Preventing Crime Together
The promising perspectives and complicated task of promoting collaborative crime prevention in Denmark
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Preventing Crime Together
The promising perspectives and complicated task of promoting collaborative crime prevention in Denmark

PhD dissertation by
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Preface: Enthralling stories of collaboration

When I first began my research on the Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs), I had a clear idea of what I was studying: interactive governance arenas where local community organizations meet with the police and local government administrators to discuss local crime developments and formulate joint action plans that cut across institutional boundaries. It said so in the statutory, on the website of the Danish Crime Prevention Council, and in all available policy reports. I was planning to depict the arenas as an advanced liberal technology serving to exploit the self-governing potentials of civil society actors for instrumental purposes of the state.

It turned out to be a much more complicated and intriguing matter than first assumed.

As I engaged in formal and informal conversations with people from various levels and sectors of society concerned with LCPCs, it became clear that the LCPCs meant different things to different people. They mentioned gains, drivers and barriers pointing in several, and sometimes opposing, directions. Little agreement seemed to exist on what was actually going on in the LCPCs. Within days, I went from meetings with high-level officials who talked in broad terms about the prospects of mobilizing community resources, distributing responsibility, and developing joint solutions to shared problems; to depressing talks with despairing local police managers who told me about passive participation and complete lack of commitment from both public and private partners in the LCPCs. Soon after I would meet with LCPC participants filled with enthusiasm who praised the new arenas for connecting actors and opening up new avenues for action; only moments before talking to other council members telling me how the leadership of the police precluded them from making any substantial contributions to local problem solving.

What was going on? How could such vast disagreements exist? Based on my careful readings of the official policy documents I thought I at least knew the basic parameters for the empirical object I had set out to investigate. Now it seemed like my informants were not even talking about the same arenas. Confused, puzzled and somewhat disillusioned, I recognized the need to find new theoretical points of departure and methodological tools to find patterns in what I had heard and observed. Doing so, my mood changed as I realized that I had encountered a case with a wealth of vertical, horizontal, and spatial variation providing highly interesting empirical material for answering key questions of governance, power and institutional transformation. Continuing my research, I got to understand how the purpose and tasks of the LCPCs changed dramatically from the original statute in the reform bill.
to the actually implemented designs; how the old guard of public social service agencies and schools colonized the new public-private platforms in large parts of the country; how conflicts of interest between public actors led to the formal and informal exclusion of community actors; how local public managers got caught in the cross-fire between vertical and horizontal relations and expectations; and how their attempts at mending fences resulted in small victories, bringing the inter-organizational arrangements closer to realizing their stated goal of promoting cross-sector collaboration around local crime problems.

It is my hope that readers of this dissertation will find the presented stories of collaboration as enthralling as I do. Together they can be taken as a set of keys for unlocking important conversations on the past, present and future of collaborative crime prevention in Denmark.

I want to thank the co-financing partners and collaborators in the Danish Crime Prevention Council, the Danish National Police, the Danish Ministry of Justice, and the local governments of Roskilde, Kalundborg, and Greve for supporting the PhD project. Thank you to the administrative staff in the Mid and West Zealand Police District for assisting me in gathering empirical material for the dissertation. Not least, thank you to all the interviewees who have taken their time to talk to me.

I also want to thank my co-workers and academic partners of discussion. First and foremost thanks to my supervisor Jacob for the most qualified mentorship and guidance one can hope for. Thank you to all my colleagues at the Roskilde School of Governance, not least Ole Helby Petersen for valuable comments at my internal evaluation. Thank you to all my PhD colleagues, not least Anne for chocolate, interesting discussions and good company during the many hours spent at the office. A special thanks to Professor Ian Loader from the University of Oxford and to Professor Asbjørn Røiseland from Nord University for hosting me during my stays as a visiting scholar and for providing me with guidance and insightful comments on my pending research.

Last but not least, I want to thank you, Liv, for your patience and support in the process of writing this dissertation. Our collaboration means the most. Thank you to Olivia and our as-yet-unnamed son for showing up along the way and putting everything into perspective.

Andreas Hagedorn Krogh
September 2017, Roskilde University
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Abbreviations

DCPC Danish Crime Prevention Council
DCPD Danish Crime Prevention Day
DMJ Danish Ministry of Justice
LCPC Local Crime Prevention Council
MWZPD Mid and West Zealand Police District
NPC National Prevention Centre of the Danish National Police
PSP Psychiatry, Social Services and Police
SSP Schools, Social Services and Police
PART ONE:

FRAMEWORK
1. Introduction

1.1 The problem of crime

Issues of public safety, crime and disorderly conduct provide significant challenges to governments across the globe, attracting considerable attention from politicians, the media, and the general publics (Simons, 2007). Terrorism, gang wars, murder, and violence fill front pages of newspapers while less dramatic forms of crime such as burglary, drunk driving, and street harassment go more unnoticed, but are arguably no less problematic. Acts of crime may not only have devastating consequences for individual victims, offenders, and bystanders. As aggregated social phenomena, crime problems compose a threat to fundamental pillars of society, including of physical security of citizens, feelings of safety, social trust, civil rights, and public, private and personal property rights. Moreover, crime is costly.\(^1\) Swedish economists have estimated that a simple mugging costs the Swedish society as much as SEK 200,000 while a beating that leads to long-term or permanent injuries can rise to several million Swedish kronor when adding up ambulance costs, emergency room operations, sick leave, police investigations, welfare support to the victim(s) afterwards, etc. (Nilsson and Wadeskog, 2008). The figures escalate drastically if a criminal carrier becomes a way of life: depending on the seriousness of the crimes committed, a gang member throughout ten years may cost society 50-80 million Swedish kronor (ibid).

1.2 The appeal of prevention

As such, preventing crime rather than simply reacting to it through ‘after-the-fact’ incarceration and rehabilitation holds the potential of protecting human lives, upholding public order and stability, as well as saving substantial public and private resources. The prospects of avoiding potential human and societal downsides of crime provide strong incentives for governments, businesses and citizens to invest in crafting, implementing and sustaining effective crime preventive measures. While tough-on-crime policies continue play a significant role in Western democracies today (Wacquant, 2009), the past 30-40 years have involved a remarkable boom in crime prevention practices that move beyond the limits of the traditional criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985; Gilling, 1997; Edwards and Hughes, 2005; Crawford, 1997, 2009; Tilley, 2005; O’Malley, 2010; Rose, 2000).

\(^1\) For a review of the crime cost literature and various methods for calculating costs, see McCollister, Frensh, and Fang (2010).
Developmental care to at-risk children and youth, camera surveillance and environmental design of physical spaces, conscious community building and correction of values and norms in peer groups are now considered to be pivotal measures for handling crime problems (Garland, 2001; Borch, 2005; Welsh and Farrington, 2012).

1.3 The call for collaboration
Due to the complexity of the problems, no single actor can go-it-alone and singlehandedly ensure effective prevention of crime. Criminologists point to a wide variety of diverse and often interrelated triggers of crime relating to socio-economics (unemployment, poverty, inequality, and declassation), physical space (deteriorated neighborhoods, poor housing conditions, availability of desired objects, and low risk of getting caught), peer groups (countercultural norms and values, truancy, and drug abuse), family relations (domestic violence, uneducated or unemployed parents and siblings, and low support), and personal traits (low self-control, high temper, and high impulsivity) (Balvig, 2017). As such, crime problems often present themselves as intrinsically ‘wicked problems’ that are difficult to grasp in a precise and accurate manor (Rittel and Webber, 1973). There is a need for multiple forms of expertise in order to craft tailor-made solutions in the local contexts in which the crime problems unfold. Effectively preventing them thus requires the active participation of diverse actors with various competencies, target group relations, and organizational resources (Choi and Choi, 2012; Torfing, Krogh, and Ejrnæs, 2017).

Concordantly, Western policy-makers and professionals have in recent decades placed increasing emphasis on the need for cross-sector collaboration around the prevention of local crime problems (Crawford, 1997, 2009). In the United Kingdom, North America and Australia, public crime prevention policy has focused on localized public-private crime prevention since the early 1990’s (Gilling, 1997; O'Malley, 1997; Tilley, 2005; Garland, 2001; Lee, 1999; Fleming and Wood, 2007). In continental Europe, we also find indications of a mounting policy interest in community policing schemes, public-private partnerships and cross-cutting crime prevention networks (Terpstra, 2008; Crawford, 2009; Van Houdt, 2014; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2010; European Crime Prevention Network, 2012; European Commission, 2015). While scholars and practitioners point to the continued relevance of a “Nordic model” of crime prevention based on social security provided by public welfare agencies and institutions (see e.g. Thomas, 1990; Jensen, 1998; Kankaala, 2015), the international trend of community crime prevention also appears to have kicked-in in Scandinavian welfare states (Borch, 2005; Lidskog and Person, 2012).
recent years, local crime prevention councils have been established in Sweden (Gustafsson and Hollari, 2005), Norway (Rambøll, 2014), and Denmark (Balvig, Holmberg and Nielsen, 2011) with the intent of strengthening inter-organizational exchange around the prevention of local crime problems. In addition, collaborative initiatives sprout from below as public and private actors come together to prevent local crime problems (Torfing and Krogh, 2013).

Evaluations of the Scandinavian experiences with collaborative crime prevention are still sparse. However, thorough research from the UK, USA, Australia and elsewhere suggests that the field of crime prevention is ridden by significant barriers to cross-sector collaboration.

1.4 Barriers to collaborative crime prevention

With the increasing focus on public-private crime prevention in public crime prevention policy during the 1990’s, observers got their hopes up for the future of cross-sector collaboration around prevention of local crime problems. However, empirical studies of the attempts at institutionalizing collaborative relations in the field have left previously enthusiastic scholars somewhat disappointed. Today, the state of research is generally less optimistic than it once was:

“With advantages of a further two decades of hindsight, the aspired dawning of a new (local) governance of crime has proved to be something of a ‘false dawn’. Whilst the discourse of partnerships is now accepted wisdom and institutional frameworks exist (some rooted in statute) in parts of the crime control field to coordinate collective responses and pursue collaborative delivery, nevertheless, progress has been hesitant, uneven and constrained. [...] The talk of ‘partnerships’ still belies the reality of single agency particularistic responses, whereby state organisations preserve their control over segments of the criminal justice ‘turf’ like fiefdoms. Delivering a ‘joined-up’, ‘networked’ approach to crime prevention has proved more complex and the obstacles much more stubborn than were often assumed.” (Crawford and Evans, 2017).

A number of reasons can be given for why the aspired dawning of a new governance of crime in the UK, USA and Australia and elsewhere did not translate into practice. Cross-sector collaboration is notoriously complicated in any policy field, but empirical studies suggest that cross-sector collaboration around the prevention of crime faces particularly vast historical, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational barriers of moving from an old state-based government regime towards wider and deeper inter-organizational collaboration around the prevention of crime. Three major barriers are often mentioned in
the research literature. First, a historical legacy of state responsibility for security and public safety hampers broad inclusion as institutionalized role divisions persist and public and private actors continue to consider crime to be a task for the state or, more specifically, the police (Crawford, 1997; Skinns, 2006; Frevel and Rogers, 2016). Second, collaboration is complicated by significant organizational differences in occupational cultures, working routines, and professional world-views between the police, social workers, and other key actors in the field (Gilling, 1994; Johansson, 2011; Crawford and Cunningham, 2015; Harte, 2015). Third, the police and other lead agencies often rely on hierarchical order-giving and legal-bureaucratic rule-following which hampers their ability to partake in, and manage, cross-sector collaboration (Terpstra, 2005: 43; Loveday, 2006; Webster, 2015).

While collaborative crime prevention carries great potentials, it is hence significantly challenged in a number of ways.

1.5 Managing and leading collaborative crime prevention

How to overcome the barriers to collaboration? Broader strands of literature on public governance suggest public management and leadership to be the antidote when faced with barriers to inter-organizational cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Put differently, public lead actors are considered pivotal for ensuring that a broad range of relevant and affected stakeholders are included in processes of collaborative problem-solving; that they are able to interact across organizational differences without the eruption of destructive conflicts; and that their interaction lead to new and better solutions that are implemented through their common pooling of resources (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Torfing et al., 2012). By virtue of creating conductive governance structures, crafting inclusive institutional designs, and facilitating inter-organizational exchange, they are quintessential for enhancing the performance of governance networks and enabling public value creation through collaborative problem-solving (cf. Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Milward and Provan, 2006; Provan and Kenis, 2008, Ansell and Torfing, 2014).

However, empirical research on collaborative crime prevention suggests that public management and leadership is more often part of the problem than its solution. Studies have shown how public lead actors apply leadership strategies and management tools that sustain old role divisions, aggravate the inter-organizational disagreements, and limit the role of local community organizations and other non-state actors (Skinns, 2006; Crawford, 2006;
Shepherdson et al., 2014; Crawford and Evans, 2017; Frevel and Rogers, 2016). The reason seems to be that public lead actors themselves are, at least partly, caught up in the old state-based government regime: they are embedded in, and accustomed to, its more traditional governance structures and management practices, and they arguably even have a vested interest in the existing institutional set-up. The field thus appears to be characterized by a number of catch-22’s. For collaborative crime prevention to unfold, public lead actors must be able and willing to transcend the institutionalized divisions of responsibility for the prevention of crime of which they themselves are a part. They must be able and willing to lead collaboration for the benefit of a broad range of relevant and affected stakeholders with other occupational cultures, working routines, professional world-views, interests and agendas than their own. Not least, they must be able and willing to lose some degree of control by giving up hierarchical order-giving and legal-bureaucratic rule-following in favour of ‘softer’ forms of governance, management and leadership.

1.6 Main research question

Present-day crime prevention appears as a field of tension where old single-agency responses meet new practices of cross-sector collaboration; where consolidated ways of thinking and acting on crime are confronted with new perspectives and agents of change; and where traditional modes of government meets novel ways of governing. While much existing research has been preoccupied with barriers, focused on failures, and criticized recent attempts at promoting and institutionalizing collaborative crime prevention for being symbolic and tokenistic, less attention has been paid to questions of when, why and how public lead actors succeed in widening and deepening inter-organizational collaboration around the prevention of crime. Moreover, as suggested above, much of what is known about institutional conditions, drivers, barriers, management and leadership of collaborative crime prevention is based on experiences from the UK, the US, and Australia. Much less is known about collaborative crime prevention practices in Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia. Recognizing the barriers, tensions and dilemmas in the field, this dissertation considers how public lead actors can break historic-institutional, inter-organizational, and managerial barriers to inter-organizational collaboration around the prevention of crime. It does so in and through a series of case studies focusing on cutting-edge attempts at developing, implementing and consolidating new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in Denmark.
Studying how public actors manage and lead collaborative crime prevention in Denmark carries the potential of generating new empirical knowledge on the conditions for promoting collaborative crime prevention in this specific socio-political context. Moreover, it provides an opportunity of gaining further insights into more general dynamics, tensions, and dilemmas arising in hybridized public steering contexts with inconsistent ideals, tools and practices. Combining the two provides a basis for empirically and theoretically informed policy advice. In sum, the dissertation aims to make empirically based contributions to literatures on collaborative crime prevention and public governance, management and leadership; and to advice public policy-makers and professionals on how to advance inter-organizational relations in and around the prevention of crime in Denmark.

With these research aims in mind, the following main research question will guide the dissertation:

How do public lead actors manage the development, implementation and consolidation of new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in Denmark; and with what consequences for the inter-organizational relations in the field?

The dissertation answers the main research question through five papers. Each paper addresses its own research question and applies different theories of governance, management and leadership to analyse recent cases of collaborative crime prevention in Denmark.

1.7 The focus of the five papers

The first three papers consider management- and leadership-related issues pertaining to the implementation and consolidation of the Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs). In 2007, the councils were established by political mandate in most of the 98 Danish municipalities with the three-fold purpose of advancing collaborative problem-solving at a local level, ensuring local adaptation of national and district-level policies, and sustaining a close contact between the police and the local community (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2006). According to the ministerial order that instituted the LCPCs, the councils should include representatives from the police, local government, and the local community; the district police commissioners should define their specific tasks; and local police commanders should chair the councils. As the first national attempt at formally institutionalizing public-private collaboration around crime prevention in Denmark, the case of the LCPCs presents itself as a bold institutional reform initiative with interesting
perspectives for the organization of cross-sector collaboration in Danish crime prevention. Paper 1 examines the relationship between the new LCPC institution and the existing crime prevention institutions in Denmark; paper 2 considers how public actors have managed the implementation of the new governance arenas; and paper 3 studies how the LCPC chairs lead cross-sector collaboration in the councils.

The fourth paper studies the role of leadership in developing a new multi-agency cooperation scheme dubbed the SSP+. The SSP+ framework aims to expand collaborative relations beyond the old and highly institutionalized Danish SSP cooperation between schools, social services in order to strengthen the prevention of crime committed by young adults in the age of 18-25. Paper 4 pays particular attention to the role of the SSP secretariat in facilitating the innovation process and its capacity to forge new collaborative relations in the field.

The fifth paper examines the role of leadership in developing and implementing 14 collaborative initiatives aiming to reduce gang-related violence and crime in the socially deprived neighbourhood of Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen. The 14 initiatives constitute a broad spectrum of new and innovative collaborative crime prevention initiatives in the local context. Paper 5 focuses on the leadership challenges of convening, facilitating and catalysing inter-organizational collaboration and provides empirically grounded advice for political leaders and public managers on how to go about it.

In sum, the cases have been selected in order capture various manifestations of the tensions and challenges of promoting collaborative crime prevention in Denmark, and strategies for overcoming them. Specifically, the dissertation papers provide insights into the implementation and consolidation of politically mandated collaboration frameworks (the Local Crime Prevention Councils); the development of locally anchored cooperation schemes (the SSP+); and the development and implementation of new collaborative initiatives that address local crime problems in a socially deprived neighbourhood (the 14 gang prevention projects in Mjølnerparken). The case-based research questions addressed in the five papers are:

P1: What crime prevention approaches have been formally institutionalized in Denmark throughout the past decades; and to what extent have public lead actors included other actors than the 'usual suspects' of the established inter-agency cooperation frameworks in the new Local Crime Prevention Councils?
P2: How have public lead actors managed the implementation of the Local Crime Prevention Councils; and with what implications for the in-/exclusion of community actors in/from the new arenas?

P3: How do formally appointed chairmen manage cross-sector relations in the Local Crime Prevention Councils; and with what implications for the collaborative capacity of the new arenas?

P4: How does a co-funded secretariat facilitate the development of a new SSP+ cooperation framework; and how, why and to what extent does it (not) forge new collaborative relations around the prevention of crime?

P5: How do public administrators and project managers convene, facilitate and catalyse processes of developing and implementing innovation solutions to wicked gang problems in socially deprived neighbourhoods?

1.8 Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation consists of two parts: an overall framework and the five dissertation papers. The framework comprises five chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the objectives and research questions guiding the dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews recent research studies of collaborative crime prevention in order to identify the most pertinent issues pertaining to efforts of bringing diverse organizations together to collaborate around the prevention of crime. Chapter 3 presents the various strands of public governance, management and leadership theory drawn upon in the five papers, consider their respective strengths and weaknesses, and clarify their interrelations. Chapter 4 describes the overall philosophy of science, interactive mode of inquiry, and case-based research design and discusses the applied case study designs, data collection methods, and data processing methods. Finally, chapter 5 concludes by summarizing key findings, making general conclusions across the five papers, and presenting the main contributions of the dissertation.
2. Literature Review

In this chapter, I review recent research studies of collaborative crime prevention in order to identify the most pertinent issues pertaining to efforts of bringing diverse organizations together to collaborate around the prevention of crime. I have decided to follow the growing trend of integrating systematic review procedures into a narrative review (cf. Bryman, 2016: 90ff) in order to exploit the advantages of both. My purpose fluctuates with the typical narrative review, but I have conducted systematic searches in databases as a method for identifying relevant literature. Doing a narrative review, I am less concerned with questions of how many studies do what and more focused on findings in previous studies that are relevant for pending research. Before presenting the results of the literature review, I briefly introduce the principles applied in the literature review.

2.1 Principles applied in the literature review

The literature review was conducted in three steps. In a first step, I conducted two rounds of searches in Web of Science. In the first round, I searched for studies of collaborative crime prevention from the past 5 years. I used the search terms “crime preventi* OR crime reduction OR community safety OR security” AND “collabora* OR partnership* OR network* OR multi-agency OR inter-agency OR inter-organizational OR cross-organizational”. In the second round, I searched for studies of design, leadership and management of collaborative crime prevention from all years by expanding the search period and adding the search terms “design* OR manag* OR lead*”.

In a second step, I screened the results based on title and abstracts. Due to my interest in processes of inter-organizational collaboration, I deselected a large number of effect studies as well as a few studies on police-citizen relations in community policing schemes that were identified in the first search round. The second search round returned quite a few studies on how to reduce crime through environmental design which I deselected since it did not relate to my interest in design of collaborative frameworks. Based on my research interests, I selected 31 articles for further review.

In a third step, I read through the selected studies to identify general themes and conclusions. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, an overwhelming amount of previous research finds significant barriers to collaborative crime prevention. For that reason, I decided to focus my review on the barriers and proceeded to inductively categorize the findings under the headings of: historically conditioned divisions of responsibility for
security and crime reduction; inter-organizational barriers stemming from organizational differences; and intra-organizational barriers pertaining to the police and other public lead actors. A considerable amount of the identified studies of design, management and leadership of collaborative crime prevention concern the empirical case of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) in England. Since the extensively researched CDRPs share several design features with the Local Crime Prevention Councils in Denmark, I decided to devote special attention to the issues pertaining to the design and leadership of these partnerships.

In the following sections, I present the results of the literature review: first, the common barriers to collaborative crime prevention identified by previous studies, and then the design-, management-, and leadership-related barriers pertaining to the CDRPs.

2.3 Common barriers to collaborative crime prevention

2.3.1 Historically distributed responsibilities for security and crime reduction

Historically oriented studies point to a broad issue concerning the willingness and ability of societal actors to actively engage in the prevention of crime, namely the long governance trajectory of combatting crime and ensuring stability and order.\(^2\) In modern times, providing security and public safety has been a primary responsibility of the state (Frevel and Rogers, 2016). In the UK, the bedrock of Peelian policing, the provision of not only security, but also crime prevention has since the first half of the 19th century been considered a police specialism (Crawford, 1997: 18ff, 26ff). Still to this day, police come to be seen as the crime prevention “experts” which can leave other actors muted in partnership settings (Skinns, 2006). As such, the institutionalized role division between the state government as service provider and the citizenry and civil society organizations as service recipients extend to present day inter-organizational crime prevention partnerships.

2.3.2 Differing professional perspectives and ‘ideological’ disagreements

Differences in occupational cultures, working practices and ideologies of partnership organisations can provide barriers for a fully integrated approach to tackling crime and disorder (Crawford, 1997; Skinns, 2006). Particularly, several case studies point to

\(^2\) Security and social order are arguably the oldest policy problems of the modern state (Foucault, 2007: 246ff). The contemporary notion of police as a professionalized unit with the task of enforcing the law, combating crime, and maintaining public order developed from the 17th century onwards as European heads of state started hiring officials to oversee and patrol larger cities (Christensen, 2011).
fundamental cleavages between law enforcement and organizations carrying out social work of various kinds. In the UK, social workers have been found to be reluctant to share information and cooperate with the police due to self-imposed confidentiality and their need to maintain trusting relations with at-risk youth (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015). In the Netherlands, attempted collaboration between mental health workers and police officers has been challenged by their different goals, perspectives, and work methods: while the police strive to maintain a secure, orderly and safe society, mental health workers are more concerned with the safety and wellbeing of their individual patients, which in some instances can be difficult to reconcile (Harte, 2015). Similar tensions have been found in Swedish Barnahus where processes of juridification privilege a ‘criminal law-oriented punitive logic’ over a ‘social welfare-oriented treatment logic’ (Johansson, 2011).

2.3.3 Intra-organizational aspects of the police and other lead actors

Police organizations are central actors in the field of crime prevention. However, a number of studies point to cultural, organizational and managerial aspects of the police that hamper their ability and willingness to engage in collaborative crime prevention initiatives.

First, crime prevention is often perceived to be secondary to ‘core’ and ‘real’ investigative police work among police officers (Webster, 2015; Edwards and Benyon, 2000). Moreover, police corps tend to be dominated by a strong internal esprit de corps and generalized scepticism towards outsiders which in some instances translate into risk aversive behaviour and a lack of trust in external partners (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015: 75). When present, these two cultural elements discourage police officers from engaging in collaborative crime prevention initiatives.

Second, police organizations tend to be relatively hierarchically organized and largely dependent upon order-giving and rule-following (Webster, 2015). Such organizational structures do not always sit well with more horizontal forms of organizations in multi-agency partnerships as they tend to limit the space for local manoeuvring, outside influence and compromise in the bottom of the organization. The organizational characteristics of the police organization can hence hamper its ability to successfully design, implement, manage and evaluate large preventive initiatives involving multiple participants (ibid.).

Third, performance management is a common feature of recent police reforms, which tends to provide strong incentives for police to concentrate on their ‘core business’ instead of spending resources on cross-organizational initiatives around complex crime problems.
(Verhage et al, 2013; Crawford and Cunningham, 2015: 80). Police performance measures typically reward outputs related to arrests, clear-up rates and response times rather than preventive outcomes of collaborative activities (Webster, 2015; Edwards and Benyon, 2000). As a result, studies have shown how the police in the Netherlands has pulled back from local security networks in which they played a key co-ordinating role (Terpstra, 2005: 43). Prompting police to constantly relocate officers to higher crime areas where targets for volume crime are more likely to be met, the performance regime can damage long-term inter-personal working relationships at the local level which are otherwise considered important for building trust and sustaining collaboration with other organizations (Loveday, 2006; Crawford and Cunningham, 2015: 81).

While a range of studies raise concerns over the willingness and ability of the police to participate and lead crime preventive collaborations, other studies remind us that similar cultural, organizational and managerial barriers apply to other lead actors in the field. First, it is observed that crime prevention is typically not a ‘core’ focus of the professions employed by local government in the UK who tend to be more concerned with ‘social issues’ which make them less interested in engaging in activities labelled ‘crime prevention’ (Shepherdson et al., 2014; Edwards and Benyon, 2000). Second, it is noted how local government administrators in both the Netherlands and the UK often fail to honour their legal responsibility for coordinating local security networks due to their legal-bureaucratic orientations and lack of expertise in managing inter-organizational arrangements (Terpstra, 2005: 43; Loveday, 2006). Third, we may also note that the intra-organizational and output-oriented performance measurement regime found in most police organizations today are part of a more general trend of new public management reforms that also pertain to other public organizations than the police (cf. section 3.1). As such, several (aspects of) the intra-organizational barriers to collaborative crime prevention also apply to other lead actors in the field.

Previous studies hence question the ability and willingness of the police and other public lead actors to properly manage the development, implementation and consolidation of collaborative crime prevention initiatives. In addition to the identified historical, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational barriers to collaborative crime prevention, previous studies also point to specific design-, management-, and leadership-related issues. In the next section, I present the findings of previous studies of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England.
2.3 The Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 gave local authorities in England and Wales a statutory duty and responsibility to develop joint strategies with the police and other actors from the public, private, voluntary and community sectors (Edwards and Benyon, 2000; Crawford and Evans, 2017). More specifically, it required them to establish formal Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) with a broad spectrum of public and private partners with in order to strengthen inter-organizational coordination and collaboration around the reduction of crime and disorder at the local level. Following the act, 354 CDRPs and 22 Community Safety Partnerships were set up in England and Wales, respectively (Ellis, Fortune and Peters, 2007).

While it was hoped that the to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society through inclusion of the voluntary sector, businesses and local community leaders, early studies of CDRPs shown that the role of the voluntary sector was frequently marginalized and community involvement “largely non-existent” (Crawford, 2006: 461). Today, many partnerships almost exclusively involve public sector organisations (Crawford and Evans, 2017) and participants experience that police frequently set the agenda and dominate partnership meetings (Frevel and Rogers, 2016). The more general barriers to collaboration delineated above may account for some of the observed marginalization of private partners in the CDRPs. However, empirical research studies also explain the marginalization of private stakeholder with issues pertaining to the design, management and leadership of the partnerships, namely low levels of autonomy from central government, bureaucratization, and lack of funding.

2.3.1 Low levels of autonomy from central government

Several studies raise the issue that the CDRPs “…lack significant autonomy from central government”, which leads them to “…prioritize national targets that reflect a preoccupation with police-recorded reductions in crime” (Crawford, 2006: 461). Since their initiation of the partnerships in 1998, national government has continued to impose national priorities, tasks and requirements on the CDRPs, e.g. through the 2006 National Community Safety Plan (Loveday, 2006). The process has appeared to play out as a zero-sum game with decreasing degrees of local influence and ownership as the result. Central government forces its interest in situational crime prevention measures that tackle graffiti and other disorderly conduct onto the partnerships, whereby the more complex social issues prioritized by local government and local community organizations are crowded out
In a critical review of three community safety partnerships, Skinns (2005) observes at a micro-level how the creeping governmentalization has crowded out non-government actors: after an early 'honeymoon period' with relatively little government interference, government agencies started taking over and try to both 'steer' and 'row' the partnerships. As a consequence, other participants were left uncertain of their role while losing sight of their own ability to contribute to the local prevention of crime.

### 2.3.2 Bureaucratization

Studies also point to issues associated with bureaucratic ways of organizing partnership meetings and structuring the work processes. Ellis, Fortune and Peters (2007) report how a steadily growing amount of paperwork flooded one CDRP to the point where several partners were stifled by all the policy papers and background information send out before each meeting. The authors interpret the paper overload as a result of a horizontal structure where no one is in a position to filter information (ibid.). While more and better leadership could arguably have stemmed the increasing loads of paperwork, the process also point to bureaucratization of the work processes which relates to the limited circle of participants and absent relations to the public more broadly speaking. According to Loveday (2006), the CDRPs have turned into closed networks whose work receives noticeably low levels of publicity which leads to a lack of transparency, very little pressure on the partnerships to achieve any of their targets, and frequently ‘memorandum-led’ meetings. Frevel and Rogers (2016) argue that CDPR’s focus too much on policy problems and issues relating to manpower, finances, law, etc. which make them unattractive for citizens, volunteers and other non-government actors.

### 2.3.3 Lack of funding

Despite the fact that resources can be saved through effective crime prevention, it is a resource demanding task to support, manage, facilitate and attend interagency forums. However, central government bestowed local government with the duty to prevent crime and establish the CDRPs without additional funding or financial support (Shepherdson et al., 2014). Apart from triggering concerns of cost-shifting from state to local government, it has led to partnership initiatives being launched without the funding necessary to effectively implement and evaluate them (ibid.). With no independent budgets, the CDRPs are dependent upon the willingness of participating organizations to invest resources in collaborative initiatives. The low levels of autonomy from central government and creeping
bureaucratization appear to hamper such processes, leaving the partnerships under-
resourced.

All in all, previous studies of collaborative crime prevention point to a number of historical, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational barriers to collaborative crime prevention which must be managed in order to succeed with collaborative crime prevention. The reviewed studies of design, management and leadership of collaborative crime prevention generally suggest that central steering, formal rules and bureaucratic procedures stifle collaboration. With my qualitative, case-based research strategy (cf. chapter 4), I will not treat the barriers identified by previous studies as hypothesis to be deductively tested in order to confirm or deny their presence/absence or determine their relative influence in a Danish context. Instead, I will take a more explorative approach in my studies and then discuss my findings with the findings of previous studies in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. Doing so will help clarify the specific characteristics of the Danish context, the generalizability of my results, and the analytical contributions of the dissertation.
3. Theoretical Framework

The dissertation papers draw on various theories of public governance, management and leadership. Specifically, the dissertation engages with theories of governmental criminology, implementation management theory, network governance theory, collaborative leadership theory, and collaborative innovation theory. In this chapter, I substantiate my choices of theory, define basic theoretical concepts, and explain how the chosen strands of theory constitute a cohesive, multifaceted theoretical framework for studying the promotion of collaborative crime prevention in Denmark.

I have selected the theoretical strands of literature from a pragmatic position of choosing theory that is best suited to answering my empirical research questions. However, they relate to one another in the sense that they are all fundamentally concerned with the move from centralized perspectives and practices of state government towards more decentralized perspectives and practices of interactive governance. In the next section, I situate the dissertation in recent scholarly debates within public governance research concerning the rise of a New Public Governance regime. Then I briefly introduce the five strands of theory drawn upon in the five papers and clarify their interrelations. Finally, I conclude by recapping and visualizing the theoretical framework as a whole.

3.1 The rise of New Public Governance?

During the past decades, scholars of public policy, administration and governance have shown increasing interest in interactive modes of governance where a plurality of public and private actors are involved in crafting and implementing solutions to public problems. In the 1970’s, public policy researchers began paying increasing attention to the role of inter-organizational relations in policy-making (Heclo, 1978; Hanf and Sharpf, 1978). During the 1980’s, public implementation researchers developed bottom-up perspectives that stressed the importance of local clusters of public and private actors for implementing public policy (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern and Hull, 1982). In the 1990’s, public governance researchers started theorizing and researching pluricentric modes of coordination and the role of horizontal networks in the governance of societies (Marin and

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3 In order to limit redundancy and repetition between this chapter and the papers, I do not go deeper into each strand of literature, but focus on providing the argument for choosing the respective theories and clarifying how they relate to one another.

Since the late 1990’s, an increasing tendency of central governments to encourage, support and even demand the use of public-private partnerships and networks (Hill, 2009: 253) has challenged theoretical understandings of the state being ‘hollowed out’ by outside forces. The megatrend of governments assimilating, instrumentalizing and advancing networked forms of governance has triggered new conceptualizations. They can be captured under the macro-theoretical idea of a current shift from a bureaucratic public policy and implementation regime of Classical Public Administration (CPA) to a market-oriented management regime of New Public Management (NPM) and, more recently, to a participatory and interactive design and delivery regime of New Public Governance (NPG) (Osbourne, 2010; Pestoff, Brandsen, and Verschuer, 2012; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013, 2017). The CPA regime relies on the governance capacity of the unitary state where policy is created and implemented within a closed political-administrative system, resources are allocated through hierarchy, and actions are coordinated by means of rules and regulations; NPM seeks to increase the efficiency of the public sector through tighter budget controls, larger units and intensified competition obtained through contracting out of public services and measuring the performance of self-governing public organizations and institutions; whereas NPG relies on increased cross-sector collaborations, partnerships and networks as tools for mobilizing resources and finding new ways of effectively dealing with intractable problems.

An ongoing debate in the literature concerns the extent to which we may talk about a transition from CPA to NPM to NPG. While some researchers suggest that we now live in an age of NPG, others take the direct opposite stance that we, at least in Denmark, still live in an age of government with ‘no signs of governance yet’ (Klausen, 2014). As a counter-move to the NPG enthusiastic literature, concepts such as the ‘neo-Weberian state’ have been developed to capture movements towards a revival of classical virtues and practices of public bureaucracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Instead of engaging in a binary debate about ‘NPG or no NPG’, scholars have in recent years been increasingly preoccupied with the issues arising from the co-existence of various regimes (Andersen et al., 2017; Thorup,
Some use the concept of hybridization to study new and unexpected governance mixtures, fusions and blends that are produced when various regimes intersect in the same organizational context (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011). Others are more preoccupied with clashes, tensions and dilemmas arising in ‘schizophrenic’ governance contexts (Majgaard, 2013).

The extent to which we may talk about a) the continued existence of a traditional, bureaucratic public policy and implementation regime, b) a more or less completed transition to a new interactive design and delivery regime, c) a fruitful interaction between co-existing regimes, or d) an ongoing struggle between them is basically an empirical question with different answers depending on the specific polities and policies under scrutiny. The literature review suggests that the field of crime prevention (and politically mandated crime and disorder reduction partnerships in England more specifically) involves considerable tensions between an old state-based government regime and a newer collaborative governance regime which can be observed on a macro-, meso- and micro-level of analysis. Through the five case studies presented in this dissertation, I investigate various modes of managing inter-organizational relations and consider how old and new regimes interact in the field of crime prevention in Denmark today. The five strands of theory presented in the remainder of this chapter all contribute to this endeavor in various ways.

3.2 Governmental criminology

In paper 1, I draw on governmental criminological theory to understand the governance trajectory within the policy field of crime prevention in Denmark and analyse the current organizational representation in the Local Crime Prevention Councils.

Governmental criminology is a form of criminological theory influenced by Michel Foucault's work on governmentality (O’Malley, 2010). Scholars of governmental criminology take interest in the historical developments of contemporary policy discourses and practices of crime control (Cohen, 1985; Garland, 1985, 2001; Gilling, 1997; Borch, 2005; Van Houdt, 2014). Since the late 1990’s, governmental criminology has been particularly interested in historical processes whereby the state and its agencies cease to assume the primary responsibility for the ‘crime problem’ and deploy technologies that pass it on to citizens, businesses, community organizations and other civil society actors (Crawford, 1997; Rose, 2000; Garland, 2001; Tilley, 2005).
In order to enable empirical studies of major shifts and developments in crime control policies and practices, theories of governmental criminology have conceptualized a number of major crime control strategies understood as historically contingent, yet relatively stable conglomerates of problem-definitions, capable actors, and techniques. In the realm of crime prevention, such major strategies include criminal justice prevention, developmental prevention, situational prevention and community prevention (Welsh and Farrington, 2012: 4). Thus far, the conceptualizations have primarily been based on British studies of crime control policies and practices. In paper 1, I attempt to take the first steps in articulating an empirically sensitive analytical framework that allows for analysis of the dynamics of present day governance of crime in Scandinavian welfare states by combining conceptualizations from theories of governmental criminology with empirical findings from crime prevention studies, penology, and welfare state studies.

While taking an interest in discursive dislocations and practical shifts in and between crime control strategies in various realms of society, governmental criminology rarely attempts to explain why shifts are occurring – or why they are not. The literature has been preoccupied with identifying shifts and carving out the distinctive features of the historical contingent crime control strategies. According to self-reflective scholars in the field, their preoccupation with shifts in public policy has led them to disregard the stubbornness of practice (Crawford, 2006). In order to better understand why or why not new policy trends of community prevention are translated into practice, I turn to implementation theory.

### 3.3 Implementation theory

In paper 2, I draw on implementation theory to develop an integrated theoretical framework for analysing top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. I apply it to the case of the Local Crime Prevention Councils in order to demonstrate its utility in tracing and understanding key formal design decisions on the purpose, goals, tasks, procedures and eligible members of new interactive governance arenas.

Implementation theory is a broad label for a vast body of public administration literature that concerns the often policy-altering process from policy is first formulated until it is put into practice (Hill, 2009). Implementation theories typically have both descriptive and prescriptive ambitions and hence include more or less explicit advice for how to craft policy and manage implementation processes based on their respective perspectives on implementation processes. Implementation theory and research has considered, *inter alia,*
how centrally formulated policy is obscured or blocked as it passes downstream through long chains of implementation with numerous communication links and potential veto-points (Pressman and Wildawsky, 1973); how public employees in the frontline come to act as policy-makers rather than loyal implementers as they apply creative strategies to cope with opposing pressures (Lipsky, 1980); and how local clusters of public and private actors serve as implementation structures that adapt, shape and affect public policies (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern and Hull, 1982).

Residing at the top of the public administration research agenda in the 1970’s and 1980’s, implementation research declined dramatically during the 1990’s as scholars and practitioners entered the ‘age of governance’ (Hupe and Sætren, 2014). Today, policy implementation figures as a ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ theme of public administration research and many consider it to be a ‘yesterday’s issue’ (Hupe, 2014). However, as discussed above, the enthusiasm around new forms of public governance that was sparked in the 1990’s may have too readily discounted more traditional forms of public administration. Politically mandated governance arenas like the Local Crime Prevention Councils prompts us to revisit the great body of implementation theory as it can help us understand how the design of new arenas is formed, altered and augmented in the process of turning policy into practice.

There is much to learn from classic implementation theory when it comes to present attempts at institutionalising interactive governance top-down; yet, it is fruitful (and to some extent necessary) to supply the great heritage with insights from metagovernance and network management theory in order to fully grasp the multi-level, multi-actor dynamics of such processes. As I argue in paper 2, productive theoretical linkages can be extracted by (re-)inscribing newer governance perspectives in the tradition of implementation research.

3.4 Metagovernance and network management theory

In paper 2, I extract key insights on multi-actor dynamics and how to manage them from metagovernance and network management theory and incorporate them in the theoretical framework used to studied the implementation of the Local Crime Prevention Councils.

Theories of metagovernance and network management were developed by a second generation of network governance theory that emerged around the turn of the century as a response to the need for more practically relevant advice on how to manage the challenges
and exploit the opportunities of network governance (cf. Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Milward and Provan, 2006; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). During the 1990’s, a first generation of network governance theory had focused on developing theoretical conceptions of governance networks as distinct (and largely superior) governance mechanisms that differ fundamentally from hierarchies and markets (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007). In doing so, they rendered formal institutions of government obsolete and argued in favour of much more decentralized and dispersed forms of policy-making, service delivery and problem-solving. According to the new generation, however, politicians and civil servants operating in and through formal institutions of government need not to give up all hope for governing society in the face of increased complexity, fragmentation and pluralisation of governance; they just need new tools for doing so.

Metagovernance is broadly defined as 'governance of (self-)governance' and concerns actions and activities that shape and affect relatively independent governance processes and their outcomes. (Kooiman, 2003; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009; Sørensen and Triantafillou, 2009). Network management is a more specific concept that covers managerial actions taken to improve the performance of governance networks (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). The metagovernance literature is typically preoccupied with ways in which politicians and civil servants fill the role as metagovernors, whereas the network management literature primarily addresses public and private managers. Some theories of metagovernance and network management tend to assume a rational, unbound and benevolent metagovernor or manager that strategically applies various tools in order to overcome barriers to interactive policy-making and improve the performance of networks. Paper 2 contributes with a more power-oriented, interest-based and conflict-ridden perspective on hands-off metagovernance. The paper argues theoretically, and illustrates empirically, how hands-off metagovernance in the form of institutional design of new interactive governance arenas also involves power struggles, inner tensions, conflicting mono-organizational aims, and strategies aiming to weaken the arenas.

The leadership and management strategies suggested by theories of metagovernance and network management are to a large extent complementary and to some extent overlapping as both literatures contemplate how actors can influence, guide and direct the actions of others without inhabiting a formal position of superiority. They both proceed from the basic
premise that actors are operationally autonomous and thus free to leave a governance network at any time (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007). Metagovernors and network managers must hence deploy other strategies and practices than those associated with more traditional forms of intra-organizational management where subordinates can be commanded to act against their own self-interests.

A conceptual distinction can be made between between hands-off and hands-on strategies (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). Hands-off meta-governance operates through various forms of political, organizational, economic, and discursive framing. It includes defining and declaring the purpose and objectives of the network; formulating entry rules, decision-making procedures and rules of communication; creating behavioral incentive structures through conditioned financial support; and constructing narratives about past, present and future challenges and opportunities (ibid.). Hands-on metagovernance is conducted through direct participation and interaction and typically involves various forms of process management and mediation between diverse partners in the network (ibid.). In the dissertation papers, I consider the exercise of both hands-off and hands-on metagovernance: paper 2 focuses on hands-off metagovernance through institutional design; paper 3 considers various hands-on leadership strategies; whereas paper 4 and 5 contemplates both types of metagovernance.

Another theoretical body of literature has developed useful theoretical perspectives and conceptual tools for understanding the exercise of hands-on metagovernance, namely collaborative leadership theory.

3.5 Collaborative leadership theory

In paper 3, I draw on collaborative leadership theory to analyze how formally assigned leaders of three LCPCs (re-)construct norms and procedures in the councils and how it affects the councils’ capacity for collaborative problem-solving. In the language of metagovernance, I use collaborative leadership theory to understand how local hands-on metagovernors informally mediate the hands-off metagovernance that higher-level public officials exercise in and through their articulation of a formal framework.

Collaborative leadership theory is a strand of leadership theory rooted in collaboration theory that focuses on ways of facilitating, encouraging and enabling inter-organizational collaboration (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Crosby, Bryson, and Stone, 2015). It shares assumptions with metagovernance and network management theory that leaders of inter-
organizational exchange cannot rely on formal authority known from the intra-organizational in-charge leadership typically associated with hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Huxham and Vangen, 2005). Collaborative leadership is basically about motivating relevant stakeholders with diverging views, values, interests and agendas to come together across organizational differences and mediating their interaction in order to avoid collaborative inertia and produce collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1996; Crosby and Bryson, 2010; Morse, 2010; Page, 2010). The criterion for success is not to obtain complete consensus among stakeholders, but to recognize and constructively manage their differences (Gray, 1989). Preoccupied with informal, emergent, participatory and distributive leadership, it concerns actors from all sectors of society involved in collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). As such, collaborative leadership theory provides a micro-level theory supplement to the more macro- and meso-level perspectives of metagovernance and network management theory.

