Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
An Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict

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Maia Juel Giorgio, Tina Søndergaard Madsen, Jakob Wigersma, Mark Westh

Global Studies Bachelor Module - Institute for Globalization and Society - Roskilde University
Abstract

This paper offers a coherent assessment of the stability created by nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Our examination posits the neorealist understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence in relation to alternative frameworks. To unfold the varying theoretical presuppositions upon which the concept of stability is based, three logically constructed analyses will be undertaken where the theories are explored in relation to empirical data. The Kargil Crisis in 1999 and the Twin Peak Crises did indeed reveal inconsistencies in the theory of nuclear deterrence, and the domestic situation in Pakistan has on several occasions threatened the nuclear stability between the countries. With this undertaking, a nuanced understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence will be offered.
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1. Introduction

Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and thus the end of the Second World War, the US enjoyed almost a decade of unrivalled military superiority. But with the surprising nuclear explosion test in 1949, the Soviet Union demonstrated its skills with and knowledge of nuclear physics. Especially the nuclear bomb testing of 1955\(^1\) proved the ability of the USSR to design and create nuclear weapons, closing the gap to the US in terms of firepower.

As the nuclear stockpiles grew and their delivery systems evolved, the ability of both the US and the Soviet Union to defend themselves from a nuclear attack dwindled. This led to a change in the strategy behind nuclear weapons, from a strategy of denial to a strategy of deterrence\(^2\) (Alagappa, 2008: 2). This strategic scenario was commonly known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) wherein aggression from one part would provoke a guaranteed annihilating counter-attack. A nuclear deterrence capability required large nuclear arsenals to ensure that a sufficient nuclear force would survive a first strike and to guarantee a vast retaliatory strike that would deter aggression (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 147-148).

Especially the Cuban missiles crisis in 1962\(^3\) threatened to topple the power balance in the Cold War, and in its aftermath several agreements were concluded in order to avoid a war between the superpowers. Most noticeable was the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) during the seventies where the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to keep their nuclear defences at a minimum. Hereby the deterrence strategy was ensured as both parts agreed to stay vulnerable to any (counter-) attack and therefore deterred from hostilities.

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\(^1\) The 1949 tests were staged testing's, thus not actual bombs being tested.

\(^2\) The strategy of denial refers to the ability to defend and turn away an incoming attack. Strategy of deterrence, on the other hand, refers to the ability to deter an opponent from action by promising retaliation in case of an attack.

\(^3\) In relation to the risk of nuclear war during the Cuba Crisis, John F Kennedy stated in a live-broadcast from the White House on the 22nd of October 1962, that at nuclear war would have disastrous consequences: "Even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth" (BBC E).
1.1 Nuclear Weapons in a Post-Bipolar Setting: Interests and Importance

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many foresaw a demise of nuclear weapons in world politics. During the nineties, there was a seemingly widespread disinterest in nuclear weapons among the western Nuclear Weapon States, (Alagappa, 2008: 3-4). But in the early 2000's the role of the nuclear bomb in a globalised world was reaffirmed as several state leaders underlined their commitment to nuclear weapons, and the importance of these in their arsenal:

“Nuclear forces continue to play a critical role in the defence of the United States, its allies, and friends.” (US Nuclear Posture Review, 2002, in Alagappa, 2008: 1)

“Russia [considers] nuclear deterrence as the main element guaranteeing its security. Maintaining a minimally sufficient number of nuclear weapons to ensure nuclear deterrence remains one of the most important policy priorities.” (Vladimir Putin, 2006: ibid)

This resumed focus on nuclear weapons is largely due to the increasing interest for this kind of weaponry in the Middle East and Asia. The increasing nuclear stockpiles of China, India and Pakistan have affirmed that the significance of nuclear weapons in world politics is not bygone.

1.2 The India-Pakistan Conflict

The effect and role of nuclear weapons is especially intriguing in the conflict between India and Pakistan. Both countries possess nuclear capacities and have fought a number of open wars and experienced several crises since the partition in 1947.

Following the partition that led to independence from the British, the main difficulty was that both nations wanted full control over Kashmir and were not willing to compromise. While Pakistan’s arguments were partly based on religion, as the majority of the Kashmir population is Muslim, India’s was based on the historical Hindu rule in the region and the wish to create a secular state. Additionally, India feared that letting Kashmir go would trigger additional secessionist drives in the country. These
arguments, along with the issue of territory and water, remain the basis of the conflict today (Khan, 2009: 63).

When India conducted several nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan promptly followed suit and responded with nuclear tests of its own, fuelling fears of a new nuclear arms race. The acquisition of nuclear weapons was met with open arms in the region as there was a widespread belief that these weapons and their deterring effect would be able to solve all outstanding issues between the two adversaries, including the issue of Kashmir (Waltz, 2003: 111). Consider, for example, this argument from 1999 put forward by senior Pakistani diplomat Shamshad Ahmad: “In South Asia nuclear deterrence may, [...], usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the requisite incentives for resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and Kashmir” (Ahmad, 1999: 125). However, it soon became clear that a solution to the Kashmir dispute was a long time coming.

With the Kargil crisis in 1999, where Pakistani troops and militants crossed the Line of Control and seized Indian positions in the Kashmiri Kargil district, the risk of an all-out war between the two nuclear weapon states seemed imminent. The conflict did, however, not escalate into nuclear war but the notion that nuclear weapons equal peace was called into question. Two years later both countries deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers along their collective border and once again the possibility of an all-out war seemed to be in the offing. Again, the international society held its breath, dreading an escalation into a nuclear war with unimaginable consequences. However, the standoff never actually came to bloodshed, but the stability in the region was seriously rattled.

The instability that these crises reveal is further emphasized by the element of terrorism that has been present throughout the conflict. Following the abovementioned crises several terrorist attacks on different targets within both India and Pakistan have taken place. Attacks committed by Pakistani based militants count, among others, the 2000 suicide attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi, the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and the 2006 and 2008 Mumbai bombings (Swami, 2009: 144-147). Additionally, there have been a number of terrorist attacks within both Pakistani- and Indian held Kashmir (Swami, 2009: 146).
Not only are the tensions high between the two states, but both states are also troubled with domestic violence. In Pakistan, armed Islamic groups aim at introducing Sharia-law, openly battling the government and in India as much as one third of the army is busy keeping insurgency under control, including the secessionists in Kashmir (Rajagopalan: 2008, 192-193).

The internal unrest in both countries and their extensive history of war, crises and terrorism paint a picture of an unstable conflict situation. Terrorist attacks and crises have taken place notwithstanding prospects of escalation into nuclear war and thus the deterring effect of nuclear weapons necessarily has to be questioned. What are the limits of nuclear deterrence? What does it encompass and what does it leave out? With the India-Pakistan conflict as the point of departure, this paper is an attempt to clarify the limits and advantages of nuclear deterrence and to examine the efficiency of this as a means of ensuring stability. With this in mind we have formulated the following question:

1.3 Research Question:

*To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict?*

### 2. Methodological Approach

#### 2.1 Clarification of Research Question

Three working questions have been formulated which will be used as tools for answering the research question and for upholding a thread throughout this paper.

1. Are India and Pakistan fulfilling Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear deterrence?

2. What is the significance of the Kargil and Parakram crises for stability?

3. In what way have domestic actors influenced the stability between India and Pakistan?

Each of the three parts will structurally and logically underpin the argumentation of the paper. The structure is based upon a dialectic reasoning, namely *thesis, antithesis,*
*synthesis*. The thesis offers a proposition on stability in relation to nuclear deterrence. In fact, the proposition, based upon neorealism, asserts that nuclear deterrence creates stability on the higher levels. The antithesis is divided into two parts and outlines two propositions to the understanding of stability. The first, based on working question number two, will offer a more nuanced understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence while staying within the realist presuppositions. With the second antithesis, we will present another perspective on stability by answering working question number three. Finally, in the synthesis (conclusion) the contradictions between the thesis and the antitheses will be reconciled by offering a nuanced account of the stability created by nuclear deterrence. Thus, taking a point of departure in the concept of stability, each of the parts offers differing perspectives upon the issue of the stability created by nuclear deterrence.

2.2 The Logic Construction of the Paper

2.2.1 Thesis

*Nuclear deterrence creates stability in the sense of absence of war: Neorealism*

The theoretical framework chosen for the thesis persists within the realm of realism. More specifically it consists of Waltzian neorealism. The choice of Kenneth Waltz, a central figure within neorealism, for constructing the thesis and thus the point of departure of the analysis is mainly based upon two factors: the realist heritage and Waltz’s extensive theorising on the subject.

