The Call To Kill:
A Discourse Analysis on Hutu Extremist Radio Broadcasts in the Early 1990s

Group 8

House 21, SIB

2nd Semester, Spring 2017

Jacob Melson (60578) and Emina Hanić (60579)

Supervisor: Lene Bull Christiansen

Number of Characters: 133.875

Abstract

The overall purpose of this study is to examine the implications of the media discourse in constructing Tutsis as the enemy of Hutus. We have examined specific radio transcripts from the RTLM in the period leading up to and during the Rwandan genocide, specifically showing how the Tutsis and Hutus were dichotomized, and further how Tutsis were dehumanized to the extent that it was justifiable to kill them. These processes of dichotomization and dehumanization of Tutsis lead back to the historical context of Rwanda, as we explore the role of colonialist practice in reconstructing the Hutu and Tutsi identities. The development of Rwanda's historical context in relation to our study draws heavily on the works of Prunier (2005), and Fujii (2009). Our findings show a clear use in the RTLM radio transmissions, of identity empowering propaganda, further distinguishing between the 'evil' Tutsi and the 'good' Hutu. Thus further emphasizing the ethnicity valued relationship in this whole situation, so as to clearly create a division between Tutsis and Hutus. Furthermore our findings show that many of the constructed identity struggles between Tutsis and Hutu were based on neo-traditions invented by Europeans.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to Problem Area

" *Killers in Rwanda often carried a machete in one hand and a radio transistor in the other,*''
(Samantha Powers quoted in Straus, 2007, p. 612)

The support for the extermination of the ''*Inyenzi-Inkotanyi*'' was in the years of 1994 common within the public discourse regarding Tutsis by Hutu extremists. The Rwandan Hutu regime had by then for about four years been in a civil war against the Tutsi rebels known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), that was mainly consisting of descendants of Tutsi refugees who had fled to Uganda in the past, i.e. during the revolution of 1959-1962 (Prunier, 1995). Throughout those years, Hutu extremists – often members of the educated elite and supporters of the regime – had taken a hate-mongering stance against not only the RPF, but the general Tutsi population as well. This anti-Tutsi perspective was preached to the common Rwandese citizens mainly through radio broadcasting (Fujii, 2006). As argued by Fuji, these radio broadcasts played an essential role in normalizing the genocidal talk, that largely contributed to normalizing the previous horrific actions that were made possible in the genocide which came to be known as the ''100 Days of Slaughter,'' where between eight-hundred thousand and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus (including political opposition members) were killed. The acknowledgement of this influence gathered a common consensus on the true impact of the Rwandan media (Fujii, 2006; Moshman, 2007; Prunier, 1995; United Nations ICTR n.d.).

Already by 1993, genocide had become ''common talk'' (Prunier, 1995), an achieved result primarily thanks to the privately owned extremist radio station, *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), which was founded by historian and one of the pacesetters of the genocide, Ferdinand Nahimana, amongst others (Fujii, 2006).

Lee Ann Fujii, associate professor in political science, has written extensively on the subject of the Rwandan extremist media and its role in the setup and act of genocide against the Tutsi minority of Rwanda. It is through her work that we take inspiration, as she argues that the radio station, RTLM, made genocidal talk a popular subject of everyday conversation so to

motivate commoners to commit collective murder, and furthermore, to immunise their listeners to the concept of genocide (Fujii, 2006). In her work, studies by communicative scholars, Kellow and Steeves, are also explained, as these scholars highlight the media's ability to create a polarized world in which a Hutu would either have to take the lives of Tutsis or have one's life taken by them. This, they argued, was done through the techniques of agenda-setting and framing:

'' *Agenda-setting is the way in which media order the importance of issues, while framing relates to the parts of a story that media choose to highlight and make salient. Through agenda-setting, media "tell us how to think about particular issues and, consequently, what to think," while framing determines "the way people interpret a message's meaning"* '' (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 110 cited in Fujii, 2006, p. 105)

These were some of the techniques communicatively used by the Hutu elite on the radio to establish a normative framework for the campaign of Tutsi extermination and the mobilization of its perpetrators. Communicative theories only further pin-point the influence and responsibility of media, reinforced by the political climate and historical background, as extremists built their messages on historical references and myths (Fujii, 2006; Waller, 2002). It was no coincidence, that radio became the most important tool to urge citizens to kill in defence, according to the broadcasters. In comparison to the rest of Africa, Rwanda had a relatively high proportion of radio-owners, where about 60% of urban citizens owned a radio and circa 30% in rural areas (Fujii, 2006).

Ultimately, this extremist elite succeeded at imprinting into the public conscience the picture of the ''eternal enemy'' – the foreign Tutsi, who would never cease his attempts at subjugating the native Hutu (Fujii, 2006). This resulted in a state in which "*killers in Rwanda often carried a machete in one hand and a radio transistor in the other,* '' (Samantha Powers quoted in Straus, 2007, p. 612), where the radio was perceived as the voice of authority delivering orders (implicit if not explicit) and the listeners as the local executioners, who often so took use of the machete in completing the task (Straus, 2007).

Thus, the relevance of these radio broadcasts – particularly those of RTLM – cannot be underestimated. These broadcasts were the medium through which the ethnic dichotomy of Hutus and Tutsis as natural and irreconcilable enemies was constructed, and it is of the interest of this study to explore how the Tutsi ''enemy'' was fashioned within this narrative.

Hence, this study aims to particularly explore how these ethnic identities were constructed within the public discourse.

As mentioned by Straus, one causal mechanism used by RTLM, was dehumanization, by which the Tutsis were reduced to the level of subhuman, giving further justification to exterminate them, as they would not belong to the moral universe of the human and rational Hutus (Fujii, 2006; Straus 2007). Thus, dehumanization is a tool used to turn immoral killing into ‘’moral killings’’. One common way of dehumanizing the Tutsis was simply to call and compare them to *‘’inyenzi,’’* meaning ‘’cockroaches’’. This definition of Tutsis was historically rooted in the Tutsi cross-border night-time raids occurring between 1963-1967, after the Tutsi-persecution of the Rwandan revolution had prompted a mass-emigration (Fujii, 2006).

Therefore, this study will be exploratory, as we will be looking at how this dichotomisation and dehumanization of identities was portrayed through public discourse under the radio broadcasts. This is of general relevance, as such a study would help to clarify the distinguishable mechanisms and the process of dichotomisation and dehumanization as tools for justifying genocidal acts. Because it is known that RTLM was owned by extremist elites, we will go about the exploration of this process between broadcasters and common Rwandese citizens by doing a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the radio-transcripts published by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. (Fuji, 2006) This analysis has been chosen, as CDA:

‘*’deals with the discursively enacted or legitimated structures and strategies of dominance and resistance in social relationships of class, gender, ethnicity* [and] *is about the underlying ideologies that play a role in the reproduction of or resistance against dominance or inequality* [as well as] *focuses on the strategies of manipulation, legitimation, the manufacture of consent and other ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of the people in the interest of the powerful,’’* (van Dijk, 1995, p. 18)

The study is therefore going about the empirical evidence on the premises of social-constructivism; the philosophy that considers reality as being a social construct. Thus, in order to understand reality one must interpret the social sphere creating it (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

Throughout the process of promoting a climate inciting genocide, it has been argued that the notion of identity is constructed and reconstructed - moulded into fitting a certain narrative – causing us to take inspiration from Moshman and his theory on identity's relevance to genocide (Moshman, 2007).

Moreover, as stated above how the word ''*inyenzi*'' was commonly used for dehumanizing the Tutsi, we find it relevant to acknowledge the historical context within which these myths contributed in constructing the *''inyenzi''*. This prompts us to look further into the historical context of Rwanda, as background knowledge will provide the necessary contextual information needed to understand the web of meanings that gave inspiration and support to the extremist agendas on RTLM. These historical facts – as well as manipulated ''facts'' - assisted the broadcasters in shaping the ''social reality'' of ethnic divisions through their hate- and fear-based narrative. Hence, if one is not aware of the historical and cultural context of Rwanda, one cannot truly know the deeper meaning and thus influence of the word *''inyenzi''*. This aspect of our study is primarily inspired by the writings of Chabal and Daloz (2006), who propagate for approaching each event – particularly those of non-Western societies – from a local and cultural perspective. We are thus required to see the event of genocide in Rwanda through a ''local lens'', perceiving the Rwandese culture as a ''world of worlds'' (Chabal and Daloz, 2006). This perspective of a cultural study correlates then with the theories of identity and genocide by Moshman, as identities are products of the cultural and societal context within which the individual has been socialised (Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Moshman, 2007).

However, as we are aware of the colonial history, we are compelled to further introduce a post-colonialist theoretical approach into our study, to examine the continuous influence of colonialism in postcolonial Rwanda. Through a postcolonial theoretical approach, we can thus acquire the contextual understanding so to correlate the social constructs (and implications) introduced by the colonials with the discursive content of the radio broadcasts. For this part, we are interested in using Edward Said's notion of ''imaginative geography'', as Said argued this to be an effective tool used by Europeans to create divisions between identities as well as heighten European superiority and authority (Haldrup and Koefoed, 2009). Therefore, we are concerned with how the colonials constructed divisions via a colonialist narrative, as well as how these divisions eventually appeared in the Hutu extremist rhetoric promoted during the radio-transmissions.

As aforementioned, this study is dealing with the genocidal message broadcasted by RTLM leading up to and during the genocide. The aim of this study is to explore how dichotomisation and dehumanization is portrayed in the discourse that RTLM operated within. The cultural, political and historical context within which the discourse was constructed will form the backdrop of this analysis. Hence, we will attempt to answer the following research and working questions:

1.2 Research Question

How was the dichotomisation of Hutus and Tutsis and the dehumanization of Tutsis in the media discourse utilised to construct the Tutsi as enemy of the Hutu during the RTLM radio broadcasting before and during the Rwandan genocide of 1994?

1.3 Working Questions

- What meanings did the terms of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' possess in pre-colonial Rwanda?
- How did neo-traditionalist colonisers reconstruct the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' identities?
- How were colonial and pre-colonial influences reflected in the utilisation of dichotomisation and dehumanization against the Tutsis by the Hutu extremist radio discourse?

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Research Design

The purpose of this study is to explore how dichotomisation and dehumanization was constructed within the narrative frames of the radio broadcasts made by the RTLM leading up to and during the genocide of 1994. In order to answer the research question, we have so far retrieved both primary and secondary empirical data that we will be analysing by the use of the methodological approaches and theories chosen for our research study.

There have been different motivational factors for conducting this study. We have a curiosity for studies and stories of the African continent, as well as an interest in the causal factors leading to genocide, which often seems incomprehensible given the extreme degree of brutality and lack compassion. As we have often heard the phrase ‘’never again’’ being repeated in the media, we are therefore motivated to examine how media can endorse the reverse – hence the name of our study: ‘’The Call To Kill’’. Lastly, we find this study of a past event important for today, as awareness of possible existing discursive dichotomisation and dehumanization in media can inspire listeners to become critical of this type of discourse. We believe that by understanding the full process of genocide and its rhetoric, society can thus better support the statement of ‘’never again’’.

2.2 Qualitative Methods

Our study will be qualitative, as we will be examining human behaviour and meanings within a case where the subject is too complex to be answered by a simple hypothesis. Therefore, one cannot generalise results simply based on quantitative research (Soiferman, 2010).

Moreover, our qualitative study will be based on interpretivist research philosophy, as ‘‘*interpretivists believe in multiple constructed realities that generate different meanings for different individuals, and whose interpretations depend on the researcher's lens,*’’ (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005, p. 270). Since interpretivism further argues that cultures can be comprehended by the examination of ideas, thinking, and meanings that are valuable to people, and searches for meanings and motives behind interactions and behaviour in society

(Chouwdhury, 2014), the philosophy emphasises the importance of contextualisation. Interpretivism makes us concerned with the distinctiveness of the RTLM radio broadcasts and how ‘’reality’’ from the perspective of Hutu-fundamentalists was socially constructed through language used by the RTLM extremists (ibid.). This leads us to the philosophical science of social constructivism.

2.3 Social Constructivism

Social constructivism is the belief that society is constructed socially through interactions between humans, who are also able to alter this reality, rather than reality being exclusively a product of the laws of nature (Detel, 2015), correlating with the interpretivist approach. Moreover, social constructivism seeks out to criticise and challenge the status quo with its different variants concerning aspects such as beliefs and social relations (ibid.). Social constructivism is believed to be a way to look upon the social nature of knowledge and science, as well as being a view on the construction of the social reality (ibid.). This relates to our project, as we are attempting to figure out how notions such as ‘’identity’’, ‘’tribalism’’, ‘’nationality’’, ‘’victim,’’ ‘’good,’’ and ‘’bad’’ have been socially constructed locally within the historical and social framework of Rwanda as well as in the narrative of the Hutu extremists. As Berger and Luckmann (1966) elaborates:

‘’*Societies exist because their members have a degree of certitude about their reality, and the reality of other things. The reality of the society, and the certitude called knowledge come into being through social processes.*’’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 122).