The type of inter-organizational interaction that collaborative leadership theory concerns goes beyond cooperation, i.e. sharing of information and expertise, and coordination, i.e. attuning mono-organizational services to each other; it is about collaboration in the sense of developing or implementing joint solutions that no single actor could produce alone (Keast, Brown, and Mandell, 2007). Collaboration is considered to be more challenging to achieve than coordination and cooperation as it requires greater degrees of inter-organizational integration (ibid.; Crosby and Bryson, 2010). As such, collaborative leadership aims high with a more specific purpose than metagovernance and network management which may attempt to promote any or all of these forms of interaction in order to harvest their respective benefits.

A type of leadership that raises the bar even further is collaborative innovation leadership. Here, it is not just about bringing actors together and helping them collaborating, but also ensuring the the interaction leads to innovation. Theory about how to bring about innovative solutions through collaboration can be seen as a subset of metagovernance, network management and collaborative leadership theory. It constitutes the final theoretical body of literature drawn upon in this dissertation.
3.6 Collaborative innovation leadership theory

In paper 4 and 5, I draw on collaborative innovation leadership theory in order to develop perspectives on how various forms of leadership can assist conglomerates of public and/or private actors in developing new solutions to intractable crime problems.

While recent efforts have been made to build integrated and coherent theoretical frameworks for studying processes of collaborative innovation (Torfing, 2016), collaborative innovation theory and research is still in its embryo (Agger et al., 2015). The crux of the argument for collaborative innovation theory is that sustained interaction between diverse actors with different perceptions and complimentary pools of resources holds the potential of generating innovation, i.e. of developing and implementing initiatives that produce a qualitative change in a given context (Roberts and King, 1996; Van de Ven et al, 2007; Eggers and Singh, 2009; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011a, 2011b). When dissimilar actors with different perspectives are brought together not only to exchange information or coordinate their actions, but to develop new solutions to a problem of common concern, their collaboration carries the potential of provoking hitherto accepted problem definitions; qualifying proposals for new solutions; creating broad ownership to new solutions and thus aiding the implementation and dissemination of the innovation – at least in theory.

Recognizing that collaborative innovation is not without challenges, collaborative innovation leadership theory and research addresses the question of how to bring diverse sets of actors together to collaborate and produce innovation. Collaborative innovation leadership theory is rooted in metagovernance, network management and collaborative leadership theory and concerns the specific type of leadership needed to engage relevant public and private stakeholders in constructive collaboration that will result in innovation (Ansell and Gash, 2012; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Ansell and Torfing, 2014; Agger et al., 2015). The budding literature deals with the conditions provided by wider institutions of governance, the design of arenas, as well as the roles, tools and tasks of individual project managers. I primarily focus on the latter in the case analyses presented in paper 4 and 5, but argue the need for considering impact and importance of institutions and arenas for advancing collaborative innovation.
### 3.7 The framework summed up

In sum, the chosen theories provide a comprehensive conceptual toolbox for grasping and discussing present attempts at sustaining and advancing collaborative crime prevention in Denmark. As a whole, they enable a multi-level analysis of the possibilities, tensions and challenges embedded in shifts towards a New Public Governance of crime in Denmark.

Since the papers use each their set of theoretical lenses to study each their empirical data material, I will not attempt to integrate the five bodies of literature into a single grand theoretical model. Yet, as I have clarified throughout this chapter, the theories relate to each other in various ways. Some theorize the macro-level developments that provide the context for meso- and micro-level practices that others attempt to capture, explain and provide conceptual tools for studying; and some of the chosen theoretical strands of literature even serve as direct sources of inspiration for others. As such, the theoretical framework can be understood as a set of Chinese boxes that provide context for each other and contain different tools for analysing recent attempts at advancing collaborative crime prevention on various levels. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework adopted in the dissertation.

**Figure 1: Theoretical framework for studying advances in collaborative crime prevention**

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<tr>
<th>New Public Governance</th>
<th>Governmental criminology</th>
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<td><em>Shifting administration, management and delivery regimes</em></td>
<td><em>Shifting responsibilities (Paper 1)</em></td>
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<th>Implementation theory + Metagovernance and network management theory</th>
<th>Collaborative leadership theory</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Designing interactive governance arenas (Paper 2)</em></td>
<td><em>Leading collaboration (Paper 3)</em></td>
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<th>Collaborative innovation leadership theory</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Leading collaborative innovation (Paper 4-5)</em></td>
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Of course, theories of implementation, metagovernance, network management, collaborative leadership and collaborative innovation leadership are applied in other fields than the governance of crime and cannot be said to constitute a subspicies of governmental
criminology. As the theories are applied in the dissertation, however, the theoretical perspectives provided by governmental criminology constitute a frame within which the more specific practices of implementation, metagovernance, management and leadership conceptualized by the respective bodies of literature reside.
4. Methodological Reflections

In this chapter I will present and reflect upon my philosophy of science, mode of inquiry, overall research design, case study designs and case selections, data collection methods, and data processing methods.

4.1 Philosophy of science: Critical-realist pragmatism

My philosophy of science combines critical realism with elements of moderate constructionism and realist pragmatism. Critical realism maintains that the social world exists as a mind-independent reality and that we can obtain at least partial knowledge of its constitution, its generative mechanisms, and its more or less stable structures and laws through systematic empirical observations and theoretical interpretations (Bechara and Van de Ven, 2007: 37f). Unlike naïve realism that assumes a near-perfect fit between reality and the terms used to describe it, critical realism recognizes that theory is always incomplete and provisional and never able to fully capture reality (Bryman, 2016: 25). The aim of science is not to achieve an ultimate Truth, but to formulate the most accurate claims about a question or problem at a given time and in a given context (Bechara and Van de Ven, 2007: 62). The validity of knowledge, i.e. the extent to which it reflects the external reality, is determined by the scientific community based on accepted standards of sound logical argumentation and empirical evidence to substantiate the claims (ibid.). Concerned with developing theoretical models that most accurately capture the social world they seek to account for, critical realism sees the need (and opportunity) for theory revision and development in the events of shifts, changes and new developments occurring in the external reality: when conditions change over time or locales and/or new and understudied phenomena emerge, new theories may be called for. In order to develop theories that capture real change, critical realism favour retroductive reasoning as a method of scientific discovery where theory is developed through iterative processes of empirical observation and creative inference (Bryman, 2016: 25; cf. Bechara and Van de Ven, 2007: 55).

I adopt these basic critical-realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, but do so with an added emphasis on moderate constructionism. While recognizing that underlying structures are at play in social reality, I do not ascribe to structural determinism or downplay the significance of agency. Actors are not dupes, but situated agents that make conditioned choices and act creatively in ways that shape social processes and their outcomes. Though social phenomena exist independent of thought and confront actors as external realities, I
do not consider them to be totalizing, fixed, nor unambiguous. For instance, I recognize that organizations and their hierarchies, divisions of labour, rules and regulations, standardized procedures, etc. exert pressure on the individuals in the organization to behave in certain ways; from a constructivist position, however, I do not expect that actors will necessarily behave as they are prescribed to do (cf. Bryman, 2016: 29). I consider organizations to be at least partly ‘negotiated orders’ (cf. Strauss et al., 1963) where rules are not extensively and rigorously imposed; rather, they are interpreted, reconstructed and perhaps altogether discounted in favour of other, more informal rules (Bryman, 2016: 30). From acts of (re-)interpretation and construction, new structures may emerge. Based on these assumptions, the dissertation not only considers how objective features of inter-organizational arrangements influence actors and their collaboration, but also how actors act creatively to convene, facilitate and catalyse collaboration, and how they sometimes also modifying and mediating formal structures and design features in doing so.

Finally, I adopt elements of pragmatism since I am driven by an interest in finding solutions to practical and social scientific problems; use a variety of methods to understand the problems; and recognize that research itself plays a part in the social, political and historical context in which it is conducted (cf. Creswell, 2009: 10f; Bogason, 2006). Compared to more traditional forms of social research, pragmatist research is less concerned with reporting and registering past events and more concerned with anticipated practical consequences and implications for policy (Cherryholmes, 1992). It strives to produce research that is useful for science, practice, and policy. Based in critical realism, I engage with realist pragmatism which recognizes that scientific knowledge is limited, fallible and unable to fully comprehend reality, but still aims to provide as accurate models of reality as possible (Bechara and Van de Ven, 2007: 59-60). The basic idea is that we are better able to help solve the problems at hand if we more accurately understandings the mechanisms at play in a given context.

From a vantage point of critical realist pragmatism, I strive to understand pertinent problems in order to provide explicit advice to policy-makers, designers, managers, and participants in collaborative crime prevention. While some pieces of advice are conveyed in the scientific papers, others have been communicated more directly to relevant stakeholders through bilateral meetings, workshops, white papers, and other publication outlets. In the following section, I will briefly present and discuss how and why I have
adopted an interactive research approach as a way to aid my efforts at arriving at accurate depictions of reality and developing solutions to problems.

4.2 Mode of inquiry: Interactive research

As a general mode of inquiry for realizing the scientific and pragmatic aims of my research, I have chosen an interactive research approach where external partners have been systematically involved in discussions of the design, methods and results of the research project. In the following, I will briefly argue and discuss my reason for choosing an interactive approach, its main merits and perils, the ways in which I have structured and managed interaction with key stakeholders, and how I have handled challenges throughout the interactive research process.

My choice of an interactive mode of inquiry, along with my pragmatic research ambition of contributing to developing implementable solutions to pertinent problems, can be located in more general developments in the social sciences. In recent years, university researchers in Europe and North America have experienced increasing external and internal pressures to make research societally relevant through partnerships and increased collaboration with public and private partners (Nielsen and Svensson, 2006; Hessels and van Lente, 2008). The idea that research should be “with and for society” has risen to the top of political research agendas at national and transnational levels (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe, 2012; Nielsen, 2016). At the same time, research ideals are undergoing subtle change and the merits of more interactive forms of research seem to gain attention and recognition in more and more academic subfields within the social sciences (Bogason, 2006; Bergold and Thomas, 2012).

Proponents of interactive research welcome the new developments, not only because they are seen to enhance the practical applicability of social science research, but also its scientific quality and robustness. From an interactive research perspective, external actors are knowledgeable agents who possess valuable organizational resources, legitimacy, knowledge and expertise that can be deployed to improve practically all phases of research (Boyer, 1990). Partnering with relevant actors can thus open up the field of study, grant researchers the opportunity to access important forums and arenas, and assist the researcher in the process of collecting and producing relevant forms of data (Van de Ven, 2007). Beyond gate keeping and data collection, the knowledgeable external actors can also

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4 This section draws extensively on arguments made elsewhere (see Krogh and Nielsen, 2017).
enhance the quality of research by directly involving them in identifying pertinent issues, designing studies, interpreting data, and discussing the scopes and limits to the generalizability of results (Fotel, 2010).

While the developments towards more research conducted ‘with and for society’ hence provide new opportunities, they also involve new challenges (Caswill and Shove, 2000). Critics have warned that current developments threaten to leave the social sciences in the hands of resourceful and already powerful public and private actors with particular interests (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997); compromise scientific standards of objectivity and independency (Ziman, 2000); and lead to a situation where scientific knowledge is no longer any different from the knowledge of competent practitioners (Kieser and Leiner, 2009: 528).

Accepting the perspectives of both proponents and critics, I have proceeded to deploy research management strategies inspired by theories of metagovernance, network management and collaborative leadership in order to harvest the advantages and avoid the pitfalls of interactive research. The central research management task that I have concerned myself with has revolved around the question of how to a) make and keep external partners interested in contributing valuable resources to the research process while b) ensuring that scientific standards are met and c) maintaining the capacity for critique?

4.2.1 Ensuring continued buy-in from relevant stakeholder

The first step in making external partners interested in contributing valuable resources to the research process was to ground the research problem in needs experienced and expressed by practitioners. At a practitioners’ workshop on collaborative innovation at the Danish Crime Prevention Day 2012, the idea for a research project on how to sustain and develop collaborative crime prevention in and around the then fairly recently established LCPCs. A number of workshop participants, including a local police chief from Roskilde, expressed some frustration that the LCPCs were not generating sufficient value. It was decided to pursue the lead further. Based on initial desk research and further talks with both national crime prevention experts and practitioners involved in the LCPCs, my soon-to-be PhD supervisor, professor Jacob Torfing, and I drew up a research proposal that was discussed with key actors in the Danish Ministry of Justice (DMJ), the Danish Crime Prevention Council (DCPC), and the National Prevention Centre of the Danish National Police (NPC). It was important to them that the research would produce useful knowledge
for practitioner at all levels and that organizations at the local level were sworn in. The Mid
and West Zealand Police District (MWZPD) was contacted and agreed to serve as a case
district for empirical studies. Based on exchanges with MWZPD employees, the LCPCs in
the Roskilde, Kalundborg, and Greve municipalities were selected for in-depth case studies.
We contacted their local governments who got in on the project by contributing with a
smaller amount of financial resources for specific field work activities. In the end, the DMJ,
the DCPC, and the NPC agreed to co-finance the project. As such, the preparatory work
ensured the initial interest and buy-in from three important national stakeholders in the field
(DMJ, DCPC, NPC), one important district level player (MWZPD) and three local
governments and their administrations (Roskilde, Kalundborg, and Greve).

With the aims of reaping the benefits of interactive research beyond obtaining financial
resources for research, sustaining relations, and ensuring continual buy-in from important
stakeholders, I decided to set up two forums for exchanges concerning my research: i) an
advisory board with members from the seven co-financing institutions and ii) a smaller
working group consisting of administrative employees from the MWZPD. The advisory
board was called in for periodical meetings in 2013-2016 where we discussed my over-all
research plans, my empirical findings and interpretations, and my changing research needs
for outside assistance, e.g. for accessing and obtaining data. I met more regularly with the
working group in 2013-2015 to discuss my plans for the empirical data collection in the
LCPCs, schedule meetings and interviews with MWZPD employees, and jointly plan a
vision seminar for MWZPD employees and members of the three case councils (see section
4.2.2 below). Apart from my involvement in these two forums, I also presented and
discussed relevant aspects of my work with stakeholders at multiple meetings in the three
case LCPCs (2013-2015); at bilateral meetings and seminars organized by the DCPC, the
NPC, the national SSP council, and the MWZPD (2014-2016); and at major practitioners’
conferences around Denmark (2017).

Inter alia, the meetings in the two forums and elsewhere have proved valuable for
sustaining ownership and buy-in from relevant stakeholders, developing more specific
policy advice, and spreading research results among a broad circle of relevant actors in the
field. First, they have provided opportunities for sharing findings and initial interpretations
throughout the research process and thus helped me bridge the classical divide between the
long-term objectives of academia and the short-term needs of practitioners which otherwise
provides a barrier for research collaborations and threatens to leave important external
actors disinterested in research projects over time (Vehviläinen, 2006: 325). Second, they have created channels more suitable for communicating between researchers and practitioners than peer-reviewed articles (Nyden, Hossfeld, and Nyden, 2011: 7). Third, they have made me aware of the shifting priorities, interests and agendas of organizations in the field which has not only been a valuable insight for my research; it has also helped me frame my research in ways that makes it relevant to external partners, thus contributing towards the aim of ensuring continued buy-in from relevant stakeholder (cf. Huxham and Vangen, 2005: 220f).

A different strategy for communicating results and their applicability throughout the process would have been to produce applied research reports for the co-financing institutions. However, this option was deselected from an interactive research perspective since it such one-way communication would have provided an extra workload without the benefits of facilitated discussions.

4.2.2 Ensuring objectivity and avoiding bias
The lines between the roles of critical observer, consultant or even colleague can become blurry when leaving the more distanced researcher-researched relationship of conventional research (Bogason, 2006: 22; Coghlan and Brannick, 2014: 138). Close interaction with external partners can lead to concerns about the objectivity and independence of research if the relation is not carefully managed and reported on by the researcher. In addition to a general awareness of the dynamics and commitment to doing sound and well-balanced research rather than advocacy research for co-financing partners, I have taken specific methodological steps to enhance objectivity and avoid bias in my analyses.

First, I have actively sought to augment the width of my interaction to include more than just one or a few external partners (cf. the description of the interaction above). Interacting with a larger number of external actors is a way to avoid biases in the research process since it deduces the risk of adopting and reproducing a particular perspective of a specific actor without proper awareness of its situatedness and boundedness (Bogason, 2006: 24). Encountering and triangulating perspectives from various actors can assist the researcher in mapping the various positions in the empirical field of study, figuring out the main points of disagreement and contestation, and thus understanding the particularities of single-actor perspectives. My continual interaction with actors at various levels and from various sectors (sometimes, but not always gathered in the same room), along with my systematic analysis
of semi-structured research interviews with a wide variety of actors (cf. section 4.5), has aided my understanding of a multi-faceted field with many partial perspectives, diverging interests and discordant agendas.

Second, I have sought to establish a clear division of roles and responsibilities between me as researcher and external partners as aiding minds and hands (cf. Van de Ven, 2007). I have done so through initial formal agreements, but also through more subtle discursive framing of interaction. For instance, I invited co-financing partners to participate in an ‘advisory board’ rather than a ‘steering group’. The partners agreed that their primary role was to contribute with inputs, comments and feedback that could strengthen interpretations and advance the research process and that I would call them in whenever I found it suitable in the research process. By discursively framing the interaction as constructive feedback and taking the role of convener and facilitator of the structured interaction upon myself, I believe I have succeeded in establishing a clear role division that have laid the grounds for fruitful exchanges with the external partners. They have fully accepted that I have the final say with respect to all research-related decisions and that none of them have the right or responsibility to decide upon, or edit in, the final interpretation of data and reporting of results.5

Third, I decided from the outset to divide my research into two separate phases: in the first year and a half, I was acting mostly as an observer, and thereafter more as an intervening consultant. The division was evident in my initial research plan which was agreed to by the external partners. From January 2013 through July 2014, I hence collected documents, observed meetings, and conducted interviews without giving advice; in the remainder of the project period I went into a more intervening role of advising various stakeholders on how to change their practice. The shift to a more intervening role was marked by a vision seminar that I facilitated for members of the three case councils and the MWZPD staff in August 2014. The time-based role division was largely respected by external actors. However, I did find myself in situations where I was asked for advice while I was still in the non-intervening period of my research. In these situations, I either explicitly revoked the agreement and referred to the vision seminar as the beginning of the next phase or simply stated that it was too early for me to provide researched-based advice. All the

5 Concordantly, external partners do not figure as co-authors on the papers which is otherwise suggested and practiced by some interactive researchers, also within the field of crime prevention and policing (see e.g. Crawford and Cunningham, 2015).
empirical data analysed in the dissertation were produced before I was taking on the role
of advisor and facilitator of change whereby my direct influence on my object of study has
been limited to the common issues of the Hawthorne effect that were dealt with through
triangulation of diverse forms of data (cf. section 4.5).

4.2.3 Maintaining a critical stance
Interactive research with pragmatic aims have been criticized for its limited ability to
formulate perspectives that has no direct utility to resourceful actors and, perhaps more
importantly, to conduct research that directly criticizes powerful actors and established
power structures of society (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Based on my experience,
however, the assumption that external partners are only interested in research that portrays
them in a positive light and grants legitimacy to their current practices is highly
questionable. In my experience, partners are often interested in knowing and understanding
what they are doing wrong in order to improve their own practice. In fact, it may even be
the very reason for them to enter into interactive research. My first meeting with police
leadership in the MWZPD illustrates my point: when I told them that my interactive
research approach involves seeing them as knowledgeable practitioners that are experts in
their fields, they immediately objected. “We have no idea what we are doing. We expect
you to tell us why we are failing and instruct us in what to do differently!”

Adding to their interest in constructive criticism, some of the fiercest critics of systems,
institutions and organizations are often to be found among insiders since their situated
perspectives allow them to see problematic aspects of a given practice that outsiders may
not see. For that reason, I believe that interactive and pragmatic research can actually
increase the ability of researchers to formulate pertinent critiques of institutionalized
practices. However, the critical perspectives of practitioners should never be adopted
uncritically. Actors are situated in a field of interests and their critiques reflect their
positions. When actors have expressed discontent with other actors in my interviews or in
more informal conversations, e.g. that the police does not know how to facilitate
collaboration due to their reliance on formal hierarchies, or that a local government
representative is simply ‘negatively minded’, I have not simply reported the critique, but to
obtain several perspectives on the issue, comparing them to each other, and triangulating
with other data sources. Furthermore, following my philosophy of science, I have used
theories to understand the underlying structural, institutional, and process-based reasons
for them to surface.
In my approach, revealing and analysing the fact that conflicting organizational interests, unequal power-bases, resource imbalances, and power struggles are integral parts of inter-organizational relations serves as an important vehicle for producing realistic policy advice and recommendations for how to sustain and advance collaborative practices. As such, I see synergy rather than opposition between interactive research with pragmatic aims and the need for, and capability of formulating, critical perspectives on collaborative discourses and practices. As will become apparent, the pragmatic analyses presented in the dissertation papers are loaded with critical perspectives.

4.3 Research design
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, I have crafted a research design consisting of five interlinked case studies that will help me answer my main research question. In the following, I will explain and discuss my overall research design along with key methodological questions pertaining to the five case studies that make up its parts. First, I argue my choice of the case study method and consider its limits and possibilities; second, I explain how and why I have selected the cases that I have; third, I go further into the specific case study designs and mode of reasoning in the five individual case studies.

4.3.1 Why case studies?
A case study can be defined as an intensive study of one or a small number of spatially and temporally delimited phenomena (units) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population) (Gerring, 2007: 19f). Whereas quantitative large n studies based on random sampling are apt for testing hypotheses of clearly defined causal relations, case studies offer an opportunity to obtain in-depth understandings of the dynamics pertaining to a particular phenomenon and its intricate relationship to the context in which it unfolds (Yin, 2013: 321). The merits of case studies fit well with my research aims, my research interests, and my research approach.

First, case studies are particularly well-suited for gaining insights into complex phenomena, process-related dynamics and multi-directional relationships (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011b). As such, the case study method is apt for pursuing my ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in empirical environments with intersecting logics, interests and demands. Through in-depth case studies, I get to explore strategies for managing the tensions, dilemmas and
challenges that arise when established cooperation structures meet new collaborative crime prevention initiatives.

Second, case studies are useful for producing knowledge of what works in a specific context (Flyvbjerg, 2010). The careful study of real-life attempts at sustaining and advancing new forms of crime prevention offer an opportunity to learn from actual applications of specific (more or less successful) strategies in a Danish context. In some of my case studies, more successful cases are compared to less successful cases; in others, a case is studied diachronically to grasp how managers overcome barriers to widening and deepening collaboration (cf. section 4.3.2 below). Both types of case study produce context-sensitive knowledge of use to policy-makers and practitioners involved in Danish crime prevention.

Third, the case study method is apt for making deep propositions with high degrees of internal validity and holds the potential of generating new insights into context-specific mechanisms (Gerring, 2007: 37ff). As mentioned, ‘the Danish case’ is relatively under-explored in the literature on collaborative crime prevention, especially when it comes to collaborative crime prevention beyond the SSP cooperation. The case studies provide paths to deeper understandings of the specific conditions, governmental trajectories, institutional set-ups and management practices that characterize, and impact on, the development of collaborative crime prevention in Denmark.

4.3.2 The five interlinked case studies

The dissertation’s research design is made up of five case studies: a synchronic single-case study with a secondary comparative-historical element (paper 1); two diachronic single-case studies (papers 2 and 4); and two comparative cross-case studies (paper 3 and 5). The case studies are not only bound together by the fact that they all respond to the same main research question; they also provide context for one another and connect to each other in more direct ways. The five papers are written as stand-alone pieces, but reading them in sequence will provide a progressively deeper understanding of the issues pertaining to specific governance arrangements and to the field as such. Before arguing and reflecting upon design choices made for each of the individual case studies, I will briefly clarify the interrelations between the five case studies which are illustrated in figure 2.

*The first case study* examines the institutional legacy and governmental trajectory of Danish crime prevention and contemplates the organizational representation in the Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs). Designed as a single country-case study with four within-
case cases and a secondary comparative-historical element, it contemplates the impact of the international trend of community safety on formalized crime prevention institutions in Denmark as a typical case of a Scandinavian welfare state. The country case study sketches out the large-scale socio-political and institutional context in which the subsequent four case studies are embedded. Moreover, its empirical investigation of the LCPCs poses the question to be answered in the second case study, namely why core SSP actors enjoy significant organizational representation in the LCPCs while the opposite is the case for civil society actors.

The second case study examines the LCPC implementation process. Designed as a diachronic single-case study, it traces alterations in the LCPC design as it travels down the implementation chain from the ministerial order to the final rules of regulation in the Mid and West Zealand Police District (MWZPD). In doing so, it provides empirical insights into the rationales behind the formal LCPC framework in the MWZPD, including the key bones of contention between the local lead actors in the police and local government. As such, the case study provides smaller-scale contextual background for understanding the leadership practices studied in the third case study.

The third case study examines the hands-on leadership practices in three LCPCs in the MWZPD. Designed as a comparative cross-case study, it considers how and why various hands-on leadership strategies are more or less successful in enhancing the collaborative capacity of the local LCPC. More specifically, it studies how the formally appointed leaders of the three LCPCs either harden or soften the issues inherent in the formal LCPC framework. As such, it provides insights into the importance of local leadership for the consolidation of cross-sector collaboration on the politically mandated governance arenas.
The fourth case study examines the role of leadership in the process of developing the SSP+ cooperation scheme in Copenhagen. Designed as a diachronic single-case study, it traces the collaborative innovation process and considers how the SSP secretariat has sustained and supported the process along the way. It shows how the established SSP cooperation framework comes to shape the new SSP+ framework. Concerned with the development of the new SSP+ cooperation scheme, the case does not consider the subsequent inter-agency exchange within the formalized framework. However, one of the 14 initiatives studied in

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6 Depictions of longitudinal/comparative case studies adopted from Brogaard (2017: 36).
the fifth case study, namely ‘the exit-strategy’, was initiated and implemented in and through the SSP+ framework.

The fifth case study examines the role of leadership in developing and implementing 14 collaborative initiatives aiming to reduce gang-related violence and crime in the socially deprived neighbourhood of Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen. Designed as a comparative cross-case study, it considers the leadership challenges of convening, facilitating and catalysing collaboration in the process of developing and implementing the initiatives. While the SSP+ framework plays a role in one of the cases, there are no relations between the examined cases and the LCPCs since Copenhagen was exempted from the requirement of setting up LCPCs due to an already established governance structure of local councils.

4.4 Reflections on case study designs, case selection, and generalizability

Having delineated the over-all research design and the interconnections between the five case studies, I will now argue and reflect upon the chosen case study designs and selected case(s) with respect to each of the individual case studies. I do so in order to clarify the limits as well as the potentials for making generalizations based on the case studies.

4.4.1 Paper 1: Single-case study of organizational representation in Danish crime prevention

Mapping the organizational representation in central inter-organizational crime prevention forums and arenas, the first case study empirically assesses how and to what extent the international trend of community crime prevention has impacted on the organizational crime prevention landscape in Denmark. It relies on secondary data collected in 2013-2016. The paper reporting the results of the study is to be resubmitted to *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*.

In the paper, I consider Denmark to be a typical Scandinavian welfare state with a long tradition of social crime prevention that relies on the social service provision by public welfare agencies and targeted interventions to reduce social strain among children and youth. While the focus of the empirical analysis is placed on Denmark, I include the UK and the USA as background cases and survey them through secondary literature in order to add a comparative-historical dimension to the analysis (a commonly deployed strategy in single-case studies, cf. Gerring, 2007: 22; Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 294). They hence serve to provide background for the observations and propositions made in relation to the Danish case. The UK and the USA were chosen as background cases because a) they are
generally considered to be front runners in adopting community safety and situational crime prevention strategies, and b) most of the scholarly work on these practices originates in these countries (cf. the literature review presented in the paper). Considering the differences in governmental trajectories between the polities, the paper argues the need for developing context-sensitive analytical concepts and demonstrates how developments in Danish crime prevention deviate from the grand narrative of British and North American crime control.

In the case analysis of organizational representation in Danish crime prevention, four within-case cases are studied (cf. Gerring, 2007: 27ff): the SSP cooperation, the SSP+ cooperation, the PSP cooperation, and the Local Crime Prevention Councils. Through a reading of all available reports on local collaboration published by the Danish Crime Prevention Council for the past 20 years (n=19) (available at http://dkr.dk/materialer/lokalt-samarbejde), they were identified as the most central inter-organizational crime prevention institutions in Danish crime prevention. The reports cited them as widely adopted cooperation frameworks with forums and arenas on multiple levels. The result of the search corresponded with my general knowledge of the field obtained through prior research, conversations with practitioners, participation in crime prevention seminars and conferences. In order to validate the selection of cases, I presented it to external partners on the research advisory board who found the selection reasonable without further additions to make.

While the SSP, the SSP+, and the PSP are studied through documents in order to establish their core actors, common collaborators, and adopted crime prevention strategies, I conduct a quantitative analysis of the membership data of LCPCs in order to determine the extent to which other actors than the core SSP, SSP+ and PSP actors have obtained organizational representation in the new arenas. In order to obtain an empirical counterpoint for discussing the results of the LCPC analysis, I draw in the case of the Danish Crime Prevention Day (DCPD) 2016. An annual open-to-all, free-of-charge, one-day conference organized by the Danish Crime Prevention Council, it illustrates the diversity of actors that consider themselves to be preoccupied with the prevention of crime. Comparing the LCPC membership data with the DCPD participant data provides an indication as to the extent to which the organizational representation in the LCPCs reflects the conglomerate of actors interested in the prevention of crime or more specific in-/exclusion mechanisms pertaining to the LCPCs. The indicated in-/exclusion mechanisms are studied further in the second case study of the dissertation.
The chosen case study design naturally places certain limits as to the reach and 
generalizability of the conclusions. First, while Denmark is a Scandinavian welfare state 
and the results of the study fits with the general accounts of Scandinavian crime prevention, 
I cannot draw conclusions on the Scandinavian crime prevention scene as such. In this 
respect, the results are indicative and similar studies in Norway and Sweden will have to 
be conducted. Within the frames of the dissertation, however, I am more interested in 
Denmark than Scandinavia as such.

Second, given the case study design, I cannot say anything about the participation of 
various actors in the wide range of projects, initiatives and partnerships at the local level. 
The conclusions of the case study are limited to the organizational representation in central 
Danish inter-organizational forums and arenas that have crime prevention and reduction as 
their explicit purpose. The dissertation’s fifth case study provides insights into the variety 
of public and private organizations participating in such initiatives at the local level.

Third, I cannot draw definite conclusions on the forms of crime prevention advanced in and 
through the forums and arenas of the surveyed institutions, but only bounded conclusions 
on the likelihood of various strategies being pursued. The study shows that social crime 
prevention enjoys high degrees of formal institutionalization in Denmark and that a third 
of the LCPCs solely consist of core actors of the SSP cooperation. It is obviously not 
impossible for a forum consisting of representatives from schools, social services and 
police to plan and implement community crime prevention or situational crime prevention 
measures. Given the history and institutionalization of the SSP cooperation, however, they 
can be expected to be less likely to do so than forums which (also) involve, for example, 
housing associations, restaurants and surveillance companies. To draw more definite 
conclusions on the pursued strategies in the various forums would require a study of the 
substantial content of the meetings and planned activities which lies beyond the limits of 
this dissertation.

4.4.2 Paper 2: Diachronic single-case study of the LCPC implementation process

The second case study is a longitudinal case study of the LCPC implementation process. 
The data was collected in 2013-2014 with the specific purpose of writing a dissertation 
paper on the process. The paper has been accepted for publication in Scandinavian Journal 
of Public Administration.
The quantitative LCPC membership data analysed in paper 1 show that civil society actors have only been included in a minority of the LCPCs. This observation clashes with the policy intentions behind establishing the LCPCs and the suggested design in the ministerial LCPC decree which describes the LCPCs as new local collaboration structures with participation of local community organizations, associations and networks.

With the intent understanding the reasons behind this policy drift, I conduct a top-to-bottom implementation study that traces the shifting LCPCs designs from the ministerial order to the final LCPC design at the local level. Since the implementation process branches out in 11 different police districts, each with their own trajectory and resulting design, it is necessary to choose between three possible research designs: a full population study including all districts; a comparative case study including a sample of districts; or a single-case study including only one police district. I have decided to go for the latter for two main reasons: the role of the LCPC case in the paper and the resource requirements for data collection and processing.

After surveying the literature on implementation, I saw the need for developing an analytical framework that would be able to capture the multi-level, multi-actor dynamics of top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. It soon became clear that developing such framework would be the main contribution of the paper. While my initial reading of the LCPC case prompted the development of the framework, I decided diminish the role of the LCPC case in the paper to serving illustrative purposes of how to apply it. While it would be interesting to pursue a comparative strategy, the role of the case in the paper did not remit a study involving multiple districts, especially since the developed analytical framework requires the collection of multiple participant accounts of the inter-organizational negotiations that have led to policy alterations being made on various levels of the implementation process. For that reason, it was decided to do a single-case study of one police district only.

Out of the 11 police districts, the Mid and West Zealand Police District was selected for the longitudinal single-case study for three reasons. First, the MWZPD is the only district that ended up including local community actors in all of its LCPCs. On paper, it is hence the only district that fully lives up to the LCPC policy intentions. Choosing the atypical MWZPD district case allows me to study how successful implementation was achieved despite apparent difficulties. Second, we find interesting longitudinal variance in the MWZPD LCPC design during the implementation process: the number of community
organizations was first limited to three community representatives and then expanded to eight representatives later on. The variance makes it possible to study both conductive and constraining factors within the same case. Third, an element in the greater PhD research design, the study provides important context for the comparative case study presented in paper 3.

Choosing an extreme case, I cannot generalize my findings to the entire population of districts (cf. Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 301f). The results of the case study are, however, relevant beyond the MWZPD case. First, by virtue choosing the successful district case, the empirical insights on the design steps taken to allow for (more) civil society actors to enter the LCPCs in the MWZPD can serve to inspire practitioners. It can trigger re-evaluations and redesign processes in other districts and, more generally, inform future national policies, requirements or guidelines on the formal design of the LCPCs. Second, by virtue of building an analytical framework that captures the constituent properties of the implementation process and anchors them in broader theories of implementation and metagovernance (cf. sections 3.3 and 3.4), the lessons derived from the case study can be analytically generalized (cf. Yin, 2013: 325ff; Lund, 2014: 226, 229). As such, it can be used by managers of future top-down implementation of other governance arrangements that are prompted, for instance, to take steps to avoid institutional designs based on logics of government. Finally, by the same token, researchers conducting future top-down governance implementation studies can use the framework to look for similar properties and dynamics as those uncovered in the case study; consider how and why they come into play; and discuss various implementation management strategies for coping with them.

Ultimately, the success of an analytical framework developed through analytical generalizations is a matter of its utility which may be broken down to two central questions: a) if it can be used to make sense of the data analysed in the case study from which they derive; and b) if it can be used by others to understand events and processes in different contexts (Lund, 2014: 228). In the paper, I show that it can explain the data of my own case. Whether or not it can be used by others is still up for validation. The fact that it has passed through international peer-review indicates that the framework is solid. The real test of its utility in other context will, however, first take place if/when it is brought to bear on other cases of top-down implementation of interactive governance arrangements. In the spirit of abductive theory building, such application would provide an opportunity for further advancement of framework.
4.4.3 Paper 3: Comparative cross-case study of hands-on leadership in three LCPCs

The third case study is a comparative case study of hands-on leadership practices in three LCPCs in the Mid and West Zealand Police District (MWZPD). The data was collected in 2013-2014 with the sole purpose of contributing to a dissertation paper. The paper has been submitted to Administration & Society.

Aiming to understand the significance of various forms of hands-on leadership for the inter-organizational relations among participants in the LCPCs, the study was designed as a most similar case study (cf. Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In a most similar case study, cases are strategically selected with the intention of obtaining maximum variation on the independent variable of interest (in this case hands-on leadership) while keeping all other independent variables constant (Ljiphart, 1971). Since most observational studies involve too many variables to ensure full similarity on all independent variables except the independent variable of interest, approximate matching is typically deployed and accepted as ‘the best one can do’ (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 305). With that in mind, I selected LCPCs within the same police district in order to ensure that all three cases shared the same formal purpose, tasks, procedures, leadership structure and general membership composition. I chose the MWZPD as a case district for reasons given above.

While I in principle could have chosen to study all ten LCPCs in the district, I limited the number of cases to three in order to allow for comprehensive qualitative data collection on leadership practices and participant perspectives through multiple participant observations and semi-structured interviews in each of the cases (see section 4.5.3). Since no written data sources exist on the hands-on leadership strategies deployed in the MWZPD LCPCs, I selected the cases in cooperation with the district police management who had at least partial qualitative knowledge of all LCPCs in the district through their regular meetings with the local chiefs of police. With the purpose of maximizing variance between the cases within the common framework, we selected three LCPCs that were considered to be ‘working in very different ways’: i) the LCPC in Roskilde which was said to be running ‘by the book’, but without producing significant results; ii) the LCPC in Greve which was said to have an entrepreneurial young local chief of police with an ‘innovative’ approach; and iii) the LCPC in Kalundborg which was considered to be more ‘autonomous’ and jokingly described as ‘the Wild West’.

As the final paper will tell, the case selection strategy proved effective in obtaining a sample with great diversity in terms of hands-on leadership practices. The common institutional
framework was filled and altered in significantly different ways by the three formally appointed LCPC leaders. While the institutional design variable was kept constant, however, it was not possible to rule out the influence of local contextual factors by design. The impossibility of doing so is a basic condition when doing small n case study research (Yin, 2013). In order to remedy this problem, I collected transitional data on the relations between the leadership variable and the inter-organizational relations (cf. ibid: 324). For instance, interviewees were not simply asked about their collaborative relations with other local actors, but how and why they experienced the LCPC meetings to be more or less productive.

I use the cross-case study findings to develop a conceptual model of four leadership strategies for sustaining and advancing collaboration on politically mandated governance arenas. Based on the findings, I map the possible hands-on leadership space along two key dimensions and from that construct four conceptual leadership strategies. If I had had 10 cases instead of three, or simply three other cases, I would potentially have discovered other relevant leadership choices. I do not claim that the conceptual framework covers each and every important dimension, but it covers two significant dimensions along which all leadership practices are situated. In order to strengthen the framework, enhance its generalizability, and contribute the accumulation of knowledge, I conclude the paper by linking the conceptualized strategies to related research literature and connecting it to extant, more commonly adopted analytical concepts (cf. Yin, 2013: 326f).

Due to the sample size, I cannot make numeric generalizations about the relative prevalence of various strategies in the LCPC population or test their effects on the collaborative capacity of the LCPCs. What I attempt to do instead is to make analytic generalizations of the kind ‘applying strategy X in cases sharing conditions Z with the studied cases is likely to contribute towards outcome Y’ (Yin, 2013). Even though I use theory to substantiate the likely causal relation (cf. ibid.), I am cautious with respect to my analytical generalizations of the likely effect of applying the leadership strategies as it must be expected to be highly context dependent. The conclusions that I can draw from the small n case study are in other words bounded by a ceteris paribus. More work is warranted in order to strengthen this part of the conceptual framework.

4.4.4 Paper 4: Diachronic single-case study of the SSP+ innovation process
The fourth case study is a longitudinal single-case study of the role of collaborative innovation leadership in developing the SSP+ cooperation in Copenhagen. The data was collected in 2011-2012 by Elisa Kankaala as a part of her PhD dissertation research. Based on a descriptive analysis of the innovation process conducted by Kankaala, we framed and interpreted the findings of the case study together. Paper 4 presents the results of this collaborative endeavor. It has been published in an anthology on collaborative innovation in the public sector, edited by Peter Aagaard, Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing (2014).

Since I was not involved in the initial process of designing the study and selecting the case, I cannot provide very detailed reflections on how and why the specific case study design was chosen and the specific case was selected. Kankaala originally selected the case for a single-case study of the role of network administrative organizations (cf. Provan and Kenis, 2008) in developing new and innovative inter-organizational crime prevention initiatives (Kankaala, 2015: 81). In the context of this dissertation, however, the question of how and why the case was selected is more a question of my reasons for including the case study in the collection of papers presented in the dissertation.

I have decided to include the case study for three reasons. First, the SSP+ case shows how established crime prevention institutions are not simply static monoliths that block any attempt at widening and deepening collaboration around the prevention of crime. It suggests how a long history of collaboration, strong ties, and well-established cooperation structures can be utilized for developing new cooperation formats that involve new actors. This insight is relevant in reference to the first case study. Second, the case shows how professional facilitators who do not have a vested interest in privileging one party over others can be expedient in overcoming barriers to inter-organizational collaboration. At such, it provides perspectives on how to organize and facilitate processes through which new collaboration structures are designed. This perspective is relevant in reference to the second case study. Finally, the case shows the potential of strong vertical relations for developing new and innovative forms of collaboration. It stresses how local decoupling from vertical structures is not necessarily the (only) way ahead in this respect. This insight is relevant in reference to the third case study.

A single-case study in which the case has not been selected based on its typicality in relation to a larger population, the study is not particularly apt for making empirical generalizations. According to Kankaala (2015: 81), the case was originally selected due to its specific, and allegedly ‘rare’, characteristic of having a network administrative organizations involved.
in the process, and hence not its representativity. I have not been able to find other studies of SSP+ development processes, yet alone obtain information on how many municipalities have developed SSP+ schemes. With no knowledge of the population, I am not able know if the studied case is typical or atypical for SSP+ development processes as such. Based on the case study findings, we discuss the need for various collaborative innovation leadership roles under various conditions. Through logical argumentation informed by theory we make the analytical generalization that innovation leadership should focus on catalysing leadership rather than facilitative leadership in situations where collaborators have a long history of collaboration. Studying SSP+ development processes in other municipalities would be a way to explore collaborative innovation processes in such situations further which could serve to qualify the thesis.

4.4.5 Paper 5: Cross-case study of 14 collaborative innovation projects in Mjølnerparken

The fifth case study is a comparative case study of collaborative innovation aiming to reduce gang-related violence and crime in and around Mjølnerparken, Copenhagen. The data were collected in 2010-2011 for a larger book project on collaborative innovation in Danish gang prevention which was completed and published within the first year of my dissertation work (Torfing and Krogh, 2013). The paper included in this dissertation present a reworked and condensed edition of points made on leadership in the book. It has been published in an anthology on collaborative governance and public innovation in Northern Europe, edited by Annika Agger, Bodil Damgaard, Eva Sørensen and myself (Agger et al., 2015).

For the larger study, we chose a multiple case study design with the aim of exploring empirical variations in collaborative innovation processes. We decided to focus on a single gang-ridden neighbourhood in order to keep the social, political and economic context stable and investigate various responses to the same gang problem. Choosing a neighbourhood with a high density of initiatives made it possible to examine the interaction between numerous actors and activities. It also eased data collection which primarily relied on interviews with project managers, employees and volunteers since several of the interviewees were involved in the studied initiatives (cf. section 4.5.5). Mjølnerparken is far from the only socially deprived areas in Denmark ridden by considerable gang problems. Due to its relatively close proximity to our homes and workplace, it was chosen in order to ease the quite comprehensive data collection in the field. In the light of the other
case studies of the dissertation, it would have been relevant to select a municipality with an LCPC in order to study the role of the LCPC in relation to the specific initiatives in a local area. Since the data were collected before I began my research on the LCPCs, however, it was not included as a case selection criterion. Since Copenhagen is one of four municipalities exempted from the requirement of setting up LCPCs, such study is unfortunately not possible to carry out on the basis of the cases.

In terms of the selection of the 14 specific cases, we did not have sufficient knowledge to strategically select one or more typical or deviant cases since no data were available on the total population of gang prevention initiatives in the area when we began our research. Instead we used a reputational sampling method to identify and select our cases. First we contacted individuals mentioned in mass media and websites concerning the prevention of gangs in the area and asked them to point out local projects that a) were trying out something new and b) involved different local actors in the design and/or implementation phase. Based on their response, we then contacted project managers and others involved in the recommended initiatives and asked them the same questions. When we rarely heard of new projects, we stopped our search.

The reputational sampling method proved valuable in identifying a relatively large number of relevant cases within the same policy area in a relatively short period of time. Involving key actors with local knowledge in the case identification and selection process helped ensure that selected cases met our definitional requirements, namely that they were not only based on collaboration, but also innovative in the local context. Finally, the method made it possible to go beyond what cases could have been identified through desk research and hence ensured that our sample also included less consolidated initiatives without websites or media attention.

However, the reputational sampling method also has its limitations. Since the case selection was not based on random sampling, we cannot assume the sample to be representative of the general population of (collaborative and innovative) projects addressing gangs in and around Mjølnerparken or in deprived neighbourhoods in Denmark more broadly speaking. Neither can we *ex post* determine the representativeness of our sample since the method did not procure data on the total population. For that reason, we cannot make numeric generalizations based on our results (cf. Yin, 2013). For our analytical purposes of understanding the role of leadership in collaborative innovation processes, however, this is
a secondary concern. For these purposes, it is more important to consider our sample profile and the limits it sets for our ability to make analytical generalizations (ibid.).

