Inuit Statehood: a Liquified chance of Independence

Johan Kaas-Olsen (55037)
Ørne Trygve Voetmann (55448)
Supervisor: Ole Bruun

Characters: 120.737

Indholdsfortegnelse

Introduction

In traditional cartographic representations, the Arctic figures as a marginalised area approaching the northern boundary of the map. Immanent spatial distortions make it difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend the actual tempo-spatial dimensions of the High North. In fact, the inscriptions of the Mercator Projection have become solidified in our "Western" mind to the extent that alternative visualisations often cause confusion and perhaps even disbelief. Consider e.g. how Greenland emerges as an immense icicle almost the size of Africa, when the actual scale is approximately 1:14. Aside from narrating fictitious tales, all maps channel select information to accompany our presumptions about the disciplining geographies.

In the wake of anthropogenic climate change, the High North has been reconfigured as a cartographic subject to represent the Arctic as *an* opening space. Climate models prognosticate how average temperatures in Greenland are likely to increase by three degrees Celsius within the 21st century (ACIA, 2004). More recent reports indicate how the loss of land-based ice has accelerated from 2011-2014, doubling the rate of loss from the period of 2003-2008, and further suggest how the Arctic Ocean could be largely free of sea ice as early as the late 2030s (AMAP, 2017: 3). Herewith, it arguably acquires an unprecedented importance in the geopolitical domain as resources "surface" and shipping routes clear. If global trends prevail, these changes will, according to scientists, carry on till 2050, due to warming already locked into the climate system (Ibid: 5).

From a social constructivist perspective, the region is constructed through disputes, practices and evocations. By means of social interactions, the Arctic imaginary is transformed into a narrative forged in a global system of Westphalian states and transnational organisations, but it is also home to generations of aboriginal ideas and spiritual communications. Whether the High North is portrayed as '*the world's backdoor*' (Birket-Smith in Sejersen, 2015: 19), a *'Polar Mediterranean'* (Steinberg, 2015: 7), or a mosaic of different indigenous territories it is critical to emphasise the interrelation between space and place. The Arctic might take up space in our public memory, but it also carves out a place on the map, and that is where representations prove to have material consequences.

No geography is stable in time or space, but amidst the anthropogenic disturbance in northern eco-systems, literal and figurative borders in the Arctic undergo an irreversible metamorphosis that animates the processual development of place (Gerhardt et al., 2010). Within this frame of reference,

scholars suggest how climate change opens up the Arctic to generate political opportunities for Greenland with new partner-potentialities, while it simultaneously makes the indigenous communities vulnerable (Steinberg, 2014).

With a population count of 55.860 people in 2017, it is estimated that by 2040, this number will decline to 52-53.000 people if no drastic changes are to occur with regards to fertility, mortality or migration (Greenland statistics, 2017). Coupled with the size of Greenland, it is the least densely populated country in the world. Only 20 per cent of the landmass is free of ice, where only 15 per cent is inhabitable. The lack of infrastructure, obscured by harsh weather and terrain, means that travel in between towns and settlements can only happen by air or sea during the ice-free period (Kuokkanen, 2017: 180). Furthermore, Greenland faces several social problems such as alcoholism and the highest suicide rate in the world. Within Greenland's development narrative, status quo is as such not an option, therefore as the ice retracts, the public discourse – both within Greenland, the Community of the Realm, and beyond - revolves around the question of resource development and "hyper-industrialisation" in Greenland (Sejersen, 2015).

Inhabiting the so-called traditional territories, Inuit peoples in Greenland have arguably developed a unique relation to the land and nature (Stern and Stevenson, 2006). Accordingly, outsiders frequently fantasise about Greenland as *'... the frozen North, on the edge of the world, [that] has maintained its relative impenetrability and inhospitality – primarily due to its cover of ice'* (Sejersen, 2015: 2).
With this perspective, Inuit identities become vulnerable to simplistic binary thinking transforming the cultural legacy into a static token. Inuit statehood, however, is not clearly established, and hence we will analyse how the Inuit identity is constructed by politicians, political organisations, corporations, scholars, and people(s).

Understandings of Greenland's geopolitical identity are simultaneously shaped through discursive struggles of conflicting and altering narratives. In order to comprehend the evolving fantasies concerning the historical Inuit territory, this project will more concretely address the discursive intersection between climate change, overlapping and conflicting perceptions of identity, and ideologically informed governance structures in the Greenlandic political spectrum.

To interpret the discourses of Independence, climate change and Inuit identity, we find it important to look at the post-colonial negotiations, the political and legal boundaries and the future aspirations of people(s), state(s) and NGO(s). We contend that the discursive intersection, alluded to above, constitutes a postmodern space of resistance. Conversations of climate change and Greenlandic independence articulate critical questions of intergenerational justice that engender counter-hegemonic-struggles against the status quo; they not only contest existing history, they also speak of an unspoken history with the *other place(s)* as reference point. Framing Greenland as a marginal space of resistance in the era of climate change and development, we ask the question:

Research Question

How is the Greenlandic narrative of independence articulated, and how does the role of climate change and indigeneity affect its formulation?

Sub Questions
- *How can Greenland be understood as a space of resistance?*
- *How are the climate narratives of Greenland appropriated?*
- *How is the Greenlandic Inuit identity contested in the political sphere?*

Methodology and methods of the project

To conduct critical research. To explore meaning-making processes of the discursive intersection sketched in the problem area, we think it essential to unveil our methodological propositions and its application in society, as any so-called *neutral* discussion would be framed within the premise of status quo; a collective-will profoundly dependent on set logics and symbolic representations that obfuscate the social dynamics in place. Simplified, we aspire to problematise the common-sense structures inherent the conventional methods of positivism - where people and objects are predetermined - as it would restrain our ability to understand the complex and contradictory ways of life in Greenland.

Accordingly, the present chapter discusses the methodological propositions of the project. We will expound primary concepts – *Subject* and *Structure* – to facilitate a theoretical discussion grounded in the debates on Greenlandic independence and climate change. In successive order, we will then ponder the post-colonial perspective inherent to our problem formulation, the social constructivist approach that gives meaning to our perceptions and the interpretivist approach that informs our analysis. To conclude the chapter we will determine the analytical boundaries, incorporating reflections on the (de)limitations of the selected empirical material, and our personal motivational drive.

Postcolonialism

No matter how diversified the Inuit peoples of Greenland may be, they share *one* thing, namely the colonial experience. During colonialism, indigenous peoples in Greenland were addressed within the dichotomous structure of *self* and *other* (cf. chapter 1). By transforming the cultural legacy into a static symbol mirrored in outsiders' perception of Inuit authenticity, the Arctic peoples have arguably become a partial token of study determined by discursive reductionism. On that account, the Inuit have acquired the prerogative connotation of "traditional" (Corntassel, 2003). Succinctly, the "traditional" reference alludes to a convinced fantasy of backwardness, while it simultaneously contains the Inuit in a methodical grid of difference allowing for others to measure their legitimacy as indigenous peoples.

Considering the Greenlandic pursuit of independence vis-a-vis the identified climate narratives, it becomes apparent how the environmentalist discourse today retains the Inuit in a similar romanticised

constellation, where distorted representations perpetuate stereotypes and existing social hierarchies (Martello, 2008).

To avoid transforming the cultural legacy into a static symbol of Inuit purity, we will conceptualise the Inuit identity, not in terms of their cultural distinctiveness, but in terms of the contingent relations - opportunities and misgivings - that colonialism has evoked. Inuit life worlds are disputably constituted by a heterogeneous and multiplex reality, but as scholars enthusiastically discuss the definition of indigeneity (Corntassel, 2003), there is at least one unmistakable connection across the expansive Arctic; namely the *colonial present*. All peoples in the Arctic share a direct or indirect link to the unjust colonial legacies, that continues to shape indigenous knowledge systems in a reciprocal relationship.

Targeting the appropriation of climate narratives in Greenland, we will engage with a postcolonial perspective - informed by a constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology - situating knowledge in the colonial present. Incorporating self-reflexion over prior knowledge, we are inspired by McEwan (2009) to understand the postcolonial approach as an analytical discipline. McEwan suggests how exploring the dialectical terrain of contemporary geopolitics can help to denaturalise and contextualise the often presupposed subjects, i.e. Inuit peoples and Greenlandic institutions. As such, we will articulate aspects of Greenland's path to independence exploring *inter alia* the Self-Government Act (2009) as a postcolonial manifestation that synchronously stimulates the political negotiations and frames the potentialities.

Constructivism

To proceed explaining our constructivist approach, we argue that people are socially embedded actors constituted by intersubjective understandings and expectations. With Alexander Wendt, we observe how '*people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of meaning that the objects have for them'* (1992: 397-398). On that account, it intrinsically follows that identities are forged through social interaction, and hence they are ontologically endogenous to the process of socialisation.

By means of social interaction, people negotiate a collective consciousness; an ideological phenomena according to which we structure and categorise our perceived knowledge about the world. In Foucauldian terminology, people construct a so-called *'order of discourse'* that allows us to judge the validity of given beliefs; judgements that simply depend on the agreed standards of a particular paradigm in which we live and interact (In Howarth, 2005: 114).

Succinctly, this principle allows us to unveil a 'truth' about socialisation, namely that knowledge and imagination proves to be fluid, but inseparable terms. If a person is confronted with an unknown 'object' - unprecedented in her/his experience – (s)he will either construct meaning and interests by *'analogy or invent them de novo'* (Wendt, 1992: 398). In prolongation, we will paraphrase Malkki and pose the question: *how can one make "objective" reference to reality without imagination?* (2015: 16-17). Indeed, these webs of meaning are variegated, and far beyond our intellectual reach; nevertheless, Wendt's proposition helps us to grasp otherwise intangible concepts such as *self* and *other*, which are arguably the two foundational components of the human psychological reality (Valentine, 2001). Further, this perspective on knowledge and imagination allows us to render the different geographical imaginaries and debates discussed in the project as meaningful.

Contemplating the self-conscious subject, it becomes a product of its encounter with other subject-identities; whereby it produces an intersubjectivity. By virtue of social interaction, *identity* enables the self to act on the surroundings and impose meaning onto others or to exert symbolic control (Dybbroe, 1996). This conceptualisation gives rise to the idea of the *dialectical-other*, which suggests an instrumental construct relying on relational assumptions about the internal and external, the self and the other (Sibley, 1995). Inherently this implies a mutually constitutive relation between I and You, Us and Them, where the (re)production of social categories only appear if, and as long as, the other performs as one's antithesis. Herewith the dialectical-other becomes *'a boundary phenomenon of hybridisation or inmixing, in which self and other become enmeshed in an inclusive heterogeneous [...] unstable zone'* (Sibley, 1995: 51). The problem of identity and identity narratives is to define a conceptual framework that allows a study to move beyond a superficial treatment of identity change (Dybbroe, 1996: 41). In this regard, we recourse to the interpretivist principles immanent in the Weberian conceptualisation of *Verstehen* (footnote: in translation: (empathetic) understanding), that bespeaks the necessity of interpretation (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2005).

Interpretivism
To expound our use of interpretivism, we question the functionalist presupposition about external social laws that determine and render human behaviour generalisable. Unlike functionalism, where exceptions are explained by absence of rationality or deviation from the mean, we appreciate how interpretivism understands subjects as linked in an intersubjective structure. Within this scope, people

become intentional beings who experience and perceive the same "objective reality" in idiosyncratic ways giving them different reasons for acting *in* and *on* the world (Yanow and Schwatz-Shea, 2015). Given the intersubjective structure - operationalised in an ontological sense - we proceed from the assumption that human behaviour is patterned, but that evidence of an "objective social reality" cannot manifest itself since perception is filtered and shaped by prior knowledge of the minds that interpret and evoke meaning (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2015).

This being said, we do acknowledge how functionalist research may generate figures and numerical data that can indicate the scale of a problem - e.g. climate change or socio-economic deprivation in Greenland - together with the challenge of a paradigmatic shift. All the same, quantitative data does not question the subtexts that we find interesting. With an interpretivist approach we can ask critical questions: who or what may be responsible, or who suffers the consequences directly and immediately?

Having established this methodological distinction, we devise interpretivism to decode context-specific meaning and people's perceptions of subjective and collective experiences (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2015). In relation to the research question, we intend to identify and interpret the articulated narratives of independence, climate change, and identity that emerge from academic-, political-, and public-debates in and around Greenland. Concretely, we will not generate a fabric mirrored in the observational world, rather the purpose is to present our interpretation of the narratives in a reflexive study based on qualitative data. As such, our work consciously posture a fragment of a processual study that invites other constructionists (i.e. "worldmakers") to present their alternative interpretations of the same discursive intersection to engage a conversation .

Application of theory

As alluded to above, our conceptual framework will function as an analytical tool to decipher the meanings of the discursive intersection between climate narratives and independence as identified in the problem area. Rather than conducting a traditional problem-solving analysis as advocated by e.g. Karl Popper, we aim to employ a discursive approach to unlock the debates of Greenlandic independence in its postcolonial context. We seek not to vindicate a theory, but to problematise the social construction of identities with reference to Greenlandic histories and structural orders.

To refine the analytical boundaries of the discursive intersection, the term "climate change" refers to changes that occur in all circumstances. Scientific research has demonstrated a historic element of "natural" occurring climate change, but in our contemporary context the fluctuations in temperatures etc. are increasingly conceptualised as anthropogenic climate change (Gore, 2006).

Since industrialisation, the human hand in forcing the climate has become evident, and hence to narrow our analytical scope, we will turn to narratives that entertain the anthropogenic climate change and to a lesser extent what could be named "natural" climate change. Reading these climate narratives in terms of perceived opportunities and misgivings vis-a-vis physical and societal outcomes, our interpretation will primarily focus on the debates of socio-spatial manifestations in and around Greenland.

