancy of 0.65.

Finally, women aged 25-55+ who had not fulfilled the childbearing desires they had had at the age of 20 were asked about the reasons for this. Across the OECD and EU-7 countries, 6.3% and 7.9%, respectively, cited financial problems within the couple, while a similar proportion (5.7% average across the OECD countries and 6% across the EU-27 countries) cited problems combining work and family life. It seems that women, especially in Greece (28%), find it difficult for financial reasons to fulfil their childbearing desires, while this is less the case in countries such as Denmark, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland (all 1%), and Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium (all 2%). Among the countries with the highest proportion of women who mention difficulties combining work and family life as a reason for not fulfilling childbearing desires, we find countries such as Bulgaria (13%), Slovakia, Belgium, Greece and Austria (all 11%).

Subjective wellbeing can be assessed by looking at the **mean of life satisfaction**. Life satisfaction is evaluated by means of a scale ranging from 1 "very dissatisfied" to 10 "very satisfied". The reported mean per country depicts the average answer on this scale. We report two different sources of life satisfaction data. The European source provides an average among the EU-27 Member States of 6.9. This indicates that on average, people usually evaluate their personal life satisfaction as 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. The missing OECD countries that are not members of the EU show a slightly higher average value on this satisfaction scale, with 7.5. In addition to life satisfaction, European countries can also consider the **satisfaction with family life**. Here, the European average is 7.8.

Table 4.1.1, Demography

						mean age for													
	Life expe	ctancy at	Fastility	2,3	Disth as	3,4	Teenenehin	4h 5,6	women at	birth of	Disting and of a			a a b a l d a ⁶	Average h	ousehold	a Households with		
	bir	in	Fertility ra	ate	Birth ra	te	l eenage bir	th rate	first cr	niid	Births out of V	VEGIOCK	Sole parent nou	senoids	SIZ	e	child	ren	
	-ife expectancy at birt 2008)	SD group	Total Fertility Rate, Vumber of children bo 1 to women aged 15 to 49 (2006)	SD group	Crude Birth Rate, Number of live births ber 1000 population (2006)	SD group	Teenage Birth Rate 2005)	SD group	Mean age for women at birth of first child (2005)	SD group	3irhts out of Wedlock, Live births outside marriage - Share of all ive births (%) (2006)	SD group	Sole-parent householc as proportion of all nouseholds with Shildren (2005)	SD group	Average household size (mid 2000s)	SD group	Households with no children (%) (2005)	SD group	
Australia	81,5	2	1,81ª	2	12,9	0	14,9	0	28,0	0	32.2 ^b	0	22	2	2,5	0	66	0	
Austria	79,4	≥	1,40	≤	9,4	≤	12,8	0	27,2	0	37,2	0	12	0	2,3	≤	70	≥	
Belgium	79,1	0	1,72 ^a	0	11,5	0	8,1 ^b	≤	27,4	0	39,0	0	18	0			66	0	
Bulgaria			1,37	≤	9,6	≤	38,5	≥	24,7	≤	50,8	≥			2,5	0			
Canada	81,2	2	1,53 ª	0	10,5 ª	0	13,8 "	0	28,0	0	5.0		25	≥	2,5	0	55	≤	
Cyprus	78,2	0	1,47	0	11,3	0	6,5	< _	27,5	0	5,6	< 0	10	0	3,0	2	64	0	
Denmark	78.1	0	1,33	>	12.0	0	10,9	<	20,0	>	46.4	>	15	0	2,4	<	74	>	
Estonia	72,6	5	1,55	0	11,1	Ő	21,4	2	25,2	5	58,2	2	10	Ŭ	2,3	≤	14	_	
Finland	78,8	Ō	1,84	2	11,2	0	10,3		27,9	Ō	40,6	ō	10	≤	2,2	≤	76	≥	
France	80,9	≥	2,00	≥	13,0	0	11,7	0	28,5	≥	50,5	≥	14	0	2,3	≤	66	0	
Germany	79,1	0	1,32	≤	8,2	< _	10,6	0	29,1	≥	30,0	0	16	0	2,1	≤	75	2	
Greece	69,5	≤	1,39	< 1	10,0	0	10,4	≤	28,5	2	5,3	Sector 10 and	5	≤	2,8	2	68 64	0	
Iceland	80.6	>	2.08	>	14.5	>	14.2	0	26,7	<	65.6	>	27	>	2,0	0	60	<	
Ireland	78,1	Ō	1,90	2	15,1	2	16,8	ŏ	28,5	2	33,2	Ō	22	2	2,9	≥	45		
Italy	80,1	≥	1,32 ^a	≤	9,6	≤	6,4	5	28,7	≥	18,6	<	6	≤	2,6	0	68	0	
Japan	82,1	≥	1,26 ^a	< 1	8,5	≤	5,7 ^b	≤	29,1	≥	2,0 ^b	5			2,6	0			
Korea	72,2	≤	1,08 ^a	≤	9,4	≤	3,5 ^b	≤	29,1	\geq	1,3 ^b	≤			3,0	≥			
Latvia	71,9	≤	1,35	≤	9,7	≤	20,9	0	25,0	≤	43,4	≥			1,0	≤			
Lithuania	74,7	≤	1,31	5	9,2	≤	18,7	0	24,9	\leq	29,6	0			2,4	0			
Luxembourg	79,3	2	1,65	0	12,0	0	12,0	0	29,0	≥	28,8	0	9	≤	2,1	≤	64	0	
Maita	79,3	2	1,41	5	9,6	5	21,8	2	21.2		22,3	5			4.0				
Netherlands	79.3	>	2,2	2	20,0	2	5.8	<	21,3	2	37.1	0	13	0	23	~	69	>	
New Zealand	80.2	~ >	2 00 ^a	>	14.3	>	24.4 ^b	2	30.7	~ >	44.8 b	>	28	>	2,5	0	65	-	
Norway	79.8	2	1,90	2	12.6	0	8.0		27.7	ō	53,1	2	17	0	2.3	5	70	2	
Poland	75,4		1,27	_ 	9,8	5	13,5	ō	25,8	5	18,9		9	≤	2,8	2	53	<u>_</u>	
Portugal	78,0	0	1,35	≤	10,0	0	18,7	0	27,4	0	31,6	0	7	≤	2,8	≥	58	≤	
Romania	72,2	≤	1,31	≤	10,2	0	33,9	≥	24,8	\leq	29,0	0			2,8	≥			
Slovakia	75,2	< _	1,24	≤	10,0	0	20,2	0	25,7	≤	27,5	0	6	≤	3,0	2	54	≦	
Slovenia	76,7	0	1,31	<	9,4	≦ 0	6,1	 	20.3	>	47,2	2	6	1	2,8	2	61	0	
Sweden	80.7	>	1,85	>	11.7	0	5.9	<	28,7	>	55.5	>	0		2,5	0	01	0	
Switzerland	80,7	2	1,43	5	9,8	5	5,1	5	29,5	2	15,4	<			2,2	≤			
Turkey	73,1	≤	2,19 ^a	2	18,7	≥	41,4 ^b	≥							4,1	≥			
United Kingdom	78,9	0	1,84	\geq	12,4	0	25,9	≥	29,8	\geq	43,7	2	24	\geq	2,3	≤	68	0	
United States	78,1	0	2,05 ^a	\geq	13,9	\geq	50,3 ^b	\geq	25,1	\leq	35,7 ^b	0	33	\geq	2,6	0	68	0	
OECD	78,2		1,64		12,01		14,4		27,8		33,0		15,4		2,6		64,5		
EU-27	77,1		1,51		10,68		15,0		27,4		34,3		12,1		2,5		64,6		
SD Mean ≤ O ≥	3,2 77,6 76,0 76,1-79,1 79,2		0,31 1,59 1,43 1,44-1,73 1,74		3,29 11,59 9,9 10,0-13,1 13,2		10,9 15,8 10,4 10,5-21,2 21,3		1,944 27,396 26,4 26,5-28,3 28,4		15,8 33,6 25,7 25,8-41,4 41,5		8,0 15,4 11,4 11,5-19,3 19,4		0,5 2,6 2,3 2,4-2,7 2,8		7,4 64,5 60,8 60,9-68,1 68,2		
-½ SD	-1,62		-0,15		-1,64		-5,43		-0,97		-7,92		-3,99		-0,26		-3,70		

+½ SD 1,62 Notes: a= 2005, b= 2004, c= 2007, d= 2003, e=2001

1) Source: CIA world fact book 2008

2) Source: 'Eurostat, Statistical Office of the European Communities', 2007 3) Source: OECD Factbook 2008: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - ISBN 92-64-04054-4 - © OECD 2008

4) Source: OECD Health Data 2008 Version: June 2008

5) Source: OECD Family Database SF6

Source: OECD Family Database SF5
 Source: OECD Family Database SF5
 Source: OECD Family Database SF5

	LM	F2	Part-time employment			Full-time employment				Working time (hours per week)*				Average current and preferred working times by gender (hours per week)								C08		
			Pro	portion of to	tal employmen	ıt	Pro	oportion of t	otal employmer	nt					Men				Women					
	Maternal employment rates with children aged 0 to 16 ¹	SD Group	Men	SD Group	Women	SD Group	Men	SD Group	Women	SD Group	Statutory maximum	SD Group	Collectively agreed (average)	SD Group	Current hrs with children in household	SD Group	Preferred hrs with children in household	SD Group	Current hrs with children in household	SD Group	Preferred hrs with children in household	SD Group	Poverty in households with children ⁶	SD group
Australia	63.1	0	12.4	>	38.5	>	94.0	<	64.5	<	48.0	>											10	0
Austria	64.7	0	5.2	<	31.5	0	96.2	0	67.2	<	40.0	<	38.8	0	45.7	>	39.9	>	32.2	0	29.3	0	6	<
Belgium Bulgaria	59.9	0	6.3	0	32.9	>	94.7	<	66.2	<	38.0	<	38	0	40.7	<	35.9	<	32.9	0	29.8	0	9	0
Canada	70.5	>	11	>	26.1	0	95.3	<	80.6	0	48.0	>											13	0
Cyprus	50.0		47		5.0		00.0		05.7		10.0			0									0	_
Czech Republic	52.8	<	1.7	<	5.9	<	99.3	>	95.7	>	40.0	<	38	0	40.6		25.1		25.9		20.5	0	8	<
Estonia	70.5	,	12.4	,	23.9	0	95.4	~	03.7	0	40.0	,	37	~	40.0	~	33.1	, ,	33.6	,	29.0	0	2	,
Finland	76.0	>	82	0	15.5	~	95.8	0	90.7	>	40.0	~	37.5	~	42.3	0	36.4	0	37.8	>	33	>	4	
France	59.9	Ó	5	<	23.1	Ó	95.8	Ő	78.9	Ó	48.0	>	35	<	40.8	<	36.1	<	34	Ó	31.1	>	7	<
Germany	54.9	<	7.9	0	39.2	>	94.4	<	60.1	<	48.0	>	37.7	0	43.4	0	37.4	0	28.9	<	27.8	0	13	0
Greece	50.9	<	4.1	<	13.6	<	96.5	0	87.6	>	48.0	>	40	>									12	0
Hungary	45.7	<	1.6	<	4.2	<	99.1	>	96.4	>	48.0	>	40	>									8	<
Iceland	84.8	>	8	0	25.4	0	96.7	0	79.9	0													7	<
Ireland	57.5	0	7.6	0	35.6	>	95.2	<	66.7	<	48.0	>	39	>	42.7	0	37.1	0	31.6	0	26	<	14	>
Italy	48.1	<	5.4	<	29.9	0	95.8	0	70.6	0	48.0	>	38	0	39.9	<	36.9	0	34.2	0	29.6	0	14	>
Japan	52.5	<	9.2	>	32.6	>	96.6	0	71.3	0	44.0	0	39.4	>									12	0
Korea			6.3	0	12.5	<	95.9	0	89.8	>	44.0	0											9	0
Latvia																								-
Luxembourg	55.4	<	16	~	28.8	0	98.5	>	72 1	0	48.0	>	39	>									11	0
Malta	00.1		110		20.0		00.0	ŕ			10.0	,	00	ŕ										, in the second se
Mexico																							19	>
Netherlands	69.2	>	16.2	>	60	>	94.1	<	43.6	<	48.0	>	37	<	43.2	0	37.6	>	21.2	<	21.3	<	9	0
New Zealand	64.6	0	11.2	>	34.7	>	95.1	<	69.6	<													13	0
Norway			10.5	>	31.6	0	94.9	<	74.2	0	40.0	<	37.5	<	41.9	0	34.9	<	32.4	0	28.5	0	4	<
Poland	46.4	<	6	0	15	<	96.0	0	85.9	>	40.0	<	40	>									19	>
Portugal	67.8	>	6.3	0	14.3	<	97.9	>	91.6	>	40.0	<	38.3	0					35.8	>	33.4	>	14	>
Romania	40.4		4.0		1.4		00.0		0.00		40.0		20.0	0									10	0
Slovakia	40.4	<	1.2	<	4.4	<	99.0	>	90.9	>	40.0	<	30.0	0									10	0
Spain	52.0	1	3.8	1	20.9	0	97.2	~	79.8	0	40.0	1	38.5	0	40.8	1	36.2	0	34.4	~	33.1	~	15	~
Sweden	82.5	>	9.5	>	19.7	õ	95.0	ź	85.9	>	40.0	~	38.8	0	42.9	ò	36.2	0	35	>	31.5	>	4	<
Switzerland	69.7	>	8.7	0	45.6	>	94.5	<	52.6	<	47.5	>				-		-					6	<
Turkey			4.6	<	19.2	0	96.7	0	82.6	0													20	>
United Kingdom	61.7	0	9.9	>	38.6	>	95.4	<	64.6	<	48.0	>	37.2	<	46.9	>	38.3	>	28.3	<	25.8	<	9	0
United States	66.7	0	7.6	0	17.9	<	97.4	>	87.7	>													18	>
OECD	61.6		7.2		25.6		96.2		77.1		44.4		38.3		42.4		36.8		32.5		29.3		10.63	
EU-27	59.5		6.3		24.1		96.4		78.1		44.1		38.2		42.5		36.9		32.5		29.3		9.89	
SD	11.0		3.6		12.8		1.5		13.3		3.9		1.1		1.9		1.2		3.9		3.1		4.76	
Mean	61.6		7.2		25.6		96.2		70.5		44.4		38.3		42.4		36.8		32.5		29.3		10.63	
< 0	50.1		5.4		19.1		95.4		70.5		42.4		31.1		41.5		36.2		30.5		27.7		8.25	
Š	67.1		5.4-9.0 9.0		32.0		95.4-96.9		(U.S-63.6 83.8		42.4-40.3		38.8		41.5-43.4		30.2-37.4		30.5-34.4		21.1-30.8		0.20-13.01	
Ń	26		29.0		29.0		29.0		29.0		26		23		15		15		16		16		30	
	20		20.0		20.0		20.0		20.0		20		20		10		10							
1/2 SD	5.48		1.8		6.4		0.7		6.7		1.95		0.57		0.95		0.62		1.93		1.55		2.38	
- 1/2 30	-0.40		-1.0		-0.4		-0.7		-0.7		-1.90		-0.57		-0.90		-0.02		-1.93		-1.00		-2.30	

Table 4.1.2 Parental labour market and income position

1) Data 2005, Source: OECD Family Database
2) Data 2007, Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2008, Statistical Annex Table E
3) Data 2006, Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Online Database; Note: Age of men and women 25 to 54 (Mexico missing in source).
4) Data 2005, Source: OECD Babies and Bosses, Chapter 7, Table 7.

5) Data 1998, Source: EFILWC Working time preferences in sixteen European countries, Table 25, page 61

6) Data mid 2000s, Source: OECD Family Database

		Gender	Gender gap of employment					
	iender wage ap in ercetntage ¹	D Group	iender wage ap in ercentages²	D Group	iender gap of mployment ercentage ³	D Group		
Australia	17	<u> </u>	050	0		<u> </u>		
Austria	17	0	20		20	0		
Rolaium	22	0	20	>	17	0		
Bulgaria			14	Ò	17	0		
Canada	21	0	14	0	11	1		
Cyprus	21	Ŭ	24	>				
Czech Republic	18	0	18	>	19	0		
Denmark	11	<	17	0	9	<		
Estonia				-	-			
Finland	19	0	20	>	5	<		
France	12	<			13	0		
Germany	23	>	22	>	13	0		
Greece			10	<	32	>		
Hungary			11	<	15	0		
Iceland					8	<		
Ireland	14	<	9	<	23	0		
Italy					28	>		
Japan	33	>			29	>		
Korea	38	>			30	>		
Latvia			16	0				
Lithuania			16	0				
Luxembourg			14	0	26	>		
Malta			3	<	40			
Nexico	17	0			46	>		
Neurenanus Neur Zeolond	17	0			17	0		
New Zealanu	10	<	16	0	7	0		
Poland	10	-	10	0	13	ò		
Portugal	10	-	8	-	14	0		
Romania			10	-	17	Ŭ		
Slovakia			22	>	17	0		
Slovenia			8	<		-		
Spain			13	0	29	>		
Sweden	15	<	16	0	4	<		
Switzerland	19	0	19	>	8	<		
Turkey					51	>		
United Kingdom	21	0	21	>	10	<		
United States	19	0			12	<		
OECD	18.8		15.5		18.6			
EU-27	16.5		14.5		16.8			
SD	7.3		5.6		11.2			
Mean	18.8		14.8		18.6			
<	15.2		12.0		13.0			
0	15.2-22.5		12.0-17.5		13.0-24.2			
>	22.5		17.5		24.2			
Ν	18		24		30.0			
1/2 SD	3.67		2.78		5.62			
-1/2 SD	-3.67		-2.78		-5.62			

Table 4.1.3 Gender equality

1) Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2008
 2) Source: Eurostat Tables Labour market
 3) Source:OECD Family Database.