Hence, social constructivism comes into relevance as we pursuit to understand the objective as well as the subjective reality of the Hutu extremists in 1994. Berger and Luckmann describes the objective reality as being the institutionalization of roles, of language, of tradition, etc.; and the subjective reality as institutions and symbolic universes internalized by individuals to create personal identity amongst other (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus, social constructivism is relevant as our study aim to understand how dichotomisation and dehumanization is portrayed according to identities and the differentiation between ‘’us’’ and ‘’them’’ in the discursive framework formed by RTLM.

2.4 Critical Discourse Analysis

As our main intention with our empirical data is to encode meanings, such as cultural and political codes, it will be an analysis of the semiotics of what is being communicated to the Rwandan citizens. With certainty, we cannot avoid considering the political discourse of Rwandan history, as war can primarily be recognised as a political matter. Therefore, the social constructivist philosophy and interpretive approach of a critical discourse analysis is ideal for our study of the RTLM broadcasts' language:

''it assumes that people act on the basis of beliefs, values, or ideologies that give meaning to their actions; and that to understand political behaviour, we must know about the meaning that people attach to what they're doing'' (Halperin, S.; Heath, O., 2017, p. 336)

Not to forget, critical discourse analysis is based on the belief that meaning is constituted through language, such as the meanings of ideology and identity (Flick, 2014).

According to Halperin and Heath, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is considered as being 'critical' because of its intention to find and expose connections between power, language, and ideology. They argue that it is concerned with the role of discourse when it comes to social power abuse, dominance, inequality, and resisting such. Moreover, they mention how discursive power is social power and gives agents possibilities to constitute dominance and hegemony (Helperin, S.; Heath, O, 2017).

Those factors will help us detect the many meanings created within a discourse, such as significance (being a Hutu or a Tutsi), practices (calling for genocide), identities ('othering' of Tutsis), relationships (between extremist Hutus as well as politicians), politics (Hutu power; Tutsis are evil), connections (radio establishing the believed fact that Tutsis are '*inyenzi'*), signs, systems, and knowledge (Belgian colonial contribution to further class and tribal divisions) (Gee, 2014). Since we are doing a critical discourse analysis of radio-transcripts, we have to keep in mind that, as Gee points out: *'' when we speak, or write, we simultaneously say something, do something, and are something,''* (Gee, J., 2014, p. 20).

Identity, particularly in the case of a civil war, plays a big role, as the meaning that we associate with the identity of our own as well of that of others makes it possible for people in the event of conflict to separate themselves from ''the other''. So, when looking upon the

case of Hutus killing Tutsis, (despite their cultural similarities and years of inter-marriage) an extensive 'othering' in public discourse by politically driven holders of discursive power can through analysis give explanation for how Hutu extremists formed the existence of the Tutsi ''enemy'', hence gathering support for ''enemy'' extermination. We will be looking further into who these ''socially significant kinds of people,'' as Gee (2014) terms them, were and how these certain identities used both non-vernacular as well as vernacular social language to convey their message and thus create webs of associations amongst civilian Hutus, such as ''Tutsi equals oppression'' (Gee, 2014).

Since we in our critical discourse analysis will be handling terms like ''tribes,'' ''culture,'' and ''enemy,'' we must take into account the contextual frames. Hence, contextualization is important, as we aim to understand not only *how* but also *why* certain identities are constructed. Contextualization is the idea that human actions are properly understood only within the context of situation (Hammersley, 2012). According to Hammersley (2012), this idea is central to most forms of qualitative inquiry. When utilizing contextualization in our study, we will be taking account of context as emphasizing the role of context as shaping actions and narratives, hence, we will be treating the dimension of context as an objective part of the constructed reality of study (ibid.). Generally, what we aim to do is draw threads leading from historic events with impacts on social relations eventually influencing the Hutu ideology used by extremist to dichotomize and dehumanize within the framed discourse. This way we will acquire an in-depth thick description and understanding of our subject.

2.5 Empirical Data

As we initially proposed a narrow research question, we have had the opportunity to make a tight research design, giving us the opportunity to do a focused study of our empirical evidence: official transcripts of the RTLM radio broadcasts. These radio transcripts were officially used under the legal prosecutions of those guilty using the media to call for the extermination of Tutsis. When the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established, it became the first international criminal tribunal in history to prosecute those responsible for spreading inciting genocide through the media. This also became known as *''the media case''* (United Nations ICTR, n.d.), and therefore we rule this to be both a both

trustworthy and valuable primary source for our critical discourse analysis and in answering our research question.

Apart from the radio transcripts, we will be attempting to acquire as much relevant historical information as possible from secondary sources by acclaimed historians and researchers who have written extensively on the Rwandan genocide, such as Gérard Prunier and Lee Ann Fujii.

2.6 Positioning

Firstly, considering limitations, we must primarily acknowledge the probability of bias, as we as researchers also have an individual perception of reality according to the philosophy of social constructivism, hence, our emotions and possibly pre-existing assumptions can deny us from distancing ourselves completely from the subject. This limitation is also expressed by Hammersley (2012): ‘’*is is argued that, in understanding anything, the analyst cannot avoid relying on inherited background assumptions* […] *the role of emotional response may also be acknowledged,*’’ (Hammerlsey, 2012, p. 2). Furthermore, as contexts are many even within the local and microcosmic sphere, the course of the study is still dependent on our choice of contextual material, meaning that we – willingly or unwillingly – are ourselves contributing in constructing a narrative that can be deemed subjective despite our best efforts to be objective.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we intend to elaborate on our chosen theories that we will apply as both guidelines and tools in the analysis of our empirical data. Hence, we aim to utilise the following theories as support in forming an in-depth understand of the factors that gave the extremists of RTLM the influence necessary to normalise genocidal talk and eventually succeed in convincing common Hutus to subjugate to the same extremist Hutu ideology. Firstly, we will cover the arguments of researchers Chabal and Daloz, advocating the importance of contextual cultural analysis. Thereafter, we will move to Moshman's theory on the role of identity in relation to genocidal uprising and the mechanisms of dichotomisation and dehumanization. Lastly, we will cover the relevance of Edward Said's study of Orientalism and ''imaginative geography''.

3.2 Culture Troubles - Politics and Interpretation of Meaning

When and how culture and its notions such as ethnicity, religion, and nationality are used with the aim of legitimising violence, is what Chabal and Daloz discuss and relate to the cultural approach of coding the web of meanings, which can only be truly understood if one takes the time appreciate the cultural context and the argument for why one cannot simply rely fully on presuppositions. Therefore, they term the cultural approach to:

''*... believe that one should probe into the societies one claims to study to determine how perception and representation of identity shape the behaviour of individuals and the communities within which they live,*'' (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 98) and to gain

''*an understanding of politics and culture and the relation between them requires a more systematic exploration of the link between culture and political identity*,'' (ibid.) as the

''*cultural approach is interested in discussing how groups and individuals think of their own political 'identity' [...] to find out how culture impinges on the ways in which individuals' notions of self and group shape their view of political identity.*'' (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 99)

As stated by the authors, the most important political function of culture is to provide political actors with a framework for the expression of rationality that is based on mainly two aspects; the ‘’logics’’ to the political system and the manners in which political actors explain what they do (Chabal and Daloz, 2006). This is where the cultural perspective is necessary so to help the analyst understand the ‘moral’ parameters of the actions made by political actors, as the approach works as an interpretation of the webs of meaning within this rationality of politics and the context in which it is happening, as political logic is always constructed in context, hence, ‘‘politics is always rooted in culture’’, according to Chabal and Daloz (ibid.). Thus, the aim of the cultural approach is:

‘*’to seek to understand how such logics emerge, or are ‘invented’, how groups of people come to agree, even if only implicitly, on what rational political behaviour is* [as] *a cultural approach would encourage the analyst to try to understand such political behaviour from the point of view of the local actors, both rulers and ruled,’’* (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 136-137).

Furthermore, in uncovering the mechanisms behind the legitimising of violence, the subject of ‘myths’ is discussed, as myths are the material from which communities are imagined, according to the authors, and they are mainly concerning newly independent countries or the developing world, as notions of myths are often at the centre of unstable political entities (Chabal and Daloz, 2006). These myths can be used as instruments by political actors as reasoning or ‘justification’ for particular acts of politics – such as inciting violence – and in this case, the cultural approach stress two points for exploration: 1) how these myths are created and 2) how the historical background of these myths can be linked to political uses, hence, the historical context is of importance, as that is where the myths emerge (ibid.). Besides, it is argued of how, and in relation to our study, how ethnic groups in Africa often have rather corresponding narratives of their origins, in which their tribal ancestry and identity is related to a god-like being in their area of where the self-proclaimed ethnic group is living, using Rwanda as an example (ibid.), and it is further emphasises how these myths are often so put into use when a community is experiencing a condition of ‘stress,’ in which a culture might feel threatened, but all of these aspects will naturally have to be examined in the correct context (ibid.). Through a cultural perspective, the aim would then be to code the

relevance to politics of these myths in order to recognise the political message or ‘’language’’ (ibid.).

Going back to our research question, we will then aim to understand and recognise the myths of the Rwandan context, particularly those used by the Hutu extremists of RTLM.

When political actors - or individuals with political interest – finally step forward to deliberately incite violence in the community or society, a cultural perspective:

‘*’rests on the premise that culture is an historically and contextually produced system of meaning, rather than ‘values’’’* and is ‘*’concerned about explaining the political context within which a particular cultural justification of that nature is thought to be appropriate and effective,’’* (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 143), so to figure out why and how certain individuals can make sense of employing violence and even go as far as to ‘justify’ killings and crimes against humanity, such as genocide. The theory of cultural approach is therefore interested in examining the explanations by influential actors within their local context, as to how they make sense of their world and of the hostility which they are fuelling (Chabal and Daloz, 2006). However, the authors also argue, that hostility towards other groupings requires the employers of violence to believe that the ‘other’ is fundamentally different than themselves, as well that their identity and culture is threatened, to ‘justify’ this violence (ibid.). Again, the authors decided to use Rwanda as an example:

‘’The attempted genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda can in no way be explained merely by a supported age-old ‘ethnic’ hostility between them and the Hutus, such as a cultural approach would claim. This abominable event must be put in the context of long-standing economic hardship, shortage of land, and intense political rivalry within a weakening patrimonial political system in which political accountability had virtually ceased to exist […] The notion of a sense of ‘Hutu-ness’ constructed on hostility to the Tutsi ‘outsider’ had powerful historical resonance in the social imaginary’’ (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 144-145).

Finally, the authors proclaim that culture is merely the language through which conflict is voiced and that ideology is basically the ‘‘political exploitation of culture’’ (ibid.). Therefore, it is necessary to use an approach based on the cultural perspective to uncover the webs of meaning in which these exploitations are happening and affecting both the people being urged to violence as well as those who are predicted victims (ibid.). Of course, in order to

understand any political actor, it is given that one as an analyst look further into the key cultural constructs of religion, ethnicity, and nationality, in which an individual's identity can exist in several 'circles of identity', as the authors argue, making each person seem more complex as they are world within a local world, which again is a world within a world, to simplify (ibid.).

Obviously, the importance of the cultural approach to our study cannot be underestimated, as we also consider this theory - or 'philosophy' on how complex our world actually is - highly relevant as a tool for getting that in-depth knowledge and recognition of the true underlying characteristics of dichotomisation, dehumanization and the incitement of genocide in Rwanda back in the 1990s. We are intending to utilise the arguments expressed by Chabal and Daloz throughout the entirety of our study process, as they can function as guides for us to continuously keep in mind the formation and effect of context and discourse.

3.3 Dichotomization and Dehumanization

The aim of our study is to explore how the concepts of dichotomization and dehumanization relate to the construction of Hutu and Tutsi identities, and how it influenced the conception of the ''ultimate Tutsi enemy'' by Hutu extremists in Rwanda when leading up to and during the genocide. We intend to explore these concepts and relate them specifically to the radio discourse that urged the people to contribute in the ''cleansing of the Tutsi''. The cause of including these concepts for our analysis, is that we find the arguments of David Moshman in his paper ''Us and Them: Identity and Genocide'' (2007) as being valuable and relevant for our study. As we initially had an interest in examining dehumanization, we subsequently found the concept of identity and its role in genocide interesting, as it was portrayed by Moshman, given that he also uses the case of Rwanda as an example in his argumentation.

For clarification, we would like the reader to keep in mind that the notion of identity is an integral part of the concepts (or tools) of dichotomization and dehumanization, and therefore, describing Moshman's perception of identity is necessary to understand the use and influence of dichotomization and dehumanization.