Firstly, realism is strongly entwined in the very emergence of nuclear deterrence theory. In fact, the realist school was among the first to offer accounts on the matter during the cold war, and has therefore become almost indispensable for nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, the first generation of nuclear strategists, including Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling, explored the possible implications for the advent of nuclear weapons in global politics in a cold war setting (Lobell et al., 2009: 4). Two possible implications of nuclear weapons were outlined: the imperative for nuclear powers to limit war, and the risk that nuclear weapons could be used as a coercive instrument to achieve political
ends. Due to this theorising on the subject, the realist school has been highly influential for the first understandings of nuclear deterrence and should thus be included. Secondly, Waltz, influenced by this heritage, has continued to theorise on the subject within the frame of neorealism. In fact, the discussion of nuclear deterrence is highly present in the optimist/pessimist debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. Waltz advocates nuclear proliferation and supports his assumptions with the argument that the possible disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons are a reliable guarantee for them not being employed. As Waltz expresses this:

“[…] the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely the country invites retaliation and its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. […] War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for.” (Waltz, 2003; 6).

The argument rests upon the assumption of rationality, an established realist notion that is central to the Waltzian understanding of nuclear deterrence. Sagan replies with organisational arguments, claiming that rationality cannot automatically be assumed, undermining the Waltzian arguments. Moreover, Waltz has developed a framework for evaluating nuclear deterrence with the formulation of three requirements for efficient deterrence. Following the Waltzian logic, if the three requirements are fulfilled by India and Pakistan nuclear stability will persist between the two adversaries.

2.2.2 Antithesis 1

Nuclear deterrence assures stability on a higher level, but is not able to increase stability on a lower level: Stability/Instability Paradox

In this part, the Waltzian understanding of nuclear deterrence will be nuanced. The theoretical resource for this undertaking, namely the stability/instability paradox, does not challenge the premises of Waltz, but offers a framework for understanding the limits of Waltz’s assessment of efficient nuclear deterrence. In this sense, one might argue that this attempt does not offer a sufficient opposition to Waltz as only the scope of nuclear deterrence is questioned, and not nuclear deterrence as such, and could thus not be
considered an antithesis. Indeed, a proper opposition is not undertaken. Nonetheless, we believe that in order to be able to dispute Waltz’s perception of stability, it is firstly necessary to accept the neorealist presuppositions. Moreover, the aim of the paper is not to reject the neorealist assumptions as such, but rather to seek a more nuanced approach to the India-Pakistan conflict and the level of stability by including alternative understandings. Indeed, to include a broad theoretical framework is interesting, as it enables us to move beyond the frame of Waltzian neorealism and assess supplementary approaches.

2.2.3 Antithesis 2

*Domestic factors in India and Pakistan may affect stability and ultimately nuclear deterrence*

In order to go beyond structural explanatory factors and explore specific domestic factors that are of importance to stability, neoclassical realism will be presented. This school is, as the name implies, derives from realism. However, contrary to Waltzian neorealism it acknowledges not only the existence of non-state actors, but also their ability to influence state behaviour. Thus, neoclassical realism will function as a tool for analysing the importance of domestic factors in the India-Pakistan conflict. It could be argued that other alternative frameworks, such as various Innenpolitik theories focusing exclusively on domestic factors would offer in-depth approaches going beyond the realist school. The choice of remaining within realism, and thus within the same ontological position, is explained by the importance of structural factors in shaping the conflict. Furthermore, although Scott Sagan is critical towards the realist assumption about the rational behaviour of states, he does, in similarity to the neoclassical realist position, put great emphasis on the significance of domestic factors. He claims that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is highly dependent on internal stability and the level of civil control.

2.2.4 Synthesis/Conclusion

The differing understandings of stability in relation to nuclear deterrence will here be reconciled. In fact, the very reason for choosing an approach that consists of applying
differing theoretical perspectives is the aim of finding an approach that can take additional complexities into account and offer a deeper understanding of the problem we seek to unveil. This does, moreover, offer the possibility of taking the analysis to another level and propose novelty to the domain.

2.3 Clarification of Concepts

2.3.1 Concepts of stability

As the term stability will be used widely in the report, it is necessary to have a clear idea of what this term encompasses. The stability concepts used in this paper originate from the Stability-Instability Paradox, and is in essence simple. It is divided into high level and low-level stability. Stability will here be defined by its antonym, namely war.

![India-Pakistan Escalation Ladder](source: Sahni, 2007: 194)

**High level stability**: High level stability implies stability at the existential level. Threats hereto are thus absolute, for example total wars – wars with no holds barred.

From the moment nuclear weapons are introduced in a war, a transition takes place from a low to a high stability threat. The use of nuclear weapons is confined to existential threats which theoretically excludes them being used at lesser threats. This is represented in the top of the triangle. It is important to note that high-level wars are not restricted to nuclear wars but can be wars fought with conventional means.
Low level stability: By low-level stability is implied stability where there is neither nuclear war nor conventional war that could threaten the existence of the state. This concept refers to the three levels below the nuclear level in the triangle. Territory, soldiers and prestige etc. might be lost in the war, but no existential threat is posed. These wars are thus conventional wars, but at a controlled scale. The distinction between the three subsequent levels is nonetheless vague.

Conventional wars: These wars can be large, but will not include nuclear weapons, although they, due to the unpredictable nature of war, quickly can escalate to the nuclear level.

Sub-conventional or Limited wars: These wars are fought with conventional means, but contrary to conventional wars, they are limited in time, space and scale. These will typically include small-scale incursions by Special Forces and fighter-bombers targeting terrorist camps, or other specific strategic targets.

Asymmetric wars: An asymmetric war is a war where a substantially interior non-state actor fights a state. For example Operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.

Proxy-wars: Proxy wars are wars where one parts fight the counter part through a third part, i.e. sponsoring someone’s fight as this correlates with one’s interest. E.g the Mujahideen's fight against USSR in Afghanistan was supported and sponsored by the US.

2.4 Theoretical Difficulties

As mentioned above, the aim is neither to test nor reject the theories used, but rather to explore their limits and forces for explaining the stability created by nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, this might cause difficulties since the theories have fundamentally differing presuppositions. Waltz’ exclusion of the domestic dimension and the privileging of structural factors inhibit criticism towards neorealism relating to domestic factors, as they are simply not explored within a Waltzian framework. The risk is thus that any disapproval on specific points is impossible, as it would be like a conversation between deaf, i.e. the so called “level-of analysis” problem. The theoretical discussion will thereby mainly evolve around what the theories include and exclude, and what repercussions this could have for the concept of stability.
Nevertheless, this inhibits detailed comparison between the theories, a limit inherent to the method chosen. However, the theories are not applied in order for us to reject their general validity, but rather to explore their approach to stability in relation to nuclear deterrence, their advantages and their disadvantages. In fact, this difficulty could be perceived as an advantage, as the differing theories enables us detach from the presuppositions of one theory to another.

2.5 Empirical Considerations

When approaching the field of study, a number of difficulties appear. Firstly, we are inevitably dependent upon the collection of data from secondary sources, (such as different publications) as we are not able to investigate the field directly. This risk is inherent to the qualitative approach, as one is depending upon subjective accounts that are not necessarily aiming towards objectivity. Being aware of the constant risk it represents to rely upon various secondary sources and adopting a critical approach towards this situation is part of the remedy. Moreover, a number of conscious choices have been made throughout the process, whereby attempts have been made to include a wide range of secondary sources. Taking a brief look at our bibliography, this is evident in the way we have strived towards employing sources from India, Pakistan, the US, Great Britain etc. When reading articles from local Pakistani or Indian newspapers, it becomes evident that there are strong emotional biases underlying the approach adopted. This is especially clear when reading the depiction of particularly sensitive events in Indian and Pakistan newspapers (e.g. the Mumbai bombing, and the parliament attacks in New Delhi), where the depictions can differ significantly. In the cases where we have employed sources from the two countries, most significantly in the form of newspaper articles etc., they have been used mainly for explanatory purposes. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the conflict between India and Pakistan is an infected issue, not only for Pakistan and India, but various actors are involved and have an interest in shaping the depiction of the conflict. Being aware of the high stakes required us to constantly approach the matter critically.
2.6 Delimitations

In the following we seek to clarify the motivation behind the deliberate choices we have made and our arguments for leaving out elements that could be perceived as relevant for answering the research question. This is done with the aim of increasing the validity and transparency of the paper.

2.6.1 The role of the US

It could be argued that the US plays an important role as it has significant interest in both states. Indeed, it is involved with both Pakistan and India, although in fundamentally different ways. The relation to India is primarily economical whereas the connection with Pakistan is primarily founded on Pakistan’s role as an ally in the war against terror. Furthermore, the US has been influential in the sense that it has functioned as a mediator both in the Kargil crisis and the Twin Peaks crisis.

We have, nonetheless, chosen only to include the role of the US to a limited extent. Although the US may play an important role in some aspects of the relationship, it can be argued that a focus on the direct relation between the two states is reasonable, as the research question prepares the grounds for an analysis of the stability inherent in this relationship.