Table 4.1.4 Child or	utcomes												
	CO	81	CO1	1	CO2a	a ¹		C	Education ²				
	Child poverty: percentages	SD Group	Infant mortality: Per 1000 live births	SD group	Lowbirth weight: percentages of newboms weighing less than	chodo Co	Young people not in education Males	SD Group	Young people not in education Females	SD Group	Pisa Scores	SD Group	
Australia	11.8	0	5.0	0	6.4	0	7.6	0	7.4	0	527	>	
Austria	6.2	<	5.0	0	6.8	0	7.2	0	7.5	0	511	0	
Belgium	10.0	0	3.7	0	7.8	>	5.8	0	3.9	<	510	<	
Bulgaria	9.0	<									434	<	
Canada	15.1	>	5.3	0	5.9	0	8.4	0	6.6	0	534	>	
Cyprus	5.0	<		~		~		~				~	
Czech Republic	10.3	0	3.4	0	6.7	0	5.0	0	6.4	0	513	0	
Denmark	2.7	<	4.4	0	4.9	<	0.7	<	2.3	<	496	0	
Estonia	13.0	0	2.0		4.1		E 1	0	E	0	531	>	
Finiand	4.2	~	3.0	ò	4.1	ò	5.1	0	5.5	0	405	<i>^</i>	
Germany	16.3	16.2		0	6.8	0	3.5	0	4.5	0	516	0	
Greece	13.2	Ó	3.8	0	8.8	~	7.6	ò	10.7	ò	473	0	
Hungary	87	5	6.2	0	8.2	~	6.6	0	5.8	õ	504	0	
Iceland	8.3	è	2.3	6	3.9	e e	1.4	~	3.8	~	491	õ	
Ireland	16.3	>	4.0	õ	4.9	<	8.3	õ	8.7	0	508	õ	
Italy	15.5	>	4.7	õ	6.7	0	9.1	õ	10.3	õ	475	õ	
Japan	13.7	0	2.8	<	9.5	>					531	>	
Korea	10.7	0	5.3	0							522	0	
Latvia	19.0	>									490	0	
Lithuania	17.0	>									488	0	
Luxembourg	12.4	0	2.6	2.6 <		<	2.1	<	3.1	<	486	0	
Malta	11.0	0											
Mexico	22.2	>	18.8	>			7.6	0	26.3	>	410	<	
Netherlands	11.5	0	4.9	0	6.2	0	2.5	<	2.2	<	525	>	
New Zealand	15.0	>	5.1	0	6.1	0					530	>	
Norway	4.6	<	3.1	<	4.8	<	4.2	<	2.8	<	487	0	
Poland	21.5	>	6.4	0	6.1	0	3.0	<	2.1	<	498	0	
Portugal	16.6	>	3.5	0	7.5	>	9.7	>	11.0	0	4/4	0	
Romania	10.0	0	7.0	0	7.2		9.6	0	7 1	0	418	<	
Slovakia	6.0	0	1.2	0	1.2	>	0.0	0	7.1	0	510	0	
Spain	17.3	~	11	0	7 1	0	10.0	~	10.8	0	488	0	
Sweden	4.0	-	4.1	0	4.2	6	7.8	ó	4.0	Ő	503	0	
Switzerland	9.4	è	4.2	ò	7.0	ò	7.6	Ő	6.8	Ő	512	ő	
Turkey	24.6	>	23.6	>	1.0	0	24.7	>	47.1	>	424	<	
United Kingdom	10.1	0	5.1	0	7.5	>	10.2	>	10.5	0	515	0	
United States	20.6	>	6.8	Ō	8.1	>	6.5	0	7.3	Ō	489	Ō	
OECD	12.4		5.5		6.5		6.9		8.5		499		
EU-27	11.4		4.3		6.5		6.3		6.3		497		
SD	5.5		4.5		1.4		4.4		9.1		34		
Mean	12.2		5.5		6.5		6.9		8.5		497		
<	9.5		3.2		5.8		4.7		3.9		479		
0	9.5-14.9		3.2-7.7		5.8-7.2		4.7-9.1		3.9-13.0		479-513		
>	14.9		7.7		7.2		9.1		13.0		513		
Ν	37		30		27		27		27		35		
1/2 60	0.74								4.54		10.01		
1/2 50	2.74		2.25		0.72		2.22		4.54		-16.91		
- 1/2 SD	-2.74	-2.74			-0.72		-2.22		-4.54		-16.91		

1) Source: OECD Family Database 2) Source: OECD PISA (2006)

	Childbearing pr	eferences 1	Difference betw	ween actual	Reasons	for not fulfill	ling childbearing c	lesires ¹	Subjective well-being								
	Childbearing preferences for childless women - none (%) (2006)	SD group	Difference between mean actual and ideal number of children (2006)	SD group	Finacial problem with the couple (2006)	SD group	Difficitties in combining work and farrily (2006)	SD group	Life satisfaction mean EU ²	SD Group	Life satisfaction mean World ³	SD Group	Satisfaction with family life ⁴	SD Group			
Australia	29	≥									7.3 [°]	0					
Austria			0.44	≤	4	≤	8	≥	7.8	>			8.2	>			
Belgium	16	≥	0.60	≤	2	≤	11	≥	7.5	>			7.9	0			
Bulgaria	2	≤	0.63	0	12	≥	13	≥	4.4	<			7.1	<			
Canada											7.7 ^ª	0					
Cyprus	3	\leq	1.10	≥	18	≥	6	0	7.2	0			7.9	0			
Czech Republic	5	\leq	0.48	≤	5	≤	5	0	6.5	0			7.5	<			
Denmark	8		1.04	≥	1	≤	2	\leq	8.4	>			8.7	>			
Estonia	5	≤	0.99	≥	13	≥	5	0	5.9	<			7.1	<			
Finland	21	≥	0.92	≥	2	≤	3	≤	8.1	>			8.2	>			
France	11	0	0.62	0	4	≤	10	≥	6.9	0			7.4	<			
Germany	18	≥	0.50	≤	6	0	10	≥	7.2	0			8.1	>			
Greece	4	<	1.13	2	28	2	11	2	6.8	0			8.2	>			
Hungary	8	0	0.64	0	13	2	5	0	5.9	<	9		7.8	0			
Iceland	0	≤		_			_	_			8.1 ^{°°}	>					
Ireland	14	0	0.79	0	1	≤	5	0	7.7	>			8.2	>			
Italy	11	2	0.69	0	3	≤	4	≤	7.2	0	0.5		8.0	0			
Japan											6.5	<					
Korea		_									6.4°	<					
Latvia	14	0	1.05	≥	15	2	2	≤	5.5	<			6.5	<			
Lithuania	3	≤	0.86	2	9	0	3	<	5.4	<			7.0	<			
Luxembourg	20	2	0.70	0	2	≤	5	0	7.7	>			8.4	>			
Maita	/	0	0.36	≤	12	≥	8	2	7.3	0	a a6		8.5	>			
Mexico		~									8.2	>		~			
Netherlands	10	0	0.83	≥	2	≤	4	\leq	7.5	>	2		7.7	0			
New Zealand											7.7ª	0					
Norway											7.9 ^e	>					
Poland	2	\leq	0.64	0	8	0	3	\leq	6.2	<			7.8	0			
Portugal	6	≤	0.47	≤	13	≥	2	≤	6.0	<			7.4	<			
Romania	14	0	0.76	0	11	0	2	≤	6.2	<			8.1	>			
Slovakia	12	0	0.62	0	9	0	11	≥					7.1	<			
Slovenia	5	≤	0.94	≥	8	0	10	2	7.0	0			7.7	0			
Spain	15	2	0.57	<	10	0	5	0	7.5	>			8.2	>			
Sweden	4	5	0.78	0	1	≤	6	0	7.8	>	a a8		8.1	>			
Switzerland						_					8.0°	>					
lurkey	33	2	0.37	<	11	0	1	≤	5.6	<			7.8	0			
United Kingdom	11	0	0.65	0	1	≤	3	≤	7.3	0	- ed		7.9	0			
United States											7.6	0					
OECD	12.3		0.65		6.3		5.7		7.1		7.5		7.9				
EU-27	9.6		0.65		7.9		6.0		6.9				7.8				
SU	8.0		0.22		0.4		3.4		1.0		0.6		0.5				
Mean	10.7		0.72		8.0		5.8		6.8		7.5		0.5				
≦ o	6.7		0.61		4.8		4.1		6.4		7.2		7.8				
Č	0,8-14,0		0,62-0,82		4,9-11,1		4,2-7,4		0.4-7.3		7.2-7.9		7.5				
≤ N	14.7		0.83		11.2		7.5		1.3		7.9		1.0-8.1				
IN .					1				21		10		8.1				
1/ 80	2.00		0.11		2.10		1 70		0.49		0.22		28				
-72 3D ±1/4 SD	3.99		0.11		3.18		1 72		-0.48		-0.32		-0.26				
1/200	0.00		0		00		· · · · -		0.10		0.02		0.20				

Table 4.1.5. Values. Preferences and Satisfaction

Note: a=1998, b=1999, c=2001, d=2006, e=2007

1) Source: Testa, Maria Rita (2006): Childbearing preferences and family issues in europe, Eurobarometer 253/Wavw 65.1 - TNS Opinion & Social

Source: FeldWC. Quality of Life in Europe (2003)
 Source: Veenhoven, R. World Database of Happiness, Distributional Findings in Nations, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
 Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EurLife database (2003)

CHAPTER 5

LEAVE SCHEMES (MATERNITY, PATERNITY, AND PARENTAL LEAVE)

5.1. SELECTION OF INDICATORS

For a family with a newborn or newly adopted child, some of the most important family policies are those that offer the possibility to take time off work to care for the child. This chapter will present the main indicators to consider when assessing leave schemes for families with newborns or young children. These are grouped under the theme of time and money available for parents to care for their child, the social investment in leave schemes in terms of expenditure, the actual use of parental leave, and finally, issues relating to gender equality (See Box 5.1.1)

Box 5.1.1 Indicators for core assessment: leave schemes

- Social expenditure on leave payments as a percentage of GDP
- Social expenditure on leave payments per child born as a percentage of GDP
- Length of maternity, paternity, and parental leave in weeks
- Effective leave (time and money available for childcare)
- Compensation as a percentage of earnings
- Proportion of employed parents with a child under the age of one on leave
- Gender equality

The provision of leave is intended to protect the mother before birth and allow her to recover fully (physically and mentally) immediately following birth, and is also provided in recognition of the child's needs to be nurtured and to establish a close relationship with both parents. Some studies from the US suggest that full-time maternal employment during the first year of a child's life may affect the child negatively in terms of its development (e.g., Waldfogel et al. 2002), for example, due to negative effects on breastfeeding and the child's general health conditions (Berger et al. 2005). Leave policies also recognise the father's needs to bond with the child, and support the equal division of childcare between men and women from a gender equality point of view.

Existing leave schemes cover a period of time in which parents can take off work, and in most countries also include cash benefits as compensation for lost wages. The leave schemes included here are:

<u>Maternity leave</u> is a period of job-protected leave for the employed woman, generally to be taken during the last weeks prior to birth and the weeks following birth (or adoption in some countries). It is intended to offer the mother and the unborn child rest before birth, and to allow the mother to recover and spend time with the newborn after birth. Only in special circumstances such as serious illness of the mother or the mother's death may the right to maternity leave be transferred to the father. Most countries provide financial support to mothers on maternity leave.

<u>Paternity leave</u> is job-protected leave provided to the employed father, normally to be taken near the time of childbirth in order for him to spend time with his newborn and offer support to the mother and other children in the home.

<u>Parental leave</u> is job-protected term leave provided to enable parents to care for their child, normally during the first years of childhood. The right to take leave is individual and available to the mother and the father, who decide which one will make use of the leave. Sometimes, a certain period is set aside for the parent who is not on leave as an individual, non-transferable right—the so-called "father quotas" often introduced to en-

courage fathers to take leave. Entitlement to public income support during leave is often family-based, giving one parent at a time entitlement to claim the benefit.

SOCIAL EXPENDITURE

As a first indicator for parental leave for an assessment of family policy, we suggest **social expenditure on leave schemes as a percentage of GDP**. This provides an overview of the public social investments made into leave schemes. In combination with the indicator on social expenditure for day-care and educational services for children as a percentage of GDP presented in Chapter 5.2, it may indicate whether countries emphasize day-care/educational services for children or leave benefits. A more sophisticated indicator is, however, the indicator **social expenditure for maternity and parental leave payments per child born, as a percentage of GDP**. This indicator combines the expenditure on leave schemes with the actual number of children being born, and thus takes into account crossnational differences in birth rates.

LENGTH OF LEAVE

Another important indicator when assessing leave policies is the number of weeks available to the parents. This is reported in this chapter as the numbers of weeks of maternity, paternity, and parental leave available in each country. Lengths of leave vary between countries and have varied over the years according to cultural norms about good parenthood and childhood. Maternity is defined by the ILO as at least 14 weeks, some of which may be stipulated to be taken before birth. Not all countries provide paternity leave, and of those that do, two weeks is the most common. In the table on indicators, a special period of time set aside for the father, the so-called "father quota," is, however, included under paternity leave although it is actually part of parental leave (and the amount may thus differ substantially from the amount of paternity leave payments). Some countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic have for a number of years provided relatively long parental leave up to the child's third year, for example, while as others such as Denmark have provided relatively short leave up to one year because of the imperative that women return quickly to the labour market.

With the introduction of new parental leave schemes and the increased number of weeks now available, a frequently debated issue is how leave take-up affects women's careers, especially since women use the majority of weeks available. Opponents to long leave schemes argue that this has an adverse effect on women's careers and lifetime earnings. Here, some of the gender wage gap is attributed to women's more frequent use of parental leave (Pylkänen & Smith 2003), and it is argued that employers may be more reluctant to hire women in some sectors because of generous leave schemes (Fagnani 1999). The (unresolved) question is what the turnaround point is where the length of leave shifts from strengthening women's labour market positions to weakening them, that is, when a leave period actually becomes too long. Swedish studies, for example, suggest that 12 months of parental leave seem to have no negative effect on women's wages (Albrecht et al. 1999).

Some studies have claimed that long parental leave can disadvantage the child as well. The availability of long leave periods has been argued, for example, to further disadvantage children who were born into dysfunctional families or to second-language parents, as these children are considered to benefit more in terms of socio-emotional development or language skills from participating in daycare programs (Bennett 2008).

PAYMENT DURING LEAVE

The leave schemes provided may just provide a period away from the labour market, or they may include payments to compensate for the loss of income during the leave period. A paid leave scheme would be more attractive to parents, and the provision of a relatively high compensation rate would ensure that more fathers make use of the scheme since their earnings often make an important contribution to the family budget. It is worth noting that local authorities may provide supplements to the statutory leave benefit that make the leave scheme even more attractive.

In some cases, the entitlement to leave and to a benefit may be separate, as is the case in the Finnish child care leave scheme and the benefit scheme, and full take-up of these forms of leave therefore depends on approval from the employer. Take-up rates will invariably reflect whether a benefit is pais or unpaid, and any comparison of schemes must take these factors into account. Here, we suggest using the **compensation rate** as given for an Average Production Worker (APW) working full-time.

To understand the interplay between leave length and compensation rate, a calculation of **"effective leave"** is provided, taking into account that the entitlement to several weeks of leave is most useful if accompanied by a sufficiently large benefit. The effective leave is computed by weighting the duration of the length of parental leave by the level of payment, that is, weeks are multiplied by the % payment benefit in FTE (full-time equivalent) payments (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Plantenga & Siegel 2004; Moss & Wall 2007). Countries may thus provide a generous period of leave, but if it is not accompanied by a good compensation rate, the indicator will accordingly be of low numerical value. Thus, 40 weeks with a wage replacement of 100% has a coefficient of 40; at a wage replacement of 50%, a coefficient of 20.

USE OF LEAVE

Any national assessment of leave take-up should take two key issues into account: whether parents are eligible to take leave, and how many eligible parents actually do take leave. Data on eligibility are, however, rarely comparable, as they depend on national surveys with variation in question wording (OECD 2008). Take-up rates can therefore not be calculated, and the comparable data can only report use of leave. Using data from the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS), we provide an indicator of paternal and maternal leave take-up. The indicator covers the **proportion of employed parents with a child under the age of one on leave**. An approach to fine-tuning this indicator has been suggested by Brunning and Plantenga (1999), who advocate calculating user rates instead, which is the average number of parents with children on leave divided by the average number of working parents with children.

GENDER ISSUES

Finally, we suggest using a weighted **gender equality index indicator**, which summarises how national leave policies have incorporated issues of gender equality. The indicator consists of a fifteen-point scale, with nine possible points for the portion of leave available to fathers or provided exclusively to fathers, five possible points for the level of wage replacement

during leave, and one possible point (positive or negative) for incentives for fathers to either take their permitted leave or transfer it to the mother (Ray et al. 2008). Scoring high on this indicator is an expression of full equality of workplace and caregiving benefits to men and women. The value of the total index indicator is given in the table, as are disaggregated indicator values.

5.2. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

In Table 5.2 the values for the various indicators are reported. In regard to **public expenditure on maternity leave**, on average countries spend 0.3% of GDP for leave payments, with the highest proportion being spent in Hungary (0.8%). If expenditures on leave schemes are calculated as **expenditure per child as a percentage of GDP**, the EU-27 countries spend on average 31% and the OECD countries 27.4%. Hungary spends the highest proportion (83%) and Korea the lowest (0.1%).

In regard to **leave length**, maternity leave is longest in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (28 weeks) and the shortest in Norway (9 weeks). On average, mothers in the EU countries have 19.1 weeks available and in the OECD countries 17 weeks. Of the countries that provide paternity leave, the longest leave is available in Iceland (13 weeks), as this includes the fathers' quotas in the parental leave, and the shortest in Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, which each award less than one week. On average, fathers in the EU countries have 1.9 weeks of paternity leave available and in the OECD countries 2.8 weeks, taking into account fathers' quotas. Parental periods vary from 12 weeks (Belgium and Italy) to 156 weeks (Poland and Slovakia), with an EU average of 82.4 weeks and an OECD average of 69.4 weeks.

In regard to the **effective leave**, which takes into account both the length and the compensation paid, the most generous system is found in Norway, where relatively long periods of leave are accompanied by a high compensation rate (100%) and the least generous in Australia, where the only leave available—parental leave—is unpaid. On average, the effective leave is reported to be 45.5 in EU and 37.1 in the OECD countries; that is, slightly more generous leave schemes are found in the EU.