In regards to the independence narrative, Prof. in Culture and Global Studies, Ulrik Gad (2012, 2017) identifies a new Greenlandic consciousness shaped by the Westphalian system of states. Emerging as a nation-state, Greenland enters new sovereignty games - featuring *inter alios* Denmark, the EU, and the ICC - which causes internal conflicts between indigeneity [represented by ICC] and statehood [represented by the GL state]. In addition, Prof. in Eskimology and Arctic Studies, Frank Sejersen (2010, 2015) suggests how the same schism presents itself within Greenland, where urban centres and technological advancements challenge the conventional perception of the Inuit identity. To ground our study, we intend to explore how these conflicts are understood and articulated in the Arctic public sphere, and further question how the two types of narratives - i.e. independence and climate change - influence and mark each other. Being students of geography and international studies, our approach is further inspired by the geopolitical discipline.

(De)limitation

In the process of shaping the scope and securing the analytical integrity of the project's narrative, certain conscious choices were made. The role of the melting sea ice - in *opening-up* the Arctic - has arguably become vital to the issue of independence, as it grants the Greenlandic state both opportunities and misgivings to act upon. However, located within the discursive narratives there are an abundance of actors who co-produce interpretations of climate change, which makes it a progressive field of expanding discourses. Accordingly, certain scalar considerations have been made to ensure a feasible focus.

At the local level, the Greenlandic state is composed of approximately 85 percent Inuit (xxx), which essentially makes it a *de facto* Inuit government. Without conducting an anthropological study of the Inuit peoples - to whom the ice functions as landmass critical to hunting etc. - we do acknowledge the demographic and cultural composition of the country. By focusing on the politics issued by shifting Greenlandic government(s) and government officials, we will primarily integrate the voices of the peoples in terms of election results and communications uttered in newspapers and public debates.

Exploring the independence narrative, we further believe that politicians - as explicit future-makers - constitute a critical role in society, as they attempt to fix meaning in the present and direct future narratives to best accommodate the people (or the state?). As such, we integrate politicians - through their political agendas - as actors who *try to define* "who Greenland is" and "what Greenland is to become". In order to do so, we look at political speeches, comments, and general conversations.

At the transnational level, we will incorporate political, intellectual, and financial exchanges between Greenland and Denmark as allegedly equal partners in the Danish Realm. Concretely, we intend to discuss the Self Government Act and the inherent repercussions for Greenland. Further, we will address the partner potentialities in terms of 1) generated development narratives, 2) their implication on Greenland's climate narrative. Further, we will relate Greenland to the EU and the Danish realm in order to elucidate the epistemic schism between the Greenlandic government and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) as it makes an interesting ideological paradox.

Empirical insights

To situate our analysis in the empirical material, we will utilise various sources providing different and occasionally opposing viewpoints in order to ensure a comprehensive coverage of the debates in and around Greenland. Since the debates we engage with revolve around several particular, but overlapping moments – i.e. independence, climate change, and identity – we will apply the new perspective to 'double back' and (re)interpret our initial impressions (Hesse-Biber & Lessy 2011: 234).

Due to to limited (economic) resources and the four month time constraint, the study will build on a qualitative synthesis of already existing material where: books, journal articles, newspaper articles, speeches, reports, official documents, and geographical maps merge in a dynamic analysis of the

debates that comprise and contest the political narratives of interest, namely; independence and climate change, where the question of identity plays a central role.

With examples of few authors, the next section will illustrate and elaborate on how we apply each type of data to the study:

Books will mainly be employed to give theoretical insight and historical depth to our study. Reading several historical entries, it becomes clear how different authors (de)select texts and subtexts according to their individual scope and interest. To facilitate an understanding of the constitutional transitions in Greenland, Andersen et al. (2016) will complement our postcolonial perspective with critical interpretations of the Danish modernisation strategy. As we frame Greenland as a space of resistance, we find that Pile and Kiel (1997) will provide us with a geographical perspective on narratives of *othering* that seemingly permeates the collective consciousness of the Greenlandic peoples. Similarly, reading the marginal space not as a site of domination but a place of resistance, Gad (2017) will help us to rethink Greenland as a nation of *becoming*; negotiating its independent future among states and institutions in the international realm. Immediately, this perspective provokes an ideological paradox compromising the traditionalist conceptualisation of aboriginal peoples, i.e. the Inuit. To challenge this binary thinking, we consult Sejersen (2015) who unfolds the discursive identity formation, where Inuit peoples not only adapt to the anticipated technological transformation, but socialise and appropriate it.

Journal Articles will supplement our study with different perspectives that we will draw upon in our discussion of narratives. To cogitate the discursive articulations of climate change, we utilise Bjørst (2008) to evaluate how people and institutions may concurrently embrace contradictory subject positions. Further, we employ Kirsch (2010) to put focus on the linguistic twist of "sustainable mining" that politicians and corporations defend in concert. Seeking to recover local perspectives, we have also taken excerpts of *inter alios* Bjørst (2016) and Nuttall (2012) that contain interviews, speeches, or political comments.

Newspaper articles will work as a (proxy)window into the public sphere. Undoubtedly, media networks can be manipulative as they are directed by various interests, but we do believe they constitute an incomparable and irreplaceable source of information on societal trends as they allegedly concentrate on "breaking-news". The newspapers will predominantly be applied to recover

direct quotes by the relevant actors involved with the production of space in Greenland. Among others, we deploy the journalist Oneal (2017) to compare his interviews with people from the town Narsaq, with Bjørst's (2016) findings in the same place. With the limited interviews from newspaper articles, we do not make claim to significant empirical evidence supporting any "truth", notwithstanding we will argue that they embody a quality as examples.

Speeches will be used with the expressed purpose of outlining the independence narrative in recent Greenland. The first speech dating 2008 is by Aleqa Hammond, and the latest dating 2016 is by Kim Kielsen. Incorporating several different opening speeches and New Year's speeches, the intention is to encapsulate the words and promises divulged to the Greenlandic peoples. Interpreting the speeches, we further situate them against the work by *inter alios* Søbye (2013).

Official documents will give insight into the political and legal framework that in part creates the foundation for the "Inuit governance". At the centre, is perhaps the Self-government Act (2009) that we will problematise and deconstruct in order to better understand the Greenlandic response to climate change. We also make reference to the Ilulissat Declaration (2008) as a political piece of architecture that has in some measure helped to facilitate the emergence of new Arctic imaginaries.

Motivational drive

Travelling the world, we have encountered some "strange places" and "strange people". Living in Asia and South America (Johan and Ørne Trygve respectively), we have experienced other ways of life making us question the familiar place we call "home", i.e. Denmark. Abroad people have repeatedly encouraged us to speak of the Danish welfare system, the monarchy, and the so-called "fairytale" geographies, but we honestly did not *think consciously* about Greenland as part of the Danish Realm before we visited the National Museum in Copenhagen back in 2016. Indeed, we have been taught about the Greenlandic history in school, but the colonial legacy has not been present in our minds.

Our prior knowledge on Greenland, has been shaped by distorted cartographic representations and symbolic caricatures of the Inuit. As children we soon became familiar with the tasteful mystery of the iconic ice-cream "Eskimo" (a Danish brand), but later, growing up, impressions of Greenland were shaped by environmental debates on climate change.

To us, Greenland seemed a "strange place" contained in a space of contradictions. Childhood memories of blissful summer days suddenly melted in the wake of global warming. Walking around in the National Museum, admiring the collection of "traditional" clothes brought as a gift to the Museum by explorer and anthropologist Knud Rasmussen, we became curious of the Danish involvement in Greenland.

Discussing a potential research question, we welcomed the discursive intersection between independence and climate change as an interesting challenge. Firstly, because it would allow us to investigate an "unknown" part of our own history, and secondly, because it would allow us to engage the methodological approach discussed above.

In itself, we understand our predisposition as neither positive nor negative; it is simply the product of our interaction in and with space. As authors of the study, we become partly defined by our subjective reading and interpretation of the literature, and thus we become closely connected to the conclusions of this project. By positioning ourselves in the study, we wish to situate our subjectivity and thereby contest the persuasive – but in our view false – move of objectivity.

Chapter 1: Matrimonial ups-and-downs: the Shifting storylines of the independence narrative in Greenland

Exploring the independence narrative in Greenland, we aim, according to our methodological stance, to situate Greenland in its impure colonial context. Succinctly, this chapter will present a preliminary interpretation of the Inuit territory and its struggle for autonomy and independence. In chronological order, we attempt to expose the multisided political resistance to Denmark apparent in the journey from being a colony (1721-1953), to achieving Home-rule (1979), and subsequently Self-rule (2009). Incorporating several actors – the Greenlandic government(s), the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), and the EU – we attempt to understand and interpret the Greenlandic political theater - from a constructivist perspective – where scale making is an active process through which actors generate the context(s) in which they live. To facilitate a qualified discussion of the discursive field between independence and climate change (cf. chapter 2), we will try to map the articulations and practices informing Greenland's collective consciousness.

A political marriage
The consummation of a marriage

By virtue of the constitutional amendment in 1953, Greenland was annexed to Denmark as an equal partner in what became known as *The Community of The Realm* ("Rigsfællesskabet"; henceforth: the Danish Realm). Some members of the Danish parliament contested decolonisation, but as has been pointed out by Beukel et al. (2010), it proved to be a convenient arrangement impeding the United Nations (UN) from supervising decolonisation vis-à-vis the UN Charter (UN, 1945: xi, §73-74).
According to international law, colonialism was officially abolished and Greenland gained *de jure* equality, notwithstanding, the *de facto* power relations remained asymmetrical, and the ethnic hierarchy prevailed. Admitted two seats in the Danish Parliament, the non-representative system in Greenland remained the local administrative body during the infamous "age-of-modernisation" spanning the 1950s and 60s (Andersen et al. 2016; Jensen 2015).

Administered from the distant metropole in Copenhagen, Greenland was (re)organised demographically, economically and socially with the explicit purpose of lifting the uneducated population out of poverty to meet the Danish standard of living. Indeed, restructuring developments

had a positive impact on general health conditions, however, the same developments also led to alarming displacements, alienation, and alcohol abuse (Strandsbjerg, 2014).

By means of coercion more than 1000 people were forced to move (Sejersen, 2010: 171), to facilitate a process of centralisation envisioned by the Greenlandic Commission authoring the G-50 and G-60 reports[1]. The Danish administrative apparatus imagined urbanisation as a prerequisite for development, and hence, the Inuit peoples were resettled into towns allowing for public services, including education, to be delivered. To deconstruct the postcolonial opera, one could argue that Greenland suffered a time with epistemic warfare; not only did Denmark, the new so-called partner, impose its ideas of state and nation onto Greenland (Beukel et al. 2010), it also redirected the social orientation with its new commodification of identities and spaces (Sejersen, 2010).

Through calculated assimilatory practices, the Inuit were removed from their subsistence livelihood to become reliant on the government sector in the urban areas (Steinberg, 2015: 69). Herewith, the supposedly equal partner became a subject of imperial dictatorship, where critical voices were not only silenced, but made spectators to a societal transformation conceived elsewhere. That is at least the interpretation forwarded by *inter alios* Andersen et al. (2016), but were Greenlandic peoples only passive occupiers of the marginal space? Truly, the birthplace criteria ("fødselskriteriet") [2] enabled the political authorities to exploit the Greenlandic population as an inexpensive and relatively disempowered labour force (Petterson, 2014: 152), but together with the involuntary EU membership[3] these specific arrangements seemed, not to pacify, but rather to stimulate a political resistance to Denmark and the Danish Realm (Gad, 2017). Reading Sejersen (2015), it can in fact be argued that these injustices gave impetus to the birth of Greenlandic nationalism and the story of an autonomous nation-state. In this view, the marginal space becomes characterised not by domination, but rather by resistance, and it is on these grounds that we frame Greenland as a space of resistance.

---

[1] The two reports outline the political strategy for development in Greenland.

[2] The birth place criteria (1964-1990): Voted in by the Greenlandic Commission, and stipulated that salaries depended on birth place. Meaning people from Denmark working in Greenland would earn more than their Greenlandic counterpart.

[3] 1972 referendum: 70 per cent voted against accession due to EU fishing quota, which posed a challenge to the Greenlandic fishing industry (Gad, 2017: 15, 82).

The Marital Separation: 1979

Stimulated by the identified injustices – assimilation, displacement, and forced institutional dependence - experienced in the immediate period after decolonisation, the 1970s became known by the political mobilisation for Inuit emancipation and self-determination in Greenland. By a public majority vote (approximately 70 per cent) Home-rule was established in 1979, and herewith Greenland could claim jurisdiction over designated internal policies e.g. *social welfare, labour market affairs, education,* and *other matters relating to trade* (cf. The Greenland Home Rule, Act no. 577, 1978).

In response, the political and financial attention turned from previous centralisation policies to new patterns of decentralisation, where participation and cooperative ownership became articulated objectives (Sørensen in Gad, 2017: 171). Among other initiatives, the special subsidies and favouring tax evasions were implemented to stimulate the welfare of isolated settlements. Herewith, the discursive Greenlandic identity was formulated in a nostalgic revival of Inuit virtues to accommodate remote communities. By Dahl (2000 & 2001), this is interpreted as a political compensation for previous Danish neglect.

Extending equally in the Arctic, the indigenous voices were united in the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) established in 1977. At the moment of writing, the ICC officially claims to represent 160.000 Inuit peoples of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka with a consultative status II at the UN[4]. The declared mission is to 1) *'strengthen unity among Inuit of the circumpolar region'*, 2) *'promote Inuit rights and interests on an international level'*, 3) *'develop and encourage long-term policies that safeguard the Arctic environment,* and 4) *'seek full and active partnership in the political, economic, and social development of circumpolar regions'* (ICC, n.d.). Succinctly, the ICC presupposes *an* Inuit identity amalgamated under *one* intersubjective consciousness transcending modern border politics by articulating a pan-Arctic voice; a transnational community officially apprehended by Knud Rasmussen's 5th Arctic expedition in 1921 (Steinberg and Tasch, 2015: 115). As will be discussed later (cf. chapter 2), the ICC engenders a curious dynamic in regard to the Inuit identity, notwithstanding, we introduce the ICC here, as it effectively stimulated the internal political

---

[4] Granted in 1983. The ICC actively assisted to draw the universal declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples (Wilson and Smith, 2011: 913).

discussions *in* and *outside* of Greenland. The two institutions – the ICC and the Home-rule – did not necessarily share *one* collective will, but with Greenlandic representatives in the ICC, it became a political instrument to further arguments on human rights and sovereignty outside of the Danish Realm[5].