2.6.2 Domestic factors

In chapter 6 we analyse the importance of domestic actors in shaping the conflict and thus influencing stability. The focus will be on the military and militant groups exclusively. This is not to imply that other domestic actors have not been important and influential in the conflict. It could, for instance, be argued that there are domestic economic interests in both states that may have been able to exert their influence and to some extent participate in altering the course of events. Also, it is argued that India’s rising economy requires it to see its “neighboring countries as essential arteries for regional trade and resources rather than as security threats” (Hogg, 2007). However, the conflict between India and Pakistan is not primarily founded on economic divergence, but is based mainly on the territorial issue of Kashmir. Thus, the military and certain militant groups have an apparent relevance. Moreover, acknowledging Pakistan’s history of recurring military coups and long periods of military rule, the
military appears to have a rather significant role. Due to the constraints in the extent of this paper and the relatively limited time available, we find it pertinent to narrow our focus to only two actors (the military and militant groups).

Additionally, the analysis will mainly evolve around the (degree of) influence of different domestic actors in Pakistan and will thus only take into account domestic factors in India and the influence of these on the conflict to a very limited extent. This is not to eliminate the possibility that several domestic actors are, and have been, influential in Indian foreign policy. However, as stated above, Pakistani militants have been especially active in both Kashmir and in India. Moreover, Pakistan is particularly interesting in what concerns civil-military relations, as the separation has historically been diffuse. India, on the other hand, has since independence striven towards a strict distinction between civil matters and military matters (Oldenburg, 2010: 170). It has been argued that the emphasis on a clear division between military and civil matters was made as a reaction to the somewhat unbalanced Pakistani structure of civil-military relations: “It would not be surprising if an important factor in the military’s acceptance of its role subordinate to civilians and elected politicians would be its view of the experience of the Pakistani army in taking over its country.”(Oldenburg, 2010: 171). As will be elaborated in the analysis, the role of the military as an influential domestic actor is discussed within the neoclassical realist approach, and central to nuclear proliferation pessimist Scott Sagan.

2.7 Validity and Generalisability

Our focus is exclusively on the conflict between India and Pakistan and we are interested in the effect of nuclear deterrence for enhancing stability in this specific context. Thus, we find it plausible to adopt a qualitative approach to the research question. Instead of drawing in numerous empirical examples in order to reach a conclusion based on quantitative measures we seek to understand the implications of the conflict between the two states in the light of nuclear deterrence. We will go in depth with specific elements of the conflict in order to draw conclusions on the extent to which nuclear deterrence has enhanced stability.
No attempt is made to reach conclusions that could be generalisable to other settings where nuclear weapons are at play. We acknowledge the specificity of the conflict, and this particularity limits the possibility of generalisation. Nonetheless, the various theoretical understandings of stability could be used as frameworks for a broader understanding of the complexity of the concept of stability.

2.8 Project Design

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3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Neorealism: Origins and Assumptions

The separation between classical realism and neorealism was made with the emergence of Kenneth Waltz’s famous oeuvre “Theory of International Politics” from 1979. Although Waltz partly rejected notions within classical realism, he was influenced by classical realism and maintained a number of basic assumptions still of importance for
understanding his framework. The concept of power is strikingly central to realism, as it is a necessary requirement for any group to attain objectives, no matter the nature of the objective. The difference between the branches within realism persists in the specific definition of the goal (which is particularly clear between defensive and offensive realists).

However, while classical realism is a heterogeneous set of inductive theories aiming at exploring the sources of state power in international politics (Lobell et al, 2009: 16), Waltz’s neorealism transfers the focus from the nation to international structural factors. Classical realism is a set of reflections, mainly philosophical, that contains a wide and diverse field of interests spanning from the problems leaders encounter in conducting foreign policy, over power distribution among states to the character of the state and its relation to domestic society. The different branches within classical realism do, however, share the common denominator of focusing on the nation state, and not specifically on the constraints of the international structures. Moreover, while classical realism approaches the field of study inductively, Waltzian realism rejects this method, and adopts a positivist deductive methodological rigour with the aim of identifying recurring patterns of world politics. This turn towards a deductive approach has been widely supported within realism more generally (Lobell et al, 2009; 20). That said, Waltzian neorealism is highly influenced by classical realism and neorealism is partly derived from this tradition.

3.1.1 Anarchy

Characteristic to the work of Waltz is the presupposition of unity of the state and anarchy in the international system. His argumentation is built upon a dichotomy of the unitary rational state in relation to the anarchy reigning beyond in the international system. In this condition of anarchy the state is the sole coherent actor. What connects Waltz to classical realists like Hobbes and Machiavelli is the underlying pessimistic perception of the human nature. Indeed, in his work Leviathan, Hobbes argues that human beings are inherently egoistic:

“[…] the disposition of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust
and dread each other, and as by natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, towards the preservation of himself” (Hobbes, 1996: 315)

Waltz’s neorealism is clearly inspired by this perception, but instead of focusing on the individual he transfers the notion of egoism to the nation state with the self-help system⁴. Thus, it can be argued that although Waltz is not concerned specifically with the human nature, he is clearly influenced by the classical realist presupposition of pessimism (Lobell et al 2009:14).

3.1.2 Structures, balance of power and stability

State behaviour

Waltz’ neorealism (or structural realism) differs from other realist schools as it is preoccupied with the structures of the international system. He emphasizes the supremacy of structural factors (Realpolitik) over domestic issues (Innenpolitik) (Lobell et al, 2009: 10). In this respect, Waltz is clearly inspired by classical realism. In “The Prince” Machiavelli expressed the necessity of a hierarchical order in politics in order to pursue the national interest⁵. Machiavelli argues that hierarchy should reign between the state (the prince) and the society (the masses). Waltz distinguishes between “high” (foreign policy, military and strategic policy etc.) and “low” (societal questions, economics etc.) politics and asserts that the domain of high politics is crucial because in this domain states are capable of shaping policies that best serve their primary interest – namely ensuring the security of the state.

Moreover, the presupposition of anarchy developed above, as being a transcendent and unchangeable condition in international relations has implications for the role of the

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⁴ The self-help system refers to the fact that all states egoistically have to strive towards their survival due to the uncertainty in what concerns other actors’ behaviour.

⁵ Machiavelli stresses the notion of nation-state and the importance of an order established by a superior. In the Prince, written in a context of political and geographical fragmentation in Italy, Machiavelli introduces the rule of the prince as being crucial for the establishment of a certain order. The prince, the enlightened despot would thus, often by manipulation (cruelty is preferred above mercy), gather the people under his rule in order to be successful in war. Indeed, Machiavelli proposes the Prince only to dedicate himself to the people in times of peace: “(…) while his only object should be the art of war, he must in times of peace pay attention to moral qualities in such a manner as to be able to use them in times of war” (Mansfield, 1998: 5)
state. The structures of the international system determine the behaviour of the state, and the state must, first and foremost, assure its own survival. The state is thereby subjected to a set of constraining conditions or structural limitations in terms of capabilities to balance its position in relation to other states. Indeed, states will respond to international systemic incentives and enhance their competitive advantage in order to survive, although the way in which they proceed may differ. In this respect, it is important to note that Waltz’s understanding of rational behaviour implies that the state will always strive towards ensuring its own survival in an anarchic system. State leaders are thus determined as their decisions are defined exclusively on the basis of structural pressures (Jackson and Sørensen, 2010: 75-76).

**Balance of power**

States can strive to ensure their preservation either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances) in relation to other states capacities. Waltz also introduced the distinction between bandwagoning and balancing, where the former refers to a state joining a greater state, while the latter refers to a state joining other states to balance against the great state. Changes in the international system do thus depend upon the structure and composition of the great states, and more precisely upon the relative capacity of the state.

**The neorealist notion of stability**

Stability is, according to Waltz, best enhanced through bipolarity:” With only two great powers, both can be expected to act to maintain the system” (Waltz, 1979: 204). In fact, this system implies the preservation of these states. Waltz mentions three reasons for why bipolarity is the best structure for enhancing stability. Firstly, there are less great-power conflicts than in a multipolar structure. Secondly, since there are only two great powers, deterrence will be easier to uphold, and finally, there is less risk of miscalculation in a system where only two powers reign (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010: 76).

By stability, Waltz refers to a situation where anarchy is momentarily tamed, but he does not offer a more specific account of the concept of stability. It is possible, however, to identify an implicit understanding of stability. Waltz consistently ranks stability and
peace alongside the mere absence of war: “The chances of peace arise if states can achieve their most important ends without using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains” (Waltz, 2003: 3). This is also indicated in the way Waltz refers to the previous half century of so-called nuclear peace, implying merely the absence of nuclear war (Waltz, 1995: 93). When exploring the question of nuclear weapons and deterrence, Waltz is preoccupied with the ability of (nuclear) states to discourage other states from attacking and thus with the ability of nuclear deterrence to create or enhance stability and peace (Waltz, 2003: 4). Finally, as Waltz recognizes the decline of bipolarity in the international system, he argues that nuclear weapons – and the deterrent effect they entail – “[…] restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are replaced by multipolar ones” (Waltz, 2003: 14). Nuclear deterrence thus becomes the new source of stability replacing bipolarity.