A number of countries provide 100% of an Average Production Worker's (APW) salary in **compensation** during maternity leave. The lowest compensation rate reported is in the UK (46.2%). Most countries also provide 100% of an APW's salary in compensation during paternity leave. Exceptions are the UK, where compensation rates are as low as 25%. On average, compensation rates for paternity leave are 93.9% in the EU and 92.3% in the OECD countries. Compensation rates during parental leave are lower than during maternity or paternity leave. The highest compensation rate is provided in Norway (100%) and the lowest in Germany (11%). Across the EU countries, the average compensation rate during parental leave is 39.9%, and across the OECD countries 45.3%.

In relation to **gender equality**, Sweden scores highest (12 points), indicating that gender equality is highest there, when paternity leave, paternity compensation, and policy incentives to encourage paternal caregiving are taken together, and lowest in Switzerland. The EU countries reported under the gender equality index score on average 9.6 in comparison to the OECD countries, with the score 8.4.

Use of leave by mothers is highest in Slovenia, where 87.2% of women with children under the age of one were reported to be on leave, and lowest in the UK, with 0.6%. Among the men, in many countries no men are reported to be on leave. The highest proportion of men reported is in Romania, where 6.2% are reported to be on leave.

Table 5.2																											
	Public expe family cas and servi	enditure on h benefits ces (% of	Social expense	diture on d as % of 2	Length of maternity, paternity and parental leave in weeks ³					Effoctivo	loovo ⁴	Compensation in % of Average Production Worker ³							Good		index ⁵		Proportion of employed parents with a child under are 1 on leave ⁶				
	GD	r)	GDP		Length of materinty, paterinty and parental leave in weeks					Effective	leave							, v	Gena	ler equality	index		Chil	u under a	je i on leave	8	
	Thereof: p/maternity leave (2003)	SD group	Spending on maternity and parential leave payments per child born as % of GDP pe capita (2003)	SD group	Maternity leave (2006/2007)	SD group	Paternity leave (2006/2007)	SD group	Parental leave (2006/2007)	SD group	Total FTE/SR for all paid leave (2005/2006)	SD group	Maternity leave (2007/2008)	SD group	Paternity leave (2007/2008)	SD group	Parental leave (2007/2008)	SD group	Gender equality inde (2008)	SD group	Fathers Portion (2008)	Wage Replacement (2008)	Incentives (2008)	Women (2006)	SD group	Men (2006)	SD group
Australia	0,0	5	2,1	5					52	0	0,0	< _							1	5	1	0	0				
Austria	0,3	0	31,9	0	16	0	0,4	<	104	2	37,8	0	100,0	2	100,0	0	21,0	≤		0	6	0	1	79,6	2	0,35	0
Belgium	0,2	0	16,6	0	15	0	2,0	0	12	5	27,3	0	76,9	0	100,0	0	20,0	5	11	2	9	2	0	21,7	5	1,06	0
Canada	0.2	0	22.5	0	17	0			35	<	28.6	0	55.0	<			55.0	0	7	0	3	4	0	70,1	2	0,52	0
Cyprus	0,2	0	22,0	0					00	-	20,0	Ŭ	00,0	-			00,0	Ū		Ŭ	Ū		Ū	27.0	5	0.00	5
Czech Republic	0,5	2	53,1	2	28	2			156	\geq			69,0	0			10,0	≤						82,3	2	0,00	5
Denmark	0,6	≥	48,7	≥	18	0	2,0	0	32	≤	53,0	0	100,0	≥	100,0	0	90,0	2	8	0	6	2	0				
Estonia																								27,2	≤	0,00	≤
Finland	0,6	2	52,7	2	18	0	3,0	0	26	≤	56,6	2	65,0	≤	100,0	0	60,0	0	12	2	6	5	1	75,9	2	4,23	2
France	0,3	0	26,7	0	16	0	2,0	0	155	2	103,0	2	100,0	2	100,0	0	25,8	5	10	0	9	1	0	35,5	0	1,05	0
Greece	0,2	<	8.4	<	17	0	0.4	<	104	~	34,5	~	100,0	~	100.0	0	11,0	2	12	>	8	4	0	19.6	<	0,78	<
Hungary	0.8	2	83.1	2	24	>	1.0	<	80	0	94.7	>	70.0	0	100,0	õ	70.0	>	.~		U		0	72.1	2	0.00	5
Iceland	0,7	2	46,3	2	13	≤	13,0	≥	13	≤	31,2	0	80,0	0	80,0	≤	80,0	≥						ĺ,			
Ireland	0,1	≤	4,9	≤	26 ³	2	0,4 ³	≤			18,2	≤	80,0	0	100,0	0			7	0	7	0	0				
Italy	0,2	0	18,9	0	21	≤			12	≤	31,6	0	80,0	0			30,0	≤	9	0	8	1	0	39,0	0	0,22	0
Japan	0,1	≤	13,3	≤	14	≤					8,4	≤	60,0	≤					5	≤	3	3	-1				
Korea	0,0	≤	0,1	5	12	≤			36	≤	18,1	≤	100,0	2			17,0	≤						00.0		0.00	
Latvia																								40.7	0	0,00	<
Luxembourg	0.5	2	38.7	0	16	0	0.4	<	26	<			100.0	>	100.0	0	62.0	>						45.8	ŏ	1.70	2
Malta	-,-			-		-	•, ·	_		_				_		-	,-	_						2,9	5	0,00	5
Mexico	0,0	≤			12	≤					12,0	≤	100,0	2													
Netherlands	0,0	≤	0	≤	16	0	0,4	≤			29,4	0	100,0	≥	100,0	0			8	0	7	1	0	24,0	≤	0,00	≤
New Zealand	0,0	≤	3,3	≤	12	5					6,0	5	50,0	5					8	0	6	8	0				
Norway	0,8	2	62	2	9	Sec. 1	6,0	2	42	5	116,0	2	80,0	0	80,0	< _	100,0	2	12	5	9	3	0	44.4	0	0.12	
Poland	0,3	0	30,3	<	17	0	2,0	5	100	2	20.0	<	100,0		100,0	0	14,0	2	11	>	6	4	1	27.3	<	0,12	0
Romania	0,2	U	14,5	-		0	1,0	-			20,0	-	100,0	-	100,0	0				-	0	-		53.0	0	6.16	2
Slovakia	0,6	2	58,5	2	28	2			156	\geq			55,0	5			24,0	≤						78,2	2	0,19	0
Slovenia											65,0	2												87,2	≥	1,38	0
Spain	0,1	≤	14	≤	16	0	0,4	≤		_	19,0	≤	100,0	2	100,0	0			10	0	9	1	0	27,5	≤	0,11	≤
Sweden	0,7	2	58	2	15	0	11,0	2	51	0	48,0	0	80,0	0	83,6	0	80,0	≥	13	2	9	3	1				
Switzerland	0,0	5	0	5	16	0					16,0	5	100,0	2					0	5	0	0	0			_	
Lipited Kingdom	0,0	5	0.0		12	5	2.0	0			22.0	<	66,0	~	25.0	<			0	0	7	1	0	0.6	-	0.71	0
United States	0.0	5	0,0	-	12	<	2,0	0			22,5	-	0.0	<	25,0	-			9	0	9	0	0	0,0	-	0,71	0
OECD EU-27	0,3 0,3	-	27,4 31,0		16,1 17,7	-	2,8 1,9		69,4 82,4		37,1 45,4		79,8 85,4	-	92,3 93,9		45,3 39,9		8,4 9,6	Ū	6,4 7,4	2,1 1,9	0,190 0,357	45,9 46,0		0,70 0,85	
SD	0.3		23.2		4.8		3.8		54.8		30.8		23.9		18.8		30.7		3.3					25.7		1.46	
Mean	0.3		27.4		16.1		2.8		69.4		38.2		79.8		92.3		45.3		8.4					46.0		0.85	
≤	0,1		15,8		13,7		0,9		42,0		22,9		67,8		82,9		30,0		6,8					33,1		0,12	
0	0,11-0,39		15,9-38,9		14,5-19,4		1,0-4,6		42,1-96,7		23,0-53,5		67,9-91,6		83-101,6		30,1-60,6		6,9-10,0					33,2-58,7		0,13-1,56	
2	0,4		39,0		18,5		4,7		96,8		53,6		91,7		101,7		60,7		10,1					58,9		1,57	
-½ SD +½ SD	-0,14 0,14		-11,58 11,58		-2,404526 2,404526	-	1,913711		-27,42162 27,42162		-15,385494 15,385494		-11,93199 11,93199		-9,418803 9,418803		-15,34096 15,34096		-1,67 1,67					-12,87 12,87		-0,73 0,73	

1) Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2003) (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure).

Source: CECO Family Database FP7
 Source: Benet, J. (2008): "Early Childhood Services in the OECD countries", table 1
 Source: Ray, R., J.C. Gomick & J. Schmitt (2008): "Parental leave policies in 21 countries; Assessing generosity and gender equality".
 OECD Family Database FP8

CHAPTER 6

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND CARE

The provision of Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) has received increasing attention during recent years, and it has been acknowledged that the provision of good ECEC services is of major importance for child development-both in social life as well as in education. Research in neuroscience, for example, studying the effect of children's participation in high-quality ECEC programmes on early brain development, has heightened governments' interest in providing such programmes as part of life-long learning initiatives (Myers 2000; Bennett 2008). Results from the OECD PISA study have also indicated that children who participate in kindergarten or pre-school education achieve better results (Bennet 2008). Of equal importance, as mentioned in Chapter 2, ECEC provision has been recognised as a means of increasing the participation of women on the labour market. Furthermore, the provision of ECEC services has been found to relate to the rate of fertility. According to Blau and Robins (1998; 1989), for example, countries with a high availability of public childcare also show relatively high fertility rates.

6.1. SELECTION OF INDICATORS

Merely having a high enrolment rate in ECEC services is not, however, sufficient for ensuring children the best opportunities and allowing parents to participate to the desired extent in the labour market. Other issues are important as well, such as the quality of ECEC provision and the affordability of the services to parents. This chapter will provide an overview of indicators relating to universalism, affordability, and quality of services.

Box 6.1 Indicators for core assessment: ECEC

- Formal entitlement to daycare
- Enrolment rate in daycare and educational services, percentage of children 0-2 and 3-6
- Children attending full-time childcare as a percentage of overall pro vision
- Opening hours
- Social expenditure on ECEC as a percentage of GDP
- Public share of expenditure
- Childcare costs for dual-earner families
- Child/staff ratio
- 80% or more staff members have received training
- 50% or more staff members have finished tertiary education

UNIVERSALISM

The "universalism" of ECEC provisions applies first of all to the availability of daycare to all children. This may be measured as the proportion of children in ECEC programmes for a given age group. ECEC may include services for children under school age, for example, according to the definition given by OECD (2001: 14) ECEC includes "...all arrangements providing care and education for children under compulsory school age, regardless of setting, funding, opening hours, or programme content" (p. 14). Eurostat's (2004) definition, on the other hand, includes arrangements for older children and socialisation: "any arrangement for children aged 0 to 12 outside compulsory school involving elements of physical care, socialisation and/or education". This would include the provision of after-school care, which is lacking in many countries and which means that many parents have problems if both want to hold a fulltime job (The OECD Family Database includes information on Out-of-School-Hours Care, but data is not comparable, as age groupings vary across countries).

In the OECD approach, the focus is on all organized ECEC provision "in centres and in group settings (including schools) and family daycare (individuals who provide care to non-related children in the carer's home)" (OECD 2001: 15), and this is the approach followed here as well.

The term ECEC originates from the term *Early Childhood Development* (ECD), which emphasises a holistic approach to the child's physical, emotional, social, as well as cognitive development. In contrast, ECEC places the emphasis on care affecting development and learning. Another commonly used name, *Early Childhood Education* (ECE) is favoured by educational authorities, who wish to emphasise the learning aspect, and is used especially in the US (White 2002).

Here, we will use the OECD definition of ECEC and include arrangements providing care and/or educational services for children aged 0-6, as this is the generally agreed-upon cut-off point in many statistical accounts. This was also the convention used originally by the European Commission Childcare Network, later to be followed in the OECD Starting Strong reviews (Bennett 2008). This does not, however, take into account that children may start in primary school earlier, for example, in the Netherlands, where it is common for children to start school at the age of four.

ECEC provisions may thus include arrangements for education and/or childcare. Across countries, there are institutional differences in how ECEC provisions were initially established and for what purpose. In some, such as the Nordic countries, ECEC arrangements were initially set up to provide care for the entire age group from birth to compulsory school age during the times when parents were at work. In other countries such as Germany, ECEC provisions originally reflected the objective of offering educational or pedagogical provisions to children aged three and over before they entered primary school. A certain adaptation has taken place, especially following the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the desire to tap the female labour reserve as mentioned in Chapter 2, but also because the institutional design of services for young children still in many ways reflects this fundamental difference of objectives in terms of funding, organisation, and provision. Arrangements included under ECEC services may thus vary and be termed "daycare centre" in one country and "nursery school" in another, although both serve the same age groups. Family daycare is another way of providing for children, and in some countries, play groups offer part-time care for children without parental supervision.

ECEC services also differ from one country to the next in whether they are under the auspices of the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of

Welfare. Until recently, comparative analyses of daycare services concentrated mainly on educational services for children three and over, where some similarity across systems can be found. This, however, underestimated provisions for the under-three year olds—for whom extensive services are provided in the Nordic countries, for instance—and also ignored services provided under the Ministries of Welfare. Today, most comparative indicators also take into account provisions under the auspices of Ministries of Welfare.

With the recent emphasis on the educational advantages of participating in ECEC, a new focus has been placed on ensuring educational equity by providing daycare to all children, focusing especially on children at risk of educational failure (Bennett 2008). The OECD national reviews of daycare in the Starting Strong project showed that it was especially children with special or additional educational needs—children with disabilities, from disadvantaged backgrounds, or from ethnic or cultural minorities who did not have access to these services (Leseman 2002).

Some countries have introduced legal entitlements to daycare; most of these guarantee daycare services to children over the age of three, but some of the Nordic countries also provide these services to children under three. The first indicator of universalism in the report is whether or not children aged 0-2 and 3-6 are offered a **formal entitlement to day-care**. A guarantee of service provision does not, however, mean that adequate services are actually available: there may, for example, be long waiting lists to get into daycare programmes.

Most countries have, however, experienced enormous growth in daycare provision in the last 20 years. Among the EU countries, where the Barcelona objectives for year 2010 have set new standards, this growth has been especially rapid. Most EU countries provide for more or less all children aged 3-6, and some components of these services are in preprimary education, which prepares children for schooling. There has also been an increase in the proportion of children in the 0-2 age group using daycare services. In this report, we use the indicator enrolment in daycare and educational services for children, which encompasses arrangements under welfare as well as educational authorities, and private as well as public services. It should be noted that some countries may not register arrangements such as family daycare, which means actual provision may be higher. Also, many forms of private daycare provision are not included, whether they are for non-profit or for-profit, as is the case in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Mexico and the US, where a significant portion of childcare is provided privately or through informal channels (OECD 2008a). Also workplace-provided daycare may not be included in the registers. In Chapter 5.4, daycare provided by employers is considered.

Most countries differentiate between services for children 0-2 years and for children between the age of three and school age, with many exceptions, however. For example, in France, crèches parentales are provided for children 0-3 years of age, and in Italy, scuola materna is for children aged 3-6. Here, we use enrolment for the 0-2 and 3-6 age groups, but actual cut-off points may vary between the countries.

It is worth keeping in mind that enrolment rates do not reveal the number of places available in daycare programmes, but only the proportion of children using the services. Enrolment rates thus do not tell us whether demand has been met, which makes them a crude indicator of accessability. Demand may also vary between countries and over time. Cultural norms regarding motherhood and parenthood affect the demand for daycare, as do levels of employment and unemployment. In addition, parental leave systems vary substantially between countries, offering great variation in the number of weeks that parents may stay home to care for the child. When interpreting enrolment rates, alternative ways of looking after children—especially very young children—must therefore be taken into consideration. Some countries do, however, take the parental system into account when calculating take-up rates and only report the proportion of children in ECEC following the end of the parental leave period.

The interpretation of enrolment rates is also complicated by the difference in hours provided. Where services within the educational sector are mainly part-time, either provided as few hours every day or several hours on a few days with one or more days off per week, services within the welfare sector tend to be full-time. Moreover, welfare services such as daycare centres and family daycare are mainly offered on a full-year basis, whereas services within the educational sector are for the most part provided during term-time only. Again, there are institutional traditions as well as cultural norms behind the difference across countries, so that fulltime provision may seem more appropriate in some countries than others. Nevertheless, in regards to fulfilling the Barcelona objectives, full-time provisions may make it easier for families to combine work and family life.

In order to emphasise the differences across countries in full-time and part-time provision, an indicator showing the proportion of **children attending full-time provision** is included. This shows the proportion of children in full-time daycare of all the children attending daycare programmes. Again, this does not reveal whether there is provision in accordance with the demand for ECEC services, or whether children are in either full-time or part-time care, mainly because this is what is provided. We also report "daily coverage" by providing an indicator of average opening hours in order to emphasise the variation across countries. This indicator is, however, based on the most commonly used daycare institutions (the form of daycare with the highest proportion of children attending) and does not take into account family daycare. Again the average hours do not take into account whether there is ECEC provision for the majority of the year or only during the school term. Opening hours do not indicate the actual time that the child spends in daycare, merely the hours of care and education available to the child during the day. Long opening hours may of course enable parents to pursue work objectives, but may negatively affect children in their relationships with their parents and reduce the amount of time they spend in a home setting.

Availability may also be measured as public investments in the provision of daycare services. Here, we report social expenditure on ECEC as a percentage of GDP. This is divided into expenditure for childcare (mainly 0-2 years) and pre-primary education (mainly 3-6 years) in order to emphasise where countries place their emphasis. All ECEC expenditure, and especially those relating to the social welfare provisions may not, however, be included. As reported by Bennett (2008), the data on expenditure taken from the OECD Social Expenditure Database is often lower than what was reported by the individual countries in 2004 to the Starting Strong reviews conducted by the OECD from 1999-2005. He notes that there seems to be some underreporting, as expenditure levels were considerably higher in the Nordic countries in the OECD national reviews. Employers' investments in the financing of ECEC services-as is common in the Netherlands, for instance-may not be included in social expenditure data either. It is also worth keeping in mind that social expenditure levels will generally depend on the age of the child, as expenditure levels on younger children tend to be higher due to the higher number of staff members and also cross-national variation in the calculation of fees, requirements of child:staff ratio as well as the level of training of staff. In daycare programmes with a high ratio of staff members to children, and with staff members who have received tertiary education, for example, costs will be higher given that the largest share of ECEC expenditure goes to staff wages.