Moshman discusses how he did multiple case studies on mass killings and genocides - the Rwanda case included - and thereafter concluded that ‘’hatred’’ was elusive in these cases, but that perpetrators of genocide were instead often driven by other alternative motivations (Moshman, 2007), which lead him to yet another conclusion: ‘*’genocide is not so much a crime of hate as a crime of identity*,’’ (ibid., p. 118) and in his research, he following states identity as being:

‘*’a conception of oneself in one’s social context that is sufficiently organized, explanatory, and conscious to be deemed an explicit theory of oneself as a person* […] *To see oneself as a person is to see oneself in relation to others and in relation to various groups* [and as] *an individual with a unique pattern of social relationships, affiliations, roles, and commitments,*’’ (Moshman, 207, p. 118)

Thus, the concept of identity is relevant to our study, as he argues that the process of genocide essentially leads to individuals constructing a frame of identity in which the in-group compares themselves as being superior to those who are excluded from this frame. This leads to the simplified dichotomy of ‘’us’’ and ‘’them,’’ through which the out-group is being marginalized within this process (Moshman, 2007). Keeping this in mind, we can view genocide as an act of violence by a group/identity against another group/identity, without undermining the responsibility of individual perpetrators (ibid.). But since identities often are constructed within several dimensions such as ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, and political ideologies, it is further specifically stated that identity does not necessarily lead to genocide, though our discussion of the dichotomy between the in- and out-group is taking place specifically within the context of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. As argued by Moshman, it is relevant, because when facilitating genocide, these frames of identities are often increased to simply number two and ultimately one dimension, such as ethnicity (ibid.). This leads us to the concepts of dichotomization and dehumanization.

Dichotomization is described by Moshman (2007) as the process of which the cultural and social dimensions of society are constructed in ways so that certain dimensions become central or mandatory. Dichotomization is a focus over specifically one dimension that differs from what is considered as an essential or necessary value, opinion or other dimensions, rather than focusing on some of the other aspects that potentially are exactly the same within

the societal boundaries (Moshman, 2007). Essentially the implication of this is that there is an identity construction of "them" and "us". Within a dichotomized society, it is argued that alternative dimensions will be marginalized for being different than that of that group. Despite possibly having similar dimensions in all many regards, a separate part of what is conforms to the group identity is at focus here (ibid.). In relations to our study of identity in the Rwandan genocide the Hutus and Tutsis had similar dimensions binding them together in a Rwandan identity. These included religious and language similarities, specifically religion (Catholicism) and language (Kinyarwanda). However, in the period leading up to the genocide, through political developments and the media, a process of dichotomization was occurring, thus shifting the sense of a whole Rwandan identity towards that of a clear distinction between Hutu and Tutsi identity. Thus, this dichotomization made the choice for the common Rwandan to identity as either Hutu or Tutsi – e.g. ''either you are with *us* ('the good') or you are with *them* ('the bad').'' (ibid.). For our analysis, we will be looking into how RTLM constructed this choice and dichotomy in their broadcasted statements.

The next part of the process described by Moshman (2007) is in cases in which one identity or "they" are perceived as inferior. The dichotomization of a specific identity within a society may further lead to the dehumanization of said identity, though not necessarily. Dehumanization extends the ideas of "them" and "us," and reinforces the focus on the specific differences between the contrasted identities. Commonly, as states by Moshman, we feel sympathy towards individuals that we can identify with in one way or another. When this is not the case, "they" are seen not as *someone* but rather as *something* living outside the moral boundaries of human categorization (Moshman, 2007). Dehumanization is by Smith defined as the notion of "conceiving of others as subhuman creatures" (Smith, 2010). Individuals are thus perceived as non-human in order to justify the feelings of disinterest towards the loss of a life dissimilar to that of one's own sense of identity. For example, in the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu perception of Tutsis as non-human contributed to justifying the killings of Tutsis. This is was done, among other ways, by referring to Tutsis as sub-human beings, thus limiting their status as human beings so that previous unjustified actions towards other humans could be justified against the Tutsi (Moshman, 2007). Through years of dehumanizing Tutsis in politics and the media, a sense of righteousness in ''exterminating'' Tutsis in the same manner as one kills an insect could be morally justified, as they as

sub-humans were not included within the moral universe of the Hutus, according to Hutu ideology (ibid.). Hence, the constructed fundamental differences between Tutsi and Hutu identities were considered so prominent, that by defining Hutus as moral, rational, and democratic humans, the perceived contrasts caused the Tutsis to exist outside of the human spectrum, ultimately stripping them of their human essence. Therefore, Hutus did not feel the same moral obligations towards them, their standards of living, nor their lives (ibid.).

A relevant concept in regard to dichotomization and dehumanization is Judith Butler's concept of 'frames', though our main focus will not be on this in the analyzing of the radio transcripts. However, the notion of 'frames' in a critical discourse analysis highlights the impact of power-holders in society, as Butler is concerned with the role of the state and media in the how various identities and senses of identities are presented in the public discourse. The 'frames' decide what is presented and how, and thus 'frames' created through political and media discourse play a massive part in the process of further distinguishing the differences between identities (Butler, 2009).

3.4 Understanding Colonial Practice

We are not stating that colonialism is the root of all of the problems on the African continent, but when looking upon the history of Rwanda and the fashioning of the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' terms as well as the contrasting of these. Though we must acknowledge that the colonial era played an important role in the process of forming ethnicities and of dichotomisation. These acknowledgements derive from the reading of the broadcast transcripts, as the broadcasters were amongst other historians who often so referred to the past so to reinforce the dichotomisation of the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as well as defend the reasoning behind 'Tutsi extermination'. Thus, we will following be discussing colonial practice and its mechanisms.

Firstly, we elaborate on Edward Said's theory on *Orientalism* and his notion of *'imaginative geography'* . Then, we discuss the mechanisms of colonial practice as put forth in *'The Invention of Tradition'*(1983) by historians, T. Ranger and E. J. Hobshawn. Basically, these tools shall function as an approach to the content so to form a deeper understanding of how past colonial policies influenced the creation of the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy and gave

argumentation for the ‘’extermination’’ of Tutsis through dehumanization. How these understandings correlate with Rwandan history is discussed in chapter 6, though we will elaborate on each of them in this chapter so to stay aware of these mechanisms while acquiring background knowledge in chapter 4.

3.4.1 Orientalism

The concept of Orientalism was introduced by Edward Said in 1978, who focused the study on the construction of the Orient (the East) as being inferior to the Occident (the West) (Haldrup and Koefoed, 2009). Said was inspired by the European and American narrative of the Middle East in Western literature,in which the Orient was portrayed as not only inferior, but uncivilised and barbaric in comparison to the modern and progressive West that viewed itself as far superior (ibid.). Within the Orientalist study, the dichotomy of the civilised West and the uncivilised East is then dramatized by the ‘’the good and the evil’’-binary, which was expressed not only in literature, but in media and geopolitics as well (ibid.). As explained in the problem area, we will in make use of Said’s notion of ‘’imaginative geography,’’ by which Europeans constructed backgrounds and borders for mythical representation in the Orient (ibid.). We argue, that this process of ‘’shaping reality’’ according to personal narrative and for own advantage, fits into our process of understanding how colonials impacted Rwandan society and contributed to shaping the Tutsi and Hutu identities. According to Haldrup and Koefoed (2009), orientalism configures power in three ways: firstly, it stages the Orient (or the colonised) as being a world ‘’outside’’ the one of the colonisers; secondly, to the West (the colonisers) this constructed picture based on Western narrative becomes accepted as the ‘’truth’’ or ‘’reality’’; thirdly, orientalism generally operates within its own established ‘’truth’’ commonly based on learned judgements implied by literature and media. Linking this to our research question, we believe that this Occidental picture that particularly the Belgians had of Rwanda was not only promoted, but also implemented and enacted in Rwandan society. Therefore, we are interested in detecting how ‘’imaginary geography’’ was utilised and eventually formed a legacy of ‘’ethnicity,’’ ‘’hierarchy,’’ and ‘’power’’ that was adapted into the arguments of Hutu extremists calling for the vanquish of their ‘’natural’’ enemies – the Tutsi.

3.4.2 The Invention of Tradition: European Invented Tradition in Colonial Africa

In the book *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), Ranger and Hobshawn discuss the notion of European invented traditions in colonial Africa. Even though the authors mainly use the British empire as their reference, we believe that the same patterns of control and inventing tradition can be detected in the history of the German and Belgian colonial era in Rwanda.

Ranger and Hobshawn discuss how European settlers had to define themselves as natural and undisputed masters upon their arrival in Africa, during a time when the concept of empire was central to European invented tradition (Ranger and Hobshawn, 1983), and so, Europeans established the ‘’imperial monarchy’’ in Africa with an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent king, as the African societies did not already offer the colonials a framework for an imperial state indigenous to them (ibid.), and thus, as Africans were perceived as already having plenty of hereditary kings, only within the monarchy did the settlers feel as if they could make a ready connection to the systems in which were built up by Africans themselves ibid.). Moreover, as the British administrators could not find either sufficient political, social, or legal connections within their own and the African systems, they decided to reinvent African traditions for Africans, and these traditions eventually became hard prescription to customs in the British colonies (ibid.). This sets the notion of not only European ideas in Africa but also a part of modern African history, according to Ranger and Hobshawn, and today it has for many African peoples become difficult to free themselves from the models of codified ‘African traditions’ that were implemented by the European colonials (ibid.). For our project, it would be interesting to examine whether these connections between the German and Belgian idea of empire and monarchy were also made with the peoples of Rwanda, as well as what possible invented traditions could had emerged from the German and Belgian rule that would still define the Rwandans’ notion of self until the 1990s.

The chapter states that invented tradition was imported from Europe to provide the white settlers with models of command, as well defining for Africans the concept of ‘’modern behaviour,’’ though most of these European invented traditions and neo-traditions of Africa were mainly used as instruments to implement a conduct of submission to the white man, and particularly to make the white man, who had been of often so a lower or middle class in

Europe, feel important through gentility and authority, as he was doing the noble task of expanding the empire of his monarchy (the book using Britain as the example) (ibid.). It is argued, that one of the ways in which colonials transformed the Africans' thought of conduct was to accept some of the local Africans into the class of government in colonial Africa, meaning that these Africans were invited into the inheritance of neo-traditional conduct formed by the imperials. Moreover, it is believed that the Europeans set up a shared framework of pride and loyalty, so to change the relationship between rulers and those being ruled, so that those being ruled would be recognised and find pride in loyalty to the throne of the empire (ibid.). This kind of socialisation for the love of the king was seen in many places, such as in schooling, the military, etc, as the new African generations were socialised in the style of their colonisers (ibid.). This is a very interesting point, as the authors furthermore mentions the ways in which, missionaries supported the insertion of more exclusive secondary schools in order to preserve a class-system or social hierarchy. We find this interesting in reference to Rwandan history and how the implementation or emphasis on 'class' by German and Belgian colonisers might have introduced a system of reinvented Rwandan traditions. It could as well be beneficial to examine whether the German and Belgian colonisers also implemented the same methods to reinforce certain conduct through general primary schooling. According to the authors, this socialisation of Africans into acceptance of subordination often lead to them being divided into different categories, such as teacher, servant, soldier, etc., which also made it easier for the colonisers to govern the areas (ibid.). By time, even Africans who were subordinated by neo-traditions would grow a profoundly conservative view of the specializations – such as teachers, ministers, and soldiers – who had become prominent within the colonial system and thus become hesitant or even resistant to change (ibid.). By time, the tribal authorities, with whom the imperials had collaborated in order to exercise indirect rule, were no longer a necessity for the colonials, as they had eventually implemented their administrations so well into the lives of the colonised, in which the ruled had developed a profound love and loyalty to the 'almighty' king of the empire, and ''proper'' conduct therefore came more ''naturally'' (ibid.). That meant that the chiefs, herdsmen, and other tribal authorities struggled with keeping their high status, and so many of them would use neo-traditions in order to fight for their influence, even though it was deemed problematic for the reason that neo-traditions had been invented by Europeans for them to uphold exclusivity and power in a world where they would have to justify the

master/servant relations as well as the expansion of their empire (ibid.). Again, looking at our project, it would seem proper to examine whether or not and specifically how these tribal authorities, such as chiefs or local kings, had influenced the social relations and compositions of the Rwandan kingdom and later the independent nation state.

Additionally, Ranger and Hobshawn discuss the invented traditions by the African elites in an attempt of making use of the European neo-traditions. These neo-traditions were manipulations of the royal symbolism, and were used in the redefinition of the indigenous leaders and authorities, such as the chiefs, who aspired to become like the emperor (ibid.).

With this view, it would be worth to see if we can detect the same connection within our own project and historical knowledge, so to make a possible conclusion of whether certain indigenous peoples in power of Rwanda were persistent in contributing to the withholding of possible division and subordination of some citizens within the system of Rwanda.

Lastly, it would be worth illuminating the point made by the authors, in which they argue about the ways, in which some Africans moved in and out of multiple identities, in comparison to the conservative belief by colonisers that they were peoples of rigid customs already, which simply had to be appropriated to fit the narrative of the imperial monarchy (ibid.). Instead, African communities offered individuals fluidity, competition, and movement across smaller and larger groupings; factors which colonials would later try to pacify in order to immobilize the indigenous civil society and thereafter reinforce and promote the European notion of African identity, following the support for those who welcomed the newly-invented ‘’African’’ customs, and many would even go as far as to gather in new tribes so to fit into the colonial framework of African society under imperial rule (ibid.). Those Africans who developed into an educated elite would attempt to form these new customs and gain authority by fusing them with the local values, so that they themselves would become the new inventors of tradition. These people could be, for example, teachers and ministers, who by the acceptance of both colonial powers and locals, would eventually hold real power of influence in comparison to the chiefs who ended up only possessing fine titles and a limited power in the political centre under administrative rule, according to the book (ibid.). Returning to the Rwandan perspective, we are interested in looking into the historical and sociological context of pre-colonial Rwanda in comparison with colonial Rwanda to examine how the indigenous people of Rwanda could have been immobilized under German and Belgian rule, and moreover, which local actors throughout the colonial rule gained influence by assimilating or

integrating into neo-traditional customs. It would be beneficial for our desire to acquire context, to study which indigenous identities exactly had social power in both small and big groupings, and how they acquired this.