3.2 Nuclear Deterrence Theory

It is important to understand the main notions of this theory, as it is essential for answering the research question. Thus, the theory is central (a) as a framework for evaluating whether or not India and Pakistan are fulfilling the requirements for nuclear deterrence as they are put forward by Waltz, and (b) for understanding and critically assessing the neorealist notion of stability in relation to the India-Pakistan conflict.

The notion of nuclear deterrence rests upon several neorealist assumptions, most significantly upon the assumption that states strive towards ensuring their own survival and security: “deterrent policies derive from structural theory, which emphasizes that the units of an international-political system must tend to their own security as best they can” (Waltz, 1995: 112). Thus, according to Waltz the logic of deterrence is highly derived from structural realism.

The optimist vs. pessimist debate regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons is based upon the different perceptions of the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. The pessimists, notably Sagan, argue that state rationality, unity and security are not matters of course. If this is not the case, the prerequisites for deterrence will not
be fulfilled, which will undermine the purpose of nuclear weapons and possibly lead to nuclear war. Waltz and the optimists, on the other hand, argue that states, no matter their shape and form, can see the danger posed by nuclear weapons and the importance of keeping their use hypothetical. Therefore, even a totalitarian regime will be restrained from using nuclear weapons.

3.2.1 Theory of deterrence

Deterrence is essentially the ability to make someone abstain from action by threat of retaliation. This has been developed into theories of deterrence. The basic assumption is that: Actor (A), fearing an attack from actor (B) seeks to alter (B)'s plans by threatening retaliation that in scope nullifies (B)'s potential gains (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298). There are however some prerequisites for this to function. Indeed, B has to be aware of (either know or believe in) A's will and capacity to retaliate. If B does not receive the threat nor believe in the retaliatory intentions of A, deterrence has failed. Kenneth Waltz (2003) additionally notes three prerequisites that necessarily have to be fulfilled for nuclear deterrence to be in effect. Firstly, a state must develop, not only the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the other side, but also a sufficient degree of “second-strike” survivability so that its nuclear forces have the possibility to retaliate if attacked. If a state cannot survive a nuclear attack, and does not have the means to inflict a retaliatory strike, there is no deterrence, because there is nothing that prevents the attacking state from striking, as the state is not prone to experience any punitive retaliation. Secondly, Waltz states that, “survival of forces must not require early firing in response to what may be false alarms.” (Waltz, 2003: 20). In other words, a state and its forces must not be prone to firing its retaliatory nuclear weapons on the basis of an unconfirmed attack, as this might lead to an unintended nuclear war. Finally, there must be an effective nuclear command and control system, as the nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use (Waltz, 2003: 20). With an efficient command and control, the risks of theft and misuse of the nuclear weapons decline. Waltz thereby recognizes that this as an important requisite for effective deterrence. Ironically, no one knows when deterrence works, only when it does not. (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298)
During and after the Second World War the US perceived their nuclear weapons as a mere extension of their conventional capabilities, preferably as shock weapons deployed early in a war. But as the USSR obtained nuclear weapons the US could no longer rely on their nuclear weapons as a trump, and the purpose of these weapons had to be reconsidered. (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298-299)

Originally, the fact that both countries had the ability to strike civilian targets with nuclear weapons and the awareness of the terrible consequences seemed sufficient to maintain peace, as Churchill figuratively put it: “‘by a process of sublime irony ... safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation’” (Churchill in Brown & Arnold, 2010: 298).

This notion was, however, challenged by Thomas Schelling, who advocated for the importance of a second-strike capability:

“There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side has the capacity to obliterate the other, and one in which both sides have the capacity no matter who strikes first. It is not the ‘balance’ – the sheer equality or symmetry in the situation – that constitutes ‘mutual deterrence’; it is the stability of the balance” (Schelling in Brown & Arnold, 2010: 19).

Hereby, he introduced the notion that states will only abstain from aggression when their offensive capabilities are insufficient in avoiding retaliation. Currently, Schelling’s assumption is one of the fundamental notions upon which nuclear doctrines are built. During the cold war enormous efforts were made to guarantee that a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons would survive a first strike and be ready for a retaliatory strike. As mentioned earlier, the US and the USSR agreed, in the SALT treaty, to limit the stocks to a minimal nuclear weapons defence in order to assure mutual vulnerability and thus deterrence (as advocated by the MAD- doctrine). Out of fear that a first strike would destroy a large amount of their nuclear weapons arsenal and that they would hereby lose the ability to retaliate sufficiently, both states did, during the Cold War, amass enough nuclear weapons to obliterate each other. Under the MAD doctrine the notion of what
was a bearable amount of damage was, according to McNamara, defined as 25 percent of the population and 50 percent of the industry (Britannica-A).

This notion was, however, dismissed by Mac George Bundy, who stated that:

“Think-tank analysts can set levels of ‘acceptable’ damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real political leaders […] a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.” (Bundy in Brown & Arnold, 2010:300)

Following this he therefore advocated “minimum deterrence”, whereby states should possess only enough nuclear weapons required to strike a few cities as he believed this would be sufficiently deterring. Since the cold war, there has been a shift towards minimum deterrence among nuclear weapons states. (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 148)

3.3 Neoclassical Realism

Considering the theoretical framework developed above, some difficulties to conform the neorealist framework to current constraints appear. The fact that neorealism emerged in a specific historical context conditions the spectre covered by the theory. Waltzian realism perceives structural pressures as ultimately determinative for state behaviour and does thereby exclude domestic political conditions from the analysis. Neoclassical realism can be seen as an attempt to offer an alternative perspective, as realism and neorealism neglect to theorize the state. Indeed, what if a second-strike capability is not assured due to lack of organisation framework within the country? What if the staff, due to uncertainty, accidentally launch on a false alarm? And, finally, what if a state, due to disagreements, is not capable of assuring a proper control and command system?

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7 MacGeorge Bundy was National Security adviser during President J. F. Kennedy and President L.B. Johnson.
States are, according to neorealists, different insofar as their capabilities differ, but they act similarly when confronted by threat, as they will strive for self-preservation. Criticism has been expressed and shared by scholars within and outside the Neorealist School, which has led to the development of for example constructivism and democratic peace theory. This has resulted in recent accounts that tend to widen the scope of analysis to include domestic factors. Neoclassical realism is inspired by early classical realist perceptions, somewhat offering a middle-way between liberal institutionalism and Realpolitik. Neoclassical realism may be closer to classical realism than neorealism, except in what concerns the methodological approach, which is, like within neorealism, deductive. Nonetheless, neoclassical realism differs from neorealism by adopting a qualitative and not a quantitative approach (Lobell et al., 2009: 20).

In 1998, Gideon Rose coined the term neoclassical realism in a review published in World Politics. Rose does here explain the similarities, but does also mark the limits of the realist heritage:

“Neoclassical realism argues that the scope of ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perception and state structure.” (Rose in Lobell et al., 2009: 5)

A certain hierarchy does also persist within neoclassical realism, as preponderance is given to structural factors. Structural variables are thus still primary, but nuanced: “[…] international imperatives [are] filtered through the medium of state structure” (Lobell et al. 2009: 3).

International political outcome mirrors the actual distribution of power among states, but the policies pursued are rarely rational or objective. Moreover, neoclassical realists agree on the condition of anarchy, but regard anarchy as a permissive condition rather than an independent causal force. The extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the
degree of state autonomy from society and the degree of social cohesion are all factors that intervene between leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies these actors pursue.

Domestic factors, such as the nature of the political system, reveal the complex relationship between systemic and unit-level variables “Unit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states-great powers as well as lesser states- to respond to systemic imperatives.” (Lobell et al., 2009; 4)

In fact, according to neoclassical realists, the constraints upon the state are not exclusively external, but are also embedded within the state.

4 Nuclear Capabilities of India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan are bitter rivals and nuclear weapon states. Since they have so far not engaged in a nuclear war, one might be prone to state that they are deterred by each other’s nuclear capabilities. Is it a coincidence that none of the states has initiated a nuclear war or are they in fact deterred? In order to explore this question, we will firstly outline the general characteristics of India and Pakistan as nuclear states, and thereafter analyse if India and Pakistan fulfil the three requirements developed by Waltz.