Parallel to the political shift mentioned above, the sea temperatures on the west coast of Greenland decreased, causing a significant decline in the cod stock and a market increase in the shrimp stock. Against Home-rule intentions, this climatic expression prompted a transformation of the fishing industry that had hitherto relied on inshore small-scale fishery to offshore large-scale fishery. A counter development, which further cemented otherwise unwanted centralisation making the villages unprofitable and disputably "redundant" (Rasmussen, 2009).

In 1985, the Home-rule government withdrew its membership from the EU by public majority vote (approximately 52 percent). By doing so they regained some political control of the fishing industry, but as market profitability fluctuated, and the renewable resource stock diminished in the early 1990s, the Greenlandic government redirected its attention to the non-renewable resource industry (Rasmussen, 2003). This did not imply an indifference to the fishery that to this day measures up the main source of income, but rather a conversation of future prospects that could diversify the otherwise volatile Greenlandic economy and potentially serve as a stepping stone to independence.

Pulling out of the EU, Greenland achieved – in diplomatic cooperation with Denmark – to negotiate the *Treaty of Withdrawal* ("the Greenlandic Treaty"). The preamble of the Greenlandic treaty refers to: *'arrangements being introduced which permit close and lasting links between the Community and Greenland to be maintained and mutual interests, notably the development needs of Greenland, to be taken into account'* (Greenlandic Treaty, 1985). Withdrawing from the EU, Greenland achieved status as a "special case" among the 21 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) with unrestricted and tariff-free access of fisheries products to the EU. Prior funds to Greenland as an EU member were interrupted, but with the introduction of "paper fish"[6] an alternative financial line was legitimised;

---

[5] Within a constructionist legacy, sovereignty does not emerge as a theoretical object in terms of its presence or absence. On the contrary, sovereignty becomes meaningful to analysis in terms of particular discourse(s) and practice(s) that constitute the legal and political domain (Gad, 2017: 1).

[6] A hypothetic fish stock, i.e. EU bought rights to catch cod should they return and redfish should they appear.

Greenland continued as a subsidiary recipient on the condition that the EU was granted satisfactory possibilities for access to the Greenlandic waters under a fisheries agreement (Gad, 2017: 221).

In 2006, the EU and Greenland formulated a joint declaration framing new fields of cooperation – *inter alia* education, mineral resources, marine transportation, and climate research – that legitimised another budget line to support Greenlandic sustainable development (EU, 2006). Same year, Greenland implemented a two phased program based on the report *'Progress through Education and Competency Development'*, to secure additional EU funding for education and development of human resources.

To reiterate, Greenland is a special case in the auspices of the EU. The details of the relationship is more complex than stated above, but to our study, it becomes relevant vis-à-vis the independence narrative. By virtue of its legal OCT status, Greenland proves to challenge the marginal space of international relations on multiple scales. The EU is a supranational institution epitomised by overlapping political and legal authorities, where Greenland asserts itself as an autonomous nation among other postcolonial entities.

All considered, Home-rule did not in and by itself diminish internal conflicts between government and peoples, and as some say: *'outside the Capital, Nuuk seems as far away as Copenhagen'* (Sejersen in Strandbjerg, 2014: 272). Nevertheless, self-government negotiations prevailed from the enactment of Home-rule in 1979, and on the 21st of June 2004 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then Danish Prime Minister, and Hans Enoksen, then Greenlandic Premier, signed the terms of reference for the Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission.

The (close to be) Final Divorce: 2009

Grounded in the commission's White Paper, Self-rule was ratified in 2009 (Greenland Self Government, Act no. 473, 2009). With yet another majority vote (approximately 75 per cent), Greenland will presumably be the first independent Inuit nation-state (Nuttall, 2008). With the inauguration of Self-rule, Greenland renamed the country by its Inuit term, Naalakkersuisut, and further declared Kalaallisut as the official language. Hereby, Greenland arguably reappropriated the *'power to define'* (Western in Mitchell, 2000: 250), notwithstanding; identity discourse in Greenland simply cannot be reduced to the promotion of aboriginal rights and culture (Stern and Stevenson,

2006; Søbye, 2013). The nationalist Greenlandic struggle for independence and autonomy not only integrates *'elements of modernity, imported by colonialism'* (Gad, 2009: 137) it has become dependent on these.

De jure Naalakkersuisut is a public government, but with an Inuit population constituting >85 per cent of the total it is *de facto* an Inuit government (Steinberg et al., 2015), and hence the democratisation of Greenland could be interpreted as a tangible progress in the decolonisation of Inuit affairs. Within the Arctic, Naalakkersuisut is hitherto the only autonomous territory that has had the possibility of legally reaching the status of full independence, and so it assumes meaning as an indisputable symbol of Inuit resistance.

The political dream of independence (headline 4)

Political figures in Greenland are and have been aware of the unique position, however, we find it relevant to mention what appears to be a "collective indecisiveness" as regards the question of *when* to "seize" independence? Proceeding from 2009, Greenland has had four different premiers: Hans Enoksen (2002-2009), Kuupik Kleist (2009-2013), Aleqa Hammond (2013-2014), and Kim Kielsen (2014-). Together they seem to agree on the premise of inevitable independence, but in speeches and interviews each premier has expressed different perceptions of Greenland's readiness. The next section will briefly incorporate and reflect upon some indicative statements made by the four premiers to elucidate how the political elite imagines a future independent Greenland:

In Enoksen's New Year's speech in 2009, he explicitly articulated the task at hand, namely the implementation of Self-rule, while he implicitly alluded to an aspiration of greater independence: *'After the introduction of Self-rule on the National Day* [the 21st of June]*, the very first task is for us to assume responsibility over raw materials from Denmark'* (Enoksen, 2009 [translation by authors]). In continuation, he mentioned the desire to take-home the jurisdiction of immigration, as the government anticipated a labour shortage in the near-future. In itself, this quote suggests an intentional diversification of the Greenlandic economy, where raw materials are framed as a potential steppingstone to independence as alluded to above.

Same year, at the press conference of the inauguration of Self-rule, the new premier Kleist is quoted saying: *'I won't set a date or a year* [on independence]. *I'm completely certain that Greenland is on*

its way to independence. It takes the time it takes…' (Unknown, 21.06.2009 [translated by authors]). Similar to Enoksen, Kleist seems to focus primarily on the present task at hand; stabilizing the Greenlandic society. Later in 2012, the first announcement by Kleist is supported by his opening speech at Inatsisartut (parliament), where he claimed that the Danish Realm continues to be an important political institution: *'It is obvious that the three countries within the Danish Realm each have our national interests, all the same we agreed to strengthen our relationship in the coming years. I am happy about this agreement, as we to a large degree need a close cooperation with Denmark in order to protect our national interests hereinafter'* (Kleist, 2012 [translation by authors]).

Kleist's successor, Hammond, articulated another political direction of independence. In her opening speech at Inatsisartut in 2013, Hammond, said: *'As chairman of Naalakkersuisut, I have an overall objective of contributing to form a stronger people and a stronger society, that we will come closer to independence, and closer at creating the state of Greenland'* (Hammond, 2013 [translation by authors]). Succinctly, Hammond emphasised the objective of state-building, which caused both applause and criticism within the Greenlandic society. Being denounced of political mistrust due to subsidiary fraud, embezzlement, and breach of trust, she had to resign[7], leaving presidency of Siumut to Kielsen who managed to form a new coalition with Inuit Ataqatigiit and Partii Naleraq.

In the new *Coalition Agreement* (2016-2018) the first phrase states: *'Greenland is irreversibly on its way to independence, and this process requires not only political stability, but also national unity. The parties agree to submit proposals for a new constitution at the end of this legislative term'* (Coalition Agreement, 2014: 2 [English Version]). Immediately, this suggests that the coalition proceeds where Hammond left, notwithstanding, personal statements by the current premier Kielsen indicate a moderation of the political will: *'We shall be our own master. But we have different opinions within our party* [Siumut]. *First, I would like to see the young generation educated, and then it must be up to them to choose if they are ready'* (Breum, 22.05.2015 [translation by authors]). Fundamentally, the objective stays the same, but the difference lies in the nuance. Kielsen does not let the need for independence influence the goal of solving the immediate societal problems. In contrast to Hammond, Kielsen does not attempt to articulate the future as if it was part of the present. Indeed, he believes in the utility of oil, gas, and minerals as crucial sources of income in Greenland, notwithstanding, he seems to prioritise education just as much. In a comment to the press, Kielsen

---

[7] Hammond has later been reported to the police (Søndergaard, 2015).

elaborates on his political intentions: *'We are in a situation, where 500 of our people have taken their own lives within the last 10 years, of which 60 have been children. If we don't take care of these serious problems prior to the country's full independence, what then do we really want to achieve with the future independence?* (Elkjær, 07.05.2017 [translation by authors]).

To reiterate, the above statements reveal how the political tale of independence has been (re)produced throughout the last decade. All politicians seem to share the idea that Greenland must pursue its independence, but the pace in which they imagine such development to unfold differs significantly. From focusing on the implementation of the SGA to secure the local communities, to putting greater emphasis on state-building and large-scale industrialisation. Hammond being the most outspoken about her intentions, seemed for a while to influence the greater debate in and around Greenland; an observation, which we find to be reflected in both the newspaper articles and scholarly conducted research (both material that we have and have not made direct reference to in this project). Her successor Kielsen, appear to share her view, although he suggests a more pragmatic approach focusing on moment. To him, it is not the current system that is to decide whether full independence should be implemented, but rather he believes that the future generation should decide when they feel ready.

The Political rules

Turning to the Self Government Act (henceforth: the SGA), it is despite prospective independence critical to understand the revitalisation of "Inuit governance" in Greenland as an expression of an impure colonial context. Indeed, we will argue that the SGA – which premise is Greenlandic industrialisation - not only contrives the perceived opportunities but implicitly it also operates and controls the political rationale, aspirations, and the actual process of *becoming* (independent). Presumably, the SGA epitomises the legal framework for future agency, however, as the social and environmental impacts of an industrial development are inherently unpredictable, the SGA may as Sejersen (2015:58) argues obstruct the (imagined) positive societal transformation that the climatic conditions are believed to entail. To clarify our argument, we are not *per se* opposing the SGA, but as the following paragraphs will problematise and deconstruct the SGA, it is our hope to elucidate some of the immanent implications of the text.

The SGA stipulates:

1) Recognition of Inuit of Greenland as a distinct people, with right to self-determination under international law; 2) Self-Government authorities assume legislative and executive power, with expanded jurisdiction over the Greenlandic courts and police; 3) absolute right over the soil and subsoil; 4) power to engage in foreign affairs that may influence Greenland. Further, the SGA contains a provision stipulating that the people of Greenland unilaterally may declare their independence from the Danish Realm if they so desire.

In contrast to the law on Home-rule, where the annual block grant would increase[8] should the local government claim new jurisdictional responsibilities, the law on Self-rule stipulates that the Greenlandic government must itself finance policy issues brought "home" from the metropole in Copenhagen. Inherently, this "restriction" comprises an enormous economic challenge to the Inuit state.

As alluded to above, the Home-rule directed its attention towards the perceived opportunities integral to the exploitation of non-renewable resources (e.g. mining and hydrocarbon) due to diminishing profits in the fishing industry. Natural resources are presumably abundant (cf. USGS, 2007), but the SGA stipulates that if revenues obtained from resource extraction exceeds 75 million kroner, the annual subsidies will be regulated by an amount equal to 50 per cent of the portion exceeding the 75 million kroner (Greenland Self Government, Act no. 473, 2009).

Concurrently, the SGA acknowledges Danish diplomacy's constitutional authority and power in regards to foreign affairs and security policy, which could for instance influence certain aspects of the anticipated industrialisation (Bjørst, 2017). Moreover, the SGA confirms that annual subsidies from the Danish Realm have been locked at 3.4 billion kroner vis-à-vis the 2009 price and wage index[9], but as Sejersen (2015) indicates, this betoken a fiscal challenge, as the inflation rate in Greenland is proportionately larger than in Denmark[10]. Consequently, the block grant is continuously diminishing; from 2010 to 2012 alone, the Danish subsidy was reduced by 50 million kroner

---

[8] According to the Home-rule legislation the subsidies would equal the amount spent by the Danish state (Gad, 2017:63)

[9] Should revenues derived from natural resources supersede the block grant, a new agreement will be negotiated between Greenland and Denmark.

[10] If the inflation rate is < in Greenland the amount will decrease, if the inflation rate is = in Greenland the amount will stagnate, and if the inflation rate is > in Greenland the amount will increase. The current trend indicates that Greenlandic inflation is higher meaning that the purchasing power of the block grant will be relatively smaller.

(Sejersen, 2015: 30). Videlicet, Greenland must search for alternatives to economic dependency, and while the pursuit of Inuit statehood was originally visualised as a possible governance structure to preserve so-called "traditional" livelihoods, change in circumstances disputably reshaped the Inuit's independence strategy.

Aleqa Hammond seemed conscious of this when she in her New Year's speech in 2014 echoed the point of state-building from her opening speech at Inatsisartut cited above: *'We can't simply lean back and wait for increased independence to come by itself. We ourselves have to create the context for it to happen, and that may mean that we today think the* **decisions and/or methods are untraditional** [emphasis added]. *But that will certainly stand in another light when we one day look back at the work we have done, when we in the future have become a state'* (Hammond, 2014 [translation by authors]). The question that emerge is whether this equals the end of the Inuit? How is it possible to consult and facilitate new "national-interests" in the public discourse without compromising the exceptional legal entitlement of indigenous peoples right to self-determination (ILO, 1989; UNDRIP, 2008)? These questions will be discussed further (cf. chapter 3).

Discursive perspectives on (in)dependence in Greenland: (headline 2)

In this subchapter, we will present a traditionalist interpretation of the Greenlandic cause of action vis-à-vis statehood and indigeneity. Succinctly, we will problematise what we refer to as "marginality logic", and subsequently, we will reflect on Greenland as a space of resistance:

Critiques of statehood dispute that the adaptation of the Westphalian doctrine might debilitate indigenous "traditions" and epistemologies, which the Inuit peoples presumably attempt to preserve while not being restricted by those (Keskitalo, 2004; Stern and Stevenson, 2006).