Chapter 4: Background Knowledge - Knowing the Rwandan Context

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contextual preface to our study, as context is an important premise of understanding the webs of meanings involved in the discourse constructed in the RTLM broadcasts. To understand the context of Rwanda, we need to know the historic events and developments of Rwanda that influenced the shaping of Rwandan identity as well as local identities. Thus with a focus on events relevant to our study, we will be describing the following times of Rwandan history: the pre-colonial era, the colonial era, and the years of the Hutu revolution. We have decided not go into a further historical description of the post-revolution era, because the socially constructed ethnicities came to be under the pre-colonial and colonial era, thus, we are interested in analysing how the RTLM broadcasters defined Hutu and Tutsi identities and how their narratives portrayed an impacting legacy of the past times.

Our description has been based on writings of different historians and researchers, but mainly on the historic analysis done by French historian and specialist in the history of the Great Lakes Region - among other - Gérard Prunier from 1995 in his book *'The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide'* . His thorough analysis on Rwandan history has been cited in several of the studies, that we have read on the matter, and therefore we believe his account on the Rwandan history to be trustworthy.

4.3 Pre-Colonial Rwanda

Even though scientists in our modern times have mapped the genetic ancestry of the people of Rwanda, we do not find it necessary to go as far back to as to when the first people arrived in the geographical area which is today's Rwanda. Instead, we are interested in how Rwandan society looked like before the European colonizers arrived and how they defined themselves.

During the days of colonialism, anthropologists based many of their conclusions on race theory that for a long period of time were regarded as 'scientific fact' (Prunier, 1995). In the case of Rwanda, the Europeans therefore divided the Rwandese peoples into three distinctive 'races' (or prescribed identities): the Twa, the Hutus, and the Tutsi. The Twa were

‘’pygmoids,’’ described as forest-dwelling hunter-gatherers, who also became the most marginalised identity in Rwandan society (we have decided to leave out the discussion of the Twa, as they make up just about 1% of the Rwandan population and were not included within the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy nor dehumanization process). Then there were the Hutus, a Bantu people, who were agriculturalists and classified as ‘’negroids,’’ situated just above the Twa and subordinated to the Tutsi within the social hierarchy. Lastly, the Tutsi were theorized to be pastoralists of ‘’the Red Race’’ according to the Hamitic myth (which we will elaborate on later in this chapter), ultimately placing them on top of the hierarchical pyramid, giving explanation behind the established Tutsi monarchy of Rwanda (ibid.). Simplified and misinformed, that was thus how the Europeans regarded the ‘ethnic’ history of Rwanda. This view of a reproduced ethnic history has by time been challenged and refuted by modern science, though we will in this study still discuss these views on reconstructed identity, as they played an important role in manifesting ‘’Hutu’’ and ‘’Tutsi’’ as ethnic terms (ibid.). But first, we will discuss in more detail the social dynamics of the Tutsi monarchy and the local perceptions of the ‘’ethnic’’ terms of pre-Colonial Rwanda.

4.3.1. The Nyiginya Clan and Tutsi Monarchy

Before the arrival of the German colonisers in 1894, most of Rwanda had since the mid-eighteenth century been increasingly ruled by the Rwandan Kingdom under the Tutsi Nyiginya clan, that had its royal court seated in the town of Nyanza (Prunier, 1995). Under the rule of King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri during the second half of the nineteenth century, the kingdom of the Nyiginya monarchy expanded and became gradually more unified and centralised (ibid.). Rwabugiri based his monarchy on feudalism, as he centralised the power and established two influential social institutions during his reign: *uburetwa* and *ubuhake*. The first system functioned as a way of the king to take ownership of land and thereafter give it for the agriculturalists to occupy in exchange of their labour. Mostly, when a single-family lineage occupied land, it was only mandatory for at least one member of the lineage to do the required work in the name of the entire family. Hence, work obligation and responsibility was not individual (ibid.). The ladder was a way of enabling social mobility, as Tutsi elites who owned cattle (like the king himself) would find Hutu and Tutsi clients to whom they would lease their cattle in exchange for services. Since the number of cattle one owned defined one’s wealth in society, the person leasing the cattle could hope for the cattle to reproduce

and thus ascend on the ladder of social influence (ibid.). Moreover, to ensure that every commoner contributed within the premises of the newly installed reforms, Rwabugiri appointed three chiefs for every hill (community); each of them with their own respective responsibilities, such as taking care of agricultural production and taxation (chief of landholdings), ruling over the grazing lands (chief of pastures), and recruiting soldiers for the king's army (chief of men). Mostly, the king appointed Tutsis for the chiefly positions, but since the Hutus were considered the experts on agricultural matters, the chief of landholdings could sometimes be a Hutu (ibid.). Eventually, the royal court began creating a clearer division between the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' terms, resulting from the implementation of the king's reforms. This was not as much to polarize the cohesive state, that the king had created, as it was to simply to expand the wealth and power of the court (Fujii, 2009).

4.3.2. 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' Meanings in Pre-Colonial Context

Despite the existence of the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' terms, these labels were mainly concerned the socio-economic status of the Rwandan. During the era of pre-colonial Rwanda and even after independence, regional and local identities mattered considerably more than the terms that were to become ''ethnic'' definitions (Fujii, 2009). The terms often took upon different meaning varying from context to context, and they were mainly utilized as a means of determining how closely a region was related to the royal court. Thus, in those areas where associations to the court were little, the local Rwandans barely used the terms, if at all (ibid.). Initially, the terms were to describe a man's social status or region of origin. This was further proven, as social mobility gave Hutus the possibility to rise in society and assimilate to the Tutsi identity, thus becoming 'tutsified' through *ubuhake*. Therefore, 'Hutu' was a term used to describe the commoner; the farmer; the peasant. Meanwhile, 'Tutsi' was the term used for the nobility and wealthy elite who were mainly coming from central Rwanda (ibid.). This socio-economic differentiation indicated by the use of the 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' label was emphasised during colonisation by the influential Rwandan historian, Alexis Kagame, as he stated: ''*according to pastoral law, whoever possesses many heads of cattle is called Tutsi, even if he is not of the Hamitic race,''* (Kagame, 1952, p. 96; cited in Fujii, 2009, p. 61) supporting the social mobility that could occur within the *ubuhake* institution.

But as centralisation during the state expansion of Rwabugiri became more prevalent, these terms took on a more uniform meaning through the politicised categorisation of them. The gap between the noble royal court and the common people expanded, consequently adding overtones of power to the 'Tutsi' term used for only the political elite in the court (Fujii, 2009).

In order to protect the ''right to rule,'' the ruling class propagated myths to maintain their influence. Here, we would like to refer to the subject of the myth, as explained by Chabal and Daloz (2006). As aforementioned, we stated that myths are the material from which communities are imagined, and that often so, leaders in newly independent countries would use these myths to justify certain acts of politics. Concerning the Tutsi kingdoms, myths help us understand how the Tutsis justified and maintained their reign, giving King Rwabugiri the authority to impose his policies and reasons for the commoner to acknowledge this authority. Here, we highlight the myth of the Kigwa deity – a famous myth used to establish the hierarchy with the ruling Tutsis in the top. The mythology of Rwanda tells, that the god, Kigwa, fell from heaven so to have three sons on Earth: Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi. These three sons were one night given the responsibility to watch over a jug of milk each, but Gatwa ended up drinking the milk, Gahutu spilled his, and only Gatutsi managed to do the task. According to Rwandan mythology, this event lead to the formation of the Tutsi royal dynasty, as Kigwa put Gatutsi in the position of ruling (Sinema, 2015, p. 46). This myth is important, as it reflects how many Rwandans in pre-colonial times viewed their own ancestry and identity. Since the myth tells that they all descended from the same deity (Kigwa), the divide caused by divine interference between the three groups of peoples was constructed upon a hierarchical basis in governance (ibid.). As the royal Niyginya clan sought out to expand their kingdom, this myth promoting Tutsi superiority was thus a tool for justifying expansion and sovereignty.

4.4 Colonial Rwanda

By the time that the Germans arrived in Rwanda to colonise it, they were little aware of the internal drama that was taking place within the Rwandan kingdom. After the death of Rwabugiri, the appointed surrogate queen mother, Kanjogera, was not satisfied with the

former king's choice of heir, which led to the *Rucunshu Coup* in November 1896 (Vansina, 2004). In the Rwandan Kingdom, the Queen Mother was one of the most influential political figures, as she possessed among other the role of manager of the royal household (Prunier, 1995), though after the crowning of her biological son, King Yuhi V Musinga, Kanjogera and her brothers acquired further political power during his reign. Referring back to the the importance of local terms to Rwandan identities during the pre-colonial era, it is important to point out that power-struggles during the heights of the Rwandan kingdom were intrigues between clans, often so within the Tutsi aristocracy. The German colonisation from 1897 in Rwanda therefore became a benefit for the existing royal court, which had come to be following the coup, as Kanjogera and the court used the aid of the German military to eliminate enemy clans and strengthen their ruling position. Meanwhile, the Germans acquired a means of imposing colonial rule indirectly upon the Rwandan society through the cooperation with the royal court and its centralised state, though they did not manage to radically modify Rwandese society drastically through the years of 1897-1916 given their small presence in the area (ibid.).

In 1916, when the German colonial territory was handed over to Belgium by a mandate from the League of Nations, the Belgians followed the German example and decided to rely on the centralised government of the Rwandan Kingdom (Prunier, 1995). The structure of the Rwandan government impressed the Belgians, though Belgium did not implement changing reforms until the years of 1926-1931, as they had spent the first years figuring out how to go about the royal court as well as the indirect administration and the Tutsi clans (ibid.). Their perception of the Rwandese peoples had been the same as that of the Germans: they believed that the Tutsi were an entirely different race, as they not only looked different from the Hutus to them, but they were also considered to be smarter. The justification of this Tutsi-preference was supported by the Hamitic Hypothesis, which was a myth based on race theory, stating that Hamites were pastoralists who had initially migrated from Europe and continuously integrated themselves into the different environments around Africa as they spread around the continent to the West and the South-East starting from Egypt (Barette, 2016). This view was commonly depicted by Belgian anthropologists, as well as missionaries living in Rwanda:

‘*’The Bahima [a Tutsi Clan] differ absolutely by the beauty of their features and their light colour from the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type. Tall and well-proportioned, they have long thing noses, a wide brow, and fine lips. They say they came from the North. Their*

intelligent and delicate appearance, their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any situation seem to indicate a Semitic origin.'' (Mgr Le Roy, Les Missions Catholiques Françaises au XIXème Siècle, Paris: Les Missions d'Afrique, 1902, pp. 376-7 cited in Prunier, 1995, pp. 7-8).

''The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the negro, apart from his colour. He is usually very tall. 1.80 m. at least, often 1.90 m. or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: a high brow, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter-skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age. […] Gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people. He is a natural-born leader, capable of extreme self-control and calculated goodwill.'' (Ministère des colonies, rapport, op. cit., p. 34 cited in Prunier, 1995, p. 6)

This racial ideology gave the Tutsis the full support of the Belgian administration, which strived to create and educate the next generation of a ruling class consisting of Tutsis, so to aid them with their colonial administration and control (Fujii, 2009). This led to a widespread 'tutsification' of the legislative system and political relations within the state through the Belgian reforms, which ultimately subjugated Hutus to the given authority of the Tutsi elite (ibid.).

Some of the reforms included decreasing the number of chiefs per hill, thus placing the responsibility and power of three chiefs onto the position of just one chief – a position almost always given to a wealthy Tutsi (Prunier, 1995). Furthermore, the Belgians attempted to extract more profits (taxes) from the *uburetwa* institution, which they modified into a structure of mandatory labour for public interest imposed upon every individual of a lineage, which could take 50-60% of an individual's time. The forced labour contributed to the growing resentment of the colonial rule by the Hutu commoner, as one would be beaten and abused if one did not perform the required labour. (ibid.) In time, powerful chiefs worked to extract increasing surplus through the transformed institutions, which eventually made the Hutu perceive these regulations and laws as means of exploitation of the marginalised Hutu population. (ibid.).

To clearly solidify and define the European-invented 'ethnic' terms of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi', the administration introduced mandatory identity cards that indicated whether one was Hutu or Tutsi. The determination of people's ethnicities was mainly done according to physical characteristics, with the Tutsi phenotype being based on the Tutsis from central Rwanda and the royal clans (Fujii, 2009). Consequently, the introduction of identity pinned the terms as pure ethnic and not socio-economic terms, putting an end to the social mobility of the Hutus, who might had been able to ascend through the social layers by doing *ubuhake* contracts (Gourevitch, 2000).