Expenditure levels may nevertheless indicate the public involvement in this field. In addition we have included **the public share of expenditure** as an indicator. This indicator shows the proportion of expenditure that the public contributes, and thus indicates how much is left for the parents (or employer) to cover.

AFFORDABILITY

The financial burden of childcare plays an important in parents' decision whether or not to participate in the labour market. Expensive services may prevent parents from using ECEC or even applying to such programmes. Correlations between childcare costs and fertility rates give some indication that high childcare costs may also affect decisions on whether or not to have a child, but this is modified to some degree by a high availability of daycare services (OECD 2008a).

Countries may subsidize daycare provision, reduce costs for low-income or lone-parent families, and offer a sibling discount to parents with more than one child. Tax reductions may also be provided so that working parents can reduce the costs of childcare. Tax provisions to mitigate the costs of childcare are common in, for example, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK.
One indicator of the affordability of ECEC systems is to calculate what **childcare costs for a dual-earner family** with earnings representing one full-time and one part-time earner (calculated according to earnings for an Average Production Worker) would amount to for two participating children aged 2 and 3 years, after any tax reductions and childcare benefits.

QUALITY

As well as considering the price of daycare, quality is likely to be an issue of importance for parents when they choose whether and where their child should be looked after. Quality can be measured in many ways, such as general satisfaction among parents or children with the provision of services or the quality of interaction between child and teachers/daycare staff. Often, however, more quantifiable measures are used, such as the **child:staff ratio**, which outlines how many adults work with a given group of children. The child:staff ratio is calculated by dividing the number of full-time equivalent children enrolled in ECEC programmes by the number of full-time equivalent teachers/daycare staff.

The child:staff ratio should be seen in relation to age, as younger children need more care and attention and thus lower child:staff ratios. Often, however, age-differentiated statistics are not available. According to Fiene (2002), the preferred ratio for younger children aged 0-2 is three to four children per staff member in daycare centres, and a minimum of two staff members per group. For older children aged 3-6, there should ideally be eight children per staff member.

Of concern when assessing the child:staff ratio is also the practice of registering staff members, that is, whether the director, kitchen and cleaning staff, and parent volunteers are included in the calculation of staff members. Preferably the ratios should be measured as full-time staff to the number of full-time daycare slots, and not the number of children attending the program, but this is very rarely the case. Most often, child:staff ratios are only reported for the main institutional care arrangement and not for family daycare providers (see Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998 for an exception).

Another important quality indicator in ECEC provision is the training level of staff. Good staff training can foster high-quality social care provision. The level of training is reported here as whether there are **80% or more of staff members who have received training**. In addition, we have included an indicator that shows whether **50% or more staff members have finished tertiary education**. Of relevance would also be personal aptitude and work experience and the combinations of trained and untrained staff.

6.2. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

Tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. present the different indicators. Apart from Hungary, it is only the Nordic countries that provide **entitlement to daycare** for younger children aged 0-2 years. Norway does not, however, guarantee daycare to either the younger or the older children. A daycare guarantee for older children aged 3-6 years is more common, except in countries such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Korea, and the US (other countries may or may not have a daycare guarantee, but no data is available).

Overall **enrolment** is 22.4% on average for children aged 0-2 years in the OECD countries and 19.6% in the EU-27, and thus far from the 33% of the Lisbon target. Several countries have, however, already reached the Lisbon target, including countries outside the EU such as Denmark

(61.7%), Iceland (58.7%), Norway (43.7%), Sweden (39.5%), the US (35.5%), and Belgium (33.6%). For the older children, on average 77.6% in the EU-27 and 74% in the OECD countries are enrolled in daycare or pre-primary activities, with the highest in France and Italy (100%, note some overreporting), but the Lisbon goal of 90% provision has also been met in Belgium (99.6%), Spain (98.6%), Iceland (94.7%), and New Zealand (92.7%). The lowest coverage is found in Turkey (10.5%)

The highest proportion of young children aged 0-2 years attending **full-time care** is found in Poland and Lithuania (100%) and the lowest in the Netherlands. On average in the EU countries, 60.5% of young children attend full-time care, slightly lower among the OECD countries (57.1%). Among the older children, aged 3-6 years, it is more common to attend full-time daycare. On average in the EU countries, 77.6% attend full-time and on average among the OECD countries, 74%. Full-time provision for the older children is lowest in the Netherlands (8%) and highest in Lithuania (93%).

The level of **public expenditure on childcare** provision mainly for 0-2year-olds as a percentage of GDP is highest in Iceland (1.2%) and lowest in Mexico (at 0.0%). On average, the EU countries spend 0.4% of GDP on childcare, and the OECD countries spend 0.3%. For pre-primary education, mainly for children aged 3-6 years, average levels are somewhat higher: 0.5% in the EU countries and 0.4% in the OECD countries.

Public funding for ECEC for 0-2 year olds covers on average 82% of total costs in EU countries, that is, leaving 18% of costs to be covered by parents and/or employers, and also 82% in OECD countries. The public share is highest in Ireland (100%) and lowest in the Netherlands (64.5%).

For older children, aged 3-6 years, the EU and the OECD average public funding covers 94%. In many countries, public funding covers 100% of expenditure, with the lowest level covered by the public in Denmark (75%).

In table 6.2.2, the average **opening hours** of the most commonly used daycare services are reported. These vary from seven hours per day (Spain) to 11.5 hours (in Sweden for younger children aged 0-2 years), with an EU and OECD average of 9.3. For older children, much provision is offered part-time, and opening hours for 3-6 year olds vary from four hours per day (Greece and Ireland) to 11.5 hours (Sweden).

In daycare programmes, average **child:staff ratios** are in general higher for the younger children aged 0-2 years. They are lowest in Denmark, with 3.3 children per staff member, and highest in Australia, with 7.5 children per staff member. For the countries reporting data for the age group 3-6 years, the highest number of children per staff member is found in Norway and the UK (8 children). For countries reporting only for the whole age group 0-6 years, the highest number of children per staff member is found in Portugal (11 children) and the lowest in the US (5 children). In pre-school programmes, the EU average is 13.8 children per staff member and the OECD average 14.8 children, being highest in Mexico (28.3 children) and lowest in Denmark (6.9 children).

Table 6.2.1											-									
	Entitleme	ntitlement to day care 1			t davcare ^{3,4}			Full time	child care ²		Pub	lic expe	nditure ECEC	5	Public funding, % of all funding 6					
	Formal entitlement 0-2 year olds	Formal intitlement 3-6 year olds	Enrolment rates 0- 2 year olds (2004)	SD group	Enrolment rates 3- 6 year olds (2004)	SD group	Percentage of 0-2 year olds in ECEC	SD group	Percentage of 3-6 year olds in ECEC	SD group	Childcare (2005)	SD group	Pre-primary education (2005)	SD group	0-2 year olds	SD group	3-6 year olds	SD group		
Australia	no	no	29,0	0	71,5	0					0,2	0	0,2	1						
Austria	no	no	6,6	≤	74,0	0	25	5	23	5	0,3	0			82,0	0	82,0	5		
Belgium	no	yes	33,6	2	99,6	2	57	0	63	0	0,2	0	0,6	2	83,0	0	100,0	2		
Bulgaria	:			~									0,8	2						
Canada	no	no	19,0	0			70	~	10				0,2	5						
Cyprus Creek Depublic			2.0		05.0	~	12	0	43	5	0.1		0,3	5						
Czech Republic	100	VOC	61.7	2	80.7		90	0	92	0	0,1		0,5	2	75.0		75.0			
Denmark	yes .	yes	01,7	2	69,7	2	90	é	03	-	0,7	e .	0,5	0	75,0	2	75,0	2		
Estonia			22.4	0	48.4		81	0	92	ŝ	0.7		0,4	0	95.0	0	95.0			
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Hungary	Ves	Ves	6.9	<	86.9	>	75	>	73	>	0.1	<	0.6	>	,-	-	,.	-		
Iceland	,		58.7	>	94.7	>		-		-	0.7	2	0.5	>						
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Italy	:	:	6,3	5	100,3	2	62	ō	73	2	0,2	0	0,5	2	80,0	ō	100,0	2		
Japan	:	:	15,2	0	86,4	2					0,2	0	0,1	5						
Korea	no	no	19,5	0	60,9	0					0,1	≤	0,1	5						
Latvia	:	1					88	2	93	2			0,6	≥						
Lithuania	:						100	2	84	2			0,6	2						
Luxembourg	:	:	14,0	5	72,3	0	55	0			0,4	≥			82,5	0	100,0	2		
Malta	1	1					38	≤	44	≤			0,6	≥						
Mexico	no	yes	3,0	≤	64,9	0					0,0	5	0,6	2						
Netherlands	no	yes	29,5	0	70,2	0	9	≤	8	≤	0,1	≤	0,4	0	64,5	≤	100,0	2		
New Zealand	:		32,1	2	92,7	2					0,1	≤	0,6	2						
Norway	no	no	43,7	2	85,1	2					0,5	2	0,3	5						
Poland	no	yes	2,0	≤	36,2	≤	100	2	75	2	0,0	≤	0,3	≤						
Portugal	1	1.1	23,5	0	77,9	0	97	2	88	2	0,0	≤	0,4	0	80,0	0	100,0	2		
Romania	:					~							0,8	2						
Slovakia	1	1.0	17,7	0	72,4	0	80	2	86	2	0,1	≤	0,3	S						
Slovenia			00.7	0	00.0		40	~	10	0	0.4		0,5	2	00.0	~	400.0			
Spain			20,7	0	98,6	2	49	0	48	0	0,4	2	0,0	5	80,0	0	100,0	2		
Sweden	yes	yes	39,5	2	86,6	2	61	0	63	0	0,6	2	0,4	0	84,5	0	84,5	5		
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Mean			22.4		74.0		60.5		58.4		0.26		0.40		82.0		93.9			
<			14.6		63.3		47.2		45.3		0.15		0.30		78.1		89.3			
ō	1		14.7-13.2		63.4-84.8		47.3-73.7		45.4-71.5		0.16-0.36		0.31-0.49		78.2-85.9		89.4-98.4			
2	1		30,3		84,8		73,8		71,6		0,37		0,50		86,0		98,5			
-1/2 SD	1		-7,87		-10,72		-13,30		-13,15		-0,11		-0,10		-3,95		-4,59			
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 1) Source: Meulders, D. & Gustatsson, s. (2002): "The Rationale of Motherhood Choices'.
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CHAPTER 7

FAMILY BENEFITS

This chapter explores possible methods of assessing the differences in the availability and generosity of family benefits in OECD and EU countries. Family benefits are understood as a means to compensate for the costs associated with rearing children. On the one hand, families face higher needs than other households. On the other, the earnings capacity (or labour supply) is restricted due to childcare obligations. Although the restrictions differ according to the design of the early childhood education and care system (see Section 5.1) and the prevalence of family-oriented policies on the employer or firm level (see Section 5.4), it is not likely that such policies fully level out the differences between families and other households. As a consequence, families with children are more economically vulnerable. In many countries, families with more than two children or lone-parent families face a higher poverty risk than other households. Family benefits can play a crucial role in limiting the economic disadvantages of families. If we assume a negative relationship between economic strain and child wellbeing, family benefits may help to better achieve this policy aim. Family benefits may also play an indirect role in balancing work and family life as they reduce the need to be fully active in the labour market.

In general we can distinguish among family cash allowances, familyrelated tax reductions, and family-related elements of the social insurance system. With regard to the latter, the main focus is on family-related reductions in employee social security contributions (for a discussion of other, more indirect aspects, such as family-related elements of the oldage pension system, see Dingeldey 2000). There are a number of approaches to capturing differences between countries in the availability and generosity of family benefits (for an overview, see Gauthier 1999). Each of the approaches is characterized by its own advantages or disadvantages; each one alludes to specific features of the family benefit system and ignores others (see also Chapter 3). Therefore, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of family benefits in a large number of countries, it is necessary to combine evidence gathered using different approaches. We rely mainly on the expenditure approach and the model family approach, both of which we discuss in the following.

7.1. GENERAL APPROACHES

The *expenditure approach* uses data on public social expenditure to assess a given country's welfare effort. Many of the classic studies on the welfare state are based on the expenditure approach (e.g., Wilensky 1975). This approach is also used in studies with a specific focus on family policies including family benefits (see, e.g., Pampel & Adams 1992, Kamerman & Kahn 1997, Guo & Gilbert 2007). The expenditure approach has been criticised for various reasons (see Esping-Andersen 1990, Gauthier 1999).

First, expenditure data do not reveal whether a given level of expenditure is due to the provision of low benefits to a large share of the population (broad coverage) or due to the provision of high benefits to a small share of the population (narrow coverage). Qualitative differences in the family benefit system that yield differential outcomes in terms of family wellbeing are not captured adequately. Second, internationally comparative expenditure data contain information about expenditure on broad categories of programmes rather than on individual measures. Some studies look at social expenditure on family policies in general, which includes expenditure on family benefits, parental leave policies, and family services (see, e.g., Siaroff 1994, Guo & Gilbert 2007). The differential outcomes of different provisions of leave policies, benefits, or services from one country to the next cannot be evaluated based on such broad expenditure categories. However, the available expenditure data have become richer in detail, with the consequence that expenditure on family benefits can be analysed separately from other types of family policy expenditure. A third objection, which is related to the second, is that-due to the complexity of expenditure data (which captures all types of social expenditure)-it is sometimes difficult to achieve full comparability between countries. Similar policies may fall into different fields of competence and be dealt with by different government agencies from one country to the next, and may thus be counted as different types of expenditure (e.g., care or education).

Despite these objections, which we will have to account for when we compare countries on the basis of such indicators, the expenditure approach has some distinct advantages. First, expenditure data is available for a large number of countries in highly standardized databases, which are updated on a regular basis and allow for broad cross-country comparisons. Second, expenditure data allow for a comprehensive overview, as all types of expenditure on family policy are included. However, the inclusion of information on tax reductions as a third type of family expenditure is not yet fully implemented. The OECD has systematically begun to include such information (see OECD 2007). However, up to now, these data are not available for all countries and it is partly unclear how the issue is handled in the other databases.

While the expenditure approach is most useful to provide a broad overview of the family-related welfare effort of a given country, the model family approach aims at providing information about the level and structure of benefits at the individual level. The basic idea is to calculate the size of the benefit package for a number of family types that differ, for instance, in the level of earnings and the number and age of the children. In addition, most studies differentiate between lone parents and couples. The approach allows for the inclusion of all aspects of the tax-benefit system such as tax reductions, family-related components of the social insurance system, family allowances, housing benefits, and social assistance payments (see, e.g., Bradshaw & Finch 2002). This approach is illustrative, as it provides information on the level of individual types of benefits at the family level and not at a highly aggregated level. However, the computation of the family benefit package on a wide range of model families is demanding, as it requires detailed knowledge of a country's tax-benefit system. Therefore, all studies rely on networks of country experts to provide the necessary information. This often works as a restriction on the number of countries included. But compared to earlier studies (see, e.g., Bradshaw & Piachaud 1980) more recent studies have gained in terms of the number of countries covered (Bradshaw & Finch 2002, Bradshaw 2006, OECD 2007). Still, the information is available for individual or few years only, and is not-like expenditure data-updated on a regular basis, which means that the indicators may soon be outdated. Bradshaw (2006) looks at changes in the family benefit package from 2001 to 2004. However, the comparison is based on a small sample of countries and it is unclear if Jonathan Bradshaw or other researchers will prepare further updates. The OECD tax-benefit models could provide a basis for continuous reporting of such indicators. However, the respective indicators are not included in the OECD Family Database.⁸

A second criticism refers to the problem that the results on the various model families cannot be generalised at a population level. Every study can provide information on a selected range of model families only, which do not allow for generalisation to families of different sizes, structures, and earnings. Since the share of these "other" family types differs between countries, the model families will represent a smaller or larger share of the population in each country. Hence, depending on the choice of model families, the approach may yield different results for the same country. Furthermore, the method has the disadvantage of producing numerous different indicators. This is not a disadvantage per se, as it reflects the variation in the family benefit package by family type. But to allow for easy comparisons, some studies (see, e.g., Bradshaw et al. 1993) also provide average values over all family types. However, as these averaged values are usually not weighted by the prevalence of a given family type and the range of model families does not cover all families in a given country, such indicators do not provide a representative estimation of the average family package in a given country. A third issue has been raised as a disadvantage, but it can be read as an advantage as well. The approach is

⁸ Instead the Family Database provides a detailed description of the child benefit systems (indicator PF3) including information on the level of benefits, variation by family size age of children and aspects of means-testing.

based on a mere description of the tax/benefit system and does not reflect the level of benefits families actually receive (Gauthier 1999: 45). In the case of non-take-up of benefits, the model family approach will overestimate the impact of family policy on problems such as child poverty. However, this can also be regarded as a strength of the approach, as it provides a full picture of the policy framework and allows for analyses that are able to differentiate between policy effects and family behaviour.⁹ In providing instructive results on how different policies (are intended to) affect the economic situation of a broad range of family types, the model family approach convincingly complements the representative but unspecific perspective of the expenditure approach. Therefore, an evaluation of family benefits needs to take into account both perspectives.