While we have no way of testing our suspicions, we have reasons to suspect that the reputational sampling method has introduced some bias into our sample. 13 out of the 14 identified innovation projects involve public funding and/or participation; and all of the identified projects are successful innovations with relatively few destructive conflicts involved in the process. These features of our sample might at least partly be explained by a) the fact that most of the key actors initially contacted were civil servants and b) the tendency of actors in the field to be reluctant to report on conflict-ridden or failed projects. Whether or not they are a result of our case selection technique, they limit our ability to gain insights into leadership practices that fall within the scope of our research interest and theoretical framework. Based on our sample, we cannot say anything about the possibilities and challenges of leading (an ecology of) projects in which public actors are not directly involved. Nor do we gain insights into the role of leadership in very conflict-ridden projects.

That being said, we have produced a sample with considerable variation on key dimensions from which we can extract knowledge of the role of leadership in bringing together public and private actors to produce innovative solutions to wicked gang problems. In the book, we consider all dimensions in each of the cases before making comparisons across cases (Torfing and Krogh, 2013: 95ff). In the paper, we solely focus on cross-case findings relating to the leadership dimension and primarily emphasize leadership challenges in order to nuance the rather harmonious picture of the various collaborative innovation leadership roles that we draw up in the theoretical section of the paper. Looking for similarities among diverse cases was a way to enhance the likelihood that the identified leadership challenges apply more generally to collaborative innovation processes (cf. Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 300f). Again, however, we cannot say anything about the general prevalence of the identified challenges based on the study, but simply show that such challenges exist in empirical application of the various leadership roles.

4.5 Data sources and data collection methods

Case studies have traditionally been associated with qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. Today, however, it is widely accepted that case studies may draw on a variety
of both quantitative and qualitative methods and incorporate substantial portions of quantitative analysis (Gerring, 2007: 10f, 19).  

In the case studies, I make use of policy documents, qualitative interviews, meeting observations, and secondary quantitative data. My choice of methods has been pragmatically guided by my specific research interest in the individual case studies and the type of data needed to pursue it. The range of different methods used in the dissertation reflects the fact that different forms of data are needed for mapping various types of institutional designs and process designs; capturing leadership actions in both formalized and more informal interactive governance settings; and understanding the motivations, interests, and concerns of designers, leaders and participants. Put differently, the various methods and types of data that they bring about each have their merits and limitations. A few general remarks on my reasons for choosing the methods should be made before explaining how they have been deployed in each of the individual case studies.

Document is a data source which is particularly useful for obtaining information on the topography of governance arrangements (e.g. who is involved at what stage in which formal role), governmental rationales for instituting them, and political and strategic dimensions more broadly speaking (Esmark and Triantafillou, 2007). Apart from providing useful factual information on designs and processes, they can be analysed as facilitators of political and social action as well as results of such action (ibid.: 100). On the one hand, they can hence be treated as ‘mirrors of reality’ which provide factual information; on the other hand, they can be seen as tools for actors to obtain their goals and as things affecting social processes (cf. Triantafillou, 2016). In my analyses, I do both. The specific ways in which understand, use and treat various documents in the individual case studies vary according to the overall purpose of the study, the role awarded to the specific vis-à-vis other data source in the study, and the type of documents analysed. Below, I argue and reflect on the use of various documents in each of the five case studies.

While policy documents are an apt source of data for analysing designs, they do neither provide insights into more informal aspects of interactive governance settings nor the experiences, understandings and reflections of designer, leaders and participants (Bogason

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7 While I rely on qualitative methods in all five case studies, I also conduct descriptive quantitative analysis in two of the case studies: in the first case study, I conduct descriptive quantitative of secondary quantitative data sets; and in the third case study, I conduct descriptive quantitative of quantifiable aspects of my meeting observations (cf. sections on the individual case studies below).
and Zöllner, 2007; Esmark and Triantafillou, 2007). In order to capture the latter dimension, I have conducted a large number of semi-structured phenomenological interviews with actors at various levels and from various sectors (Kvale and Brinckmann, 2009: 26ff). These interviews are based on themed interview guides that focus on predefined topics and questions of specific interests while allowing room for rich descriptions and exploration of issues of particular concern to the respondent (cf. Kvale and Brinckmann, 2009: 130ff). I have included a selection of interview guides in the appendix for illustrative purposes. The phenomenological interviews serve as my primary data source for obtaining insights into the experiences and perspectives of subjects. Yet, I have drawn on other data sources when preparing, conducting and analysing the interviews, for example by identifying relevant interviewees through key documents, referring to documents and observations during an interview, or linking observations and interview statements together in the analysis.

In addition to the phenomenological interviews, I have also conducted so-called factual interviews (Kvale and Brinckmann, 2009: 150f). They seek to obtain accurate factual information rather than subjective experiences and perspectives, e.g. for mapping sequences of events or the circle of participants involved in a given negotiation. Generally, the factual (parts of my) interviews are shorter, more structured and reliant upon closed questions whereas the phenomenological (parts of my) interviews are longer, more explorative and based on more open-ended questions. In order to increase its validity, I triangulate the factual information obtained through interviews with information obtained through other sources whenever possible. In much the same way as documents have aided me in selecting interviewees, factual interviews have also aided me in identifying key documents. Except for two factual phone interviews, all of the interviews have been conducted in person, recorded and transcribed in their entirety to allow for subsequent data analysis. In the sections on each of the four case studies using interviews below, I explain my specific strategies for selecting, conducting and processing the interviews according the purpose of the interviews in the specific study, the subject matter, and the subject position of the interviewees (cf. Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).

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8 In some instances, the same interview contains both factual and phenomenological elements, i.e. questions that aim to obtain factual information in addition to questions that seek to obtain descriptions of the interviewee’s subjective experiences and perspectives. In such cases, I separate the different types of information in my analysis and validate the factual information as described.
While interviews are apt for gathering some pieces of factual information and gaining insights into the reflections, experiences, motivations and concerns of actors, they do not say anything about unreflective leadership practices and actual interactions between actors at meetings. In order to explore how hands-on leaders ‘set the stage’ in inter-organizational governance arrangements (cf. Hajer, 2005), I make use of non-participatory meeting observations. They enable me to study the more informal aspects of inter-organizational collaboration, including the internal in- and exclusion of actors (cf. Young, 2000). All of the observations are conducted as overt observations in closed settings (cf. Bryman, 2016: 266ff). I explain the reason for choosing this approach in relation each case study below.

Finally, quantitative data sets make up an important data source in the first case study which contextualizes the subsequent case studies. They are deployed for descriptive and comparative purposes of mapping and discussing the organizational representation in the Local Crime Prevention Councils vis-à-vis other inter-organizational institutions and public-private platforms in Danish crime prevention, rather than for testing causal relations (or co-variance) between variables. The data sets hence provide insights into the organizational landscape in Danish crime prevention and, more specifically, how the LCPCs across the country are designed, but they do not tell me why they are designed the way they are. Other data sources are needed for such analysis which is conducted in the second case study.

Across the papers, the analysed data sum up to a number of policy documents, 80 qualitative research interviews, 16 meeting observations, and two quantitative data sets. Table 1 provides an overview of the data sources used in the five papers. In the following sections, I go through each of the five case studies and explain why the specific types of data were gathered and how they were processed.

**Table 1: Data sources used in the five papers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Quantitative data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Policy reports</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Two sets (n=806; n=733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Policy documents</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Policy documents</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Policy documents</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Project descriptions</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5.1 Case study 1: Organizational representation in Danish crime prevention

Policy reports
The first half of the analysis presented in paper 1 is based on policy reports and official websites. The material was gathered with the aim of establishing the main purpose, methods and core actors of the within-case cases of the SSP, SSP+, and the PSP. As part of the process of selecting within-case cases (described in section 4.4.1), I identified the policy reports, whereas the websites were found through Google searches after the key inter-organizational crime prevention institutions had been selected. The gathered material was deductively coded to identify each institution’s core actors, common collaborators, primary objectives, main target groups, year of establishment, degree of formalization, geographical spread and degree of adoption.

As such, the written sources are treated as mirrors of reality that capture the key aspects of the studied institutions. The validity of the results thus hinges upon the extent to which the written sources actually mirror reality. Based on a general assessment of the trustworthiness of the authoring institutions (and a specific assessment of the individual reports), I consider both the reports and the websites to be reliable. The fact that the picture drawn from the websites and reports necessarily reduces complexities of local variations pertains to the level of analysis rather than the trustworthiness of the sources. The reports stress that the local applications of the cooperation frameworks vary across locales. This local variation is not captured by the analysis which focuses on the basic, commonly shared characteristics of the frameworks.

Quantitative data
In the second half of the analysis, I conduct a descriptive analysis of two sets of high quality secondary data: a) a Local Crime Prevention Council membership data set (n=806) and b) a Danish Crime Prevention Day (DCPD) 2016 participant data set (n=733). The data sets include the name, job title, and home organization of all registered LCPC members in Denmark and all registered participants at the DCPD 2016, respectively. Both data sets were constructed by the Danish Crime Prevention Council who granted me access to the data upon request.9

9 The purpose of gathering the LCPC data was to establish a central, non-public data base with contact information on all LCPC members. Before disclosing the data to me, a DCPC employee cleansed both data sets from contact information in order to protect the personal information of volunteers and other
The Danish Crime Prevention Council collected the LCPC data in 2013 by asking all districts to report the members of their LCPCs. As a whole, I consider the data set to be reliable and expect the data to be valid.\textsuperscript{10} Obviously, the data set only provides information on formally appointed members of the LCPCs and not on informally in- and excluded participants in councils.\textsuperscript{11} Based on the analysis, I am thus not able to tell the extent to which others than the official members are informally included in the councils or if some of the appointed members are not actively engaged, e.g. never showing up to meetings, not listening or sharing anything at the meetings, or not participating in any LCPC activities. As mentioned, it takes other data collection methods to study processes of informal in-/exclusion which are hence beyond the scope of the analysis presented in paper 1; I study them in the observation- and interview-based analysis in paper 3.

The DCPD data were generated through online self-registration on the website of the Danish Crime Prevention Council which was required in order to participate in the open-to-all and free-of-charge conference. The data provides full and accurate information on who preregistered for the conference. Much like the LCPC data, the DCPD data set only provides information on registered participants, some of which may not have shown up at the conference for various reasons. I consider this limitation in the data a secondary concern since I deploy them as an empirical counterpoint discussing the formal in-/exclusion mechanisms pertaining to LCPC membership. They are hence included by virtue of showing how distributions in (formal) organizational representation turn out in public-private crime prevention platforms with no formal gatekeepers (as explained in section 4.4.1). The actual participation in the DCPD is beyond the scope of the analysis. After gathering the data, I coded the data in order to investigate key distributions in both data sets. The specific coding procedures are argued, explained and discussed in the paper.

4.5.2 Case study 2: The LCPC implementation process

\textsuperscript{10} In order to check the validity of the list, I decided to do a random cross-check of one police district. Through my contact persons in the Mid and West Zealand Police District, I had obtained updated membership lists of the MWZPD LCPCs. Comparing the MWZPD data to the membership list, a few discrepancies were identified, but they could all be attributed to the fact that members had been substituted between the times of data collection.

\textsuperscript{11} As mentioned, it takes other data collection methods to study processes of informal in-/exclusion which is done in paper 3.
Policy documents

In the case analysis of the LCPC implementation process, I use policy papers, policy reports, meeting minutes, and internal working documents in two tempi. First, I use policy documents to obtain factual information on the implementation process, i.e. to answer questions on the sequence of events, the actors involved at various stages of the process, and the resulting policy alterations. Then, I consider how policy documents produced in early stages of the implementation process come to frame later multi-actor design negotiations at the district level; and how the documents express particular interests and serve to affect the practices in and of the new arenas in ways that serve these interests.

In gathering written material from the implementation process, I made use of public sources, formal requests of access to records and documents, and direct contacts in the police. First, my administrative contact person in the Mid and West Zealand Police District granted me access to all documents concerning the LCPCs in the district, including internal working documents and meeting minutes. Second, I contacted the Ministry of Justice and formally requested access to any and all documents relating to the LCPCs from the ministerial archives. Third, I combined procedures of forward and backward mapping, applying a method of ‘snowballing’ whereby I systematically scanned the obtained documents for references to other documents. Through this process, I inter alia identified one seemingly crucial preparatory report which I had not already gained access to. I obtained this report by specifically asking the Danish National Police for access. Finally, I asked all interviewees for relevant documents (cf. below). I believe that the policy document collection strategy has proven useful for obtaining a range of relevant documents that cover the full implementation chain from top to bottom.

I processed the documents by systematically reviewing and classifying the gathered material according to time and level of application (national/regional/local) which produced an overview of various stages in the implementation process. Considering the process as a whole, I detected four key documents that each mark a critical moment of redesign in the implementation process. For each of these documents, I created an overview table with information on the stated purpose of the LCPCs, their tasks, and circle of participants. In mapping the process, I hence treated documents as mirrors of reality. The information they provide is triangulated and supplied with factual information provided by key actors interviewed about the process (cf. below). In interpreting the process, I treated
the policy documents as things affecting social processes and as tools for actors to obtain their goals. The interpretation is aided by the interviewees’ situated accounts (cf. below).

**Interviews**

I conducted semi-structured interviews with seven key actors from various stages of the implementation process in order to a) obtain factual information on the implementation process (cf. above) and b) understand the most important reasons for the design choices made at each stage, map the most important points of contention, and obtain insights on the motivations, interests and agendas of the individual actors. Table 2 provides an overview of the interviews.

The interviewees were identified through a combination of reviewing documents and asking my contacts in the Mid and West Zealand Police District to point to relevant actors. In the documents obtained from the Ministry of Justice, I identified two ministerial employees who were listed as the civil servants responsible for the documents. I contacted them and they both agreed to a phone interview on the process surrounding the formulation of the ministerial answer that introduced the LCPCs in the political negotiations of the police reform as well as the period of time passing from the negotiations (in the spring 2016) until the ministerial order is sent to the district chiefs of police (in December 2016). They both asked me not to cite them directly and pointed out that they would simply point me to information that I could find in publicly available documents, transcripts and newspaper articles. I accepted these terms and used the interviews to validate my understanding of the process and the relation between ministerial answer and the ministerial order.

**Table 2: Overview of Critical Moments of Redesign in the Implementation Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Involved Actors</th>
<th>Main Document</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring of 2006</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>MPs in the Legal Committee and civil servants in the Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Ministerial answer</td>
<td>Two civil servants in the Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12 Such perspective is prompted by interest- and power-based implementation theories and the specific analytical framework developed in the paper.
The two high-level managers from the Danish National Police and the Danish Crime Prevention Council (DCPC) were identified and selected as interviewees at an early stage in the research project due to their central positions in organizations with a stake and an interest in the LCPCs. They were interviewed on the role of their organizations in relation to the LCPCs, including their involvement in the implementation process. The specifically told about the process of crafting the preparatory implementation report and their more general impression of the main points of contestation in the implementation of the LCPCs, also those arising at the local level in the wake of the implementation report. The more general accounts were confirmed in my interviews with the local level actors.

My contacts in the Mid and West Zealand Police District pointed to the then chief superintendent in the district as a leading figure in the LCPC implementation process at the district level which was confirmed by the obtained documents from the district. It was evident in the interview with the chief superintendent that the process had involved several important points of contestation between the district police and the local governments in the district. I asked the chief superintendent to name two public executives from local government who represented ‘the other side of the table’. They were then contacted and interviewed on the process. Selecting interviewees this way involves the risk that the chief superintendent have attempted to manipulate the research by pointing to local government representatives that are less critical of his actions and, more generally, the police’s management of the implementation process. I have sought to reduce the risk by letting him know that I would share the results of the analysis with a broader circle of actors with knowledge of the implementation process. Any gross misrepresentation of the process would hence be identified. The interviewed local government representatives proved to be highly critical of the design solutions suggested by the police and did not leave me with the impression that they were among a less critical group of local government representatives (if anything, quite the contrary).
Seven interviewees are not a lot. Interviews with more actors could potentially have added more nuances to the story. However, I believe I got the main points, which is enough for the illustrative study. The relatively small number of interviewees makes the study vulnerable to consciously skewed or otherwise fallible accounts. I have dealt with this issue through triangulation with documents, cross-interview validation\textsuperscript{13}, and sharing my analysis in various forums with external stakeholders that have knowledge of the process from various positions and perspectives (cf. section 4.2).

4.5.3 Case study 3: Hands-on leadership in three LCPCs

\textit{Policy documents}

In the third case study, I use the policy document on the rules of procedure for LCPCs in the Mid and West Zealand Police District to delineate the main features of the common formal framework for the three studied LCPC cases. I obtained the document when gathering relevant MWZPD documents in relation to the second case study described above. While the document accurately expresses the objective formal features of the LCPCs, it is a central point of the paper that the formal document does not mirror reality in the sense of actual occurring practices in the LCPCs. Rather, the analysis shows how the formal framework is disobeyed, modified and mediated in practice. However, even though the hands-on leaders in the councils do not follow and apply (all of) the formal rules (all the time), they do relate and refer to them in my interviews and sometimes also at the LCPC meetings. As such, the document must be interpreted as a thing framing and affecting, but not determining social processes. Considered as a metagovernance tool, it must, by extension, be seen as an imperfect tool for leading the LCPCs towards specific goals.

\textit{Interviews}

For the hands-on leadership case study, I conduct semi-structured, phenomenological interviews with the appointed leaders of the three LCPCs (all local chiefs of police) and a sample of LCPC participants from various sectors in order to study how various ways of conducting and constructing the LCPCs at a local level affect the attitudes, willingness and ability of the participating organizations to work together. The most general aim of interviewing the leaders and participants is to understand the motivations, perspectives, and experiences of various public and private actors in the three LCPCs.

\textsuperscript{13} The interviewees expressed various opinions about the process and the decisions made, but generally agreed on the course of events and main lines of contestation.
More specifically, I use interviews with LCPC leader as a method for getting to know their general attitudes towards the LCPC and each of their respective perceptions of, and opinions on, the primary role and tasks of both the LCPC and themselves as LCPC leaders. Through the interviews I gain an understanding if they think the LCPC is a needed, superfluous, useful, inadequate, challenging, problematic or promising forum; if they see the LCPC as an implementation network, a forum for long-term strategic visioning, a decision-making arena, a place for information-sharing, or a venue for developing new initiatives; and if they see themselves as chairmen, facilitators, agitators, boundary-spanners, decision-makers, administrators, or visionaries. I also get to know more about why they hold those opinions, what they are attempting to do as hands-on leaders of the LCPC, and their reasons for acting in certain ways instead of others. Combining these pieces of information with my observations of LCPC meetings and interviews with the participants, I attempt to construct a holistic picture of how each of them lead their LCPC; why they lead it in that specific way; and what implications it has for the inter-organizational relations in, and collaborative capacity of, the respective LCPC.

I conduct interviews with a selection of participants in order to understand their reasons for participating in the LCPCs, their hopes and expectations for the inter-organizational exchange in and through the LCPCs, how they see the relation between the LCPC and other inter-organizational arenas, what they gain from participating, and what they would like to see change. The interviews give a voice to participants who are vital to the collaborative capacity of the arenas, but who are not particularly involved in deciding how the LCPCs should be conducted and constructed. By interviewing a sample of participants that are more or less centrally positioned in the LCPCs and in the broader field of crime prevention in Denmark, I get the chance to tap into their perspectives and utilize them for improving the LCPC leadership and its ability to build, sustain and advance inter-organizational relations in the field. Combining the perspectives of various participants with my other data sources, I aim to understand and explain which leadership strategies are most successful in convening, facilitating and catalysing cross-sector collaboration around the prevention of crime.

I conducted the participant interviews in two rounds: in each of the case councils, I did one LCPC leader interview and three participant interviews in the spring of 2013 (n=12) and the same again in the spring of 2014 (n=12). Two of the three LCPC leaders had been replaced right before the second round of interviews. When processing the data, I decided
to limit my study to the hands-on leadership practices of the first leaders, and hence the first year of observations, in order to ensure that all the data related to the same leadership practices. I hence discarded the interviews with the two new LCPC leaders in the data processing phase. Conversely, I decided to include three additional participant interviews conducted in one of the case councils in the fall of 2013 by a group of bachelor students whom I supervised. This decision was based on an assessment of their quality and relevance to my analysis. All in all, I ended up with one leader interview and nine participant interviews in the first case (n=10), one leader interview and six participant interviews in the second case (n=7), and two leader interviews and six participant interviews third case (n=8). Table 3 provides an overview of the interviews.

Table 3: Interviews in the three LCPCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPC chair</td>
<td>LCPC chair</td>
<td>LCPC chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention Unit</td>
<td>Prevention Unit</td>
<td>Prevention Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Unit</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Gov.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local Gov.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local Gov.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, Youth and Family A</td>
<td>Children, Youth and Family A</td>
<td>Children, Youth and Family A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, Youth and Family B</td>
<td>Children Services</td>
<td>Jobcenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Services</td>
<td>Homeowner’s Association</td>
<td>Sports Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Psychiatry</td>
<td>Night Ravens</td>
<td>Business Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Sports Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation Services</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Ravens</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Local Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Centre</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Business Association A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Association</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td>Business Association B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Club</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Business Association C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>School A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>School B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When selecting participants, I aimed to obtain a broad spectrum of perspectives. I was interested in perspectives of participants also involved with the SSP in order to understand the relation between the two forums; and of those not involved with the SSP in order to understand the ability of the LCPCs to draw in and activate actors who were not a part of the established inter-organizational crime prevention institutions.

In the first round, my selection criteria for each of the three LCPCs were: one local government representative from the SSP; one private or voluntary sector representative from the local community; and one who had participated in the LCPC for many years, preferably since 2007. For practical reasons, most of the interviews were conducted right before or just after the first meeting I observed in the respective LCPC. Since I had not yet familiarized myself with the LCPCs and their participants at that time, the local LCPC leaders helped me identify participants who lived up to the delineated criteria. In addition to the participants, I also interviewed the LCPC leaders in the same round.

In the second round of interviews, I wanted to add to the diversity in perspectives and thus decided to select: one local government representative who was not involved with the SSP; one police representative who was not the LCPC leader; and two private or voluntary sector representatives from the local community. I formulated the criterion that all interviewees must have participated in at least two of the past four LCPC meetings. I did so in order to ensure that the interviewees were familiar with the most recent LCPC meetings since I wanted them to specifically comment on the ways in which these (observed) meetings were conducted. In that way, I ensured that the perspectives of the participants could be linked to the practice of the present LCPC leader and not the practices of former leaders and/or unobserved/-recorded ways of leading the council. In doing so, however, I also limited the breadth of the gathered perspectives. It would have been interesting to hear the perspectives of newcomers and perhaps especially those who are appointed to the council, but do not show up to the meetings. For the mentioned methodological reasons and due to the limited capacity, however, I prioritized otherwise.

In order to ensure reliability and raise the validity of cross-case conclusions, two common interview guides were crafted: one for the LCPC leaders and one for the participants. Based on the first round of interviews, I made a report with preliminary observations and started analysing the data. For the second round of interviews, I decided to shorten the interview guides in order to sharpen the focus of the interviews and cut away the parts that I would
not pursue further in the analysis. I left out introductory questions on crime problems and collaborative relation in the local context in general in order to focus in on the role of the LCPC vis-à-vis other arenas; the extent to which they have their interest served in and through their participation on the arena; and what they would like to see changed (to which some answered “nothing”). While the second round of interviews are thus more precise, the first round of interviews still provides valuable, albeit less elaborate information on the specific issues that I focus on in my analysis. I have decided to include them in the final analysis.

Meeting observations

From Marts 2013 through Marts 2014, I conducted 11 overt, non-participatory meeting observations in the three case councils (four in case A, three in case B and four in case C) in order to explore how the leaders ‘set the stage’ in the three case-councils (cf. Hajer, 2005). I hence observed all of the quarterly LCPC meetings during the one year period of observation except for one. As described in my reflections on my interactive mode of inquiry (section 4.2), I separated the LCPC research process into an observing and an intervening phase. I continued to attend LCPC meetings in the three councils until August 2015 (i.e. for another year and a half), but I only included the meeting observations conducted during the first non-intervening year of research in the analysis presented in paper 3.

The meeting observations are non-participatory in the sense that the meeting participants did not consider me a participating actor and that I did not intervene or voice my opinion during the meetings. It does not mean that I have abstained from any form of interaction with the participants at any time. Since it was a closed setting with a relatively small number of participants, it was not possible for me to hide. Given my pragmatic and interactive research ambitions, I also wanted to make the research project known to the participants. In order to make the participants comfortable with my presence, I introduced myself and my research project to all participants at the first meeting in each of the case councils. I told them about the research ambitions of contributing to more well-functioning LCPCs and the research plan of first observing meetings and interviewing participants and then facilitating a vision seminar. I made it clear that I would not cite directly from what was said by whom at the meetings, but simply use the observations to understand what was going on at the meetings and how they could be improved. Being open about my doings was I way for me to involve the participants in the research plan, safeguard my position as a passive observer.
in the first period of time, and limit the reactive Hawthorne effects of my presence in the councils. If I did not speak out or initiate any interaction at any time, I would expect the participants to become suspicious of my doings and perhaps more self-conscious in my presence. By the same token, I said hello and goodbye to everyone and engaged in small talk with participants before and after the meetings.

During the meetings, I seated myself at the same table as the LCPC participants, but I chose to sit where my presence was the least disturbing, e.g. by the far end of a table. I used a laptop to take observation notes during the meetings since the speed of writing on a keyboard allowed me to take detailed notes on the spot. Furthermore, it created a more secluded space for me with my notes on a screen pointing towards me instead of lying on the table for anyone to see. At one meeting in each council, I presented preliminary results from my analysis of the LCPC implementation process in order to give something back to the participants and show that I was using my insights for something useful before going into the more intervening phase. Since I was presenting, I did not take observations noted during this session and I have not included this part of that particular meeting in my analysis.

In order to ensure systematic observations as a basis for cross-case comparisons, I followed an observation schedule that guided me in terms of what to look for and how to record it (cf. Bryman, 2016: 266ff). For all meetings, I noted the time and place of the meeting; the names of the participants; the physical set-up of the meeting room; the physical positions of participants in the room; the meeting agenda; the persons speaking under each agenda point; and the content of what was said. I paid specific attention to the role of the leader, e.g. if and when he/she was passive/active, if and when he/she gave one-way speeches or prompted others to talk, how new agenda points were introduced, etc. After each meeting, I wrote down my reflections on what I had observed and formulated temporary points for the analyses.

From the first set of meeting observations and the first round of interviews, I found that the participants rarely take the lead by interrupting, putting things on the agenda, suggesting other forms of interaction, etc. It was evident that the appointed leader defined the space and the modus operandi of the LCPC. Also, it was clear the three leaders conducted the meetings in dissimilar ways. In order to survey exactly how much of the meetings in each of the three LCPCs were spent on a) one-way information sharing from the leader to the participants, b) information sharing among the participants, c) facilitated discussions, and
d) spontaneous discussions, I decided to time and record the type of activity under each agenda point. The data allowed me to make time distribution tables that illustrate the different ways of leading the meetings in the three case councils.

As I interviewed more participants and observed more meetings, a picture of each LCPC started emerging. The combined sources of data gave me an understanding of how the respective leader saw his/her own role, how he/she led the meetings, what the participants were thinking, and how they acted in the meeting situation. The interviews helped me understand the actions of leaders and participants in the meetings; and the observations helped me understand the reflections of the interviewees. Working abductively, the empirical insights helped shape my theoretical framework in the process. After all the data had been gathered, I systematically review it and coded it along the lines of the derived theoretical framework.

4.5.4 Case study 4: The SSP+ innovation process

As described, my fellow researcher Elisa Kankaala have planned, conducted, transcribed, and coded all the data used in the fourth case study. The main data source is 23 one-on-one, semi-structured interviews with public employees at various levels of government who were involved in different phases of the SSP+ innovation. The interviews focused specifically on the processes leading to the SSP+ innovation and on cross-sector collaboration and innovation more generally. For background, five unstructured meeting observations were conducted: four in the frontline groups and one at an educational seminar for the SSP+ participants. Finally, policy documents are included as secondary sources to describe the matrix structure for the established SSP framework and the new SSP+ framework. Since the paper does not concern the actual collaborative practice in the new cooperation structure, but focuses on its development, the documents are simply considered to mirror the output of the innovation process. More specific details on the process of selecting interviewees, crafting interview guides and observation schedules, and processing the data are found in Kankaala’s dissertation (Kankaala, 2015).

4.5.5 Case study 5: Collaborative innovation in Mjølnerparken

Project descriptions

In paper 5, project descriptions on websites, in pamphlets, and in policy documents are used for obtaining information on the official purpose of, the participants in, and the design
of each of the 14 prevention initiatives in Mjølnerparken. The material was gathered by asking all interviewees for written material on the innovation projects at hand and by searching the Internet for all relevant written material on the projects. The information in the written material was triangulated with the factual information provided by the interviewees. In case of incongruence between the written material and what was said in the interviews, we carried out follow-up phone interviews or asked for clarification via e-mail.

Interviews
The fifth case study draws on 26 semi-structured single interviews and a semi-structured group interview with four respondents, i.e. a total of 30 interviewees in key positions with respect to our cases. Some of the interviewees were involved in, and hence interviewed on, more than one of our cases. The interviews were planned and conducted in 2010 with fellow researchers Troels Schultz-Larsen and Jacob Torfing for the before mentioned book on collaborative innovation in the prevention of gangs (Torfing and Krogh, 2013). As a means for creating consistency in our data collection, we followed the same interview guide.

We decided to conduct semi-structured interviews in order to allow room for pursuing relevant stories about the innovation process and the steps on the way that interviewees found particularly challenging. Since semi-structured interviews require on-the-spot decisions on what elements in a response to pursue further, they open up for great variations in form and focus when multiple interviewers are involved. In order to tackle this issue and establish a common modus operandi, we conducted the first interviews in teams of two before doing more interviews individually.

Two research assistants and I transcribed the interviews and Jacob Torfing deductively coded them according to five key analytical dimensions: i) the problem addressed by the initiative; ii) the proposed solution to the problem; iii) the scope and depth of collaboration; iv) leadership and management; and v) drivers and barriers in the process. Each case was first described and analysed separately along the five dimensions, and then an overview table of all the 14 innovation projects in order to ease comparisons across the five dimensions. In the book, we go into detail with each and all of the five dimensions (Torfing and Krogh, 2013: 95ff). Paper 5 focuses specifically on the fourth dimension of ‘leadership and management’ and relates it to the other dimensions, specifically the fifth dimension of ‘drivers and barriers in the process’.
It is evident that we have relatively few respondents with respect to each of our cases. When deciding to do a qualitative case study of a relatively large number of innovation projects, we also accepted that we would not be able to interview as many respondents in each case as we would have liked to due to resource constraints. As mentioned, some interviewees were interviewed on several projects and we have supplemented the interview data with written material in order to obtain and correct information on all the dimensions of interests with respect to each case. Based on the data, we have not been able to study learning processes that are not recorded in documents and that the interviewees themselves are not aware of. Participant observations would be a method that could have solved this issue. In most cases, however, it was not possible to conduct such observations since the projects were already implemented when we began our research.
5. Conclusions

The collection of papers in this dissertation contribute towards the end of answering the main research question of how public lead actors manage the development, implementation and consolidation of new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in Denmark; and with what consequences for the inter-organizational relations in the field? Through a number of strategically selected cases of cutting-edge collaborative crime prevention, I have investigated various management and leadership strategies and considered how, why and to what extent they contribute towards the end of widening and deepening cross-sector collaboration around the prevention of crime. I have thus paid special attention to the ability of various management strategies to expand collaborative relations beyond core public actors of the established institutions (i.e. the police, public welfare agencies, public schools, public hospitals, etc.).

In the following, I will first highlight the main findings of each of the five case studies. Then I formulate general conclusions across the five papers and hence the empirical contributions made to the literature and practice of collaborative crime prevention. Finally, I delineate the contributions made to the various bodies of literature on public governance, management and leadership drawn upon in the dissertation.

4.1 Main findings

Paper 1 reviewed the most significant inter-organizational institutions in Danish crime prevention and conducted a quantitative analysis of the organizational representation in the 97 Local Crime Prevention Councils. The analysis showed how the SSP, the SSP+, and the PSP cooperation schemes have cast an expansive net of municipal steering committees and local actions groups in which the social crime prevention agents plan, coordinate and sustain their interventions. Furthermore, it showed how public agencies of the social crime prevention regime continue to enjoy extensive organizational representation in the Local Crime Prevention Councils. Triangulating the results with analysis of the distributions in the participant data from the Danish Crime Prevention Day 2016, the analysis indicated that the mediated access to the closed LCPCs privileges public agencies of the social crime prevention regime over public, private and community actors of the situational and community prevention niches. The case study hence provided support for the thesis that the police and public welfare agencies (continue to) assume the main responsibility for handling crime, safety and security issues in Denmark. It suggested that a social crime
Paper 2 developed a theoretical perspective for studying top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas and applied it in a longitudinal case-analysis of the implementation of the Local Crime Prevention Councils in the Mid and West Zealand Police District. The analysis showed how the LCPC implementation process was structured by an unfavorable (top-down government) implementation process design. As a result, the implementation of the LCPCs was ridden by redesigns based hierarchical and formalistic logics of government; power strategies based on a logic of one-sided distributational advantage; and active resistance from local actors with a vested interest in the existing institutional set-up. More specifically, the analysis showed how the police constituted the LCPCs as police-led steering committees for the SSP and other local crime prevention networks to which local government officials reacted with defensive strategies in an attempt to limit the relative influence of the new arenas. Consequently, the formal powers of the LCPCs were dismantled and the number of community actors included in the councils was kept down. Only after some years, when the district police and local government officials had gained confidence that the LCPCs would not be reconfigured or used as formal decision-making arenas, they decided to open up for more community actors to enter the LCPCs. This decision was based on a logic of governance, which considers a wider inclusion of actors to be a means for increasing the power and practical utility of the forums. Based on the case analysis, the paper recommended political leaders and public managers to involve relevant stakeholders at an early stage in the policy design process; to distribute leadership roles among several agencies; and to ensure neutral mediation between the involved parties during the implementation process.

Paper 3 investigated the role of hands-on leaders in bridling design-based barriers to collaboration on politically mandated arenas. The paper developed the hypothesis that politically mandated governance arenas are institutionally prone to exhibit structural features that compromise necessary conditions for cross-sector collaboration. Compared to self-grown arenas, politically mandated governance arenas are expected to be more likely to rely on appointed representatives, formal procedures, and a formal lead actor structure. When these design features exist in concert, it was argued, they are likely to complicate vital collaborative leadership tasks of satisfying organizational self-interest, sustaining and
exploiting interdependencies, and ensuring the legitimacy of the collaborative arena. The comparative case study of hands-on leadership in three Local Crime Prevention Councils showed that the appointed hands-on leader who loyally implemented the formal rules and regulations in the LCPC was the least successful in producing cross-sector collaboration. Conversely, the hands-on leaders who deviated from the formal rules of procedure and/or involved other relevant stakeholders than the formally appointed representatives in the processes created spaces more apt for collaborative problem-solving. Based on the case analysis, the paper conceptualized four idealized hands-on leadership strategies for promoting collaboration in politically mandated governance arenas which can be expected to be more or less conducive to inter-organizational collaboration. It hypothesized that applying a strategy of the loyal implementer will, ceteris paribus, produce an arena with poor conditions for cross-sector collaboration; deploying strategies of the orderly host and the mainstream bender will construct an arena with improved, albeit not ideal conditions for cross-sector collaboration; whereas pursuing a strategy of the institution builder carries the potential of overcoming the design-based challenges to cross-sector collaboration while exploiting the advantages of politically mandated governance arenas.

Paper 4 studied the role of leadership in developing the new SSP+ cooperation framework in Copenhagen. Proceeding from a broad definition of leadership as all elements driving collaborative processes forwarded, the analysis showed how the institutionalized framework of the SSP cooperation eased the process of establishing the new SSP+ framework. A well-developed culture of collaboration, consolidated trust relations, and thoroughly tested collaborative structures and practices provided solid grounds for the public actors involved in the innovation process. Moreover, the analysis showed how strong vertical linkages between administrative levels contributed to the development and implementation of the new SSP+ framework. As the SSP+ idea travelled from the bottom to the top and back again, it was qualified and anchored in various layers of the participating organizations. Considering the role of the network administrative organization (NAO) in charge of advancing the innovation process, we found that the NAO primarily focused on supporting and sustaining the inter-organizational negotiations rather than catalysing the collaboration through strategic disturbances. As such, it fulfilled the collaborative innovation leadership role of the facilitator, but neglected that of the catalyst. While the combination of a highly institutionalized framework for collaboration and a facilitative NAO proved useful for successfully developing a new initiative, it also led to relatively
modest degrees of innovation: the new SSP+ framework ended up resembling the old SSP structure to a large extent. Reflecting on the results of the case study, the paper recommended leaders of collaborative innovation to consider the potential of catalysing leadership, especially in settings where public actors with a long history of collaboration interact within a highly institutionalized framework.

Paper 5 provided empirically grounded advice for political leaders and public managers on how to lead collaborative innovation processes. The cross-case analysis of 14 cases of collaborative innovation aimed at curbing gang violence in the city of Copenhagen identified three major barriers to collaborative innovation that leadership should address. First, in some instances, relevant public and private actors cannot discern any clear benefits from spending time and resources on collaborating around the prevention of gangs. Second, competitive conflicts erupt among otherwise obvious collaborators because they run similar initiatives that cater to the same group of users, but focus on their own achievements. Third, some stakeholders experience publicly facilitated collaboration processes as predetermined and ‘locked’ whereby they lose their inclination to participate. Based on the analysis, political leaders and public managers were advised to constitute ‘burning platforms’ and stress the interdependencies of relevant actors; to highlight the respective strengths and contributions of various actors and provide platforms for coordination between relevant stakeholders in the same area of operation; and to allow initiatives to change and develop as new actors join in. In the light of the delineated barriers, the importance of impartial leadership was stressed. To this end, it was suggested that political leaders and public managers consider the possibilities of establishing NAO’s in the form of multi-party steering committees and common secretariats with professional facilitators. If that is not feasible, they should do what they can to ensure that leadership is exercised by well-connected and trusted actors who are able to gather relevant public and private actors around a common cause and lead them through open-ended problem-solving processes.
4.2 General conclusions

4.3.1 Institutionally embedded practices of collaboration

The dissertation set out to provide a deeper understanding of the context-specific conditions for promoting collaborative crime prevention in Denmark. To this end, the analyses of recent cutting-edge attempts at expanding and strengthening inter-organizational relations in the field have shown how established crime prevention institutions shape the constitution of new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in and through their influence on the strategies pursued by public lead actors in the field.

The long-standing SSP institution and its more recent offspring of the SSP+ and the PSP cooperation schemes form the institutional backbone of a pervasive social crime prevention regime which, in addition to the police, counts the social services, schools, Jobcentres, housing services, psychiatric hospitals, and care homes among its core actors (cf. paper 1). As the case analyses have shown, the social crime prevention regime is expansive, but by no means totalizing or completely static. Peripheral actors are both formally and informally included in new inter-organizational arrangements (cf. papers 1-3); its inter-organizational structures facilitate the development of new structures that, at least to some extent, broaden the circle of participants (cf. paper 4); and many initiatives spring from outside and below its quite extensive net of steering committees and action groups (cf. paper 5). While recognizing how the established institutions can play a conductive role in processes of conceiving new initiatives (cf. papers 4 and 5), I have also found that they can figure as a factor in processes that exclude ‘institutional outsiders’ from new initiatives and restrain their innovative potentials and wider collaborative capacities (cf. papers 1-4).

The established inter-organizational crime prevention institutions serve to in- and exclude actors in three ways. First, the institutions distribute roles and responsibilities for preventing crime. Preventing crime is desirable for society as such (cf. introductory chapter), but not all individual public and private actors consider it to be their task or primary concern (cf. paper 5). Enrolling actors in institutionalized crime prevention cooperation schemes and initiatives can make their potential contributions apparent to themselves and others. Since their participation is voluntary, such enrolment requires that they can see how their participation contributes towards their organizational interests. Leadership strategies may be more or less successful in inciting active participation from
relevant actors who do not consider the prevention of crime to be their primary concern and responsibility (cf. papers 3-5).

Second, the institutions link specific actors together and provide inter-organizational infrastructure for their communication, coordination and collaboration. Established forums, arenas and other communication channels make it relatively easier for some actors to interact around new cooperation schemes or collaborative interventions. Over time, already included actors can be expected to develop trust relations and a common language, but also some degree of collective tunnel-vision (cf. paper 4). Under stable conditions, accustomed collaborators within an established institutionalized framework are hence likely to reproduce its basic crime preventive approach and actor-setting when developing new initiatives, thus bypassing more peripheral actors and approaches. Leadership strategies may be more or less successful in catalyzing collaborative processes in ways that disturb taken-for-granted assumptions and open them up towards new solutions that involve new sets of actors (cf. papers 4 and 5).

Third, the institutions distribute resources and decision-making power in the domain. As such, their arenas constitute sites of power and influence. Regulating the access to the arenas is hence a means for gaining and maintaining control over organizational resources and priorities. When new inter-organizational platforms like the LCPCs are introduced top-down, they may potentially alter the established distributions of power (cf. paper 2). As such, they present themselves as a potential threat to actors with a vested interest in the existing institutional set-up. When threatened, resourceful actors in privileged positions may engage in institutional power-struggles, guard the borders of their institutions, and exclude otherwise relevant and resourceful actors in order to defend their positions. Leadership strategies may be more or less successful in alleviating tensions between old and new inter-organizational arenas and facilitating collaborative processes among old and new collaborators (cf. papers 2 and 3).

4.3.2 Design- and leadership-based barriers to collaboration

As argued throughout the dissertation, understanding the barriers to collaboration is a step on the way for overcoming them. Some frustrated leaders of collaboration that I have talked to as part of the research presented in this dissertation explain the reluctance of others to commit resources to joint problem-solving with a self-centered attitude and a lacking sense of common responsibility on the part of other actors. Through its analyses and theoretical
explorations, this dissertation has argued that reluctance to engage in a collaborative initiative should be analyzed and understood in the light of its particular design and leadership, including its relations to other arenas and initiatives, i.e. its place within the wider institutional environment. It has suggested that organizational self-interest should not be seen (and condemned) as an antidote to collaboration per se; rather, it should be seen as a condition that various designs and leadership strategies maneuver in with more or less skill and attainment. It follows that successful collaborative designs and leadership strategies do not expect organizational self-sacrifice in the name of a greater cause, but acknowledge, incorporate and cater to a variety of organizational interests and agendas.

In a similar vein, counterproductive and exclusionary designs and leadership strategies must also be analyzed and understood as a result of something else than a lack of commitment to a greater cause, a general unwillingness to collaborate across sectors, or basic collaborative incompetence among public managers. As described in broad terms in introductory chapter, and more specifically in the individual papers, there is a significant political and administrative interest in mobilizing community actors, expanding collaborative relations, and promoting broad ownership to local problem-solving. Of all the actors I have talked to, I am yet to meet an individual who does not find wide and deep cross-sector collaboration to be a good idea. Furthermore, I found the individual public leaders involved in the various cases to be knowledgeable, competent and reflective with respect to inter-organizational collaboration.

While there is always room for improvement in terms of individual collaborative leadership skills, the analyses have shown that significant challenges to productive collaborative leadership pertain to structures, processes, and logics beyond individual control. For example, we have seen how inexpedient implementation process designs give way to logics of government and one-sided distributional advantage (cf. paper 2). In the process, public actors who have nothing against the idea of local cross-sector governance networks end up limiting the number of civil society actors, installing formal voting procedures, and demanding action within specific focus areas. I have also shown how local hands-on leaders get caught in the cross-fire between central (intra-organizational) directives, on the one hand, and local (inter-organizational) needs and demands, on the other hand (cf. paper 3). Local managers who follow centrally formulated and formalized rules and regulations end up with poor conditions for inter-organizational collaboration. Finally, we have seen how competent facilitators from a network administrative organization support and sustain
collaborative innovation processes (cf. paper 4). However, by doing their job, they end up contributing to the reproduction of familiar forms of organizing inter-organizational relations. As such, I have found inexpedient structures, processes and logics rather than ill-will and incompetence to be the main causes of management and leadership practices with restraining consequences for the inter-organizational relations in the field.

As shown in chapter 2, previous studies on Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England have ascribed the exclusion of civil society actors from partnerships to their low levels of autonomy from central government, processes creeping bureaucratization, and a lack of funding. This dissertation has identified similar issues in relation to the LCPCs in Denmark. It indicates that the observed phenomena are not simply particular deficiencies of the CDRPs (or the LCPCs), but pertain more broadly to politically mandated governance arrangements in the field. However, I have also shown how some LCPCs are more autonomous and less bureaucratic than others whereby these features cannot be seen as necessary features of all politically mandated governance arenas. In the end, it is a matter of how they are implemented and led.

4.3.3 A way forward

While the case analyses have shown the restraining implications of inexpedient structures, they have also shown how agency plays an important role. Structures are neither all-determining nor completely fixed. Reflective designers and entrepreneurial leaders find productive ways to convene, facilitate and catalyze inter-organizational collaboration at various organizational levels. Too often, however, public managers seem to succeed despite of, and not because of, the existing structures and designs. Based on the presented analyses, one may argue for more creative and entrepreneurial public managers and leaders who are capable of working independently and unconventionally; or for more flexible structures and locally adapted designs that are based on logics of governance. Ultimately, one would have both as they can contribute to one another.

