Corporate Scramble for Africa?
Exploring the Interrelations of International Business and Politics in the Case of New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
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On May 18, 2012 leaders of the G8 and three African countries jointly launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NA). The collaboration was announced by the US president at the time, Barack Obama, who declared that “…food security is a moral imperative, but it’s also an economic imperative. History teaches us that one of the most effective ways to pull people and entire nations out of poverty is to invest in their agriculture” (Obama, 2012). NA aims to do just that: enhance Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in African agriculture by a partnership model committing public and private actors to shared goals of “sustained, inclusive, agriculture-led growth” (New Alliance, n.d.A).

However, this aim – and with it NA as such – has received severe media criticism for being but a thin foil for what the The Guardian has dubbed the ‘corporate scramble for Africa’ (Jones, 2014): “It will be like colonialism. Farmers will not be able to farm until they import, linking farmers to [the] vulnerability of international prices. Big companies will benefit” a Tanzanian politician told the newspaper (Kabwe, quoted in Provost, Ford & Tran, 2014). More recently, the European Parliament (EP) has issued a resolution raising similar concerns, albeit in different tones. Thus, the EP (2016) in its review of NA:

Calls on governments and donors to suspend or review all policies, projects and consultancy arrangements that directly encourage and facilitate land grabbing by supporting highly harmful projects and investments or indirectly increase pressure on land and natural resources and can result in serious human rights violations.

Here, the general unease with a perceived neocolonial drift within NA is coupled with a specific worry about land grabbing; that is, large-scale acquisition of farmland so as to concentrate
ownership or user rights on a few actors, often large multinational companies (Cotula et al., 2009: 3).

In this paper, we aim to explore the possible link between NA and neocolonialism, generally, as well as land grabbing, more specifically, asking whether the laudable principles and practices of NA, despite declared intentions, may have adverse effects. Put succinctly, our query is whether NA offers an innovative form of multilateral cooperation that may pull more people out of poverty more effectively than public investment alone or precipitates a restrictive form of corporate colonialism that involves dependence on big business rather than increased self-sufficiency. While this question may seem polemical, it is not rhetorical; as briefly indicated above there is a real debate as to whether the pro-growth principles of NA translate into positive development practices. That is, *is the NA’s partnership model equally advantageous for everyone involved?*

To answer this question, we will first present a conceptual framework that builds on established critiques of development initiatives and points to possibly better principles and practices. Here, we begin by observing a commonality between organization studies (OS) and development studies (DS), which have both raised concerns about a neocolonial drift in currently dominant forms of development policies and practices. Theoretically, then, we draw upon common insights of OS and DS in order to establish a framework for studying the local consequences of multinational development initiatives; that is, for conducting the empirical investigation of a possible corporate scramble for Africa. On the basis, we will discuss what is needed in an agenda of reinvigorating the principles of global value chains by means of practices of alternative organizing, thereby combining and applying more specific insights of the DS and OS literatures, respectively. Our framework, then, consists of two tiers: one general and common to OS and DS and aimed at diagnosing the risk of a neocolonial drift in the principles and practices of NA; the second more particular and combining the DS concept of global value chains with OS insights on alternative organizing, aiming to suggest an agenda for identifying new and better avenues for development.

We apply the framework in a multi-level, mixed-method analysis of New Alliance. Here, we first conduct a macro-level analysis of key documents related to the initiative in order to identify its dominant development principles and organizational logics. Second, we engage in a meso-level investigation of how these general principles and logics have been politically implemented in the case of Malawi, one of the now total of ten African countries to have joined the alliance. Third, we delve further into the micro-level details of our chosen case country in order to assess the practical implications and real-life consequences for rural communities involved in and/or affected by NA
initiatives. Based on this analysis, we finally engage in the discussion of not only how to understand and assess NA, but also of possible improvements of current practices.

**Organization meets development: A common critique**

While development policies and initiatives are, obviously, at the core of development studies, they have only been an occasional concern for organizational scholars. Further, organization studies’ engagement with development has quite singularly been in line with – if not directly inspired by – a certain strand within development studies; namely, that which is critical of the principles and practices that arguably dominate (or have dominated) the empirical field of development.

This strand of DS begins from the observation of continued inequality between the participants in relationships of development, often formerly colonized and colonizing countries (Frank, 1969; Wallerstein, 1986; Edwards, 1989). By the mid-1990’s this observation had become so pervasive and was perceived to be so problematic as to constitute a scholarly as well as practical ‘impasse’ of the field of DS. Most notably, major development organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had, since the 1970s and ‘80s, been heavily criticized for operating on universalized caricatures of development that were unsuitable in practice (Long & van der Ploeg, 1994). This failure of dominant development logics, led to calls for alternatives:

> In much current development work, the advice we put forward cannot be used locally because it is manufactured under completely different circumstances. The only way to ensure its relevance is by fostering the participation of poor people in identifying their own problems, priorities and solutions” (Edwards, 1989: 127; see also Booth, 1994).

