From Hume's "Delicacy" to Contemporary Art

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ABSTRACT

David Hume's essay “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757)—which represents a major step towards clarifying eighteenth-century philosophy’s dawning aesthetics in terms of taste—also relates closely to literal, physical taste. From the analogy between gustatory and critical taste, Hume, apt at judging works of art, puts together a contradictory argument of subjectivism (taste is individual and varies from person to person) and the normativity of common sense (the test of time shows that some works of art are better than others). However, a careful reading of the text unveils a way of appealing to art criticism as a vital component in edifying a philosophically more solid standard of taste. Hume’s emphatic references to a requisite “delicacy” complicate the picture, for it is not clear what this delicacy is, but a close inspection of how Hume frames the criterion of delicacy by means of “practice” and the absence of “prejudice” might perhaps challenge us to address issues of contemporary art.

KEYWORDS

Hume, Delicacy of Taste, Art Criticism inherent to Aesthetics, Lawfulness without Law, Creative Art Processes
yet, in an attentive perusal of the entire essay, the text appears to stray into not only complex argumentation but also to provide evidence of the conceptual potential of taste. This is the reason why I shall propose a more myopic, literal reading of the text that focuses on—and almost tastes—some of the high-profile words that take Hume's inquiry of a standard of taste into surprising dimensions of aesthetic theory. In that sense, the methodological grasp of this paper proceeds more by a kind of deliberate 'decontextualizing' than it is based on the contextualizing lines that most often guide the study of the British eighteenth-century moralists. If Hume largely joins Shaftesbury and Burke in making aesthetic morality ideologically effective, as well as the British thinkers are more concerned with manners, customs, and habits of human nature than with art,³ Hume actually seems to involve art substantially when he is addressing the question of taste.

Of course, focusing on an individual essay written late in Hume's career may also misrepresent the degree to which his aesthetic theory is integrated into his philosophical system, but such an objection—once again—manifests a tendency to take for granted that radical scepticism is primary in aesthetics, as elsewhere in Hume, and thus to lock the text in place as a historic document representing a traditional philosophical position. I would like to risk the exact opposite. While re-reading this energetic and undeniably complex text it struck me that, beyond empiricism or any common sense perspective of taste, beyond later Kantian transformation as well, Hume makes art criticism an important aspect of his argument. Art criticism appears as a vital component in his way of edifying an unexpectedly, philosophically more solid standard of taste and, even more intriguing, in doing so Hume intensively relates taste to the world of art, to works of art and, more implicitly, to the very making of art. “Delicacy” was the ambiguous term that made me suspect that the text had an undercurrent of aesthetic intuitions that may perhaps lead all the way to contemporary art, which chronically lacks—so the saying goes—any standard of taste.

PRAGMATICS OF COMMON SENSE
Let us return to the legendary, ingenious introduction in Hume's essay. This stupendous opening confines the search for a standard of taste as stretching between two proverbial truths, both of which nip that same search in the bud. On the one hand, Hume begins by positing that taste varies from one person to another, from one culture to another, and from one civilization to another, only
to conclude with the well-known proverb that there can be no accounting for tastes, stating: “the proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes” (137). In other words, it is useless to try to agree about something that depends on pure individual inclinations. Relativism with regard to taste poses an insurmountable obstacle. Unlike understanding—whose “determinations have reference to something beyond themselves,” and accordingly can be judged conformable, or not, to a standard: “all sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself” (136). Closely connecting taste to feelings inevitably leads to banning any attempt to decide what good taste is and what bad taste is. When judgments of taste conflict, everyone must insist on his or her own sensibility. How culturally rooted taste may be, it is produced individually and inseparable from one's emotional fingerprint. A sentiment either is or it is not; it has no other criterion than itself. Sensibility, accordingly, seems at once the surest foundation of taste and no foundation at all.