Although the combination of both approaches already provides a detailed overview of country differences in the field of family benefits, information from a third source may be added. As described above, the model family approach provides information at the policy level, while it cannot take into account the actual payment of transfers. The expenditure approach reflects the payment of transfers at a highly aggregated level only. Comparative micro-data on income such as the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) or the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) allow for the assessment of the impact of family benefits at household level. These databases provide detailed information on the income package of households. Thus, family benefits can be separated from other types of income, and this information is used to calculate the average value of family benefits or as a share of total family income. Such data-

⁹ However, this view ignores that the design of policy measures (e.g., means-testing) and administrative procedures have an influence on the process of claiming benefits and on the non-take-up rate (van Oorshot 1991).

bases do not allow only for an evaluation of the size of benefits but also for detailed analyses of the distributional impact of such measures. Therefore, such data is usually provided in studies on poverty or the income distribution (see, e.g., Whiteford & Adema 2007). However, respective indicators have also been included in studies on family policy (Gornick & Meyers 2001) and in the OECD Family Database.¹⁰

7.2. SELECTION OF INDICATORS

As in the previous chapters, we provide an overview on the country differences on the basis of a selection of the available indicators. We suggest a combination of evidence from expenditure data and indicators derived from the model family approach. The core assessment looks at four main areas: 1. the level of public expenditure on cash family benefits and its relation to total expenditure on family policy, 2. the level of family benefits, 3. the variation in the level of benefits according to family characteristics such as earnings level, family size, and family type and, 4. the genderneutrality of the tax-benefit system. As discussed above, expenditure data is available from different sources. We suggest using indicators from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) and the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS). The main reason for including an additional database is that ESSPROS provides information on all non-OECD EU countries, for which comparable data on family policies are still scarce. Combined, the two databases cover the full sample of OECD and EU countries (see indicator PF1 in OECD FDB).11

¹⁰ The OECD Family Database contains an indicator on the level of child support (PF5). However, the indicator on the level of benefits covers only a small set of countries and is therefore not included.

¹¹ In the latest update of the Family Database the OECD has also used ESSPROS data for countries that are not included in the SOCX database. In addition, the latest version of the FDB contains

Since the two databases are not fully comparable, the ESSPROS data should be reported also for the countries covered in SOCX. There are no or tiny deviations for many countries, but some distinct differences for some countries that we discuss when presenting the data. SOCX as well as ESSPROS provide detailed information on different types of expenditure on family policy; in ESSPROS, for example, expenditures are subdivided into 48 categories. In order to assess the basic characteristics of the general focus of a country's family policy, we first present information on **total public expenditure on family policy**. In addition, we distinguish the aggregate categories of **cash benefits** (and as a subcategory **child or family allowances**), **in kind benefits** and **tax breaks**. The databases allow for additional comparisons of differences in targeting (means-tested vs. non means-tested expenditure), periodic and lump-sum payments, and other details that we do not include in our core assessment.

updated SOCX data (2005). But as some of the more detailed SOCX data used in this report are not yet publicly available (only data on broad categories), we use the 2003 version of the SOCX data.

Box 7.1 Indicators for core assessment: family benefits7

- Total public expenditure on family policy
- Public expenditure on cash benefits
- Public expenditure in kind
- Tax breaks
- Public expenditure on child or family allowances
- Size of family benefit package by level of earnings
- Size of family benefit package by family size
- Size of family benefit package by family type
- Gender-neutrality of tax-benefit system

While many details can be omitted because the respective benefits represent a just tiny share of total expenditure (and therefore do not exhibit strong variation between countries) the issues of targeting is a crucial distinction between benefit systems. However, we do not suggest addressing the targeting of benefits on the basis of expenditure data (meanstested, non means-tested spending) but based on the comparison of model families at different earnings levels. In our view, the evidence provided by the model family approach is more illustrative to assess the crucial differences in the family benefit spending patterns of different countries. But how is variation by earnings level addressed in the model family approach in recent studies? Bradshaw and Finch (2002) and Bradshaw (2006) examine different earnings constellations within families, for example, couples with no earner, with one or two earners at a half or full average wage. If the size of the family benefit package is dependent on the earnings level, we will find variation by earnings constellation. If family benefits are granted independently from the level of earnings (such as a non-means-tested child allowance), the size will be the same. The indica-

tors provided by the OECD (2007: 77) differentiate between even more earnings levels (0%, 25%, 50% ... 200% of the average wage). Furthermore, the OECD indicators cover a larger sample of countries than the studies by Bradshaw and Finch (2002) and Bradshaw (2006). Therefore, we will report the OECD indicators on the size of the family benefit package by level of earnings. However, it is not necessary to provide information on the full range of income levels as indicators in the core assessment. Instead we report the size of the family benefit package for a family with average earnings, which provides information about the generosity of family benefits for an average family. If (some) benefits are means-tested, these values are informative about a certain range of earnings only. Therefore the OECD computes what could be called a "targeting ratio." It compares the level of benefits for those with high earnings (200% AW) to those with no earnings (0% AW). In the case of targeting, this ratio is greater than one. If there is no targeting of benefits and no earnings-dependent tax breaks, the ratio equals one.12 If the measuressuch as tax breaks-affect rich families more than poor families, the ratio is below one.

In a similar manner, one can assess the variation of the **level of family benefits by family size** and **family type** (lone parents vs. couples). We selected as core indicator the level of family benefits of a family with one child (aged seven) and in addition a ratio that compares the benefits for a third child who is 17 years old ("family size ratio"). Unfortunately there is no information on families of different sizes with children in the same age group. Therefore the ratio refers to differences in the benefits for additional children but also to differences by the age of the child. If this ratio

¹² If no benefits at the 200%-earnings levels are paid the ratio is not defined.

is greater than one, the tax/benefit system in a given country favours larger families and/or older children. In addition, indicators are available to assess the level of benefits for lone parents and couples in order to see if different countries' family policies take the situation of lone parents specifically into account. Up to now, the OECD has not published results based on the model family approach that allow for a differentiation of families of different size and type. Therefore, we use the most recent data collected by Bradshaw and colleagues (see Bradshaw 2006) although the study covers only 21 countries. An advantage of this study is that the data are fully documented, so they can be used to calculate the size of the family benefit package as a percentage of an average worker's wage (i.e., producing the same measure as used by the OECD).¹³ In addition, the results refer to the same year (2004). Again, the data available are rich in detail, but we will report only selected indicators. These are, however, able to give hints about the "preferences" of countries' tax/benefits systems towards smaller or larger families and towards lone parents or couples.

The OECD Family Database offers an alternative approach. It provides information on the level of family allowances in comparison to an average worker's wage (indicator PF1). In addition, the database contains information on the general characteristics of the family allowance system in a given country (e.g., differences in the level of benefits by age of child, by size of family, by income level). However, the information is provided in qualitative terms only. The quantitative indicator on the level of child allowances refers to the maximum benefit for one child between 3 and 12 years. But in particular in countries with means-testing or strong differ-

¹³ The full data is available at the project webpage

http://php.york.ac.uk/inst/spru/research/summs/welempfc.php (last access on 4 December 2008). Thanks to Jonathan Bradshaw for some additional hints.

ences in the level of benefits by family size, the full amount will be paid only to a small share of families. Therefore, for the core assessment we are using the information derived from the family model approach, which provides quantitative information on a large variety of family types.

The expenditure data and the indicators based on the model family approach provide information on the relevance of family benefits in general and the variation in the level of benefits according to the structure, size, and earnings of families. In a last step of the core assessment, we propose to use indicators on the gender-neutrality of tax-benefit systems (PF4). With regard to gender equality, it is crucial to what extent the taxbenefit system sets incentives for an equal division of labour. A simple indicator to address this issue is whether a couple's earnings are taxed jointly or individually. However, also in individualised tax systems there are elements that take into account an earner's family context, such as child or partner tax breaks, which may yield similar outcomes to joint taxation systems (see Dingeldey 2001). Therefore, we suggest assessing potential differences between countries on the basis of the tax rates of model families, which differ by the division of labour between partners. Using information from the OECD tax-benefit model, we compare the tax rates of a single earner family (earnings at 133% of the average wage) with a dual-earner family, where both partners earn 67% of the average rate.

7.2. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

Tables 7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 present an overview on the indicators for all countries (as far as information is available). As in previous sections of this report, we briefly discuss OECD and EU averages of the individual

indicators. However, since the number of countries differs from indicator to indicator, the average values are computed on the basis of different samples.

We discuss expenditure data first. We will comment separately on ESSPROS and SOCX data only if there are relevant differences. OECD countries spend 2.2% of their GDP on family policy. According to our data source, average expenditure in EU countries is slightly higher or lower. The total public expenditure on family policy ranges from less than 1% to about 4% of GDP. Expenditure on cash benefits is about 1.5% in the OECD and EU countries. In-kind expenditure is significantly lower. The data on expenditure in the form of tax breaks is available for OECD countries only (with some countries missing). As tax breaks are not always used to support families, the expenditure is zero in many countries. The OECD and EU averages are therefore below 0.5%. The indicators discussed so far allow for a general overview of family policy expenditure. As the broad category of cash benefits contains expenditure on parental leave as well as on child or family allowances, we provide an additional, more detailed indicator. It shows that on average, the OECD and EU countries spend around 1% of GDP on child or family allowances. This is about half of the total expenditure on cash benefits. However, countries such as Denmark or Sweden put an emphasis on parental leave compensation and therefore exhibit only average spending on family allowances despite an overall high expenditure on total cash benefits. The opposite is true for countries such as Germany and Ireland, where the major share of cash benefits goes into family allowances and not toward parental leave compensation.

The detailed comparison of SOCX and ESSPROS data reveals important differences among a number of countries. In some countries, there are large differences in the level of in-kind expenditure (e.g., France). A likely explanation is that part of the expenditure on childcare is not counted as in-kind expenditure on family policy but on education in the ESSPROS data. Differences in the level of cash spending can be explained by expenditure that may be classified as social assistance or as family expenditure (e.g., in the UK). There appear also to be different approaches in how to classify expenditure on tax breaks. Expenditure on cash benefits and tax breaks in SOCX for some countries approximately add up to the expenditure on cash benefits in ESSPROS (e.g., Germany). However, it is unclear whether this is the only reason behind these differences (for a brief discussion of differences between SOCX and ESSPROS data, see also Math & Thevenon 2008).

The family model approach provides information on the level of benefits at the family level. At average earnings, the **family benefit package** of a family is worth on average about 10% of an average wage. In many countries, the size of the package depends on earnings. Therefore, the "**targetting ratio**" is on average greater than one. The difference between the OECD average ratio (2.6) and the EU average ratio (1.6) is explained by the fact that in some non-EU OECD countries, family benefits are strongly targeted (e.g., Australia, Canada, Korea). In some countries the family benefit package differs widely by **family size**. In Table 7.2.2, this is expressed in the indicator for the difference of the benefit for the third child in comparison to the first child. On average the benefit for the third child is about two percentage points (percentage of an average wage) higher than for the first child. Not in all countries is there a preferable situation for single parents in terms of the family benefits package. Comparing the family benefit packages by **family type** shows that in Belgium and the Slovak Republic, taxes and benefits place single parents in a worse position than couples without children. In comparison to couples with children, the benefits for single parents are the same or lower in a larger number of countries, with some notable exceptions like Austria and Norway. On average, the family benefit packages of single parents are about the same as those of couples in the OECD countries (-0.2) and are smaller on average in the EU countries.

Table 7.2.3 presents indicators on the gender-neutrality of the taxbenefit system. On average, the tax rate for single-earner couples is 21.3% in the OECD countries and 23.3% in the EU countries. It is on average smaller for dual-earner couples (at the same level of family earnings—133% of an average wage). Hence, most countries support an equal division of paid labour in families or tax single-earner and dual-earner couples in the same manner (exception: Germany).

Table 7.2.

public expenditure on family policy (as % of GDP) 1. total (excl. tax breaks) 3. in kind 4. tax breaks 2. cash ESSP ROS 2005^ª ESSP ROS 2005^a) SOCX 2003) SD Sroup ESSP ROS 2005ª SOCX 2003) SD Broup SD Sroup 30CX 2003) SD Broup SD Broup SOCX 2003) SD SD Australia 33 1 2.6 07 0 0.0 1 Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria 3.3 3.1 2.7 0.6 3.0 2.5 2.5 0.5 0 0.0 > 0 > > > < > 2.0 1.1 0 1.7 Ó 1.7 0 0 0.4 ŏ 0.5 > 0.1 < < < Canada 1.1 < 0.9 < 0.2 < 0.1 < 2.1 0 Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark 1.9 > 0.2 < 1.9 3.9 1.4 3.8 1.5 0.6 2.3 0.4 0 1.3 1.6 0 1.2 0 0 0.2 < < > > > 1.5 ō > 2.2 -Estonia 1.4 0.1 < > 0 0 0 3.0 3.0 1.9 3.0 2.5 3.2 1.5 1.4 0.0 Finland > 1.6 0 1.6 2.0 0 > 1.4 < France Germany 14 0 1.6 0.8 0.8 > 0 > × . 0.5 > ó 1.2 2.4 > 0.8 5 0.4 1.5 1.7 0.3 0 Greece 1.3 < < 0.9 < 1.0 < < 0.5 Hungary Iceland Ireland 2.5 2.1 1.9 0.6 3.5 > > > > > 2.5 3.0 2.5 1.1 3.2 2.5 1.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.5 2.3 0 1.3 0 > > > > > > > < < 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 ò 0.5 õ 0.0 Italy < < < < < 0.5 Japan Korea 0.7 0.1 < 0.3 0.0 < 0.4 0.1 < < < < ~ 1.3 1.2 3.6 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.5 Latvia Lithuania 1.1 0.8 < < 0 < > < Luxembourg 4.1 > 3.5 > 3.1 0.6 0 ō > Malta < 0.8 < 0.1 < 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.6 0.3 0.8 0 Mexico < < < Netherlands New Zealand 1.3 0.6 0 < < < 0.7 > < 23 19 ~ 1 1 Norway 3.4 2.8 1.9 1.6 0 1.5 1.3 > 0.1 ò > > > > 0.8 1.2° 0.5 0.0 0.5° < 0 Poland 1.5 < < 1.0 0 0.8 < 0.2 Portugal 1.6 < < 0.7 < 0.7° < 0 0 0 1.4 Romania < 0 0 1.3 0.2 < < 0 Slovakia Slovenia 1.9 0 1.9 2.0 1.3 0 1.7 0 0.6 0 0.1 0.5 > 1.4 0.6 Spain 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0 0.7 õ 0.1 < < < < 3.5 1.5 1.1^b 0 0 1.9 0.4 Sweden > 3.0 1.3 > 1.6 1.1 1.6 0 > 1.5 > < 0.0 < Switzerland 1.1 0.2 < < < Turkey United Kingdom United States 1.0^b 0 0.1^b < < 0 0 1.7 0 1.2 0.4 0 2.9 0.7 > 2.2 0.1 0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 0 < < > OECD 2.2 2.2 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.2 EU 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.3 SD 0.61 0.51 1.05 0.84 0.79 0.53 0.28 2.16 1.35 1.42 mean 1.99 0.83 0.58 0.25 < 1.63 1.58 0.96 1.74 1.11 0.56 1.10 0.32 2.69 2.41 1.72 0.39 0.84 Ν 32 32 32 32 32 32 26 1/2 SD 0.53 -0.53 0.42 -0.42 0.30 -0.30 0.27 -0.27 0.26 -0.26 0.14 -0.14 0.39 -0.39

-1/2 SD -0.53 -0.42 -0.39 -0.30 -0.27 Sources (by indicator): OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX 2003), see also OECD Family Policy Database PF1, European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) 2005.

Notes: a) BG, CY, CZ, FR, DE, IT, LV, LT, NL, PL, RO, SV, SI, ES, SW: provisional values, UK: estimated values, b) 1999, c) 2004.

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	public expe	nditure on fa	mily policy (as	% of GDP)		size of family benefits package by												
	5	. child or fam	illy allowances	5		6. level c	of earnings		7.	family size	and age of child							
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ech Republic	0.5	<	0.6	ś	14.3	>	2.6	0	5.7	>	8.0	>	6.5					
enmark	1.0	0	1.0	0	11.1	0	2.9	0	3.0	0	0.0	<	4.9					
tonia			0.8	0														
hland	0.9	0	1.0	0	8.1	0	2.2	0	3.8	0	-3.8	<	7.2					
ance	1.1	0	1.7	>	5.1	<	1.4	<	1.7	<	14.5	>	0.9					
rmany	0.8	0	2.1	>	9.4	0	0.9	<	5.1	>	-0.6	<	1.5					
eece	0.6	0	0.8	0	2.4	<	0.4	<										
ingary	1.2	>	1.2	0	14.7	>	0.6	<										
land	0.7	0	0.7	<	13.9	>	2.4	0	2.7	<	-2.7	<	5.2					
land	1.4	>	2.2	>	13.0	>	1.2	<	5.2	>	1.3	0	19.4					
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and	0.0	-	0.6	-	6.6	2	d	0	0.2	0	0.0		10.4					
Janu	0.4	~	0.0	<	0.0	~	2.0											
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ovenia	0.7	0	0.8	0	11.0	0	1.0	-	0.0	-	0.0		0.0					
pain	0.2	~	0.2	<	3.5	~	2.5	0										
veden	0.9	Ó	0.9	Ó	7.4	Ó	1.7	õ	3.7	0	1.0	0	-1.0					
vitzerland	1.1	0	1.0	0	9.8	0	1.8	0										
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	10		11		10.0		16		4.2		27		5.4					
,	1.0		1.1		10.0		1.0		4.2		2.1		3.4					
	0.60		0.60		4.50		2.12		1.66		4.50		E 0/					
an	0.00		1.06		4.32		2.13		3.57		4.00		6.55					
	0.58		0.76		7.07		1.42		2.75		0.01		3.62					
	1.18		1.35		11.59		3.55		4.40		4.51		9.47					
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. 30	-0.30		-0.30		-2.20		-1.00		-0.83		=2.20		-2.92					

9. gender-nentrality of tax-penetit system ie earmer ie earmer AW) Croup AW) AW) AW)	Group
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Belgium 30.3 > -2.9	0
Bulgaria	
Canada 19.7 O -4.3	0
Cyprus	
Czech Republic 9.0 < 1.4	>
Denmark 35.6 > -1.9	>
Estonia	
Finland 29.5 > -10.8	<
France 19.5 O 0.3	>
Germany 29.1 > 1.6	>
Greece 39.3 > -14.3	<
Huligaly 20.9 > -10.5	<
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lanan 160 -14	0
Korea 13552	0
	U
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Malta	Ŭ
Mexico 11.4 < -13.0	<
Netherlands 32.1 > -6.1	0
New Zealand 15.6 < -5.0	0
Norway 26.7 > -5.5	0
Poland 31.5 > -0.7	>
Portugal 16.2 < -3.8	0
Romania	
Slovakia 10.2 < 0.1	>
Slovenia	
Spain 17.2 O -0.9	>
Sweden 30.0 > -7.6	<
Switzerland 13.2 < -1.3	>
Turkey 30.9 > -1.7	>
United Kingdom 23.2 O -4.1	0
United States 15.7 < 0.0	>
OECD 21.3 -4.3	
EU 23.3 -4.6	
SD 8.85 4.42	
mean 21.40 -4.30	
< 16.98 -6.51	
> 25.83 -2.09	
N 32 32	
1/2 SD 4.42 2.21	
-1/2 SD -4.42 -2.21	

Sources (by indicator): 9: OECD Family Policy Database PF4.