Thus, the rising suspicion of the ‘development project’ (Sharp & Briggs, 2006) led to a new agenda, which may broadly be described as postcolonial in the sense that its adherents are particularly concerned with the pervasiveness of asymmetrical power relations between historically colonized and colonizing peoples (Schurmann, 1993). Beginning from this concern, a number of different positions and approaches have emerged, ranging from complete deconstruction of development in the ‘anti-development’ perspective to more constructive takes of empowerment and participation, good governance and livelihoods (Booth, 1994). Further, the enhanced attention to what might be termed ‘the postcolonial condition’ of DS has led to a ‘cultural turn’, which recognizes the heterogeneity of the subjects of development, facilitating a “re-learning to see and reassess the reality of the global South” (Simon, 2006: 13) and focusing on the ‘sub-altern’ people who are
scripted out of conventional histories and narratives (Chambers, 1997). Moreover, postcolonial DS emphasizes the ‘situated local’ (Simon, 2016), and the adverse effects that development initiatives may have on this subject. Such concepts as ‘development from below’, ‘putting the last first’, and anti-development/post-development (Chambers, 1997; Escobar, 1995) aim at ameliorating this situation by tapping into and empowering “localized cultural politics that inflect translocal discourses of development, a sort of contra flow to globalizing discourses” (Moore, 2000: 655). In sum, the challenge posed by postcolonial DS “…is to link […] local identities, practices and agendas to broader and multiscale campaigns and ‘projects’ for progressive and radical change that are substantially postcolonial and critically (post)developmental” (Simon, 2006: 17).

While not exactly subject to a ‘postcolonial turn’, OS has been alerted to “the hegemony of western management thinking” (Muhr & Salem, 2013: 66) and sought to ‘decolonize’ its own discourses and practices (Jaya, 2001). More specifically, postcolonially inspired OS aims to ‘provincialize’ what was previously taken to be universal knowledge and seeks to reconfigure the field of research so as to become more receptive to “deconstructive, emancipatory and relational theorizing” (Westwood & Jack, 2007). Further, postcolonial insights typically inform analyses and critiques of the organization and management of development policies and initiatives, whereby OS engagement with the field of development is generally aligned with the postcolonial strand of DS. In this context, the work of Bobby Banerjee and his co-authors stands out as providing particularly succinct critiques of the pervasive asymmetry of donor-recipient relations (see inter alia Banerjee, 2000; Banerjee & Linstead, 2004; Banerjee & Jackson, 2017). Importantly, Banerjee has pointed out the uneasiness of the ‘post’ in postcolonialism; we must not let it become an excuse for absolving “…any claims for present consequences of the damages caused by colonization” (2003: 146), but instead see it as an entryway into “…new spaces for critique and resistance” (ibid: 164). Thus, Banerjee’s particular brand of postcolonialism does not dissolve, let alone absolve, the asymmetrical power relations between former colonizers and colonies, but to the contrary seeks to expose and criticize the pervasive colonialism of broad discursive constructions like ‘sustainable development’ (Banerjee, 2003) as well as specific initiatives like ‘microfinance’ (Banerjee & Jackson, 2016).

OS and DS, then, share a general critique of ‘mainstream development policy’, which is seen to “…perpetuate colonialist and western-centered discourse and power relations, even as it seeks to focus attention on the marginalized” (Sharp & Briggs, 2006: 7). More specifically, a neocolonial relationship is discerned in matters of land ownership that means the sovereignty of so-called
developing countries and indigenous communities continues to be impaired by the interventions of a nexus of international organizations and multinational corporations (Banerjee, 2011; Carmody, 2016; see also Banerjee, 2000). In adopting the shared postcolonial framework of OS and DS, we are not diverted from studies of power relations, but rather alerted to the potential pervasiveness of colonialism at the level of discourse as well as practice. That is, using this framework enables us to explore whether and how NA might be neocolonial in both the ideological sense of imposing Western ideas and policies on non-Western contexts and the material sense of actual Western takeovers of non-Western land.

*From common critique to common alternatives?*

The similarities between postcolonial perspectives within OS and DS are, as established above, apparent: First, and more generally, a critical concern with the power relations inherent in universalizing discourses and standardized practices; there is never a ‘one size fits all’, and we should be weary of anyone who tells us so. Second, and more particularly, a critique of the way in which development initiatives tend to transfer the dominant logics of western politics to the global South, leading to detrimental effects. Here, we see the contours of the argument that current development initiatives constitute a neocolonial ‘scramble’: such initiatives are said to be not only indirectly complicit in, but actively supportive of multinational corporations’ take-overs of land and other natural resources in the developing world, generally, and Africa, more particularly (Moyo, Yeros & Jha, 2012; Carmody, 2016). The common starting point, then, is that development initiatives are perceived to have a neocolonial drive; they demand of the recipients of such initiatives to not only reshape themselves in the image of the donors (whether individual countries or international organizations), but also – and as a result of this reshaping – to make themselves vulnerable to takeovers by multinational corporations.

Beginning from this critique, both OS and DS turn to ‘the local’, hoping to find there not only resistance to dominant development policies, but also alternative practices that may substitute or at least supplement these. Within DS, one prominent result of this search for more localized and nuanced alternatives has been the identification and promotion of ways in which local producers may be integrated into and gain stronger positions within so-called global value chains. Global value chain analysis focuses on the current global restructuring of production into dispersed and expanding networks of actors that integrate producers in the global South with buyers in the global
North (Gereffi, 1994; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005). Here, “economic activity is not only international in scope; it is also global in its organization” (Gereffi, 1994: 96). Focusing on the integration and position of different actors in global production and trade, global value chain analysis also looks into governance structures and the distribution of power within the chains (Barrientos, 2005; Gereffi et al, 2005) as well as actors’ possibilities for ‘upgrading’, i.e. improving their position in a global value chain, which links directly to development. In order to upgrade, it is necessary for producers to be integrated into the global value chains and to move up the value-added ladder into more profitable positions in the chain (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2004). In other words, focusing on economic upgrading, integration into a global value chain is a precondition for upgrading and generates possibilities for development (UNCTAD, 2013). Recently, social upgrading has been included in the global value chain approach, meaning the position of small holders and marginalized groups in global value chains has attracted attention from development organizations and scholars. One example is the Capturing the Gains project that highlighted the difficulties in distributing the gains of linking up to global values chains and the role of multi-faceted and strategic policy approaches in promoting inclusive growth and poverty reduction (Goger et al., 2014). Meanwhile, there is an emerging argument that inclusion into global value chains may lead to economic upgrading, but simultaneously to social downgrading of marginalized actors (Gereffi, 2014). Hence, globalization without measures for redistribution and bottom-up initiatives may link globalization directly to increased inequality (Kaplinsky, 2000).