On the other hand, Hume prepares for a reversal of gustatory relativism, actually throughout the whole essay. The redundant use of “but though” is nothing but a linguistic marker of his attempt to go beyond relativism, for example: “But though this axiom, by passing into a proverb, seems to have attained the sanction of common sense; there is certainty of a species of common sense, which opposes it, at least serves to modify and restrain it” (137). What exactly is Hume pointing to? Does he intend to replace one common sense with another? Or if not opposing, then modifying and restraining the relativist lack of a standard of taste? What happens to be this other common sense comparable to the shared proverbial wisdom? It is simply, claims Hume, a fact that some judgments of taste are obviously better than others. Yet, in arguing for this common sense, which is as irrefutable as the other one, Hume seems to leave the point of view of the tasting subject behind him and, all the same, the strength of truth inherent to individual sentiments that made consensus impossible. In return, he enters the world of art by referring to works of art and the artists that produce them. This argument is however in the first place framed as conventionally as the other one. The existence of canonical, classical works proves that some are better than others and, consequently, should be met by the admiration of all mankind: “Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton […] would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Tenerife, or a pond as extensive as the ocean” (137).
The common sense at stake in a unanimity of appreciation achieved through reference to masterful works like Milton's points to what we, in a modern philosophical vocabulary, could translate as a culturally intersubjective pragmatic process of selection by means of which experts, art critics, art amateurs and ordinary people end up joining sharing each other's tastes. The true works of art impose their authority over time, through the ages. Taste, then, ultimately, relates to, responds to or reflects negotiated conventions within a specific cultural context. If the argument of taste's inseparability to spontaneous individual feelings was based upon an empiricist a priori of no return, this other claim concerning the canonization of undoubtedly outstanding artworks points to a posteriori proceedings by means of which works of art pass the test of time.

However, instead of accepting an obliteration of taste, be it downwards by sticking to strictly idiosyncratic standards, or upwards by establishing authoritative standards, Hume is eager to search for a truer, more proper standard of taste, i.e. the "operations of true taste" (147). It seems as if at least the collective standard of taste builds upon a normative basis that leans on a truer sentiment—perhaps a refined one—but nevertheless a sentiment otherwise capable of claiming its truth. In arguing so, art criticism comes into play.

DELICACY OF TASTE
At the turning point where the two standards of taste, so to speak, collapse into common sense, Hume actually carries on by drawing a portrait of art critics. The most distinguished of the kind demonstrate a taste that satisfies a considerable number of the conditions that might enable them to "establish their own sentiment as the standard of beauty" (147). In this promotion of fine arbiters of taste, delicacy functions as a major term—one of four key notions Hume italicizes—in that it assumes the various claims to a necessary refinement of the organ of taste, from its most literal embeddedness in bodily perception, to more intellectual capacities of imagination and understanding, if a standard of taste should be able to overcome the natural variety and ordinary caprice of taste. It takes a "sound" organ, just as it takes a "delicacy of imagination" to obtain a "true standard of taste and sentiment" (140), Hume argues.

Delicacy certainly claims Hume's full attention and he strongly points out the need to provide a more "accurate definition of delicacy". For that purpose, he relates an anecdote from Don Quixote about how at a wine testing, two kinsmen were able to detect subtle
flavours, the one a slight taste of iron and the other a faint taste of leather, even though neither of them knew that a key on a leathern chain was hidden at the bottom of the wine cask. But, once revealed, it of course gave proof to their judgment. Hume makes use of this story to give a more explicit definition of the meaning of delicacy: “Where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense” (141).

Still, this firm definition may be more ambiguous than it seems. Delicacy, understood as the ability to perceive the subtillest ingredients in what composes an object of taste, almost presupposes the existence of objective criteria, as if Hume were tempted to follow Baumgarten, who declared aesthetics to be “the science of sensual cognition.” But Hume uses the narrative less rigorously, with the anecdote quite simply serving to instead invoke the kind of attention that should be cultivated in order to gain delicacy, i.e. an ability to keep one’s eyes and ears open, to let one’s glance dwell on the object of taste while experiencing it with sagacity, refining one’s tastes, proving that taste is a credible guide. Even so, if Hume does not subscribe to German rationalism in descending from the universal to the particular, he also deviates from his British colleagues that largely connected delicacy to aestheticized morality, praising a delightful fulfilment of nature in men of good manners.

Two other terms, also italicized by Hume, back up the claim of a much more practical approach to delicacy, when he strongly insists on the necessity of practice and the absence of prejudice, since both contribute to solidifying the understanding of a delicacy of taste beyond the idea of sensible cognition. In this perspective, practical experience is what matters, as far as practice permits the critic to increase his talent, notably by making comparisons (also italicized by Hume) that allow him to form a clear and distinct sentiment concerning those objects that an unpracticed person would be unable to perceive: “A man who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to him” (144).