Reading Bold and Long's (1984) traditionalist reflection on the tribal dilemma in Canada, it could by parallel be argued that a Greenlandic structure informed by the colonial notion of sovereignty, would self-serve as an instrumental device oriented to consolidate the same structural paradigm, which has subjugated and coerced the Inuit nation in Greenland since 1721. Dissecting Bold and Long's argument, it proves to follow a traditionalist "marginality logic" according to which, the Inuit is "at risk" of being consumed by capitalism, and hereby they become prone to self-alienation.

In response, we will argue that Bold and Long's reminiscence neglects the mosaic space where peoples of resistance deflect and give idiosyncratic shape to self, and self's place in space. If resistance is *'to occupy, deploy and create alternative spatialities from those defined through*

oppression and exploitation' (Pile and Keith, 1997: 3), the *self* becomes separated from the *other,* when "tradition" is conceptualised as a passive token of authenticity mirroring a system of unambiguous intergenerational knowledge. Reading Greenlandic history however, it becomes evident that analytical dichotomies – separating *one* from *the other –* merely contribute with a limited insight printed on a one-dimensional surface. Dialectics admittedly reveal immediate axis of power, notwithstanding, their essentialist conceptualisation of identity neglects the multiplex processes of creolisation.

Tradition may be defined as: "what is transmitted", but as peoples '*reach back **selectively*** [emphasis added] *to deeply rooted, adaptive traditions...* [They create] *new pathways in a complex postmodernity. Cultural endurance is a process of becoming'* (Clifford, 2013: 7), and consequently the traditionalist binary-grid repudiates Inuit agency and their right to rework the intersubjective consciousness according to the moment (Dybbroe, 1996). Within this frame of reference, "tradition" becomes a source of cyclical transformation where subjects proactively engage with several chronologies to narrate their own stories and historical perceptions (Clifford, 2013).

Paved with good intentions, traditionalist "marginality logic" perpetuates what Said (1979) defines *'Orientalism'*, where prejudice and semi-caricatural representations inform the discourse on Inuit in the Arctic. The question is if the Inuit identity is not a stream of suspended memories and visions, which exist in reciprocity between structure(s) and agency? From our application of the constructivist perspective, *'roles are not played in mechanical fashion according to precise scripts... but are "taken" and adapted in idiosyncratic ways by each actor'* (Wendt, 1992: 419), and herewith we think it critical to distinguish between the structural determination of the self, and the self determination of choice.

Indeed, the Inuit sense of community has been penetrated, (re)shaped, and negotiated through the medium of colonial technocratic-bureaucracies (Crawford, 2014; Petersen, 1995). Nevertheless the Inuit in Greenland seem to resist assimilatory policies and discriminatory legislation to preserve what is deemed specific and particular to *their* understanding of *self* (Sejersen, 2015). Consider e.g. the first Greenlandic rock-band Sume, the new artistic literature in Greenland, or the establishment of The National Theatre of Greenland in 2011 that house performances inspired by the Greenlandic culture.

In prolongation, it is curious to explore the historical development of nationalist discourse employed by the peoples of Greenland. During Home Rule, Greenlandic authorities contested the dualistic conceptualisation of the *dialectical-other* to turn the linguistic scene (Sejersen, 2015). By means of demographic policies facilitating economic and structural development of the metaphorical *self*, epitomised by the isolated settlements (Dahl, 2010), Greenland learned to *'reconceptualise themselves as "cultures" for purposes of political interaction with the current world system'* (Turner, 1993: 426). Later, with the enactment of Self-rule, the normative premise of the discourse changed from indigenous rights, to Naalakkesuisut as a nation in its own right (Gad, 2014), which ironically has inspired a recentralisation of the economy. Worth remembering, this only occur as the Greenlandic language, Kalaallisut, is simultaneously being actively integrated into the public system of education etc.

The shift implies alternative scalar productions of space, where Greenland: firstly, articulates the Inuit on a local scale as the marginalised subject oppressed by the colonial power; secondly, articulates the Inuit as the central subject in a process of moving beyond the colonial grid to *become* global. Analytically speaking, Greenland legitimises itself according to the "rules of international relations"[11]. Herewith, the Inuit no longer represent the marginal *other*, but they effectively dislocate the perception of Greenland as a subnational dependency to Denmark by asserting themselves as equals in a postcolonial sovereignty game.

On the question of indigenous subjectification, Lars-Emil Johansen, from the Siumut party, argued: *'According to international law, being considered as a minority in another people's country or being defined as an indigenous people is useless. Both positions may give certain rights as well as some international support, but they won't give the right to choose freedom and independence for one's people and country, which can only come from the international recognition as a people. [...] for many of us at home, this may sound as a truism. We do know we are a people in this world'* (Johansen 2008 in Søbye, 2013: 10). With this statement, Johansen makes a direct reference to the legal – and to some extent strategic - shift from framing the Inuit peoples as a marginalised minority within the Danish Realm to becoming a majority of a united people recognized in international law.

This abstract practice of scale-making has material consequence. Consider e.g. the internal political landscape of Greenland, where the majority seem to endorse the notion of independence. As

---

[11] Only sovereign states (Gad, 2017).

Greenland by virtue of public votes starts to erase Denmark from the map, new powers must fill out the empty spaces, but how should the production of space be orchestrated? What on a local scale seemed to be *one* consolidated socio-political unit, now appears as space(s) of contradictions (cf. chapter 2 & 3). By upscaling Greenland, the new state anticipates a national diversification of the economy, but this upscaling relies on utilitarian centralisation that may drain smaller communities of human capital (Rasmussen, 2009; Sejersen, 2010). On the other hand, it allows Greenland to influence other states and intergovernmental institutions (Gad, 2017).

To understand how peoples in Greenland *do* and *think* geographical resistance is analytically demanding. While it does not necessarily harmonise with simplistic epistemological classifications, one should try to situate Inuit ideas and political struggles with reference to the shifting truth regimes and their scalar implications. By interpreting Inuit strategies of resistance in terms of abstract causal mechanisms, one neglects how resistance and activism *'cannot simply address itself to changing external physical space, but must also engage the colonised spaces of people's inner worlds'* (Pile and Keith, 1997: 17). The Inuit must in other words conquer parts of themselves in order to achieve the called for emancipation. Succinctly, this implies – as has been alluded to earlier - that the Danish state colonised not only the external- but also the internal-space(s), and thus any resistance requires the subject to face and recognise itself as it is under the new circumstances. In this regard, Aleqa Hammond articulated the need for reconciliation (Hammond, 2013), and in 2014 Greenland established the Reconciliation Commission with the expressed purpose to *'...uncover cultural and societal challenges in society which generate tense relations as a consequence of the colonial heritage'* (Forsoningskommission, n.d. [translation by authors]). The Commission's focus lies with 1) internal sociological issues, and 2) with historical development and cultural interaction in Greenland and between Greenland and Denmark. The Commission makes no demands on apologies or legal justice claims, but merely attempts to avoid the continuation of Greenlandic self-identification as victims. By accepting Greenlanders own partial responsibility in historical developments, the Greenlandic peoples will have to articulate taboos e.g. Danish-Greenlandic marriages and internal linguistic estrangements (Gad, 2009).

Accordingly, we will suggest that the narrative of independence becomes a storyline of processual negotiations where the edges of political identities become blurred as they juxtapose and co-exist in new hybrid constellations (cf. chapter 3).

Considering Greenland as an analytical space of resistance, we will argue that it constitutes a spatial duality where the meaning of place is partially connected and disconnected from the boundaries and scales imposed by the "oppressor", i.e. Denmark. It is connected in the sense that Inuit peoples *'insinuate'* (de Certeau in Pile and Kieth, 1997: 15) themselves into the space of the oppressor, and disconnected in the sense that the meaning inscribed in that space is contentious. By nature of the social, the Inuit may actively engage resistance in the dislocation(s) of space, and hereby challenge the discursive order articulated and enforced by Denmark. Spaces become reconfigured to other ends, but this form of resistance is not merely of governmental-, but also of ideological-character.

Sub conclusion.

It is critical to note that the analytical mosaic assembled above predominantly rests on other people's work. Indeed, it might not portray all the intentions and the derived positive achievements of Danish modernisation projects or the subsequent process of decolonisation, all the same, we will argue that it does not portay the traumatic experiences shared among the Greenlandic peoples either.

Conceptualising Greenland as a space of resistance, we have questioned the colonial apparatus' perception of indigenous identities. To *'[caricature] "culture" as static, bounded homogenous, and uncontested* (Saywer and Gomez, 2012: 22), truly has inflicted suffering on Inuit peoples, nevertheless the objective to control indigeneity has not been achieved. Of this, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and the Inuit government in Greenland are together loud testimonies of contestation in the production of space (cf. chapter 2 & 3).

Greenland exemplifies how negotiations have facilitated Inuit statehood, but the question remains how these worlds reflect a conscious self- to self-reflexion? How do Inuit peoples fit into a world that has tried to eradicate them? Indeed, Inuit peoples have suffered a disproportionate amount; nevertheless, the same people envision a future (cf. chapter 2). Not all understand phenomena as globalisation and capitalism as the downfall of identity. Perhaps we should rethink indigenous studies and avoid a binary discourse of (non)culture, to focus more on the idea of hybrid cultures. As one Greenlandic Official said *'culture is not necessarily what you do to maintain a living; it is also what you do after 4 o'clock'* (Steinberg et al., 2015:79)

Chapter 2: Painting the Arctic, A Tale of Contesting Narratives

If the Greenlandic state is to control the Inuit territory as an independent nation-state, the former chapter prognosticated a diversification of the economy – i.e. substantial investment industrialisation – to overcome the fiscal challenge immanent in the Self-Government Act. To better understand the discursive intersection between independence and climate change, this chapter will explore some of the different perspectives that may influence Greenland's conceptualisation of environmental opportunities and misgivings. Within this frame of reference, we will portray the Arctic Council as a context generative organ inducing new meaning into the Arctic region, and further consider how the adaptation of the Ilulissat Declaration (2008) evokes a potential schism between the ICC and the Greenlandic state. Thereafter we will investigate how three major actors - the Greenlandic government, corporations and the ICC - articulate Greenland's position in an *opening* Arctic.

Setting the Scene: An opening Arctic

In light of the political narrative towards Greenlandic independence (cf. chapter 1), environmental change emerges as a phenomenon constituted not only by measurable natural forces, but also as a social construction in which nature, climate and peoples are co-produced (Sejersen, 2015: 33). Within Greenland alone, the responses to climate change differ greatly between actors. Hunters are expressing concerns as their livelihoods are challenged by the melting sea ice, whilst sheep farmers in the South benefit from the increasing landmass that becomes available to them. In the town of Maniitsoq, the aluminium company Alcoa has plans to construct an aluminium smelter, of which the citizens are hopeful as it could provide job opportunities and potentially reinvigorate the area's economic growth[12]. Meanwhile, the government – the politicians in Nuuk – are attempting to imagine and articulate the potential wealth of the subsoil resources as they become uncovered by climate change (Nutall, 2012; Sejersen, 2015: 18). To that extent, climate change in Greenland and the Arctic region cannot merely be considered a natural catastrophe. The warming of the Arctic endangers the livelihoods of certain groups of the Inuit as the landscape politically and economically changes, however, quoting Nutall, climate change also: *'presents opportunities for a productive economic future and discussion about it is framed within a Greenlandic political discourse of nation-building, state-formation and resource development…'* (2012: 118).

---

[12] Maniitsoq used to be a virtuous fishing village but has suffered from fisheries being shut down.

With the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, the circumpolar Arctic was conceptualised as an international region. With no independent legal authority, the declaration formally established the Arctic Council (AC) as an intergovernmental forum for Arctic governments and peoples (Arctic Council, 2016). The AC consists of 8 member states – Canada, the Danish Realm, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA – together with six international organisations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples – including the ICC - with a permanent participant status. The articulated targets are to *'[promote] cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues; in particular, issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic'* (Arctic Council, 2016).

In itself, the AC is beyond our analytical scope, but it is interesting to note how Tennberg argues that the AC has influenced the geographical imaginaries of states' *'Arcticness'* (2009: 294). By framing the Arctic region as an environmental panopticon in the *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment* (ACIA, 2004; cf. AMAP, 2016), the AC actively put focus on *the opening-up* of the region; something that was indirectly reflected in subsequent articulatory practices of the Arctic states (Tennberg, 2009).

Scholars suggest how the anticipated *opening-up* presents new spatial interpretations, where climate change is constructed as a technical matter to be governed vis-à-vis utilitarian cost / benefit logics (cf. Dodds, 2010; Gerhardt et al., 2010; Dittmer et al., 2011). Within this frame of reference, states arguably produce the Arctic as a space *of* and *for* politics where nature becomes subject to ownership, commodification, and commercialisation. If we think-in the AC however, the merits of the claim becomes questionable, exactly due to the expressed aim of pursuing knowledge of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

With the Russian flag planted on the North Pole in 2007, speculations about a *'scramble for the Arctic'* (Sale, 2009) prophesied a security dilemma in the "anarchic region". Immediately, this brand of realist allegory connotes an image of the New Imperialism (1881-1914), where European states invaded, annexed and colonised the African continent. To avoid the uncertainties integral to the prospects of this scenario, Denmark invited four out of seven members of the AC to negotiate a framework for future governmental interventions in the Arctic. In search of stabilising a status quo imaginary controlled by the littoral Arctic states, *outsiders* were deliberately excluded from the diplomatic meeting.

Signing the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, the so-called Arctic five agreed to endorse the UN convention of the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) as the governing principle in the region. Implementing the UNCLOS as the preferred legal mechanism to establish sovereign right claims to the Arctic Continental Shelf, the littoral Arctic states – with the exception of the USA – submit geological evidence of continental continuity to the Commission (Gad, 2012: 220). Even though the Declaration in itself did not *de facto* change anything (Steinberg et al., 2015), the *either/or* concept of sovereignty implied in the Ilulissat Declaration did cause some disturbance and discontent among the parties excluded by the new horizontal sovereignty game.