While DS scholars have focused on how to create more equal relations between donors and recipients by empowering local producers within global value chains, OS literature tends to attend more specifically to finding and advancing local alternatives. In fact, an entire sub-field of alternative organization studies, dedicated to this endeavor, is emerging. Here, alternative organizations are identified through their compliance with the minimal qualifying criteria of enhancing individual freedom, collective solidarity, and general sustainability (Parker et al., 2014). And the hope is that studying organizations that fulfill these criteria may enable OS to not only engage with organizations more constructively, but also to partake in generally positive social transformations (Parker & Parker, 2017). In the present paper, we follow a similar logic of not only criticizing the powers that be, but also looking for better alternatives. Thereby, we hope to be able to identify local practices that may, if given sufficient support, come to reconfigure global value chains. Thus, we begin by studying NA at the policy level, then move into a more detailed analysis of its local implementation, noting not only the consequences of, but also the possible alternatives.
to it. Before proceeding to this analysis, however, we will present the methodological considerations and procedures that support it.

**Methodology: Operationalizing the critique of development**

In order to investigate the general postcolonial argument concerning the neocolonial drive of currently dominant development principles and practices, we need to, first, establish whether or not current development initiatives can, indeed, be characterized as neocolonial. Further, even if we can confirm a neocolonial tendency or threat, we cannot immediately conclude that development initiatives are inherently bad. Such a conclusion would itself suffer from the universalizing tendencies that the postcolonial approach sets out to dispel. Instead, we must carefully assess the specific consequences of particular initiatives as these are realized in certain contexts. That is, we must not only look at general development discourses and principles, but also study how they are articulated and practiced ‘on the ground’, as it were. These reflections lead us to abandon any ambition of being able to speak of development initiatives as a totality and, instead, turn to the study of one more particular initiative and the specifics of its realization.

As mentioned in the introduction, we focus our empirical work on the NA and its implementation in Malawi, as one particularly relevant example of the principles and logics of current development work and how these play out in practice. In the following, we will first provide the background for this case selection, then detail the methods of our data collection and, finally, present the analytical operationalization of our theoretical framework.

**Case selection: New Alliance and its implementation in Malawi**

The issue of food security has been particularly dominant in development discourses since the global food price crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent global economic crisis (Food Security Information Network, 2017). These crises resulted in historically high levels of worldwide hunger, both in proportional and absolute terms. With the aim of attending to the, at the time, 1 billion people facing hunger, the G8 countries promised substantial funding for global food security at the 2009 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy. In order to fulfil this promise, the G8 leaders launched NA in 2012 as a joint public and private commitment to sustained agricultural growth in Africa (White, 2013). NA, then, is an important and ambitious initiative aimed at addressing one of the most commonly recognized and pressing challenges of development work.
This provides the general backdrop for our choice of case, but we are also more specifically motivated by the critique that has been raised against NA. As mentioned in the introduction, both perpetrators of public debate (e.g. The Guardian) and institutionalized political actors (e.g. the EP) have raised concerns about the neocolonial tendencies of NA. Further, the claim that NA propagates Western ideology has been forwarded in policy papers (e.g. McKeon, 2014) and supported by research articles (e.g. Brooks, 2016). While we do not take this critique at face value, it does make NA a particularly relevant choice for our investigation; here, we are likely to find the tendencies of which our theoretical framework speaks and to be able to study their consequences in the richest possible empirical detail.

However, the study of how development principles are turned into practices must be further localized as we cannot assume that NA will have the same consequences in all contexts. Again, we have relied on existing critique to identify Malawi as one context in which NA has already been accused of having adverse consequences (Patel et al., 2014). Further, and as will be detailed in the following section, we had unique access to the Malawian case, making it an ideal site for the detailed examination of how NA played out in one particular context.

**Data collection**

Our case study involves two initial units of analysis: the general principles and logics of NA and the specific practices of their implementation in Malawi. These two levels are connected by the so-called Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) that specifies how NA is to operate in Malawi. In order to cover the general and the local level as well as the interconnections between the two, we collected a wide range of qualitative data, consisting primarily of documents and interviews. Documents were used for the analysis of the general principles and logics of NA as well as the implementation of these in Malawi. Here, we gathered all relevant texts from publically available sources (for an overview, see table 1).
For the analysis of local practices and experiences, however, we needed more specific and specifically located material. Here, we relied on previous (and previously unpublished) research performed by one of the authors who in 2016 conducted an extensive study of land deals in Malawi. A total of ten government officials, 13 civil society stakeholders and 50 smallholder farmers were interviewed (for an overview, see table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of documents</th>
<th>#</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country cooperation frameworks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Alliance Progress reports</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Development Agenda, Policy Report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Council Terms of Reference</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Statements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press releases</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the research in Malawi focused on one particular aspect rather than the full range of consequences of NA, namely land grabbing, this issue has been pointed out as a particularly direct and detrimental manifestation of neo-colonialism. Zooming in on this specific issue provides a strong starting point for not only criticizing NA, but also identifying possible local practices that may provide better alternatives to currently dominant principles and practices.
Analytical operationalization

As mentioned, our theoretical framework alerts us to the potential neocolonialism of development initiatives in both the ideological sense of imposing Western ideas and policies on non-Western contexts and the material sense of actual Western take-overs of land and other (natural) resources. However contested the concept may be, it seems safe to assume that neoliberalism remains the currently dominant Western ideology (Gamble, 2001; Mirowski, 2013; Springer, Birch & McLeavy, 2016). Therefore, we begin the assessment of the potential ideological neocolonialism of NA by establishing whether and in what way NA can be said to rely on neoliberal principles and logics.