Likewise, the critic should be free from all prejudice in order to embrace the point of view of the work he is judging. Hume argues, by analogy, to use of reason because prejudices are generally devastating to the faculty of judgment: “It is well known, that, in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment, and perverts all operations of the

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intellectual faculties: it is no less contrary to good taste” (146). Though Hume concedes that critics uniting these qualities of delicacy, practice and impartiality are extremely few in number—even “during the most polished ages”—he concludes that there is a standard of taste that is shaped upon the features that might distinguish “so rare a character” as to be a “true judge in the finer art,” stating that a “strong sense, united to delicate sentiment improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared from all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty” (147).

But while Hume goes on by asking where to actually find such critics, and in fact returns to consider natural variations within these rare men of delicate taste (young people often prefer different types of art than their elders), it is worthwhile to go further and scrutinize his argumentation concerning delicacy and its auxiliary terms of practice and the like. Again, Hume demonstrates amazing complexity. On the one hand, delicacy of taste is, in general and conventional terms, put down to a vague reference to human nature: “because it is the source of all the finest and most innocent enjoyments of which human nature is susceptible”—upon which he also states: “the sentiments of all mankind are agreed” (143); but, simultaneously, in the margins of the text, it also becomes clear that the criterion of delicacy more profoundly and more substantially connects to works of art. Delicacy is somehow sharpened by works of art, not only when we experience them but when we learn from them. After all, works of art themselves, considered from inside out, so to speak, might ultimately shed light on how to conclude from delicacy “a true standard of taste” (140).

Surreptitiously, the perspective is no longer that of critics tasting art with delicacy, but has been transposed into a question of artistic creation. Works of art testify to the rules upon which they should be judged, and these rules are strictly rules of art. Hume is perfectly clear on this point, for example, with regard to poetry: “But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or observation” (138). This remark marks may be a hidden, but also an important turn in the essay, in that Hume almost insensibly, and without any further mediation, adopts the position of the artist, and more precisely the artist at work. The author feels compelled to discover the rules of his art while writing, whether poets are guided by inspiration or by making their own observations. What matters is that the implicit “true standard of taste” points to a
truth that originates from the work of art and its previous process of having become a work of art. Art truly needs rules, but not as instructions to adhere to. Rules appear in the process of creating the artwork, not prior to it. In emphasizing the rule of no rules, Hume moves intuitively close to Kant’s edifying negative transcendental formulation of the lawfulness without law at play in the aesthetic judgment, but he does so basically when speaking of art and artists, approaching even more substantially the Kantian understanding of genius, because, in Kant too, genius is the gift of the artist to create that for which no rule can be given; rather, as Kant explicitly states: “the rule must be abstracted from what the artist has done.”

We might then say that Hume situates the standard of taste in a kind of blindness, on the blind edge of artists’ experiences, for instance when a poet or a painter has to make decisions about what is next in the execution of a poem or a painting.

The teasing question about rules, the artists’ own rules inherent to the making of their art, should not go passed unnoticed, because it causes a redistribution of the relationships Hume establishes between taste, delicacy and art criticism. If artists suddenly have a lead on critics, the standard of taste being somehow associated with artistic production at the most concrete level of execution, this signifies that art criticism should be engaged at the same altitudes. Finally, works of art require art critics who are capable of meeting them at the very level of the “performances” achieved by the artists. This was also Hume’s reason for fighting against prejudices as the critic should be sensible “to that what is required by the performance” (145). It is extraordinary to encounter, under the plume of Hume, the word “performance” as synonymous to a work of art. It actually means that Hume wants to place the point of view of the critic as near as possible to the point of view that the work assumes: “placing himself in that point of view which the performance supposes” (145). Incidentally, “performance” also matches the criterion of practice that Hume meticulously paid attention to. It is worth noting that when discussing the right attitude of the critic towards “the merits of every performance”, Hume essentially draws on the practice of the artist as the inner mirror of what should be the practice of the art critic as well: “the same address and dexterity, which practice gives to the execution of any work, is also acquired by the same means in the judging of it” (144).

It becomes clear that the key notions of delicacy and practice run in two different directions, in reality as much towards the artist and the process of making art as towards the critic and the process of judging art; or better: the practice required by the critic in order
to improve the requisite delicacy that must be informed by the practice and the various ways of execution and practical choices that support a work of art. At this point, Hume's search for a standard of taste embraces the standard that art itself establishes. Of course, in this seminal text on orienting taste towards aesthetic issues, the impulses and orientations are heterogeneous, fluctuating, indecisive; but in pursuing the specific perspective of delicacy and the need for delicacy in tasting art properly and truly, Hume associates a standard of taste to what has to be extracted, inside out, from the artist's own struggle to create a work of art. Taste consequently comes across as a workspace, implying rationality, as far as the artist is not guided by divine inspiration alone, but has to invest both practical and rational skills once determined to produce a work of art.