4.1. Becoming Nuclear Weapon States

India’s nuclear program dates back to the late 1950s and was initially developed for civilian purposes and thus with peaceful intentions. However, when China tested its nuclear device in 1964, only two years after India had been soundly defeated by China in the Sino-Indian war, New Delhi decided, despite advice from the international society, to launch its own nuclear weapons program. Besides from the obvious motive of rising up to the Chinese threat, there were several other reasons for India to flex its muscles. In 1962 Pakistan and China formed an “anti-status-quo” alliance against India and were thus strategic allies. Given India’s history of wars with both countries, the state may have aimed at proving that it was able to stand up to the threat from its neighbours. Moreover, it is argued that India chose the nuclear-path because it wanted to assert its power status on the global stage (Khan, 2009: 77-80).
Pakistan instigated a secret nuclear weapons program in 1972, immediately after the end of the 1971 Bangladesh-war between India and Pakistan. Allegedly Pakistan initiated this program partly because it perceived the need to deter India with nuclear weapons, and partly due to its inferior position with regards to conventional forces and arms. Hereafter, the covert arms race between the two countries began and when India tested its nuclear device in 1974, Islamabad urgently advanced its nuclear program (Kerr and Nikitin, 2010: 2).

Even though both India and Pakistan began developing their programs at an early stage, it was not until 1998, when both countries conducted nuclear tests, that they; “[…] both came out of the closet and declared their nuclear status to the world.” (Khan, 2009: 78). The tests evoked strong condemnation from the international society and economic sanctions were imposed on both states. However, this did not seem to trouble the two rivals and the development of the nuclear programmes proceeded. The sanctions on Pakistan were lifted in 2001 after the 9/11 terror-attacks, since the US needed Pakistan in its so-called “war on terror”. In order to avoid resentment and accusations of one-sidedness, sanctions on India were lifted as well (BBC, A). Today, the Indian nuclear stockpile is estimated to include 60-80 warheads, of which only around 50 are fully operational (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 76). The means of delivery is assured through Aircraft, Land-based and Sea-based Missiles. It is difficult to estimate how many nuclear weapons Pakistan has produced and deployed, but it has been estimated to be approximately 70-90 warheads (Norris and Kristensen, 2009: 82). Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can be delivered in three ways, with Aircraft, Ballistic Missiles or Cruise Missiles (See Appendix for detailed information).

4.2 Second-Strike Survivability and Capability

The first of Waltz’s requirements will be developed in the following section. In order to assess whether India and Pakistan fulfil Waltz’s requirement of “second-strike” survivability, which assures effective deterrence, an analysis of the nuclear doctrines and strategies of India and Pakistan will be undertaken.
India declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998, but it was not until five years later, in January 2003, that a nuclear doctrine was formalized. The contemporary nuclear doctrine is based upon a framework drafted in 1999 by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)\(^8\) (Roy-Chaudhury, 2009: 406).

Within the doctrine, the nuclear weapons are a defensive asset only to be used as a response to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on Indian Territory or its military force. The doctrine does thus promote deterrence. Thereby, the nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of No First Use, which indicates that India will not be the first to launch a nuclear strike, but will only respond with retaliation should deterrence fail (Pant 2005). As a result of this, the notion of Credible Minimum Deterrence was implemented in Indian nuclear policy. Generally, this is a rather unclear concept as no explicit definition to what this entails is offered. However, Credible Minimum Deterrence encompasses that if India is hit by a nuclear strike, it has ensured the means to initiate a nuclear retaliation. In other words, India asserts that it has the credibility and capability to strike back.

Survivability has further been increased, as the Indian launchers are road- and rail mobile. India has the Dhanush missile, which is a sea-based deterrent, and has furthermore recently launched a nuclear submarine, which is difficult to target (Norris and Kristensen, 2010: 76). Moreover, India is procuring aircraft carriers and missile defence systems. Based on the abovementioned factors, it is fair to state that India promotes the capability of second-strike, which corresponds with Waltz’ first requirement of effective nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear weapons are a vital and strategic asset to Pakistan, as they are regarded as the ultimate guarantee for the security and survival of the Pakistani state. Pakistan has since Independence always conceived itself as inferior to India in terms of conventional arms, and has used nuclear weapons to equalize the power asymmetry with India. Pakistan does not have a formal nuclear doctrine (Kazi, 2007). Nonetheless, based on various

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\(^8\) This draft outlined the fundamental principles for the development, deployment and employment of India’s nuclear forces between 1998 and 2003, but was as the name implies, just a draft. In other words, there was no official strategy during five years on how India’s nuclear weapons should be used. It was first after international pressure and in the aftermath of Operation Parakram that India created its official nuclear weapons policy in 2003. In relation to this, a formal nuclear command structure was presented.
Pakistani statements from its strategic community, it is possible to outline some of its nuclear strategies. Pakistan has adopted the notion of minimum nuclear deterrence, implying that even though using a limited amount of resources, Islamabad has the means to assure destruction should this be required. This is for instance indicated by former Foreign Minister Abdul Satter who stated:

“Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build-up will necessitate review and reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of our deterrent, Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capability.” (Satter in Zeb, 2006: 390)

Pakistan, contrary to India, does not have a No First Use policy. They have not ruled out a First Use of nuclear weapons policy, as the main priority of Pakistani nuclear weapons originally was to offset India’s superior conventional military (Zeb, 2006:394). Pakistan has refused to consider a No First Use agreement with India, and India has, in return, declined a Non-aggression agreement with Pakistan (Kazi, 2007). General Khalid Kidwai, head of the Strategic Plans Division in charge of nuclear operations in Pakistan, has stated that Islamabad will use its nuclear weapons in a first strike should Pakistan lose a large part of its territory or its military forces, be economically strangulated, or be destabilized domestically. It is interesting to assess how nuclear weapons can be used in a military context as well as a political. Not only has Pakistan been using nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, as a tool against conventional and nuclear weapons, they have also used it as an instrument that allows offensive low intensity conflicts (Snyder, 1965). We will return to this in Chapter 5.

Pakistan has primarily developed a first strike capability, but is aware of the necessity of being able to strike back, and is thus currently implementing second-strike capabilities (Current Affairs, 2009). Indeed, according to a US congressional report, Pakistan has “[…] built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war” and “It also has built road-mobile missiles, air defences around strategic sites, and concealment measures” (ibid.).
Therefore, we can state that even though India is more advanced in terms of second-strike capabilities than Pakistan, both countries have the means to initiate a nuclear retaliation. Thus they both meet Waltz´ first requirement for effective deterrence as both countries should be deterred by each other’s second strike capabilities.

4.3 False Alarms and Early Firing

In accordance with Waltz´ second requirement, retaliatory strike forces should not be prone to or reliant on early firing, if the projected attack turns out to be a false alarm. Firstly, to our knowledge, neither India nor Pakistan have been inclined to early firing and it is therefore impossible to assess whether or not they fulfil the second requirement for effective nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the requirement is difficult to investigate, as it relates to procedures nuclear forces are to follow should they believe they are under nuclear attack – procedures that are not official. Moreover, the weapon components of India have been dispersed throughout the country (Pant, 2005: 286). This separation of operating units from their weaponry, and the storage of the nuclear weapons themselves in dormant status, means that it takes time to assemble the nuclear weapons. Thus, according to Pant:

"Since the weapons are not configured and mated to the delivery platforms, they are in a state of de-alert. The time to bring together these components and launch a second strike is reported to be few hours. This gives sufficient time for Indian leaders to verify and confirm the first strike before launching a counter strike” (ibid.).

In regards to Pakistan, a Congressional Service Report states that "Pakistan's nuclear weapons are reportedly stored unassembled, with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives” (Kerr and Nikitin 2008:6) and "These components are stored separately from delivery vehicle” (ibid.) Furthermore, a recently published Harvard report states that Pakistan’s "[…] nuclear weapons are believed to be stored in disassembled form, with the components stored in separate buildings.” (Bunn, 2010: 29)
Therefore, it can be argued that Pakistan, as well as India, has implemented policies aiming towards preventing false alarms and ameliorate early firing. This has been termed “force-in-being” by Ashley Tellis (Tellis, 2001: 372).

Furthermore, if we take point of departure in Waltz, states act rationally. A state would thus not risk firing its nuclear weapons if it is not sure that it is under attack. Should the perceived attack turn out to be a false alarm, it would not be rational for the state to “retaliate” as this would threaten the state’s survival.

On the other hand, if the main focus for states is survival, they will not risk their sovereignty for anything. As an incoming strike might render the state defenceless, it might conclude that a launch on warning protocol might be risky in terms of doubtful first strike capability (towards the perceived aggressor), but it is nonetheless better than sitting back and doing nothing.

“A former head of the US National Security Agency, General William Odom, characterized the choice facing a US president under or after a nuclear attack as ‘releasing 70–80 percent of our nuclear megatonnage in one orgasmic whump, or just sitting there and saying: “Don’t do anything, and we will just take the incoming blow.”’” (Brown & Arnold, 2010: 302)

This, however, could also be considered irrational, as an incoming attack equals a failure in deterrence, and launching one's own nuclear weapons would only cause more horror and grief with no apparent goal.