Rather than engaging in discussion and/or critique of neoliberalism per se, this part of the analysis is primarily descriptive, focused on identifying commonly recognized indicators of neoliberalism (e.g. privatization, open trade, deregulation; see figure 1 for details) in NA documents, generally, and in relation to Malawi, specifically. Thus, we use the assessment of the degree to which NA espouses neoliberal principles and demands that participating recipient countries must enact neoliberal policy reforms as a proxy for its propensity to ideological neocolonialism.

Material neocolonialism is, in principle, easier to trace: to what degree have Western actors taken over non-Western land as a result of NA? In practice, however, data on this matter is often hard to find and causal relationships even harder to establish. Nevertheless, we will provide as neutral an account of this aspect as possible, relying on the data on provided by the Land Matrix, “a global and independent land monitoring initiative” (LandMatrix.org, 2017).

On the basis of the identification of ideological and material neocolonialism – or neocolonial drives – in NA, we turn to the more interpretative task of detailing how these drives are experienced in the local context of Malawi. In the final discussion, we will provide our assessment of the current situation and turn to the discussion of how it may be improved.
In order to identify the ideological underpinnings of NA, a series of specific issues must be addressed, and this initial part of the analysis concerns two of these. First, the section presents the overall content, underlying assumptions, and origins of NA (macro perspective). Secondly, we look into how NA has been implemented in Malawi, focusing on the new role of the private sector as compared to the role of the national governments (meso perspective).

New Alliance is a child of the G8 2012 Summit, and hence predominantly designed by the G8 countries. It is a reaction to previous failed development initiatives and brings the private corporate sector more directly into development initiatives. NA was presented by former US President Obama at the 2012 summit where he called on a number of stakeholders, including companies, to lift the burden of securing global food security, because, as he said, “[…] government cannot and should
not do this alone. This has to be all hands on deck” (Obama, 2012). The fundamental principles of NA, including donor pledges, pro-market reforms and corporate capital investments, are primarily a developed nation invention. However, the partnership platform Grow Africa, established in 2011, was an additional driving force in the development of NA. This platform was founded jointly by the African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum (McKeon, 2014). Beyond the indirect influence of AU, it is unclear to what degree African nation states and leaders have had the opportunity to form or alter the design and implementation of NA at the overall level. It is likewise unknown whether the leaderships of any of the ten involved African nations have had the desire to do so.

What is clear, is that in both NA and Grow Africa there is no smallholder-farmer representation. Neither smallholder-representing organizations nor local civil society organizations working with nutrition and poverty have been involved in the process of developing the NA framework. Further, when NA is implemented at the national level through CCFs, the negotiation of each of these frameworks is undertaken exclusively in collaboration between donor countries, governments, and private sector firms. No other domestic stakeholders, e.g. smallholder farmer organizations, have been involved in the negotiations in any of the ten countries (McKeon, 2014). This is despite the stated policy that: “New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks are developed in consultation with farmer organisations to ensure policy reforms and investments respond to the specific needs and opportunities of small-scale farmers.” (DFID statement, 2013). This lack of consultation from smallholder farmer organizations in the procedures of designing the NA framework and in the signing of agreements with local governments has been pointed out by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter among others (ACF, 2014).

In order to ensure accountability in NA, an international Leadership Council has been put in place as an “informal, multistakeholder leadership group committed to advancing progress on investment in sustainable and inclusive agricultural development in Africa […]” (New Alliance, 2014). As stated in its Terms of Reference, this forum is taking the role of monitoring, supporting and advancing progress of commitment implementations. The goal of the Leadership Council is also to “align the work of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa partnership in support of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)” (Co-Convenors of the Leadership Council, 2014). The Council is formed by African governments and agencies, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Secretariat, multilateral organizations, such as International Finance Corporation (IFC); civil society organizations, such as
Oxfam America; private sector firms, such as Yara; and development donor partners such as the European Union. The exact scope of the Council’s mandate holds a degree of uncertainty, however. The Terms of Reference state that the Council provides: “strategic direction and advise. It does not provide operational governance of or oversight to either the New Alliance or Grow Africa, each of which have or will develop their own coordination, governance and accountability structures” (New Alliance, 2014). Thus, the actual governing body and the governing practices ensuring accountability of the New Alliance are not transparent.

The development model of NA assumes that growth and development are interlinked and facilitated by the private sector:

Africa is on the rise. Under the leadership of President Obama, we have pioneered a new model of development that is transforming agriculture and accelerating Africa’s impressive growth and potential. By harnessing the skills, resources and expertise of the private sector, we can build on our investments to power the markets of the future and lift millions of people out of extreme poverty (USAID administrator Rajiv Shah, as quoted in Ford, 2014).

Donald Kaberuka, president of the African Development Bank, is also optimistic about NA:

Anything that ensures that we become part of the global value chain is welcome. Anything that enables us to develop agribusiness is what we need, in short investment. The New Alliance is meant to achieve the following, ensure that the policies are in place which encourage agricultural production, that the infrastructure is in place and then businesses encouraged to come … as they do in mining as they do in telecommunications and in financial services (as quoted in Tran, Provost & Ford, 2014).