**EPILOGUE ON CONTEMPORARY ART**

Reopening the argument assumed by delicacy ultimately leads to how Hume destabilizes any standard of taste based on normativity or common sense, yet simultaneously reconstructs a standard of taste in a rather distorted way by drawing direct attention to the artistic process. And thereby taste points to something a little more conceptually dignified than pure subjective feelings. At least we can say that, with Hume, art criticism astonishingly becomes part of aesthetic theorization before it disappears into Kant's epistemological favoring of natural beauty. In this regard, it is worth remembering that French philosopher Denis Diderot, during the same period, was about to launch the adventure of art criticism by embarking on *Salons*, which ended up becoming one of his most compelling works and covered more than twenty years of the French Academy's biennial exhibitions in the Louvre. In *Salon of 1765*, which represents one of the pinnacles of Diderot's enthusiasm as an art critic, Diderot explicitly recognizes that it is the very task of conducting art criticism that encouraged, if not urged, him to develop and practice a more sensitive approach to the works of art he was writing about than the “superficial gaze of the crowd,” which had also characterized his own experience of the Salons prior to becoming an art critic. Art criticism taught him the necessity of a bodily embedded perception—“to fixe my eyes at the canvas” and “to go around the marble”—in order to be more impartial, and just, in his judgments of taste.

With Diderot, a certain amount of sensibilization involving concrete and bodily perception is inherent to art criticism, probably a constitutive one, not only because the critic should “feel” the work, but more fundamentally as far as the critic endeavors to
engage in the difficult task of converging with the ambitions of the artist to create beauty, or simply create art. This ambition was perhaps an additional reason why Diderot was remarkably eager to expand his knowledge about painting techniques and subjects related to the “faire” (the making) of painting. Again, as with Hume’s delicacy, aesthetic rationality points less to standards of taste obtained by conventions than to proper artistic challenges originating from the artworks themselves, and accordingly judgments have to be pronounced on that lane. Of course, Diderot, as a child of his time, remained widely loyal to classicism, somehow stuck to the “grand style” based on the hierarchy of genres and thus certainly incapable of transgressing the conventions that made up the standard of that time, but his experience of art criticism nevertheless dynamically meets art head-on when art demands its own due. Strikingly Diderot also invites philosophical modesty when he is not only sincerely, but also visibly, grateful towards German philosopher Grimm, who commissioned the reviews, and confesses that the “few thoughtful notions about painting and sculpture”8 he had come to cherish owed their philosophical credit, in reality, to his experience as an art critic.

This can be said to be even truer about our time. The emancipation of contemporary art from all traditional criteria has opened up a field of limitless possibilities and total freedom, which, according to Arthur Danto, has led to the negation of art in that “the history of art has come to an end.”9 Actually, ever since art’s post-Duchampian power of self-definition, many theorists define art without reference to any notion of quality, or invoke, with reference to George Dickie, in accordance with Danto, structures of art institutions as the only “necessary and sufficient conditions” which are left to define (or properly dictate) what art is and what it is not.10 But, rather than paying witness to the end of the history of art or to the institutional art world, contemporary art testifies to the loss of any model, to the extent that criticism finds itself obliged to examine each work on its own merits—not to mention that the so-called experts and the artists themselves inhabit that same art world. This leads us back to Hume where we left him.

For every era, appreciating a work of art clearly requires familiarity with various historical conditions for artistic creation. Not everything is possible at every time. Aesthetic delicacy includes knowledge about what can be art—or what art can be—in relation to its recent past and the possibilities that it holds. No aesthetic delicacy or refined affinity (or complicity) with artists would have enabled Hume, or Diderot, to defend the artistic pretention of a
readymade or a monochrome, while a canvas painted today in a classical fashion would scarcely correspond to what is generally considered a current preoccupation of art. Also, if it is relatively easy to measure the impact of a work retrospectively by its influence on successors or the artist’s lifework, this is not the case when a momentous legacy has not been established. Contemporary art is chronically exposed to these circumstances, especially when caught, as it seems to be, in a spiral of radicalization that characterizes avant-gardist expectations, with no rebound in sight.