Hence, to invigorate future positionality vis-à-vis an imagined circumpolar hierarchy, political actors in the Arctic arguably recourse to introspective imaginations with the purpose of extricating *self* from the present "(dis)order" epitomised by *other*. Consider e.g. the ICC's claim to be *'united as a single people'* with *'the rights of all peoples'* (Inuit of Inuit Nunaat, 2014; 1.3) while simultaneously stipulating that *'Inuit consent, expertise and perspectives are critical to progress on international issues involving the Arctic'* (Inuit of Inuit Nunaat, 2014: 3.5). The *'postcolonial sovereignty games... played on the way to the realisation of independence'* in Greenland (Gad, 2012: 219). Or the above mentioned sovereignty game played by the littoral Arctic states. All, so-called "games" seemingly project themselves into a prospective opening of the circumpolar region, while they simultaneously modulate the social structures of status quo in a self-serving manner.

The Conference of Parties (15): An identity shift

In 2009 the fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP 15) was held in Copenhagen, carrying forth a large emphasis on reducing CO_2 emission in line with the Kyoto Protocol signed back in 1997. As part of the Danish Realm, Greenland was set to reduce its emission of CO_2 by 8 percent (Bjørst, 2010). Such reductions could impose a barrier for the envisioned industrialisation, and further imply that Greenland would have to rely on purchasing emission quotas in order to continue industrialising. These implications were negatively perceived by Hans Enoksen, who stated: '*It cannot hold true, that when it becomes our turn* [to industrialise and develop]*, we first have to pay a hefty price in order to emit CO^2. If it is the so, it would be a clear case of inequality'* (Enoksen, 2009 [translation by authors]). The result of such implications would devalue the economic benefits of pursuing industrialisation as a tool for self-reliance. Illustratively, the aluminium smelter

proposed by Alcoa has been estimated to increase Greenland's emission of CO_2 by an estimated 450-600,000 tons, almost doubling its current emissions (Schmidt & Thrane, 2009).

Leading up to COP 15, Enoksen was replaced by Kuupik Kleist. This proved to result in a shift in the political agenda; with regards to climate change, Enoksen's party articulated the Greenlandic peoples as victims of "Western" development – a narrative that implied a marginal position (Bjørst, 2011: 148). With the inauguration of the Inuit government's new premier, Kuupik Kleist, a new approach to climate change appeared. In response to the emission goals discussed at COP 15, Kleist wrote a clear statement to the Danish (now former) Minister for Climate and Energy, Lykke Friis:

"*The world society has a common but differentiated responsibility in limiting greenhouse gas emission in order to reduce global warming. However, the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must not stop development in societies that, like the Greenlandic, have actual needs for economic growth and development*" (Kleist, 2009 [translation by authors]).

Following, a deal was negotiated, stating that Greenland would be exempted from the targets and commitments made by Denmark at COP 15 (Jacobsen, 2015). In part, this was a battle of unequal advancement and growth for developing countries, fought *internally* in Denmark (Sejersen, 2015: 85). However, it was also a battle of identity in the global political landscape as Greenland situated itself and its position on climate change, not as victims but as agents capable of, and with the right to, development. By virtue of such, Kleist achieved an articulation of Greenland as a climate actor in both the local and the global political setting.

In as much, climate change was on the Greenlandic government's agenda; but instead of adhering to the perhaps expected discourse of environmentalism as representatives of the the Inuit peoples, their ambitions have become articulated around extensive industrial progress in order to achieve economic self-reliance. Climate change in and around Greenland has thus become involved with debates that relate to the prospect of self-determination, self-reliance and an industry that utilises industrialisation to achieve these goals. This giving shape to a *new* Greenland that detaches itself from the past and present by looking into the future (Sejersen, 2015: 49). The increased awareness and focus on CO_2 emission at COP 15 presents an interesting problematic in the perception of a new Greenland; namely that industrialisation places the Greenlandic government in a different political landscape that alters expectations, requiring a reshaping of the scale of operations (Sejersen 2015: 86). Herewith, Lefebvre

argues that *'the more space partakes of nature, the less it enters into the social relations of production'* (1991: 83), hence a Greenlandic narrative of independence driven by industrialisation requires a re-appropriation of the land both figuratively and literally. It thus becomes a question of the Greenlandic government to re-articulate their identity and sense of place in a world concerned with climate change. The next section will therefore investigate how the Greenlandic government articulates resource extraction as viable within the narrative of climate change.

The Greenlandic mining narrative

The barring reality for Greenland is that roughly 60 per cent of its budget revenue stems from the 3.4 billion DKK annual block grant that it receives from Denmark (cf. chapter 1). In order to fully withdraw from the Danish Realm and achieve independence, the Self-Government is in dire need of a new source of income generated from within Greenland. According to Nutall (2012), Bjørst (2016) and Kuersten (2015), local politicians and business leaders argue that there is only one viable option for a "sustainable" economic future shaped within Greenland, namely resource extraction (mining) and oil and gas (exploration and drilling). In a journal article analysing the key storylines of mining emerging in the public debate of Greenland, Bjørst wrote that '*judging from the political debate in Greenland, Denmark and elsewhere... there seems to be no plan B [to mining]'* (2016: 35). Elucidating the painted narrative of resource extraction created within Greenland, it is here noteworthy to draw upon the recent political development Greenland has seen in regards to the mining of uranium.

Uranium

In 1988 a zero-tolerance policy on uranium was introduced in Greenland, effectively banning the mining of the radioactive element. Over two decades later, speaking to an international audience at the Arctic Circle Assembly held the 12-14th of October in 2013[13], then premier Aleqa Hammond stated that Greenland was '*developing* [their] *mineral, oil and gas resources as basis for a future independent Greenland economy*' (Hammond, 2013a [translation by authors]). Further along her speech, Hammond alluded to a pro-uranium stance, arguing that nuclear power yet holds importance in certain parts of the world as an energy source, and helps reduce greenhouse gas

---

[13] The Arctic Circle (not to be confused with the Arctic Council) organisation's mission is to bring together various Arctic actors in order to facilitate discussions about issues brought forth by climate change, such as decline of sea-ice, the increased possibility of transportation and shipping this opens up to, and resource development (Medred, 2016)

emissions (Ibid). At a meeting held in the Greenlandic Parliament shortly after the Assembly, Jens-Erik Kirkegaard, the previous minister of Industry and Minerals said: '*We're in a situation where we must expect that the mineral resources are the future of Greenland. It is in this area that the main profits to secure the future of Greenland will be…*' (in Bjørst, 2016: 36). Just ten days after the Assembly, on the 24th of October, the Inatsisartut (Greenlandic parliament) cast a vote on lifting the moratorium on mining the radioactive elements. With fifteen in favour of lifting the ban, and fourteen against, the mining of uranium was officially legalised once again, to the sound of demonstrations filling the streets of Nuuk (Ibid).

One of the potential locations in which the opening of a uranium mine is discussed is the city of Narsaq in the municipality of Kujalleq. In 2014, it was estimated that Kujalleq had 350 unemployed people (Ren et al. 2016), with the municipality being occupied by around 7150 citizens that equates to an almost five per cent unemployment ratio. That same year, the mayor of the most populous municipality in Greenland spoke on behalf of a future-scenario for Narsaq, in which a functional mine could be a reality. In her speech, she articulated a past people that had worked for the development of a prosperous Greenland, and a future people that could '*… show the rest of the world that it is possible to find gems, but also wealth and quality of life in our subsoil*' (Mølgaard, 2014). Omitted from her speech was the topic of environmental repercussions the establishment of a mine could have on the local community. With this development, it becomes clear that the lack of job opportunities in the current Greenland is a large driving force for politicians trying to legitimise mining of resources in the subsoil. In a visit to Narsaq in 2013, Bjørst (2016) interviewed locals, who although voicing concerns about a uranium mine, would vote yes to the commencement of mining in the city. The worst concern of the citizens of Narsaq was to remain in a status-quo; the mine thus representing opportunity and course of action.

Directed by similar questions as the ones posed by Bjørst, journalist Michael Oneal visited Narsaq to interview locals for his article '*Greenland needs money. Is a uranium mine the answer?*' (February 10, 2017). The answers given by the people resonated a story of uncertainty; a shrimper mentioned mining's inherently unsustainable nature, not only environmentally, but also economically as the lifetime of the mine would amass to 30-40 years. Despite the mining company, Greenland Minerals and Energy (GME), claim that contamination would not be threat to Narsaq, two sheep farmers were concerned that the mere presence of a uranium mine could scare off

consumers and tourists. Conversely, a seal hunter believes that the improvement in technology makes it a viable option, and has friends that have pursued mining certificates in order to work for GME. Vittus Qujaukitsoq, the Greenlandic Minister of Industry argues that an economy sustained by subsidies and filled with unemployment is not an option, and thereby questions whether the citizens of Narsaq really have a choice; '... *it's a question of how willing the people are to be free*' (February 10, 2017). Whilst the interviews conducted by Bjørst and Oneal indicate that the public community in Narsaq is split on the mining of uranium, we do not claim that this is indicative of how the narrative sounds in the entirety of Greenland. However, within the government, the prevailing storyline does seem to revolve around the extraction of resources.

Following up on this, we find that the smelter project proposed by Alcoa in 2006 is an interesting example of how resource extraction is articulated in Greenland. It shows how the Greenlandic politicians exercise a local/global environment scale in an attempt to justify the large output of CO^2 the smelter would produce.

Aluminium smelter in Maniitsoq

In order for an aluminium smelter to run, a substantial amount of energy is required; energy that makes up a fourth of the expenses related to production of the chemical element. This factor is particularly important to Greenland who, since 1993, has opened up six hydroelectric power plants, with a seventh underway. In all, hydroelectricity constitutes 70 per cent of Greenland's generated energy (WWF, 2015), and a direct result of climate change is an increasing ice-melt, concurrently providing Greenland with greater hydroelectric potential. Prior to COP 15, Hammond held a speech titled *'Greenland's involvement in the international climate debate',* in which she notably said:

"In terms of global warming and climate change policies Greenland has gifts from nature that may help meet the global environmental challenges. Greenland today has opportunities to develop hydro power stations to supply process facilities with power for instance to produce aluminium" (2008)

Following, in 2009, Enoksen presented the results of a report studying the environmental impacts of the aluminium smelter in Maniitsoq. The report found that the smelter, being supported by hydroelectricity, would emit a third to a twelfth the amount of CO^2 as a similar smelter constructed elsewhere run on either coal or oil (2009; cf. Schmidt & Thrane, 2009). As will be discussed

shortly, the results of the report were important in situating the project at a global scale. With regards to hydroelectricity, Hammond said in her 2013 opening speech:

"*It is good for the climate, and increases* [Greenland's] *energy self-sufficiency. It further presents the opportunity for industrial growth based on renewable energy. It could be a model example of economic and industrial growth working in conjunction with sustainability. It is further an example of Greenland's will to be climatically responsible without hindering* [economic] *growth"* (2013, [translation by authors]).

Herewith, the results of the environmental impact assessment report presented by Enoksen, alongside Hammond's statements, frame a future scenario in which hydroelectricity suggestively plays an important role in Greenland for several reasons; it works to reduce CO^2 emissions globally, it develops energy self-sufficiency, and it entices transnational companies to invest. Furthermore, they frame the Alcoa project on several scales; locally nature will be exploited in terms of its water-resources, and the smelter will increase Greenland's emission level significantly. However, globally, it serves to reduce overall emissions, and is thus in line with the environmentalist discourse. This goes in line with Kuupik Kleist's political agenda at COP 15, the main focus of which was "differentiated responsibility" in climate change mitigations.

According to Sejersen, these articulations by the Greenlandic politicians work to produce '*their own* [place] *in the world and relate actively to global issues'* (2015: 151). Yet, as observed by Nutall, it seems ironic that Hammond speaks of combating climate change by means of hydropower made available by global warming (2008). The production of aluminium is very energy-intensive; as mentioned earlier, the smelter in Maniitsoq alone would almost double Greenland's CO^2 emission whilst being run on hydropower, contributing to climate change and environmental pollution (Ibid).

Politics of Uranium and Aluminium:
The revocation of the uranium ban meant that the Greenlandic public had to rework their ideas and notions of uranium as a resource. Concurrently, the geopolitical discourse of mining as a path forward (to independence) was employed by Greenlandic politicians, utilising unemployment and the reduction of global greenhouse gasses as a rhetoric legitimising their actions. It further projects a future in which modernisation (and industrialisation) is the key to independence, beckoning the

question of whether there is a place for the "traditional" Inuit livelihood in a *new* Greenland, and if so, how this is going to be protected (cf. chapter 3).

As of 2017, the Alcoa smelter plans in Maniitsoq have been set on standby as a result of low global aluminium market prices (Hansen, 2016). This proposes another dilemma that Greenland may face in relying on the mining industry; albeit a solution to overcoming the block grant and releasing themselves from Denmark, it may merely shift their reliance onto another form of dependency – TNCs (cf. Andersen et al. 2016; Dodds and Nutall, 2016: 37).

Next, we re-observe the Narsaq mining project from the perspective of the transnational company in charge of developing the mine. In doing so, we aim to investigate how the resource extraction storyline is explored by TNCs.

Transnational Companies: Saving the Community

On the homepage of Greenland Minerals and Energy, Narsaq is described as a quiet city in decline, stating that the local fishing industry is slowly diminishing. They further write that *'today GME A/S is a company carrying vital importance to Narsaq's development'* (Greenland Minerals and Energy A/S, 2017). The narrative suggested herewithin is a city (and country) in decline, and a TNC with the means to rescue the "neighbourhood" (Ren et al. 2016). Ib Laursen, the local manager for GME thinks that the mine in Narsaq is a '*golden opportunity to do it correctly. Greenland is standing at the starting block just waiting for the gun to go off*' (Oneal, February 10, 2017). In an interview with Bjørst (2016), Laursen said that the GME was working towards building a "Greenland friendly" project, showing little to no concern with regards to the potential environmental hazard the project could cause. At a public presentation in Copenhagen, hosted by GEUS, a similar narrative to the one articulated by Laursen became prominent. In it, the project was described as *sustainable* (Bjørst, 2016).