Inherent to the reasoning of the New Alliance framework is the assumption that increased food security and decreased poverty levels across the ten participating African nations is predicated upon sustained and inclusive growth in their agricultural sectors. The means to achieve such growth appear to be found primarily in promoting investment. As stated on the website of the White House, “[…] our goals are to increase responsible domestic and foreign private investments in African agriculture, take innovations that can enhance agricultural productivity to scale, and reduce the risk borne by vulnerable economies and communities” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2012).
Moving from the NA, generally, to the Malawian context, more specifically, former president Joyce Banda echoed the pro-growth and pro-privatization sentiments in her justification for the decision to join NA in 2013:

My government doesn't just view agriculture as an essential means to attaining household and national food security; we see it as a business through which our farmers can generate wealth, improve their livelihoods and transform Malawi's economy. None of this can be achieved without private-sector investment (Banda, 2013).

The specific contents of the NA-Malawi deal are presented in Malawi’s CCF. It was initiated by the Malawian government in 2012, launched in 2014 and revised in 2015 into the final draft, reducing the number of policy commitments from an original 35 to a total of 15. The specific contents of the agreement are categorized within three pillars; namely, 1) commitments made by donor countries, 2) policy commitments made by the Malawian government, and 3) investment intentions announced by private sector actors, both international and Malawi-based.

In the first pillar, eight donor countries and the European Union have announced their commitments to support various funds and programmes working locally and nationally in Malawi under the NA. Malawi’s CCF sums up the donation commitments to be a total of $273.9 million in 26 different projects during a 6 year-period. It is not stated whether these commitments, or parts thereof, constitute fresh funding or are part of established donation regimes between the donors and Malawi.

As the second pillar, the Malawian government has committed to undertake 15 policy reforms categorized under four main objectives: Firstly, to create a conducive environment with reduced risk in doing business and fair market returns for farmers, including: elimination of export bans and promotion of exports, promoting smallholder integration into agricultural value chains through, for instance, contract farming, tax reform to promote increased investments, identification of land for commercial agriculture, and a review of seed policy and the regulatory framework for fertilizers in order to encourage competition. Secondly, to improve access to water and basic infrastructure focusing on two policy commitments, namely ensuring that irrigation infrastructure accommodates food and priority cash crops, and secondly prioritizing rural feeder roads\(^1\), which lead to primary production areas of prioritized food and cash crops. Thirdly, improve productivity, storage of

\(^{1}\) Feeder roads are “unpaved rural roads that link agricultural productivity areas with either district roads or national roads” (World Bank, 2011).
produce and produce packing. Here, two policy commitments are to introduce agricultural zoning\(^2\) based on prioritized food and cash crops, and to “reorganize extension services to improve delivery of modernised market-oriented agricultural extension services” (CCF, 2015, p. 5). Finally, to improve advocacy for the growing and consumption of more nutritious food crops and agro-processed foods in order to reduce the prevalence of stunted growth.

In the third pillar of the NA deal, concrete investment plans have been announced by private sector firms. So far, 26 companies have signed letters of intent, briefly describing their intentions of agricultural investments. The private sector investment to be channeled to Malawi through NA comes from 10 multinational companies, one cotton development initiative\(^3\) and 15 African-based firms. Foreign companies have pledged to invest more than $112 million in Malawi’s agricultural sector. Malawian-based companies have pledged approximately $60 million. The companies commit to invest in land and processing facilities. The prioritized crops among investors are groundnuts, oil seed commodities, dairy products, maize, fruits, seeds, toor dahl, sugar, honey and tobacco. There is no systematic reporting on which commodities are meant for the Malawian market and which are meant for exports. However, it can be expected that products such as tobacco, sugar and fruits are directed to the international market since global values chains for these specific commodities are already in place.

Although the general rhetoric surrounding NA does not directly refer to deregulation, privatization, and limiting of subsidies, looking at the policy commitments in Malawi’s CCF, some formulations do link directly to the neo-liberal trajectory of development studies. In Table 3 below is a comparison of the main neoliberal market-oriented policy strategies and Malawi’s NA policy commitments that potentially align with these through: emphasizing measures of job creation and trickle down growth, lack of involvement of local knowledge, no involvement of food expertise, key indicators based on doing business index and increased dollar value. There are no indicators for progress in food security.

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\(^2\) “The purpose of agricultural zoning is to protect farmland from incompatible uses that would adversely affect the long-term economic viability of the area within the region” (Kruft, 2001).

\(^3\) Competitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI) has been funded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), while Africa-based private cotton companies are responsible for implementation on site (Compaci, 2017).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neoliberal strategy</th>
<th>NA policy commitment no.</th>
<th>NA Policy commitment by Malawian government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Reorganise extension services to improve delivery of modernised market-oriented agricultural extension services [MoAIWD]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax reform</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Review taxation regime and its implementation to promote more investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financialization</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fast track implementation of financial sector development strategy by improving Export Development Fund effectiveness and developing low cost finance opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting labor costs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Develop strategy and legislation for contract farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Review Control of Goods Act to eliminate export bans and improve licensing e.g. duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Promote effective smallholder participation in agricultural value chains by formulating a special Farmer Organisation Development strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Review seed policy, strategy and certification to enhance regional harmonisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Develop farm input regulatory framework for fertiliser to encourage competition and regional harmonisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater international trade</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Deregulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>General facilitation of investment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Identify land, in phases, suitable for commercial agriculture (10,000 ha/year from 2013)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Ensure that irrigation infrastructure designs accommodate food and priority cash crops (with designs up to the farm gate and water storage)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Introduction of agricultural zoning based on priority food and cash crops in growth clusters</td>
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Table 3: Indicators of neoliberalism in Malawi’s NA policy commitments