By 1927, despite the Rwandan governmental positions being mainly occupied by Tutsis if not by Belgian administratives, the Catholic church experienced a wave of Rwandans converting to Christianity (Prunier, 1995). Before then, the church had mainly been helping just poor Hutus seeking aid and protection, but after the Belgians had replaced King Yuhi V Musinga with his son, Mutara III Rudahigwa, the Tutsi elite realised that the colonial administration was 'rwandifying' the state on their own terms. This turned Christianity into a prerequisite for elite-membership (ibid.). Conversions of the commoners were also propagated by the new king who himself was regarded as a well-mannered Christian, in comparison to his father, who had seemed as a pure contradiction: supporting the indigenous *kubandwa* religion as well as practicing native customs, such as polygamy and wearing native attire. Moreover, Musinga and the queen mother, Kanjogera, were not always completely cooperative, as they had fought against the Belgians when the Germans were still settled in Rwanda. Through the reorganisation of Rwanda by the help of the church, whose priests and missionaries were some of the only whites to speak the local Kinyarwanda language, the colonials painted a picture of a more hard-working Rwanda, where newly established morals affected the neo-traditionalist colonial society (ibid.). This was all considered a positive development for the Catholic church, who gained more political and social influence through the converted Tutsi elite. Marginalisation then continued, as the church institution oversaw the educational system and privatised schooling, which forced some Hutus to seek education through the theology seminars at the churches. There, they were taught about justice and equality and subsequently, as they were unable to find jobs given their Hutu status, became increasingly aware of the unjust subjugation of Hutus in Rwandan society. This realisation played an important role in the ever-growing resentment of the Tutsi-dominated system by the 'enlightened' Hutus, who would later incite the Hutu revolution of 1959 (ibid.).

4.5 The Hutu Revolution and Rwandan Independence

Despite the continuous oppression of Hutus in the society of Rwanda that after decades of being constructed on the premises of Belgian colonial neo-traditions, the Hutu did have a growing middle-class for the last decade of Belgian rule. The Second World War had expanded its economy of cash to the African colonies, and Hutus (especially those who emigrated for jobs in neighbouring colonies) had a share in this wealth (Prunier, 1995). Meanwhile, the reformed *uburetwa* institution of individual forced labour had turned Hutu peasants into independent economic agents who subsequently started to think more for themselves, as more Hutus went from thinking within collective relations to taking individual independent action (ibid.). This combined with the social mobility that was brought by church schooling and a growing economic capital for the Hutu middle class, caused many of the schooled Hutus to form a Hutu counter-elite in response to the aristocratic Tutsi-elite. Additionally, as commoners came to the realisation that they were not only collectively oppressed, but also individually exploited, this counter-elite eventually sought to liberate themselves from what they considered a racial Tutsi-oppression (ibid.). Even the church, that for years had contributed to maintain Tutsi-power, changed its view, as the church had gradually come under the control of the growing number of Hutu priests. Sympathising with the Hutu priests were the Flemish Belgian missionaries, who in contrast to the upper-class Walloon priests had come from working class-families in Belgium, and thus they identified with the marginalised hard-working Hutus (ibid.). With Western capitalism came also the disappearance of the *ubuhake* institution, as well as changes within the colonial system, as Western attitudes began to offer a view of democracy in contrast to the oppressing colonial states. This gave inspiration to both Tutsi and Hutu elites for future liberation. Particularly, the Tutsi clergy began to advocate self-governing and racial equality within Rwanda, which by the colonisers (including the church) was perceived as a challenge of authority (ibid.). Eventually, many parts of the Tutsi elite became strongly opposed to Belgian rule in favour of independence, which caused the Belgian church and administration to slowly relocate their support from the Tutsis to the Hutus. Meanwhile, the Hutus did not just seek liberation from the white coloniser, but from the entire Tutsi-population itself. This was expressed in what

became known as the ‘*’Bahutu Manifesto’’* which was published in 1957 by nine Hutu intellectuals (ibid.). As political parties started to form, the Hutu-Tutsi-dichotomy was pronounced when the notables of the royal court stated, that the Kigwa deity in ancestral times had made the choice of subjugating the Hutu forcibly, and therefore it could not be possible for the two groups of peoples to live alongside each other on equal terms (ibid.). Though this way of using myth to deny change was mainly a defence-mechanism to the Tutsi aristocracy.

By 1959, several Hutu and Tutsi movements for political and governmental liberation had been established. Two of the most notable ones were the *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR), led by conservative Tutsis and funded by communist nations, and *Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu* (PARTMEHUTU) led by Hutu intellectual, Grégoire Kayibanda, who would also later become the first president of an independent Rwanda (Prunier, 1995). That same year, the Hutu revolution was sparked on the 1st of November 1959, when UNAR supporters attacked a PARMEHUTU activist. Almost immediately, a string of attacks and retaliation between PARMEHUTU and UNAR supporters and members, as well as other Hutu organisations took place (ibid.). As aforementioned, the Belgians had sided with the Hutu, and as Tutsis were attacked and had their houses burnt, Belgian authorities stayed passive, since they by then had started to consider the elite that they had created themselves as too traditional (ibid.). The ‘’social revolution’’ that it was began to recreate Rwandan society with Hutus as power-holders, as the Belgian administrative started replacing Tutsi chiefs of the many hills with Hutus. Following, the newly-appointed chiefs initiating killings of the Tutsis living within their new domain of influence, leading to the escape of 130,000 Tutsi refugees to countries such as Uganda and Burundi (ibid.). Thus, the neo-traditionalist ‘’Rwandan ideology’’ which before had been used to justify Tutsi-reign, was by 1960 used as justification for Tutsi-massacres, and after some years of turmoil, local elections, and the establishment of Hutu power-positions, Grégoire Kayibanda managed on the 28th of January 1961 to stage what was regarded as a ‘’legal coup’’ so to declare the independence of The Sovereign Democratic Republic of Rwanda: a Hutu republic founded on the premise that racial differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were so great that the two groups would never achieve unity (ibid.). During the following years, groups of Tutsi guerrilla-fighters - called ‘*’inyenzi’’* (cockroaches) by the Hutu - raided the Rwandan border from Uganda, though these raids never had the effect of an immediate threat to the Rwandan

government (ibid.). But in the future, these events of Tutsis imposing suffering onto local Hutu societies were not easily forgotten, and they – along with other past events – provided Hutu extremists of the early 1990s with justification for their anti-Tutsi discourse, as we will be examining in the following chapter.

4.6 Habyarimana and the Inkotanyi

Before engaging in our analysis of the RTLM radio transmissions we will shortly describe the connection between Inyenzi and Inkotanyi, as these terms became normalized throughout the period of war, as well as to include the Tutsi commoner, guerilla fighter or not. Additionally, these terms were used extensively during the RTLM broadcasts.

Following the Rwandan revolution of 1959 a large amount of Tutsis were displaced of their homes and had thus become refugees in the neighboring countries such as Burundi and Uganda in which their living conditions were easy. The term *'Inyenzi'* as used in the RTLM originally dates back to 1963-67, and came to describe the Tutsi guerilla fighters which had engaged in raids scattered along the Rwandan border (Prunier, 1995)

When the internal problems in Uganda worsened, there was a growing reluctance towards Tutsi refugees which in turn worsened their living conditions. This caused the Tutsi refugees to dream of returning to Rwanda and what had their ancestors had known as their "home" and in 1988 they created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), calling themselves the ''Inkotanyi'' (Prunier, 1995). RPF had the intentions of freeing the Rwandan people from the one-party dictatorship that Habyarimana's MRND had carried out, with the intentions of replacing it with democracy. Rwanda under Habyarimana's political influence was also discriminatory towards the minority Tutsis, and furthermore all other political parties than Habyarimana's own MRND were forbidden (ibid.).

With the start of the war between RPF and the Rwandan forces, the Hutu power struggles within the Habyarimana regime became more significant. Specific Hutu extremists used the situation to gather the Rwandan people around the common enemy, the Tutsi '*Inyenzi'*. The existing tensions between Hutus and Tutsis were thus further signified so as to place the blame on the Tutsis, with the purpose of strengthening Hutu political identity internally.

4.7 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, we have given a detailed and descriptive account of the Rwandan history in order to provide the necessary background knowledge for our discussion chapter. The data retrieved from secondary sources, such as historic analysis and studies on the matter, will aid us in doing an in-depth discourse analysis as well as in answering our research and working questions. As a critical discourse analysis is interested in power-relations and how these relations are used and shown in a discourse, the chapter on background knowledge will aid us in recognising historical patterns and influences that played a role in the political discourse of RTLM in 1994. In this chapter, we have focused on three particular times of Rwandan history relevant to provide context to the genocide, known as the pre-colonial era, the colonial era, and the years of the Hutu revolution. Furthermore we provide a description of the Habyarimana years and the origins of the RPF (the Inkotanyi). We included all these times in order to explore Rwandan identities through history and their meanings in society. Now, we can conclude that in fact, the definitions of the Hutu and Tutsi identities during the pre-colonial era were based on socio-economic premises in comparison to the colonial re-invented identities that were crystallized, prescribed, and dichotomised on the basis of ethnicity. Conclusively, these periods of Rwandan history left a legacy of a strongly divided country, ethnically as well as socio-economically.

Chapter 5: The Call To Kill

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to perform a critical discourse analysis of the empirical data. This is in the form of radio transcripts of the aired broadcasts by RTLM before and during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which we will analyse in order to distinguish the genocidal discourse constructed by the Hutu extremists. This analysis is applied by using a deductive approach, as we have already put forth theories of dichotomisation and dehumanization. These theories act as mechanisms of the process of genocide as explained by Moshman (2007), and the aim is thus to investigate and recognise these same mechanisms in our empirical data. In this chapter, we use excerpts from our data - the official RTLM broadcast transcripts - to show and discuss how these mechanisms of constructing certain identities within a specific discourse (that is dichotomisation and dehumanization) are used by the Hutu extremists.

5.2 Dichotomisation

As explained by Moshman (2007), dichotomisation is the first step of the process of facilitating genocide. Identities within society are reconstructed as ''us'' and ''them,'' urging people to choose. Moreover, it functions as a justification for dehumanization and ultimately 'destruction'. Simplified, dichotomisation is a way of creating a narrative which contrasts, distances and pits identities up against each other.

Now that the historical context has been established in the study, the Rwandan case becomes particularly interesting. Conclusively, the mechanisms and process of dichotomisation already came to existence during the pre-colonial era, as governmental centralisation, annexation of surrounding Hutu kingdoms, and myths under King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri created socio-economic divisions between the Hutus and Tutsis within the frames of a feudal monarchy. During the colonial era, the Hutu and Tutsi dichotomy was strengthened, as it was turned into an ethnic contrast with supposedly ''natural racial divisions''. The racial

understanding during these colonial years became by time deeply rooted and accepted in the common belief throughout all layers of Rwandan society (Prunier, 1995).

For our investigation of the RTLM broadcasts and how broadcasters expressed dichotomisation, we have picked several radio transmissions that were aired shortly before the commencement of the genocide and after the assassination that sparked the killings of the Tutsi minority.

Firstly, it should be stated that dichotomisation is indeed taking place in the radio broadcasts, besides the colonial discursive legacy of ethnicity, that was manifested in the form of identity cards among other:

‘’*Even the Inkotanyi do not believe that Hutus and Tutsis exist… Except that* ***when they are going to kill, they first check identity cards and faces***.’’ (Nkurunziza cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on June 9, 1994, p. 1)

Nonetheless, the Hutu extremists were making clear references to colonial history, thus indicating a continuance of this legacy that was kept alive during the years of war between the Rwandan government and the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

‘’***The Tutsi superiority complex goes a long way back*** *[…] the School for the Elite had been set up at Nyanza* […] *not for everyone, still much less for the Hutus, who had been subjugated for centuries.* ***The only people who had access… to that school were those who, according to the feudo-colonial myth, were born to rule. That is, the Tutsi children*** *who were considered as the most intelligent.* ***It is especially that superiority complex that characterizes these Tutsi fellow citizen****s…*’’ (Rucogoza cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on April 22, 1994, p. 19)

For the critical discourse analysis, we realised that the process of dichotomisation in the narrative argued by the Hutu extremists of RTLM was a series of several contrasts made between Hutus and Tutsis, which essentially can be viewed as an expansion of the overall Hutu/Tutsi-dichotomy – as in, prescribing certain behaviours, values or characteristics to each dimension of identity so to enforce contradiction as well as reason absolute incompatibility, gradually adding substance to the justification of mass killings.