4.4 Nuclear Command and Control System

The third and final requirement for effective nuclear deterrence is a proper command and control system. In the Indian case, the nuclear arsenal is, with the formalization of the 2003 doctrine, placed under the control of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) (Roy-Chaudhury, 2009:409). The NCA’s Political Council is headed by the Prime Minister, while the Executive Council is led by the National Security Advisor. The Prime Minister is the only person who can authorize the launch of missiles, while the
national security advisors' role is to assist and ensure that the political councils’ orders are carried out. The operational arm of the NCA is the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) of India, who controls the nuclear warheads and delivery systems (Pant, 2005: 280). As mentioned, the different nuclear components have been de-mated and spread throughout the country. This separation of the warhead from the delivery vehicle indicates that India decreases the risk of mischievous or accidental detonation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, from a Waltzian perspective, it can be argued that India has an effective Nuclear Command and Control system.

The Pakistan command and control system is based on a three-tier structure. The National Command Authority (NCA) is the highest decision-making authority in the nuclear command and control system, which includes both the president and the Prime Minister (Bremmer and Kuusisto, 2008: 10). The NCA is responsible for formulating policies and deploying its strategic nuclear forces. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) acts as the permanent secretariat for the NCA and assists in implementing NCA decisions. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) manages the operational control of the nuclear weapons and its delivery systems, which among others include a 10,000 strong guard that is assigned to protect its nuclear weapons sites (ibid.). Islamabad argues that their nuclear weapons are safely stored, and as Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of SPD, states:

“We have institutionalized the structures [overseeing the nuclear arsenal] and introduced modern technology so there are sufficient firewalls, safety, and security built into the chain of command, as well as into the weapons and weapon producing facilities.” (Norris and Kristensen, 2009:85).

Assessing Pakistan’s doctrines, it should thus be taken into account that the weapons are stored unassembled and that nuclear cores have been separated from the rest of the weapon (force-in-being) (ibid.). We can on this background state that the mechanisms for security should be in place. Thus, Pakistan has a Command and Control that is effective (Jaspal in Zeb 2006:389-390), and therefore meets Waltz’s third requirement in what is needed for effective deterrence. However, we cannot conclude that theft of
nuclear weapons will not occur, as it is difficult to conclude whether Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are prone to accidents or unauthorized use.

4.5 Sub Conclusion

We have now assessed Waltz’s three requirements for effective deterrence between India and Pakistan. In regards to survivability of their nuclear arsenals, both meet this requirement as they have clearly stated that their nuclear weapons should be able to perform a retaliatory strike. Furthermore, India and Pakistan are procuring various delivery vehicles, such as nuclear submarines, which enhance second-strike capability. The second requirement, no early firing as a result of false alarm, is difficult to test empirically, as it is nearly impossible to find out the reactions of soldiers who believe they are under nuclear attack. However, by the fact that weapon components are separated from fissile cores, time is given for commanders to react appropriately, which reduces the risk of being subjected to false alarms. With regards to the third requirement, India has an effective command and control system with regards to the notion of force-in-being. As components take time to be assembled, unauthorized use or accidents are not likely to occur. Even though there are insurgent elements that might disrupt the Pakistani nuclear security in the future, it seems that currently, Pakistan, as well as India, is not prone to immediate theft and accidents of its nuclear weapons. Through their doctrines and statements, both countries believe in retaliatory action. Therefore, it is possible to conclude, through Waltz’ framework, that both countries are deterred by each other, and thus that deterrence is in effect.

5. Nuclear Deterrence and the Kargil and Twin Peak Crises

This chapter will give insight in the two major crises between India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2001-2002 respectively. The aim of this chapter is to explain the extent of the crises and thereafter discuss this in relation to the chosen theories. The importance of the two crises is expressed through the fact that they arguably can be seen as signs of
instability and could therefore be perceived as an anomaly of nuclear deterrence as explained in earlier chapters.

Firstly, a brief introduction of the two crises will be undertaken, followed by a theoretical analysis of the crises. Any shortcomings of the theories and concepts will be sought remedied by drawing in additional theories and concepts.

5.1 The Kargil Crisis in 1999

The Kargil crisis, also known as the Kargil War,9 was a military confrontation between Pakistan and India in the Kargil region of Kashmir. The aggressor was Pakistan who during February 1999 sent troops, in civilian clothing, across the Indian Line Of Control (LoC). The operation was the brainchild of General Musharraf and aimed at occupying several strategic ridges, points and Indian military posts in Kashmir. These had routinely been left unoccupied during the winter, as the harsh Kashmir winter rendered them near inhospitable (Dittmer, 2005: 130). The Pakistani forces were a mix of regular soldiers and militants, and were supposed to appear simply as Kashmir insurgents. Pakistan sought, among other things, to gain an edge in the Lahore talks10 that were being held simultaneously, by performing a fait accompli which Islamabad could use to negotiate from a “position of strength”, and gain international focus on the Kashmir issue, an issue that India refused to discuss (Hagerty, 2009: 103, Basrur, 2008: 59). It should be noted that Sharif later claimed that he had not been fully informed on the operation by the military command. We will return to this in Chapter 6.

Although the military feat of occupying these positions was quite extraordinary (several position were situated at +5.000 meters height), the Pakistani forces were not capable of withstanding the intense military counter-offensive by India, which consisted of up to 30.000 soldiers supported by heavy artillery and fighter jets. The Indian forces were

9 Unfortunately, the definition of war is vague, and the Kargil crisis has been rather randomly referred to as both crisis and war. In this paper, we will refer to Kargil as a crisis. This is because we want to distinguish the Kargil crisis, which was an asymmetric war/limited war, from the large-scale conventional wars, 1948, 1965 and 1971, cf. the clarification of concepts.

10 The Lahore talks were based upon the need for confidence building measures, in regards to exchanging information on nuclear and ballistic missiles tests etc. (Dittmer, 2005: 44)
opposed by a mixed force of approximately 5,000 Pakistani regulars and irregulars, where of 4/5 were mainly occupied with logistics (Hagerty, 2009: 101).

Moreover, although the Pakistanis occupied the ridges and thus had a tactical advantage, the Indian forces met them head on, and did not, as might have been more tactically sound, cross the LoC elsewhere and cut off the Pakistan positions. The Indian forces hereby got into fierce close combat, and probably suffered far more casualties, but the conflict was still kept “low”\(^\text{11}\). After heavy fighting, the Indian troops managed to expel the intruders from most of their positions. Roughly six months after the infiltration, the Pakistani forces had withdrawn to their LoC and *status quo ante bellum* appeared.

The Pakistani withdrawal was to a large degree a result of heavy US pressure and lack of Chinese support (and even condemnation) of Pakistan's incursion. As the aim of the operation, among others, was to bring international focus on the Kashmir issue (in Pakistan’s favour), the operation turned out to be rather embarrassing. Only after the US helped Sharif maintain a modicum of dignity, was he willing to call back the “Mujahedeen” fighters. (Kumar, 2008: 69) It should be noted that Musharraf, at the moment Chief of Army Staff, later complained, claiming that there was no reason to withdraw the forces, and criticised Sharif for giving in to early, an issue we will get back to in the next chapter on civil-military relations (Joeck, 2009: 126, Kumar, 2008: 72, Dittmer, 2005: 144-146). It should be noted that by the time Sharif called back the troops, the Indian forces had already gained the upper hand and by July the 14\(^\text{th}\) the fighting had essentially ceased (globalsecurity.org A). Estimates as to the losses suffered by both sides vary significantly, but according to Ganguly and Hagerty in Kumar (2008) roughly 1700 Indian soldiers and 800 Pakistanis perished.

5.2 Waltz and Deterrence on Kargil

The Kargil crisis was a relatively intensive conflict between two nuclear states, both in terms of troops involved and casualties suffered. The scale of the conflict is particularly significant with regards to the deterring role of nuclear weapons. The presupposition of nuclear deterrence theory, that nuclear weapon states fearing escalation will abstain

\(^{11}\) Because the intruders were not officially backed by Pakistan, India could not justify attacking on Pakistani soil, as that would be an unprovoked aggression, even though there was little doubt that Pakistan was behind the intrusion.
from open conflict seems seriously challenged by the Kargil Crisis. As clarified in the previous chapter, the prerequisites for nuclear deterrence were in place and Pakistan ought to have been deterred from instigating the conflict. But the severity of nuclear weapons might ironically be their Achilles heel, as the sheer consequences of using nuclear weapons renders them near unusable. In fact, only a substantial threat might justify their use.