In order to better understand how mining, which is inherently unsustainable, can be articulated as sustainable by corporations, we draw upon what Stuart Kirsch coins '*sustainable mining'* (Kirsch, 2010). Kirsch argues that in contemporary capitalism, one of the main strategies that companies use in order to neutralise critics is the deployment of corporate oxymorons, i.e. *clean coal* or *sustainable mining*. Both of these oxymorons require one to simultaneously accept two

contradictory beliefs – what George Orwell called *doublethink*[14] (Ibid). Due to its lack of a lexical meaning, sustainability can be identified as what linguistic anthropologists call a *'strategically deployable shifter'*, meaning that its definition has come to depend on the context[15] (Ibid: 91).

Returning to the GEUS meeting, when questioned with how the Narsaq project could be considered sustainable when mining inherently is not so, Damien Krebs, the Metallurgical Manager for GME, explained to the audience that what the project could offer to the locals was withstanding economic benefits. He further alluded to job availability and the education of a workforce that could sustain in itself post-mining operations (Bjørst, 2016). To that end the sustainability articulated by the GME is not referring to the more traditional meaning of the word, but rather focuses on a growth-centred discourse. By emptying out the meaning of the word (most notably its reference to ecology), the mining industry appropriates the term and uses it to legitimise their actions.

In similar vein, reading Alcoa's sustainability report informs a similar experience to that of the GME. In the CEO statement, it reads; *'... our ability to operate responsibly is built upon a solid foundation of adding economic value to the communities, reducing environmental impacts, and delivering on our social responsibilities'* (Alcoa Sustainability, 2016: 1). Elaborating further, the CEO, Roy Harvey, adds that their product is inherently sustainable, and uses arguments of other economic sectors using their product to lower their greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., lighter airplane constructions results in less fuel-consumption and building designs that save energy) (Ibid).
By means of employing the narrative of *sustainable mining*, sustainable here alluding to primarily economic benefits projected to create social growth, Alcoa and GME sell their ideas to Greenland on a false premise permeated by Orwellian Newspeak.

Moving forth, we shift focus away from the industry-heavy narratives generated by the Greenlandic government and the TNCs, and move onto the ICC. As will be discussed, these narratives are contested by the ICC who implore a pan-Arctic non-state society, in which the Inuit are organised under one transnational community.

---

[14] Doublethink is the notion of accepting contrary beliefs or opinions at the same time.
[15] (for sustainability, think 'conservation-centered', 'human-centered', 'equity-centered', 'growth centered' etc.)

The Inuit Circumpolar Council

The Inuit people span over Canada, Greenland, Russia and the United States of America, and are represented by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which makes up one of the strongest Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council (Kuersten, 2015; Steinberg et al. 2015: 193-94; cf. chapter 1). In representing Inuit from across four different national borders, the ICC advances an international message driven by the indigenous peoples – seeking to understand and resolve Inuit issues. Steinberg et al. coins the terminology '*transcendent nationhood*' (2015: 113), herewith understood that the ICC is interested not in the conventional nation-state model, but rather a community of Inuit that transgress the borders of nations. The ICC was created partially on behalf of the ambition for Greenland to achieve more autonomy and self-determination from Denmark, and with Greenland portraying an almost entirely Inuit polity it holds great importance to the council's agenda (Kuersten, 2015). Likewise, prior to achieving Self-Rule in 2009, the ICC served as a means for Greenland to give voice to themselves in the international scene (cf. chapter 1). Following the post-colonial discourse, however, Greenland is now approaching statehood *vis-à-vis* a state-centered conceptualisation of sovereignty – and as observed throughout both the first and the second chapter, its priorities have shifted from predominantly internal affairs to a more global articulation. According to Gerhardt (2011), an estrangement is occurring between Greenland and the ICC as a result of different approaches to Inuit sovereignty. Extending upon this argument, Kuersten (2015) and Strandsbjerg (2014: 262) both argue that it is in the interest of Greenland to distance itself from the ICC (to promote its own state-centered power), as the ICC could directly challenge the autonomy of Greenland as it wishes to mobilise its 88 per cent Inuit population.

In 2013 the Greenlandic government made a budget proposal for the following year, in which funding for the Greenlandic branch of the ICC[16] would be cut from receiving 5.4 million DKK yearly, to only 1.4 million. This proposal was accepted with a 1 million DKK cut-back annually from 2014-2018 (McGwin, 2014, April 7th). In response, the then president of the ICC recommended that the Greenland department slowly be shut down starting from 2015, culminating in its termination in 2017 (ibid). Currently, ICC Greenland is lead by Hjalmar Dahl, but the lack of any available online speeches and articles, not to mention the outdated website[17], could signify that the economic cuts have heavily impeded the organisation.

---

[16] Known as ICC Greenland

[17] http://inuit.org – a look around the website reveals that dead links are prevalent with references to old documents that are no longer existing on the site.

In the following section, we will examine how the Greenlandic Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum provides an example of how the ICC and the Greenlandic government clash over their conceptualisations of Inuit identity and sovereignty.

The Greenlandic Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum

In the start of August 2007, policemen and representatives from the Greenlandic Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) intercepted citizens from Nuuk as they were collecting gemstones in Qeqertarsuatsiaat, a small settlement in the municipality of Sermersooq. The citizens were prohibited from the area, following which they claimed that their indigenous rights to collect gemstones from the land were being breached by the Nuuk government (Strandsbjerg, 2014). The issue at hand regards the geopolitical '*scrambling for the Arctic*', in which actors at all levels – states, indigenous peoples, NGO's, and TNCs – try to (re)appropriate the Arctic and its resources. Strandsbjerg (2014) suggests that the incident of 2007, for which the BMP was reprimanded by public advocates, is indicative of the tension between 1) the ICC's idea of promoting indigenous rights, and 2) the Greenlandic government's aspiration of becoming a nation-state. In indigenous politics, it is often mentioned how modernisation and modern relations in societies, in particular with reference to the capitalist economic system, threatens the traditional lifestyle led by indigenous peoples Dalby et al. (2006: 186), as is illustrated by the case of the gemstone collectors.

As previously noted (cf. chapter 1), when Self-Rule was inaugurated in 2009, Greenland assumed absolute right over the soil and subsoil through the Mineral Resources Act (MRA). The MRA contributed to structuring resource extraction and affected the rights to and use of the land. It is the job of the BMP to attract capital investment from abroad and to identify spaces of significance for TNCs. As a result of a limited budget, the BMP only does initial surveys, after which companies apply for licenses to pursue further research – which in turn may result in actual mining licenses (Nutall, 2012). Companies interested in pursuing mining licenses in Greenland only have to go through a *one-door* policy, in which the BMP is responsible for everything; license applications and environmental examinations alike (Strandsbjerg, 2014). The problem with such a structure is that the BMP has to deal with the dichotomy of attracting investors whilst providing appropriate environmental protection (ibid). According to Nutall '*the BMP is known locally by many in Nuuk as "The Republic" for its authoritative power, for its lack of transparency, and for fact that there is no appeals process in place*' (2012: 123). In accordance with the abovementioned, the Mineral

Resource Act and the BMP has received substantial criticism from the ICC, raising concern with regards to environmental issues and the rights of the indigenous, to whom the use of land is based on customs (Strandbjerg, 2014). When Aqqaluk Lynge, the former Chair of the ICC and current member of the Executive Board, was questioned about the restrictions of the Mineral Resource Act, he claimed that the Greenlandic government had undone the achievements of autonomy that had been worked towards previously. Furthermore, he said that *'the institution of common ownership over land is the foundation of Greenland's society, and the day that is broken, then "it is over"'* (Ibid: 270).

Sub-conclusion

In this chapter, we investigated how the Greenlandic government, TNCs and the ICC frame narratives of independence by exploring different angles of climate change. By means of articulating a *differentiated responsibility,* Kleist invoked Greenland's position in a changing climate in a global scale. By doing so, Kleist paved the way for the nation to pursue economic self-reliance via resource extraction. Complimenting this achievement, Hammond spoke of global warming with an ironic duality; namely that climate change has made it possible for Greenland to pursue hydropower, an environmentally friendly source of energy, and that this hydroelectricity can be used to power, i.e, Alcoa's aluminium smelter, an environmental polluter. The narrative of development is at the center of Greenlandic politics, where the extraction industry is framed as a '*job machine'* (Ren et al. 2016: 292) with which to reach state-formation. Herewith transnational companies, such as GME and Alcoa, play an important role in Greenlands attempt to realise its extraction industry as they articulate the growth they can offer to local communities as a story of "rescue". By virtue of a narrative informed by "sustainable mining", they attempt to legitimise the environmental degradation that follows the inherently unsustainable industry. As discussed lastly in the chapter, contestation of Inuit identity and sovereignty occurs as the ideology of the ICC clashes with the Greenlandic state. Herein the ICC attempts to reconcile all Inuits under one umbrella organisation, free of the conventional borders of nation-states.

Chapter 3: Who are you after 4 o'clock?

Discussion:

The present chapter will proceed as follows: The first section will ponder the immediate conflict between indigeneity and statehood identified in chapter 1. Putting focus on the articulation of "people of Greenland" as citizens in the SGA, we will then question how the legislative text is understood with reference to the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP). The second section will further entertain the positive spin on climate change exemplified in chapter 2. Problematising the oxymoronic articulations of "sustainable mining", we will then ponder how the notion of development is actively depoliticised.

In all, this chapter will take form of a free flow text drawing connections to other fields and disciplines, with the expressed purpose of discussing issues and topics related to the research question phrased in the introduction: *How is the Greenlandic narrative of independence articulated, and how does the role of climate change and indigeneity affect its formulation?* We will not provide any absolute answers, but rather try to offer an understanding of the intricate social, political, and geographical webs informing the Greenlandic narrative of independence.

Inuit or statehood?

Contemplating the idea of "traditional" methods touched upon by Aleqa Hammond (cf. chapter 1), we now want to situate the question of the Inuit identity in the Greenlandic context. In this regard, it seems relevant to read how Kuupik Kleist referred to the UNDRIP in his celebration speech at the inauguration of Self-rule in 2009. Articulating Greenland's active involvement in the process, facilitating the adaptation of the UNDRIP in 2007, Kleist mentioned the act as a symbolic and tangible achievement that resembles an example to *'Indigenous peoples everywhere'* (Kleist, 2009a: 1). Later the same year, Kleist maintained that *'this new development in Greenland* [the implementation of the Act] *... should be seen as a de facto implementation of the Declaration and, in this regard, hopefully an inspiration to others'* (Kleist, 2009b: 249).

Indeed Self-rule in Greenland could be interpreted as an Indigenous triumph that may inspire resistance elsewhere, namely among other aboriginal peoples in the Arctic. In an encouraging letter, Duane Smith, former President of the ICC, framed the Greenlandic model as a testimony of Inuit resistance and sovereignty as he claimed: *'We in Canada see this event as a major step by a*

circumpolar region of people gaining significant control of its rights and livelihood which is now seen by other groups and Inuit throughout the circumpolar Arctic as hope and opportunity for their chance to gain better control of their own destinies. Your fight is our fight and although you may be a public government, it is made up primarily of Inuit to govern an area inhabited by Inuit for Inuit' (Smith, 2008). Immediately, this stands in contrast to the statement by Aqqaluk Lynge (cf. chapter 2), who contested the political endeavor in Greenland.

To qualify this discussion, it is curious to note how the unbalanced dynamic between states and peoples is, as pointed out by Søbye, confirmed in the UNDRIP by the repeated use of: '*"States shall…" and "indigenous peoples have the right to…"'* (2013: 9). Making this reference, we do not intend to divert the focus away from Greenland to discuss the UNDRIP, rather the purpose is to link this differentiation to the way that the Greenlandic government has chosen to frame the people(s) not in terms of their indigeneity, but rather as citizens. In the SGA, the "people of Greenland" is utilised as an all-embracing referent to the population in general; indigenous and non-indigenous alike. Omitting to articulate the Inuit identity as an entity in its own right, the SGA does not officially acknowledge the Inuit status as a people, and hence does not deliberate the question of Inuit self-determination. As discussed earlier (cf. chapter 1), this approach partially reflects a strategic move vis-à-vis the "international community of states". However, another argument encapsulated in an interview by Gad (2017) suggests that it is also a question of democratic inclusion of non-indigenous citizens in Greenland.

To ground the question, the schism between indigeneity and statehood also seems contested in the production of space. Consider e.g. the gem collectors discussed earlier (cf. chapter 2). This case epitomises the issue of different tenure systems where the Inuit adhere to collective-ownership and the BMP, i.e. the state, enforce the law of private property. Through the commodification and commercialisation of property, the state apparatus explicitly challenges the Inuit self-determination and right to land. Conversely, the Inuit production of space – where peoples have no exclusive entitlement to property – can be interpreted as a counterforce to the capitalist mode of production directed by private-ownership, but do these forms only compromise each other, or can they in fact be complementary?

Drawing upon Lefebvre's (1991) *Production of Space,* this particular case of contestation could be interpreted as an example of institutional domination of space. By physically removing the Inuit gem-collectors from the site, it can be said that the BMP synchronously endorses the conventional Eurocentric conceptualisation of space, i.e private ownership.

Parallel to this controversy, the Greenlandic government does articulate and protect other Inuit traditions through their OCT-status in the EU, e.g. seal hunting and whaling.

Hybridisation of narratives? (sub-headline 3)

Despite the exclusion of Inuit peoples in the SGA, and herewith governance principles directed by indigenous ideology, the Greenlandic Self-rule is perceived by many as an Inuit mode of governmentality. Firstly, due to the Inuit authorship of the SGA-design, and secondly, due to the Greenlandic majority vote in favour of the referendum in 2009. In addition, it is noteworthy how the constitutionally protected rights of the "people of Greenland" exceeds that of most indigenous peoples elsewhere (Kuokkanen, 2017), and hence the demand of independence as a nation-state can be interpreted as *'pushing the boundaries of the norm of the right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination'* (Ibid: 193).