One of the prominent – and common – elements of dichotomisation that we detect in our study, is the dichotomy between the ‘’good’’ and the ‘’evil,’’ portraying the Inkotanyi (Tutsis) as a threat to Hutus and their democracy. According to the RTLM hosts, the main goal of the Tutsis was to subjugate Hutus once again and achieve total control. From the following extract from one of RTLM’s broadcasts on March 23, 1994, it is obvious how the Tutsi rebels by the broadcasters were being portrayed as complete anti-democrats driven by a need for power. Furthermore, the broadcast supported the statement of anti-democratic Tutsi ideology by connecting it to the recent assassination of the president of the Burundian republic carried out by Tutsi rebels:

‘’*… Tutsi grandchildren who fled Rwanda gave themselves the name Inkotanyi and attacked Rwanda in 1990. They claimed they wanted to install democracy but, to date,* ***it is obvious that they want to take back power seized from them by the Hutus in 1959*** […] *In democracy, it is the majority that rules.* […]. *When we say the majority, we are referring to ethnic background or political parties* […] ***… a close analysis reveals that the same plan the the Tutsis in Burundi had to seize power and hold on to it also exists in Rwanda*** […] ***You understand that what they want is power, complete and not partial power*** […] ***any Hutu convinced that Rwanda is his country, that his group is majority and that it is the majority group that must rule and not the minority group****.* […] ***Kagame*** **[one of the RPF leaders]** ***himself stated that*** *…* ***the Inkotanyi have only one goal: to take power.*** *This, the Tutsis will seize and hold on to power, which the Hutus took from them in 1959, for as long as they want* […] ***The Tutsis are trying to be the only masters in charge. That means that they will not accept democracy, they will not allow the majority to rule even if it won the elections*** […] ***They are lying stating that they would like to promote democracy*** *…*’’ (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on March 23, 1994, pp. 1-3, 10-12)

The supposed anti-democratic Tutsis are further linked to an inhumane behaviour, underlining why exactly this group cannot be considered as advocates of democracy:

‘’*What kind of democracy chases people from their homes!* ***What kind of democracy butchers people and rips open their bellies!*** […] *Whoever behaves like that is not a democrat*.’’ (Habinama cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, p. 14)

By adding emphasis to the statement that Tutsis have a natural hunger for power and Hutu-subjugation, the broadcast further generalises Tutsis to indicate that the goal of re-establishing unjust Tutsi-dominance is a threat to Rwanda, as all Tutsis supposedly are like this. This generalisation is perceived because the broadcaster used the ethnic term 'Tutsi' and not the more political 'Inkotanyi''

Here, we will also include the concept of 'frames' as presented by Butler. In chapter 3, we stated that 'frames' are constructed through political and media discourse to highlight differences between identities and further strengthen dichotomisation (Butler, 2009). As the Hutu extremists of RTLM undeniably garnered much attention and influence through media, we regard their influence as power; political even, as their extremist Hutu ideology expressed in the fashioned media discourse was related to the current political landscape of Rwanda. However, by reporting and constructing a biased narrative (truthful or not) based on the intrigues of Burundi, they managed to set up 'frames' within which the Tutsis were gradually generalised as enemies of all Hutus. Simplified, the stories of the Tutsi attacks on Hutus in Burundi, gave RTLM the opportunity to firstly define the ''dangerous'' identity of the Tutsis in Burundi. Thereafter they made gross generalisations so their definition would encompass all Tutsis, mending connections between the enemy RPF-Inkotanyi and the civilian Tutsis. Thus, we argue that framing was a tool used by the RTLM to associate the name 'Inkotanyi' with the Tutsi-term so to eventually make them indistinguishable.

As we continue, we notice that the broadcasters often described the Tutsi Inkotanyi as a wicked, untrustworthy trickster:

'*''Inyenzi-Inkotanyi who attacked us and resumes hostilities while we thought we had signed the* […] *Arusha Peace Agreement with them. So once again they…****as in usual of them****,* […] ***they did this behind our back****, but this time they did not take us by surprise.''* (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on April 22, 1994, p. 10)

'*''All of this proves that the Inyenzi cannot do anything.* ***Everything that they say is untrue***.'' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, p. 20)

‘’*We should not consider the Inyenzi as people of good sense*. ***They are wicked people.*** *They will continue to kill people even if any kind of argument was signed.* ***They have always violated agreements and killed Rwandan citizens.***’’ (Nkurunziza cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on June 9, 1994, p. 6)

What is important to point out here, is how the radio strengthened the dichotomisation between Hutus and Tutsis through the discourse against the Tutsi, by not only referring to them as anti-democratic but also anti-Rwandan. As the Inkotanyi within the frames of the discourse were not regarded as Rwandan citizens. If the foreign, non-Rwandan Inkotanyi represented all Tutsis, and all Tutsis were essentially considered as being Inkotanyi, then all Tutsis must had been dishonest power-mongering foreigners.

‘’*They are solely the children of the Tutsis who left* […] ***I confirm that even if they claim to be Rwandans born of Rwandan parents, there is no proof to convince us that they are Rwandans***.’’ (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM radio broadcast aired on June 13, 1994, p. 2)

On the contrary, to emphasise this dichotomy of honest and untrustworthy identities, the Hutu extremists of RTLM put themselves and their fellow Hutus in the position of honest victims who necessarily had to unite against the constructed immoral and omnipresent Tutsi enemy:

’’... ***you cannot close the voice of people and say that you are acting in the name of the people***. […] ***You will keep on lying and we will keep on telling the truth***.’’ (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on April 14, 1994, p. 2)

‘’... ***you need to understand the tricks of the Inyenzi.*** *They are trying to scare people [...]* ***Take courage*** […] ***These people are indeed strange. Rise up and fight them. I think that they are crazy.*** *Nobody understands them.*’’ (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, pp. 7, 13-14)

‘’ ***These are the people who have brought all these troubles to our country****, but we can be happy … that* ***people have now united*** […] ***Thieves whose objective is to steal power as well as robbing people*** *of what they have achieved in a period of thirty years* […] ***We must defend out property, we must defend our people****…’’* (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 22, 1994, p. 11)

An interesting aspect of this narrative created by RTLM was the way that they managed to turn the roles and redefine the ethnic identities. Back in colonial times, before the Hutu revolution, Hutus were the marginalised as it was argued that they were less civilised and thus of lower social status. Through this media narrative and perception of high- and low-class citizens, the broadcasters defined Tutsis as uncivilised, unmodernised, uneducated mad men, who had come to disrupt the just democracy implemented by the Hutu. In relation to this belief, the assassination of the Burundian president, Ndadaye, became a way for the broadcasters of really putting into perspective the threat imposed by the uncivilised Tutsi or Inyenzi-Inkotanyi, as their common designation came to sound like. Now, it was Tutsi savages that were attacking influential and moral Hutu elites and intellectuals who had been situated into powerful positions by the choice of the native Hutu majority:

‘***’When Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was elected President of the Republic of Burundi*** *to succeed Buyoya, a Tutsi, the* ***Tutsis were gripped with fear for they realized that the power which they had possessed for years had slipped away*** *from them. On 21 October, 1993, Ndadaye and some of his closest associates were gruesomely assassinated* […] ***It was the Tutsi soldiers who were behind the unrest because they had refused to grant people the right to elect their leaders*** […] *As far as Tutsis in Burundi were concerned****, killing influential Hutus was some form of pleasure.****”* (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on March 23, 1994, pp. 1-3)

The supposed morbid pleasure deriving from killing Hutus is once again emphasised in the text:

*‘’****In Burundi, killing a Hutu was a form of pleasure*** […] *In fact, they are used to shedding blood and they continue to do so. Today, as they are still planning a coup, it means* ***they still***

want to shed blood, this time around, on a large scale." (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on March 23, 1994, pp. 1-3)

The dichotomisation in the discourse is continuous, as RTLM argues that the Tutsi threat never ceases, considering that the dangerous nature of the Tutsis cannot be changed:

'***'As the saying goes ''the leopard cannot change its spots'' The thirst for power and blood for which the Tutsis of Burundi are known has just resurfaced*** […] ***You can drive out nature with a pitchfork but she keeps coming back*** […] *It has become clear today that this thirst is supernatural.*'' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on March 23, 1994, pp. 1, 8)

Particularly in the following quote, we observe how this constructed enemy of the Hutu infiltrates Rwandan society by using children. Giving reason to find and kill the Inkotanyi as soon as possible, we observe how the depiction of innocent children as spies of the enemy contributed to the picture of an evil omnipresent enemy that could be anyone anywhere:

'*'You will see RPF children who, in daytime, make themselves street children but who, in the night, disguise themselves and go to inform RPF on the situation* […] ***I think that those who have guns should immediately go to these Inkotanyi*** *before they listen to Radio RTLM and flee* […] ***encircle them and kill them*** *...*'' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 16-17, 1994, p. 3)

This omnipresent threat leads the broadcasters to call for vigilance several times throughout the many transmissions, as the Inkotanyi (the Tutsis) are portrayed as an infiltrating and restless enemy, who the Hutus must always be prepared to fight and exterminate at last:

'*'You sons of Sebahinzi* [the Father*],* ***unite and be vigilant***.'' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on April 14, 1994, p. 2)

'***'That is the reason why you must be vigilant because as their name suggests the Inkotanyi will go on fighting, they do not get tired … when you are fighting Inkotanyi you do not tire,***

you have to keep on […] ***You have to remain vigilant all the time,*** *you have no time to drink water because* ***the Inkotanyi are always observing you*** *...*'' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on April 22, 1994, p. 8)

'*'Arm yourself with clubs and arrow and* ***protect yourself****. When criminals attack,* ***people rise up in arms and fight****.* […] *You do not negotiate with a thief!* […] ***get up and fight the inyenzi****!*" (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, p. 13)

These quotes are important to the notion of dichotomisation, as the repetitive character of the broadcasts pushes the listener to believe that Tutsis are indeed naturally ''bad guys'' who are coming to kill, subjugate, and exploit the ''good guys'' - the native Hutus of Rwanda; the ''true'' Rwandans who had been victims under Tutsi reign for decades in the past. Additionally, as the evil Tutsis were described as unfit for change for the better, they were thus explained to be an unavoidable enemy to whom the Hutus must heroically stand up so to justly save themselves. Simplified, the discourse of RTLM used to instill fear and incite action was based upon the mantra of ''kill or get killed''.

Lastly, the repeated calling of Hutus as ''the sons of Sebahinzi'' (translated to 'sons of God') is the last underlying dichotomy that we wish to highlight on. It is the dichotomy of ''the blessed'' and ''the cursed'':

''*… these people have been cursed by their soothsayer.* ***He has cursed them so they may all commit suicide. And leave no one behind*** […] *They will be exterminated* […] ***Come and assist us in exterminating them so that the population will be rid of this plague at all cost*** *for in Kigali-ville, we shall exterminate them.* ***There is nothing else to do****.* '' (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, p 16)

''***Rwanda's God is never far*** […] ***He will continue helping us in this crisis****,* […] *a small group mobilising here and there some people, including bandits and all, and coming to take over power form leaders representing the people who make up the majority of the population.* […] *it will not succeed in Rwanda;* ***Rwanda's God will ensure victory against it.***'' (Habimana cited in RTLM broadcast aired on April 22, 1994, p. 17)

From this, we can interpret the narrative as stating, that victory cannot be achieved without the Grace of Rwanda's God, who, if this said God is as the Catholic God (a religious impact from the colonial missionaries), only acts in favour of moral, humane, and civilised beings. From the picture portrayed of the Tutsi and Inkotanyi throughout the dichotomisation process, the Tutsi clearly do not possess these characteristics – but the Hutus do. Therefore, as preached by the RTLM, the Hutus must win the battle against the invading anti-democratic Tutsi who are fighting for total dominance – a victory that can only happen if the Hutus take up arms to defend themselves against and kill the wicked plague of a Tutsi.

5.3 Dehumanization

In order to further distinguish between the identities of Hutus and Tutsis to propagate genocide, the second part of the process as previously mentioned by Moshman (2007) is known as dehumanization. It is during this process that the intended targets (Tutsis/Inkotanyi) are categorized as subhuman beings similar to insects and vermin in order to eliminate moral obligations that would usually apply to other humans. This is done so by the Hutu extremists so as to justify killings and with the intent of rallying Hutus and urging them to kill the enemies, the Tutsi Inyenzi. The dehumanization process is seen as a sort of next step in the process of implementing the Tutsi/Hutu dichotomy as it expands the identities of "them" and "us" to them being subhuman, challenging "our" way of life.

We have chosen a number of radio transmissions from RTLM during the genocide so as to show how Dehumanization was employed with the purpose of rallying Hutus and urging them to take part in freeing their country from the enemy Tutsis. In the early days of the war between RPF and Rwanda the RTLM argues that it performs the duties of an independent radio, and thus the dichotomization is more evident. Arguably dehumanization is more excessively used during the genocide and the period closely associated with it. Therefore most of the transmissions used in this part of the analysis were aired following the commencement of the genocide on the 6th of April, 1994 (Prunier, 1995).

A specific example of how dehumanization was employed by the RTLM is seen in this transmission transcript from the 9th of June 1994, where the use of Inyenzi is evidently more obvious than the more neutral usage of Inkotanyi previously seen before the genocidal killings started. The speaker Valérie Bemeriki urges people to catch the Inyenzi and exterminate them.