It is unknown whether investors have been chosen on the basis of increased production within specific sectors or whether all investors have been accepted to NA regardless of their type of crop production. Thus, there is no requirement for investors to produce food crops rather than cash crops,
for instance. Among 26 letters of intent from investors, only a few are committing to the following development related activities: Four investors intend to provide training for smallholders, three to engage in demonstration/research farm/training centers, three in finance solutions, two will engage in a partnership with the farmers’ union, one in an ecotourism project, and one will engage with developing cooperatives. Hence, a total of 14 activities can be said to lie beyond a traditional sphere of business activities, and potentially enhance progress in food security. Furthermore, judging from the letters of intent, no companies are involved, directly or indirectly, in any of the 26 food security projects funded by the NA donors. Meanwhile, all 26 investing entities have described their intentions to develop, contribute to, and support different elements of the Malawian agriculture, by for instance creating employment, building research farms or adding value to certain agricultural sectors. The common denominator of all these commitments is increased investments and mobilized capital. Thus, not all investors are committing to job creation or training of smallholders, which indicates that there is no requirement to provide these benefits.

The companies are given certain gains in return for joining the NA: Elimination of export bans, pro-market regulatory environment for doing business, improved infrastructure, agricultural zoning – provisions of large tracks of land, beneficiary tax regime, tax laws to make it easier for companies to do business in the country, enhanced brand recognition and publicity. Whereas the gains for smallholders are more diffuse, difficult to measure, and indirect, such as: potentially getting wage jobs instead of independent farming, possibility for contract farming, possibility for training, possibility for access to loans, and possibility for access to improved seeds.

As reported in Malawi’s NA progress reports of 2014 and 2015, the implementation in Malawi has so far been a success. The report of 2015 writes out the progress in such indicators as: Improved score on Doing Business Index; increased dollar value of private sector investment in the agriculture sector and value added agro-processing; increased private investment in commercial production, sale of inputs and produce and value addition. Besides an updated estimate for each of these indicators, the progress report reviews the stages of the fulfillment of donor, government and investor commitments. However, there is no mention of the progress made with regards to food security and poverty levels as an effect from the implementation of the NA and no measurements or indicators documenting the impact on hunger, malnutrition and access to food in the country.

Summing up this first part of the analysis, we find that investment-based growth assumptions, trickle-down logics, and other neoliberal ideas pervade general NA documents, just as a strong impetus to implement neoliberal policies of, for instance, privatization, tax-reduction and free-trade
saturates specific NA agreements, as exemplified by the policy commitments written into Malawi’s CCF. This clearly indicates that Western ideas are imposed upon non-Western contexts as a prerequisite for participation in NA; that is, a drive towards ideological neocolonialism is inherent to this initiative. However, the NA is not necessarily experienced as neocolonial in its implementation and practice in the local context. Rather, this issue is yet to be explored, but before doing so we turn to the issue of whether NA potentially facilitates material as well as ideological neocolonialism.

**Material neocolonialism**

As powerful as ideas may be, it may seem harsh to talk of a neocolonial drive simply because a development initiative is based upon and/or propagates Western ideas. While many postcolonial critiques do just that, we seek to extend our analysis from the ideational to the material level in order to assess whether and to what extent NA facilitates actual Western take-overs of non-Western land. As mentioned in the theory section, the grabbing of land and other (natural) resources has far from gone unnoticed in the critical literature, and one may even speak of a new scramble for Africa, but how does NA relate to this scramble?

As it turns out, this is the point on which NA has been criticized most harshly; it is said to promote land grabbing by MNCs rather than to support and empower smallholders to climb up the global value chains in which they are involved. This argument has been advanced most vehemently by various NGO’s and advocacy groups (see inter alia Curtis, 2015; Haigh, 2014; Pascal, Jorand & Jamart, 2014), but it has, as referenced in the introduction of the paper, also been taken up by political institutions like the EP (European Parliament, 2016). And it has, as we will detail in the discussion section of this paper, gained some academic traction, albeit in somewhat modified form.

The main support for the argument is that NA offers private investors easy access to land that was formerly public property or owned by smallholders by explicitly including this issue in the participating countries’ CCFs. In the case of Malawi, 200,000 hectares of land were initially to be made available for large-scale commercial farming, and even though this area was reduced to 10,000 hectares per year in the final CCF, the number may still be seen as a clear indicator that NA facilitates corporate takeover of local resources. We could, in principle, observe the material neocolonialism of NA by documenting which companies have actually bought how much land and what it is being used for, but such documentation is not readily available. That is, there are no
official records of the land deals made as part of NA. Instead, we may get an initial idea by looking at which companies participate in the CCF and what their crops are, as already listed in the previous section. This list provides evidence of “...the kind of agriculture envisioned by the New Alliance: large scale, export driven, chemically intensive, centralized knowledge and expertise in the (mainly foreign) private sector” (Patel et al. 2014). Whether and how the participating companies have realized this vision, generally speaking, and in terms of the acquisition of land, more specifically, is, however, more difficult to ascertain. Land Matrix reports eight land deals in Malawi, but only two of these took place after the country had entered NA. Further, the site’s data, by its own reckoning, is only 50% complete. The two confirmed deals to have taken place in or after 2013 amount to a total of only 952 hectares, but with a reported intention to expand one of the deals with a further 3000 hectares. In both deals, the primary investors are private companies and in both cases they are backed by the UK and other Western governments. Further, the purpose of both deals is commercial agriculture, and contract farming is involved in both cases. In the present context one of the two lead companies, Malawi Mangoes, is especially interesting as we will hear more about it in the next analytical section.