With reference to geopolitics, Greenlandic governance proves more diverse than conventional theories on international relations usually allows. Articulating itself at the intersection between *'late sovereign EU, the postcolonial Third World, and autonomous-but-less-than-sovereign entities'* (Gad, 2013: 18), the Greenlandic Inuit continuously negotiate their identity. The Self-rule in Greenland is undoubtedly imbued with supplemental – social, cultural and historical – meaning, that influences the political strategy and visions.

On the topic of Inuit statehood, land is regularly understood as the essence of indigeneity (Shaw et al., 2006), but despite of its societal importance, we believe with the social constructivists Saywer and Gomez that *'identity does not pre-exist the social'* (2012: 19). This ontological proposition is key to understand the inherited complexities of colonialism, as indigeneity proves to evolve in response to social interactions. Consider e.g. the act of hunting. From an outsider's perspective, the Inuit "tradition" of hunting can easily be reduced to a set of skills and inherited techniques acquired to survive, but as Dybbroe argues, hunting is *'a milieu of social relations'* (1996: 49). Besides being a source of subsistence, the act of hunting also transmit *habitus* – a subconscious set of behavioural

dispositions – where identities are performed and produced through intergenerational experience (Ibid.). Another example could be the fisheries in Greenland. Today, the "traditional" subsistence economy has evolved into an industry constituting approximately 40 per cent of the revenue budget, and admittedly, the motorised ships might seem far away from the archaic image of an Inuit kayak. However, assisting marine biologist etc., it seems that Inuit knowledge continues to inform the fisheries and ways of understanding/utilising the sea. This is also reflected in the myths and stories concerning the *Mother of the Sea*, that prevail as a part of the social fabric in the "modern" society (Por, n.d.). With this reference, we think it is imperative to observe rather than judge as Inuit communities arguably evolve along with everything else.

As a last point in this part of the discussion, it is also critical to reflect upon Inuit historicity. While Inuit livelihoods to some may epitomise the idyllic "traditional" life, this romanticisation arguably neglects the terrible struggles for survival. Through history, many Inuit peoples have starved during winters, and today alcoholism and suicide are prevalent issues, which in itself make an argument for change and new initiatives.

Inuit and environmentalism in a development strategy? (sub-headline 2)

In the pursuit of independence, the question of sustainable development discussed earlier (cf. chapter 2) portrays various conceptualisations of the environment. In this section, we intend to problematise the assumptions sustaining resource extraction as the only option with the purpose of revealing the interests that inhabit the different narratives articulated in the debates.

Through our analysis of the political sphere in Greenland, we have identified a collective will to frame climate change as an opportunity for new economic and social development in society. Within this narrative, climate change is rendered technical and hereby becomes subject to rational management to further the political aspirations of independence. By means of innovative scale-making, Greenlandic politicians have articulated e.g. the Smelter as "the lesser of two evils" by use of an argumentative future escape; meaning that they referred to the potential GHG emissions that a proxy smelter elsewhere would produce (cf. chapter 2). Framing the industrial projects within the discourse of sustainability, politicians and corporations make creative use of Orwellian Newspeak to meet the ideological requirements in a time of climate change. With new insights into the acceleration of climate change (cf. AMAP, 2017), the narrative of "sustainable mining" acquires a strong persuasive

power. Indeed, the label of sustainability *'forces one to concur with the operational conclusions of the SD platform almost regardless of one's fundamental ethical persuasions and priorities'* (Lélé, 1991: 608).

Regardless, mining is as *inter alios* Kirsch (2010) contend not sustainable. The notion of "sustainable mining" is a process of direct change to the socio-spatial dimension that impacts the construction of climate change narratives. As the tainted cousin of sustainable development, the discourse of mining omits referring to the distinction between objectives and means, where the objective is Inuit independence and the mean is environmental (and potentially social?) degradation. By parallel to Escobar's analysis of development politics (1995: 195), politicians and corporations in Greenland weave a tale of "sustainable mining" that essentially reconcile two "arch-enemies", i.e. sustainability and the commodification of nature.

Immediately, this contrasts what Martello (2008) identifies as the environmentalist representation of the Inuit as one with nature. It also becomes suggestive of an argumentative paradox, where the premise of independence is dislocated; from the initial articulation of Inuit resistance in a *different space* to subsequently pose a direct challenge to the very same space. Put differently, independence was first a mean to secure and conserve the Inuit identity. To facilitate this, the Greenlandic peoples approached a new strategy of industrailisation that now could pose a threat to the original objective. The question that emerge is what industrialisation will mean to the environment, but also what it will mean to the society?

Drawing on our analysis, industrialisation undoubtedly becomes the mean to obtain independence, but to answer the question above, independence is perceived in sync with a democratic welfare state inspired by the Scandinavian model. To increase the Greenlandic share of material gain, it seems natural, as Redclift argues with regard to "developing countries", that *'they must extend their control over the environment, or over the way in which technology transforms the environment'* (1992: 200). In the Greenlandic context, this socialisation of the environment is explicitly pronounced in relation to the framing of climate change as a "development opportunity". With few exceptions, the conversation about industrialisation consistently revolves around singular mines or smelters without explicit consideration of the overall societal and environmental impact the many plants would potentially have in their entirety (Sejersen, 2015). Herewith, it may arguably be difficult for people

to comprehend the gravity of the impending transformation. Undoubtedly, the Greenlandic peoples remember the era of colonialism together with the ensuing injustices and discrimination, and hence it proves politically strategic to link the notion of climate change with the celebrated proposition of independence. However, as Nuttall (2013) argues, this narrative expedite a (false)image provoking a distorted conceptualisation of the matter at hand; previous barriers to industrialisation and mining in Greenland were not only physical as we are often made to believe vis-a-vis the story of ice-melt. Rather, as he argues, it might have been an issue of policy and inadequate technology making profitable mining less feasible.

Hybridisation of narratives (2)? (sub-headline 2)

In view of the discussion above, we will now address the rationale behind the positive spin on climate change, to situate it in relation to the Inuit imaginaries and imaginaries about the Inuit. Succinctly, we will entertain the idea of hybrid identities, where the climate narrative becomes a partial reflection of the Inuit resistance in Greenland. Not in the sense that the Greenlandic peoples protest against the "Western" conceptualisation of weak sustainability, but rather that they effectively appropriate the development discourse to manifest their sovereign right to manage the raw materials as they see it fit. On this subject, it is relevant to emphasise how our analytical scope targets the climate narratives, and hence the focus is not to review the different ways in which industrial development can be treated (cf. To the benefits of Greenland, 2014).

To open this discussion, it is curious to follow Bjørst's (2008) utilisation of Luhmann and his framing of subject positionality. Succinctly, she illustrates how people synchronously may inhabit contradictory subject positions e.g. travel by plane and oppose pollution. In the context of Greenland, politicians articulate contradictory subject positions in the same way. Consider e.g. the comment in Kielsen's New Year's speech 2016: *'The development of the mineral resources have to be sustainable and it has to happen with the greatest respect for our environment, nature, and not least for all us living in Greenland. Therefore it is naturally important to emphasise that all resource projects must be carried out properly and safely with respect to safety, health, environment and societal sustainability'* (Kielsen, 2016). Not only does this quote embody the *'double climate strategy'* (Bjørst, 2016), it also crystallises the shift from strong to weak sustainability; each with their respective focus on natural capital and human or manufactured capital. According to the weak

sustainability agenda, natural capital and human capital form equal part in an equation where sustainability is accomplished if the total value remains constant or increases (Kirsch, 2010: 90). This mathematical formula invites two preliminary questions 1) how is the value of natural and human capital determined, and 2) how is the derived benefit distributed? To formulate answers to these is beyond our scope, but we pose them as they arguably signal the complexities involved in the general field of sustainability. In addition, they expose how the discourse of "sustainable mining" aligns itself with James Ferguson's (1994) analysis of Lesotho, where he problematises the way in which (some) politicians and corporations depoliticise the notion of "development".

If we from an outsider's perspective look at Greenland, it is as if the politicians are caught in an internal conflict as advocates of mineral extraction and as environmental regulators, where they engage in a process of rational management, *'in which they attempt to legislate a limited degree of protection sufficient to deflect criticism but not significant enough to derail the engine of growth'* (Hannigan, 1995: 21).

Notwithstanding, this interpretation can be problematic exactly due to its perspective. As an outsider, it is difficult to inhabit the Inuit identity, which would, as Escobar (1995:168) argues, be the prerequisite for a credible interpretation of "non-western" knowledge and practices.

Instead, we will as alluded to throughout the project lean towards an interpretation of hybrid identities, where the Greenlandic Inuit selectively choose elements, not only from their own library of thought, but also from the new "Western" catalog. To us this implies, that the Inuit identity is not exclusively constituted by how they achieve independence, but rather how they live it. Identities are processually created through social interaction, and by negotiating change in terms of new development projects, the Greenlandic government does not necessarily think "development" in equal terms with their "partners", i.e. Denmark, the EU, and corporations etc. To Greenland, development becomes the tool of hope that could facilitate their right to cultural and institutional sovereignty, and herewith, we do not perceive it as a sell-out of the "traditional to the "modern". Neither do we perceive the Greenlandic course as an amalgamation of the "traditional" and the "modern" that together create a new "essence". Hybridity brings about a social creation that might or might not be articulated in hegemonic struggles, and though we acknowledge the stress imposed on the Greenlandic society from the outside, we interpret Greenland as a space of resistance.

Project Conclusion:

Our presentation of the Greenlandic Inuit and the political narratives surrounding Greenland is not intended to promote particular truth claims. Informed by a constructivist approach, we have instead identified a series of contested truth claims that fashion the narratives of Inuit statehood and climate change; i.e. the "traditional" Inuit (represented by ICC) and the "modern" Inuit (represented by Self-Rule).

Institutions and researchers construct heuristic categories which allow them to administer and reify intangible concepts such as identity, but through interaction with the non-indigenous groups we argue that the Greenlandic Inuit have become more heterogeneous and thus increasingly difficult to define. Categories that are defined as internally homogenous and externally bound both epitomise a mirror of reflection and a token of judgement, notwithstanding they constrain our understanding of complexity.

Conversations *in* and *around* Greenland prove to be intricate and difficult to grasp. Without end, the narrative of independence seems to redress, overlap, and reverse as it expands in the discursive intersection between indigeneity and climate change. Nevertheless, independence has clearly been an articulated goal since the first constitutional amendment in 1953, through 1978 with the inauguration of Home-rule, and later beyond the ratification of Self-Government Act in 2009.

By means of colonial and later imperialistic coercion, Denmark has actively tried to assimilate the Inuit, but as contestations display, the Inuit peoples have resisted the outside oppressor. By means of spatial appropriation, the Greenlandic politicians have devised a new strategy of Inuit statehood that enables the peoples to claim their sovereignty in the geopolitical sphere. However, as the Self-Government Act - authored in collaboration between Greenland and Denmark - constitutes a fiscal challenge to the new Self-rule, politicians have come to envision a large-scale industrialisation in continuation of the "opening Arctic*"*.

The construction of climate change has been developed and institutionalised as a new language adopted into political vocabularies around the world. By means of a strategically deployed shifter, climate change is successfully framed in terms of opportunities and misgivings. Hereby legitimizing the notion of sustainable mining whilse simultaneously becoming a mean to indepdence and a challenge to the Inuit identity.

Bibliography:

Books

Beukel, E., Jensen, F. and Rytter, J. (2010). *Phasing out the Colonial Status of Greenland, 1945-54, a Historical Study.* Copenhagen : Museum Tusculanum Press.

Bjørst, L. (2017) "Uranium : The Road To 'economic Self-Sustainability for Greenland'? : Changing Uranium-Positions in Greenlandic Politics." In *Northern Sustainabilities: Understanding and Addressing Change in the Circumpolar World*, edited by Gail Fondahl and Gary N. Wilson, Chapter 3. Springer Polar Sciences: Switzerland.

Clifford, J. (2013) Returns: becoming indigenous in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Dalby, S., Tuathail G and Routledge, P. (2006) The Geopolitics Reader. Routledge: London.

Dodds, K. and Mark N. (2016). *The Scramble for the Poles: The Geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic.* 1 edition. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World, Princeton studies in culture/power/history. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.

Ferguson, J. (1995) The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", depoliticisation, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, University of Minnesota Press

Gad, U. (2017). *National Identity Politics and Postcolonial Sovereignty, Games.* Museum Tusculanum Press : University of Copenhagen.

Gad, U. (2013) Greenland projecting sovereignty: Denmark protecting sovereignty away., in: Adler-Nissen, R., Gad, U. (Eds.), European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and Territories. Routledge, pp. 217–234.

Gore, A. (2006) An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It. Rodale: New York.

Hannigan, J. (1995) Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective. Routledge: New York.

Howarth, D. (2005): Concepts in the social sciences: Discourse, Open University Press

Keskitalo, E. (2004) Negotiating the Arctic: the construction of an international region, Studies in international relations. Routledge: New York; London.

Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell. (D. Nicholson-Smith trans.)

Malkki, L.H., (2015) The need to help: the domestic arts of international humanitarianism. Duke University Press: Durham.

Mitchell, D. (2000) Cultural geography: a critical introduction. Blackwell Publishing: Malden.

McEwan, C. (2009) Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies. In *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, edited by Rob Kitchin Nigel Thrift, pp. 327–33. Elsevier.

Petterson, C. (2014) Studies in Critical Social Sciences: The Missionary, the Catechist and the Hunter: Foucault, Protestantism and Colonialism. Brill, Leiden, NL.

Pile, S. and Keith, M. (1997) Geographies of resistance. Routledge, London.

Rasmussen, R. (2003) Socio-Economic Consequences of Large Scale Resource Development: Cases of Mining in Greenland, in: Myers, Reshcny (Eds.), Beyond Boom and Bust in the Circumpolar North: Circumpolar Arctic Social Sciences Ph.D. Network: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference. UNBC Press, pp. 101–131.

Redclift, M. (1992) Sustainable Development: Exploring the contradictions. Routledge: New York.