CHAPTER 8

POLICIES ON THE EMPLOYER/FIRM LEVEL

Policies on the employer/firm level are another group of measures that allow parents-or people with caregiving responsibilities in general-to balance work and family life. Moreover, policies on the employer/firm level can promote gender equality and child wellbeing. People with care obligations need flexibility in organising their time during the day. Hence, not only the distribution of childcare (see Chapter 6) or parental leave (see Chapter 5) enables employed parents to balance work and family life, but also policies on the employer/firm level, such as flexible working hours or particular family-friendly workplace arrangements. One might argue that such policies on the employer/firm level are of less importance for the assessment of family policy on the federal level, given their narrow focus on the firm or employer. Nevertheless, there is a clear connection between family-friendly workplaces and outcomes for society or the economy as a whole (see Chapter 3). Moreover, new approaches to national family policy-such as those introduced in Germany-focus much more on employers than former policy approaches

did. Other countries like the Netherlands have a longer tradition of employer support for families, such as the co-financing of childcare.

In this vein, alliances between the federal government and employers to improve workplaces are one potential instrument for family policy. Given the increasing importance of such approaches, countries need indicators to assess family policies as a result of, or precondition for, workplace practices.

In general, one can distinguish between various groups of workplace practices that are either enforced by law on the national or subnational level, or are agreed upon between unions and employers or within the firms themselves. At the firm level, four types of family-friendly working arrangements can be distinguished: Flexible working arrangements, special leave arrangements, special childcare arrangements, and other supportive arrangements (originally developed by Den Dulk 2001). With regard to leave and childcare arrangements, the measures provided at the firm level are often complementary to parental leave and childcare provided on the national level, as discussed in the preceding chapters. Thus, leave arrangements offered by employers are often provided for family reasons (e.g., sick child leave). Childcare arrangements at the firm level may include workplace nurseries, contractually guaranteed slots in outside childcare facilities, or financial assistance (for an overview, see Den Dulk 2001). Flexible time arrangements are the most common approach by employers to enable employees to reconcile work and care responsibilities. Other supportive measures contain possibilities such as work-family management training or employee counselling. So far, these services are not widespread among firms, and there are hardly any representative internationally comparable data on this.

8.1. GENERAL APPROACH

On the firm level, two ways of balancing work and family life can be distinguished (Den Dulk 2001): by providing facilities that ease the burden of childcare, or by giving employees the flexibility to adjust their work to their childcare responsibilities. Flexible working time arrangements on the firm level consist of part-time work, flexitime, telework, and saving hours. Many analyses focus on part-time work as the most common work-family arrangement. For Europe, the Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance (ESWT), surveying more than 21,000 firms with 10 or more employees in 21 European countries, makes it possible to assess part-time work on the firm level in all its particulars (e.g., Anxo et al. 2007b). Apart from the proportion of employees who work part-time, another important facet of part-time work is the notion of reversibility. Authors often estimate whether firms provide the possibility to reverse a temporary part-time job to a full-time job. Reversibility depicts the quality of part-time work with respect to reconciliation of work and family life. This indicator is used by several studies analysing part-time work in firms; see for instance, Anxo et al. (2007b), Flüter-Hoffmann & Solbig (2003), Klammer & Letablier (2007) and Riedmann et al. (2006). Other forms of flexible working time arrangements that should be assessed include the option to vary the start and end of daily work, to accumulate hours, to use accumulated hours for full days off, and to use accumulated hours for longer periods of leave. This selection of flexible time schemes is used in analyses of familyfriendly policies at the firm level by authors such as Den Dulk (2001), Evans (2002), Hurley (2006) and Pärnänen et al. (2007). The use of flexible working arrangements to assess the level of reconciliation needs to be treated with care as other studies report that employees do not necessarily have access to family-friendly working measures, as certain arrangements depend on the structure of firms (Chung et al. 2007).

While *leave arrangements* have been discussed in Chapter 5.1, in a workplace context it is important whether the organisational culture in the workplace encourages or discourages employees from taking parental leave. The different or additional leave options provided by employers reveal attitudes and barriers in the workplace. Fathers might face negative attitudes towards taking paternity leave. Conversely, employers face difficulties managing parental leave absences. Hence, in order to assess a firm's flexibility with regard to parental leave, fathers' take-up rates need to be considered, as does the overall prevalence of leave take-up (Anxo et al. 2007a). Besides Anxo et al. (2007a), Gornick & Hegewisch (2008) also refer to parental leave at the firm level. The take-up of leave is often used to assess parental leave systems—either at the state level or at the firm level. Take-up is affected by factors that affect the way parental leave operates in firms, including the gender division of labour, access to complementary policy measures, and opportunities for reduced hours.

Although *childcare arrangements* have been discussed in a preceding chapter (see Chapter 5.2), employers' provision of workplace nurseries or financial assistance indicates whether firms take an approach of lightening the childcare burden, or an approach enabling employees to adjust their working time, or both. Still, very few firms provide employees with childcare support. In Europe, a small number of companies provide a variety of such services. The literature assumes that policies at the firm level are clustered, whereby companies seem to combine childcare arrangements and leave arrangements (Anxo et al. 2007a). The provision

of daycare by employers is also examined by Den Dulk (2001), Plantenga & Remery (2005) and Fagan (2003).

Other supportive arrangements have been subjected to almost no systematic cross-country analysis. However, a survey has been conducted on firms providing work-family management training or research on employees' needs in Europe. It found that in the Netherlands, for example, only a small proportion of organisations have begun using an investigative method to establish employees' needs for certain arrangements, since work-family policies are widely covered in the media and by policy makers (Den Dulk 2001). Thus, employees are already well-informed.

There are various sources available for indicators on workplace practices on the national level. These indicators are included in studies of the OECD countries (see, e.g., Evans 2001) and are planned and to some extent already included in the OECD Family Database (e.g., indicator of employment patterns of couple families). For some of these indicators, see the indicators in Chapter 4 on parental labour market outcomes. Comparative data on workplace practices on the firm level, however, are rare. They are found in sources such as the Establishment Survey on Working Time (ESWT), which allows for the analysis of family-friendly arrangements in Europe. Data on OECD countries outside Europe are even more difficult to come by.

8.2. SELECTION OF INDICATORS

For a core assessment of a country's family policy, we suggest using indicators on the firm level only. In the following, indicators of workplace practices are described briefly. Looking over the indicators, it will become obvious that they are the result of voluntary regulations or practices on the firm level (such as the prevalence of leave take-up).

Box 8.2.1 Indicators for core assessment: policies on the employer/ firm level

- Flexible working time arrangements
- Rationale for introducing part-time work
- Reversibility of part-time work
- Proportion of firms with males on parental leave
- Prevalence of leave take-up
- Proportion of firms providing daycare

As stated above, part-time work is, in principle, the most common flexible working time arrangement. Yet part-time work is not the only form of flexible working time; hence other **indicators on flexible working time arrangements**, such as possibilities to vary the start and end of the working day, to accumulate hours, to use accumulated hours for a day off, and to use accumulated hours for longer leaves should be assessed as well.¹⁴

In Europe, part-time work seems to be a good example of a practice that results from combining labour law and collective agreements at the firm level. The Part-Time Directive (97/81/EC) developed by the European

¹⁴ For an extensive assessment of family policy, the organisation methods of part-time work for country groups might be helpful. Nevertheless there are no country data available on this. There is only information in country groups, such as Scandinavia, western Europe, the UK, the Mediterranean countries, and central Europe. Firms offer employees four possibilities to work part-time: they can work a set number of fixed hours every day, a set number of hours over other fixed periods, flexible hours on demand, or other forms (see Riedmann et al. 2006).

Commission somewhat supports a right to part-time work in its Member States. At the firm-level, employers are requested to consider (a) requests by workers to transfer from full-time to part-time work as the latter becomes available in the firm, and (b) requests by workers to transfer from part-time to full-time work or to increase their working hours should the opportunity arise (European Commission 1998). Reasons for introducing part-time work may vary across firms. For many employees, part-time work is not regarded as permanent status but rather as a transitory phase. The ESWT survey asks questions regarding the rationale for introducing part-time work in a firm, and results show that although companies in some countries (e.g., Germany) are obliged by law to offer their employees adequate part-time work on request, the managers of many firms regard such transitions as difficult (Riedmann et al. 2006). About onethird of the managers questioned introduced part-time work mainly in response to the firm's needs rather than in response to employees' wishes (Anxo et al. 2007b). The indicator on the rationale for introducing part-time work in a firm approximates the right to request parttime work at the firm level. It shows whether part-time work is introduced in a company for economic or organisational reasons, or in response to employees' requests. It is particularly difficult for companies to provide employees the option to switch at will, as stated in the Part-Time Directive of the European Union, especially from full-time to part-time work. Thus, reversibility of part-time employment is a major issue for the quality of part-time work. Thus we suggest adding an indicator to reflect the notion of reversibility at the firm level. This indicator describes the proportion of establishments offering full reversibility between part-time and full-time work. The majority of firms with parttimers prefer to switch employees from full-time to part-time work, and

often do so quickly, whereas they have difficulties with the reverse situation (Riedmann et al. 2006).

Leave arrangements made at the firm level are less frequent than leave decisions implemented by law. Nonetheless, we consider two indicators in this context to be valuable for family policy assessment: First, an **indicator covering the proportion of firms with male employees on parental leave and the respective take-up of leave for males.** This indicator enables us to identify countries where fathers could face negative attitudes or other barriers that could prevent them from taking up parental leave. A second leave-related indicator is the **prevalence of leave take-up** among women and men. With regard to the gender division of parental leave, it is helpful to describe the overall acceptance of extended leave provision.

An indicator that clearly belongs at the firm level is **childcare arrangements of firms**. The indicator depicting employer provision of daycare compares firms with employees on leave and firms with no employees on leave. It does not necessarily hold that firms with leave arrangements are more likely to provide daycare, as some countries differ in federal provision of childcare and leave arrangements.

8.3. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY DIFFERENCES

As in previous sections of this report, we now briefly discuss OECD and EU averages of the indicators used in this chapter. Table 5.4 presents an overview of the indicators for all countries. Indicators related to policies on the employer level are scarce for the OECD countries outside Europe. In fact, all indicators had to be taken from European sources. This lack of non-European data is also the reason why the OECD and EU averages do not differ (significantly).

First, Table 8.3.1 reports indicators related to **flexible working time arrangements**. Regarding these different possibilities, the following patterns can be noted for Europe. The **possibility to vary the start and end of the working day** is widely used among the members of the EU-21, followed by the **possibility to use accumulated hours for longer leave periods**. The former possibility is provided on average by 14.8% of firms in Europe, and the latter by 12.4%. The variation in the start and end of the working day is used mostly in Ireland (25% of firms) and Spain (23% of firms), whereas the Scandinavian firms prefer to offer their employees the option to accumulate hours for longer leaves, i.e., Denmark (25%) and Sweden (27%). The **possibility to use accumulated hours for full days off** is provided by an average of 12.0% firms. The option least-used by European firms is **the possibility to accumulate hours but not in order to take full days off**; here, on average, only 7.1% of firms offer this option as a flexible working time arrangement.

The indicators describing the **rationale for introducing part-time work** in firms approximate the right, provided at the firm level, to request a switch from full-time to part-time work. Here, the majority of firms report that employees switch to part-time work **mainly on employee wishes** (on average 37.9%). This is mostly the case for firms in Scandinavian countries, i.e., 50% in Denmark. The reason **"mainly needs of establishment"** is high in Cyprus (60%) and in Poland (65%). This rationale averages 34.3% among the members of the EU-21. Firms that reported establishment needs and employee wishes being of **equal** **importance** in switches to part-time work make up 20.8% of all firms in Europe.

Yet not only should the possibility of part-time work at the firm level be assessed by countries, but also the notion of **reversibility**. The indicator reporting reversibility indicates the proportion of firms per country where employees can switch from part-time to full-time. On average 9% of firms that allow their employees to switch from full-time to part-time also provide the possibility to switch back to full-time employment. The highest proportion of firms providing reversibility can be found in Austria (16%) and in Sweden (17%).

Leave arrangements provided at the firm level are less frequent than at federal level. The indicators **firms with males on parental leave** and **prevalence of leave take-up** allow parental leave to be assessed at the firm level. In Europe, 31.6% of establishments allow male employees to go on leave. The Scandinavian countries report the highest proportion of firms offering leave periods to male employees among all firms with employees on parental leave in past three years, for example, Finland (59%) and Sweden (69%). The **prevalence of leave take-up** amounts to an average of 54.7% of firms. Sweden (89%) and Finland (80%) state again the highest prevalence of leave. However, not in all countries can a preferable situation for employees with regard to leave take-up be found. In Spain, for instance, only 25% of firms report a prevalence of leave.

Finally, we discuss the **childcare arrangements of firms**. The proportion of firms offering childcare arrangements as an additional form of support is reported separately according to the number of employees on leave. On average, 6.9% of firms providing childcare arrangements have no employees on leave, whereas 8.1% of firms offering childcare as an additional support do have employees on leave. The provision of such services at a company level is significantly more extensive in some countries, i.e., the Netherlands (41% of firms with employees on leave), Latvia (22%) and the UK (17%) than in other countries.

Table 8.3.1 Workpla	ace practices																									
			Forms of	of flexible worl	king time arrange	ements					Ratio	nale for introd	ucing part-time v	work			Reven	sibility		Parent	tal leave		Prop	ortion of firms	providing day	care
	Proportion of firms (in percentages)								Proportion of	firms with part	-time work (in p	ercentages)					Pro	oportion of firm	ns (in percentag	ics)	Proportion of firms (in percentages)					
	\		μ μ		s.																				-	
	Possibility to vary start/end of daily work but no accumulation of hours	SD Group	Possibility to accumulate hour but no compensation of full days off	SD Group	Possibility to use accumulated hours for full day off	SD Group	Possibility to use accumulated hours for longer period of leave	SD Group	Mainly needs of establishment	SD Group	Mainly wishes of employees	SD Group	Both of equal importance	SD Group	Other reasons	SD Group	Reversibility of part-time work (Proportion of firms (in %)	SD Group	Firms with males on parental leave	SD Group	Prevalence of leave take-up ⁴	SD Group	Employess on leave	SD Group	No employess or leave	SD Group
Australia																										
Austria Belgium Bulgaria	8.0 14.0	< 0	2.0 6.0	< 0	14.0 8.0	0 <	28.0 10.0	> 0	27 15	0 <	40 57	0	27 23	> 0	6 5	0	16.0 13.0	>	12 49	< >	50 61	0	6 3	0 <	7 3	0 <
Canada	40.0		10		0.0		0.0		<u>00</u>		45		00	0		0	10				50	0		0	0	
Cyprus Crock Bopublic	10.0	<	4.0	<	2.0	~	2.0	0	60 29	0	15	< 0	20	0	5	0	4.0	<	1	<	50	0	4	0	3	<
Denmark	10.0	<	3.0	<	13.0	Ó	25.0	>	19	<	50	>	30	>	1	<	13.0	>	42	ò	52	0	5	ò	4	ò
Estonia	5.0		40.0		00.0		00.0			0		0	10			0	5.0		17	<	00		-	0		0
Finland	5.0	<	12.0	>	23.0	>	22.0	>	36	0	44	Ŭ V	16	< 0	4	0	5.0	<	59	>	80	>	7	0	4	0
Germany	60	4	7.0	0	17.0	>	21.0	2	20	0	40	0	24	0	0	0	5.0	é	14	4	52	0	7	0	3	4
Greece	17.0	ò	8.0	0	2.0	Ś	10	Ś.	71	>	14	<	13	<	2	<	2.0	, ,	14		51	0	9	0	5	0
Hungary	14.0	0	6.0	0	11.0	0	5.0	<	39	0	27	<	26	>	8	0	6.0	<	5	<	53	0	4	0	5	0
Iceland																										
Ireland	25.0	>	5.0	<	15.0	>	10.0	0	28	0	47	>	23	0	2	<	9.0	0			47	<	5	0	14	>
Italy	21.0	>	7.0	0	7.0	<	5.0	<	16	<	62	>	20	0	2	<	9.0	0	22	0	52	0	2	<	2	<
Japan																										
Latvia	26.0	>	12.0	>	15.0	>	13.0	0	45	>	30	6	13	~	12	>	80	0	13	6	59	0	22	>	15	>
Lithuania	20.0		12.0	,	10.0		10.0	0	40	,			15		12		0.0	0	10			Ŭ	LL		15	
Luxembourg Malta	11.0	<	7.0	0	13.0	0	15.0	0	21	<	51	>	18	0	10	0	6.0	<	43	>	60	0	9	0	5	0
Mexico																										
Netherlands	16.0	0	5.0	<	9.0	<	14.0	0	12	<	63	>	22	0	3	<	10.0	0	52	>	46	<	41	>	26	>
New Zealand																										
Poland	18.0	0	6.0	0	19.0	>	12.0	0	65	>	20	<	10	<	5	0	5.0	<	10	<	45	<	3	<	7	0
Portugal	12.0	0	4.0	<	4.0	<	3.0	<	34	0	24	<	40	>	2	<	2.0	<	54	>	44	<	7	0	5	0
Romania Slovakia																			66	>						
Slovenia	10.0	<	6.0	0	14.0	0	8.0	<	23	<	30	<	12	<	35	>	3.0	<			63	>	1	<	2	<
Spain	23.0	>	10.0	>	5.0	<	6.0	<	45	>	28	<	15	<	12	>	9.0	0	17	<	25	<	8	0	3	<
Sweden Switzerland	11.0	<	9.0	>	19.0	>	27.0	>	25	<	51	>	19	0	5	0	17.0	>	69	>	89	>	3	<	3	<
United Kingdom	28.0	>	7.0	0	11.0	0	10.0	0	35	0	30	<	30	>	5	0	16.0	>	46	>	55	0	17	>	17	>
United States	20.0		1.0	0	11.0	0	10.0		~								10.0				~					
OECD	14.2		6.9		11.9		12.4		32.4		39.5		21.3		6.8		9.6		35.4		54.2		8.0		6.9	
EU-27	14.8		7.1		12.0		12.4		34.3		37.9		20.8		7.0		9.0		31.6		54.7		8.1		6.9	
SD	6.6		3.2		5.9		8.1		16,1		14.7		7.2		7.2		4.7		21.4		12.2		8.6		5.9	
Mean	14.8		7.1		12.0		12.4		34.3		37.9		20.8		7.0		9.0		31.8		54.6		8.1		6.9	
<	11.5		5.5		9.1		8.3		26.3		30.6		17.2		3.3		6.6		21.1		48.5		3.8		3.9	
0	11.5-18.1		5.5-8.7		9.1-15.0		8.3-16.4		26.3-42.4		30.6-45.2		17.2-24.2		3.3-10.6		6.6-11.4		21.1-42.5		48.5-60.8		3.8-12.4		3.9-9.8	
>	18.1		8.7		15.0		16.4		42.4		45.2		24.4		10.6		11.4		42.5		60.8		12.4		9.8	
N	21		21		21		21		21.0		21.0		21.0		21.0		23		22		23		23		23	
10.00	2.24		1 50		2.02		4.04		9.06		7.94		2 50		2.64		2.97		10.70		6.10		4.20		2.02	
1/2 SD	-3.31		-1.58		2.93		4.04		8.06		7.34		-3.58		3.01		2.37		-10.70		0.12 -6.12		4.29		2.93	
Source: European Fr	undation for the I	mprovement	of Living and W	orking Condit	-2.83		-4.04		-0.00		-1.34		-0.00		-3.01		-2.31		-10.70		-0.1Z		-4.23		-2.33	
oouroo. European n			or coming allo w	orning condit																						
CHAPTER 9

GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT

For governments that want to assess their family policies, it is important to have some guidance as to which context and outcome indicators on the one hand and which indicators on policy measures on the other hand should be analysed. It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate which indicators and which measures should be considered when assessing the policy aims discussed here: gender equality, child wellbeing, and balance in work and family life.