5.3 The Stability-Instability Paradox

The issue was addressed already in the fifties, among others by B. H. Liddell Hart, who questioned the extent to which nuclear weapons would provide stability. But the first time it was specifically addressed was in 1965 by Glenn Snyder, in his paper: *The Balance Of Power And The Balance Of Terror*. These concepts would later become known as the Stability-Instability Paradox (Onwards known as SISP)

SISP is an offspring of nuclear deterrence theory and therefore also situated within the basic framework of realism. It assumes complete rationality, an anarchic world order and self-interested states. (Kumar, 2008: 54-55). The basic assumption in SISP is that two competing states possessing nuclear weapons and second strike capability will not be completely deterred from action towards the other, as the reason for the conflict remains unsolved despite the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Due to the fact that both states are rational actors, as assumed in realism, no state will use their nuclear weapons since a retaliatory strike would be devastating, whereby the possible gains are offset by the losses. As a consequence, the threshold for “going nuclear” is high, and a rational actor will thus not use his nuclear weapons unless in dire trouble. This is what ensures stability in the relation between the contenders.

The main argument of the stability/instability paradox is that this high threshold could be exploited to conduct warfare on a smaller scale, as it is not enough to justify nuclear retaliation:

“Because the defender cannot meaningfully threaten massive retaliation in the event of local transgressions by the aggressor, the latter’s inducement
to undertake such transgressions is greatly increased” (Brodie 1965, in Kumar, 2008: 53).

and:

“Lowering the probability that a conventional war will escalate to a nuclear war-along preemptive and other lines - reduces the danger of starting a conventional war; thus, this low likelihood of escalation-referred to here as 'stability'- makes conventional war less dangerous, and possibly, as a result more likely” (Chari 2003 in Kumar, 2008: 53-54).

The sub-nuclear actions could, among other things, be proxy wars or limited wars. These actions therefore create instability at the lower levels, while the stability on a higher level is maintained. Neorealist John Mearsheimer declared that “It is possible that nuclear-armed great powers might conclude that it could fight a conventional war against a nuclear-armed rival without the war turning nuclear” (Basrur, 2008: 115). This would thus justify the state’s search for ever-expanding conventional capabilities.

5.4 Stability-Instability Paradox and Kargil

“Consequently, it can be argued that the applicability of the stability/instability paradox is very obvious in the analysis of the Kargil war. In fact, no other theory can explain Kargil, better.” (Kumar, 2008: 72)

The Stability-Instability Paradox was, according to Kumar (2008), the main reason why Pakistan instigated the infiltration across the LoC. The Pakistani military command was confident that the country’s nuclear arsenal would provide an umbrella under which Pakistan could wage low intensity conflicts e.g. proxy-wars in Kashmir, without risking nuclear war with India (Ahmed, 2005, 143, Pant, 2008: 75): “The Indians cannot afford to extend the war to other areas in Kashmir, leave aside launching an attack across international boundaries 'because of the' risks of nuclear conflagration” (Senior Pakistan official in Ahmed, 2005: 145)

The Stability-Instability Paradox is evident in the way both parts severely restricted themselves and their actions. As mentioned earlier, the Indian forces attacked the
Pakistanis head on, and restricted their actions to the sector occupied by the Pakistani forces, whereby they were not able to bring their numerical superiority to full effect. Pakistan, clearly aware of their disadvantage, both numerically and in terms of support, did not reinforce their troops and thus kept the conflict at a low level. India did, however, mobilize large amounts of troops and ships, but importantly, did not include them in the conflict, and did therefore not escalate the conflict further.

Although the Indian air force was very active with air-strikes on Pakistani positions (something Musharraf considered out of proportion to the conflict (Joeck, 2009: 133)), they were strictly confined to the Indian side of the LoC, even though there were several tempting targets such as supply camps, roads etc. on the other side of the LoC. Similarly, the Pakistani air-force was kept out of the conflict, leaving their soldiers unprotected and at the mercy of the Indian Air force. Again, this is a clear example of the SISP, as both countries were cautious of anything that might escalate the conflict, and thereby crossing their respective nuclear threshold.

It should here be noted, however, that nuclear pessimists like Neil Joeck (2009) disregard the role of deterrence in the conflict. Joeck does instead explaining the responses and restrains by the actors as a contest of brinkmanship. Joeck claims that New Delhi was ready to escalate the conflict in spite of the presence of nuclear weapons. By mobilising more troops and material than Pakistan, India tried to give an impression of no-tolerance, and hereby cancelled Pakistan’s hopes of a fait accompli. Joeck is, indeed, rather sceptical towards the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the Kargil conflict, and would rather explain the conflict as a contest of brinkmanship (Joeck, 2009: 137-138).

But SISP can also explain why Pakistan insurgents appeared in Indian controlled Kashmir in the first place: “It is not a simple coincidence that insurgency exploded in Kashmir in 1989, at almost the same time that Pakistan also acquired nuclear capability.” (Kumar, 2008: 60). Some argue, that the nuclear shield provided Pakistan

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12 The term diplomatic brinkmanship implies that two states, usually nuclear weapon states, up the ante (go to the brink) in the hope that the opponent, fearing that events will spin out of control, will withdraw or make concessions (McLean & McMillan, 2009: 53).
with the leeway to support the insurgency in Kashmir. In fact, *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, an official Indian review of the crisis noted that the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan provided the umbrella under which insurgents could be supported: "Otherwise, it is inconceivable that it could [have] sustain[ed] its proxy war against India, inflicting thousands of casualties, without being unduly concerned about India’s “conventional superiority”" *(The Kargil Review Committee Report* cited in Basrur, 2008: 59).

5.5 Sub-conclusion

The Kargil Crisis is noticeable as it was an armed conflict between two nuclear states. As the purpose of the nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India is to deter rivals from hostile action, it is interesting that Pakistan conducted an armed incursion on Indian Territory. By including Glenn Snyder's Stability-Instability Paradox, an alternative understanding for the incursion is offered. By exploiting the possibility for action underneath the nuclear threshold, Pakistan was capable of pursuing its military and political goals in spite of India's nuclear weapons. This furthermore shows that although nuclear deterrence might be in place, the origins of the rivalry have not been solved, and the states are therefore still pursuing the gains perceived to be within reach. But it can plausibly be stated that nuclear deterrence, although creating the leeway for Pakistan to launch the incursion, has simultaneously restrained the two states from escalating the conflict. However, it is impossible to predict how the situation unfolded, had the states not possessed nuclear weapons.

The ability of nuclear deterrence to ensure stability was questioned again two years later during the Twin Peak crisis.

5.5.1 The Twin Peak Crisis

During ten months, from December 2001 to October 2002, South Asia saw one of its largest military mobilizations. These tense months are commonly known as the Twin peak crisis, referring to two incidents during the period that threatened to throw two
nuclear states into a full-fledged war. The Twin Peak Crisis is also known as Operation Parakram, the name for the Indian mobilization that followed the first 'peak'.

India has been subjected to several terrorist attacks during the last two decades. Especially Islamic jihadists have been active, and more so after the 1999 Kargil war. On the 13th December 2001, a small group of militants armed with explosives and small arms attacked the Indian parliament. The target was the Indian legislation, including the Prime Minister. Although the attack failed and the perpetrators were killed in an intense firefight with security forces before they managed to reach the parliament\textsuperscript{13}, the symbolic value was huge, and public outrage was enormous. New Delhi quickly associated the militants to two terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, and blamed Islamabad for sponsoring the groups (Nayak & Krepon, 2006:15). Indian leaders were forced to act, and orders were issued for a full mobilization along the Indian-Pakistan border: the Operation Parakram. The mobilization consisted of 500,000 soldiers and three armoured divisions positioned along the border, and the air force and navy being put on full alert. Although denying any involvement in the terrorist attack, Islamabad responded in kind and positioned 3-400,000 soldiers along the border (globalsecurity.org, B.) The US was at the time occupied with an offensive in the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan, and on a US request a large amount of Pakistani troops were stationed at the border to intercept any Taliban or Al-Qaeda members who tried to escape from Afghanistan. The US was thus quite dismayed when Islamabad ordered the troops to the Indian border. As a result, the US immediately tried to calm the two rivals down, most likely also due to the fear of an eventual war turning nuclear.

In the days that followed the attack, India handed over a list of demands to Pakistan, including a requirement to immediately stop militants from crossing the border, to clear out terrorist groups based in Pakistan and to hand over 20 named terrorists. In January 2002 president Musharraf held a speech, wherein he outlawed several terrorist groups, including those responsible for the December 13 attack, but refused to hand any

\textsuperscript{13} Fortunately, an electricity black-out resulted in a meeting being postponed, and there were thus few ministers in the vicinity. Furthermore, the terrorists crashed their car, and their cover was therefore blown, leading to a gunfight.
suspected terrorist over to India. Moreover, he restated Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. The speech lowered tensions, but India refused to de-mobilize until they saw clear evidence of cross border infiltration being over. In the months that followed, however, militants continued to cross the border, and when terrorists struck again in May 2002, the tensions flared once again.