Still, the quality of particular works of art, as well as the aesthetic experience they give access to, remain a principal concern of art criticism and aesthetic reflection in general, with the entire issue resting on knowing how to account for taste, for what one likes or dislike without applying standards of taste independently of the artworks involved, but certainly also without accepting that anything goes. New standards of taste arise, spelling out new criteria more pertinent to the contemporary social context; sometimes it happens immediately, sometimes after years of delay. The hardly disguised contempt that German and American Neo-Expressionism partially encountered when artists such as Baselitz, Penck, Immendorf, and Kiefer appeared on the international art scene during the late nineteen-sixties and nineteen-eighties might serve as an illustrative example. Many established art circles rejected, for instance, Kiefer’s gigantic melancholic works because of a “return to painting” that was associated with an aesthetic regression of Neo-Expressionism and political and moral regression. Apparently, Kiefer did not deliver what had become the standard of taste as related to an avant-garde logic of rupture. In 2015 the Centre Pompidou in France had a compelling retrospective exhibition of more than 150 of Kiefer’s works, implying that a half a century had had to pass for the “new language” that Kiefer had developed in his controversial works to be deciphered on a common scale. The language, artistically symbolic, was described in the exhibition leaflet as: “both poetic and cathartic, steeped in German culture, in universal history, in mysticism and philosophy.” Again, we may join Hume in connecting the perspective of taste to the delicacy of art criticism. It surprisingly turns out that taste, essentially unmediated as pure sentiment, is illuminated by entire intellectual spaces permeated by theoretical reasons. Or put differently: If beauty or cultural value in Kiefer, or any other artist, is not an objective property of things, the critic cannot neutrally describe a work of art, ignoring its claim to aesthetic value, which essentially implies artistic processes of symbolization. The only workable description

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is one that grasps the artwork in light of its own artistic ambitions, and which therefore seeks to identify the nature of its coherence and intensity, its scope—what precisely is at stake in it—and its contemporary relevance for aesthetic experience. Without categories of this order, an object, a text, an image or a piece of music cannot be “tasted” as an aesthetic object or a work of art.

Certainly, critics of art, as well as aesthetic theorists, will have to play a more modest role and no longer claim, together with the Romantics, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, to challenge Western rationalism in the name of art, nor limit the scope of art to a politicizing interpretation of avant-garde art (and if not delivered, proclaiming the end of art). But, delicate critics in Hume’s sense are needed at the very core of aesthetic theorization in order to contribute to a discussion of the issues presented by the most eloquent, interesting works, especially if they succeed in carrying out—in line with Jacques Rancière’s approach to aesthetics—new ways of seeing, heightening critical awareness or, quite simply, increasing sensitivity about society in general. Of course, as constitutively with taste, this conviction runs into a barrier because taste originates in the flesh, but this obstacle should not discourage aesthetic reflection from attempting to explore the underlying reasons of taste preferences and dislikes. Especially in light of the terror of the “purely subjective,” it is urgent to unfold and identify how artists more or less convincingly succeed in coming across issues of concern by formal embodiment. The notion of “beautiful” makes no sense “only for me,” but engages concerns about additional shared cultural likes and dislikes that divide society. This idea of sharing that is inherent to “beautiful” (how misleading this outdated attribute might be in aesthetics) when applied to a successful work of art is exactly what still escapes positivist and empiricist approaches to aesthetic judgment. That is why Hume ultimately connects with Kant, as well as his essay on taste might be rehabilitated as an invitation to open up the Kantian deduction of the aesthetic judgment towards works of art and their silent knowledge about their coming into being as art.

2 David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste” (1758), in *Selected Essays* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 (1996), 133. All subsequent quotes from this text will use in-text citations that indicate the page number.


4 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, 1750, §1. Baumgarten also stated that: “The aim of aesthetics is the perfection of sensible cognition as such” (*Aesthetica*, §14).


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


11 Donald Judd, drawing upon the avant-gardist criterion of the “new”, severely criticized Kiefer’s work at the Venice Biennale of 1980 as “one of the worst paintings” he had ever seen, in addition to accusing the German artists in general of reactionary nationalism. See *Écrits 1963-1990* (Paris: Daniel Lelong éditeur, 1991), 128.


14 For a distinction between art as language “for one” and “for all”, see Albrecht Wellmer, *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag: 1985), 41-64.