Ren, C., Bjørst, L., & Dredge, D. (2016) Composing Greenlandic tourism futures: an integrated political ecology and actor-network theory approach. In: Mostafanezhad, M., Norum, R., Shelton, E. & Thompson-Carr, A. (2016) Political Ecology of Tourism: Community, power and the environment. Routledge: New York. Chapter 14.

Said, E. (1979) Orientalism, 1st Vintage Books ed. ed. Vintage Books, New York.

Sale, R., and Eugene P. (2009) The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North. London: Frances Lincoln.

Saywer, S. and Gomez, E. (2012): Indigenous identity and a language of rights, in The Politics of Resource Extraction. Indigenous peoples, Multinational Corporations, and states, (Eds.) Saywer, S. and Gomez, E., Palgrave Macmillan, US, pp. 9-32

Sejersen, F. (2015) Rethinking Greenland and the Arctic in the era of climate change. Routledge.

Sibley, D. (1995): Geographies of Exclusion: Society and difference in the West. Routledge: New York.

Steinberg, P. and Tasch, J. (2015) Contesting the Arctic: Politics and Imaginaries in the Circumpolar North. I.B.Tauris.

Stern, P. and Stevenson, L. (2006) Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography. University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln.

Strandsbjerg, J. (2014) Making sense of contemporary Greenland: indigeneity, resources and sovereignty, in: R. Powell & K. Dodds (Eds.), *Polar geopolitics? : Knowledge, Resources and Legal Regimes,* pp. 259-276.

Valentine, G. (2001) Social Geographies: Space and Society. Prentice Hall.

Yanow, D, and Schwartz-Shea, P. (2015) Interpretation and Method : Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. Sharpe, Inc.: New York.

Journal Articles

Bjørst, L. (2010) The Tip of the Iceberg: Ice as a Non-human Actor in the Climate Change Debate, in *Etudes/Inuit/Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 133-150.

Bjørst, L. R. (2011) Politiske diskurser og paradigmeskift i den grønlandske klimadebat fra 2001-2010, in Arktiske diskurser og klimaforandringer i Grønland (2011). Københavns Universitet: Danmark.

Bjørst, L. R. (2012) Politiske positioner og skift i den grønlandske klimadebat fra 2001 til 2011. Vol. 60, nr. 1, pp. 2-19.

Bjørst, L. (2016) Saving or destroying the local community? Conflicting spatial storylines in the Greenlandic debate on uranium, in *The Extractive Industries and Society*, Vol. 3, pp. 34-40

Bold, M. and Long, A. (1984) Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indians. *Can. Polit. Sci. Assoc. Société Québécoise Sci. Polit.* Vol. 17, pp. 537–553.

Dahl, J. (2010) Identity, Urbanization and Political Demography in Greenland. In *Acta Boreal*, Vol. 27, pp. 125–140.

Dittmer, J., Moisio, S., Ingram, A. and Dodds, K. (2011) Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics. In *Polit. Geogr.* Vol. 30, pp. 202–214.

Dodds, K. (2010) Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf. In *Polit. Geogr.* Vol. 29, pp. 63–73.

Dybbroe, S. (1996) Questions of identity and issues of self-determination. In *Études/Inuit/Studies* Vol. 20, pp. 39–53.

Gad, U. (2009) Post-colonial identity in Greenland?: When the empire dichotomizes back — bring politics back in. J. Lang. Polit. Vol. 8, pp. 136–158.

Gad, U. (2014) Greenland: A post-Danish sovereign nation state in the making. *Coop. Confl.* Vol. 49, pp. 98–118.

Gerhardt, H., Steinberg, P., Tasch, J., Fabiano, S. and Shields, R. (2010) Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. Vol. 100, pp. 992–1002.

Gerhardt, H. (2011) The Inuit and Sovereignty: The Case of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and Greenland, in *Tidsskriftet Politik*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 6-14.

Corntassel, J. (2003) Who is indigenous? "Peoplehood" and ethnonationalist approaches to rearticulating indigenous identity. Natl. Ethn. Polit. Vol. 9, pp. 75–100.

Crawford, A. (2014) "The trauma experienced by generations past having an effect in their descendants": Narrative and historical trauma among Inuit in Nunavut, Canada. Transcult. psychiatry Vol. 51, pp. 339–369.

Jacobsen, M. (2015) The Power of Collective Identity Narration: Greenland's Way to a More Autonomous Foreign Policy, in *Arctic Yearbook 2015*.

Jensen, L. (2015) "Postcolonial Denmark: Beyond the Rot of Colonialism." *Postcolonial Studies* 18 (4): 440–52.

Kirsch, S. (2010) Sustainable Mining, in *Dialect Anthropology,* Vol. 34, pp. 87-94.

Kuersten, A. (2015) Imagining the Arctic: International Law, Governance, and Relations in the High North. In *Michigan State International Law Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 599-623.

Kuokkanen, R. (2017) To see what state we are in: First years of the Greenland Self-Government Act and the pursuit of Inuit sovereignty, in *Ethnopolitics,* Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 179-195.

Lélé, S. (1991) Sustainable Development - A Critical Review, in *World Development*, Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 607-621.

Martello, M. (2008) Arctic Indigenous Peoples as Representations and Representatives of Climate Change, in *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 351-376.

Mazza, M. (2015) The Prospects of Independence for Greenland, between Energy Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (with Some Comparative Remarks on Nunavut, Canada). Beijing Law Rev. Vol. 6, pp. 320.

Nuttal, M. (2008) Self-rule in Greenland: Towards the World's First Independent Inuit State? in *Indigenous Affairs,* Vol. 1-2, pp. 44-51.

Nuttall, M. (2012) Imagining and governing the Greenlandic resource frontier, in *The Polar Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 113-124.

Petersen, R. (1995) Colonialism as Seen From Colonised Area, in *Arct. Anthropol.* Vol. 32, pp. 118–126.

Rasmussen, R. (2009) Gender and Generation: Perspectives on Ongoing Social and Environmental Changes in the Arctic.

Sejersen, F. (2010) Urbanization, Landscape Appropriation and Climate Change in Greenland, in *Acta Borealia*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 167-188.

Shaw et al. (2006) Encountering Indigeneity: Re-imagining and Decolonizing Geography, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 267-276.

Søbye, G. (2013) To Be or not to Be Indigenous People and Sovereigtny in Greenland after Self-Government. in *Curis - Købehavns Universitets Forskningspublikationer*, pp. 1–25.

Tennberg (2009)

Tiainen, H. (2016) Contemplating governance for social sustainability in mining in Greenland, in *Resources Policy*, Vol. 49, pp. 282-289.

Turner, T. (1993) Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What Is Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful of It? in *Cult. Anthropol.* Vol. 8, pp. 411–429.

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. In *Int. Org.* Vol. 46, pp. 391-425.

(Online) Articles and websites

Elkjær, Kenneth. (07.05.2017). "Vejen Mod Selvstændighed Kan Blive for Dyr." *KNR*. April 7. http://knr.gl/da/nyheder/vejen-mod-selvst%C3%A6ndighed-kan-blive-dyr (accessed on 29.05.2017)

Greenland Minerals and Energy A/S (n. d.) En mine skaber vækst i Narsaq. GME A/S [online].
Available at: <http://gme.gl/en-mine-skaber-vaekst-i-narsaq>
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Greenland Statistics (2017) "Befolksningsfremskrivning 2017-2040".
Www.stat.gl [29.05.2017]

Hansen, N. (2016) Smelteværk af aluminium sat på standby. Sermitsiaq.ag [online] 2nd February.
Available at: <http://sermitsiaq.ag/smeltevaerk-aluminium-sat-standby>
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Heinrich, J. (2015). "Grønlands Forsoningskommission." Grønlands Forsoningskommission: Dagens Grønland.

ICC (n.d.). Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada. URL: http://www.in-uitcircumpolar.com/
[accessed 29.05.2017]

McGwin, K. (2014) ICC Greenland faces shutdown after funding slashed. The Arctic Journal [online] 7th April. Available at: <http://arcticjournal.com/politics/543/icc-greenland-faces-shutdown-after-funding-slashed>
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Medred, C. (2013) New Arctic Circle group forms to address needs of changing north. Alaska Dispatch News [online] (last updated September 27, 2016). Available at: <https://www.adn.com/arctic/article/arctic-circle-assembly-hopes-address-needs-changing-north/2

Mølgaard, N. (2014) Billeder: Historisk aftale underskrevet. Sermitsiaq.ag [online] 17th June. Available at: <http://sermitsiaq.ag/billeder-historisk-aftale-underskrevet>
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Oneal, M. (2017) Greenland needs money. Is a uranium mine the answer? The Washington Post [online] 10th February. Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/10/greenland-needs-money-is-a-uranium-mine-the-answer/?utm_term=.4a34e16e4a15
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Por, T. (n. d.) Greenland Myths and Legends. Visit Greenland [online]. Available at: <http://www.greenland.com/en/articles/greenland-myths-and-legends/>
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

Unknown (2009) Kuupik Kleist: Ingen dato for selvstændighed. KNR [online] 21st June. Available at: http://knr.gl/kl/node/117928
[Accessed on 29.05.2017]

WWF (2015). "Clean, Green Energy for Greenland - Thin Ice Blog." *Thin Ice Blog - WWF*. http://arctic.blogs.panda.org/default/green-energy-greenland/.
[accessed the 29.05.2017]

Reports

ACIA (2004): Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, ACIA Overview report, Cambridge University Press

Alcoa Sustainability (2016) URL: https://www.alcoa.com/sustainability/en/pdf/2016-Sustainability-Report.pdf (accessed on 29.05.2017)

"AMAP Assessment 2011: Mercury in the Arctic | AMAP." 2017. Accessed May 29. Available at:https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/amap-assessment-2011-mercury-in-the-arctic/90. [accessed the 29.05.2017]

AMAP (2017) "Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost. Summary for Policy-Makers." SWIPA.

Greenland 'Progress through education and competency development' (xxx) Råstofdirektoratet (2007)

Schmidt, J. & Thrane M. (2009) Life Cycle Assessment of Aluminium Production in New Alcoa Smelter in Greenland. Nuuk: Government of Greenland.

To the Benefit of Greenland. (2014) A report written by The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society. University of Copenhagen and the University of Greenland, Ilisimatusarfik. http://nyheder.ku.dk/groenlandsnaturressourcer/rapportogbaggrundspapir/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf

USGS. (2007). "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the East Greenland Rift Basins Province." https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2007/3077/pdf/FS07-3077_508.pdf. (accessed on 29.05.2017)

Speeches & Letters

Enoksen, H. (2009) Landsstyreformandens tale til nytårsreceptionen, 2009. http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Taler/DK/nytaarstale_2009_HE_DK.pdf

Enoksen, H. (2009) Formanden for Naalakkersuisut åbningstale, 25. september. http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Taler/DK/aabningstaler/aabningstale_EM_2009_HE_DK.pdf

Hammond, A. (2008) Greenlands involvement in the international climate debate. http://vintage.nanoq.gl/Emner/Landsstyre/Departementer/Departement_for_finans_indenrigs/Nyhedsforside/Nyheder_fra_dep_finans/2008/04/~/media/2E97A758F2D64B0C9867E342C1B2F00E.ashx

Hammond, A. (2013) Åbningstale ved Formand for Naalakkersuisut http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Taler/DK/aabningstaler/Aabningstale_EM_2013_AH_DK.pdf

Hammond, A. (2013a) The Premier Aleqa Hammond's speech at the Arctic Circle Assembly. http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Pressemeddelelser/ARCTIC%20CIRCLE%20presentation%20TEKST%20DK.pdf

Hammond, A. (2014) New Year Speech

http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Taler/ENG/Nyt%C3%A5rstale%202014%20ENG.pdf

Kielsen (2016) Nytårstale 2017, Formanden for Naalakkersuisut
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Taler/DK/Nyt%C3%A5rstale%202017%20DK.pdf

Kleist, K. (2009) Grønlands forpligtelser i henhold til en international klimaaftale
http://climategreenland.gl/media/18989/2009-Kuupik-Kleists-brev-til-Lykke-Friis-DK.pdf

Kleist, K. (2009a) Celebration speech by Premier Kuupik Kleist on inauguration of Greenland self-government, 21 June
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Engelske-tekster/Celebration%20speech.pdf

Kleist, K. (2009b). Statement by Mr. Kuupik Kleist, Premier of Greenland, 2nd session of the expert mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Geneva, 10–14 August 2009). In R. Stavenhagen & C. Charters (Eds.), Making the declaration work: The United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (pp. 248–251). Copenhagen: IWGIA.

Duane, S. (2008) Subject: Greenland's Path Towards Self-Government.
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Selvstyre/Lyk%C3%B8nskning%20fra%20ICCs%20pr%C3%A6sident.pdf (accessed on 29.05.2017)

Official documents

Coalition Agreement (2016) (Translation - The Greenlandic Version Applies). Equality, Security, Development.
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Koalitionsaftaler/Koalitionsaftale_S_IA_PN_eng.pdf (accessed on 29.05.2017)

EUC. (2006). "Communication from the Commission - A New Comprehensive Partnership with Greenland in the Form of a Joint Declaration and a Council Decision Based on Article 187 of the EC Treaty." http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2006:0142:FIN. (accessed on 29.05.2017)

ILO (1989). C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989). (No. 169) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Entry into force: 05 Sep 1991). International Labour Organisation.

The Ilulissat Declaration, (2008). URL.
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf (accessed 29.05.2017)

Inuit of Inuit Nunaat (2014). A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic. In *Fourth World J.* Vol. 12, pp. 96–101.

The Greenland Home Rule, Act no. 577 (1978). URL: http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html (accessed 29.05.2017).

Greenland Self Government, Act no. 473 (2009). URL: http://www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html (accessed 29.05..2017).

The Greenlandic Treaty (1985). (Acts whose publication is obligatory) http://web.archive.org/web/20160304044627/http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Bruxelles/EU%20and%20Greenland/The%20European%20Union%20and%20Greenland/Greenland%20Treaty%20eng.pdf (accessed on 29.05.2017

UN. (1945). "Charter of the United Nations | United Nations.". http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. (accessed on 29.05.2017).

UNDRIP (2008). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Inigenous Peoples. United Nations. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed on 29.05.2017)