Despite the delineated challenges pertaining to formalized interactive governance arenas like the LCPCs, they evidently also have some important advantages. First, they provide some degree of institutional stability and continuity which is important for building inter-organizational relations. Second, they gather various actors around the table who are not necessarily involved in the same specific initiatives, but can still benefit from interaction.
Third, they provide a platform for local leaders to obtain political-administrative support for new cross-organizational initiatives.

The LCPCs should thus be maintained, but they should be governed in a different way than they are in most districts today. The purpose, tasks and institutional relations of the LCPCs should be (re-)constructed in ways that ease collaboration among key actors and open up the arenas towards civil society actors. They should not decide on priorities of SSP other local networks. Instead, their role should be to identify, support, strengthen, develop, and expand on activities at the local level. They should be organized as a multi-actor network administrative organization (NAO) that ensure coordination and support and foster new connections and ideas for fruitful collaborations. They should keep themselves updated on the developments of new initiatives and maintain an expansive network of public and private actors at various levels in the municipality. They should be a go-to-place for public and private actors who want to get involved in crime prevention and their contact information should hence be publicly available.

As an outgoing activity, the LCPCs could facilitate workshops in different locations where local stakeholders are invited to identify inter-organizational needs and potentials and plan future collaborations and interventions. Acting as a multi-actor elevator of initiatives with contacts at the local and central levels of governance, the LCPC would be able to lift the most promising initiatives to strategic forums and higher political-administrative levels in key organizations. Local initiatives that enjoy wide inter-organizational support could thus obtain political-administrative legitimacy and vital resources for their further development and implementation. It would strengthen inter-organizational knowledge of the initiatives and facilitate dissemination of innovative projects, concepts, and models.

In order to ensure that important public actors in local government and the police invest sufficient resources in the LCPCs, political leaders and top-management could jointly decide on a particular crime preventive focus area for the LCPC in the individual municipality to focus on, e.g. burglaries, traffic violations, or feelings of safety among the elderly. Choosing a focus area before inviting other relevant public and private actors to join the LCPC would raise chances that actors choosing to join the LCPC would all share an interest in the focus area. SSP coordinators should only participate in the LCPC to the extent that they are relevant to the chosen focus area. Since the SSP cooperation already has a number of inter-organizational forums and arenas in many municipalities, it would make sense to consider other focus areas than prevention of crime among children and
youth. Of course, the success of getting relevant and resourceful actors to join the LCPC depends on the extent to which the chosen focus area would resonate with public and private organisations in the municipality which the political-administrative leadership should be aware of when choosing the focus area.

Competent leaders from the police and local government should carry out hands-on leadership of the LCPC. The leadership strategies of the orderly host, the mainstream bender, and the institution builder (cf. paper 3) along with the leadership roles of the convener, the facilitator, and the catalyst (cf. papers 4-5) can serve as inspiration for how to conduct expedient leadership of the LCPCs.

4.3 Contributions to public governance, management and leadership research

The dissertation has drawn upon a several bodies of literature on public governance, management and leadership to which it has made various contributions.

In relation to the literature on New Public Governance, the dissertation has shown how coexisting and sometimes contradictory service delivery and implementation regimes produce managerial tensions and dilemmas. Based on my research, the collaborative agenda of New Public Governance appear to be strong among public actors in Danish crime prevention, but the continual existence of other logics of government hampers their ability to put it into practice. The empirical analyses have primarily pointed to tensions between practices relating to Classical Public Administration and New Public Governance. Further research could focus on the implications of intra-organizational practices of New Public Management on collaborative arenas and initiatives in Danish crime prevention.

In relation to governmental criminology, the dissertation has contributed with a social crime prevention concept which is more apt for capturing crime prevention practices in Scandinavian welfare states. Challenging universalized accounts of developments in crime control practices, it has stressed the need for empirically anchored theory and research in the field. Connecting various conglomerates of crime prevention agents to various crime prevention strategies, it has operationalized central concepts for empirical investigations of organizational representation in inter-organizational crime prevention forums. Further research is needed in order to test and nuance the hypothesis of a particularly strong social crime prevention regime in Scandinavia; and continued monitoring of the changing crime prevention landscapes in Scandinavian welfare states is called for.
In relation to implementation theory, the dissertation has contributed with a top-down governance perspective on implementation. Through a top-down/bottom-up and government/governance matrix, it has suggested a way of positioning and comparing existing and future theories of implementation. Drawing-in theories of metagovernance, network management and multi-actor institutional design, it has reconciled old and new perspectives in public administration and management research. In doing so, it has shown not only the deficiencies, but also the continued relevance of classical public administration theory for the analysis of new public governance practices. Further research could nuance the perspective by deploying it in more case studies of top-down implementation of politically mandated governance arenas.

In relation to metagovernance theory, the dissertation has shown how the exercise metagovernance can be less beneficial, rational and unitary than often assumed. It has pointed to self-interested forms of metagovernance that do not aim to enhance the performance of networks. It has shown the influence of institutional logics and multi-actor processes on the exercise of hands-off metagovernance. Finally, it has concerned itself with the potentially uneasy relationship between hands-off and hands-on metagovernance, even when the same public organization act as the leading hands-off and hands-on metagovernor. Further research could contribute by focusing on how to ensure productive metagovernance in settings where multiple actors manage and direct the same network.

In relation to collaborative leadership theory, the dissertation has pointed to the importance of handling both horizontal and vertical relations. More specifically, it has stressed the important role of hands-on leaders in constituting the arenas they lead and constructing its relations to other venues. Collaborative leadership is thus not only about directing and facilitating inter-organizational exchange among a set of relevant and affected stakeholders. It is also about mediating and consolidating links upwards to strategic forums and levels in key organizations; outwards to other inter-organizational arenas; and downwards to local networks and initiatives. Further research could focus more on the collaborative leadership tasks relating to constructing and maintaining productive inter-level and inter-institutional relations.

In relation to collaborative innovation leadership theory, the dissertation has contributed by nuancing and expanding on the roles of the convener, the facilitator, and the catalyst. It has argued the need to consider prehistories of collaboration when deciding on which form of collaborative innovation leadership to exercise: collaboration between actors with a long
history of collaboration will typically be less in need of facilitative leadership and more in need of a catalyzing leadership if the goal is to produce innovation; and vice versa when it comes to actors with little or no prior history of collaboration. Further research could explore when, how and why formal structures support or limit the ability of public managers to exercise the various forms of innovation leadership.
PART TWO:

THE FIVE PAPERS
Paper 1:
Who’s in and Who’s out?
Organizational Representation in Danish Crime Prevention

Andreas Hagedorn Krogh
Requested revise and resubmit to

Abstract
Appeals to community actors have been a core part of the radical transformations in British and North American crime control since the 1970’s and the community safety discourse is now spreading across Europe. To this day, however, little is known about whether and how the international community prevention trend has impacted on the organizational crime prevention landscapes in Scandinavian welfare states with long traditions of social prevention. This article develops a context-sensitive conceptual framework for mapping organizational representation in Scandinavian crime prevention and applies it in a mixed-methods study of the Danish case. It reviews the most significant inter-organizational institutions in Danish crime prevention and conducts a quantitative analysis of the organizational representation in 97 Local Crime Prevention Councils (n=806) and the Danish Crime Prevention Day 2016 (n=733). The analysis shows that the traditional social crime prevention regime and its public welfare agencies continue to dominate Danish crime prevention. Yet, it also finds that new prevention agents have entered the scene, indicating the formation of new crime prevention niches. Over time these niches may grow stronger and alter the fundamental organizing principles and institutions. Continued monitoring of the changing crime prevention landscapes in Scandinavian welfare states is called for.

Keywords: community prevention; social prevention; criminal justice agencies; public welfare agencies; community organizations; Local Crime Prevention Councils.
1. Introduction

British and North American policy-makers have for the past three decades placed increasing emphasis on notions of community safety and community-based crime prevention (Cohen, 1985; Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 1997; Tilley, 2005). In recent years, the policy discourse of community-based crime prevention has diffused to other countries and gained grounds in continental Europe, including the Scandinavian countries (Borch, 2005; Crawford, 2009; Lidskog & Persson, 2012; Van Houdt, 2014; see also European Commission, 2015; European Crime Prevention Network, 2012; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2010). Police reforms and policy papers on crime prevention now call for the active participation of private citizens and local community actors and stress the need for community revitalization as a means for enhancing feelings of safety and effectively preventing and reducing the harming effects of crime, delinquency and anti-social behavior (Terpstra, 2008; Verhage, Deelman, Muylaert, & Van Parys, 2010).

The community approach does not only represent a way of tackling crime that is radically different from traditional responses of reactive law enforcement, incarceration and rehabilitation that depend on the criminal justice system to deter crime (Welsh and Farrington, 2012). It also challenges some of the basic principles, mentalities and practices of the so-called Nordic model of crime prevention which relies on well-developed public welfare agencies to provide social services to the citizenry at-large as well as more targeted interventions to reduce social strain, especially among children and youth (Lidskog & Persson, 2012).

While community crime prevention has for long been an integral part of doing and thinking crime prevention in the UK and the USA, little is known about the extent to which the international trend has actually made an impact beyond the level of policy discourse in Scandinavian welfare states. Studies deploying perspectives of historical institutionalism (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Torfing, 2009), policy regime theory (Wison, 2000) and transition management theory (Koppenjan, Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, Charles, & Ryan, 2012) have shown how the introduction of new actors, mentalities and practices in any policy field is often faced with significant barriers. Path-dependency, institutional inertia and the inclination of established regime players to favor the preservation of status quo tend to limit the effects of reform initiatives and contribute to patterns of sustained socio-political reproduction.
This article sets out to empirically assess to what extent the international trend of community crime prevention has impacted on the organizational crime prevention landscape in Denmark. It does so by analyzing ‘who’s in’ and ‘who’s out’ in the most important inter-organizational institutions and public-private platforms in Danish crime prevention today: the SSP cooperation, the SSP+ cooperation, the PSP cooperation, the 97 Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs), and the Danish Crime Prevention Day (DCPD). The organizational mapping enables us to move beyond the level of discourse when discussing the relative impacts of community prevention, situate the push for community safety in wider socio-political developments and rooting the treatment of the subject in empirical research findings (cf. Crawford, 2006).

The results of the analysis should be of interest to observers and critics as well as practitioners and advocates of new community crime prevention trends. Observers will obtain insights on the organizational representation of various crime prevention strategies in a Scandinavian society today and use it as an up-to-date piece in the continued monitoring and assessment of international crime prevention developments. Critics may use the results of the empirical analysis as ammunition for critical reviews of political quick-fixes and official crime prevention narratives of public-private collaboration in the light of an often more stubborn empirical reality. Last but not least, practitioners and advocates of participatory and community-based forms of crime prevention in Denmark can read the analysis as an empirical roadmap that they can use to locate their current position and contemplate new avenues for change.

The article proceeds in the following way. First, I define the key concepts in a contextualized typology of major crime prevention strategies that tie specific ways of preventing crime to specific agents of change. Second, I lay out the research strategy and discuss the methodology of the empirical study. Third, I conduct a qualitative analysis of the most significant and well-consolidated institutions in Danish crime prevention today in terms of their core actors, common collaborators, and adopted crime prevention strategies. Fourth, I consider the institutional relation of the LCPCs to the established institutions and present the results of a quantitative analysis of LCPC membership data (n=806) that make use of DCPD participant data (n=733) for means of triangulation. Finally, I conclude by restating the purpose of the study, recapping the theoretical argument and summing up the findings of the empirical study.
2. Four Major Crime Prevention Strategies and their Agents of Change

A widely accepted typology of major crime prevention strategies that tie specific ways of preventing crime to specific agents of change distinguishes between criminal justice prevention, developmental prevention, situational prevention and community prevention (Welsh & Farrington, 2012: 4). Despite claims to universality, the typology has to a large extent been developed by Anglophone scholars in close contact with the empirical field in the British and North American societies. Surely strategies of control and regulation reflect the specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts that generate, nourish and sustain them (Crawford, 2006: 451). As I will argue below, there is a need for attuning the conceptual framework in correspondence with the particular governance trajectories of the Scandinavian societies when applying it in Scandinavian studies of criminology and crime prevention.

In order to formulate an adapted conceptual framework, I will first sketch out the common typology of major crime prevention strategies and explicitly embed it in an abbreviated history of British and North American crime control in the second half of the 20th century. In its condensed form, the history presents itself as a grand narrative of radical transformations in the perceptions of what causes crime, how it is remedied, and who is responsible and capable of doing so; what have for long been the main interest of ‘governmental criminologists’ that build on the influential works of Michel Foucault (1977), Stanley Cohen (1985) and David Garland (1985) (O’Malley, 2010).

Following the contextualized definitions of the basic concepts, I will consider the particularities of the Scandinavian history of crime control and wider governmental trajectories. Here I develop a concept of social prevention that adds to the conceptual framework in ways that makes it apt for studying the developments in the organizational crime prevention landscapes of Scandinavian societies.

2.1 The Grand Narrative of British and North American Crime Control

In the post-war period from 1945-1975 – dubbed ‘the age of penal-welfarism’ (Cohen, 1985; Garland, 2001) – British and North American crime prevention was based on Peelian principles of policing and an optimistic rehabilitative ideal. The state assumed the primary responsibility for securing its citizens through the criminal justice system. Crime was understood as a socio-psychological problem and offenders as pathological individuals that should be treated and reformed through extensive corrective programmes and therapeutic
measures. Following this this criminological line of thought prison and probation services came to base their work on the professional expertise of psychologists, psychiatrists and doctors that were to cure criminals and prevent relapse into crime (Foucault, 1978; 2008: 250).

While crime remained largely depoliticized in the age of penal-welfarism, the British and North American public agenda changed during the 1970’s where dramatically ascending crime rates, cultural turmoil and moral panics challenged the institutionalized way of controlling crime (Cohen, 1972; Garland, 2001). National politicians responded to the rise in crime and public anxieties with a variety of tough-on-crime and zero-tolerance policies that led to what penologists and political sociologists have later described as ‘the punitive turn’ in criminal justice (Pratt, D. Brown, M. Brown, Hallsworth, & Morrison, 2005; Wacquant, 2009). The over-all *criminal justice prevention* strategy was gradually transformed from rehabilitation to incapacitation and deterrent. Alongside the new punitiveness, criminological thought reacted to the crises by contemplating new anticipatory models and preventive measures that went beyond the traditional criminal justice system (Gilling, 1997). At least three major crime prevention strategies arose from the crises.

First off, the old need-based welfare programmes were altered along the lines of the so-called actuarial turn in crime control (Feeley & Simon, 1992) and morphed into new risk-based social interventions that constitute the basis of what is commonly referred to as the *developmental prevention* strategy (Crawford & Evans, 2012; O’Malley, 2001: 97-8). Developmental prevention seeks to prevent the development of criminal potential in individuals at an early age (Welsh & Farrington, 2012). Rather than universal services and rehabilitation of offenders, focus is directed at children and youth who exhibit a) individual risk factors such as high temperament, impulsiveness and low empathy; b) family risk factors such as child abuse and neglect, poorly educated family members, and offending or anti-social parents; and c) school risk factors such as high truancy rates, low commitment to school and low educational attainment (Farrington, 2002). Depending on age, risk factors may also include alcohol consumption and drug use (ibid.).

As part of the transformations in crime control, routine activity theory and other so-called ‘criminologies of everyday life’ also emerged in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Garland, 2001). These criminologies formed the theoretical basis for what have been dubbed *situational prevention* strategies (Crawford & Evans, 2012). Shifting the concept of the
offender from *homo criminalis* to *homo economicus*, situational prevention seeks to prevent the occurrence of crime by reducing crime opportunities and increasing the risk of getting caught. From this perspective, criminogenic situations should be avoided through environmental design and technical installations such as fences, locks, surveillance cameras, light posts, and the removal of obstacles that block sight (and hence limit panoptical self-disciplinary effects, cf. Foucault, 1977). The well-known Broken Windows thesis (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) was conceived along these lines, focusing on the removal of graffiti and other physical signs of the absence of formal and informal authorities and caring communities.

The new focus on internal community control and regulation as a prevention tactic fostered an increased focus on *community prevention*. Similar to the situational approach, this form of crime prevention targets crime at the local community level, rather than at the individual or state-wide level, and pays specific attention to hotspots with high risks of crime (Welsh & Farrington, 2012: 9). Instead of controlling the behavior of individuals through technical installations, however, community prevention strategies seek to revitalize and responsibilize local communities, strengthen their relational ties and build positive norms as a means for preventing crime (Crawford & Evans, 2012; Putnam, 2000; Rose, 2000). General community prevention schemes such as *Neighbourhood Watch* and the like became popular in the UK and the USA throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a way to engage residents in watching out for themselves and each other, caring for their local community and strengthening their internal relations as well as their relations with the police (Crawford, 1997: 50; Tilley, 2005). Throughout the 1990s, appeals to community have also come to include local organizations and businesses as an integral part of the ‘partnership’ and ‘mixed economy’ approach advocated by Western governments (Crawford, 1997: 55ff; Terpstra, 2008).

In and through these transformations in the rationalities and practices of crime control, new actors have emerged as central agents of change as new forms of expertise are seen as relevant to the prevention of crime. The developmental prevention strategy points to the need for involving professionals that deal with children and youth, not only inside but also outside the criminal justice system, such as schools, youth clubs and day care centers. The situational prevention strategy calls for public and private actors outside the criminal justice system such as Technical Services, city planners, landlords, housing associations, residents, property owners and private businesses to assist in the prevention of crime. Finally,
community prevention necessitates the active participation of local community members, community associations and various for- or non-profit organizations with an integrative social function.

The three major post-1975 crime prevention strategies and their addressed causes of crime, preventive measures and main crime prevention agents are depicted in table 1.

As indicated, the Scandinavian experience deviates from the history of British and North American crime control. We shall now turn to the particularities of the Scandinavian history of crime control and wider governmental trajectories, develop a context-specific concept of social prevention and add it to the conceptual framework.

### Table 1: The Three Major Post-1975 Crime Prevention Strategies in UK/USA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addressed causes of crime</th>
<th>Developmental prevention</th>
<th>Situational prevention</th>
<th>Community prevention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal potential in individuals</td>
<td>Crime opportunities, i.e. accessible targets and low risk of getting caught.</td>
<td>Weak or negative social norms, relations and identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive measures</td>
<td>Early interventions directed towards at-risk children and youth who exhibit personality-, family-, and school-related risk factors</td>
<td>Environmental design and technical installations.</td>
<td>Social and socio-cultural activities that built social capital, create ownership and empower vulnerable communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main crime prevention agents</td>
<td>Professionals dealing with children and youth such as social workers, teachers and psychiatrists</td>
<td>Technical Services, city planners, landlords, housing associations, residents, property owners and private businesses</td>
<td>Community members, churches and religious associations, local sport associations, local shops and cafés and other community institutions at the local level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.2. The Nordic Model of Crime Prevention**

The crisis of traditional ways of controlling crime that led to the radical shift from penal-welfarism to punitism and new forms of crime prevention in the Anglosphere in the 1970’s was, as explained in the previous section, conditioned upon a quite dramatic rise in crime rates. In Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia, crime rates also rose significantly in the late 1960’s. In fact, the number of reported criminal offences in Denmark doubled from approx. 150.000 to 300.000 between 1966 and 1970 (http://www.dkr.dk/historie). While significant
political turmoil also characterized the period (cf. the notorious Danish ‘landslide parliamentary election’ in 1973), the increase in crime does not seem, however, to have shaken the institutional set-up as much – and in the same way – as it did in the UK and the USA.

Studies in penology indicate that ‘the penal turn’ has been less prevalent in the Nordic countries than the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-American societies. Nordic (or Scandinavian) exceptionalism has become a common term to describe the fact that Scandinavian societies are characterized by lower degrees of punitism and higher degrees of welfarism than other European (and certainly than American) states (Pratt, 2008a, 2008b). While the desirability of the exceptional retention of the rehabilitation ideal is debated (Barker, 2013) and punitive responses to crime may have gained in strength in recent years (Barry & Leonardsen, 2012), it is generally agreed that the Nordic model is less punitive than its British-American counterpart (ibid.).

Considering the wider state-building and socio-political developments in Scandinavian societies, it is perhaps no surprise that the welfare side of penal-welfarism seems to have survived to a larger extent than the case being in the Anglosphere. The close-knit public welfare regimes of social service agencies in Scandinavia were not penetrated and dismantled by the ‘marketization’ ideas and pro-market doctrines during the 1980’s as much as the public sectors in the UK and the USA (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011: 285ff; Torfing, 2001). The extensive public welfare programmes that characterized Scandinavian polities for most of the 20th century can be expected to provide particularly favorable conditions for forms of governance that rely on (the professional expertise of) welfare service agencies.

In terms of crime prevention, more specifically, we find similar indications. According to Chief Constable Lars Rand Jensen¹ (1998), Nordic crime prevention is concerned with ‘two essential preconditions for the lives of people: care and order’ (p. 75, emphasis in original manuscript). Jensen describes the ‘constant components’ of the Nordic approach to crime prevention as: 1) the perception that the criminal justice system only exerts limited influence on crime rates; 2) the idea that social policy plays a key role in reducing marginalization and social isolation; and 3) a focus on maintaining ‘the good life’ for children and youth (ibid.).
The model sketched out by Jensen resonates with the order-and-care nexus of penal-welfarism and exhibits affinities with the basic coordinates of developmental prevention as defined above. While specific reference is made to ‘the good life’ for children and youth, however, it goes beyond the narrow focus on children and youth and points to broader concerns of reducing marginalization and social isolation among vulnerable groups of all ages, e.g. through general social policy. The model hence combines penal-welfare elements of public agency-placed responsibility for maintaining order with wider social concerns for the general public, vulnerable groups and individual citizens with special needs.

Based on these observations, I suggest adding another major crime prevention strategy to the conceptual framework that reflects the particular governance trajectories and socio-political developments in Scandinavia. Due to its social problematizations and remedies I suggest labeling the strategy the social prevention strategy. Table 2 exhibits the augmented conceptual framework, defines the terms along three dimensions and displays the differences between them.

**Table 2: Conceptual Framework for Studying Prevention in Scandinavian Societies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addressed causes of crime</th>
<th>Developmental prevention</th>
<th>Situational prevention</th>
<th>Community prevention</th>
<th>Social prevention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal potential in individuals</td>
<td>Crime opportunities, i.e. accessible targets and low risk of getting caught.</td>
<td>Weak or negative norms, relations and identities</td>
<td>Social marginalization and isolation stemming from unemployment and other social ills of society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive measures</td>
<td>Early interventions directed towards at-risk children and youth who exhibit personality-, family-, and school-related risk factors</td>
<td>Environmental design and technical installations.</td>
<td>Socio-cultural activities that built social capital, create ownership and empower local communities</td>
<td>General social policy and specific care and support for vulnerable groups and individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main crime prevention agents</td>
<td>Professionals dealing with children and youth such as social workers, teachers and psychiatrists</td>
<td>Technical Services, city planners, landlords, housing associations, residents, property owners and private businesses</td>
<td>Community members, churches and religious associations, local sport associations, local shops and cafés and other community institutions at the local level.</td>
<td>Public welfare agencies such as social services, housing services, educational services, and employment services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear that the social prevention strategy is somewhat of an expanded version of the developmental prevention strategy. Family- and school-related risk factors make up some, but not all, of the social-environmental risk factors considered by the approach. By the same token, at-risk children and youth constitute a subset of a broader target group of
vulnerable groups and individuals. As such, the developmental prevention strategy is a more specific strategy within the scope of the wider social prevention strategy. At the same time, however, the developmental prevention strategy goes beyond the social prevention strategy by potentially involving private sector professionals, while the social prevention strategy is restricted to public agencies per definition. Rather than replacing the developmental prevention strategy with the social prevention strategy in the conceptual framework, I have chosen to include both strategies in the framework in order to display their similarities and differences.

The remainder of the article will apply the conceptual framework to the specific case of Denmark. The research strategy and methodology is presented in the next section.

3. Research Strategy and Methodology

In order to map the organizational crime prevention landscape and assess the relative influence of the various strategies in Denmark today, I apply a two-fold research strategy. First, I identify and conduct a qualitative institutional analysis of the most significant inter-organizational institutions in Danish crime prevention today. Second, I conduct a quantitative representational analysis of the membership data from 97 Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) and triangulate the findings with participant data from the Danish Crime Prevention Day (DCPD) 2016. Let us briefly attend to the aims and methods of the two studies before presenting the findings.

3.1 The Qualitative Institutional Analysis

The institutional analysis was conducted in order to uncover the set of organizations that enjoy institutionalized privileges and central positions in Danish crime prevention both historically and today. As we know, institutions play a key role for the inclusion and exclusion of ideas, world-views and actors in any policy field (Torfing, 2001). The most significant inter-organizational crime prevention institutions in Denmark were identified through a cursory survey of policy papers, reports and general accounts of collaborative arrangements in Danish crime prevention (see http://dkr.dk/materialer/lokalt-samarbejde).

They were studied through secondary sources that depict their history and defining characteristics in terms of their core actors and common collaborators as well as their primary objectives and main target groups. Based on the assumption that the longer an institution has been in place, and the more formalized it has become, the more consolidated
and defining we can expect it to be for the positions and practices in a field, the analysis also considers the period of time that each institution has been in place, their degree of formalization, their geographical spread and degree of adoption.

The institutional analysis provides indications on which major crime prevention strategies (cf. the conceptual framework) have historically been adopted in Denmark and links specific sets of agents to specific crime prevention strategies. By doing so, it provides the empirical basis for a contextually sensitive operationalization of the conceptual framework to be applied in the quantitative analysis. It feeds into the second step of the coding strategy presented below.

### 3.2 The Quantitative Representational Analysis

The LCPCs and the DCPD are central forums in Danish crime prevention and the only formal public-private crime prevention platforms that involve participants from all sectors of society and geographically cover all of Denmark. The LCPCs were established across Denmark in 2007 as the first national attempt at formally institutionalizing public-private collaboration around the local prevention of crime, whereas the DCPD is an open-to-all, free-of-charge, one-day conference organized by the Danish Crime Prevention Council that brings together public and private crime prevention partners for talks and discussions of crime prevention strategies. Including data from both forums allows for a more comprehensive mapping of the organized crime prevention landscape in Denmark and enables us to triangulate the findings and raise the validity of the study. The LCPC data serve as the primary data source whereas the DCPD data is drawn in as an empirical counterpoint for discussing the results of the LCPC data analysis. Following the institutional analysis and preceding the quantitative analysis, I will present the institutional characteristics of the LCPCs in greater detail.

Both data sets must be considered sets of high quality secondary data. The LCPC data consists of 806 cases with information on the variables ‘name’, ‘job title’ and ‘organization/workplace’ and was collected by the Danish Crime Prevention Council through the responsible LCPC managers in the 12 police districts. The DCPD data set consists of 733 cases with information on the same variables and was generated through online registration to the conference. The LCPC cases were grouped in councils, whereas the DCPD cases were randomly organized. The datasets are not publicly accessible, but have been made available to the author by the Danish Crime Prevention Council.
A three step coding strategy was devised and applied in order to allow for closer investigation of three key distributions: 1) the agent-level distribution of the members as representatives of the public/private sector, 2) the agent-level distribution of the members as representatives of the major crime prevention strategies, and 3) the council-level distribution of the members as representatives of the public/private sector and the major crime prevention strategies.

As a first step the cases were coded in terms of institutional affiliation. An inductive coding strategy was first applied to the 806 LCPC cases using Excel to produce a coding scheme of 55 codes of which 31 were public actor codes (e.g. police, prison and probation services and social services) and 24 were private actor codes (e.g. housing associations, sport associations and religious communities). The coding schedule was then transferred to the DCPD data set in order to ensure the largest degree of stringency and post-coding comparability between the coded datasets (cf. Bryman, 2004: 189ff). The 733 DCPD cases were then coded deductively while allowing for new codes to emerge in order to capture cases that were not covered by the LCPC induced coding schedule. 27 codes were discarded as no cases applied to them, while 35 were added. The DCPD coding scheme hence ended up consisting of 63 codes of which 36 were public actor codes and 27 were private actor codes.

As a second step the cases were classified in mutually exclusive prevention strategy categories. The police and prison and probation services were grouped in a criminal justice category. The core agents of the social prevention institutions identified in the institutional analysis (beyond the police and prison and probation services) were placed in a social prevention category. The actors that correspond to the agents assigned to the situational and community prevention strategies in the conceptual framework were grouped in a combined situational-community prevention category. The reason why the situational strategy and the community strategy were not given separate codes pertains to the difficulties of clearly differentiating between the two when coding the cases in the datasets. The level of abstraction and the overlaps between the suggested agents in the general strategy definitions are too vast to draw such distinction in a reliable and valid way. The absence of inter-organizational institutions that revolve around situational or community prevention in Denmark precludes more detailed analysis of this kind. An ‘other’ category was constructed for cases that did not fit any of the categories such as MPs, City Council
members, City Managers, researchers and students from various higher education institutions.4

As a third step the LCPC data set was coded at the council-level in terms of their composition of members as representatives of the major crime prevention strategies. Councils solely populated by social prevention agents in addition to the police were given a social prevention code; councils solely populated by community-situational agents in addition to the police were given a community-situational code; while councils that involve community-situational prevention agents in addition to the police and the social prevention agents were assigned a mixed prevention code. Since the police lead the LCPCs, they are represented in all councils (in the same way as they participate in all of the other significant inter-organizational crime prevention institutions); the councils are hence categorized based on their membership in addition to the police. The councils were further coded in subcategories of ‘public actors only’ and ‘mix of public and private actors’.

Frequency tables and pie charts were produced in order to investigate various distributions of interests. As a final methodological remark we should note that the described distinctions between the categories will put the institutional regime thesis to the hardest test possible since only the core agents of the social crime prevention institutions were included in the social prevention category, not the common collaborators. The analysis hence produces a result that reflects the minimum of social regime dominance and the maximum of potential for alternative paths.

4. The Institutionalization of Social Prevention in Denmark

Surveying policy papers, reports and general accounts of collaborative arrangements in Danish crime prevention today, three inter-organizational crime prevention institutions appear to be particularly significant: the SSP, the SSP+, and the PSP. This section identifies their core agents and common collaborators, their primary objectives, and their main target groups. Apart from uncovering the sets of actors that can be expected to occupy central positions in the organized crime prevention efforts in Denmark today, the institutional review paint a general picture of how the social prevention strategy has been gradually institutionalized in Denmark from the 1970’s onwards. For the same reason, the review is chronologically organized, starting with the oldest and earliest inter-organizational crime prevention institution and ending with the latest.
4.1 The SSP

The SSP is a cooperation scheme involving schools, social services, and the police. It was formally adopted as a key cooperation scheme in 1977 (Danish Crime Prevention Council, 2012), i.e. right at the crucial transition period in British and North American crime control, and is considered a prime example of the early adoption of a social crime prevention approach in Denmark (Kankaala, 2015). The primary objective of the SSP is to prevent juvenile crime and delinquency among 6-18 year-olds through individual case work, interventions targeted at-risk youth, as well as general education and guidance to the age group at large (http://www.ssp.kk.dk/artikel/about-ssp). The risk factors used to identify target groups include personal, family and school related risk factors (ibid.).

The SSP was a voluntary cooperation scheme for the first 30 years, but in 2007 the latest police reform legally obliged Chief Police Commissioners to ensure that a formalized SSP cooperation is instituted in all municipalities (cf. Administration of Justice Act § 114, stk. 1). At a more general level, all local governments are legally bound to make prevention policy directed at children and youth with special needs, including an integrated strategy to prevent delinquency (cf. Service Act § 19, stk. 2). As of today all 98 Danish municipalities have established a formal SSP cooperation in some form (National Board of Social Services, 2008).

Local governments enjoy considerable autonomy in Denmark and choose to organize their departments and administrative units in various ways. In some municipalities, social services directed at children and youth are organized in departments that also manage public policies on culture, leisure time activities and/or health. Hence these policy areas may also be represented in the local SSP arrangements even though they are not part of their core (Danish Crime Prevention Council, 2012). The core SSP actors typically consider other public and private institutions that deal with children and youth to be important collaborators: youth clubs, after-school classes and daycare institutions have, for instance, long been considered vital local SSP partners (Bolsen, 2000).

4.2 The SSP+

In some municipalities, the SSP cooperation has been expanded to include interventions targeting young adults in the age of 18-25. This expansion, which first appeared in the late 1990’s, is commonly referred to as the SSP+ (Danish Crime Prevention Council, 2012: 24ff). The overall objective of the SSP+ is to provide support and coordinate services
directed at young adults in risk of committing crime. More specifically, the goals revolve around assisting individuals from the target group in getting employed, enrolling in education and/or finding a place to live while keeping them out of drugs and criminal social circles (ibid.). As such, the SSP+ expands the developmental prevention principles to include young adults and represents a further consolidation of the social crime prevention approach in Danish crime prevention.

Apart from police and prison and probation, core SSP+ actors include the municipal JobCentres, upper secondary education and youth education programmes, housing services and health services (ibid.). Typical collaborators include private businesses, housing associations and drug abuse centres (ibid.). Unlike the SSP, the SSP+ has not been made mandatory by law and as of today no surveys have been published on the extent to which the SSP+ has been adopted as a formal cooperation scheme in Danish municipalities.

4.3 The PSP

First developed in the municipality of Frederiksberg in 2004 (Danish National Police et al, 2009), the PSP is a cooperation scheme consisting of the Police, Social services, Psychiatry and health services. The objective of the PSP is to assist citizens with mental disorders through individual case work that prevent them from getting (further) involved in crime (ibid.).

Like the SSP, the police reform of 2007 made it mandatory for the Chief Police Commissioners to ensure that a formalized PSP cooperation is set up in their respective police districts (cf. Administration of Justice Act § 114, stk. 2). According to the National Prevention Centre of the Danish National Police, PSP action groups have been established in most municipalities today (personal communication, September 26, 2016).

The PSP covers all age groups and cannot be considered a developmental prevention arrangement as such. Having social services involved and focusing on individual case work, however, it is more closely associated with the social prevention approach than the situational and community prevention approaches as defined above. It is noted that prison and probation services are among the common PSP collaborators (http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk/PSP-samarbejde-85.aspx).
4.4 General conclusions

The institutional analysis confirms the presumptions of the general framework that Denmark (and other Scandinavian societies) reacted to the crime control crisis of the 1970’s by consolidating the care-and-order paradigm and integrating a developmental prevention strategy. It also shows how the focus has expanded throughout the years to include other (vulnerable) target groups than children and youth and, by the same token, deeming new public agencies and private collaborators relevant to the prevention of crime.

While the three institutions differ on their specific target groups and involved agents of change, they share a number of characteristics that point to a social prevention regime far from the basic assumptions of situational and community prevention strategies. First, they are primarily concerned with (groups of) citizens rather than places or communities. Second, they are framed as public inter-agency cooperation schemes rather than public-private cooperation schemes. Third, they all include police and social services as their core agents. Various private actors are recognized as important collaborators of the SSP, the SSP+ and the PSP. However, the state (especially the police) and the local government apparatus (especially social services) serve as central actors with an institutionalized responsibility for alleviating crime and safety issues. Table 3 sums up the core actors and common collaborators of the three social crime prevention institutions.

In 2007, a new set of collaborative crime prevention forums – the Local Crime Prevention Councils – were mandated by the Danish government. They had a different focus than the established institutions and were expected to introduce new players and bolster new forms of crime prevention in Denmark. The next section considers the relation between the new LCPCs and the established crime prevention institutions before empirically testing to what extent the new reform initiative has shaken up the institutionally consolidated social prevention paradigm.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Core Actors</th>
<th>Common Collaborators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized institutions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government administrations:</td>
<td>Social Services, specifically Children and Youth Services and Family Services; Educational Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agencies:</td>
<td>Police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized institutions:</td>
<td>Upper Secondary Education; Youth Education Programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government administrations:</td>
<td>JobCenter/Employment Services; Social Services, specifically Adult Services; Housing Services; Health Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agencies:</td>
<td>Police; Prison and Probation Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized institutions:</td>
<td>Psychiatric Wards and Mental Hospitals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government administrations:</td>
<td>Social Services; Handicap Services; Health Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State agencies:</td>
<td>Police; Prison and Probation Services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The Local Crime Prevention Councils: A Path-Breaking Initiative?

In 2007, the Danish Ministry of Justice introduced a grand institutional reform initiative as part of a wider police reform bill: a web of cross-sector collaborative forums, simply dubbed *Local Councils*[^5], were to be established across the country, one in each of the 98 Danish municipalities, with representatives from the local police, local government and the local community (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2006).[^6] The new councils were intended to ensure local anchorage of policing, strengthen public-private relations and enhance the capacity for solving local crime problems in the new (and larger) police districts (ibid.).

The prospects of broadening the spectrum of crime prevention practices and opening up for different strategies than those of the established crime prevention regime quickly became part of the expected outcomes of the *Local Crime Prevention Councils* (LCPCs). In an early...
report on the LCPCs, the Danish Crime Prevention Council (2008) describes the overall aims with the institutional reform in the following way:

The well-functioning SSP cooperation – which has been in place for many years in most municipalities and which rests significantly on cross-sectorial and inter-disciplinary collaboration – must be expanded to other forms of collaboration and partnerships in order to reach all citizens and cover all types of crime. All of society must be considered and activated more in the prevention of crime [...] To put it briefly, crime prevention must be strengthen and it must be given a strong local anchorage. (p. 3, my translation)


The institutional reform holds the disruptive potential of shaking up the consolidated institutional landscape and opening up a window for new community crime prevention agents to enter the field. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the case. Since the LCPCs are not based on a specific program theory or a clearly defined set of actors (like the SSP), they must be seen as arenas open to colonization by various crime prevention agents and approaches.

If the old guard of the social prevention regime is sufficiently strong – and the support for new situational and community prevention niches is too weak – we can expect the LCPCs to be populated with the well-known SSP, SSP+ and PSP actors while others are kept at bay. More specifically, we can test the social prevention regime theses by analyzing the empirical data to see if public representatives significantly outnumber private actors; if social prevention agents significantly outnumber situational and community prevention agents; and if a significant number of the LCPCs solely consist of the public representatives of the established social prevention institutions.

The following subsections conduct the test by scrutinizing three key distributions in the LCPC membership data: 1) the agent-level distribution of the members as representatives of the public/private sector, 2) the agent-level distribution of the members as representatives of the major crime prevention strategies, and 3) the council-level distribution of the members as representatives of the public/private sector and the major
crime prevention strategies. In the first two sections, the corresponding distributions in the participant data from the Danish Crime Prevention Day (DCPD) 2016 are included to triangulate the findings and provide an empirical counterpoint for discussing the LCPC distribution.

As we shall see, the empirical analysis lends considerable support to the social prevention regime theses. At the same time, however, it shows that agents of situational and community crime prevention have indeed entered the Danish crime prevention landscape, indicating that new paths may be underway. The results of the empirical investigations are presented and discussed in each of the subsequent subsections before summing up the findings and general conclusions in the closing section of paper.

5.1 The Public/Private Sector Distribution
The results of the empirical analysis of the public/private sector distributions show that representatives of public agencies account for the vast majority of the participants in the LCPCs (see table 4 and chart 1). The same is true for DCPD (see table 5 and chart 2). Representatives of state agencies, local government agencies and public schools make up 88 pct. of the LCPC members and 84 pct. of the DCPD participants, while private and non-profit sector representatives constitute 12 pct. of LCPC members and 16 pct. of DCPD participants. The general picture clearly indicates that the state and local government continue to assume the main responsibility for crime, safety and security issues in Denmark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>36.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>46.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Schools</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>11.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>806</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>43.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>36.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Schools</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>16.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>733</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the public representatives, we see how local government representatives make up a greater share of the LCPC membership base than the state agency representatives (47 pct. and 36 pct., respectively), whereas the opposite is the case at the DCPD (37 pct. and 43 pct., respectively). The difference can be explained by the fact that the LCPCs are located at the local level and local government is involved in appointing members for the councils, whereas DCPD is a national event that attracts representatives of a number of different ministries, national boards and councils.

Typical private actors in the LCPCs include representatives of local trade organizations (15), housing associations (14) and private citizens (10); at the DCPD, the most common private actors are representatives of housing associations (32), socio-economic businesses (18) and security, surveillance and insurance companies (17). Housing associations thus prove to be important private sector crime prevention agents, which – as discussed above – can play a part in both social, situational and community prevention strategies. We may note that businesses representatives are typically appointed to the LCPCs due to their involvement in local trade organizations, while they represent themselves at the DCPD. This qualitative difference indicates that the public authorities are reluctant to involve for-profit organizations in formulating and discussing crime prevention policies if they cannot be said to represent the local business community as such. Such logics of representation may hamper the inclusion of (more) private businesses in the LCPCs and hence their ability to serve as vehicles for path-breaking developments towards (more) situational and community crime prevention in Denmark.
5.2 The Agent-Level Strategy Distribution

The results of the empirical analysis of the agent-level strategy distributions show that agents of the established crime prevention institutions are strongly represented in the LCPCs (see table 6 and chart 3). The same goes for the DCPD, albeit to a lesser extent (see table 7 and chart 4). Criminal justice and social prevention agents make up 72.1 pct. of the LCPC members and 52.8 pct. of the DCPD participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>36.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>36.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Situational</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>21.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>806</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Justice</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>29.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>23.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Situational</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>27.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>19.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>733</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the general level, we can conclude that the social crime prevention regime has survived the potentially disruptive effects of the LCPC reform and been largely successful in populating the new councils with its agents. On the other hand, the results also indicate that new crime prevention niches have formed. Community-situational prevention agents constitute a significant 21 pct. of the LCPC members and 27 pct. of the DCPD participants. If the relatively large N/A category is removed from the DCPD dataset, then the
community-situational prevention agents make up around a third (34.2 pct.) of the DCPD participants. Situational and community prevention hence seem to be sprouting in Denmark despite the solid institutionalization of social crime prevention.

Considerable differences exist in the strategy composition of the two crime prevention forums. The ratio between criminal justice and social prevention agents, on the one hand, and community-situational prevention agents, on the other hand, is approximately 3:1 in the LCPCs and 2:1 at the DCPD. In the LCPCs, the social prevention agents alone outnumber the community and situational agents, whereas the opposite is the case at the DCPD.

The results indicate that the public authorities that appoint members to the councils are wedded to the social crime prevention regime and its basic ideas of how crime is prevented and who can and should be responsible for doing so. We could, in other words, expect more agents of situational and community prevention to be a part of the LCPCs in a hypothetical situation of open access to the LCPCs than the case is today where public authorities invite and appoint members to the councils.

### Table 8: LCPC Social Regime Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP+</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>291</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9: DCPD Social Regime Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking a closer look at the distributions within the social crime prevention regime, the analysis also suggests that agents of the more recently established social crime prevention institutions have internalized their crime preventive role to a lesser extent than the traditional SSP actors. Whereas the non-police SSP actors muster considerable representation in both forums, the specific SSP+ and PSP actors, i.e. JobCentres, Adult Services, Health Services, psychiatric wards and mental hospitals, almost disappear completely when it is left to the individual agencies to decide on their participation (see table 8 and 9). This finding indicates that public authorities at the local level consider the
specific SSP+ and PSP actors to be important crime prevention agents, but that SSP+ and PSP agents themselves do not (yet) consider crime prevention to be part of their core functions.

5.3 The Council-Level Sector and Strategy Distributions
As described above, the LCPCs were intended to bridge the public-private divide and expected to promote alternatives to the social crime prevention strategy. The results of the empirical analysis of the council-level strategy distribution show, however, that public agents of the social prevention regime have been largely successful in accommodating the new crime prevention councils and in many cases not only partially, but completely (see tables 10 and 11 and chart 5; as noted in the methodology section, the police representatives participate in all LCPCs: table 11 and chart 5 hence concern LCPC members in addition to the police representatives).

### Table 10: Council-Level Sector Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Only</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11: Council-Level Strategy Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Pct.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Situational</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chart 5: Council-Level Sector and Strategy Distribution

- Public Sector, Social Prevention
- Public Sector, Mix Prevention
- Mix Sector, Mix Prevention
- Mix Sector, Community-Situational Prevention
A mere 22 LCPCs bridge the public-private sector divide and include local community associations, businesses and/or private citizens, whereas the remaining 75 LCPCs consist of public actors only. Of the 75 public-actors-only LCPCs, 45 LCPCs solely involve actors of the established social crime prevention institutions (32 SSP-only LCPCs and 13 SSP/SSP+/PSP LCPCs), while 30 LCPCs include one or more representatives of local government divisions that fall outside the social prevention category. Of the 22 LCPCs that bridge the public-private sector divide, 18 LCPCs involve representatives of all strategies whereas four LCPCs solely include police representatives and community-situational agents (all of which are located on the island of Bornholm). Put differently, all LCPCs except four include social prevention agents.