"*I want to transmit the messages of those who are fond of RTLM radio station. It is ever more obvious that we are winning.* ***They should stop with negotiations and let us catch those Inyenzi, exterminate them...*** *Then, we will drive those who would survive away from the border, not only at 2 or 3 km, but at least at 10 km from the border.* […] *They do not understand what the* ***Inyenzi*** *Inkotanyi are doing.* ***They just can see that those Inyenzi are full of wickedness... That they just like to suck innocent people's blood, especially Hutus'*** "
(Bemeriki cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on June 9, 1994, p. 11)

The meaning of *Inyenzi* is cockroach, and so the Inkotanyi are reduced to nasty insects with whom people have no problem with killing. Moreover the intended use of the verb 'exterminate' further justifies the act of killing an Inkotanyi as it is the same as ridding one's house of bugs. Furthermore, the Inyenzi are compared to vampires or similar superstitious beings which suck the blood of innocent people. There is a clear distinction made here between the *Inyenzi* 'evil' beings and the 'innocent' people of the Rwandan democracy, more specifically Hutus.

The next example of dehumanization is from the transmission on the May 30th 1994, in which RTLMs Kantano Habimana described some of the violent killings performed by the Inyenzi. He then goes on to dehumanize the Inyenzi through calling them cursed, and telling about how they act like dogs, a subhuman being.

"*As for me you may think that I am exaggerating, but one can never know the objectives of the* ***Inyenzi*** *[…]* ***They are either cursed or mad****. Hold on: It was reported this morning, around 3 a.m. rather, they* ***launched an attack barking like dogs.*** *Some people thought that it was a pack of dogs going somewhere. They eventually realized that it* ***was the Inyenzi for***

***they are well aware of their tricks*.”** (Habimana cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on May 30, 1994, pp. 16-17)

Through the dehumanization of the Inkotanyi, presenting the example of them barking like dogs, they can appear as less human and thus arguably they can be killed with less obligations or moral concerns involved. Also the tricks employed by the Inyenzi and the curses employed by them alludes to voodoo craft or dark magic that cannot be trusted. Again there is a clear emphasis on the distinction between the ‘people’ and the subhuman creatures of the Inyenzi who cannot be trusted and are mad to the extent of them being cursed.

“*We were told how **Inyenzi struck on the heads of pregnant women with small hoes** and then **cut through their wombs and removed their babies.** After that **they would lay down the baby and kill it too, cutting it through**. They would do this **in front of other women** to make them feel that the same fate was awaiting them*.” (Bemeriki cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aired on June 9, 1994, p. 5)

Here again they are referred to as Inyenzi, as well as they are presented as beings without human morals in the sense that they feel no guilt towards violently murdering pregnant women and babies. This has a strong effect in portraying the Tutsis as the ultimately evil, since pregnant women often are perceived as vulnerable members of society, and babies are often considered the most innocent. Since we aware of the demonisation of Tutsis going on so to dehumanize them, we have reason to believe that Rwandan society regarded pregnant women and babies likewise, painting a picture of an identity that was out of moral and ethical reach.

“*He will tell us a lot of things about **the cockroaches, RPF.** Listen to his revelations**. It is sad. It is sad to hear that the cockroaches (RPF)** take 12 year **children, young children,** to the battlefield and give them difficult tasks because there are **children**, still ignorant, and not yet intelligent enough*.” (Habimana cited in transcripts of RTLM broadcast aired on May 16-17, 1994, p. 3)

The use of cockroach is very clear throughout this excerpt. How these ‘’cockroaches exploit children’’ is emphasized through the repetitions of how sad the circumstances of the killings are and how the ‘’cockroaches’’ seemingly feel no signs of human remorse in their exploit of innocent “*children, young children*” who must carry out the spying for the Tutsis among other ‘evil’ deeds.

“*The way* ***they kill people****.* ***The way they exterminated people and even killed members of religious orders of whom 3 bishops*** *[...]* ***All the Rwandans*** *are now weary of the* ***Inyenzi Inkotanyi... They do not even understand them.*** *They [the Inyenzi Inkotanyi] put themselves in a bad situation. If the* ***Inyenzi really want to come back to their country, they should not come killing people****.* ***No one of good sense will accept a killer as his neighbour****. I think that this will never be possible especially that up to date they did not give up their killing*.” (Bemeriki cited in transcript of RTLM broadcast aire on June 9, 1994, p. 9)

The Inyenzi are further presented as killers with no morals as they even kill bishops. The idea of Inyenzi Inkotanyi purely as killers intensifies the justification of reacting to the Inyenzi, “*no one of good sense*” would simply accept a killer (with no morals or empathy) as his neighbor. The aspect of “them” being a killer is intended to further dehumanize the Inkotanyi, e.g. they show no signs of humanity, they are simply killers, and must therefore be exterminated.

5.4 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, we investigated the occurrence and use of dichotomisation and dehumanization respectively through analysis. We selected fractions of the transcripts that we ruled to be clear use of these mechanisms. We proceeded to discuss each fraction in order to elaborate on the different ways that dichotomisation and dehumanization could be used in constructing the identity of the Tutsi-enemy. However, we also shortly included a paragraph explaining the use of ‘frames’ as postulated by Butler (2009), and how this related to the applied processes of facilitating genocide as described by Moshman (2007). Our findings indicated how the Hutu extremists worded and guided the discourse against the Tutsi minority, as well as they emphasised the influence of power - particularly that of the media. Through the intended discourse and the use of the aforementioned mechanisms, the Hutu extremists created a strong dichotomy between the Hutu and the Tutsi. They

were portrayed as strong irreconcilable contrasts not only on the basis of ethnicity, but on the very notion of humanity and the foundation of values. As this dichotomy was reinforced through the constructed discourse of RTLM, dehumanization was used to situate the Tutsi-identity outside of the perpetrators' sphere of morals, so that Tutsi extermination would not be regarded as immoral or inhumane, but as a simple necessity so to preserve the very humanity of Rwanda.

Chapter 6: Discussion

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we aim to answer our stated research question: *How was the dichotomisation of Hutus and Tutsis and the dehumanization of Tutsis in the media discourse utilised to construct the Tutsi as enemy of the Hutu during the RTLM radio broadcasting before and during the Rwandan genocide of 1994?*

This will be done by elaborating on our theories, our findings, the connections in between, and how we eventually have come to answer our working questions in the process. We will be going back to discussing the theory and mechanisms expressed by Said, Ranger, and Hobshawn in their writings, so to show how knowledge on colonial practice has aided us in reaching a more in-depth understanding of what is a complex concept and how colonialism by the use of these practices has managed to influence history even in the post-colonial era. Furthermore, we discuss how the writings of contextual understanding by Chabal and Daloz have been relevant to our approach towards the research question as well as towards Moshman's theory on identity. Lastly, we will explain how we investigated the mechanisms of dichotomization and dehumanization which were the tools used to understand the construction of the Tutsi-enemy within the frames of a context heavily influenced by history.

6.2 Context

Firstly, we would like to discuss the writings of Chabal and Daloz (2006) and how their arguments for an approach concerned with the perspective of culture aided us in exploring our subject as well as our empirical evidence from a contextual standpoint. In our theoretical framework, we elaborate on how they describe politics as always being rooted in culture, particularly so in the case of politics inciting violence. This inspired us to do a critical discourse analysis which explores how power-relations are involved in discourse. Most importantly, Chabal and Daloz made us realise that we needed to be careful with our choice of theories as well as our own viewpoints. Analysing a subject such as the RTLM broadcasts would require us to acquire sufficient background knowledge so to understand the cultural

and historical references made during the broadcasts. The argument of probing into the society of study to determine how perception of identity fashions the opinions and behaviours of the actors involved in the local society within which our case was taking place, urged us to reconstruct our whole approach. Instead, we had to acknowledge that the event of the genocide was not an event standing alone, rather it was the culmination of a chain of events in history. Thus, the cultural perspective and need of contextualisation promoted in the writings of Chabal and Daloz was used in our study as an influence and has guided us as to how we should start from the scratch and continuously work to gather the many pieces so as to see the bigger picture. Additionally, it made us reflect more upon what aspects of the RTLM broadcasts that we wished to explore and which methods and theories to use so to reflect local context and the uniqueness of the subject in our study. Moreover, this perspective and awareness of contextual influence complimented the philosophy of social constructivism, which we had chosen as a part of our methodology. We argue that the writings of Chabal and Daloz were an important factor of reaching our results and chapter conclusions.

6.3 Answering the Working Questions

As we wanted to answer the first working questions, we had already concluded that we needed to go into a historical description of the pre-colonial and colonial times of Rwanda. As we read different historical analyses on the topic, we found the analyses of Fujii (2004; 2009) and Prunier (1995) to be the most relevant studies for our research. In answering the first working question, the findings that we retrieved from working on our background chapter for the purpose of context, showed us that the terms of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' possessed meanings based on socio-economic status, indicating whether one was a citizen of a higher or lower social layer – an elite or a peasant/commoner. From Fujii (2009), we further found out that these terms were not even used in all of the Rwandan kingdom, but that they were mainly a result of the centralisation and formation of a hierarchical feudal society established by the Nyiginya clan under King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri. This finding contradicted the concept of ethnicity which the terms today are mainly associated with, but then again, we had from our readings of Ranger and Hobshawn (1983) also realised how under times of colonisation, identities could be reconstructed and given new meanings. Hence, this finding led us to do a more thorough description of the colonial era, as we found that it had had a more substantial

impact on Rwandan society than earlier expected through its reformation of the already centralised station. This leads us to our discussion on neo-traditionalist processes in order for us to give an in-depth answer to our second question.

First of all, Ranger and Hobshawn argues in their book, *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) that the British colonisers upon arrival in Africa had to establish themselves as undisputed masters, and they established a connection to governing African societies through the vision of the imperial monarchy. Now, looking at the Belgian arrival in Rwanda, their case was quite different, as Rwanda first of all already had been colonised by Germany, and secondly, the Rwandan kingdom was already an established centralised state with a firm governing body. So instead of imposing a vision of an omniscient foreign king as ruler of the African state, the Belgians took use of the already-existing government and decided to modify it for their benefit. There were several ways in which Belgians differed from the British, but it was mainly in the aspects of not creating an imperial monarchy based on their own monarchy, rather they cooperated with the Rwandan kingdom and tried to find ways to exploit the pre-existing system. Another aspect in which they differed was that they did not bring to Rwanda Belgium settlers such as farmers, like the farmers basing their lives and elite-status on gentility and being white. As Rwanda was a rather small country with a dense population, Belgians reconstructed traditional Rwanda through neo-traditionalism instead, and eventually they educated their own hand-picked elite of the Rwandan people – the Tutsis. But what is interesting about this point, is that, despite the choice of installing native Africans as the educated elite, race theory still played a role in that decision. As we found out, even between local African identities, racial differences can be constructed upon myths. The myth of the invading foreign Hamitic race seems to have been the main justification for appointing Tutsis as the de facto aristocracy and setting in stone a division between individual locals who might had lived side by side before the introduction of the neo-traditionalist constructions of the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’. So to answer our second working question, we can state that, from our findings from historical analyses, the Belgians reconstructed the ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ identities by writing into the past of the Rwandans the present, meaning that they re-modelled Rwandan society into the Belgian perception of Rwanda. The physical manifestation of this reconstruction happened by the introduction of identity cards, stating a person’s ‘’ethnicity’’ which was also often based on Belgian race-based generalisations. To add further to this discussion of the techniques of the Belgians, we include Said’s study of Orientalism and his

concept of ‘’imagined geography’’. As we talk about the socially constructed dichotomy of the neo-traditionalist meanings behind ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’, we notice that the Orientalist dichotomy of the Orient and the Occident is showing as well. As Said argued, the Orient dichotomy is based on the Western construction of the Orient as being uncivilised and barbaric, while the West in contrast is civilised and progressive. By the findings from our readings, we argue that Orientalism and imagined geography is defined within the frames of the Rwandan colonial context. But instead of the having the West itself as being opposed to the Orient, we see Tutsis as representing the civilised West and the Orient as being represented by the Hutu and the Twa. This is shown in the fact that Tutsis were regarded as Hamites, a supposed African race descending from European pastoralists That is a clear link of East versus West, as race theory further enhances the view of Hutus as naturally being of a subordinate and uncivilised world opposed to the educated Tutsi elite. The ‘’imaginative geography’’ was portrayed by Belgians through the ‘’Rwandification’’ of society in which the established social layers and hierarchy as well as marginalisation was excused by ‘’science’’ and the ‘’genetic background of the Tutsis’’. Imaginative geography contributed to further dichotomisation amongst people in society, and borders were created in many parts of society – in politics, schooling, the job sector, etc. Belgians used these techniques to exploit the common people through the modified institutions that were initially established by the royal Tutsi court under pre-colonial rule.

Now, as we have answered the first two working questions, these writings on colonialist techniques and theories have assisted us in uncovering the prerequisites needed for the social construction of a narrative in which Tutsis are portrayed as the natural enemy of the Hutu. One can discuss whether or not we could had made the same conclusions on colonial development without these writings, but we argue that these writings functioned as a lens for seeing through just descriptive writings on history. So, by applying the perspective of writings on colonialism and postcolonialism, a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the colonialist machinery is portrayed, as the informational pieces that we are receiving from descriptive background history suddenly come together so to reflect the bigger picture.