In order for countries to assess their national family policies, it is important not only for them to interpret policies according to relevant context and outcome criteria, but also for them to be able to assess their position relative to other countries. For this purpose, national scorecards have been developed. In principle they can be constructed for all countries. We demonstrate the use and construction of these scorecards for three countries: Denmark, United Kingdom, and Germany. These are merely examples that demonstrate the principle approach of our scorecards. The scorecards cover most of the core indicators discussed earlier in the report and consist of a selection of what are considered to be the most relevant context, outcome, and policy indicators for the achievement of any of the three policy goals: gender equality, child wellbeing, and balancing work and family life.

Each policy indicator in the scorecards is chosen according to its importance for achieving the policy goal, whereas context and outcome indicators are chosen according to their ability to illustrate the country context and state of the policy goal. Policy measure, context, and outcome indicators might be part of more than one policy goal, for example, the provision of early childhood education and care might serve all three purposes of achieving gender equality, promoting child wellbeing, and maintaining balance between work and family life. In most cases, however, indicators have either a direct or an indirect relationship with policy goals.

In the scorecards, each state can assess the relative value of its national indicators in two graphs. The first graph presents the relative values of the national indicators on context and outcome dimensions; the second graph presents the relative values of the family policy indicators. For each indicator, its assumed relationship with any of the three policy goals has been indicated by a capital letter: G for gender equality, C for child wellbeing and B for balancing work and family life.

It is of great importance important to keep in mind that the choice of indicators does not reflect the stance that there is a direct statistical causal relationship between context, policy measures, and outcomes. This would require extensive further testing. The scorecards can only give a first indication as to which indicators are important to take into consideration when assessing policy settings.

Moreover, we emphasize that the scorecards are first attempts at a family policy assessment. They should stimulate the discussion. Furthermore, they are open for improvement. Such improvements can take place in the methodology, in the data quality, in the availability of data to construct the indicators, and in the links between policy aims and indicators. Apart from this, more indicators could be added.

9.1. POTENTIAL LINKAGES BETWEEN POLICY AIMS, CONTEXT AND OUTCOME INDICATORS, AND POLICY MEASURES

As described in Chapter 3.2.2, defining the aims of family policies is a major precondition for family policy assessment. These aims determine what direction the assessment will take, and establish its foundation. In some cases, the results of the assessment will differ depending on what are chosen as the guiding aims; in others, they will not. However, since both the list of indicators and the list of policy measures are subject to change, the proposed groupings may change as well. They should be regarded as suggestions, open for discussion and improvement. In the end, only the use of such groupings will prove whether they are appropriate and useful for government assessment.

9.2. POLICY AIM: CHILD WELLBEING

If governments want to assess if the aim of ensuring child wellbeing has been achieved in their countries, a first set of context indicators in the short run and outcome measures in the long run could be considered. The following box summarises indicators that refer clearly and directly to the wellbeing of the child. Some indicators refer to child wellbeing in a more indirect manner, via the time parents spend with their children and via the financial resources available to the family if one or both parents are employed. While the use of the first set of indicators is relatively straightforward, the use of the latter set provides an example of the difficulties associated with attempting to link particular indicators with even one particular policy aim. On the one hand, parental employment clearly increases the material wellbeing of families, leading to a potential increase in the material wellbeing of children. But on the other, there is no clear correlation between parental employment and child development respectively child wellbeing. This correlation depends on a set of various factors related to employment, or even other factors relating to parents, children and the care situation. The average number of actual working hours, preferred hours versus current hours, and the time spent on childcare and daily household chores are important as well. But even these objective indicators show no clear picture. Some child development advocates argue that it is not simply the time parents spend with their children but the quality of that time that matters. Others argue that it is parents' satisfaction with their work-life balance that matters, and not so much the question of employment. Thus, the life satisfaction of parents could be another important indicator for child-wellbeing.

Box: 9.2.1 Context and outcome indicators relevant for child wellbe-
ing
Directly related to child wellbeing
Material outcomes
Child poverty
Health outcomes
Infant mortality rate
• Low birth weight
Development outcomes:
• Literacy scores, age 9*
• PISA scores
Young people not in education
More indirectly related to the child (via the time parents spend with their children and via the financial resources available to the family)
Maternal employment rates
Part-time employment of women
Average number of actual working hours
• Current vs. preferred working hours of parents
• Time spent on work, childcare, and daily household chores*
• Life satisfaction

* Not yet available in the OECD Family Database.

The linkage between policy measures and the policy aim of child wellbeing is affected by a number of direct and more indirect measures. Again, we try to summarise some of the measures we discuss in Chapter 5, which are relevant in respect of child wellbeing. In particular leave and ECEC measures are directly linked to child wellbeing. It is assumed that longer paid leave periods promote child development, because they allow parents (in particular mothers) to spend time with their very young children in what is considered an important phase for child development. However, from a long-term perspective, a longer leave period affects the labour market performance of mothers, and thus might reduce family income. This affects the material wellbeing of the child. The linkage with ECEC measures is clearer. In particular, measures to increase the quality of ECEC services are of great importance for the wellbeing of children. With respect to more indirect measures, it is important that leave periods be paid, and that enough (public) funds be allocated to ECEC. These factors may affect the quantity and quality of ECEC services. An increase in quantity increases the employment opportunities for both parents, and thus might lead to an increase in the material wellbeing of children. Family benefit measures (various ones) help to increase the financial resources of families, and thus promote the material wellbeing of children. Moreover, special benefits for lone parents or families with many children might provide focussed support to groups that are known to be at a higher risk of poverty. Finally, policies on the employer/firm level should be considered, as they can help to improve the wellbeing of children as well. Flexible working time arrangements help parents to react more flexibly to special needs of their children.

Box: 9.2.2 Policy measures relevant for child wellbeing

More directly related to child wellbeing

Leave schemes:

- Length of maternity, paternity, and parental leave in weeks
- Effective leave (time and money available for the care of children)
- Take-up of parental leave

Early childhood education and care (quality issues):

- Take-up of daycare and educational services
- Children attending full-time provision as a percentage of overall provision
- Opening hours
- Child:staff ratio
- 80% or more staff members have received training
- 50% or more staff members finished tertiary education

More indirectly related to the child (via the welfare position of the family as a whole)

Leave schemes:

- Social expenditure for leave schemes, percentage of GDP
- Compensation in percentage of earnings

ECEC (cost issues):

- Social expenditure on ECEC as precentage of GDP
- Public share of ECEC expenditure

Family benefits:

- Total public expenditure on family policy
- Public expenditure on cash benefits
- Public expenditure in kind
- Tax breaks
- Public expenditure on child or family allowances
- Size of family benefit package by level of earnings
- Size of family benefit package by family size
- Size of family benefit package by family type

Policies on the employer/firm level:

- Flexible working time arrangements (proportion of firms)
- Proportion of firms providing daycare
- Family-friendly workplace practices
- * Not yet available in the OECD Family Database.

9.3 POLICY AIM: GENDER EQUALITY

A large number of indicators make it possible to assess whether the aim of gender equality has been achieved. These could include aspects of labour market equality and income inequality, but also issues of political participation and representation. From a family policy perspective, equal representation in the labour market, equal pay, and equal sharing of time appear most pertinent. The respective indicators can thus be used for an assessment of the aim of gender equality. Differences in labour earnings between men and women are reflected in the gender pay gap. There are various indicators that measure the gendered structure of the labour market. The gender employment gap captures the overall differences between men and women in labour market participation. Maternal employment rates are more directly focussed on the relationship between gender, family, and employment. Part-time employment is, in many countries, an important means of gaining flexibility to combine work and family. However, part-time working status often entails lower earnings and more limited career opportunities. As part-timers are predominantly women, a high share of part-time work not only means higher flexibility but also restrictions for women in the labour market. Furthermore, equal sharing of paid work, as captured by labour market participation rates, does not necessarily mean an equal sharing of unpaid work. Therefore gendered information on the time spent on paid work care and household chores is an important indicator to assess gender equality.

Box: 9.3.1 Context and outcome indicators relevant for gender equality

Earnings

• Gender wage gap

Employment

- Gender employment gap
- Maternal employment rates
- Part-time employment rates by gender
- Full-time employment rates by gender

Sharing of time:

• Time used for work, care and daily household chores

* Not yet available in the OECD Family Database.

As with the policy aim of child wellbeing, there are a large number of policy measures that affect the aim of gender equality. There is also substantial overlap among policies-that is, policies that affect different aims-since both maternal labour market position and the sharing of unpaid work also have an impact on child wellbeing (higher resources, less time for childcare). It is also true that most family policies will have some impact on gender equality-some more directly, others less directly. Thus, measures from all four policy areas (leave schemes, family benefits, early childhood education and care, policies on the employer/firm level) are regarded as important in achieving the aim of gender equality. A direct link can be assumed between policies such as leave schemes that affect maternal and paternal labour market positions (in particular the relationship of maternal to paternal leave) and the reversibility of part-time work to full-time work. Furthermore, a gender-neutral tax benefit system is expected to positively influence the equal division of labour within households. Indirectly, not only the relation of maternal to paternal leave will affect gender equality, but also the design of leave policies in broader terms. The availability of formal childcare increases the opportunities for

labour market participation of care providers. Therefore, policies such as formal entitlements to daycare, take-up rates of daycare and educational services, the share of children in full-time provision, opening hours, and ECEC expenditure are included. It should be kept in mind that equal labour market participation rates do not necessarily imply an equal position on the labour market (e.g., due to the gender pay gap). The same constraint may apply to policies on the employer/firm level that increase flexibility in the workplace.

Box: 9.3.2 Policy measures relevant to gender equality
More directly related to gender equality
 Leave schemes: Length of maternity, paternity, and parental leave in weeks Proportion of firms with males on parental leave Policies on the employer/firm level: Reversibility of part-time to full-time work Tax-benefit system: Gender neutrality of tax-benefit system
More indirectly related to gender equality (via balancing of work
and family)
Leave schemes:
 Social experimenter for leave schemes, percentage of GDF Effective leave (time and money available for the care of children)
 Compensation in percentage of earnings
 Take-up of parental leave
ECEC:
Formal entitlement to daycare
• Take-up of daycare and educational services, percentage of children 0-2 and 3-6
Children attending full-time provision as percentage of overall provision
Opening hours
Social expenditure on ECEC as percentage of GDP
Policies on the employer/firm level:
Flexible working time arrangements
Prevalence of leave take-up
Proportion of firms providing daycare
* Not yet available in the OECD Family Database.

9.4 POLICY AIM: BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY LIFE

When assessing whether parents can balance work and family life, relevant direct context and outcome indicators should outline the demographic structure as well as the employment situation. These are outlined in Box 6.1.3.1. Whether these are outcome or context indicators is not always easily established; for example, high female employment rates may be the result of a preference for having fewer children or conversely, high labour force participation may cause women to prefer having fewer children. Nevertheless, the indicators can be used for a better understanding of which factors are relevant in a national assessment. Of the demographic indicators proposed to have direct relevance for the understanding of the balance between work and family life, fertility rates and women's average age at first birth should be considered, as they are likely to be influenced by problems of combining work and family life. Also the average household size, the proportion of households without children, as well as the difference between the actual and ideal number of children may be indicative of whether families succeed in balancing work and family life. The reasons why women have not fulfilled their childbearing desires can explain whether these reasons are work-related or not.

Among the employment indicators, one of the most important context and outcome indicators is how many mothers are in employment, which indicates whether it is possible to combine motherhood and paid labor. Average working hours may also be indicative of how pressured men and women feel. We assume that part-time employment rates for men and women indicate how much difficulty parents face combining work and family life, but this may also represent a strategy for participating in the labor market while children are small or an (undesired) solution to problems balancing work and family life. How men and women distribute the household chores between them may also indicate whether women are more burdened with these tasks and therefore find it difficult to participate in paid labor.

Of the more indirect indicators, that of life satisfaction may reveal the difficulties men and women have combining work and family life—if we accept this as part of general life satisfaction. The indicator of lone parent households is relevant, albeit indirectly, for understanding in how many households the sole breadwinner also has the sole responsibility for the family and household chores.

Box: 9.4.1 Context and outcome indicators relevant for balancing work and family life

Directly related to balancing work and family life

Demography

- Fertility rate
- Women's average age at first birth
- Average household size
- Proportion of households with no children
- Childbearing preferences of childless women
- Mean actual and ideal number of children
- Reason for not fulfilling stated childbearing desires (lack of balance between work and family life)

Employment

- Maternal employment rates
- Average number of actual working hours
- Time used for work, care, and daily household chores*

Indirectly relevant

- Lone-parent households
- Life satisfaction

* Not yet available in the OECD Family Database.

Policy measures of direct relevance that should be included in an assessment of the policy goal of balancing work and family life are: policy measures on leave, ECEC, taxes, and employment. These are outlined in Box 6.1.3.2.

We assume that the public investment in leave and ECEC services, represented by the social expenditure levels in these two policy fields, will be a reflection of the possibility for parents to choose between looking after the child at home or having the child looked after in formal daycare. The combination of high expenditure in both policy fields would very crudely indicate better possibilities to combine work and family life (not taking into account institutional variation in leave and ECEC arrangements across the countries). Likewise, length of leave may indicate whether it is possible to take time off work to look after the child, but preferably in combination with high enrolment rates and formal entitlement to ECEC in order to provide a choice between work and childcare. The compensation rates provided by leave schemes as well as the effective amount of leave provided indicate whether or not it is realistic for men and women to actually take the leave, and in cases where the compensation rate is low, they also indirectly indicate the pressure on the woman to take the majority of the leave, since she is normally the one who earns the lowest wages. Finally, the gender equality index also portrays the possible gender imbalance in the design of the leave schemes and how this may affect women's opportunities for balancing work and family life.

Payments for ECEC, opening hours, and the possibility to use full-time services may also influence parents' decisions to make use of these services and thus whether it is feasible to combine work and family life.

In regard to indicators on employment, the statutory regulation of maximum number of working hours and average number of actual working hours are important for understanding how much time work takes up and whether this leaves time for tending to a family, whereas existing problems balancing work and family life may be captured in the indicator current vs. preferred working hours of parents.

Parents may also consider the quality of the services, reported as child:staff ratios and staff training levels, when deciding if and how much they want to use services.

Among the more indirectly related indicators, parents may also consider the quality of services, reported as child:staff ratios and staff training levels, when deciding if and how much they want to use services, but since these indicators relate to the child's outcome from participating in ECEC services, they are treated as indirect indicators under this policy aim.

Finally, various family benefit indicators may be included as indirect indicators of whether men and women can balance work and family life, insofar as they indicate the general support available to families and the degree to which parents need to supplement their income from paid labour.

Box 9.4.2 Policy measure indicators relevant to balancing work and family life

Directly relevant to balancing work and family life

Leave

- Social expenditure on leave payments, percentage of GDP
- Social expenditure on leave per child born, as a percentage of GDP
- Length of maternity, paternity and parental leave in weeks
- Effective leave (time and money available for the care of children)
- Compensation in percentage of earnings
- Proportion of employed parents on leave with a child under age 1
- Gender equality

ECEC

- Formal entitlement to daycare
- Enrolment rates in daycare and educational services, percentage of children
- Children attending full-time provision as a percentage of overall provision
- Opening hours
- Social expenditure on ECEC as a proportion of GDP
- Public share of expenditure
- Child care costs for dual-earner family

Employment

- Statutory maximum of working hours
- Average number of actual working hours
- Current vs. preferred working hours of parents

Indirectly related

ECEC

- Child:staff ratio
- 80% or more staff members have received training
- 50% or more staff members have finished tertiary education

Family benefits

- Total public expenditure on family policy
- Tax breaks
- Public expenditure on child or family allowances
- Size of family benefit package by level of earnings
- Size of family benefit package by family size
- Size of family benefit package by family type

9.5 DESCRIPTION OF SCORECARDS

Scorecards have been constructed for three countries in order to illustrate how a comparable synthesis of country context, policy measures and outcome indicators can be presented. Scorecards have been constructed for Denmark, Germany, and the UK. In principle, scorecards for all countries could be made in the same manner.