When one or more community-situational prevention agents are present in an LCPC they may interrupt and disturb the consolidated ways of thinking about, and acting on, crime among the agents of the established social prevention institutions (cf. Ansell & Gash, 2012; Krogh and Torfing, 2015). Conversely chances are slim that situational or community prevention strategies will be applied in LCPCs that solely consist of core social prevention agents.

Being solely populated with actors of the established social crime prevention institutions, 45 LCPCs (i.e. almost half of the councils) are not very likely to consider and act on crime in ways that challenge or diverge from the social prevention approach. More specifically, 32 LCPCs (i.e. a third of the councils) are likely to adopt developmental prevention policies as they include core SSP actors only. The 30 public-actors-only, mixed-strategy LCPCs may adopt situational or community crime prevention policies; however, given the fact that community crime prevention initiatives pr. definition necessitates the active participation of community actors, the community crime prevention potential is restricted to policy formulation and second order planning. The 22 councils that also involve private actors (i.e. less than a fourth of the councils) carry the potential to initiate, plan and effectuate community crime prevention. Whether that potential is realized depends on the framing and management of the interaction taking place in the councils which is beyond the limits of the present study to explore.

5.4 General Conclusions
The empirical analysis lends considerable support to the social prevention regime theses. At the same time, however, it shows that agents of situational and community crime
prevention have indeed entered the Danish crime prevention landscape, indicating that new paths may be underway. Three questions were posed to the empirical data in order to test the social prevention regime theses that we can now answer.

_Do public representatives significantly outnumber private actors?_ The public/private sector distribution showed that representatives of public agencies account for the vast majority of the LCPC membership base as well as the DCPD participants despite the fact that both forums hold the ambition of involving community actors and spanning the public-private divide. The organizational-representational analysis hence confirms the proposition of the institutional-organizational analysis that public agencies (continue to) assume the main responsibility for handling crime, safety and security issues in Denmark.

_Do social prevention agents significantly outnumber situational and community prevention agents?_ The agent-level strategy distribution showed that community and situational agents (still) constitute a minority in Danish crime prevention and that the social prevention agents do outnumber the community and situational agents in the LCPCs. It also showed, however, that community and situational agents in fact outnumber social prevention agents at the DCPD. We can conclude that the social crime prevention regime has been largely successful in populating the new councils with its agents, while recognizing that agents of situational and community prevention do form a significant part of the wider organizational environment in Danish crime prevention.

_Do a significant number of the LCPCs solely consist of the public representatives of the established social prevention institutions?_ The council-level sector and strategy distribution showed that public agency representatives completely occupy more than three fourths of the LCPCs; that representatives of the established social prevention institutions make up almost half of the LCPCs; and that less than a fourth of the councils involve community actors. The hopes and ambitions of the Danish Crime Prevention Council and others that the LCPCs would be a path-breaking initiative on the forefront of activating new actors as crime prevention agents hence appear to be thwarted – or at least severely limited in practice. The results indicate that the social prevention regime and its agents (continue to) form the backbone of formalized Danish crime prevention.

6. Conclusions

This article set out to explore the impact of the international trend of community safety on the organizational crime prevention landscape in Denmark. It has substantiated the thesis
that the general socio-political and governmental trajectories of Scandinavian welfare states provide fertile grounds for a social prevention strategy that deter crime by a) reducing social marginalization and isolation stemming from unemployment and other social ills of society b) through general social policy and specific care and support for vulnerable groups and individuals c) provided by public welfare agencies such as social services, housing services, educational services, and employment services.

Since the general crime control crises of the 1970’s, a developmental prevention strategy focusing on children and youth has been institutionalized in Denmark through the SSP cooperation and throughout the years the institutionalized focus has expanded to include other (vulnerable) groups through the SSP+ and the PSP cooperation. Today, an institutionalized social prevention regime of public welfare agencies is in place.

Reviewing the membership base of the recently established Local Crime Prevention Councils, we have found that public agencies (continue to) assume the main responsibility for handling crime, safety and security issues; that community and situational prevention agents (still) constitute a minority in Danish crime prevention; and that agents of the social prevention regime (continue to) form the backbone of formalized crime prevention in Denmark.

The general conclusions were confirmed by the distributions in the participant data from the Danish Crime Prevention Day 2016; however, we found a greater share of community and situational prevention agents at the DCPD than in the LCPCs. The public authorities that mediate organizational access to the local arenas in their capacity of inviting and appointing members to the LCPCs hence seem to put a break on the influx of community actors in Danish crime prevention rather than advancing it. With the agents of community and situational prevention forming a significant part of the wider organizational environment, however, the door to the formal arenas may soon be kicked-in. Private partners are already collaborating with the agents of the established crime prevention institutions. Over time, the development of the alternative niches of community and situational crime prevention may prove to have more pervasive implications for the fundamental organizing principles and organizational landscape of Danish crime prevention.

Whether the institutionalized social prevention regime is seen as a barrier or a safeguard depends on the perspective. The community safety approach is no panacea and has many
glitches and limitations of its own.\textsuperscript{8} It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in more normative discussions on the desirability of the various prevention strategies. Whatever normative agenda one may hold, it is important go beyond the level of discourse and explore the actual impacts of new crime prevention trends and how established institutions may limit their bearing on the organizational environment. It is hoped that the research presented here will inspire more empirical research in the developing crime prevention terrains of Scandinavian welfare states.

\textbf{Endnotes}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Chief Constable Lars Rand Jensen was allegedly one of the earliest exponents of the SSP idea in Denmark (Thomas, 1990: 582).
\item Some scholars use the social prevention term to denote a decentralized and civil society-based approach that combines elements of the community and situational strategy as defined above. As indicated, the definition of the social prevention term applied in this article is, however, more closely related to the developmental prevention strategy (for similar line of reasoning, see Rosenbaum, Lurigio and Davis, 1998: 201).
\item The latest available data on the LCPC composition at the time of coding were gathered in the fall of 2013. A survey among the police districts carried out by the researcher shows that the LCPC members in 10 of 12 police districts are appointed for an unlimited period of time, i.e. until they leave their position. In the remaining two police districts members are formally appointed for a four year and two year period, respectively. Since nothing indicates any radical shifts in LCPC membership composition in the years 2013-2016, and since the analysis is not concerned with the specific individuals but their institutional affiliation, the two and a half years in between the collections of data for the analyzed datasets do not cause compatibility concerns.
\item The DCPD data set included a number of representatives from state agencies that were assigned to the social prevention or the community-situational prevention categories based on their respective profiles and the given definitions of the strategies.
\item Complaints about the generic name \textit{Local Councils} have been voiced by various parties. In order to avoid confusion I have chosen to label the councils \textit{Local Crime Prevention Councils}.
\item 94 of the 98 Danish municipalities have established LCPCs. The municipalities of Copenhagen, Dragør and Tårnby were exempted due to an already established structure of local committees and the municipality of the island Læsø was deemed too small for an LCPC. The municipality of the island Bornholm decided to establish four LCPCs instead of one, which makes for a total of 97 LCPCs.
\end{enumerate}
In the LCPC data set, the non-applicable category covers 30 public leadership representatives (3.7 %) and 24 various other representatives (3.0 %); in the DCPD data set, the non-applicable category covers 15 public leadership representatives (2.0 %), 44 researchers and students (6.0 %), and 86 other/unspecified representatives (11.7 %).

As Crawford (2006) puts it: ‘…communities can be wonderfully conciliatory, egalitarian and democratic but they can also be parochial, intolerant, hierarchical and punitive.’ (p. 453).

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References


Paper 2:
Implementing and Designing Interactive Governance Arenas:
A Top-Down Governance Perspective

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Abstract
Mandating interactive governance arenas presents itself as an appealing strategy for determined public policy-makers at the frontier of New Public Governance. However, it also confronts researchers and practitioners with a new set of policy execution problems which prompts re-examination of one of the oldest research questions in public administration research: how and why are the high hopes of central policy-makers (not) translated into practice? Through combining insights from the public policy implementation literature, network governance literature and theories of multi-actor institutional design, the article develops a theoretical perspective for studying top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. The developed perspective enables researchers and practitioners to identify a number of critical junctions in the implementation process with important implications for the final design of the interactive arenas. A longitudinal case-analysis of the implementation of ten Local Crime Prevention Councils in one of twelve Danish police districts is conducted to demonstrate how the perspective may be deployed in empirical studies.

Keywords: implementation; institutional design; mandated governance arenas; interactive governance; cross-sector collaboration.
1. Introduction

Today partnerships, networks and other interactive forms of governance are widely celebrated by public policy-makers as a means of ensuring effective, democratic and innovative public governance (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012; Agger et al., 2015). The surging interest in new forms of cross-cutting collaboration, co-creation and co-production (Bovaird, 2007) has led scholars to suggest that we are in fact witnessing the rise of a whole new participatory and interactive design and delivery regime that is currently transforming public administration in profound ways. Allegedly the new regime, dubbed the New Public Governance (NPG), is emerging as a response to the shortcomings of the bureaucratic public policy and implementation regime of Classical Public Administration (CPA) and the more recent market-oriented, managerial regime of New Public Management (NPM) (Osborne, 2006, 2010; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013; Morgan & Cook, 2014; Lindberg, Czarniawska & Solli, 2015).

The many promises of cross-sector collaboration advanced in contemporary policy discourses across policy fields provide strong incentives for central political decision-makers to craft policies that deliberately attempt to shift the balance from CPA and NPM to NPG. Rather than formulating and adopting public programmes, public officials are encouraged to foster and lead interactive governance that cuts across silos and prompts public and private actors to come together to confront new problems as they arise (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Krogh & Torfing, 2015; Sørensen, Lidström & Hanssen, 2015; Bockstette et al., 2014). Mandating interactive governance arenas is one way of doing so which presents itself as an appealing strategy for determined public policy-makers at the frontier of NPG.

However, on closer study, mandating interactive governance proves to be a perilous policy strategy. If the implementation process is not managed in ways that consider the specific dynamics of multi-level, multi-actor interaction in and around collaborative governance institutions, the central push for more collaboration may in fact end up worsening collaborative relations between local actors and leave them with inefficient and tokenistic governance arrangements.

Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) in Denmark are an illustrative case of some key policy execution problems pertaining to top-down implementation of NPG practices. In order to ensure sustained collaboration between the local police, local government and local
community organisations, the Danish Ministry of Justice required the District Police to set up cross-sector collaborative arenas in each municipality within the police district following the Danish Police Reform of 2007. However, newly derived empirical data shows that private actors have been formally excluded from 75 of 97 LCPCs, i.e. the vast majority of the councils consist solely of public authorities. How and why did the noble ambitions of advancing cross-sector collaboration translate into this?

This article sets out to develop a theoretical perspective that will deepen our understanding of the specific policy execution problems of top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas and how such problems may be bridled. In order to do so, the article first critically examines different schools of policy implementation research and their primary explanations of policy execution problems. Special attention is paid to their respective fortes and inadequacies for analysing top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. Insights from the network governance literature are introduced in order to develop the contours of a top-down governance perspective on implementation. Second, theories of multi-actor institutional design are consulted to grasp the specific dynamics of multi-actor governance arrangements and further develop the perspective. Third, the perspective is operationalized and applied to the case of the Danish LCPCs in order to demonstrate its usefulness in grasping the vertical and horizontal dynamics of multi-level, multi-actor implementation processes. Finally, the article concludes by summing up the lessons learned and reflecting upon the prospects of advancing New Public Governance through top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas.

2. Four perspectives on public policy formulation and implementation

In order to understand what is at stake when implementing interactive governance arrangements, we are well advised to consult the vast body of implementation research within the field of public administration. I suggest using the well-known top-down/bottom-up, government/governance distinctions implicitly or explicitly deployed in all policy studies to get a hold of the available perspectives. These concepts are intuitive for most public administration researchers; however, for the sake of accuracy the following definitions apply. Top-down perspectives focus their attention on processes through which policies formulated by central policy-makers translate into practice through vertical chains of implementation. Bottom-up perspectives consider how local actors play a key role in both formulating and translating policies into practice. Government perspectives are concerned with policy formation and implementation in and around formal political
institutions and public bureaucracies. Governance perspectives are concerned with policy formation and implementation in networks of public and private actors.

Crossing the two dimensions provides us with four distinct (groupings of) perspectives on policy formulation and implementation with each their specific set of research interests, assumptions and normative biases: a top-down government perspective, a bottom-up government perspective, a bottom-up governance perspective, and a top-down governance perspective. A graphic representation of the conceptual model is depicted in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: The top-down/bottom-up, government/governance matrix](image)

In the following subsections, I will sketch out the four perspectives in terms of their key propositions and consider both their value and shortcomings for the analysis of multi-level, multi-actor implementation processes.

### 2.1 The Top-down Government Perspective

Following the seminal work of Pressman and Wildawsky (1973), a top-down government perspective dominated much of implementation research in its early years. This perspective
is mainly concerned with the failure of realizing the original goals of government programmes as defined in the policy statutory. Any opinions, ideas and perspectives of lower level actors that diverge from those formulated by central policy-makers are seen as illegitimately distorting elements that should be repressed. From this perspective, implementation failure occurs due to (too) long implementation chains with (too) many communication links and potential veto-points, which threatens to obscure the policy as formulated by central decision-makers. In order to decrease the risk of original policy goals being distorted, the number of actors involved in implementation should be reduced (Pressman & Wildawsky, 1973). Moreover, central policy-makers should state policy goals clearly (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983); develop detailed means-ends schemes (Elmore, 1982); and place the responsibility for implementation in an agency sympathetic with the intent of the policy to be implemented (Sabatier, 1986).

The top-down government perspective points to the fact that shifts in levels may cause shifts in the form and content of the policy in question, especially if multiple agencies are involved. The perspective hence prompts researchers to pay attention to potential policy alterations occurring at each new level in the implementation process.

By defining any alterations to the original policy formulation as a failure, however, the perspective effectively disregards the concerns and potentially valuable contributions of lower-level actors. In brief, the importance of voice, ownership and co-design for successful policy implementation is neglected.

2.2 The Bottom-up Government Perspective

Critiques of the basic assumptions of the top-down perspective were voiced in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, which eventually led to the heated top-down/bottom-up debate in implementation studies (Linders & Peters, 1987; Lester et al., 1987). Scholars deploying a bottom-up government perspective pointed to the fact that public employees in the frontline are not simply loyal implementers that do what they are told as long as the message is clear; they effectively make policy based on their perceptions, their situation and own self-interest. Lipsky (1980) showed how street-level bureaucrats such as policemen, teachers and social workers make discretionary decisions, establish routines and devise strategies to cope with the cross-pressures of conflicting goals and norms, large caseloads, inadequate resources and uncertainties. This may be done by routinizing services, controlling users or lowering demand.
The bottom-up government perspective recognizes the existence of vertical conflicts of interests between levels while granting some degree of legitimacy to the concerns of actors operating on lower levels. Policy analysts as well as central policy-makers are thus prompted to consider the interests and (limited) resources of implementing actors.

Being less concerned with the acts of central policy-makers, however, the literature written from the bottom-up government perspective rarely explicitly considers how public managers may contribute to successful implementation. Like the top-down government perspective, potentially positive contributions by local actors are hence difficult to track: local influence must be avoided rather than cultivated. Finally, the perspective solely focuses on the vertical dimension of public bureaucracy and has little to say about cross-sector policy design and implementation.

2.3 The Bottom-up Governance Perspective

In the early 1980’s, Benny Hjern and colleagues introduced a bottom-up governance perspective on implementation with their key concept of implementation structures (Hjern & Porter, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 1982). Implementation structures are defined as interconnected clusters of firms, governments and associations that come together within the framework of public programmes “almost irrespective of mandates from the central levels” (Hjern & Porter, 1981: 215). The perspective views such inter-organisational networks as an important resource for the implementation process. Local adaptation of public policies is seen as desirable as it ensures a better fit between public policy and the specific needs and capabilities of the local community. Hence, central policy-makers should not seek to avoid substantial variation in policy delivery across locales; rather they must expect and appreciate it as it reflects the adjustment to local conditions informed by the contextual knowledge of the pool of organisations from which the implementation structure is formed. Exponents of the perspective thus recommend flexible policy implementation that allows for considerable local autonomy.

The bottom-up government perspective recognizes the existence of private actors and their importance for shaping public policies, especially at the local level. Taking the lack of control by central authorities as a basic condition, it makes an important analytical contribution by re-conceptualizing new policies as triggers of complex multi-actor interactions rather than well-defined programmes that should be loyally implemented according to central plans.
However, while the government perspectives delineated above were biased towards a negative interpretation of alteration made by local actors, the bottom-up governance perspective tends to over-emphasize the positive contribution of local actors. Hence it easily ends up surrendering control of policy to implementers. The perspective either presupposes the willing cooperation of local network actors in realizing central policy goals or, in cases where vertical conflict arises, grants privilege to the interests of the local actors by conceptualizing alterations as necessary and desirable adaptations to local conditions. Hence, it tends to neglect the negative aspects of local influence stemming from bias of local coalitions, conflicting interests between local actors and established power structures. For that reason it does not consider viable strategies for handling such situations.

2.4 The Top-down Governance Perspective

During the 1990’s, the government-governance debate really took off and protagonists of the governance perspective such as Kooiman (1993) and Rhodes (1994, 1996, 1997) argued the emergence of more differentiated polities and increasingly complex social-political arrangements. Under these conditions, the very term ‘implementation’ became associated with a lost age of Classical Public Administration and the amount of public administration research directly using the term started to regress (Hupe & Sætren, 2014). While the first generation of interactive governance literature focused on governance networks as distinct governance mechanisms differing from hierarchies and markets (e.g. Marin & Mayntz, 1991; March & Rhodes, 1992), a second generation emerged in the late 1990’s and early 2000s which introduced network management and metagovernance as central concepts (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Even though the label might not sit well with the authors, we may use their theories to distil a top-down governance perspective on policy formulation and implementation.

The top-down governance perspective recognizes the legitimacy of central policy-makers to formulate policies and the importance of ensuring the fulfilment of the policy objectives formulated by political leadership (like the top-down government perspective). At the same time, the links between local governmental actors, private businesses and community organisations are seen as important for mobilizing knowledge and competencies that can help qualify the policies in question and facilitate successful implementation (like the bottom-up governance perspective). Local actors are, however, not simply conceptualized as benevolent and conductive to policy implementation by definition, but as situated actors.
with particular goals, interests and world-views that may obstruct the policies coming ‘from above’ (like the bottom-up government perspective).

Hence, the top-down governance perspective recognizes both the vertical and horizontal dimension of implementation processes as well as the need to encourage constructive participation from both public agencies and private stakeholders. It is based on the premise that the concerns and interests of key (public and private) stakeholders must be served by a policy (or governance arrangement) for it to effective. For that reason, strengthening public policy-makers’ hierarchical control over the process (as proposed by the top-down government perspective) is not seen as a viable strategy for ensuring successful implementation. In fact various forms of command-and-control are posited to be outright counterproductive in multi-organisational settings since the operationally autonomous actors will withdraw from the process if other actors try to force their will on them (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Government actors must rather govern through incentive structures, facilitative process management and mediation between potentially ‘reluctant partners’ (cf. Stoker, 1991).

While the interactive governance literature, particularly theories of metagovernance and network management, offers valuable insights on how to manage complex processes of multi-actor policy-making, a number of assumptions imbedded in the perspective may cause blind spots in the analysis of multi-level, multi-actor implementation processes. First, it tends to assume that public and private managers are interested in, and to some extent able to, act as more or less neutral, facilitative metagovernors that ensure the inclusion of relevant actors and support their interaction in order to reach common goals. By doing so, it fails to recognize the metagovernor as a situated actor with specific interests in the composition and agenda of the governance arena that may be a barrier for achieving well-functioning networks. Second, the perspective tends to focus on how a single metagovernor/network manager may assemble and direct networks. By doing so, it fails to capture the multi-actor dynamics of institutional design and management processes. Third, it sometimes assumes a strategic rationale in the design of new arenas that neglects the power plays and interest-based negotiations between multiple metagovernors.

In order to make up for these shortcomings and make the top-down governance perspective more apt for studying implementation of mandated governance arenas, we will now turn to theories of multi-actor institutional design.
3. Multi-Actor Institutional Design of Mandated Governance Arenas

Interactive design theory asserts that institutional designs are rarely derived at out of rational, strategic and benevolent considerations of how best to attain collective goals and optimize task performance. Rather multi-actor design processes are shaped by the fact that new governance institutions are likely to alter the distribution of resources and relative influence of key actors.

As Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (2006) points out, multi-actor institutional design often unfolds as “a negotiation game in a garbage can-type context” characterized by “complicated and lengthy procedures” taking place in an “uncertain institutional environment” where the final design must be interpreted as “the result of the process of pushing and pulling between parties” (p. 155). From this perspective, each attempt at changing the composition and set of network rules is *ex post* a power struggle structured by past interactions, choices and power relations, which leads to the institutionalization of distributive advantages, the mobilization of bias and the exclusion of certain actors, interests and issues (ibid.: 146-148).

As Jens Blom-Hansen (1997) asserts, the collective output of multi-actor institutional design processes may be compromised if and when a ‘logic of one-sided distributional advantage’ kicks in, where powerful actors seek to create and shape the new institutions as a means for pursuing their own interests and gain strategic advantages at the expense of less powerful actors. Within this logic of action, “actors who fundamentally disagree with the purposes served by the institutions and who are harmed by their effects […] pursue a strategy of crippling the institutions as much as possible”, which may very well lead to “rationally strange and inefficient institutions” (ibid.: 680). The design of new arenas is hence shaped by the different interests and orientations of the actors involved and may fall victim to situations where one or more of the designers deploy defensive strategies that directly seek to cripple the new institutions.

Furthermore, Erik-Hans Klijn (2005) notes that “lengthy implementation processes typically have unanticipated consequences as actors attempt to adapt institutional reforms to their own needs” (p. 334). These unanticipated consequences, we may add, could run counter to the central policy intent as well as the interests of the implementing designers themselves.
The theoretical exposition allows us to formulate three propositions on the dynamics and specific challenges pertaining to top-down implementation of interactive governance arrangements.

First, local actors with a vested (self-)interest in the institutional set-up of a given policy field cannot be assumed to favour the establishment of new governance arenas mandated by central government. On the contrary, the fact that the proposed governance arena has not already been established by the local actors themselves may well indicate that the existing power structures and interdependency relations do not support such interactive governance mechanism. Especially in situations where established regime actors have not been involved in the process leading up to the central initiation of the new arenas, the implementation process may be hampered by defensive strategies that seek to cripple the new arenas as much as possible.

Second, when a governance arrangement is mandated by law, lead agencies may be tempted to (re-)design the institution to fit their own purposes during the implementation process, e.g. by ascribing formal powers to the arena, excluding other actors from the arena, and/or assigning leadership roles to themselves. Since the voluntary participation of other organisations is needed for collaborative arenas to produce anything of value, they may, however, cripple the new governance arena by doing so. Since the public agencies and private actors in the field cannot dissolve the mandated arena – even if they do not find it to be mutually beneficial – dissatisfied actors are left with the option of pursuing more defensive strategies of *de facto* weakening the significance of the new arena by withdrawing competencies and other resources.

Third, if new governance arenas are conceptualized as formal bodies that are able to make binding decisions affecting those involved as well as others – rather than platforms for voluntary interaction between operationally autonomous actors – then the lead agency will be inclined to exclude other actors since such exclusion will enhance rather than diminish the lead agency’s control over the arena and its domain. We may further hypothesize that this situation is most likely to occur if and when public agencies act as sole designers. Hence if private stakeholders are not involved in the design of a new interactive governance arena that they are expected to participate in – and if their interests have not been brought into the design phase by any other means – then there is a greater risk of developing bureaucratic designs that limit their influence and active participation on the arena.
The three propositions point to the fact that it is highly important who are involved (and who are not involved) as partners and co-designers in the implementation process. Process design strategies (Klijn, 2005) may be deployed in order to structure the implementation process in ways that build support and broad ownership to the new governance arena; ensure the inclusion of multiple perspectives in the design phase; and avoid policy capture by a single agency. This may be done by distributing leadership roles among more than one agency from the outset; by requiring lead agencies to consult relevant stakeholders on the institutional design; and by setting up pay-off structures that will encourage public and private stakeholders to participate. Implementation managers may also deploy process management strategies that help parties bridge their differences and avoid destructive conflicts; facilitate the actual inclusion of different interests and perspectives; and ensure that the overall policy objectives are not lost of sight. Whether or not such strategies have been pursued – and how the implementation process design has impacted on the interactive design process – is an important focal point for policy-makers and policy analysts who wish to bolster and/or understand such processes.

4. Applying the Perspective to the Case of the LCPCs

In order to illustrate how the synthesis between implementation theory, network governance theory and multi-actor design theory can help us understand and explain policy execution problems pertaining to the top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas, I will proceed to apply the theoretical perspective to the case of the Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) in Denmark. It is beyond the scope of the article to provide a comprehensive analysis of the specific case in question, yet alone to make generalizable proclamations based on the results. The case analysis simply serves as an initial (and cursory) attempt at putting the perspective to work that illustrates the applied use of the perspective.

Before embarking on the case analysis itself, a few words on case selection and data collection methods should be stated. Hopefully these methodological reflections can inspire other researchers to apply and develop the perspective in and through empirical case analysis.

4.1 Case Selection

The illustrative case is strategically selected to exhibit policy problems pertaining to top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. Contemporary police reforms in

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Western Europe seem particularly suited as critical cases for showcasing and investigating some of these problems since they tend to be “firmly embedded in a vertical, state-oriented vision” (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2013: 6) while at the same time placing significant emphasis on community-oriented policing and multi-agency collaboration (Verhage et al., 2010). We can hence expect to find tensions between logics of vertical government and horizontal governance to be particularly prevalent in such reforms.

As mentioned in the introduction, the LCPCs were introduced as a part of the Danish police reform of 2007 to advance collaborative crime prevention between the local police, local government and local community organisations. As such it must be considered a least likely case in terms of successful implementation of interactive governance arenas. Moreover, the specific institutional conditions of the Danish LCPC case also satisfy the conditions advanced in the theoretical framework (see section 5.1 for further explanation).

In order to conduct an analysis of the implementation process from top to bottom, one of 12 police districts was strategically selected for further investigation. The selected police district is distinct in the sense that it started out by limiting the number of community organisations in its ten LCPCs before redesigning the councils and expanding the number of community organisations. Today, it is the only police district that has included community actors in all of its LCPCs. The specific police district was selected since the longitudinal variance in the LCPC design allows for an exploration of both conductive and constraining factors.

Based on the analysis it is not possible to generalize the findings to other police districts with different implementation trajectories. However, the analysis points to important focal points that should be subjected to further studies in other Danish police districts and in other cases of top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. As mentioned, the case analysis is conducted with the purpose of illustration.

### 4.2 Data Collection Methods

A combination of forward and backward mapping (Elmore, 1982) was used to reconstruct the implementation process and identify critical moments of (re-)design. Three steps were taken.
Table 1: Overview of Critical Moments of Redesign in the Implementation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Moment</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Involved Actors</th>
<th>Main Document</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring of 2006</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>MPs in the Legal Committee and civil servants in the Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Ministerial answer</td>
<td>Two civil servants in the Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall of 2006</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National Police, Local Police, National SSP Council, and the Danish Crime</td>
<td>Preparatory Police Reform Implementation</td>
<td>Two high-level managers from the National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention Council</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>and the Danish Crime Prevention Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring of 2007</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>District Police and public executives from the Local Governments in the district</td>
<td>LCPC Rules of Procedure</td>
<td>A Chief Superintendent from the District Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and two public executives from the Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring of 2010</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>District Police and public executives from the Local Governments in the district</td>
<td>Revised LCPC Rules of Procedure</td>
<td>(Same as above)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, written material from the process was gathered through public sources, formal requests of access to records and documents, and direct contacts in the police. The obtained documents were scanned for references to other documents which were then specifically requested; this was done until no further documents could be identified.

Second, the gathered material of parliamentary committee proceedings, ministerial directives, LCPC rules of procedure, and internal working documents was systematically reviewed and classified according to time and level of application (national / regional / local). The classification served to recreate a vertical implementation chain ranging from top to bottom in a linear progression over time.

Third, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors who had been involved in the design negotiations at each step in the implementation process. The theoretical perspective prompts us to obtain insights on the motivations, interests and agendas of the actors involved in crafting the design of the new arena, which served as the main purpose of the interviews.
Four critical moments of (re-)design were identified and expounded in this way (see table 1).

In the following section I will first provide some background on the specific institutional context; then review each moment in terms of its main actors, their considerations and the resulting design features; and finally consider the implementation process as a whole.

5. Case analysis

5.1 The Institutional Governance Context: The SSP Cooperation

The theoretical prompts us to survey the institutional environment in order to understand the established positions of key actors in the field and how the new governance arena may alter the distribution of resources and relative influence of the actors.

Denmark has a long tradition for collaborative crime prevention. Since the 1970’s, the so-called SSP cooperation between Schools, Social services and Police has formed the backbone of Danish crime prevention (Kankaala, 2015). The primary objective of the SSP is to prevent juvenile crime among children and youth in the age of 6-18 years old through individual case work, targeted interventions towards groups at risk and general education and guidance to the age group at large (Ssp.kk.dk).

Taken as a whole, the SSP has developed into a comprehensive and well-organized institution with collaborative forums on multiple levels. While the exact way of organizing the SSP cooperation varies across locales, all Danish municipalities has adopted the scheme in some form (Danish National Board of Social Services, 2008). Local government typically has a significant amount of resources bound up in the SSP structure. Most places local government employ several fulltime SSP coordinators and counsellors. A municipal steering committee headed by politicians and/or administrators from local government typically coordinate the local SSP action groups (ibid.). While the police are typically represented in the steering committees, local government remains the lead actor in the cooperation.

As we shall see, the struggle over the division of labour and relative importance of the new LCPCs vis-a-vis the established SSP institution was pivotal when national and local actors were to implement and design the new governance arrangement. The implementation of the LCPCs coincided with two major structural reforms that impacted on the hitherto existing institutional set-up: the 2007 Police Reform and 2007 Local Government Reform.
The Police Reform reduced the number of police districts from 54 districts to 12 districts, and the Local Government Reform reduced the number of municipalities from 271 municipalities to 98 municipalities.

While the implementation of the LCPCs took place in a policy field with long traditions of inter-agency collaboration and clear divisions of labour between the key actors, the two structural reforms created a new and temporarily uncertain institutional environment where the future organisation of crime prevention in the new and larger districts and municipalities, including the prime institutions of coordination, was yet to be defined. The institutional conditions were hence conducive to power-ridden negotiations and attempts at expanding, defending or solidifying the individual agencies’ relative influence and control over resources through institutional design of the new arenas (cf. section 3 above).

5.2 Spring of 2006: General Policy of the LCPCs (National Level)

A few months before the police reform bill was to be passed in parliament, the prospect of fewer and much larger police districts triggered widespread public concern that the local anchorage of policing would dwindle and that the collaborative ties would suffer (Balvig, Holmberg & Nielsen, 2011: 47). The introduction of so-called District Councils in each of the new police districts, where the District Police Commissioner meets with the Mayors of the municipalities in the district at least four times a year, was not enough to dampen the concerns. Mayors from peripheral municipalities criticized the fact that no main police station would be placed in their municipality and started exerting political pressure through the national parliamentary parties who also had considerable interests in local politics.

In the first reading of the bill in the parliamentary Legal Committee in mid-Marts 2006, the social-democratic member of the committee declared that:

The presence of police in local communities will be weakened if the bill concerning the new District Councils is not supplemented with a new local structure, where the police, the municipal authorities, the SSP employees and for instance the Night Ravens [non-profit street outreach association] and other local networks can strengthen the prevention of crime. (Ft.dk, 2006)

Later in the same round of negotiation, the more general concern was translated into a specific policy proposal by the same spokesperson:
Would it be possible to establish new crime preventive councils around the prospective sub-stations that were given the task of strengthening the prevention of crime and mobilize the local community organisations, schools, police and other authorities for a far better prevention of crime in these areas? (ibid.)

The LCPCs were formally adopted as official policy with the support of the major parties in parliament in a two-page long ministerial answer to a question posed by one of the reform partners in the Legal Committee two weeks before passing the reform bill. The answer states that:

…the Ministry of Justice finds it to be a natural task of the District Police Commissioners to establish local collaboration forums (“local councils”) in the individual municipalities with representatives from the police, local government and the local community. (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2006)

The written answer is formulated within a relatively short time span in the Ministry of Justice and only involves a few requirements and guidelines for the design of the new collaborative forums. It states that the primary purposes of the councils is to advance collaborative crime problem-solving at a local level; to ensure sustained contact between the police and the local community; and to translate the general frames and goals of the Police District into practice. The District Police Commissioner is imbued with the power to define the specific tasks of the councils and the Local Police Commander is expected to prepare and lead the council meetings with the aim of ensuring that the local police will get the widest possible knowledge of local developments.

As such, the statutory grants both a privileged design position to the District Police Commissioners (in practice the police as such) and a privileged leadership position to the Local Police Commander. Hence, the implicit implementation process design grants the police the main responsibility for convening and defining the agenda of the new arenas.

5.3 Fall of 2006: Ascription of Formal Decision-Making Powers (National Level)

During the fall of 2006, a crucial report for the design of the LCPCs is completed. The report is composed by a working group under the National Police consisting of police officers from the Local Police (4), municipal employees from the National SSP Council (2), and experts from the Danish Crime Prevention Council (2).
In the report, published internally on the Danish police intranet in February 2007, a quite radical redesign of the LCPCs occurs. The report sets out to ensure a clear distribution of roles between old and new collaborative forums. To serve that end, the report recommends a three-layered structure where: 1) the District Council serves as the strategic forum for leadership of all collaborative crime prevention in the district (the strategic level); 2) the LCPCs are responsible for coordinating all collaborative crime prevention in the municipality (the operative level); and 3) the local arenas for collaboration such as the local SSP action groups execute the action plans (the tactical level).

The statutory LCPC task of translating the general frames and goals of the Police District into practice is now elevated to a central organizing principle of an entire collaborative crime prevention structure. The police hold the position of lead organisation in both the strategic District Council and the operative LCPCs. In the proposed governance structure, the well-established SSP institution led by local government is all of a sudden subsumed under the new police-led governance institutions.

The LCPCs are now ascribed both formal decision-making powers and resource allocation powers. Every year, each LCPC should craft three types of plans: 1) a local action plan that coordinates all collaborative crime prevention activities in the municipality based on the strategic plan of the District Council and the local crime prevention needs; 2) a local action plan that defines the activities of the local police concerning law enforcement and police-counselling on security issues; and 3) a plan for the distribution of resources for competence development around crime prevention in the municipality.

The composition of the LCPCs largely goes by without mentioning apart from the referenced wording in the statutory. Community organisations are still assumed to be a part of the LCPCs. It is pointed out specifically that the head of the SSP cooperation in the municipality should participate in the LCPCs due to the (newly ascribed) formal role of the forum.

At first sight, this redesign ostensibly strengthens community participation in the new governance arrangements since the new collaborative forums are given a more central role in the crime prevention structure and endowed with formal decision-making and resource allocation powers. However, the theoretical framework allows us to see how this redesign in fact may serve to complicate cross-sector collaboration and de facto limit community influence.
The idea that the police-led District Council sets strategic goals for the LCPCs, who will then craft local action plans for the SSP to follow, rests on a hierarchical logic of government. It ignores the fact that interactive governance relies on the willingness of operationally autonomous organisations to enter into agreements on joint action. If forced to follow police-led decisions taken elsewhere when interacting on the arena, other public and private actors are likely to either withdraw from the arena or to pursue defensive strategies of crippling the arena.

As we shall see next, the fatal redesign promotes a logic of one-sided distributional advantage where public actors seek to retain control of the policy field by limiting the number of participating private actors.

5.4 Spring of 2007: Curtailment of Community Participation (District Level)

At the district level, the District Police first responds to the national redesign with a defensive strategy that aims to shield itself from external influence on police priorities. It is speculated that a forum with formal powers will enable local community actors to “take revenge” following the centralizing police reform and force the police to deal with neighborhood-specific issues (interview with Police Commissioner). As a response, the District Police draws up a design proposal to be discussed with the Local Governments in the district. In order to inhibit community actors from imposing tasks on the police, formal voting procedures are introduced and the number of participating community actors is limited to three:

> It was implied that the Local Councils were to have some form of influence on the local priorities of the police. [...] The voting procedures were a precautionary measure. We shielded ourselves. Because we were not sure what we were signing up for (Police Commissioner, interview).

Having ensured the majority of public actors in the councils, the District Police by and large adopted the District Council-LCPC-SSP structure from the national policy report in the design proposal. It is, however, slightly changed to the advantage of the police: While the LCPCs should not craft any action plans for the local police, they should do so for the SSP. It is thus suggested that the existing SSP coordination councils are replaced by, or subsumed under, the LCPCs.
The proposed District Council-LCPC-SSP structure makes Local Government react with great skepticism. Local Government has two objections. Firstly, the proposed design is seen to shift the power-balance from Local Government to the police:

*The police said: “Let the Local Councils be the locus of all collaboration between police and Local Government.” That was when we had to put on the breaks. Suddenly they were closing down our SSP organisation. [...] They wanted to transfer decision-making power from the political and administrative level in the municipalities to the police station. We didn’t want that. It is life blood we are dealing with here* (Municipal civil servant A, interview).

Secondly, the proposed design is seen to give private community organisations too big of a say on the coordinated prevention of crime and thus the priorities of Local Government:

*When the police introduced the idea that the Local Councils should govern the prevention of crime and the municipal SSP funds, we simply had to tell them: “Forget it!” We cannot give a Local Council involving community actors the decision-making authority over Local Government. It probably wouldn’t be legal at all, and it definitely wouldn’t be functional* (Municipal civil servant B, interview).

The worries of both police and Local Government that the new forum would give civil society actors too big of a say in deciding on the priorities of public authorities leave the parties with two design options: remove the formal decision-making power from the LCPCs or exclude civil society actors from the arena. The police and Local Government agree to wear both belts and braces by removing all formal decision-making powers of the LCPCs and ensuring their own majority in the councils with a 3-3-3 composition (three representatives from police, local government, and civil society, respectively).

The design implemented in 2007 is hence shaped by very different logics, interests and ideas than the ones giving birth to the LCPC initiative. The LCPCs were conceived as a set of collaborative governance institutions that were to ensure local anchorage of policing and bolster cross-sector collaboration on crime prevention. Now it is about keeping otherwise resourceful civil society organisations at bay in order to limit community power over the public authorities.
According to the theoretical framework advanced above, however, we can expect that the removal of formal decision-making power from the arena may pave the way for greater community participation and collaboration in the long run. That is exactly what happens when the design of the LCPCs in the district is evaluated three years later and eventually changed once again in 2010.

5.5 Spring of 2010: Expansion of Community Participation (District Level)

After some time, the local designers realize that the formal exclusion of other actors only made sense within the bureaucratic government design proposed by the District Police on the basis of the national policy report:

Our initial fear was gone. We could now see that it was not about telling the police what to do. [...] We then said: Okay then, let all civil society actors who want to participate do so (Police Commissioner, interview).

The reasons for limiting the number of community actors had evaporated when formal decision-making powers were withdrawn from the arena (and actions trying to force the police to make specific priorities had proven to be absent in praxis). It was now decided to include up to eight community organisations in each council.

At the same time, the status of the appointed community organisations was changed from standing members to ad hoc participants to be called in for meetings if the Local Police Commander deems them relevant for the issues to be discussed at the given meeting. In actual fact, however, all the formally appointed community organisations are invited for all meetings:

Today, everyone is invited for all meetings in order to ensure continuity. It is the logical conclusion since no one formally decides anything. Formal decisions are made by the local sheriff, Local Government or whoever has the authority on a given issue (Municipal civil servant A, interview).

The final result of the implementation process in the District was a forum where no one formally decides anything, but where everyone can join.

5.6 The LCPC Implementation Process from Mandate to Final Design

The LCPC implementation process exhibits the potentially crippling effects of power-ridden design negotiations that: i) take place in times of institutional turmoil; ii) are structured by an unfavorable (top-down government) implementation design; and, as a
result, iii) involve policy capture by the lead agency, redesigns based on hierarchical and formalistic logics of government, and power strategies based on a logic of one-sided distributional advantage.

The theoretical propositions on conductive top-down governance policy designs advanced above enable us to see how tensions were intensified rather than alleviated by the statutory LCPC policy design (spring of 2006). The policy was an outcome of political negotiations between national politicians and did not go through a hearing or any other forms of deliberative process among relevant public and private stakeholders before it was adopted. No other ministries than the Ministry of Justice were involved and the initial phase involved no stakeholder influence, awareness or ownership. The sole responsibility for implementing and leading the LCPCs was placed with the police without any obligations to consult relevant stakeholders on the design or the setting up of any pay-off structures to encourage public and private stakeholders to participate in the design process. Hence the risk of both policy capture and LCPC designs based on a formalistic logic of government was imminent in the process design from the outset.

Following the theoretical perspective, the fatal redesign occurring in the national policy report under the auspices of the National Police (fall of 2006) can be interpreted as the outcome of an (unchecked) power strategy on the part of police. The police make use of their privileged design position to expand their influence vis-à-vis other public and private actors by turning the police-led LCPCs into formal steering committees for already established collaborative arenas at the community level. As a response, the local actors react with crippling strategies by severely curtailing the formal inclusion of community actors in the new governance structure (spring of 2007).

After some years, a logic of governance enters the design process, which makes the inclusion of (more) community actors a means for increasing the power and practical utility of the forums (spring of 2010). This is conditioned upon the fact that the institutional environment has stabilized and policy learning has occurred: no formal decision-making powers have been granted to the LCPCs ‘from above’ and interaction with community actors in the councils has proven that no attempts are made at forcing the local police or local government representatives to act against their will ‘from below’.

Taken as a whole, the LCPC case analysis has illustrated the challenges proposed in the theoretical framework. It has shown how top-down implementation of interactive
governance arenas may be compromised by active resistance from local actors with a vested interest in the existing institutional set-up; by lead agency attempts at redesigning new arenas to fit their own purposes; and by hierarchical and formalistic logics of government that turn arenas into formal bodies able to make binding decisions affecting those involved as well as others.

6. Conclusions

Mandating interactive governance arenas presents itself as an appealing strategy for central policy-makers in an age of New Public Governance (NPG). As this article has argued, however, it also confronts researchers and practitioners with a new set of policy execution problems that prompts us to re-examine some of the earliest research questions in public administration research and consider new and more suitable strategies for managing public policy implementation.

The theoretical perspective on top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas developed in this article incorporates insights from network governance literature and theories of multi-actor institutional design. It posits that the final output of the implementation process, i.e. the design of the mandated arena in question, must be interpreted as the result of more or less overt power struggle between situated actors who attempt to expand, defend or solidify their relative influence and control over resources. It suggests that the blatant use of offensive and defensive power strategies deployed within a logic of one-sided distributional advantage is likely to cripple the interactive governance arenas in their ability to serve as platforms for inter-agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration. The risk of failed implementation is accelerated in times of institutional turmoil where the involved parties find themselves in a situation with high levels of uncertainty in terms of future role divisions and resource allocations.

The article has suggested that policy execution problems may be bridled by deploying appropriate implementation design and management strategies. Involving relevant stakeholders early on the process, distributing leadership roles among several agencies and mediating between the involved parties during the implementation process lowers the risks of policy capture by a single agency and design negotiations proceeding from a logic of one-sided distributional advantage. The need for implementation management can be expected to be particularly pertinent in polities and policy fields populated by strong public
actors who, more or less intentionally, easily end up crowding out other relevant stakeholders.

It follows from the theoretical assertions that polities, policy areas and public agencies with long histories of interactive governance and cross-sector collaboration are more apt for top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. The risk of formalistic government designs decreases if the involved parties are accustomed to cross-sector collaboration between operationally autonomous actors. However, policy-makers, implementation managers and researchers should be aware that such experience is no guarantee that agencies will refrain from deploying offensive power strategies in the hope of expanding their relative influence in the field if and when the opportunity arises.

Endnotes

1 Of the 98 Danish municipalities, all have established one LCPC except for: the municipalities of Copenhagen, Dragør and Tårnby in the Capital Region, which were exempted due to an already well-established structure of local committees; the municipality of the island of Læsø, which was deemed too small for an LCPC; and the municipality of the island of Bornholm, which decided to establish four LCPCs instead of one. This makes a total of 97 LCPCs.

2 The data on the composition of the LCPCs was collected in the spring of 2015 by Danish National Police in collaboration with the researcher.

3 Analysing the data on the present composition of the LCPCs, we find that one police district has included community organisations in all of its local councils, three districts have included community members in some of their councils, and one district has included private citizens in all of their councils. The remaining seven police districts have not included community members or private citizens in any of their LCPCs.

References


Abstract
Today, politicians are inclined to mandate interactive governance arenas in order to mobilize public and private resources; however, in doing so they risk manufacturing institutional designs ill-suited to that purpose. This article develops the hypothesis that politically mandated governance arenas are institutionally prone to exhibit structural features that violate necessary conditions for cross-sector collaboration. Through a comparative case-study of hands-on leadership in three Local Crime Prevention Councils, it conceptualizes four hands-on leadership strategies for overcoming the barriers: the strategy of the loyal implementer, the orderly host, the mainstream bender, and the institution builder.