For now, the available evidence only allows us to draw a few conclusions. First, we can see that Malawi is acting in accordance with the underlying assumptions behind NA, that attracting agricultural investments, “[...] will help smallholder farmers (most of them women farmers in Africa) to improve their agricultural production and increase their incomes” (Feed the Future, 2012). Thus, the NA logic of land deals is that investing firms will increase incomes through local job creation, and particularly through contract farming. Contract farming, or outgrower schemes, is a way in which agribusinesses can include or hire smallholder farmers to produce certain crops, but on their own plots of land. The smallholders obtain access to necessary inputs to increase productivity and can sell the produce to the company after harvest. In essence, it is understood to promote food security through employment and increased productivity; preferably, through the technology and innovations provided by the private sector. Second, a critical lens would turn the story around and conclude that, even though the evidence is still scarce, there are concrete examples that the ideological neocolonialism of NA is materialized in and through land deals, which not only grant MNCs access to, but also control over land that was formerly locally owned and cultivated. The question, then, is how the material consequences of NA ideology is experienced in practice. Are they felt to be oppressive and exploitative or, perhaps, empowering and profitable? That is, is NA neocolonial in its experienced practices as well as in its principles and policies?
Experienced neocolonialism

Having established the ideological and material impetus towards neocolonialism inherent to NA principles and policies, it becomes pertinent to study how these are practiced and, especially, experienced. Here, the real-life implications for rural smallholder farmers is especially relevant. How do they experience the implementation of NA policies? Thus, we turn to evidence from rural community members, civil society stakeholders as well as government officials in Malawi in order to analyze the implications that the political focus on agricultural commercialization brings about. In order to address this issue as thoroughly as possible, this final analytical round is structured around proving the following claims: First, commercial agriculture is politically prioritized in Malawi, and the government is committed to identifying land and facilitating its acquisition for the sake of investment. Second, such political focus risks dislocating and/or excluding smallholder farmers. Third, dislocation and/or exclusion impairs the livelihoods and food security of smallholder farmers.

First, the general development strategy of the Malawian government with its focus on industrial farming is particularly apparent in interviews with government officials and civil society organizations. When asked about the development potentials of commercializing agriculture, Mr. Simbani, Director of Development at the Ministry for Finance, Economic Planning and Development says: “We are just starting. Everybody saying that’s the way to go.” Likewise, when asked the same question, the Chief Executive of the Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI), Mr. Kaferapanjira states: “Yes, that’s the way to go. And the question is where are you going to get the land. People from rural areas, make sure that they get jobs elsewhere. To me it’s the best way for them to become factory workers, some laborers or something. You have to find an alternative occupation for the people. You can’t commercialize agriculture without moving the people. You have to find an alternative... In my view, it is better to get people out of the land. Because it works for them in the long run. Make sure you have commercial farms there and people have other options.” When asked whether the Malawian government shares this view, and urges the commercialization of agriculture, he says: “They do. But they think the policies might be unpopular, because sometimes they displace some people.” The Director of Crop Development at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development, Mr. Ching’oma, explains the advocacy for commercial farming thus: “If we bring a
new company to invest on a 5000ha piece of land, we give them land, and then they employ 3000 people, already that's tax for the government. And with that tax, the government can build a hospital in the same location. They can build a road in the same location. In terms of social services, it's not necessarily income coming to the pockets of the communities, but you might find that important services might be improved in the area. Those are indicators of economic growth. In the long term the community benefits.” According to Mr. Chinsinga, Professor of Political Science and Deputy Director at the University of Malawi, another explanation for the government’s advocacy for industrializing agriculture lies in the necessity of earning foreign exchange. He says [...] one of the ways is to promote large-scale farming and initiatives like the New Alliance [are therefore] attractive to the government.”

Second, land expropriation is not an entirely new phenomenon in Malawi. Often labeled as ‘land grabbing’, the process entails the dislocation of smallholder farmers in usually rural communities from their land as it has been acquired by an agricultural investor (Chinsinga et. al., 2013, Chasukwa, 2015). This is made possible by the government’s commitment to facilitating land acquisitions and the lack of safeguard mechanisms ensuring proper compensation and negotiations with small-scale farmers. Thus, smallholders are potentially left without means of survival, let alone the opportunity and ability to buy up new farmland.

Interviews with small-scale farmers in Malawi demonstrates this tendency. Six community members in the village of Kazilira in the Dwangwa district gave individual testimonies of having unwillingly lost their land to a sugar producer, Dwangwa Cane Growers Trust. The land lost by the six smallholders was farmland, on which they grew crops for the survival of their families. As explained by one respondent, around 500 people in her community were affected by this land takeover, including people not only losing farmland, but also land on which they had built their homes. Another respondent explained how he has been “[...] cultivating ever since my father gave that land to [me], it has been a source of [my] livelihood, [I have] been growing food for [my] family and maybe selling some surplus for [my] own development. [T]he land was grabbed from [me] [...] through the police, which used coercive means to take the land and also use the authority that they have.” The remaining respondents likewise described how the police forced them away from their land on the day of the take-over: I [...] just heard from other people who say that no, if you go to Kazilira this time, you are going to see tractors and many things are happening there, tractors destroying houses and many people are crying. When I wake up I go there, and I find police are all over there. They were not allowing someone to go there. I was beaten somehow.
because I said I can go there to find out what, and they say 'no, you cannot go there, this is not your land, this is our land'. So it was just matter of forcing.