For each country we present two figures. The first figure provides an overview of outcome and context indicators (see Chapter 4) that are directly related to the policy aims of child wellbeing, gender equality, and balancing work and family. The second figure contains information on indicators that describe the design of family policy measures (see Chapter 5). Both figures follow the same style in organizing the data. The basic idea is to present a country's value for a given indicator in relation to the indicator's distribution across all countries. Therefore, the figures contain for each indicator the mean, minimum, and maximum values. This allows for a quick and transparent assessment of a country's position in comparison to other countries.

All indicators have been transformed into z-scores (i.e., as the deviation of a value from the mean divided by the standard deviation). The mean of a z-standardised variable is zero, one unit equals the standard variation of this variable. Hence, the scale is the same for all indicators and thus they can be compared directly. To provide better orientation, all figures include separating lines at +1/2 and -1/2 standard deviations. Values falling between these two lines can be regarded as close to the mean of the variable. The same logic has already been used in earlier chapters to differentiate between three levels for each indicator (>, O, <). Any updating of such z-scores is relatively unproblematic as they are simple calculations of raw indicators based on the data available from the OECD database.

The labels in the figures on family policy indicators contain additional letters C, B, and G. These letters pick up the discussion of the link between family policy measures and policy aims in Section 6.1. For instance, C signifies that the respective indicator is directly or indirectly related to the aim of child wellbeing (B=balancing work and family, G=gender equality). However, many indicators are related to all three policy aims, and also, indicators might be related to an additional policy aim at least indirectly. Therefore, the letters are meant as a tool to read the figure but they do not suggest that there is a causal relationship between a policy measure and an outcome based on a proper evaluation.

Two additional caveats should be added. First, the country sample differs from indicator to indicator (see the respective tables in Chapter 4 and 5). Therefore, the calculation of the mean, the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum often do not take into account the full sample of 38 countries examined in this report. Second, the direction of the indicators differs. A high value does not always have to be read as a positive outcome. Also a low value can be positive (e.g., a low proportion of children in poverty). As it sometimes depends on the policy aim or is simply a normative question how to interpret a given value, we have not attempted to produce unidirectional indicators. Hence, if a country exhibits the maximum, it just means "highest value" and not necessarily "best performer."

We briefly discuss the example of Denmark to illustrate the contents of the scorecards. The first graph is divided into three subsections that contain context and outcome indicators for the three policy aims: child wellbeing, balancing work and family, and gender equality. Denmark scores low in most indicators of child wellbeing (values below the average over all countries for which an indicator is available). However, with the exception of the PISA scores, which are almost average, a low share can be interpreted in a positive way. The share of young people not in education and the child poverty rate there are the lowest among all countries. Also, the share of children with low birth weight is well below the average.

Regarding the indicators that describe the context and outcomes in the field of balancing work and family, we also have to take into account the direction of the indicators. Denmark scores above-average with regard to maternal employment rates, the part-time rate of men, the fertility rate, and the share of households with no children, and also the difference between the actual and ideal number of children tends to be high. The average household size is below average. However, the share of people who state that they do not have children because of difficulties combining work and family or due to financial problems is low. The childbearing preferences of childless women, the mean age of women at first birth, and the part-time employment rate of women are at a level at or near the average. It is not easy to summarize the results for Denmark under a common heading that reflects the complexity of assessing the outcomes and the contexts for the aim of balancing work and family.

Looking at the aim of gender equality, we find three indicators that have already been used since they are also related to the aim of balancing work and family (part-time rates of men and women, maternal employment rates). The other two indicators show that the gender wage gap as well as the gender employment gap is comparably low in Denmark. The second graph, which shows the family policy indicators, is divided into six subsections (benefits and taxes, expenditure, firm-level policies, working time, child care, parental leave). Denmark scores rather high (or at the top) with respect to compensation for parental leave, but lower with respect to the length of parental leave. Denmark also scores high in almost all indicators that describe the child-care system. As explained above, for each of the policy indicators, we have added the letters B and/or C and/or G (B=balancing work and family, G=gender equality). In many areas-such as childcare-it is easy to assume that policy measures are related to all three policy aims. The enrolment rates in childcare are high. For zero to two year olds, they are the highest of all countries in our comparison. The share of children in full-time care (as a percentage of all children in care) is high. Childcare facilities in Denmark have, on average, long opening hours. On some of the indicators, Denmark scores low. First, the child:staff ratio in preschool programmes is low, which can be taken as an indicator of the quality of the programmes. Also the share of public funding is low (while the overall public expenditure on ECEC is high). This example shows clearly that it takes a normative view to evaluate whether high or low indicators can be interpreted in a positive or negative manner.

Looking at working time regulations, the scorecard shows a mixed picture for Denmark. The statutory maximum is the highest of all OECD and EU countries. However, the collectively agreed average working time is well below the average. There are, to varying degrees, possibilities to accumulate hours. A comparatively high share of firms offer the option to reverse part-time work. The share of firms providing daycare is belowaverage; the share of firms with males on parental leave is above-average. Overall public expenditure indicators show that Denmark spends a high share of its GDP on family policies, in particular on in-kind measures. But also expenditure on cash benefits is above-average (which includes expenditure on parental leave). Family support via tax breaks seems to play a minor role. The family benefit package for a family at average wage level is slightly above-average. Family benefits are targeted (at an average level). Benefits for larger families or single parents are not particularly high compared to other families. Average tax rates are high and also the differences between the tax rate for single and dual earners (i.e., the rate for dual earners is lower).

Although the scorecards are meant as a tool to summarize the detailed information collected in earlier chapters, they still provide information on the value of a given indicator, but in a more standardized manner, with direct reference to the overall distribution of an indicator (minimum, maximum, average). In our view, this allows for a quicker assessment of an overall country profile without assigning an overall grade to that country's family policy, since many of the indicators can be read in different ways (positive for one aim, detrimental for another aim).

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

This report provides a first attempt at identifying and operationalizing relevant indicators for a national assessment of family policy. Indicators on contexts, outcomes, and policy measures have been selected according to a definition of family policy that focuses on families with smaller children. The indicators have been selected according to their importance and relevance for three overall policy aims: child wellbeing, gender equality, and balancing work and family life. Based on the indicators selected, country-specific scorecards for the assessment of family policy were selected. Three national scorecards have been presented as examples to illustrate how countries can assess their family policy relative to other comparable countries.

The indicators chosen for use in this report by no means represent an exhaustive list. They are part of a core approach based on the data presently available. Our approach is also pragmatic; it does not focus on the question of which indicators could be useful from a theoretical point of view. Throughout the report, we have commented on the limitations of the data and which additional data we would like to see provided. Much of the data originates from the OECD Family Database, which is a true

advancement in making data comparable and accessible, and in providing an understanding of the differences in family policy design between countries. Still, we would like to see more indicators oriented towards the child, for example, number of hours worked by both parents per child, which would suggest how the child might be affected by the amount of time that both mother and father work. Data following the child would also be helpful for understanding the national differences in combinations of leave and early years daycare. Overall, the available data on the various leave schemes is also not sufficient for a full understanding of the national differences, for example, for comprehending how parents combine the various forms of parental leave and what compensation is available for them across different income groupings and employment sectors. Moreover, the indicators so far mainly focus on the state agencies responsible for family policies. Indicators on policies on the employer/firm level are sparse. However, the firm level is important, in particular to balancing work and family life. More and better data on the firm level are needed for a cross-country evaluation on this level. Apart from this, the indicators we selected mainly cover objective indicators; nevertheless, subjective indicators are important as well. Further work in the creation of new comparable indicators should take this into account.

The indicators are presented with their individual value in order to provide as transparent an overview as possible. Further work may establish how the indicators could be weighted in order to provide more composed indicators.

The choice of indicators has, as mentioned, been pragmatic and policydriven. We have not attempted to investigate whether indicators are directly related to policy aims. Since the policy aims are rather broad, most indicators can be used to explain more than one policy aim. It has not been the purpose of this report to establish whether there is a linear or other relationship between indicators and policy aims, nor to test the level at which an indicator has a negative vs. positive relationship to a policy goal. It is left to future investigation to establish such relationships. However, we hope this report will contribute to the discussion on the assessment of family policy. It should offer tools for assessment that may be developed further, and should offer an approach to using the OECD Family Database, acknowledging this unique data source for crosscountry comparisons in the field of family policy.

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APPENDIX

TABLE SOURCES (SORTED BY TABLES AND INDICATORS)

Table 4.1.1:

- Life expectancy at birth: CIA world fact book 2008, Data 2008
- Fertility rate: Eurostat, Data 2007 and OECD Factbook 2008, Data 2006
- Birth rate: OECD Factbook 2008, Data 2006 and OECD Health Data 2008, Data 2006
- Teenage birth rate: OECD Family Database FS6, Data 2005 and OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table 2.1, Data 2005
- Mean age for women at birth of first child: OECD Family Database FS5, Data 2005
- Births out-of-wedlock: Eurostat, Data 2007 and OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table 2.1, Data 2005
- Sole parent household: OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table 2.1, Data 2005

- Average household size: OECD Family Database SF1, Data mid 2000s
- Households with no children: OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table 2.1, Data 2005

Table 4.1.2:

- Maternal employment: OECD Family Database LMF2, Data 2005
- **Part-time employment:** OECD Employment Outlook 2008, Statistical Annex, Table E, Data 2007
- Full-time employment: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Online Database(2006), Note: Age of men and women 25 to 54 (Mexico missing in source), Data 2006
- Working time: OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table 7, Chapter 7, Data 2005
- Average current and preferred working time: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (1998), *Working time preferences in 16 European countries*, Table 25, page 61, Data 1998
- Family poverty: OECD (2008) Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD countries, Figure 1.1, Data mid 2000s

Table 4.1.3:

- Gender pay gap: OECD (2008) Employment Outlook, Statistical Annex, Table H, Data 2006
- Gender pay gap: Eurostat Tables: Labour market: Earnings, Data 2006
- Gender gap of employment: World Economic Forum (2008), *The Global Gender Report*, Data 2008

Table 4.1.4:

- Child poverty: OECD Family Database CO8, Data mid 2000s
- Infant mortality rate: OECD Family Database CO1, Data 2005
- Low birth weight: OECD Family Database CO2a, Data 2005
- Young people not in education: OECD Family Database CO13, Data 2004, primary source OECD Education Database
- PISA score: OECD (2006) PISA, Annex A7, Table A7.2, Data 2006

Table 4.1.5:

- Childbearing preferences: Testa, Maria Rita (2006), Childbearing preferences and family issues in Europe, Data 2006
- Difference between actual and ideal number of children: Testa, Maria Rita (2006), *Childbearing preferences and family issues in Europe*, Data 2006
- Reasons for not fulfilling childbearing desires: Testa, Maria Rita (2006), *Childbearing preferences and family issues in Europe*, Data 2006

- Life satisfaction mean EU: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2003), *Quality of Life Report*, European Quality of Life Survey, Data 2003
- Life satisfaction mean World: Veenhoven, R. World Database of *Happiness*, Note: Various data sources, Data 1998-2007
- Satisfaction with family life: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, EurLIFE Database, Data 2003, mean of scale of 1 to 10

Table 5.2:

- **Public expenditure on family cash benefits:** OECD Social Expenditure Database, Data 2003
- Social expenditure on leave per child: OECD Family Database PF7, Data 2003
- Length of leave: OECD Family Policy Database, Data 2006/2007, Bennet, J. (2008), *Early Childhood Services in the OECD countries*, table 1.
- Effective leave: Bennett, J. (2008), *Early Childhood Services in the* OECD countries, Figure 9, page 42, Data 2005/2006
- Compensation: Ray et al. (2008), Parental Leave Policies in 21 countries, Data 2007/2008
- Gender equality index: Ray et al. (2008), *Parental Leave Policies in 21 countries*, Figure 6, page 14, Data 2007/2008
- **Proportion of employed parents with a child under age 1:** OECD Family Database PF8, Data 2006

Table 6.2.1:

- Entitlement to daycare: Bennett, J. (2008), Early Childhood Services in the OECD countries, table 3.
- Enrolment in daycare: OECD Family Database PF11, Data 2004, primary source OECD Education Database
- Full-time childcare: Eurostat, EU SILC, Data 2006
- **Public expenditure ECEC:** OECD Family Database PF10, Data 2005
- **Public funding:** UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, *Report Card 8*, Figure 4, page 27, Data 2003

Table 6.2.2:

- Average opening hours: Eurydice
- **Training of staff:** UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, *Report Card 8*, Figure 1, page 2
- Average child-staff ratio:
 - Day care programmes: OECD (2008): Babies and Bosses. reconciling work and family life, table 6.A1.1
 - **Pre-school programmes:** OECD (2008): Babies and Bosses. reconciling work and family life, table 6.A1.1

Table 7.2.1:

• **Public expenditure:** OECD Social Expenditure Database; OECD Family Database PF1 and European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics, Data 2003-2005

Table 7.2.2:

- **Public expenditure:** OECD Social Expenditure Database; OECD Family Database PF1 and European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics, Data 2003-2005
- Size of family package:
 - Level of earnings: OECD (2007) Babies and Bosses, Table
 4.2, page 77, Data 2005
 - **Family size:** own calculations based on Bradshaw and Finch (2006)
 - **Family type**: own calculations based on Bradshaw and Finch (2006)

Table 7.2.3:

• Gender neutrality of tax benefit system: OECD Family Database PF4, Data 2006

Table 8.3.1:

- Forms of flexible working time arrangements: EFILWC, Working time and work-life balance: a policy dilemma? Figure on page 16, Data 2004-2005
- Rationale for introducing part-time work: EFILWC, *Part-time work in European companies*, Figure 12, page 32, Base: all establishments with part-time work (management interviews), Data 2004-2005
- **Reversiblity:** EFILWC, *Part-time work in European companies*, Figure 26, page 53, Base: all establishments with employees on parental leave.
- Firms with males on parental leave: Working time and work-life balance in European companies, Figure 20, page 36, Base Establishments with employees on parental leave, Data 2004-2005
- Prevalence of leave take-up: Parental leave in European companies, Figure 1, page 15, Base: all establishments (management interviews), Data 2004-2005
- Firms providing daycare: Parental leave in European companies, Table 5, page 38, Base: all establishments (management interviews), Data 2004-2005

TABLE NOTES AND DEFINITIONS (SORTED BY TABLES AND INDICATORS)

Table 4.1.1:

• Life expectancy at birth:

Definition: Life expectancy at birth is the average number of years that a person can be expected to live, assuming that age-specific mortality levels remain constant.

Note: life expectancy at birth for the total population is estimated by the OECD Secretariat for all countries, using the unweighted average of life expectancy of men and women.

• Teenage birth rate:

Definition: Births per 1,000 women aged 15-19.

• Births out-of-wedlock:

Definition: Births, where the mother's marital status at the time of birth is other than married.

• Average household size:

Definition: The size of households is determined by members who live in the same dwelling and include dependent children of all ages.

Footnote to Turkey: The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey will maintain its position concerning the "Cyprus issue." Footnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognized by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

• Households with no children:

Definition: Households with no children as a proportion of all households.

Table 4.1.2:

• Statutory maximum:

Definition: Some European countries set their maximum weekly hours at the 48 hours specified in the EU working-time directive. Yet, some European countries also set a limit of about 40 hours, and working time flexibility schemes allow weekly hours to vary around an average over a reference period. For example, in Austria, weekly hours may be varied up to a maximum of 50 over a reference period, if an average 40-hour week is maintained (see OECD 2007).

Table 4.1.5:

• Childbearing preferences:

Definition: Childless women aged 15-39 with no preferences for children

• Difference between actual and ideal number of children:

Definition: The difference between the mean actual number of children and the mean general ideal number of children. Note: Females

• Reasons for not fulfilling childbearing desires:

Definition: Distribution of people not fulfilling childbearing desires formulated at age 20 by reason of not having had all the children desired.

Table 5.2:

• Length of leave:

Note: Paternity leave includes periods set for fathers' quotas; payment may vary between the two schemes.

• Effective leave:

Note: Based on 2FTE/SR meaning full-time equvalent salary replacement. Thus, 40 weeks replaced by 100% of earnings has a coefficient of 40; at 50 % of earnings, a coefficient of 20. Please note that the calculations are approximate, as some countries offer a percentage of salary while others offer only a percentage of a minimum wage or unemployment benefit. Although a percentage of salary will in most cases be superior to a percentage of the minimum wage (or in the Nordic countries, to the wage of an unskilled worker), the calculation of the replacement wage in this table treats both sources in the same way, that is, 50% of the minimum wage and 50% of salary receive an equal weighting

• Gender equality index:

Definition: Measure of countries' policies on a fifteen-point scale, with nine possible points for the distribution of leave, five possible points for the level of wage replacement during leave, and one possible point (positive or negative) for policy incentives that encourage men to take or not take the leave available.

Table 6.2.1:

• Public expenditure ECEC:

Definition: Public expenditure on childcare and pre-primary education services, percentage of GDP.

Table 6.2.2:

• Average opening hours:

Definition: Average opening hours of ECEC

• Training of staff:

Definition: 50% of staff in accredited early education services tertiary educated with relevant qualifications. Note: Data for UK refers to England only EXAMPLES OF SCORE CARDS

Denmark: Context and outcomes by policy aims





Denmark: Family policy indicators



Notes: All values have been transformed into z-scores. The mean of a variable equals a z-score of 0 and a standard deviation (SD) a z-score of 1. Various sources, for details on single indicators and the sample of countries see Chapter 5. Assumed direct relevance for policy aims in brackets (B=Balancing work and family, C=Child well-being, G=Gender equality).

Germany: Context and outcomes by policy aims





Germany: Family policy indicators



Notes: All values have been transformed into z-scores. The mean of a variable equals a z-score of 0 and a standard deviation (SD) a z-score of 1. Various sources, for details on single indicators and the sample of countries see Chapter 5. Assumed direct relevance for policy aims in brackets (B=Balancing work and family, C=Child well-being, G=Gender equality).

United Kingdom: Context and outcomes by policy aims





United Kingdom: Family policy indicators



Notes: All values have been transformed into z-scores. The mean of a variable equals a z-score of 0 and a standard deviation (SD) a z-score of 1. Various sources, for details on single indicators and the sample of countries see Chapter 5. Assumed direct relevance for policy aims in brackets (B=Balancing work and family, C=Child well-being, G=Gender equality).