Keywords: collaborative governance; institutional design; mandated arenas; collaborative leadership; cross-sector collaboration.
1. Introduction

Over the past few decades, collaborative governance arrangements that bring public and private organizations together around issues of common concern have gained reputation as attractive and legitimate alternatives to hierarchies and markets, especially for dealing with complex, wicked and unruly problems that cut across institutional boundaries (Roberts, 2000; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Agger, Damgaard, Krogh, & Sørensen, 2015). In the wake of the interactive governance trend, politicians have become all the more inclined to mandate interactive governance arenas as a proactive way of mobilizing public and private resources, distributing responsibility, and resolving public problems with multiple causes and effects that no single agency can handle alone (Crosby, Bryson, & Stone, 2015).

A recent example of large-scale institutional reform introducing politically mandated governance arenas as a means for producing cross-sector collaboration is found in Denmark. In 2007, Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) were established in 94 of 98 Danish municipalities in order to advance cross-sector collaboration between state actors, local government agencies and civil society organizations around the local prevention of crime. An element in a comprehensive national police reform bill, the LCPC statute placed the formal leadership responsibility with the police and granted the chiefs of police the formal powers to define the specific institutional design of the new arenas (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2006). In each of the 12 police districts, the police partnered with local governments in appointing members, formulating formal rules of procedure and defining specific tasks of the LCPC.

Despite the promising perspectives, delivering on the promises proves to be a complicated task. Evaluations of the LCPCs show mixed results (CASA, 2013). While some LCPCs seem to foster some degree of cross-sector collaboration, others are charged with critiques of disengaged participation, tokenistic action plans and inconsequential small talk.1 The question begging to be answered is why some LCPCs are doing relatively well while others are not?

Several theoretical accounts and empirical studies have convincingly argued how institutional design as a form of hands-off metagovernance that frames and structures interaction between operationally autonomous actors is crucial for advancing cross-sector collaboration (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Jessop, 2011; Ansell & Torfing, 2014; Torfing,
This article argues, however, that institutional designs of politically mandated governance arenas are likely to compromise some of the basic conditions for collaboration since their design is more exposed to logics of government than collaborative arrangements developing from below (cf. Edelenbos, 2005; Klijn & Edelenbos, 2007). I develop the thesis that hands-on leadership is crucial for obtaining collaborative advantage in politically mandated governance arenas because hands-on leaders play a decisive role in mediating the effects of the institutional design on its collaborative capacity. Building on comparative case-studies and theoretical reasoning I suggest a conceptual framework for understanding how hands-on leadership strategies mediate the institutional design in various ways, with varying preconditions and with various implications for the collaborative capacity of the arena.

The article proceeds in the following way. First, I consult the existing literatures on collaborative leadership and network governance in order to theoretically account for some key challenges that are likely to face cross-sector collaboration on politically mandated governance arenas. Second, I briefly review the institutional design of the surveyed LCPCs in relation to the expected design features delineated in the theoretical framework. Third, I explain the applied methodology of a qualitative case study that was designed to explore how three hands-on leaders handle the design-based barriers to cross-sector collaboration in the LCPCs. Fourth, I present the results of the case study and discuss the findings across the three cases. Fifth, I use the case study to map the strategic action space for hands-on leadership and conceptualize four hands-on leadership strategies for promoting collaboration in politically mandated governance arenas. The article is concluded by summing up the main findings of the study and briefly reflecting on possible implications for collaborative leadership theory and practice.

2. Theoretical Framework

Collaborative governance is generally defined as a mode of governance that brings multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in joint decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543). This definition implies that collaborative governance concerns public-private collaboration that goes beyond the mere sharing of information and expertise (cooperation) and involves a deeper collective commitment to joint problem-solving than attuning existing services to each other in order to avoid redundancies in services and mutual operational disruptions (coordination) (Keast, Brown,
Collaboration is said to occur when multiple organizations develop or implement joint policies and solutions that none of them could produce alone (ibid.). Since public and private partners are operationally autonomous that may (and will) choose to leave the collaboration if they do not see an interest in participating, collaborative leaders cannot rely on formal authority known from the intra-organizational in-charge leadership typically associated with hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Crosby & Bryson, 2005, 2010). In order to bring about collaborative problem-solving they must continually focus their energies on: a) satisfying self-interests of the participating organizations, b) sustaining and exploiting interdependencies between them, and c) ensuring legitimacy of the collaborative arena. Let us examine the role of leadership in procuring these necessary conditions for cross-sector collaboration before considering the specific circumstances and prospects for during so on politically mandated governance arenas.

2.1 Satisfying organisational self-interests

Shared-power arrangements will always remain a “mixed-motive” situation with both shared and unshared objectives, and all participants do not need to ascribe the same meaning to the same activities in order for collaborative action to occur (Crosby & Bryson, 2005, p. 18; Vangen & Huxham, 2012). Whether the collaboration is self-grown or initiated from above, all participants must, however, see a clear interest in pursuing the collaborative agenda. As Huxham (1996) notes: “[Even] if organizations are mandated to be part of a collaboration, getting something out of it for themselves is important in motivating them to inject sufficient energy into it to make it work” (p. 15). Individual partners must in other words be able to ascribe meaning and justify their collaborative involvement in terms of its contribution to their own aims or remit for them to enter into the collaboration and commit resources to the collaborative endeavour.

Initial partnership agreements raise the chances that all collaborating parties find the collaborative agenda to be sufficiently important for them to enter into the collaboration. It is, however, an on-going hand-on leadership task to keep parties interested since the views, interests and agendas of organizations are not constants, but variables that change over time and fluctuate with external chocks in the environment, e.g. the emergence of new acute problems, the adoption of new public policies, or unanticipated strategic manoeuvring of other actors (cf. Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004). Inclusion of stakeholders should be viewed as
a process of continual adaptation due to the changing dynamics of the domain (Gray, 1985, p. 920). Collaborative leaders are hence advised to continually pay attention to the changing aims, aspirations, incentives and motivations of the participating organizations and their representatives in order to mobilize them to work on behalf of the collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 220-222).

2.2 Sustaining and exploiting interdependencies
Second, the ‘collaborative advantage’ must be clear to all participants, i.e. each organization must recognize the need to engage with others in order to achieve something of relevance to them (Huxham, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 60). It is, in other words, not enough that the participants consider the collaborative agenda and the defined problems relevant to them. They must also find it impossible or undesirable to go-it-alone. Despite their different perspectives, parties involved in collaborative problem-solving will recognize each other as relevant stakeholders with needed resources and a legitimate voice with respect to a shared problem.

For these reasons, leaders must focus on sustaining mutual appreciation of joint interdependencies as a basis for convening collaboration (Gray, 1985, p. 917; Crosby & Bryson, 2010, p. 219; Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 117). The degree to which collaboration partners need to formulate a common purpose based on shared interests – or simply act on their implicit understandings of their need for one another – is contested in the literature (Thomson & Perry, 2006). In any case, successful collaborative leaders are able to mediate, translate and frame issues so diverse partners understand how the issue is relevant to them and how other organizations are needed for effectively dealing with the issue at hand.

2.3 Ensuring legitimacy of the collaborative arena
Finally, the collaborative arena and its leadership must enjoy internal legitimacy in order to keep organizations interested in using it as a venue for collaborative problem-solving (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008). As stated in the definition of networked governance arrangements above, interactions and negotiations between operationally autonomous actors are never completely free and unguided; rather they are mediated, framed and limited by internal and external forces. That is not a problem per se. Regulatory, procedural and cognitive frameworks are needed for creating the stability and predictability needed for collaborative action to form. If the arena, its design and its procedures are not recognized and implicitly or explicitly supported by the participating organizations,
However, the important stakeholders may withdraw their engagement to go-it-alone, set-up alternative venues or prioritize other more appealing platforms for interaction.

### 2.4 Institutional features of politically mandated governance arenas

Politically mandated governance arenas constitute a specific subset of interactive arenas that are initiated by politicians, implemented ‘from above’ through the political-administrative system, and typically more tightly governed by central policy-makers than self-initiated networks and collaborations. Mandates differ in their level of detail, but may define eligible and/or mandatory members; formal leadership positions; purpose, goals and/or tasks; as well as formal procedures and decision-making structures (Crosby, Bryson, & Stone, 2015).

Being politically conceived and administratively managed by public agencies, institutional logics of government, representational democracy and bureaucracy are likely to pervade politically mandated governance arenas (Edelenbos, 2005; Klijn & Edelenbos, 2007). These logics involve a disposition towards the ‘primacy of politics’, hierarchical decision-making structures and high degrees of formalization as means for transparency and accountability (ibid.). These circumstances, I argue, threatens to produce a number of institutionalized barriers to cross-sector collaboration.

#### 2.4.1 Appointed representatives

First, the combination of a) centrally regulated access to politically mandated arenas through appointment of eligible and mandatory members and b) the logics of representational democracy makes for an increased risk that c) the appointed members do not recognize each other (or even themselves) as relevant stakeholders with a legitimate voice, a relevant perspective and a set of needed resources with respect to the problem at hand.

Gathering the ‘right’ actors around the table, i.e. relevant and affected stakeholders with the needed resources, is a crucial first step in fostering well-functioning collaborative problem-solving (Gray, 1985; Ansell & Gash, 2012). The logics of government, however, make for an institutional disposition towards a representational approach to the appointment of organizations that judges potential members in terms of their wider external legitimacy and the whole group in terms of equal (or disproportionate) representation of various constituencies and communities. Such an approach is less conducive to collaborative problem-solving than an asset-based approach that selects actors based on
their stakes in solving a specific problem and a consideration of ensuring that the entire group has the needed and complimentary resources for doing so.

If/when the central regulation of access to politically mandated governance arenas is wrapped up in a representational logic, the collective problem-solving capacity of the network of public and private actors on the arena is hampered.

2.4.2 Formal procedures

Second, the combination of a) centrally defined procedures and b) logics of government favouring high degrees of formalization as means for transparency and accountability restricts c) the ability of leaders and members of politically mandated arenas to accommodate shifting agendas of the participating organizations.

If hands-on leaders follow bureaucratic procedures and forms of organization rather than facilitating interactive processes, they will ceteris paribus find it more difficult to figure out the collaborative advantage (cf. Bryson, Ackermann, & Eden, 2016). Deploying appropriate working formats is crucial for filling the role as facilitator that assist participants in jointly formulating problems, exploring collaborative solutions and developing shared visions (Ansell & Gash, 2012). Following the logics of government, mandates or administrative metagovernors are more institutionally prone to dictate formal frameworks that include fixed agendas and formal decision-making procedures rather than for instance interactive workshop formats.

In tightly framed governance arenas, leadership will be limited in its ability to integrate the perspectives and changing aims and aspirations of the participating organizations into a collaborative agenda that accentuates their interdependency, ensures that all membership organizations benefit from their involvement, and incites investment of resources in collective action.

2.4.3 Lead actor structures

Third, the combination of a) centrally defined purpose, goals and tasks; b) an appointed lead actor position; and c) inscription of the arena in hierarchical governance structures imperils that d) all participating organizations have their interests served and consider the arena to be legitimate. As Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2015) put it: “Mandates, in particular, may specify hierarchical collaborative governance structures in which one partner is granted more authority and control. As a consequence, the more powerful partner may
ignore other partners, thus undermining the potential for more genuine collaboration” (p. 9).

When a mandate appoints a public lead actor who is also an interested party in the collaboration, it jeopardizes the crucial collaborative leadership capacity to mediate, translate and frame an issue so that diverse partners understand its importance and relevance to them (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Moreover, the lead actor may even premeditatedly seek to commit ‘collaborative thuggery’ by using its privileged leadership position to advance its own agenda at the expense of others (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 78ff). Such thuggery may be supported by formal requirements of producing general action plans that other public agencies are required to follow. Huxham and Vangen (2005) report from their numerous empirical studies of cross-sector collaboration:

[W]here [larger, public] agencies have overlapping or identical physical boundaries, we have seen many examples of one organization apparently taking control through taking a strong lead in the creation of an ‘overarching’ plan for the area and then aiming to influence the behavior of the others in line with the plan. (p. 158)

Due to the basic premises of collaborative problem-solving, however, attempts at collaborative thuggery are often short-sighted. When strong actors in a domain experience an arena as an unlevelled playing field that does not favour their interests, they have the choice of opting out and applying a strategy of ‘venue shopping’, especially if other and more attractive collaborative venues are available (Crosby & Bryson, 2005, p. 175; Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p. 61; Vangen & Huxham, 2012; Crosby & Bryson, 2010; Crosby, Bryson, & Stone 2015). In mandated settings with designated leaders and appointed members, however, the participating (public) actors may not be able to leave nor take control over the arena. They are left with the options of refraining from making agreements and other tactics that will lower the impact and relative importance of the collaborative arena. Conflicts remain latent and hands-on leaders will have to face reluctant partners on the arena.

2.5 Summing up

In order to explain why empirical studies find that network managers consider it to be much harder to get collaboration going when it is mandated ‘from above’ than when it is self-initiated ‘from below’ (Goerdel, 2006; see also Rodriguez, Langley, & Denis, 2007), the
theoretical framework presented here suggests that we look to the institutional design features and supporting logics for explanations.

I have argued that politically mandated arenas are institutionally prone to develop design features that compromise the necessary conditions for cross-sector collaboration. I do not claim that all politically mandated governance arenas are automatically imbued with the logics and institutional features delineated above. The argument simply rests on the presumption that logics of government are more likely to pervade politically mandated governance arenas than those developing from below and that these logics produce infertile conditions for cross-sector collaboration. Whether or not a politically mandated arena actually exhibits the delineated design features will always remain an empirical question.

Having provided a theoretical account of the institutional dispositions of politically mandated governance arenas and their likely implications for cross-sector collaboration, I now return to the empirical case of the Danish Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) to investigate the institutional design, illustrate the logics at play and argue the LCPCs to be a critical case of politically mandated arenas that exhibit all of the delineated design features. It also serves as a backdrop for the case study of how hands-on leaders in the LCPC manage the barriers to collaboration imbedded in the institutional design of the arena.

3. Revisiting the Local Crime Prevention Councils

The theoretical framework prompts us to investigate the institutional design of an arena in terms of its membership, formal procedures, and leadership structure. Formal documents and interviews conducted during the field work described in the methodological section of this paper allows for such exploration.²

Apart from the local chiefs of police who serve as LCPC chairs, the LCPCs consist of two local police officers, up to four local government employees, and up to eight “local community representatives” (LCPC Rules of Procedure, 2010). The city council appoints the local government representatives as well as the local community representatives (ibid.). The members are appointed from administratively derived lists of associations in the municipalities with consideration to broad representation of various constituencies (interviews). The circle of participants in the LCPCs is thus characterized by the features described in the theoretical framework.
The LCPC chair is charged with responsibility to formulate the meeting agendas and call in the appointed representatives for at least four LCPCs meetings a year (LCPC Rules of Procedure, 2010). Very early on, a standardized LCPC agenda was distributed among the Local Chiefs of Police by top-management of police. It prompts them to conduct meetings in the following way: 1) the police present statistics on the development of crime in the municipality; 2) the police inform on current and upcoming police actions; 3) local government representatives inform on current and upcoming activities; 4) local community representatives inform on current and upcoming activities. The fixed agenda involves little space for interaction and joint problem-solving. Also defining formal voting procedures (LCPC Rules of Procedure, 2010), the design largely follows the logics of government described above.

As mentioned in the introduction, the statutory document placed the formal leadership with the police, granting the district chiefs of police the formal powers to design the LCPCs and suggesting that the local chiefs of police took on the formal role as chairmen of the councils (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2006). The LCPCs were thus constituted as lead actor arenas from the outset.

Related to the lead actor structure, the formal competencies, and the centrally defined task of the arena is the question of how the LCPCs should relate to other collaborative arenas. At the district level, it was decided that the LCPCs must craft annual local action plans within focus areas defined by the top-management in police and discussed with the mayors in the District Council (LCPC Rules of Procedure, 2010). The police originally suggested that the local action plans should set the direction for all crime preventive collaboration in the municipalities, including the long-established inter-agency SSP cooperation involving Schools, Social services and the Police (Krogh, forthcoming). Due to local government protest that such overarching plans would de facto result in police and other actors taking control over resources and priorities of the SSP, the formal action plans are now only supposed to concern the practice of LCPC itself (ibid.). Since the SSP coordinators of local government are members of the LCPCs, however, such action plan will influence the priorities and distributions of SSP resources. The underlying conflict relating to the specific lead actor structure and formal tasks of the LCPCs hence remains latent.

All in all, we can expect the LCPCs to involve the design-based barriers to collaboration considered in the theoretical framework. Before taking a closer look at the hands-on
leadership strategies deployed by the LCPC chairs and their ability to overcome these barriers, a few words should be spent on the methodology of the case study.

4. Methodology

4.1 Multi-level sampling for a most similar case study design

A most similar case study design was chosen in order to explore the role of hands-on leadership in advancing cross-sector collaboration on politically mandated governance arenas while keeping the independent design variables affecting an arena’s collaborative capacity constant (cf. Ljiphart, 1971). In order to achieve the desired mix of uniformity and variation, I deployed a multi-level sampling strategy which is known to be particularly well-suited for examining organizations in which different units of analysis are “nested within one another” (Teddle & Yu, 2007, p. 93ff).

As described above, the case of the Danish Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) was selected as a critical case that exhibits all the typical design features of politically mandated arenas. Due to design variations across the 12 police districts, one police district was selected in order to ensure uniformity on formal purpose, tasks, procedures, leadership structure and general composition. Nested within the police district, three local LCPC cases were strategically sampled to obtain maximum variation on the independent variable of hands-on leadership and the dependent variable of collaborative capacity. Utilizing the available and needed expertise in the purposive selection of cases (cf. ibid.), the police were asked to point to three LCPCs with different local leaders that were ‘working in very different ways’ with ‘very different results’.

**Figure 1: Assumed relations in embedded case study design**

The assumed relations between the variables in the embedded case study are graphically depicted in figure 1.

Critics of this case study design may object that a range of other independent variables relating to the municipal contexts vary between the cases which may affect cross-sector
collaboration in the municipality, e.g. local prehistories of collaboration, local geographies and local politics. Here it is important to keep in mind that the dependent variable of the study is the collaborative capacity of the arena, not the strength of collaborative relations or the number of collaborative initiatives between the parties in general. In terms of the investigated relationships, it is a question of whether, how and to what extent the applied leadership strategies succeed in ensuring the necessary conditions for cross-sector collaboration on arenas with formal design features that challenge those very conditions.

4.2 Qualitative data collection methods

In order to explore how, why and to what extent participants on the arena find their interests served, recognize each other as relevant and needed stakeholders and see the arena and its leadership as legitimate, a total of 23 semi-structured individual research interviews were conducted with leaders and LCPC participants representing a broad range of sectors and organizations. Table 1 provides a directory of the interviewed (and non-interviewed) participants in the three case-councils.

A common interview guide was crafted in order to ensure the reliability of the study and raise the validity of cross-case conclusions. Apart from background information, the interview guide involved questions concerning strengths and weaknesses of the LCPC as an arena for collaboration vis-a-vis other relevant arenas. The interviewees were allowed to focus on what they found being the most pertinent gains or challenges in relation to the LCPC. The three LCPC chairs were also asked specifically to their own perception of their leadership role and tasks in relation to the LCPC.

Furthermore, I conducted 11 direct, non-participatory meeting observations over a period of one year in order to explore the performative dimension of policy-making and how the leaders ‘set the stage’ in the three case-councils (cf. Hajer, 2005). A common meeting observation guide was crafted. At each meeting, observation notes were made on the physical set-up of the meeting room, the behaviour of the leader and participants and the content of what was said. Special attention was given to the degree of interaction throughout the meetings (i.e. one-way communication, questions-answers, spontaneous discussions or facilitated deliberation). At the second and the third meeting in each of the LCPCs, each agenda point was timed by the researcher in order to allow for subsequent production of time distribution figures of the respective meetings based on a qualitative
coding of the type of interaction under each agenda point. They are presented in the analysis to illustrate the modus operandi of the meetings.

### Table 1: Interviewees and participants in the three LCPCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICE</th>
<th>Case A</th>
<th>Case B</th>
<th>Case C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Police of Police (LCPC chair)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention Unit</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Unit</td>
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<td>/</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LOCAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children, Youth and Family</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X /</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Psychiatry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Services</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen Services</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobcenter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>School</td>
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<td>/ /</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports Association</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Association</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Association</td>
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<td>X X /</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeowner’s Association</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Ravens (Street Outreach)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Centre</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
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<td>OTHER</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation Services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Politician</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X: Interviewed participant. /: Not interviewed participant.

### 4.3 Validity, Reliability and Measures

Systematic comparison between cases requires information on the same variables across units (King, Keobane, & Verba, 1994, p. 45f). As the same time, the case study was intended to capture the distinct practices and experiences of each case while being open to new connections to emerge, which demanded sufficiently open questions to be asked (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 20f). Conducting semi-structured interviews and semi-structured observations following the same guidelines, a data collection strategy was applied to accomplish both. Triangulating multiple data sources in each case (multiple
meeting observations, multiple participant interviews and multiple action plans) is expected to limit the Hawthorne effect and raise the external validity of the study.

Table 2 shows the key variables, their cross-case measures and related data sources. The qualitative data was coded using the measures as coding categories and tables were produced to provide overview and basis for comparison. Finally, particularly illustrative interview quotes were selected to ensure sufficient citing of the case study data and evidence in the reporting of the results (Yin, 2003).

Table 2: Measures and Related Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership strategy</td>
<td>a. Does hands-on leader keep to the formally appointed representatives?</td>
<td>Interviews with leaders; observations of meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Does hands-on leader follow the formal rules of procedure?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Does hands-on leader insist on crafting formal action plans?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How, to what extent, what (else), and why (not)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modus operandi</td>
<td>d. How are the meetings structured?</td>
<td>Observations of meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Who speaks when?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. How much time is spent on guided or unguided one-way communication and interaction, respectively?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions for collaboration</td>
<td>g. Do participants find their interests served by/on the arena?</td>
<td>Interviews with participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h. Do participants recognize other participants on the arena as relevant and needed stakeholders?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. Do participants see the arena and its leadership as legitimate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How, to what extent, and why (not)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Results of the Case Analysis

In the following subsections, the three cases are presented and analysed one by one. To ease the subsequent cross-case comparison, the presentation of each case analysis is structured under the same headings: 1) local leadership strategy; 2) degrees of perceived relevance and interdependency; 3) the LCPC-SSP power dispute. In line with the theoretically based model of assumed relations presented in the methodology section, the analysis is concerned with the mediating influence of (1) on (2) and (3). Having analysed the individual cases within a common analytical frame, I will go on to compare them, draw cross-case conclusions and develop a conceptual model that captures the most crucial hands-on leadership tactics identified in the analysis.
5.1 Case A: Roskilde

As depicted in table 1 above, the Roskilde LCPC consists of the local chief of police, a prevention officer and an officer from the citizen unit; local government representatives from the family department, social psychiatry and technical services; a representative of the probation services; and local community representatives of a public school, a youth club, a sports association, a housing association, a street outreach organization (the Night Ravens), a volunteer centre, and a local taxi company. The locally specific composition is thus very heterogeneous with an average representation of the police (3 of 14), a quite small representation of other SSP-related actors concerned with children and youth (3 of 14), a participant from the state probation services, and an addition mix of private for-profits and non-profits.

5.1.1 Local leadership strategy: Loyal implementation, no alterations made

All meetings in the Roskilde LCPC take place at the central police station. The leader keeps to the centrally defined group of participants and loyally follows the common format suggested by the top-leadership in the police. In his own words, the leader sees himself as a superintendent – someone who keeps things ordered, need and tidy – but to his own regrets he for some reason ends up being the one speaking at, and not with, the other participants:

*If no one makes sure to set a date and call in for the meetings then nothing happens. So it is actually kind of a superintendent role. I had hoped I didn’t have to do all the talking. But that’s how it’s been.*

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Roskilde)

All meetings follow the same basic agenda. The local chief of police starts out by delivering a presentation on crime statistics and informing the other participants on present and upcoming police actions such as raids and emergency drills. These 40-45 minute presentations are typically delivered as one-way communications with little or no space for interaction. In the second half of a typical meeting, the participants are one-by-one prompted to give an orientation on the current activities in their organizations, starting with the local government representatives and ending with the local community members. The orientations are not framed by a common theme and they are rarely followed by questions or other forms of interaction.
At the spring meeting every year, about 45 minutes (or approx. 40 pct. of the meeting) are spent on discussing and crafting action plans on the focus areas of the police. Figure 2 depicts the time consumption at the spring and summer meetings. As indicated, the time consumption profile of the summer meeting is more representative of the autumn and winter meetings.

### 5.1.2 Implication I: Low degrees of recognized relevance and interdependency

The interviewees generally appreciate the fact that they get the chance to obtain knowledge on crime developments, insights into activities of other organizations and direct contacts to representatives of other organizations. Differing in their preferences and interests, however, many of them find large parts of the substantial content of the meetings irrelevant. That goes for the first part of the meeting where the police informs on developments and actions within varies focus areas as well as the second half where the participants inform each other on their activities. As the volunteer centre representative puts it:

> I think 2½ hours is a really long time if I am not informed on what it’s about. [...] Quite a lot of meetings turn out to be without much relevance to my field. [...] Even though volunteering is very broad, you can find areas where it just doesn’t make sense.

(Leader, Volunteer centre, Roskilde)

The arena suffers from the fact that it is not convened with considerations to unifying joint interest and immediate interdependency among the participants. The one-way communication style and absence of a facilitated dialogue between the participants results
in a plethora of statements with no common denominator. One of the most basic premises for collaborative problem-solving is hence absent.

5.1.3 Implication II: Unresolved LCPC-SSP power dispute

The participants show little interest in taking part of the process of collective crafting action plans at the spring meetings. Despite eager requests from the police leader stressing that everyone is responsible for solving crime problems and that the plan forms the backbone of a mutual committing collaboration, the planning process fails. The action plans simply end up summarizing the existing activities of the police. The lack of engaged participation on the part of the other organizations causes great frustration on the part of the LCPC leadership:

*You see, I am not directly in command. I cannot say: “You have to!” That makes it a bit peculiar, ‘cause what is the chairmanship then? I don’t have any authority over any of the people involved here.*

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Roskilde)

On the question of why no action is planned in the LCPC, the local government’s family division, who is also the municipal SSP coordinator, replies:

*Projects have been anchored in the places where it makes sense to anchor them. If you do a project on fire-fighter cadets, then you obviously don’t anchor the project in a local council with the police. You anchor it at a fire station. If you do a project involving volunteers, then of course we anchor it in the volunteer sector and not with the police.*

(Leader, SSP, Family Division, Local Government, Roskilde)

The representative clearly posits the LCPC to be an ‘arena of the police’ which provides a barrier to developing and anchoring initiatives in that setting. By the same token, she is critical of the fact that the police insist on discussing SSP-relevant problems related to children and youth in the LCPCs (as two of the centrally defined focus areas concern at-risk youth and youth behaviour in the public space.) The local chief of police realizes the LCPC-SSP dispute, but finds himself trapped in a Catch-22:

*We were met with the opinion that we already had the meeting forums that we needed. So we experienced some opposition. In that respect, the chairmanship has also been about telling the people from local government that the local council was something else than just SSP. [...] We feverishly try to move beyond discussing*
children. ‘Cause we know that it’s not just about children – it is not necessarily just children committing burglaries for instance. [...] But that is what the participating parties are accustomed to.

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Roskilde)

In saying so, the local LCPC leader exposes a key paradox at the hard of the design of the arena. SSP representatives from local government are concerned with children and youth and hence have a hard time (or simply no interest in) discussing issues that are not related to children and youth. Experiencing the arena as an unlevelled playing field under strong police leadership, however, they do not want to discuss issues and actions concerning children and youth in the LCPC. The social services being a central and resourceful actor, the unresolved LCPC-SSP dispute severely strains the Roskilde LCPC.

While the hands-on leader is aware of the dispute, we should note that he does very little to remedy the fact that the formal design embeds the arena in a hierarchical governance structure led by the police. In fact, he sustains it by starting all meetings with one-way communication from the police and picking the police station as the location for all meetings.

5.2 Case B: Greve

Besides the local chief of police, the Greve LCPC consists of a prevention officer; local government representatives from the family department and citizen services; and local community representatives of two public schools, a sports association, a housing association, a business association, a homeowner’s association, and a street outreach organization (the Night Ravens). Like the Roskilde LCPC, the locally specific composition is thus very heterogeneous with a relatively small representation of police (2 of 11) and moderate representation of other SSP-related actors concerned with children and youth (3 of 11), while the remaining community representatives constitute a multifarious group of local organizations.

5.2.1 Local leadership strategy: Bending the mainstream

In Greve, a very different hands-on leadership strategy is deployed. The leader keeps to the centrally defined group of participants, but – as opposed to the Roskilde case – she does not follow the common format defined by top management of the police. No time is spent crafting action plans at all. Instead the leader facilitates rounds of discussion of on-going activities and planned actions within the designated focus areas at every meeting. During
these rounds of framed interaction, the focus is placed on possible collaborative action among the participants. The leader is keen on mobilizing the community without sacrificing the focus areas of the police in the process of doing so:

*My role as a chairman is to ensure a binding collaboration around some of the goals and strategies that we as the police have to pursue. […] I appreciate the fact that they agree not to work with some action plan saying 20 pct. fewer burglaries. ‘Cause I do not believe that is our role. That is not what we are good at – to deliver some product. I think we need to make use of each other's networks.*

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Roskilde)

Four out of six interviewees who have witnessed a time before the current LCPC chair took office mention that the LCPC has become a lot less information-oriented and a lot more action-oriented under her leadership. While the prepared police presentations still take up a significant share of the meetings (see figure 3), they do not only concern crime statistics and information on police actions as in Roskilde. They also focus on collaborative initiatives in the municipality and typically involve space for – and sometimes direct invitation of – interaction throughout. The line between police-led information-sharing and guided discussions is hence more blurry in this case compared to the previous one.

**Figure 3: Greve LCPC Time Consumption Profile**

![Figure 3: Greve LCPC Time Consumption Profile](image)

The participatory orientation of the hands-on leadership is further stressed by the fact that other LCPC members than the police host some of the LCPC meetings. One of four observed meetings were hosted by the housing association and involved a tour on the
premises and a 15 minute presentation by a local boxing club followed by a joint discussion of the involvement of sport clubs in the prevention of crime.

5.2.2 Implication I: Higher degrees of recognized relevance and interdependency

The Greve hands-on leadership strategy succeeds in enhancing the experienced relevance of the meetings among participants. The more interactive format of the presentations allows the leader to attune the presentations to the concerns of the participants as they are delivered and the constant action-oriented planning focus at all meetings makes it worth the time to come to meetings. As local government’s crime prevention coordinator expresses it:

*The meetings we had before were meetings we had because we had to have them. They were completely stripped from the idea that we should actually do something together [...] [Name of the current LCPC leader] believes that we need to have some action. The local council needs to move outside the meeting room and show its worth. So she puts something else into it, which is why we see a change.*

(Crime Prevention Coordinator, Family division, Local Government, Greve)

By bending the centrally defined procedures and facilitating action-focused interaction among the participants throughout the meetings, the leader also provides more fertile grounds for the mutual recognition of interdependencies. The focus on collaborative initiatives in the municipality rather than the actions of the police helps the participants connect the dots. As another local government representative sees the change of the working procedures of the council after the current leader takes over in late 2011:

*During 2012, it has turned into a network where we make use of each other to a greater extent than we did before. [...] As you saw at the meeting today, we get that input: “I know something there!” “I will bring that back with me!” “Let’s call each other up!” It’s been that way more and more during the meetings in 2012.*

(Neighbourhood Development Coordinator, Citizen Services, Local Government, Greve)

That being said, the leader does not completely overcome the expected problems related to the recognition of self and others as relevant stakeholders. By keeping to the centrally defined group of participants that were not appointed based on a stakeholder analysis, the leader can only do so much to elicit the common interests and relevant resources of the individual participants. Smaller organizations on the margins of the centrally defined focus areas find it difficult to see their own role and capacity to take part in the collective action.
A representative of a local property owner association says that he participates out of a sense of societal duty despite the fact that he has a hard time seeing his own use:

*I don’t think I’ve been able to contribute to any projects. Notice how much of it concerns the youth. In the property owners association that’s not at all the direction we’re heading in ‘cause we have fewer and fewer children. [...] I have tried bringing local council posters to the general assembly in the property owner association, but they don’t really catch on.*

(Chair of Property Owners Association, Greve)

Altering the formal meeting procedures can do some to alleviate the challenges embedded in the formal institutional design. Operating within the limits set by formal membership, however, fundamental barriers to collaboration still exist.

**5.2.3 Implication II: Relieved LCPC-SSP power dispute**

Refraining from crafting (yet another set of) formal action plans that bind the participating organizations and define activities on the children and youth area, the LCPC-SSP dispute is relieved. Local government retains its power to lead the discussions and deciding which policies to adopt with respect to its services and initiatives directed at children and youth. In fact, the LCPC adopts the plans of local government, not the other way around:

*The two officers who have been in charge while I have been involved have been really good at cooperating with us. We had our policy plans accepted and turned into the children and youth plans of the local council. So it was merged in order to avoid a situation with separate projects and initiatives were developed each place. ‘Cause we need to make the ends meet.*

(Crime Prevention Coordinator, Family division, Local Government, Greve)

Rather than withdrawing power and resources from the arena, the local government representatives appreciate the LCPC as yet another opportunity for them to get in touch with civil society organizations and reaching out to their membership bases with information on how they themselves may participate in the prevention of crime. The acceptance of the LCPC as a common forum for collaboration proves to be vital for its ability to foster collaborative problem-solving.
5.3 Case C: Kalundborg

As shown in table 1 above, the Kalundborg LCPC consists of the local chief of police, a prevention officer, an officer from the investigation unit, and an officer of the emergency unit; local government representatives from the children and youth department, the family department and the jobcentre; a local politician who is also a teacher at a local school; and local community representatives of three public schools, a sports association and three business associations. The locally specific composition is hence strong on police (4 of 15) and other SSP-related actors concerned with children and youth (5 of 15), while business constitutes a significant part of the remaining group of local community representatives (3 of 6).

5.3.1 Local leadership strategy: Convening and facilitating working groups

In Kalundborg, the LCPC leader a radically different strategy to solve the inherent challenges of facilitating collaborative problem-solving within the formal institutional set-up of the LCPCs: convening and facilitating his own stakeholder networks – or ‘working groups’ – to which he himself invites local actors that are believed to have a relevant perspective, needed resources and an interest in the designated focus. The division of labour between the formal LCPC meetings and the working group meetings are explained by the LCPC leader in the following way:

The local council is the formal decision-making body. When we are to really dig into something, it happens in a different forum. [...] 'Cause I myself haven’t had a say in how the local council is composed. I am pleased with those who are there. I generally think they are committed. But in some matters we are missing some. That’s why I’ll rather solve things in a working group and then present it to the LCPC.

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Kalundborg, 2014)

About 20-30 individuals from various public and private organizations attend the working group meetings. Following a very brief welcome by the police leader, including a short introduction to the focus area in question, e.g. young people’s behaviour in the public space, the participants engage in collective identification of what is already taking place, a brainstorm round in smaller groups on what is needed, and finally a joint discussion of what to do to advance the existing efforts (cf. my own observation of working group meeting, spring 2015).
Based on the written minutes from the working group meetings, the LCPC leader formulates action plans concerning police priorities which he then passes on to the LCPC; the action plans are then approved by the LCPC before passing them upwards in the system to the top-management of police.

**Figure 4: Kalundborg LCPC Time Consumption Profile**

The action plan process and general division of labour between the LCPC and the working groups is reflected in the time consumption profiles of the LCPC meetings depicted in figure 4. While the working group meetings consist of almost 100 pct. guided discussion of joint action, the Kalundborg LCPC proves to be the least interactive and the least action-oriented LCPC case with less than 10 pct. of the meetings spent on guided discussion of joint action.

**5.3.2 Implication I: Varying degrees of relevance and recognized interdependency**

Even though the SSP coordinator has a hard time understanding why the local community members would want to come to the LCPC meetings in the existing set-up, the interviewees express great contentment with the meetings. They appreciate the opportunity to get information on what the police and the SSP are doing. In the words of the sports council representative:

*What drives me? Curiosity of what’s going on around me. [...] The police agency is part of our society. It’s good to know what they are up to. [...] I’ve gotten the impression that those coppers are some competent and skilled guys.*

(Chair of Sports Council, Kalundborg)

The point is echoed by a trade council representative:
We are getting a lot from the police and as you know, it’s mostly statistics: how many burglaries have occurred etc. [...] To me, it’s very interesting to hear what they do – how they grab hold of the young people to solve some of the problems we are experiencing. [...] That’s really what I find interesting: what are they actually doing out there? They do a great job.

(Member of Trade Council, Kalundborg):

Only one interviewee – the local politician – is somewhat dissatisfied with the fact that no collaborative planning of action is planned in the LCPC. The leader thus largely succeeds in keeping the LCPC participants satisfied by creating a cosy atmosphere, providing them with information and giving them the chance to voice problems that they believe the police or the SSP should address.

While the degree of recognized interdependency is low in the LCPC, the chosen working group format is built to create and highlight interdependencies between the invited actors. By focusing the working group meetings on only one of the centrally defined focus areas and inviting participants based on a local stakeholder analysis, the leader circumvents the problems related to the representation-based appointment of members in the LCPC. Naming it working group meetings rather than extraordinary LCPC meetings frees the leader from the institutionalized procedures of the LCPCs. It allows for a more workshop-based format with higher degrees of interaction. As such, the Kalundborg strategy can be argued to be the most effective in overcoming the structural challenges of the mandated arenas and providing constructive conditions for collaborative problem-solving.

5.3.3 Implication II: Strong LCPC-SSP cooperation

Not surprisingly the local government representatives are very content with the applied strategy. The LCPC leader’s decision to focus the action plans on the work of the police dismantles the LCPC-SSP dispute. It eases the work relations between the local chief of police and the SSP coordinator tremendously:

I don’t fight wars that I can’t win or that are way too troublesome to fight if I can find other ways of solving things. I know that in some places it’s been an organisational challenge to get the LCPC to be above the SSP coordination committee. Here we haven’t cared much about it. [...] Some will probably say it’s a mess. But it’s not. It’s actually working tremendously well.

(Local Police Chief and LCPC chair, Kalundborg, 2013)
The relieved LCPC-SSP dispute allows for a strong collaborative relation between the local police leader and SSP coordinator. In fact, the SSP coordinator acts as a co-organizer of the working group meetings concerning children and youth. She assists in conducting the stakeholder analysis, inviting relevant actors and hosting the meetings at the police station. Relevant actors are recruited in both formal and informal settings. Sometimes members of the LCPC are also invited. The informal and non-binding setting of the working groups makes it easier to engage public and private actors, including the SSP coordinator herself. As she ponders after an LCPC meeting where she recruited a member to a working group concerning young people’s behaviour in the public space:

*I simply threw that thing about the mopeds up in the air. Then one of the trade council representatives returned to me and said that he could see how business could benefit from it. So he will be a part of that action plan – he will get an invitation to join the working group. [...] So you basically just call everyone in and then you throw it up in the air. There are no guarantees that each and all will have a share in the final result. Then you just pull out of it again.*

(SSP Coordinator, Local Government, Kalundborg)

In the same way, the police leader assists the SSP coordinator in setting up similar meetings that do not directly relate to the LCPC. Sometimes developed ideas and solutions from working group meetings that were convened by local government with the help of the local chief of police are included in the action plans of the LCPCs. Operating with a more informal undergrowth of working groups that can be used by the partners as they please, e.g. by subtracting parts of the results of a brainstorm and presenting it in more formal forums and arenas, the two major public parties in the prevention of crime succeed in dismantling the battle between venues and actors at the local level – a tremendous asset for advancing their mutual interest in mobilizing community resources and enhancing the collective problem-solving capacity within their overlapping fields of operation.

### 5.4 Discussion

The cases revealed different strategies for leading collaboration on the politically mandated arenas. Comparing the strategies on how they mediate the institutional design, we see how they vary on two dimensions, one concerning the group of participants and the other relating to the processes of interaction. We can boil down their divergence to questions of: a) whether they keep to the formally appointed representatives or go beyond the defined
set of actors by involving (other) relevant stakeholders; and b) whether they follow the formal rules of procedure or suspend them by creating their own informal rules of interaction.

In the Roskilde case, the leader deployed a strategy that keeps to centrally appointed representatives and enforces formal rules of procedure to produce formal action plans on centrally defined focus areas. In the Greve case, the leader pursued a strategy that also keeps to the centrally appointed representatives, but replaces central aspects of the formal rules of procedure with locally defined rules of facilitated interaction around the centrally defined focus areas. Finally, in the Kalundborg case, the leader used a strategy that supplies the formal arenas with working groups with self-selected stakeholders that are engaged in interactive processes around the centrally defined focus areas, hence creating an alternative forum that suspends the formal rules of procedure and in addition moves beyond the centrally appointed representatives.

5.4.1 Implications for the Collaborative Capacity

The strategies vary in their ability to overcome the design-based barriers to collaboration and hence have various implications for the collaborative capacity.

In trying to push through with the formal action plans in an unmediated form, the leadership strategy deployed in Roskilde fails to mediate the negative effects of the formal lead actor design. In fact it does quite the contrary. Blind to the fact that the arena is not simply neutral grounds, it contributes to the skepticism of other partners and jeopardizes the legitimacy of the arena along with the willingness of other resourceful actors to use it as a venue for collaboration.

The leadership strategy pursued in Greve, on the other hand, successfully dismantles the design-based barriers related to the formal rules of procedure and the formal lead actor structure. Breaking the formal rules of procedure and refraining from producing formal action plans, it relieves the tensions between otherwise competing planning arenas and allows for explorations of possible plus-sum connections between the appointed members. Keeping to the formally appointed representatives, however, it still has limited ability in engaging all members around issues of mutual interest.

Finally, the leadership strategy used in Kalundborg successfully surpasses the all design-based barriers of the mandated arena related to the appointed representatives, formal rules of procedure and formal lead actor structure by setting up separate, non-formalized forums
for collaborative planning. Focusing the formal action plans on the work of police, it dismantles potential conflicts with other arenas and gets local government on board as co-organizers of collaborative processes. Turning the formal arena into a court for formal sanctioning of the action plans, it succeeds in procuring conductive conditions for collaboration while at the same time obtaining the benefits of formal legitimacy.

In order to clarify the strategic action space for hands-on leaders and produce an analytical tool for scholars concerned with politically mandated collaboration, the following section will develop a conceptual model and discuss the induced leadership concepts by considering their relations with related concepts of collaborative leadership theory.

6. Conceptual Hands-on Leadership Model

Crossing the two dimensions of participants and procedures that explain the differences found in the observed leadership strategies, we can map the strategic action space of hands-on leaders operating in a mandated setting characterized by the institutional features delineated in this paper. The conceptual model allows us to identify four idealized strategies. Figure 5 illustrates the strategic action space and the four idealized strategies labeled the loyal implementer, the orderly host, the mainstream bender, and the institution builder.

Figure 5: Strategic action space of hands-on leaders and four idealized strategies
In order to clarify the concepts and propose some expected effects of, and prerequisites for pursuing, the strategies, I will conclude by briefly relating the developed concepts to the commonly cited leadership roles of *conveners* (e.g. Gray, 1985, 1989); *mediators* (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2012) and *champions* (e.g. Crosby & Bryson, 2005).

**6.1 The Loyal Implementer**

Situated in the first quadrant of the action space depicted in figure 4, *the loyal implementer* conducts meetings with centrally appointed representatives according to formalized rules of procedures (as we saw in the Roskilde case). It tries to push through collaboration through references to obligation and formal expectations.

Existing collaborative leadership theory does not cover the form of leadership exercised by *the loyal implementer* as it is a somewhat atypical leadership strategy for cultivating cross-sector collaboration more closely associated with traditional forms of public management. Warnings for applying such a strategy may however be extrapolated from the literature. For instance, Crosby and Bryson (2010) argue that the “development of informal leadership throughout a collaboration is likely to be especially important, since participants often cannot rely on clear cut, easily enforced, centralized direction” (p. 222). Similarly, Bryson, Crosby, Stone, and Saunoi-Sandgren (2009) conclude that it is critical to the success of a collaboration that the leading manager “is willing to pursue tasks in ways that are at odds with normal procedures and sequences” (p. 31).

Given that the theoretical argument of the hampering effects of the delineated institutional design features is accepted, we are able to formulate the generalized hypothesis that leaders deploying the strategy of *the loyal implementer* on arenas with similar institutional design features as the ones delineated here will (re-)produce an arena with poor conditions for cross-sector collaboration.