Two community interviews testify of similar events. In Kasitu village in the district of Nkhotakota, community members had formed a food security group with the purpose of protecting their land from Dwangwa Cane Growers Trust. Of the 20 people interviewed, five people had lost their land to sugar production. They describe how “[I]hey did not consult us, and we just saw that our land was gone” and how they “[…] were in their fields […] and then suddenly police came with guns and they had to run for their lives. And that is how it was taken. Just like that”. When asked whether they received compensation for their land the response was: “Not any compensation. Everyone in this area, no one has received compensation.”

In the Salima district, villagers explain how their land was leased by the British fruit company, Malawi Mangoes; a company partnering in NA and on record for entering land deals after Malawi had entered the alliance (see above). While the community members did not directly inhabit the land, they expressed their despair as they were forced to sell the livestock, which had been grazing on the land prior to the lease. Hence, land displacements of smallholder farmers occur in Malawi, and although we cannot, with the available data, link existing displacements to NA, we have strong indications that they will remain a tool in the implementation of commercial agriculture as a political priority.

Third, smallholder communities were questioned about the effect that the loss of land has had on their livelihoods, and all unanimously described a negative impact. The main issue appears to be the shift from being a self-sufficient producer of food to being dependent on others for work. As one respondent stated: “In terms of survival, [I am] struggling because [I do not] have a place where [I] can continue cultivating what [I] want. So [I] survive on casual labour, pieces of work elsewhere, and then [I] get maybe 1000 MWK and buy something from others, maybe maize.” Another community member explained how she depended on her land not only for food, but also for selling produce to be able to finance her children’s clothes and education. She stated that this is no longer possible. Furthermore, none of the interviewed community members had been offered a job from the company investing on the land previously belonging to them.

The testaments of the smallholders are supported by key civil society stakeholders. When asked how the livelihood of smallholder farmers would be affected by losing their land, Audrey Namwaza from the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) responded: “If it is taken away, their means of survival will not be there, because they produce to survive. They are
producing for their own consumption. And it is very little that is sold. The impact would be adverse. For sure, their livelihood would be affected.” Mr. Dzanja from Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources likewise assessed the effects of land deals to be adverse for the smallholders: if they don’t even have their land to produce food, of course that is going to affect their food security and eventually their economic livelihood is going to be affected negatively as well.” Mr. Chisinga, from the University of Malawi also pointed to the shift from being a self-sustained farmer to being a peasant working at others’ farms: “What they have now on offer is only their labour. That kind of livelihood is not sustainable. You cannot survive on working on other people’s land, because what you get is very low.”

Thus, it appears clear that the expropriation of smallholders from their farmland significantly impedes their livelihood. The development mechanisms that are operative within NA have led to dislocation of communities in Malawi and effectively decreased their food security. This is acutely troublesome as it is in direct opposition to the stated goals of NA. The principles and policies of NA, then, may be said to lead to the opposite of what they are said to do. The logic of NA is, quite simply, wrong and this, in our view, exposes the neocolonial drive as not only inherent to NA, but also a direct outcome of its implementation.

Concluding discussion

The operative logics of the NA in Malawi, focusing on job creation, facilitation of FDI and trade, tax reform, and privatization, bear strong similarities to a neoliberal ideology. This demonstrates a general assumption that an increase in private investment will contribute to development and food security through trickle-down dynamics. The favoritism and inclusion of private investors in Malawi has shown to generate practices of expropriations of smallholder farmers with little or no opportunities of resistance. The occurrence of expropriations means that the implementation of the NA in Malawi is experienced negatively by smallholders. Besides losing their land, they have incurred losses of self-determination and self-sustainability as well as the right to resistance. In other words, when looking at the practical consequences on livelihoods in Malawi, the ideological and material neocolonialism of NA also result in neocolonial practices that are experienced as oppressive and conducive of destitute. As this is in direct opposition to the stated goals of NA, this paper demonstrates that the logic of this initiative is inherently flawed; it subjects the supposed
beneficiaries of NA action to a new form of corporate colonialism in which MNCs strip smallholders of their livelihoods and/or tether local farmers to their modes of production.

Our ambition is not only to criticize these tendencies, but also to look for and agenda of more viable alternatives. Thus, we turn back to DS and OS literature for indications of what might be done. Where DS has found global alternatives in the form of attempts to reposition developing countries within the value chains of which they form part, OS has turned to local practices. Thus, a new approach to alternative organizing is currently emerging around specific studies of local sites that have organized themselves in ways that may be said to ‘prefigure’ (Maeckelbergh, 2011) broader societal re-organizing, e.g. in the form of participatory democracy (Reedy, King & Coupland, 2016), co-operative ownership (Webb & Cheney, 2014) or translocal resistance (Banerjee, 2011).

From this perspective, currently disadvantaged individuals and groups improve their situation, not by gaining a better position within an already established value chain, but by reconfiguring the very relationships of which they form part. Although global value chains has been applied to international development initiatives with a strong focus on economic upgrading through inclusion into a global chain, bringing in social aspects to upgrading and new measures of value into the application of value chains in development is still lacking. Linking concepts of economic and social upgrading to alternative organization is relevant in this case – given that the aim of NA results in the exact opposite: social downgrading of small holders. The logics of NA and neo-liberalism/neo-colonialism are based on economic upgrading, but do not take social upgrading into account although the aims relate to this. Thus, there still is a need to turn current logics on their head, beginning with the local smallholders and considering what can be done to empower them in relation to global value chains; they need to move up these chains as independent actors, not through MNCs.

In order to redirect the distribution of upgrading and value, and integrate small holders into global value chains, a new agenda for inclusive development from below needs to establish ways to integrate actors from below by engaging in the local before the global. While there might be positive outcomes of foreign investments, governance and commitment is needed at all levels, e.g. by having requirements beyond investment project, bring in more inclusive pro-poor measurements for success, diversification, poverty reduction measurements.
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