As we have answered the first two working questions, these writings on colonialist techniques and theories have assisted us in uncovering the prerequisites needed for the social construction of a narrative in which Tutsis are portrayed as the natural enemy of the Hutu.

One can discuss whether or not we could had made the same conclusions on colonial development without these writings, but we argue that these writings functioned as a lens for seeing through just descriptive writings on history. So, by applying the perspective of writings on colonialism and postcolonialism, a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the colonialist machinery is portrayed, as the informational pieces that we are receiving from descriptive background history suddenly come together so to r the bigger picture.

Until now, we have discussed our process and findings very methodically. That is because we have been particular in our choice of composition of the study. As we have already stated in chapter 1 the relevance of our subject of study, this study has also incited further discussion about *how* we study as well as *how* we position ourselves before performing an analysis on a specific topic. Our third working question that we would like to answer concerns the recognition of colonial and pre-colonial influences in the discourse promoted by Tutsi extremists on RTLM.

Obviously, by presenting these questions in a specific order shows, that we would not had been able to answer the last working question without initially having answered the other questions beforehand. Again, we would like to emphasise the importance of contextualisation and background knowledge. What we have learned from this study, above other things, is how one can start out with the specifics, but will still be required to go broad in order to narrow down the focus again. We believed that if we specifically narrowed our attention to the detection of dichotomisation and dehumanization, we could quickly and determined commence on a thorough analysis of our empirical data. Instead, as it dawned upon us, we had to acknowledge that we did not know sufficiently in order to recognise and detects the elements of dichotomisation and dehumanization present in the transcripts. In order words, we could not possibly map and mark the webs of meaning in the discourse, as we had not yet understood how the Rwandans interpret these same words. Say, if we find a passage in the transcripts in which the RTLM host called the Tutsi by ‘inyenzi’ or compared them to dogs does not have same meaning for everyone. For example, if we did not know the history behind the word ‘inyenzi’ we could possibly understand the true meaning behind it and how loaded the word actually is. Moreover, how we perceive dogs and interpret a comparison to one, differs as well. In certain contexts, a dog is viewed as a loyal best friend, or even as a part of the family, while in other contexts, they are considered as dirty animals who cannot have caring relations to humans.

The tools of dichotomisation and dehumanization as used in the process of facilitating a genocidal discourse as explained by Moshman (2007) are important, because they help us to explore the definition, intentional use, and effect of these processes. But as we look at our findings along with the answers to our working questions, we become aware of, that if we had immediately proceeded to the analysis of the empirical data, a lot of meaning would had been lost by the exclusion of context. Therefore, we argue that one must acknowledge when background knowledge is not sufficient to get the intended meaning behind messages and opinions portrayed as those of the RTLM broadcast-transcriptions. Because one cannot recognise dichotomisation or dehumanization before one is aware of respectively the existing identities, entities, and definitions of self along with values.

Given that we indeed did include contextuality in our study, we will answer the third working question. According to our findings, we saw that colonial and pre-colonial influences were reflected in the utilisation of dichotomisation and dehumanization against the Tutsis in the Hutu extremist radio discourse. As we pointed out in our analysis, RTLM hosts would draw references to history particularly when attempting to portray the Tutsis as inhumane anti-democratic killers addicted to power opposed to the civilised and democratic Hutu majority. They would particularly have mention that the Tutsis had subjugated the Hutus both during feudalism in pre-colonial Rwanda as well as during the Belgian colonisation, when they were officially labelled as peasants by identification cards and denied equal rights. Moreover, our findings also showed us how the Hutu had taken the Hamitic myth and applied it to the discourse with a reverse narrative: here, the Hamitic race was simply unjust foreigners coming to thieve the land from the native Hutu, the true Rwandans, as portrayed by RTLM.

6.4 Answering the Research Question

As we throughout our study have elaborated on methodology, theories, background knowledge, and analysis, we have several findings that relate to our research question and the process of answering it. As we divided our analysis into two parts, we will start off by explaining the first set of findings that we found, as we were analysing our empirical data to detect the use of dichotomisation in in the discourse.

Dichotomisation was clearly present in the discourse and utilised first and foremost to give the listeners a sense of distance from the Tutsi. By polarising the two terms of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi,' the RTLM broadcasts laid the groundwork for further utilising dehumanization after or alongside dichotomisation, as the two can function complementary. What our findings show is that the use of dichotomisation not only portrayed Hutu versus Tutsi, but also by making associations and contrasts, multiple dichotomies were created with which these identities of Tutsis and Hutus were also identified. For example, in several of the RTLM broadcasts, the RTLM repeatedly portrays the Tutsi as being ''evil'', ''blood thirsty,'' power-mongering, anti-democratic, wicked, and natural enemies of the Hutu, as they had arrived as foreigners in pre-colonial times to subjugate the Hutu. These portrayals and interpretations are then contrasted to the Hutu interpretations of themselves: ''good,'' peaceful, democratic, humane, and innocent victims who must defend themselves. These binaries used to create a picture of ''the good'' versus ''the evil'' dichotomy, is how dichotomization is used in the discourse. It is initially a process of distancing the commoner from the supposed ''enemy'' to instil fear so that when the discourse switches to dehumanization, the Tutsis will already have been demonized to such a degree that common Hutus should not identify themselves with them. It is the construction of the ''us'' and ''them'' basically.

Then, in the radio broadcasts, dehumanization is shown mainly by referring to the Tutsis as ''*inyenzi*'' (cockroaches), ''dogs,'' ''plague,'' ''wicked,'' ''killers,'' and ''cursed.'' This portrayal of Tutsis as subhuman beings is meant to place the Tutsis outside the sphere of moral obligation for the extremist Hutus, meaning that they are indirectly taught not to have remorse for the Tutsis that are killed, as they are enemies of the Hutus who must be exterminated if the Hutus want peace.

These are all examples from our findings from doing an analysis of transcripts of the RTLM's broadcasts in 1994. Moreover, they are findings that have helped us with answering the research question as we have done just above. But the understanding of the discourse and local meanings within could not have been achieved, if we had not studied the contextual background knowledge necessary to familiarize ourselves with the Rwandan discourse.

One possible limitation could be the fact that we are doing our study on the basis of interpretivism. So, there is a slight chance of bias or influencing presuppositions, though unlikely as we by the integration of our theories and specification of study have already

automatically limited and positioned ourselves, and thus our analysis is performed on the basis of a context set in stone beforehand.

We argue that the results and conclusions of this study are important, as they both influence knowledge as well as manner through which we perceive knowledge and process it. Our findings have thus elaborated on the theories provided by Moshman (2007), through which one can gain get a better understanding of the facilitation process of genocidal discourse which is rooted in culture according to Moshman. However it is important to stress the importance of contextualisation so as to gain a deeper understanding of the local cultures and webs of meaning associated specifically with Rwanda,

This study can also inspire further research on for example the use of media discourse and propaganda in the context of other genocides, such as the one that occurred in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the 1990s. Furthermore, it would be interesting to pick the same context of Rwanda, but with a different focus, perhaps with a more thorough study on the specific power-struggles and politics of Rwanda at hand in the 1990s.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In conclusion, dichotomisation between Hutus and Tutsis as well as dehumanization of Tutsis was used in the RTLM broadcast discourse to construct the Tutsi as the enemy of the Hutu by demonizing Tutsis.

Firstly, especially during the early days of the genocide, the radio would contrast and polarize the Hutus and the Tutsis by portraying the Tutsis as a danger to the Hutus; as a bloodthirsty, power-addicted people who would never share their influence with a Hutu in any democracy. Tutsis were further portrayed as anti-democrats who were probably not even true Rwandans, as whose ancestors had immigrated to Rwanda according to the European-invented Hamitic myth.

Secondly, we conclude that dehumanization later complemented dichotomization. From our findings, we can tell that later during the genocide, dehumanization used by Hutu extremists portrayed Tutsis as nothing but ‘*’inyenzi*” – cockroaches who ought to be exterminated like other unwanted ‘’guests’’ (insects) in their homes. However, even though that *‘’inyenzi’’* was the most commonly used term for dehumanising Tutsis, they were also described as dogs, ghosts, vampires, wicked people, and killers.

So, by stating our findings, we can further conclude that this use of dichotomisation and dehumanization was effective, especially for two main purposes of the utilization: to make the common Hutu feel distanced from the Tutsi, so that they would never identify with Tutsis. Moreover, the Tutsi was portrayed as a natural killer who by his own unchangeable nature would always seek to take power and subjugate the Hutus once again. Dehumanisation was then used quickly after, so that once people felt, that they could not relate to the Tutsis, who – according to RTLM – were infiltrating Rwanda so to gain power over the majority. Dehumanization functioned most of all as a way of justifying the killings of Tutsis. If these humans had first been *de*humanised, then they were no longer to be included within the sphere of moral obligation, hence, making the killings of Tutsis much easier as it would not be considered as immoral, but as justice.

Furthermore, we can conclude from our findings of the background history chapter, that historic events and eras played an important role in the forming of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Especially during the colonisation by Belgium, the colonisers modified and introduced

reforms that would prioritise Tutsis and marginalise Hutus to such a degree that even decades after the end of colonialism in Rwanda, the Hutu still felt resentment for what had happened. The historic background of Rwanda had for years contributed to the facilitation and polarization of Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda.

Bibliography

Litterature:

- Baisley, E. (2014) *Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda,* Sage Publications, pp. 39-51

- Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Doubleday, p 203

- Butler, J. (2009) *Frames of War,* Verso, pp. 5-23

- Chabal, P. and Daloz, J. (2006) *Culture Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning*, Hurst Publishers, pp. 98-145

- Chowdhury, M- F. (2014) *Interpretivism in Aiding Our Understanding of the Contemporary Social World,* Scientific Research, Open Journal of Philosophy, 4, pp. 432-438

- Detel, W. (2015) *Social Constructivism*, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 22, Elsevier, p. 228

- van Dijk, T. A. (1995) *Aims of Critical Discourse Analysis,* Japanese Discourse, Vol. 1, p. 17-27

- Flick, U. (2014) *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* 5 th edition. Sage publications, pp. 114-115, 121, 137-139, 153-154, 183, 188-189

- Fujii, L. A. (2004) *Transforming the moral landscape: the diffusion of a genocidal norm in Rwanda*, Carfax Publishing, Journal of Genocide Research, 6:1, 99-114,

- Fujii, L. A. (2009) *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda,* Cornell University, 45-75
- Gee, J. (2014*). An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, Theory and Method* (4.th ed.). Hoboken: Taylor and Francis pp. 17-43
- Gerring, J. (2004) "What is Case Study and what is it Good for?'' *American Political Science Review* vol. 98, No. 2 (May) pp 341-354
- Gourevitch, P. (2000) *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed With Our Families* (Reprind. Ed.) Picador pp. 55-57
- Haldrup, M. and Koefoed, L. (2009) *Orientalism,* Elsevier, Ltd., pp. 37-42
- Halperin, S. & O. Heath (2017) *Political Research: methods and Practical Skills*. 2nd edition. Oxford University Press. *Chapter 14 Textual Analysis*
- Louis, R. (1979) *Ruanda-Urundi: 1884-1919*, Greenwood, p 107
- Levy, J. (2008) Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference, Routledge, p.4
- Moshman, D. (2007) Us and Them: Identity and Genocide, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 7(2) pp. 115-135
- Onwuegbuzie, A., & Leech, N. (2005). "Taking the "Q" out of research: Teaching research methodology courses without the divide between quantitative and qualitative paradigms," *Department of Educational Measurement and College of Education, University of South Florica; University of Colorado*, pp. 267-296.
- Prunier, G. (1995) *Rwanda Crisis, 1954-94: History of a Genocide*. Hurst Publishers, pp. 1-40, 41-90, 93-126
- Ranger, T. and Hobshawn, E. J. (1983) *The Invention of Tradition,* Cambridge University Press, pp. 211-260
- Sinema, Kyrsten (2015) *Who Must Die in Rwanda's Genocide? The State of Exception Realized,* Lexington Books, p. 70
- Soiferman, L. (2010) *Compare and Contrast Inductive and Deductive Research Approaches*, University of Manitoba, pp. 3-7
- Strauss, S. (2007) *What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda's "Radio Machete",* Sage Publications, p. 612
- Waller, J. (2002) *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killings,* Oxford University Press, Inc., pp. 202-235

Websites:

- Concordia University, All used transcripts from 8th of July, 1993 to 3rd of July, 1994. http://migs.concordia.ca/links/RwandanRadioTrascripts_RTLM.htm [Accessed on 15/03/2017]

- Al-Jazeera (2014) *''Timeline: How Rwanda's genocide unfolded"* Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/04/interactive-how-rwanda-genocide-unfolded-2014478459557910.html [Accessed on 15/03/2017]

- BBC News (2000) *''Belgian Apology to Rwanda''* Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/705402.stm [Accessed on 15/03/2017]

- The Guardian (1994) *"Rwandan apocalypse"* Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/jul/23/rwanda.usa [Accessed on 15/03/2017]

- The Guardian (1994) *''UN troops stand by and watch carnage"* Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/apr/12/rwanda.fromthearchive [Accessed on 15/03/2017]