**6.2 The Orderly Host**

Operating in the second quadrant of the action space depicted in figure 4, *the orderly host* invites relevant stakeholders to join meetings conducted according to formalized rules of procedure. While none of the leaders in the surveyed cases pursued this strategy as a general leadership approach, the Greve and Kalundborg leaders both invited a representative from a local organization to participate as an external speaker for a delineated part of an LCPC meeting, hence deploying the strategy of *the orderly host*. 
In its focus on involving relevant actors beyond the appointed representatives, the strategy is related to the well-known collaborative leadership role of the convener concerned with identifying and drawing together legitimate stakeholders (Gray, 1985: 923f, 1989, p. 71f). Leaders are said to have the best chances of successfully doing so when they have reputation and social capital to invest (Ansell & Gash, 2012) and are recognized as boundary-spanning leaders with credibility in multiple arenas (Crosby, Bryson, & Stone, 2006). Along the same lines, Gray (1989, p. 72) argues that conveners must be perceived as credible, capable and unbiased in the eyes of the stakeholders to be effective. This may prove to be a central barrier to success for orderly hosts seeking to involve stakeholders in interaction on an arena that grants one party a formal leadership position and inscribes the collaboration in hierarchical governance structures.

Based on the premises advanced in the paper, we are able to formulate the generalized hypothesis that leaders deploying the strategy of the orderly host will partake in constructing an arena with improved, albeit not ideal conditions for cross-sector collaboration.

### 6.3 The Mainstream Bender

Operating in the fourth quadrant of the action space depicted in figure 4, the mainstream bender involves appointed representatives in informal processes of interaction (as was the case in Greve).

Not simply keeping to the formal rules of procedure, but finding ways to connect participants and ease their interaction, the strategy is related to the collaborative leadership roles of mediators and champions. Mediators facilitate construction of shared meaning, build trust among stakeholders and serve as ‘honest brokers’ in mediating disputes (Ansell & Gash, 2012). In similar ways, champions use informal authority to engage partners in their mutual work by applying process skills and translating policy ideas in comprehensible ways to multiple constituencies (Crosby, Bryson, & Stone, 2006, 2015). Bending the mainstream, hands-on leaders applying this strategy are more likely to succeed in fulfilling these important roles. They may, however, still be challenged by the general condition that organisations acting as an interested party in a collaboration have a harder time being accepted as ‘honest brokers’ in any institutional context (Ansell & Gash, 2012). Also, keeping to the appointed representatives, the mainstream bender is challenged on the task of identifying, sustaining and exploiting interdependencies among them.
Within the conditions set by the framework of this paper, we are able to formulate the generalized hypothesis that leaders deploying the strategy of the mainstream bender will procure improved, albeit not ideal conditions for cross-sector collaboration on politically mandated arenas.

6.4 The Institution Builder

Located in the third quadrant of the action space depicted in figure 4, the institution builder breaks the entire framework by setting up informal venues for solving the tasks of the formal arena (as we saw in the Kalundborg case).

Identifying and inviting relevant stakeholders to participate in facilitated processes of collaboration, the strategy is related to the collaborative leadership roles of conveners as well as mediators and champions. The strategy hence requires reputation, social capital, informal authority and facilitation skills, which makes it a highly resource demanding strategy for hands-on leaders to pursue. A specific aspect of the institution builder strategy concerns an activity typically attributed to champions, namely winning over political or financial sponsors with formal authority and access to resources that can benefit the collaboration (cf. Bryson et al, 2009, p. 26). Combining (rather than altering or replacing) the politically mandated arena with informal forums, the institution builder may still use the formal arena for ensuring the support of upper-level management, e.g. through the adoption of formal plans in the mandated arena. The ability to facilitate collaborative processes while ensuring resources through hierarchical governance structures is what sets the strategy of the institution builder apart from the other strategies.

Based on premise that leaders possess the necessary resources to successfully carrying out the strategy, we are able to formulate the generalized hypothesis that a strategy of the institution builder that incorporates several elements of central collaborative leadership roles will achieve the best possible conditions for cross-sector collaboration.

All in all, we expect the chances of producing cross-sector collaboration to increase, ceteris paribus, as hands-on leaders shift their strategy from the loyal implementer over the orderly host and the mainstream bender to the institution builder. The specific conditions for successfully applying the various strategies vary from case to case and that leaders may cross and combine the idealized strategies in various ways. These empirical questions are left for both researchers and practitioners to explore further.
7. Conclusions

Focusing on institutional design as a management tool for facilitating cross-sector collaboration, the interactive governance and network management literatures have paid little attention to barriers to collaboration ingrained in the very designs of interactive governance arenas. This article has suggested that hands-off metagovernance in the form of institutional design of politically mandated governance arenas may in fact impede collaboration – and explored hands-on leadership strategies for overcoming the institutional barriers. The developed conceptual model of four idealized strategies can be used as an analytical tool for scholars seeking to understand processes of collaboration in mandated settings as well as a strategic tool for leaders seeking to advance them.

On an empirical level, the article has contributed to a better understanding of the unfolding practices of the Danish Local Crime Prevention Councils. Investigating the dynamics of both successful and less successful LCPCs, we have seen how hands-on leaders and their applied hands-on leadership strategies are crucial for understanding their relative success qua their ability to mediate and manipulate central aspects of the formal institutional design of the politically mandated governance arenas. It is worth noting that the public manager most loyal to the rules and regulations of the public administration is the least successful in producing cross-sector collaboration on the designated focus areas. Public leaders with the courage to do things differently, on the other hand, have better chances of succeeding. As such, the results of the analysis presented here provide the basis for critique of administrative control systems that monitor frontline workers in order to ensure compliance with centrally defined procedures, rules and regulations.

That being said, it is far from unproblematic to have hands-on leaders invite the stakeholders that they deem relevant, craft their own rules of procedure, and go beyond the established institutional frameworks. First, the hands-on leader will not necessarily do what is best for the collaboration, but include and exclude actors based on kinship, grudges and personal interest. Second, all public managers cannot be expected to possess the substantial amount of resources, leadership competencies and local network position needed to perform the mediating strategies suggested here. Third, one may subscribe to the perspective that the decision on who to include in policy processes should be anchored in the institutions of representational democracy rather than being left to a public manager, however trustworthy, professional and competent he or she might be.
In the best of all worlds, the institutional designs are brought more in line with the logics of governance than the logics of government. The prospects for doing so while maintaining the political anchorage, initiative and direction is a question left open for scholars and practitioners to ponder and explore.

Endnotes

Cf. informal conversations with practitioners as well as recorded research interviews by the researcher; see methodology section of this paper.

2 The formal LCPC frameworks vary between police districts and change over time. The review concerns the formal LCPC framework in the Mid and West Zealand Police District at the time of the case study.

3 All participants are formally described as ‘ad hoc’ participants and the local chief of police is given the power to decide who to call in to which meetings based on a criterion of relevance to the agenda. In practice, however, all appointed members are called-in to all LCPC meetings, perhaps due to the fact that the described standardized LCPC agenda makes it difficult to apply a criterion of relevance.

4 Interviews with LCPC chairs exhibit both disagreement and uncertainty whether this standardized LCPC agenda is compulsory or optional.

5 Of the 12 Danish police districts, the Mid and West Zealand Police District is the only district where both public and private actors participate in all of its LCPCs.

6 At the time of study, the police were the only actor with extensive knowledge of the workings of multiple LCPCs in the district. Also, they were an essential gatekeeper giving access to achieve data, meetings and interview persons.

7 The role of hands-on leadership as a mediating variable has been empirically induced through cursory readings of the data and then theoretically developed before appropriate measures were constructed that allowed for systematic analysis of the empirical data. Such iterative processes are typical for case studies building on the analytical technique of explanation-building (Yin, 2003).

References


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Paper 4:
Ledelse af samarbejdsdrevet innovation i den kriminalpræventive indsats

Elisa Kankaala and Andreas Hagedorn Krogh

1. Indledning

Dette kapitel fokuserer på ledelse af samarbejdsdrevet innovation og præsenterer et eksempel på en kriminalpræventiv serviceinnovation fra en større dansk by. Innovationen er organiseret inden for rammerne af det lokale SSP-samarbejde mellem skoler, socialforvaltning og politi og retter sig mod unge voksne mellem 18 og 25 år, som ønsker at komme ud af et liv med kriminalitet. I den nye service skabes individuelle handlingsplaner for de unge voksne i et samarbejde med forskellige kommunale forvaltninger.

Med udgangspunkt i casen argumenterer vi for, at lederskab altid bør udøves med øje for den specifikke aktørsammensætning og samarbejdhistorie på feltet. Er aktørerne forskellige og uden forudgående samarbejdhistorie, består den primære ledelsesopgave i at få aktører med forskellige perspektiver til at samarbejde. Er aktørerne ens og med en længere samarbejdhistorie, består opgaven hovedsageligt i at ruske op i vanetænkningen. Vores case viser, at en lang samarbejdhistorie blandt de samme aktører kan virke befordrende på samarbejdsdrevet innovation, idet allerede etablerede samarbejdskultur, -strukturen og -relationer sikrer, at viljen, evnerne og mulighederne for tværgående samarbejde er til stede. Den indikerer dog samtidig, at nye tiltag i overvejende grad vil ligne de gamle, hvis der ikke samtidig arbejdes aktivt med at skabe strategiske forstyrrelser.

Som vi skal se, demonstrerer casen ligeledes, hvordan ikke blot stærke horisontale relationer mellem organisationer, men også stærke vertikale relationer mellem administrationsniveauer er vigtige for samarbejdets innovationskapacitet. I den forbindelse synes samarbejdets institutionelle design og den strategiske innovationsledelse, som udføres af en netværksadministerende organisation, at være af afgørende betydning. Det giver anledning til en tese om, at innovationsledelse i en samarbejds situation med en relativ lav diversitet i deltagersammensætningen og en relativ høj densitet i samarbejdsrelationerne med fordel kan fokusere på at styrke de vertikale forbindelser mellem administrationsniveauerne.

Opgyngningen af kapitlet er som følger: Først diskuterer vi de historisk betingede drivkrafter og barrierer for samarbejdsdrevet innovation i den kriminalpræventive indsats. Herefter præsenteres den teoretiske ramme, der har fokus på innovationsledelse. Dernæst skitserer vi innovationsprocessen i vores konkrete case. Endelig diskuteres, hvad
casestudiet fortæller os om ledelse af samarbejdsdrevet innovation i sammenhænge som dem, der gør sig gældende i vores case.

**Tekstboks – Casestudiets datagrundlag**

Dette kapitel er baseret på data indsamlet i forbindelse med Elisa Kankaalas ph.d.-afhandling om tværinstitutionelt samarbejde og innovation. Casestudiet er baseret på i alt 23 semistrukturerede interviews med offentligt ansatte på operativt, administrativt og udøvende niveau, som har været involveret i den beskrevne innovation. Et flertal heraf har været involveret fra den tidligste fase i innovationsprocessen. Interviewene har fokuseret på tværinstitutionelt samarbejde og innovation samt processerne bag den nye innovation. Ud over interviewene er der foretaget fem mødeobservationer, heraf fire i frontlinjegrupperne og én på et uddannelsesseminar for deltagerne i programmet. Endelig er der foretaget en mindre social netværksanalyse (SNA), hvis resultater dog ikke anvendes i det forhåndenværende kapitel.

2. Drivkræfter og barrierer for samarbejdsdrevet innovation i den kriminalpræventive indsats


I dele af litteraturen om kriminalpræventivt samarbejde identificeres koordinationsproblemer og besværigheder med at nå til enighed om fælles mål og metoder som væsentlige samarbejdsbarrierer (Thacher 2004; Terpstra 2005). Et typisk problem med samarbejde omkring kriminalpræventive indsatser er således de forskellige faglige opfattelser af, hvad der bør gøres for denne gruppe af borgere (Gilling 1994; Locke, Shaftoe og Johnson 2004; Rosenbaum 2002). Mens de forskellige tilgange kan udgøre en umiddelbar barriere for samarbejde, kan de være produktive for innovationsskabelsen, hvis det gennem design og ledelse lykkes at få dem til at mødes på konstruktiv vis (Sørensen og Torfing 2011). Det vender vi tilbage til i afsnittet om innovationsledelse.

Disse resultater illustrerer nogle af de mere generelle udfordringer for tværinstitutionelt samarbejde på dette område, som både vedrører forskelle i problemforståelser og organisatoriske forhold.


Som det er blevet bemærket, kan vedvarende samarbejde i lukkede stabile netværk føre til fastlåste verdensbilleder og fælles forståelser af et begrænset mulighedsrum, hvilket kan hæmme nytænkning og kreativitet (Skilton og Dooley 2010; Torfing 2012). Spørgsmålet er her, hvorvidt og hvordan samarbejde kan omsættes til innovation i en sådan sammenhæng. Netop det spørgsmål har nyere forskning i ledelse af samarbejdsdrevet innovation taget op.

3. Ledelse af samarbejdsdrevet innovation

Samarbejdsdrevet innovation er i dette kapitel defineret som innovation, der er initieret og gennemført i et samarbejde mellem forskellige organisationer. I vores case udspringer innovationen af et veletableret samarbejde, som har karakter af et styringsnetværk.
Karacteristisk for et styringsnetværk er blandt andet, at de baserer sig på horisontale relationer mellem autonome aktører, hvilket skaber særlige vilkår for udførelsen af ledelse (Sørensen og Torfing 2008).

Fordi organisationer er autonome, kan ledelsesmetoder, der benyttes inden for den enkelte organisation, ikke anvendes i ledelsen af styringsnetværk, da ingen enkeltaktør har myndighed over de andre (Huxham og Vangen 2000). I styringsnetværk er beslutningsprocessen snarere baseret på forhandling, og ledelsens rolle er ikke at tøffe beslutninger, men kan for eksempel være at fjerne forhindringer forårsaget af organisatoriske siloer (Lewis 2010), bygge bro mellem aktører med forskellige baggrunde (Weber og Khademian 2008) og bevæge forhandlingsprocesserne fremad (Keast et.al. 2004).

I ledelsen af samarbejdsdrevne innovationsprocesser kan der skelnes mellem tre lederroller, hhv. konvenérrollen, facilitatorrollen og katalysatorrollen, som alle er væsentlige for at sikre succesfuld innovation, og som kan udføres af en eller flere personer eller organisationer (Ansell og Gash 2012; Torfing 2012; Torfing og Krogh 2013).

Konvenérrollen er primært aktuel i innovationsprocessens første faser, hvor det handler om at etablere samarbejdsarenaen og igangsætte samarbejdsprocessen. Opgaven består i at identificere relevante deltagere, sætte holdet og bringe parterne sammen ved at skabe rammer, processer og incitamenter, der motiverer til deltagelse i samarbejdet. Det kan blandt andet gøres ved at italesætte en fælles brændende platform og den gensidige afhængighed aktørerne imellem. Konveneren kan også foregribe senere konflikter ved at hjælpe parterne med at afklare rollefordelingen og afstemme forventninger til, hvem der bidrager med hvad i hvilke dele af innovationsprocessen.

Når parterne er bragt sammen, kommer facilitatorrollen i spil. Facilitatorens opgave er løbende at understøtte samarbejdsprocessen, pleje samarbejdsrelationerne og sikre den gensidige tillid deltagerne imellem. Det handler kort sagt om at få parter med forskellige interesser og perspektiver til at arbejde sammen. Facilitatoren kan hjælpe deltagerne med at formulere klare fælles spilleregler, etablere et fælles vidensgrundlag og udvikle et fælles sprog. Mere lavpraktisk kan facilitatorrollen bestå i at indkalde til møder, aktivere deltagerne på møderne og efterfølgende samle op på møderne. Skulle der undervejs i forløbet opstå uklarheder om, hvordan omkostninger og gevinster fordeles, vil det være facilitatorens opgave at mediere forhandlingerne herom. Målet er at håndtere potentielle
konflikter på en måde, så de bliver produktive snarere end destruktive for innovationsskabelsen.

Mens facilitatorens rolle er at understøtte samarbejdet, er det katalysatorens rolle at forstyrre det. Forstyrrelser kan bestå i at invitere nye aktører på banen, bringe ny viden i spil eller bryde op i de vante møde- og omgangsformer ved at ændre stedet eller interaktionsformen på møderne. Opgaven består således i at animere deltagerne til at anlægge nye vinkler på problemet og tænke ud af boksen. Målet er at udfordre grundlæggende antagelser, forestillinger og forståelsesrammer, der begrænser mulighedsrummet for, hvad der kan lade sig gøre. Det skal hjælpe interessenterne med at identificere og realisere nye værdiskabende muligheder, som de ellers aldrig var kommet i nærheden af.


Som vi skal se nærmere på i det følgende, udøves det aktive lederskab i vores case primært af SSP-sekretariatet, der kan betragtes som en såkaldt netværksadministerende organisation (NAO). En NAO er en organisation, der er dannet med det specifikke formål at påtage sig koordinationsopgaver i et netværk (Provan og Kenis 2008). Som vi skal se i analyses, har NAO’en ikke besluttende myndighed over deltagerne, men har derimod til opgave at mægle horisontalt mellem agenturer og vertikalt mellem administrationsniveauer. NAO’en er ikke oprettet med det eksplicitte formål at skabe innovation, men at koordinere og udvikle det arbejde, der udføres inden for SSP-samarbejdet i kommunen. Efter at innovationsprocessens forløb og resultat er blevet præsenteret, skal vi se nærmere på, hvordan denne rolle og den særlige form for ledelse, som NAO’en har udført i forlængelse heraf, har haft betydning for innovationsprocessen og den producerede innovation.
3. Innovationsprocessens forløb og resultat

Baggrunden for innovationen findes i et øget politisk fokus på at gøre noget for sikkerheden i det offentlige rum, som på det pågældende tidspunkt opstod grundet en opblusning i den verserende bandekonflikt. Blandt SSP-parterne i kommunen var der en erkendelse af, at de involverede i grov kriminalitet ofte er ældre end SSP’s vanlige målgruppe, og at der for 18+ gruppens vedkommende kun var meget få hjælpeforanstaltninger til rådighed.

Figur 1: Serviceinnovationens organisering

Behovet for at sætte ind med nye foranstaltninger over for denne gruppe af borgere blev konkret formuleret i en evaluering af de aktuelle kriminalpræventive indsatser i kommunen, som baserede sig på interviews med ansatte i kommunen. Evalueringen blev foretaget i foråret 2008 af et privat konsulentfirma i samarbejde med kommunens egen arbejdsgruppe, som havde til opgave at kortlægge den kriminalpræventive indsats i kommunen og komme med forslag til forbedringer. På baggrund af evalueringen og det identificerede behov nedsatte SSP-sekretariatet en arbejdsgruppe bestående af ledere fra de deltagende
organisationer i SSP-samarbejdet, som skulle udvikle konceptet for det nye program. Det mundede ud i et arbejdsdokument, som i grove træk skitserede, hvordan det nye program skulle udformes og implementeres (se figur 1).


Figur 2: Innovationsprocessens forløb

Arbejdsgruppens programplan blev godkendt i bestyrelsen for SSP-samarbejdet i kommunen, hvorefter den ene af de to medarbejdere i SSP-sekretariatet, som skulle
koordinere aktiviteterne, gik i gang med at designe mødeprocedurerne, som skulle anvendes i frontlinjegrupperne. Herudover udfærdigede sekretariatsmedarbejderen retningslinjerne for koordination og opfølgning på de individuelle sagsforløb, inden implementeringen blev sat i gang i efteråret 2009 (se figur 2).

Programmet videreudvikles efter sin lancering af de to koordinatorer, som afholder teambuilding-workshops og gennemfører to evaluerende undersøgelser blandt de deltagende frontlinjemedarbejdere. Nye idéer og udviklingsbehov formuleres også til de regelmæssige møder i frontlinjegrupperne og bringes videre til de relevante instanser af koordinatorerne. Frontlinjemedarbejdere oplever blandt andet, at arbejdspresset er blevet for stort, idet deres almindelige opgaver i deres respektive organisationer er fortsat på uændret blus. Herudover udtrykkes også ønske om at etablere et tættere samarbejde med Kriminalforsorgen, hvilket senere skulle blive en realitet.

**Figur 3: SSP-samarbejdets organisering**

Innovationen er alt i alt at betegne som inkrementel. Et lignende samarbejde var allerede til stede i kommunen i en mindre skala, og den organisatoriske model ligner organiseringen af SSP-samarbejdet omkring indsatser rettet mod unge under 18 år til forveksling (se figur 3). Den væsentligste nyskabelse har været inddragelsen af tre nye aktører i samarbejdet,

Det er sandsynligt, at vanskelighederne med at skabe og realisere innovationen havde været anderledes, hvis der havde været tale om mere radikale ændringer. Fordelen ved at bruge kendte ”ingredienser” og holde innovationsambitionerne på et lavt niveau har været den relativt gnidningsløse proces, som har ført til realiseringen af et nyt tiltag på området. Ulemperne er, at man afskærer sig muligheden for at komme frem til en ny, bedre og billigere måde at gøre tingene på. Det er fortsat offentlige organisationer, der samarbejder om at lave handlingsplaner for individuelle borgere i en gammelkendt struktur. En del af forklaringen på, at der ikke er blevet eksperimenteret med nye formater, kan givetvis findes i tendensen til nulfejlskultur i den offentlige sektor, hvor fokusset er på at lave tiltag, som man er nogenlunde sikker på vil virke. For at forstå, hvordan det kan være, at det i denne sammenhæng lykkedes at lave samarbejdsdrevet innovation, men at innovationen blot blev inkrementel, må vi imidlertid også se på den hidtidige samarbejdshistorie, NAO’ens rolle og de vertikale forbindelsers betydning.

4. Samarbejdshistoriens bidrag til innovationsskabelsen

Flere af de interviewede peger på, at den lange samarbejdshistorie i SSP-regi har været en afgørende forudsætning for innovationen. Samarbejdshistorien har ført til udviklingen af en samarbejdskultur, en samarbejdsstruktur og specifikke samarbejdsrelationer, som har muliggjort udviklingen af det nye program. Hvordan det kommer til udtryk, og hvilken betydning det har set i et innovationsledelsesperspektiv, vil vi se nærmere på i det følgende.

For det første kan der blandt interviewpersonerne spores en generel opfattelse af, at arbejde på tværs af organisationer giver en positiv synergieffekt. Samarbejde tilskrives positiv værdi, og i visse sammenhænge anses samarbejde som direkte nødvendigt for at kunne gøre noget ved problemerne. Som én af de interviewede bemærker, er udgangspunktet for innovationen netop: “...at man for det første siger: Det her er ikke et problem, som en enkelt forvaltning kan løse”. Opfattelsen af samarbejdets nødvendighed er noget, der af interviewpersoner på flere forskellige niveauer nævnes som en væsentlig drivkraft for innovationen. Den generelle holdning opsummeres således af én de offentlige ledere:
“Det er jo en kunstig opdeling, vi har lavet i forhold til, hvad det er for nogle behov, man har som borger. Altså, man kan jo sagtens igennem sit liv både have behov for hjælp fra en sundhedsforvaltning, beskæftigelsesforvaltning socialforvaltning og en børne- og ungeforvaltning. Så derfor er det også nødvendigt, at når man laver udvikling eller innovation, eller hvad man nu kalder det, at man også tænker over, at der også er andre, der kan bidrage til løsningen, end bare én selv.”

Den positive holdning til samarbejde, der ser de tværgående relationer som svaret på nogle af de udfordringer, som både borgere og forvaltning står over for, er noget, der har udviklet sig over tid. Som én af de interviewede ledere bemærker, har det været afgørende for innovationen, at der på forhånd var etableret en kultur for samarbejde blandt SSP-samarbejdsparterne i kommunen. Samarbejdskulturen har altså været med til at bringe parterne sammen omkring bordet for at finde en løsning på det konkrete problem med kriminalitetstruede unge voksne. På denne vis har den lange samarbejdshistorie fremmet en orientering mod samarbejdsdrevne løsninger i almindelighed og samarbejde blandt de implicerede parter i særdeleshed, hvilket har bidraget til at udfylde en del af det, der ligger i innovationsledelsens konvenernolle.

Én ting er kulturen, som gør samarbejdspartnerne indstillede på samarbejde. Noget andet er strukturerne, der skal muliggøre, at samarbejdsorienteringen også udvikler sig til reelle møder mellem parterne. I den forbindelse anfører en leder, at den nye innovation kun var mulig, fordi der allerede eksisterede en samarbejdsarena i form af SSP-bestyrelsen mv., hvor de deltagende organisationer kunne mødes. Det bemærkes i øvrigt, at den fungerende NAO i form af SSP-sekretariatet havde været på plads i mere end ti år, og at tilstedeværelsen af en NAO, som ikke er tilknyttet én organisation, men ledes og finansieres af de deltagende parter i fællesskab, i sig selv er med til at understøtte tilliden til processen og til hinanden. De allerede etablerede samarbejdsstrukturer udfyldte altså dele af innovationsledelsens konvenernolle, idet de ikke blot muliggjorde mødet mellem organisationerne, men også opbyggede tillid til processen og ligeværd organisationerne imellem.

Ud over kulturen og strukturerne lægger mange af de interviewede vægt på de veludviklede personlige relationer som en afgørende faktor i innovationsprocessen, især blandt frontlinjemedarbejderne i implementeringsfasen. Som andre studier af samarbejdsdrevet innovation har fundet, er personlige relationer vigtige for samarbejdsdrevne
innovationsprocesser, idet de har indflydelse på risikovilligheden og dermed mulighederne for at skabe innovation (f.eks. Keast og Hampson 2007). I interviewene bliver det påpeget, at personlige tillidsrelationer udvikler sig gennem længere tids ansigt-til-ansigt-interaktion. Den relativt lange samarbejdshistorie har givet de implicerede parter et kendskab til hinanden, som har gavnet samarbejdet og været medvirkende til at skabe et forløb med relativ lav grad af konflikt. Opbygning af tillidsfulde personlige relationer gennem længere tids samarbejde har med andre ord været med til at udfylde en del af innovationsledelsens facilitatorrolle.

5. NAO’ens bidrag til innovationsskabelsen

Mens den lange samarbejdshistorie i SSP-regi således har bidraget positivt til innovationsprocessen i kraft af den velforankrede samarbejdskultur, den veletablerede samarbejdsstruktur og de veludviklede samarbejdsrelationer, har den ikke kunnet forhindre en række mindre kontroverser i forbindelse med den nye ansvars- og opgavefordeling blandt gamle og nye samarbejspartnere.

Som nævnt var tilbuddene til kriminalitetstruede unge over 18 år i udgangspunktet meget begrænsede, og Socialforvaltningens Voksenafdeling havde ikke tidligere været involveret i det kriminalpræventive samarbejde i kommunen. Målgruppen var ny, og deltagelsen i programmet skabte behov for ny viden om denne gruppe i afdelingen. Hertil kommer, at Voksenafdelingen ifølge interviewpersonerne havde færre ressourcer til rådighed pr. borger i forhold til Børne- og Familieafdeling. Endelig havde Børne- og Familieafdeling mulighed for at fortsætte hjælpen efter borgeren fylder 18 år. Det betød, at det undervejs i processen var uklart, hvem der i udgangspunktet sidder med ansvaret på området, hvilket førte til diskussioner om opgave- og ressourcemulighederne i programmet. De to koordinatorer i NAO’en var med til at facilitere forhandlinger om fælles retningslinjer på det punkt og indtrådte således i en medierende rolle, som hjalp innovationsprocessen frem.

En informant, som var med til at planlægge programmet, peger på, at en del af forklaringen på de mindre kontroverser i processen skal findes i det forhold, at Voksenafdelingen ikke var en del af den indledende planlægningsproces. En anden informant siger, at problemet lå i afdelingens manglende erfaringer med kriminelle over 18 år som særlig målgruppe og utilstrækkelige tilførsel af midler til at udføre de nye opgaver. Nogle nævner også, at der kan være en generel tendens til at undgå at tage ansvar for ’besværlige sager’, som
sagsforløb med kriminalitetstruede unge over 18 år ofte kan være – især hvis man føler, at det ikke rigtig er éns bord.

Disse resultater viser, at det ikke blot er vigtigt at forhandle indholdet af innovationen, men også de ressourcer, som hver part forventes at investere for at realisere innovationen. Herudover er de enkelte deltageres behov for at være involveret i en innovation forskellige, og nogle deltagere vil finde samarbejdet mere relevant end andre. I disse tilfælde er det nødvendigt med aktiv facilitering og mediering mellem parterne; en opgave, som NAO’en påtog sig i dette tilfælde.

Ud over konfliktmæglingen har koordinatorerne som beskrevet også været med til at udvikle retningslinjer for koordinationen af sagsbehandlingen og taget sig af alle de praktiske detaljer i forbindelse med møderne i frontlinjegrupperne og ledergruppen, herunder udfærdigelsen af dagsordener og referater. NAO’en har således i overvejende grad spillet en facilitering rolle i processen. Som nævnt var NAO’ens opgave netop at koordinere og udvikle samarbejdet, ikke at skabe innovation, hvilket har afspejlet sig i den lederrolle, som NAO’en har påtaget sig i innovationsprocessen.

6. De vertikale forbindelsers bidrag til innovationsskabelsen

Idéen til en ny indsats for de unge voksne over 18 år kom som beskrevet fra kommunale frontlinjemedarbejdere, og der er således tale om en medarbejderinitieret innovation (Juul Kristensen og Voxted 2009). Idéen blev imidlertid først omsat til en bydækkende innovation, efter at bolden blev grebet af administratorer på det centrale niveau, som udviklede konceptet og fik det endeligt godkendt politisk. Sammenhæng mellem forskellige niveauer i administrationen har således været afgørende for igangsættelsen af innovationen.

Hertil kan føjes, at frontlinjemedarbejdernes løbende ytringer om nye behov også har haft indflydelse på videreudviklingen af programmet. En interviewperson fra NAO’en fortæller, at det fra starten var hensigten at give plads til en vis fleksibilitet, så frontlinjegrupperne kunne være med til at udvikle deres egen måde at strukturere arbejdet, og at grupperne har udviklet sig forskelligt på grund af de forskellige omstændigheder i de enkelte bydele. En interviewet leder påpeger, at samarbejdets organiserings på forskellige niveauer betyder, at beslutninger, der ikke kan foretages på et niveau, kan tages på et andet niveau, men stadig i samarbejde med alle de involverede enheder. Det tillader hurtig respons på nye behov og bringer forskellige aktørers viden i spil i videreudviklingen af innovationen.
Væsentligheden af frontlinjemedarbejdernes løbende involvering i innovationsprocessen anerkendes af flere af interviewpersonerne. De peger både på det udviklingspotentiale, der ligger i den viden om borgernes behov, som frontlinjemedarbejderne besidder, og på vigtigheden af at skabe ejerskab til forandringerne blandt frontlinjemedarbejderne, så implementeringen bliver vellykket. Det er en pointe, som også bakkes op af innovationslitteraturen (Sørensen og Torfing 2011). Koordinatorerne har i forlængelse heraf arbejdet på at mediere feedback mellem frontlinjegrupperne og ledergruppen.

De stærke vertikale forbindelser mellem frontlinjemedarbejdere og ledere har altså været med til at sikre initieringen, implementeringen og løbende videreudvikling af innovationen. Det er her interessant, hvordan samarbejdet mellem organisationerne i mindre grad er blevet katalysereret af udefrakommende perspektiver, som sætter den gængse praksis i et nyt lys. Det er i højere grad sket ved at organisere sig og gøre brug af en række foranstaltninger, som tillader nye ideer at vandre op ad, hvor de videreudvikles, før de vandrer ned ad igen og bliver modereret løbende i henhold til frontlinjeardbejdernes nye erfaringer.

7. Innovationsledelsens betydning for den samarbejdsdrevne innovation


Med udgangspunktet i en etableret gruppe af samarbejdspartnere med en lang samarbejdshistorie har faciliteringsbehovene været begrænsede, hvilket har været en fordel i at få processen til at rykke fremad. Til gengæld har fraværet af nye aktører været med til at lede processen hen imod inkrementel innovation, hvor en ny serviceydelse realiseres, men hvor man ikke finder frem til radikalt nye måder at levere de nye eller de eksisterende serviceydelser på. Når de samme samarbejdspartnere, som har arbejdet sammen i en årrække, skal innovere, vil det være begrænset med nye perspektiver, som kan forstyrre den mere eller mindre institutionaliserede måde at tænke og gøre tingene på, der med tiden har fundet indpas parterne imellem.

Som en interviewperson var inde på, kunne nogle af de løbende udfordringer være undgået, hvis Voksenafdelingen havde været involveret i den tidlige udvikling af innovationen. I forhold til at katalysere planlægningsprocessen ville det have været gavnligt at inddrage så mange relevante deltagere som muligt og ikke blot de gamle kendinge i SSP-regi. Det må
dog erkendes, at detaljeret styring af den samarbejdstrætte innovationsproces er vanskelig, at innovation udvikles løbende, og at det ikke nødvendigvis er klart fra starten, hvem de relevante parter er.

NAO’en har primært haft et faciliterende fokus, hvilket der har været behov for i forbindelse med (gen-)forhandlinger af ansvars- og rollefordelinger i samarbejdet. Med et klart fokus på at understøtte samarbejdsprocesserne, lave klare retningslinjer, konflikthåndtere og sikre en vellykket implementering har den katalysatorende innovationsledelsesrolle ikke været i højde. I en sammenhæng med en lang tradition for samarbejde, er det ellers i innovationsmæssigt øjemed ønskværdigt, at den ledende NAO i højere grad træder ind i katalysatorrollen. Som vi har set, betyder den særlige systemkontekst med den lange samarbejdshistorie, at ledelsesopgaverne, som ligger i konvener- og faciliteringsrollen, langt hen ad vejen er varetaget (eller overflødiggjort om man vil) af de allerede etablerede samarbejdskulturer, -strukturer og -relationer mellem parterne. Samtidig har den lange samarbejdshistorie været med til at skabe et vist tunnelsyn i netværket, hvilket NAO’en med fordel kunne have udsat for kontrolleret forstyrrelse. Netop når samarbejdet har så gode forudsætninger, som tilfældet er her, vil forstyrrelser kunne foretages uden den store bekymring for, om samarbejdet vil falde fra hinanden. I sammenhængen, hvor det primært handler om at få forskelligartede aktører uden tidligere samarbejdserfaring til at mødes og forpligte sig på samarbejdet, kan forstyrrelser være utidige og skabe kontraproduktiv usikkerhed blandt aktørerne. Når samarbejdskultur, -strukturer og -relationer som her er på plads, vil forstyrrelser omvendt være produktive for innovationsprocessen.

Mens det har været begrænset, hvor mange nye horisontale forbindelser, der er blevet skabt i planlægningsfasen, og dermed også begrænset, hvor mange innovationsgavnlige forstyrrelser, der her er fundet sted, har de vertikale forbindelser mellem administrationsniveauer til gengæld været med til at katalysere samarbejdet. Den særlige organisering og NAO’ens facilitering af kontakten mellem de forskellige niveauer har bragt idéer op og ned mellem niveauerne, hvilket har stimuleret innovationsskabelsen og dannet grundlag for fortsatte videreudviklinger, der er blevet omsat i praksis. Nytænkningen, som den høje densitet og lave diversitet i det horisontale samarbejde har sat visse begrænsninger for, er blevet stimuleret gennem vertikale koblinger mellem de organisatoriske niveauer.
8. Konklusion


Vi har således set, hvordan forhold, der styrker samarbejde, kan være blokerende for mere radikal innovation, hvis ikke der tages ledelsesmæssig hånd om det. Der er dog tale om en fin balancegang. Mens for lidt forstyrrelse vil føre til manglende nytænkning, kan for meget føre til samarbejdsvanskeligheder og opbrud. I samarbejder med stærke og veletablerede samarbejdsrelationer mellem relativt ensartede aktører, kan der dog skrues en anelse ned for denne bekymring, da samarbejdshistorien sikrer et stærkt fundament. Her vil ledelsesopgaven i højere grad bestå i at forstyrre samarbejdet end at understøtte det.

Vores caseanalyse har vist, hvordan ikke blot stærke horisontale relationer mellem organisationer, men også stærke vertikale relationer mellem administrationsniveauer har betydning for innovationskapaciteten. Institutionelle designs og strategisk innovationsledelse, der styrker de vertikale forbindelser, kan på den baggrund siges at virke befordrende på innovationsprocesserne, måske særligt i en samarbejdssituation med relativ høj deltagerhomogenitet og en lang samarbejdshistorie, da de vertikale forbindelser kan være med til at katalysere samarbejdsprocesserne på en måde, som kompenserer for fraværet af nye aktører med andre perspektiver.

I offentlige organisationer vil der ofte være fokus på driftsikkerhed og en modvilje mod at løbe for store risici, hvorfor den understøttende ledelsesform er mere oplagt end den forstyrrende, selvom det ud fra et innovationsperspektiv, der har sigte mod nye og smartere måder at gøre tingene på, ikke altid er ønskværdigt. I sidste ende handler det dog om at gøre sig ambitionerne klart og have en forståelse for den organisatoriske kontekst, man træder ind i, når man søger at udøve innovationsledelse på den mest hensigtsmæssige måde i en given sammenhæng.
Referencer


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Abstract

Collaborative innovation presents itself as a promising method for crafting innovative solutions to wicked problems. While the barriers and drivers of collaborative innovation have been studied extensively in the expanding collaborative innovation literature, there is still a need for more empirical studies of the role of public leadership in overcoming the barriers and strengthening the drivers of collaborative innovation. In order to contribute to this endeavour, this chapter conducts a cross-case analysis of 14 cases of collaborative innovation aimed at curbing gang violence in the city of Copenhagen. The chapter provides empirically informed answers to the questions of when and where leadership is particularly needed, what public leaders should be aware of when leading collaborative innovation processes, and how they should go about developing innovative solutions to wicked problems such as the current Danish gang problem.

Keywords: Leadership; collaborative innovation; wicked problems; gangs; public safety.
1. Introduction

Recent public policy and administration research suggests that networks and collaboration between public and private actors have great potential when it comes to generating innovative solutions to complex problems (Roberts and King, 1996; Van de Ven et al, 2007; Eggers and Singh, 2009; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011a). The growing body of literature on collaborative innovation in the public sector has prompted scholars to ponder the specific type of leadership needed when public and private stakeholders come together to produce public innovation (Crosby & Bryson, 2010; Morse, 2010; Page, 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2012; Sørensen & Torfing, 2012). While the theoretical argument for collaborative innovation leadership is well developed, there is still a lack of empirical research investigating when and where leadership is particularly needed, what public leaders should be aware of when leading collaborative innovation processes, and how they should go about developing innovative solutions to complex problems. In this chapter, we conduct a cross-case analysis of 14 innovation projects addressing the problem of gang-related violence and crime in order to provide empirically informed answers to these questions.¹

The chapter is organized in the following way. First we demonstrate how the acuteness and wickedness of the current Danish gang problem spur an urgent need for public innovation. We then review the latest theories of collaborative innovation leadership in order to present key concepts and concerns. Next, we explain how the 14 empirical cases were selected and how the data was collected and analysed, before presenting key findings from the cross-case analysis. Finally, we conclude the chapter by proposing some tentative answers to the question of how public leadership can enhance public sector capacity for collaborative innovation.

2. The Wicked Danish Gang Problem

In recent years, the Danish gang problem has grown considerably in scope and complexity. Today, it constitutes a wicked problem since it is not only hard to solve, but also difficult to define (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Historically, the Danish gang scene has been dominated by outlaw motorcycle gangs, as in other Scandinavian countries. The two dominant biker gangs, Hells Angels and Bandidos, expanded from the U.S. to Scandinavia in the 1980s and 1990s. In The Great Nordic Biker War from 1994 to 1997, extensive confrontations between these two rival gangs resulted in 11 killings and 74 attempted murders before they...
reached a peace agreement to cease fire and cancel all plans to set up new chapters in any of the Nordic countries (Høyer, 1999).

A seven year period of relative stability was interrupted in the mid-2000s. In 2004, the government decided to shut down Pusher Street in Christiania – an area of Copenhagen known for its open cannabis trade. The well-established gang turfs were disrupted and gang-related drug trafficking spread throughout the city of Copenhagen. The old biker gangs were increasingly challenged by ethnic minority youth gangs that had emerged in deprived neighbourhoods since the mid 1990’s (Danish National Police, 1998, 1999, 2005).

The ethnic minority youth gangs are less formalized than the well-established biker gangs and it has proven difficult for the authorities to keep up with their constantly shifting factions and alliances. Typically, recruitment takes place among friends, local acquaintances and younger siblings. Threats of fines and detention are often overshadowed by the benefits of belonging to the gangs. The incentives to join a gang are not only material but also include protection and security, social integration, a resistance identity and excitement in an otherwise dull and depressing environment (cf. Jankowski, 1991).

The rise of the ethnic minority youth gangs has significantly compounded both the complexity of the gang formation processes and the overall gang situation in Denmark. In this situation, standard solutions fall short, creating an urgent need for public innovation through cross-sector collaboration. In the summer of 2012, the Minister of Justice, Morten Bødskov, summarized the strategy to curb gang-related violence and crime as follows:

*We are intensifying our efforts in marginalized neighbourhoods where bikers and immigrant gangs recruit. (...) But it’s an illusion to think that the police can do this alone. If we are to stop the gang recruitment of rootless youths, we need to involve the local community and the schools. These young people need to get an education and to enter the labour market as this will dramatically lower their risk of being recruited to gangs. But we also need the parents of the young immigrant boys to tell their sons: ‘Stay away from these environments, even though they’re your peers’.*

(Politiken, 10.06.2012, translated by the authors).

Following this line of reasoning, Gang Councils were established in strategically selected municipalities in 2009. Here, the local authorities meet regularly with a diverse group of local community representatives to discuss the current gang situation and how to intervene.
While public officials on all levels of government are prepared to engage with non-public actors to find new and innovative solutions to the complex gang problems, there is a lack of practical knowledge about how to lead such collaborative innovation processes. New theories of collaborative innovation leadership seek to capture the specificities of this type of leadership.

3. Theories of Collaborative Innovation Leadership

In recent years, we have witnessed a growing interest in collaborative innovation in the public sector (Roberts & King, 1996; Van de Ven et al, 2007; Eggers & Singh, 2009; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). With its emphasis on multi-actor interaction in networks and partnerships, collaborative innovation offers a new approach to public innovation that builds on microeconomic theories of *social innovation* (Phills, Deiglmeier & Miller, 2008), *open innovation* (Chesbrough, 2003) and *co-creation* (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). These theories all stress the need to involve external stakeholders, e.g. customers, users, experts, etc., in corporate innovation processes.

While innovation is here defined as the development and implementation of new ideas that produce a qualitative change in a given context (Roberts & King, 1996), we define collaboration as the constructive management of differences in order to find joint solutions to shared problems (Gray, 1989). Emergent problems, persistent challenges or new opportunities kick off open-ended search process for new and creative ideas that are assessed, selected, implemented and sometimes scaled up and spread to other contexts and organizations (cf. Eggers and Singh, 2009). As argued in the introduction to this edited volume, theories of collaborative innovation claim that all phases of the innovation process can be strengthened through collaboration between various public and/or private actors (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). The definition of problems and challenges will be more accurate when actors with different types of knowledge and expertise on the subject are involved. Creativity increases as multi-actor collaboration disturbs the actors’ perceptions and taken-for-granted assumptions and new ideas emerge and develop through mutual learning processes. The cost/benefit analyses and risk assessments of new, alternative solutions become more nuanced, enabling the selection of the most creative and promising solutions. Implementation of the selected solutions is also strengthened since multi-actor collaboration facilitates the mobilization of resources, stimulates inter-organizational coordination, and builds joint ownership of bold new initiatives. Finally, the participating
stakeholders act as *innovation ambassadors* who help diffuse the innovative solutions to other parts of their organization or to other organizations in their respective networks. Collaborative innovation thus presents itself as a very promising method for public innovation.

In practice, however, the great potential of collaborative innovation is not always fulfilled. Getting relevant, interested and resourceful actors together to collaborate and produce public innovation is no easy task due to various commonplace barriers. First, barriers to stakeholder participation may be present. These barriers include the absence of a tradition of participation in a given field; bad experiences from previous participatory processes; and uncertainty among the stakeholders about the level of engagement of the other actors, the benefits of participation, as well as the requirements and costs of participation (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989). Second, barriers may exist that prevent constructive collaboration between different actors, e.g. organizational and mental silos, lack of mutual trust between the parties as well as deeper conflicts of interest (Straus, 2002). Finally, there may be barriers which impede both the formulation and implementation of innovative solutions. These barriers include the emergence of a tunnel vision among actors who frequently work together and know each other well (Skilton & Dooley, 2010); risk aversion on the part of actors who avoid trying something new due to the risk of failure (Mulgan, 2007); and low degrees of institutionalization in collaborative arenas, leading to unclear divisions of responsibility and a lack of administrative routines and thereby to a failure to implement new and creative solutions (O'Toole, 1997).

In order to overcome these and similar barriers, a specific type of leadership is needed (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Sørensen & Torfing, 2012). Recent research on collaborative innovation leadership draws on theories of distributive, collaborative and integrative leadership in order to identify distinct collaborative innovation leadership roles that respond to the challenges of engaging relevant stakeholders in constructive collaboration that will result in innovation (Crosby & Bryson, 2010; Morse, 2010; Page, 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2012). These roles we will label the *convener*, the *facilitator* and the *catalyst* (Torfing, 2012; Torfing & Krogh, 2013; Kankaala & Krogh, 2014).

The primary task of the *convener* is to initiate collaboration and set up the collaborative arena. The convener identifies relevant stakeholders, assembles the team and brings the parties together by creating institutional frameworks, processes and incentives that promote collaborative action, e.g. by constituting a *burning platform* and stressing the actors’
interdependence. The convener can also pre-empt future conflicts by helping the parties to align their expectations and clarify their respective roles and responsibilities from the outset. Being clear about who will do what in which parts of the innovation process reduces uncertainties for the actors involved, increases commitment to the process, and lowers the risk of disappointment with other actors.

When the relevant stakeholders have agreed to collaborate, the facilitator enters the stage. The role of the facilitator is to help parties with different interests and perspectives to work together. The facilitator’s primary task is to continuously support the collaboration process by promoting collaborative relationships and mutual trust among participants, e.g. by helping them to formulate common rules, establish a shared knowledge base and develop a common language. The facilitator organizes meetings that enable the active participation of relevant stakeholders and drives the process forward by following up on the steps and actions agreed upon by the participants. In cases of persistent disagreements about the distribution of costs and benefits of innovative solutions, it is the task of the facilitator to mediate negotiations among the involved actors. It is important to note that the facilitator’s task is not simply to avoid conflicts by building consensus. It is precisely the differences between the actors in terms of their worldviews, forms of knowledge, ideas and points of view that make their collaboration potentially innovative. The facilitator should be aware that disputes, disagreements and conflicts are not only very likely to arise when diverse actors are brought together in sustained interaction, but can in fact be an important source of innovation. Thus, the facilitator’s role is to help the participants to make these clashes and conflicts productive rather than destructive.

When collaboration has been established and trust has been built between the collaborators, the need for the catalyst arises. The task of the catalyst is to inspire participants to think outside the box by challenging any basic assumptions, perceptions and understandings that restrict the way in which the problem is conceived and the problem-solving options available to them. Thus, while the facilitator’s role is to support and enhance collaboration, the role of the catalyst is to disturb the collaborators’ cognitive processes. Disturbances can be introduced by bringing new actors onto the arena, by supplying the participants with new knowledge about the problem, and by pointing to the limited reach and/or direct negative consequences of both the established and the alternative solutions being discussed. Like the other leadership roles, the catalyst’s role is not limited to hands-on leadership through direct participation but can also take the form of hands-off leadership. Hands-off
innovation leadership involves making strategic changes in the institutional design in question with a view to challenging social conventions and interaction patterns among the participants. This can be done by changing the site and form of the meetings and the way in which information is distributed between meetings.

Since collaborative innovation unfold in complex processes characterised by jumps, feedback loops and iterations (Van de Ven et al., 2007), the three types of innovation leadership must often be exercised simultaneously and in varying sequences depending on the needs that arise along the way. Also, it is important to note that the three leadership roles can be performed by one or more individuals, e.g. politicians, public administrators or participants involved in a collaborative innovation process, as well as organizations inside or outside the collaboration such as government agencies, administrative units and secretariats; and/or metagoverning networks, assemblies and other collaborative bodies.

After considering how the cases were selected and how the data was collected, we will compare the 14 innovation projects across four key analytical dimensions: the problems addressed; the type of innovation developed; the scope of collaboration; and the role of leadership and management. We examine the challenges to, and needs for, leadership as experienced by the participants in order to advance our understanding of when and where collaborative innovation leadership is particularly needed, what public leaders should be aware of when leading processes of collaborative innovation and how they should go about it.

4. Case Selection and Data Collection

Studying collaborative innovation through case studies involves a choice between carrying out in depth analysis of one or two cases, or looking for similarities and differences in comparative studies of a larger number of cases. We have chosen the latter option because we want to explore variation in collaborative innovation processes and because we do not yet have sufficient knowledge to select a typical or extreme case that will permit hypothesis testing.

The cases were identified through reputational sampling. We used mass media and websites to identify a number of key actors engaged in efforts to curb gangs in Nørrebro, allegedly the most gang-ridden borough of Copenhagen. These key actors were asked to point out local projects that were trying out something new and that involved different local actors.
in the design and/or implementation phase. Individuals involved in the identified projects were then asked the same questions. When we reached a point where we rarely heard about new projects and initiatives, we suspended the search for new projects. Through this process, 14 projects aiming at reducing gang-related violence and crime were identified, all of which we deemed relevant as examples of collaborative innovation.

The projects involve the establishment of *parent networks* that take collective responsibility for the children in the neighbourhood and promote positive norms and codes of conduct; *local police officers* who walk or cycle through the local area on a daily basis to show presence, allay conflicts and build trust; *street outreach teams* that build relationships with young people and help calm things down when trouble is brewing; *open school events* where social workers and other community resources are present at the local school after regular opening hours in order to help families with their social problems and concerns; the provision of *after-school jobs* that provide young people with an alternative income to that obtained from the gangs while fostering a sense of ownership over neighbourhood maintenance; *resource centres* that keep young people off the streets, create positive social communities and provide opportunities for meaningful leisure activities arranged by volunteers; and an *outdoor music festival* that encourages the local community to reclaim the streets.

The reputational sampling method proved valuable in identifying a relatively large number of relevant cases within the same policy area in a relatively short period of time. However, the method also introduces some bias into our sample. First, the vast majority of our cases (13 out of 14) involve public funding and/or participation, which might at least partly be explained by the fact that most of the key actors initially contacted were civil servants. Second, the identified innovation projects are all relatively successful, which might be caused by reluctance on the part of actors in the field to report on failed projects. Finally, we cannot determine whether our sample is representative of the general population of collaborative innovation projects addressing gang violence in Norrebro since we do not know the total number of projects. However, we consider this a secondary concern since our aim is first and foremost to identify and describe examples of collaborative innovation within the same policy area in order to better understand the role of leadership. The data collected mainly consists of semi-structured interviews with a total of 30 interviewees in key positions with respect to our cases. Some of the interviewees were involved in more
than one innovation project, enabling them to shed light on several of our cases. In some
cases we carried out follow-up phone interviews or asked for clarification via e-mail.
Furthermore, a substantial amount of written material was collected and analysed. Apart
from the material publicly available on websites, all interviewees were asked to provide
written material on the innovation project at hand. The documents obtained include
pamphlets, newspaper articles, meeting minutes and policy reports. Finally, we enriched
our empirical data collection by organizing a theatre workshop where key actors were
invited to take part in a discussion about collaborative innovation. The workshop was
videotaped and used as data material alongside the qualitative interviews. For each case the
data was coded according to the key analytical dimensions of i) the problem addressed; ii)
the solution to the problem; iii) the scope of collaboration; iv) leadership and management;
and v) drivers and barriers in the process. In the following section, we compare the 14
innovation projects across the first four dimensions before examining the challenges to, and
needs for, leadership as expressed by the participants in the collaborative innovation
processes.

5. Comparing the 14 Innovation Cases

In table 1, the 14 innovation cases are compared across four key analytical dimensions. As
the comparison reveals, it is primarily the lack of services and the failure to meet the social
needs of youth at risk and their families and neighbourhoods that spur the search for new
and innovative solutions. While there are some examples of innovative projects that target
existing gang members (‘The Exit Strategy’ and ‘Mankind’), the predominant focus is to
prevent youth at risk from being recruited to gangs. Some of the projects aim to serve a
broader social purpose and include parents and families in their target groups (‘The Holistic
Community Strategy’ and ‘The Open School Project’). Finally, more general problems
such as real or perceived insecurity in the neighbourhood have also given rise to innovation
(‘Your Police Officer’ and ‘Songs from the Borough’).

Table 1: Comparison of the 14 cases across four analytical dimensions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Innovative solution</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'The Exit Strategy'</td>
<td>Gang members have a hard time leaving the gangs</td>
<td>Timely, holistic and customized services for gang members</td>
<td>Collaboration between four municipal administrations</td>
<td>A shared secretariat provides administrative support and facilitates collaboration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(service and process innovation)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>'Your Police Officer'</td>
<td>Police cars with wailing sirens erode feelings of safety among residents and complicate police investigation</td>
<td>Local police officers walk or bike through the local area to defuse conflicts and build trust</td>
<td>Collaboration between local police department, local politicians and civil servants in local government</td>
<td>Politicians initiate the innovation and the local police conducts operational management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(service and process innovation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'The Holistic Community Strategy'</td>
<td>Residential area with high concentration of social problems and marginalized ethnic minority youth serves as a breeding ground for gangs</td>
<td>Residents are involved in solving social problems, improving conditions for children and youth and enhancing public safety</td>
<td>Collaboration between municipal administrations, tenant association, housing association, and local community organizations; considerable number of external conflicts.</td>
<td>A steering committee leads the collaboration and conducts operational management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(service and process innovation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Resource Centre Outer Nørrebro'</td>
<td>Lack of spare time activities in marginalized residential areas increases risk of gang formation and recruitment</td>
<td>Provision of local leisure activities in close collaboration with citizens and local community organizations (governance innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between local politicians, municipal administrations, local QUANGO, associations and residents</td>
<td>Politicians initiate the innovation and day-to-day manager conducts project management with executive committee, advisory board, and youth council</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>'First Floor'</td>
<td>Youth hang out on the streets and lack various kinds of support</td>
<td>Drop-in Centre offering spare time activities, doing outreach work and developing positive role models (service and process innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between director and employees of the Centre, local schools, local police and municipal administrations</td>
<td>The director of the Centre initiates innovation and facilitates support from authorities and employees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>‘Club 36’</strong></td>
<td>Public cutbacks have created a need for services for children and youth in a marginalized residential area</td>
<td>Tutoring, homework café, sports activities and organized day trips seeking to involve girls and their mothers (service and process innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between a local community organization, the municipality, Danish Refugee Council and local volunteers</td>
<td>A local community organization initiates and manages the innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>‘The Portable Cabins Project’</strong></td>
<td>Youth hanging out and hassling passers-by at a town square</td>
<td>Temporary, custom-made initiative offering cabins as a place for youth to hang out (service innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between SSP (Schools, Social services, and Police), municipal administration, local community organization, local police, ‘First Floor’, ‘The Street Team’ and local gym; conflicts with tenants association.</td>
<td>The SSP initiates the innovation and a local community organization conducts operational management and maintains contact with collaborators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘The After-School Job Project’</strong></td>
<td>Youth at risk engage in criminal activity instead of getting an education and seeking employment</td>
<td>Introducing youth to the labour market and procurement of after-school jobs in the public and private sector through the Jobindex website (service innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between local politicians, municipal Job Centre, Jobindex, immigrant association, municipal administration, local youth network and local community associations</td>
<td>The mayor initiates the innovation, a project manager in the Job Centre establishes a steering committee, and the committee conducts operational management and maintains contact with collaborators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘The Street Team’</strong></td>
<td>At-risk youth in a deprived residential area need support to avoid a criminal career</td>
<td>The Street Team walks the neighbourhood and provides on-the-spot counselling in the community (service innovation)</td>
<td>Public employee-driven innovation without collaboration in the initial phases, however broad network of various service providers later on</td>
<td>An employee at the local Service Centre initiates the innovation and a project coordinator manages external contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘The Uncle Network’</strong></td>
<td>Ethnic minority youth lack support, recognition and advice from adults with the same ethnic background as themselves</td>
<td>A group of fathers and other grown men act as ‘uncles’ to children and youth in a conflict-ridden neighbourhood to promote dialogue and a peaceful code of conduct (service and governance innovation)</td>
<td>Collaboration between an informal parent group and employees in a local community organization</td>
<td>A local community organization initiates contact to a parent group and manages the network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Innovation Aspect</td>
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<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>'The Night Owls'</strong></td>
<td>Youth feel unsafe at night due to occasional acts of violence and the presence of police</td>
<td>Local teams of adult volunteers are present at particular hot-spots at night to make youth feel safe and calm things down if conflicts arise</td>
<td>(service and governance innovation)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>'The Open School Project'</strong></td>
<td>A local school receives a large amount of inquiries from ethnic minority parents who need help addressing social and family problems</td>
<td>Every other week, a diverse team of public employees offers on-site support and case management at the local school</td>
<td>(organizational and service innovation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>'Mankind'</strong></td>
<td>Public authorities and projects have a hard time reaching gang members and influencing their norms, values and identities</td>
<td>A community association advocates positive male roles in order to limit the use of violence and threats that make life unsafe for families of gang members</td>
<td>(governance innovation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>'Songs from the Borough'</strong></td>
<td>Tensions between police and local residents and an increase in gang-related shootings</td>
<td>Private initiative sets up a residents’ church choir, arranges an outdoor music festival where the choir sings alongside the police choir, and urges residents to reclaim the streets</td>
<td>(governance innovation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principal initiates the collaboration and brings together the relevant stakeholders to find a solution to the problem.
Most of the innovative projects take the form of service innovations that offer new and alternative ways of catering to the needs of specific citizens and population groups (cf. Hartley, 2005). Interestingly, many of the specific service innovations involve process innovation, i.e. innovative processes for the production and delivery of public services. Several examples show how these initiatives push the limits of the public sector, e.g. by involving volunteers in the provision of services and thereby bringing about governance innovation.

Regarding the scope of collaboration, multi-actor collaboration is mostly limited to smaller and more manageable innovation projects requiring less coordination and support (such as ‘First Floor’, ‘The Uncle Network’, and ‘Mankind) and to initiatives that adopt innovative solutions developed in other local contexts (‘The Night Owls’). Furthermore, the data reveals deeper and wider collaboration in the implementation phase than during the project formulation phase, suggesting that difficulties may arise from the involvement of many different people and organizations in the phase where new and innovative ideas are being developed. Conversely, collaboration, coordination and support are clearly important during the implementation phase. Finally, only four of the 14 projects exclusively involve public actors (‘The Exit Strategy’, ‘Your Police Officer’, ‘First Floor’, and ‘The Street Team’), and only one project involves only private partners (‘Mankind’). Collaborating across the public-private divide seems to be appealing – especially in the implementation phase – perhaps because of the significant benefits that can be obtained by leveraging complementary public and private resources.

In several cases, we observe a shift in leadership during the collaborative innovation process whereby individual innovation leadership only plays a role in the first phases, while a more traditional form of operational management takes over during the implementation phase. One example of this is ‘Resource Centre Outer Nørrebro’. At the beginning, one or more passionate proponents would often act as conveners, facilitators and catalysts for collaborative innovation initiatives. Later on, more formalized steering groups and committees have tended to take over primary responsibility for leading and monitoring the projects. For instance, in ‘The After-School Job Project’ the mayor and a project manager from the Job Centre set the agenda and created an alliance between key stakeholders before handing over operational management of the project to a steering committee. However, there are still examples of individual innovation leadership enduring beyond the first phase (e.g. ‘First Floor’, ‘The Street Team’, ‘The Open School Project’, and ‘Mankind’). Second,
the data shows that collaborative innovation is initiated both from below by actors on the ground and from above by central decision makers. Most of the projects were initiated by public and private employees applying for public and private funding and other kinds of resources from higher up in the system. A few of the projects were initiated by incumbent politicians (‘Your Police Officer’, ‘Resource Centre Outer Nørrebro’, and ‘The After-School Job Project’); others by local civil society activists who had managed to establish collaborative relations with private and public partners (‘Mankind’ and ‘Songs from the Borough’). Finally, the data also shows that not only public leaders exercise collaborative innovation leadership: local community organizations, private associations and citizens also take on responsibility for convening, facilitating and catalysing collaborative innovation processes.

5.1 Barriers to Collaborative Innovation

Having broadly compared the 14 collaborative innovation cases, we will now discuss the challenges experienced in the innovation processes and the leadership needed to address them.

The cases show that innovation leaders are faced with a number of barriers to innovation which they try to tackle. As pointed out by the theories of collaborative innovation leadership presented above, a first challenge is to get relevant and resourceful actors engaged in collaboration. Several of our interviewees point to the lack of incentives for otherwise relevant actors as a particularly important barrier in this regard. If relevant associations and organizations cannot discern any clear benefits from spending time and resources on collaboration with other actors, collaborative innovation processes are likely to be hampered. For example, it is obviously relevant for street outreach workers, the police and others to collaborate with local sports clubs to set up new, alternative activities for youth who would otherwise be hanging out in the streets increasing the risk of recruitment by gangs. However, public employees report that sports clubs show little interest in such collaboration. As one public leader says:

Local sports clubs have no impetus or motivation to collaborate around anything other than what they already do. If they have sufficient members and training hours and otherwise function fairly well why should they get involved in social work in marginalized neighbourhoods? Why would they want to enrol all the troublemakers into their club and do something for them?
A second challenge arises when relevant stakeholders do come together to find a new and innovative solution to a common problem, but fail to collaborate productively. While minor conflicts may be fruitful in the sense that they force the actors to sharpen their ideas and arguments and revise their proposed solutions, serious conflicts may destroy collaboration and create insurmountable deadlocks that prevent innovation. Destructive conflicts are triggered by various factors. Some stem from the divergent interests of different project managers and organizations that all want to cater to the same group of users. There are, for example, competing after-school projects launched by the municipal Job Centre, the Steering Committee of ‘The Holistic Community Strategy’ and a resourceful local block association, respectively, causing tension among these otherwise obvious collaborators. Conflicts also arise because stakeholders have different professional approaches and all take pride in their own particular endeavours and ways of thinking. As a seasoned project manager explains:

Although there are many enthusiasts who all have good intentions, that doesn’t mean that they are open to other people’s ideas. There are a lot of people who want to appear to have done the best job. So to be honest, there is a lot of infighting.

(Interview, translated by the authors)

Several other interviewees confirm that there is often a “battle to take credit for new ideas and projects, which can obstruct the projects themselves”. Since no single actor is responsible for the final results of these complex collaborative innovation processes, the participating organizations engage in disruptive battles for credit and glory, hampering both current and future collaborative innovation processes.

Finally, barriers exist that are attributable neither to lack of interest in collaboration nor to collaboration difficulties, but rather have to do with the stakeholders’ ability to produce innovative solutions to the problems at hand. In some cases, key stakeholders experience the collaborative processes as being ‘locked’, and feel that they have little or no opportunity to move beyond what has already been thought of. As a prominent member of the local trade association puts it:

When you enter the public bureaucracy, it’s often difficult to push things forward and bring about change. Very often, the collaboration is organised around
something that has been decided upon in advance, and which they simply want
us to legitimize. It has already been decided on and now they want us to say that
it’s a good idea in order to ensure support and encouragement to do this or that...
But people’s inclination to participate evaporates if they have no influence.
(Interview, translated by the authors)

Such experiences do not only indicate constraints on the public sector’s immediate capacity
for collaborative innovation; they are also remembered by the involved actors for years to
come and thus constitute a barrier to collaborative innovation in the future.

5.2 Collaborative Innovation Leadership

In order to succeed in fostering collaborative innovation and enhancing the capacity for
collaborative innovation in the public sector, the barriers mentioned above must be
overcome, mitigated or at least addressed through innovation leadership. This places new
demands on public leaders. Interviewees employed in local government and the police
generally agree that the pool of talented and ambitious public leaders is larger than ever
before. This is perhaps most notable within the police. As one police commissioner says:

I think we are better educated today than the leaders before me. They were
perhaps more conservative and rigid. Today police leaders are handpicked to a
much larger extent than just 10-15 years ago. We also have an HR department,
which we certainly didn’t have before.
(Interview, translated by the authors)

New, more open and competent public leaders are certainly conducive to collaborative
innovation. But even for skilled leaders, the leadership tasks in question are not
straightforward. A local project manager reflects on the needs and challenges of
collaborative innovation leadership:

You can’t put one of the participating organizations in charge of the
collaboration as the others get jealous. There has to be some kind of ‘Mother
Earth’ that governs them all; a central body that governs all participants and
activities in the collaboration. They may well accept that, especially if they trust
the governing body.
(Interview, translated by the authors)
The point is not only that there is a need for collaborative leadership, but also that this kind of leadership should come from the outside or at least from a well-connected actor who is trusted by the other actors. If leadership is exercised by a participating organization in the collaboration rather than, for example, by a professional facilitator or a secretariat, it can be a challenging task to exercise impartial leadership for the benefit of the whole network while acting in the role of an interested party (cf. Provan og Kenis, 2007).

It appears essential that leadership of multi-actor collaboration does not revert to traditional forms of hierarchical leadership involving the exercise of authority through orders, control and sanctions. Management must provide space for the participants to act and encourage active participation as well as individual and collective self-management. An experienced public leader confirms the need for this type of leadership when dealing with collaborative innovation processes:

> When it comes to leadership, it is important for the municipality to give employees the freedom to work with what they are most passionate about and to assure them that what they are doing is okay and that collaborating with others is alright. Because this is often how new ideas come to life and flourish. If problems arise and they come back to me and tell me that things are not working out the way they should, then it is my job to facilitate the process. (Interview, translated by the authors)

From this perspective, collaborative innovation leadership should primarily be conducted hands-off, while hands-on leadership should be conducted only if problems arise. When it comes to the exercise of hands-on innovation leadership, the empirical data confirms the importance of the convener role in assembling the right team by hand-picking actors with relevant innovation assets. As one public leader says:

> When you want to start up a new project, the municipality calls in the relevant actors that have the necessary competences and who know something about what it takes to succeed. I myself think that we are good at picking out the important and relevant people, but you cannot force people to collaborate. ...But it definitely means a lot if you are able to gather the right people to solve the right problem. (Interview, translated by the authors)

When the team is assembled, there is also a need for facilitative leadership. As mentioned, collaboration is complicated by the fact that both public and private firebrands tend to focus
on their own achievements. It is a demanding leadership task to facilitate collaboration in this kind of environment. As one public leader says:

*The project managers of the individual projects are often very proud of their projects and they basically think that they are the best and the brightest. Of course it’s a good thing that they are proud of what they do, but it’s our job to get them to loosen up and collaborate with each other. Get them to sit down together and discuss the pros and cons of different solutions. Take their respective strengths and convey them to the others. That’s a huge task.*

(Interview, translated by the authors)

As may be apparent at this point, there is no evidence of a single, ground-breaking innovation in efforts to reduce gang-related violence and crime; rather, we see a large number of incremental innovations. Several interviewees point to the need for better coordination of, and between, the various projects. Although coordination differs from collaboration in the sense that it does not involve any attempt to work upon and transform a common ‘boundary object’, coordination appears to be an important element in the attempt to establish good and productive relations between relevant stakeholders and to optimize the overall performance of the ecology of innovation projects. Thus, coordination can help defuse and prevent destructive conflicts between project managers that constitute a barrier to future collaborative innovation processes.

**Conclusions**

The empirical findings presented in this chapter add to the growing literature on collaborative innovation leadership by answering key questions about when and where leadership is particularly needed, what public leaders should be aware of when leading processes of collaborative innovation, and how they can contribute to the development of innovative solutions to wicked problems such as the current Danish gang problem.

The need for collaborative innovation leadership seems particularly pertinent in ‘first mover’ initiatives that are not simply adopted from other contexts and in larger innovation projects where multi-actor collaboration is both extensive and complex. Furthermore, when projects move from the project formulation phase to the implementation phase, collaboration tends to deepen and widen, indicating that the need for collaborative leadership increases as processes of innovation unfold. By the same token, leadership tends to shift from individual innovation leadership to project management undertaken by
formalized steering groups, committees and administrations, suggesting that leadership
tasks become more comprehensive and demanding as innovation processes develop.

Since collaborative innovation is not only initiated from above but also from below,
political leaders and public managers should continuously scan the field for new and
promising initiatives and be ready to step in to provide the necessary support. Such a search
for new and promising initiatives should exceed the boundaries of the public sector since
collaborative innovation is not only initiated by public leaders and employees but also by
private and third sector parties. When public organizations do step in, they should be careful
not to stifle innovation by taking over full responsibility for the projects and preventing
joint ownership over the processes since stakeholders become disinclined to participate if
they feel they have no say. For this reason, public managers should encourage active
participation as well as individual and collective self-regulation, allowing public and
private employees and local civil society activists to take on leadership roles.

When exercising collaborative innovation leadership, the data suggests that public leaders
should be particularly aware of the importance of constituting ‘burning platforms’ and
stressing the interdependence of relevant actors since the lack of incentives proves to be a
particularly important barrier preventing relevant and resourceful actors from engaging in
collaboration. Also, they should be aware of the challenges of exercising impartial unbiased
leadership for the benefit of the entire network while acting in the role of an interested
party. In order to avoid destructive conflicts and disruptive battles for credit and glory,
*hands-off* leadership must be exercised by common or neutral secretariats and steering
committees and *hands-on* leadership by professional facilitators or, if this is not feasible,
by well-connected and trusted actors. Finally, public managers should be aware of the
importance of coordination for establishing good and productive relations between relevant
stakeholders and optimizing the overall performance of the ecology of innovation projects
unfolding in various local contexts.

Even when talented public leaders and managers are aware of the specific type of leadership
needed to drive collaborative innovation processes forward, it is still a demanding task to
lead complex processes of collaboration among multiple actors, each with their own
resources, interests and professional approaches. If public organizations wish to develop
innovative solutions to wicked problems they must train, encourage and support public
leaders by deliberately and systematically developing their ability to convene, facilitate and
catalyse processes of collaborative innovation; enable and urge public managers to exercise
hands-on and hands-off innovation leadership by allocating the necessary time and resources for such activities; and ease the leadership tasks by building institutional designs that strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination and collaboration among public and private stakeholders.

Endnotes
1. This chapter builds on research presented and discussed at greater length in the book Samarbejdsdrevet innovation i bandetindsatsen (Torfing & Krogh, 2013).

References


Politiken (2012). *Straf er en del af resocialiseringen*, June 10th, PS, (p. 8).


Post-script

Omar El-Hussain, the ‘lone wolf’ behind the Copenhagen terror attacks on February 15, 2015, was associated with the gang Brothas in Mjølnerparken which several of the preventive initiatives presented in paper 5 addressed. Members of Brothas were charged with allegation of assisting El-Hussain in committing the terror attacks, but the State Attorney was not able to prove that they had knowledge of his doings and intentions when assisting him in disposing the weapon from the first attack and helping him redress before the second attack. Whether or not they knew what was going on, investigations show that the gang did play a part in the events. As of lately, the gang has gained renewed media attention since it has been involved in several shooting in the summer of 2017.

The described collaborative prevention initiatives in Mjølnerparken were evidently not enough to deter the gang. No matter how well local initiatives do in cumbering criminal associations and activities, they will never be able to fully prevent any future acts of violence. However, the same can be said of intensified police presence, increased use of ‘stop and frisk’ strategies, and amplified surveillance and investigation which have been among the main responses in the wake of the terror attack and the recent upheaval in Danish gang conflicts.

In the current situation, it seems important to remind political and administrative leaders that collaborative relation between public and private actors with needed resources for the prevention of crime cannot be sustained left-handedly while busy completing other ‘high-priority’ tasks. If the police downplay locally anchored prevention in favour of reactive police work, and does so for too long, collaborative relations will suffer. If political leaders and top-level managers really believe in the need for wider and deeper collaboration in the field, they must go beyond talking fondly of collaborative crime prevention and take action to strengthen it. The dissertation has suggested a number of ways of doing so. It is my hope that some of the suggestions put forward in this dissertation will inspire actors from various sectors of society and at various levels of government to develop, implement and consolidate new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in Denmark in the years to come.
Appendix 1: Interview guide – LCPC implementation
Kommunal direktør, november 2014

Proces: Hvem og hvornår

Hvornår blev I i kommunerne opmærksomme på, at der skulle etableres lokalråd?

Hvornår mødtes i første gang med politiet omkring etableringen?

Mødtes I samlet politikreds-kommuner eller bilateralt? Hvornår blev kontaktudvalget oprettet (først ‘embedsmand-politi-udvalg’)? Hvor og hvordan blev beslutningen om et kontaktudvalg truffet?

Var andre end politiet og kommunerne involveret i drøftelserne omkring designet af de nye råd på kredsniveau?

Hvordan forløb processen i jeres kommune? Hvem var involveret?

SSP

I skulle bl.a. finde ud af, hvordan lokalrådene skulle relatere sig til de allerede etablerede samarbejdsfora. Hvilke overvejelser gjorde I jer, og hvad gik drøftelserne på i den forbindelse?

I forbindelse med evalueringen i 2010 blev det konstateret, at der var stor forskel kommunerne imellem i forhold til lokalrådets indplacering i strukturen. I nogle kommuner valgte man i forbindelse med oprettelsen af lokalrådet at nedlægge SSP-styregruppen.

Kredspolitiet/kontaktudvalget/kredsrådet opfordrede dengang til en afklaring. Hvad gik drøftelserne på i den forbindelse?

Har I fortsat en SSP-styregruppe, som ikke er underordnet lokalrådet?
(Hvordan kan det være? Hvordan har politiet forholdt sig til det?)

Sammensætning

Udover relationen til andre samarbejdsfora skulle I finde ud af, hvordan lokalrådene skulle sammensættes. Hvilke overvejelser gjorde I jer, og hvad gik drøftelserne på i den forbindelse?

Hvorfor og hvordan blev det til, at lokalrådet skulle bestå af 9 repræsentanter: 3 fra politiet, 3 fra kommunen og 3 fra lokalsamfundet?

Hvorfor og hvordan blev det til, at der ikke skulle sidde politikere i lokalrådet?

Har der været overvejelser omkring på hvilket niveau kommunens lokalrådsrepræsentanter skal være på?
Efter evalueringen i 2010 besluttede I jer for at udvide deltagerkredsen. Hvordan kan det være?

**Udpegelse**

Når det kommer til lokalsamfundsrepræsentanterne, er det kommunen, der indstiller, og politidirektøren, der udpeger. Hvordan og hvorfor blev det sådan?

Hvem I Kalundborg udvælger, hvem der skal indstilles? Hvordan foregår det? (I nogle kommuner er det embedsværket, der tager sig af det; andre steder indstiller embedsværket til byrådet, og så er det byrådet, der indstiller til politidirektøren.)

På hvilken baggrund udpeges medlemmer? Er der nogen retningslinjer?

**I dag: Relation ml. kontaktudvalg, kredsråd, byråd og lokalråd**

Hvad er kontaktudvalgets rolle kort fortalt, og hvilken rolle spiller hhv. kontaktudvalget og kredsrådet i relation til lokalrådene?

Kommunikerer du som kontaktudvalgsrepræsentant med de kommunale repræsentanter i lokalrådet?

Hvordan forløber kontakten mellem det politiske niveau i kommunen og lokalrådet?

Byråd vs. borgmester i kredsråd?

Hvordan fungerer hhv. kontaktudvalget og kredsrådet som konstruktion?

Politiet leder begge – har det en betydning for processen?
Appendix 2: Interview guide – LCPC chair
Lokalrådsformand, marts 2013

Baggrundsoplysninger
Hvad er din baggrund? Hvor länge har du været ansat i politiet, og hvad lavede du, før du blev lokalpolitistationsleder?

Betydningen af samarbejdet med foreningerne
Hvordan ser du foreningernes rolle i den kriminalpræventive indsats?
Hvilke typer af foreninger er relevante at inddrage i indsatsen og hvorfor?
Hvilke udfordringer er der forbundet med at skulle samarbejde med foreningerne?

Betydningen af samarbejdet med den kommunale forvaltning
Hvordan ser du kommunens rolle i den kriminalpræventive indsats? Hvad kan samarbejdet med de kommunale forvaltninger bidrage med?
Hvilke forvaltninger er relevante at inddrage og hvorfor?
Hvilke udfordringer er der forbundet med at skulle samarbejde med kommunerne?

Styrker og udfordringer ved lokalrådssamarbejdet
Hvad ser du som lokalrådssamarbejdets største styrker?
Hvad ser du som de væsentligste udfordringer for lokalrådsarbejdet?
Har du bud på, hvordan udfordringerne kan håndteres og lokalrådsarbejdet optimeres? Hvad mener du, der bør gøres for at få mere ud af lokalrådsarbejdet?

Formandsrollen
Hvordan ser du din rolle som formand? Hvad er dine primære opgaver?
Er der blevet gjort noget særligt for klæde dig på til at bestride rollen som lokalrådsformand?
Kurser, sparring, værktøjer?
Er der udfordringer forbundet med at udfylde rollen som formand?

Samarbejde uden for rådet
Taler du med de andre lokalrådsmedlemmer uden for lokalrådsmøderne? Hvornår/hvordan?
Er du involveret i andre samarbejdsfora?
Lokalrådsarbejdets relation til SSP

Hvordan forholder lokalrådsarbejdet og SSP-samarbejdet sig til hinanden? Hvad kan lokalrådsarbejdet, som SSP-samarbejdet ikke kan?

Lokalrådets relation til kredsrådet

Hvad er den overordnede arbejdsdeling mellem kreds- og lokalråd?

Hvordan forløber kontakten mellem kredsrådet og lokalrådet? Hvordan er den organiseret?

Evalueringer: Bliver der lavet evalueringer til kredsen? Hvor tit? Hvordan foregår det – fokuspunkter, udfærdigelsesproces, videre behandling?

Lokalrådenes kontakt med hinanden

I hvor høj grad er der kontakt, vidensdeling og samarbejde på tværs af lokalrådene i politikredsen? På nationalt plan?

Ambitioner og visioner

Hvad er dine ambitioner for lokalrådsarbejdet?

Hvis du kunne få lov at drømme frit og forestille dig lokalrådet om tre-fem-ty år, hvor l er lykkes med at udvikle lokalrådsarbejdet, som du måtte håbe på – hvordan ser rådet så ud, og hvordan fungerer det?
Appendix 3: Interview guide – LCPC participant, first round
SSP-koordinator i Kalundborg, marts 2013

Baggrund og deltagelse i lokalrådet
Du er SSP-koordinator – hvad består dit arbejde i kort fortalt?
Hvor længe har du været medlem af lokalrådet i Kalundborg?
Hvordan blev du medlem af lokalrådet? Hvem udpeger medlemmer til rådet?
Hvor lang en periode er du udpeget for?

Hvordan og hvor ofte afgøres det, hvilke forvaltninger der skal udfylde kommunernes pladser i lokalrådet?

Det kriminalpræventive arbejde i Kalundborg
Hvad ser du som de væsentligste kriminalpræventive problemstillinger i Kalundborg?

Betydningen af samarbejdet med civilsamfundsorganisationerne
Hvordan ser du civilsamfundsorganisationernes rolle i den kriminalpræventive indsats? Hvad kan de bidrage med?
Hvilke typer af civilsamfundsorganisationer er relevante at inddrage i indsatsen og hvorfor?
Kan du komme med et konkret eksempel på et problem eller en udfordring, som I har stået over for, hvor samarbejdet med en eller flere civilsamfundsorganisationer har været særligt succesfuldt og hjulpet til at finde en løsning?

Betydningen af samarbejdet med politiet
Hvordan ser du politiets rolle? Hvad kan samarbejdet med de kommunale forvaltninger bidrage med i den kriminalpræventive indsats?

Lokalrådsarbejdet
Hvad er lokalrådets formål?
Hvad ser du som lokalrådsarbejdets største styrker?
Hvad ser du som lokalrådets største svagheder / de væsentligste udfordringer for lokalrådsarbejdet?

Hvordan vil du beskrive samarbejdet i rådet? Er det et forum for samarbejde? Er det et forum for innovation? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
Taler du med de andre lokalrådsmedlemmer uden for lokalrådsmøderne? Hvornår/hvordan?

Kan du komme med et konkret eksempel på et særligt succesfuldt tiltag, som baserer sig på samarbejde mellem politiet, civilsamfundet og den kommunale forvaltning, og som er undfanget i lokalrådet?

**Lokalrådets relation til kredsrådet**

Hvad er den overordnede arbejdsdeling mellem kreds- og lokalråd?

Hvordan forløber kontakten mellem kredsrådet og lokalrådet? Hvordan er den organiseret?

**Lokalrådsarbejdets relation til SSP og øvrige samarbejdsstrukturer**

Du er også involveret i SSP-samarbejdet. Hvordan forholder lokalrådsarbejdet og SSP-samarbejdet sig til hinanden?

Hvad kan lokalrådsarbejdet, som SSP-samarbejdet ikke kan? Hvad kan SSP, som lokalrådssamarbejdet ikke kan?

Hvordan spiller lokalrådet sammen med øvrige samarbejdsstrukturer? Hvad kan lokalrådsarbejdet, som andre samarbejdsfora og -relationer ikke kan?

**Videre kontakt**

Hvem andre i kommunen er centrale i forhold til lokalrådsarbejdet?

Hvem vil du anbefale mig at tale med om udpegning til lokalrådet og den overordnede koordinering?
Appendix 4: Interview guide – LCPC participant, second round
Lokalrådsmedlem, marts 2014

Baggrundsplysninger
I hvilken egenskab sidder du i lokalrådet?
Hvor længe har du været medlem af lokalrådet?
Hvordan blev du formelt medlem af lokalrådet?

Lokalrådsarbejdet
Hvad er lokalrådets formål, som du ser det?
Hvorfor sidder du i lokalrådet?
Hvad får din organisation ud af at deltage i lokalrådet?
Hvem er dine/jeres primære samarbejdspartnere?
Taler du med de andre lokalrådsmedlemmer uden for lokalrådsmøderne? Hvornår/hvordan? Er du involveret i andre samarbejdsfora?
Hvad ser du som lokalrådets største svagheder / de væsentligste udfordringer for lokalrådsarbejdet?
Hvordan kunne man styrke lokalrådssamarbejdet?

Lokalrådets relation til kredsrådet
Hvordan oplever du kredsrådets rolle i relation til lokalrådet?
Hvordan oplever du arbejdet med handleplanerne?
Dansk resumé

Den artikelbaserede ph.d.-afhandling ”Preventing Crime Together” undersøger, hvordan offentlige aktører på forskellige niveauer kan styrke det kriminalpræventive samarbejde mellem myndigheder, private virksomheder, civilsamfundsorganisationer, frivillige foreninger og beboernetværk i Danmark.

Politikere og professionelle ser i stigende grad potentialer i tversektorielt samarbejde, når det kommer til at forebygge komplekse kriminalitetsproblemer. Regeringer i flere europæiske lande besluttede at oprette formelle samarbejdsfora på lokalt niveau med henblik på at bringe offentlige og private parter tættere sammen omkring forebyggelsen af kriminalitet. Imens myndighedernes interesse for tværgående samarbejde er stigende, peger den internationale forskningslitteratur på en række betydelig barrierer for tversektorielt samarbejde på det kriminalpræventive område. Et væsentligt problem synes at være, at toneangivende offentlige aktører på feltet ikke besidder de nødvendige kompetencer til at styre og lede offentligt-privat samarbejde.

Langt hovedparten af den forskningsbaseret viden om styring og ledelse af offentligt-privat samarbejde på det kriminalpræventive område er udviklet uden for Danmark og de øvrige skandinaviske lande. De særlige vilkår for tversektorielt samarbejde, som findes i en dansk kontekst, og de offentlige myndigheders evne til at udnytte potentialerne i et bredere og dybere samarbejde på området, er derfor underbelyst. Afhandlingen søger at råde bod på dette ved at stille og besvare forskningsspørgsmålet: ”Hvordan håndterer offentlige aktører udviklingen, implementeringen og konsolideringen af nye, samarbejdsdrevne initiativer i den kriminalpræventive indsats i Danmark; og med hvilke konsekvenser for de tværorganisatoriske relationer på feltet?”

Formålet med afhandlingen er ikke blot at bidrage med nye empiriske indsigter til forskningslitteraturen, men også at forsyne offentlige aktører i Danmark med et mere kvalificeret beslutningsgrundlag for den videre udvikling af det tværgående, kriminalpræventive samarbejde i Danmark.

lokalrådene, som blev etableret med den seneste politireform i 2007 med henblik på at styrke samarbejdet mellem politi, kommune og lokalsamfund; fjerde artikel omhandler SSP+ samarbejdet i Københavns Kommune; og femte artikel ser nærmere på 14 samarbejdsdrevne innovationsinitiativer, som sigter mod at forebygge banderelateret vold og kriminalitet i og omkring Mjølnerparken i København.

Teoretisk trækker afhandlingen på indsigter fra styringsorienteret kriminologi, implementeringssteori, metastyrings- og netværksledelsesteori, samarbejdsledelsesteori og samarbejdsdrevet innovationsteori. Metodisk bygger afhandlingen på en kombination af kvalitative data i form af policy-dokumenter, interviews og observationer, og i en enkelt artikel inddrages også kvantitativ deltagerdata.

På baggrund af artiklernes analyser konkluderes det, at offentlige myndigheders evne til at udvide og øge det kriminalpræventive samarbejde er særligt udfordret på tre punkter. For det første er den stærke institutionalisering af det mangeårige SSP-samarbejde mellem Skoler, Socialforvaltning og Politi med til at ansvarliggøre, mobilisere og sammenkoble offentlige aktører med fokus på social kriminalitetsforebyggelse, mens andre aktører henvises til periferien. For det andet fører top-down styringslogikker til uhensigtsmæssige implementeringsdesigns, som danner grundlag for nulsumsspil og ensidige fordelingslogikker, der leder til eksklusion af civilsamfundsaktører fra formelle samarbejdsarenaer. For det tredje fører et for stærkt fokus på faciliterende ledelse frem for katalyserende ledelse i udviklingen af nye samarbejdsstrukturer til reproduktion af kendte formater med gamle kendinge. Det anbefales, at offentlige aktører, der vil udvide og styrke det kriminalpræventive samarbejde i Danmark, involverer en bred skare af aktører i design af nye formelle samarbejdsstrukturer; skaber fleksible og problemorienterede samarbejdsfora, som er koblet op til mere formelle styringsarenaer; og gør brug af ledelsesstrategier, som anerkender, inkorporerer og imødekommer tilstedeværelsen af en række forskellige organisatoriske interesser og dagsordner.
English abstract

The article-based PhD dissertation "Preventing Crime Together" studies how public actors at different levels of government can promote collaborative crime prevention between public authorities, private businesses, civil society organizations, voluntary associations and community networks in Denmark.

Politicians and professionals increasingly recognize the potentials of cross-sector collaboration when it comes to preventing complex crime problems. Several European governments have decided to mandate collaborative governance arenas to be set up at a local level in order to bring public and private partners closer together around the prevention of crime. However, while public authorities show increasing interest in crosscutting collaboration, the international research literature points to a number of significant barriers to cross-sector collaboration in the field of crime prevention. A significant problem proves to be public lead actors’ lack of collaborative leadership competencies.

The vast majority of the research-based knowledge on management and leadership of public-private collaboration in the field of crime prevention has been developed outside of Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries. The specific conditions for cross-sector collaboration that exist in a Danish context, as well as the abilities of public lead actors to tap the potentials of a wider and deeper collaboration in the field, are hence underexplored.

The dissertation sets out to remedy this neglect by posing and answering the research question: “How do public lead actors manage the development, implementation and consolidation of new collaborative crime prevention initiatives in Denmark; and with what consequences for the inter-organizational relations in the field?”

The purpose of the dissertation is not only to contribute with new empirical insights to the research literature, but also to provide public actors in Denmark with a more qualified basis for decisions on the further development of collaborative crime prevention in Denmark.

The dissertation answers the main research question through five papers. The five papers rely on each their case study: one single case study with a secondary comparative-historical element, two longitudinal single case studies, and two comparative cross-case studies. The case studies shed light on challenges and solutions associated with various strategies and initiatives that seek to promote collaboration in the field. The first three papers concern the Local Crime Prevention Councils, established with the latest Danish police reform in 2007.
with the intent of strengthening the collaborative relations between the police, local government and the local community; the fourth paper considers the SSP+ cooperation in Copenhagen; and the fifth paper studies 14 collaborative innovation initiatives seeking to prevent gang-related violence and crime in and around Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen.

Theoretically, the dissertation draws on insights from governmental criminology, implementation theory, metagovernance and network management theory, collaborative leadership theory, and collaborative innovation leadership theory. Methodologically, the dissertation builds on a combination of qualitative data in the form of policy documents, interviews, and observations; in one paper, quantitative participant data is also included.

Based on the analyses presented in the papers, the dissertation concludes that three significant barriers challenge public authorities on their ability to widen and deepen collaborative relations around the prevention of crime in Denmark. First, the significant institutionalization of the long-standing SSP cooperation between Schools, Social services and the Police primarily responsibilize, mobilize and link-together social crime prevention actors from the public sector, which in turn serves to keep other actors in the periphery. Second, logics of top-down government foster inexpedient implementation designs, which give way to zero-sum games and logics of one-sided distributional advantage that serve to exclude civil society actors from formal governance arrangements. Third, too strong a focus on facilitative leadership rather than catalyzing leadership in the development of new cooperation schemes leads to reproduction of known formats with the usual suspects. If public lead actors want to widen and deepen collaborative crime prevention in Denmark, they are advised to involve a broad set of actors when designing new formal collaboration structures; to create flexible and problem-oriented collaboration forums that link-up to more formalized governance arenas; and to deploy leadership strategies that acknowledge, incorporate and cater to a variety of organizational interests and agendas.
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