The second peak during the standoff occurred when terrorists, dressed as Indian soldiers, attacked a camp housing family members of Indian soldiers positioned at the border. Both countries were thus once again brought to the brink of war, as India mobilized another 200,000 soldiers at the border. Pakistan did, in response, test several nuclear capable missiles and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the use of nuclear weapons (Raghavan, 2009: 251-252). Subsequently, the Indian prime minister stated that: “The time has come for a decisive battle.” (Singh quoted in Raghavan, 2009:251). But, according to the Indian Army Chief they had at this time, despite the numerical superiority lost the military edge in the standoff (Raghavan, 2009: 251).

In June 2002, the US Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage, publicly announced that Musharraf had, in a private meeting, reaffirmed his commitment to permanently stop cross-border infiltration\textsuperscript{14}. According to a US official, this announcement gave India the excuse it needed to pull back from a war it did not want (Nayak & Krepon, 2006: 37). Although the situation was stable at the end of June, the Indian troops did not stand down until October 2002.

\textbf{5.5.2 The Twin Peak Crisis and Deterrence}

Although the Twin Peak Crisis did not come to blows it was arguably closer to escalation than the Kargil crisis two years earlier. The sheer number of soldiers facing each other would have left India little space for action before crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. In fact, one must assume that India knew that a mobilization of approximately 500,000 soldiers along the border would leave few steps untrodden on

\textsuperscript{14}Musharraf had not the same definition of publicly announcing as the Americans and Indians, and was not pleased with them doing so as there was no mentioning of resuming talks on Kashmir, which Armitage and Musharraf had spoken about (Nayak & Krepon, 2006: 36).
the escalation ladder. As the terrorists attacks were not enough to warrant a nuclear war, it can be assumed that India was confident that the mobilization would not lead to all-out war or that it could keep any armed struggle below the Pakistani nuclear threshold.

It is not clear how far India was in fact ready to go when mobilizing (Ragahvan, 2006: 244-247). In the days following the parliament attack, the political leadership of India met with the military high command to discuss the actions to be taken against Pakistan and the terrorists. The army chiefs argued that the army was not in position (being in peacetime locations) to perform a sub-conventional war, consisting of air strikes and special forces operations targeting terrorist training camps on Pakistani soil – something they were not too fond of in the first place (Raghavan, 2009, 245). Instead the army advocated a full-scale mobilization of the army to get it in positions for future operations:

“The army chief, General S. Padmanabhan, subsequently observed that limited strikes would have been ‘totally futile’: ‘if you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.’” (Raghavan 2009: 245).

The army did not necessarily seek an all-out war with Pakistan, as the army maintained that it could capture portions of Pakistani territory and limit, i.e. destroy parts of, Pakistan's military capacity without crossing the nuclear threshold “we do not envision striking in a way that would lead them to use their nuclear weapons” (Indian official in Raghavan, 2009: 246).

The mobilization, whether with a war in mind or not, may seem intriguing as Pakistan's nuclear weapons ought to deter any hostile action, but, according to Raghavan:

“Indians, we may recall, held that the presence of nuclear weapons did not negate their conventional superiority against Pakistan, but merely made it imperative to avoid endangering Pakistan’s vital security interests. From the Indian decision-makers’ perspective, the military balance weighed in their favour as long as
certain limits were not crossed. In consequence, their threats would seem credible to Pakistan” (Raghavan, 2006: 246).

Furthermore it seemed that India envisaged Pakistan as more deterred by India's nuclear weapons than India by Pakistan’s. Indeed, according to the Indian defence minister George Fernandes: “Pakistan can’t think of using nuclear weapons … We could take a strike, survive and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the nuclear issue would figure in a conflict.” (Raghavan, 2006: 246). Navy chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, shared this perspective: “It would be lunacy for them [Pakistan] to start one [nuclear war].” 15 (Raghavan, 2006: 246).

It is tempting to conclude that Pakistan failed in ensuring that their nuclear capability was strong and/or credible. If it was a common perception among the Indian political and military leadership that Pakistan was not a serious nuclear threat it could explain why India ‘dared' to conduct such a massive build up.

US Secretary of state Colin Powell partly noted this lacking credibility. During a phone call with President Musharraf he said:

“‘All this chatter about nuclear weapons is very interesting, but let’s talk general-to-general. You know and I know that you can’t possibly use nuclear weapons….It’s really an existential weapon that [sic] not been used since 1945. So stop scaring everyone.”’ (Powell quoted in Nayak & Krepon, 2006:32).

However, several scholars have questioned whether the mobilization was in fact thought through. In “Operation Parakram: the war unfinished” Sood and Sawhney compares Operation Parakram to a “knee jerk reaction” and claims it was a reaction to domestic pressure to do something “equally spectacular” (Swami, 2009: 153).

15 It deserves being mentioned that by downplaying India’s fright of Pakistan’s capabilities, they solidified their own (at least outwardly) determination to enforce their rhetoric with action.
Focusing on the sheer scale of the mobilisation, an interesting aspect comes into play. Considering that India prepared for a war of such a scale that it would require almost all of Pakistan's conventional force to withstand (a feat that would even then be difficult for Pakistan), Pakistan might quickly have felt cornered and compelled towards using their nuclear weapons. India’s “jump” up the escalation ladder might either have been an ill-considered notion of acting decisively and resolutely, or actually is precisely what India aimed at. By leaving little or no room for the conflict to escalate further (a variation of Nixon's Mad-man theory\textsuperscript{16}, if you will) the international community, mainly the US, would hopefully feel compelled to intervene on India's part. Furthermore, recognising that India, aware of the proximity to Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, continued its preparation for war, Pakistan would be in no doubt of India's resolve. That was, at least, what India hoped for. However, India's attempt at coercing Pakistan failed, as Pakistan resolutely counter-mobilized and refused to bow down. It thus turned out to be a textbook example of brinkmanship. That the mobilization was an attempt at brinkmanship is reinforced as both states, in spite of the massive build-up, showed considerable restraint during the standoff. It is noticeable that none of them placed their troops in “offensive positions”, but kept them in defensive positions.\textsuperscript{17}

5.5.3 Sub-Conclusion

India has arguably become a victim of its own designs. When India went overtly nuclear in 1998 Pakistan followed suit. Unfortunately India has since then been incapable of bringing its conventional superiority to bear, as this to a large extent has been countered by Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This was exemplified in the 2001-2002 standoff, when India, in spite of its conventional superiority, was deterred from launching any offensives against conventionally inferior Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, has on several occasions instigated limited and proxy wars with India, and has been protected from any major retaliation by its nuclear capability. Thus: “While the acquisition of a

\textsuperscript{16}”[…] Nixon, called the Madman Theory, or "the principle of the threat of excessive force." Nixon was convinced that his power would be enhanced if his opponents thought he might use excessive force, even nuclear force. That, coupled with his reputation for ruthlessness, he believed, would suggest that he was dangerously unpredictable.” (nuclearfiles.org)

\textsuperscript{17} An Indian commander was even disciplined when his troops strayed too close to the border (Basrur, 2008:63 Raghavan 2009: 249)
nuclear deterrent has freed Pakistan's hand in the use of force against India, it is simultaneously placed severe constraints on the use of force by India to counter Pakistan” (Sahni, 2007: 194). Additionally, it is important to note the propensity of the combatants to repeatedly restrain themselves whenever there was a crisis.

It can thus with reasonable certainty be concluded that the SiSP has come to its fullest in the case of India and Pakistan. Although enhancing stability on the higher levels, manifested in the absence of large-scale conventional wars, nuclear deterrence has created instability at the lower levels of the conflict, and has among other things caused leeway for the 1999 Pakistan intrusion and the 2001-2002 Parakram crisis.

6 The Influence of Domestic Actors

Having analysed the significance of the Kargil and Parakram crises for the stability created by nuclear deterrence, we will now turn to the influence of domestic actors on the conflict. As indicated in the previous chapter, domestic actors, in the form of militant groups, were able to seriously threaten the stability in the region on the lower levels. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant disagreement between the Pakistani civil leadership and the military apparatus on how to approach the conflict. This chapter therefore seeks to go in depth with the role and influence of these two domestic actors (the militant groups and the military) and their affect on the stability between India and Pakistan, and thus ultimately on the stability of nuclear deterrence.

6.1 The Neoclassical Realist Approach

From what has been presented so far, it is evident that neoclassical realists, in contrast to neorealists, emphasize the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy making of states. However, it is yet to be specified exactly which domestic actors can be influential and under what circumstances. Neoclassical realist Norrin M. Ripsman puts forward several criteria that domestic actors must fulfill in order to gain influence in policy making.

In his assessment of which actors may be able to gain influence Ripsman distinguishes between democratic and non-democratic states, and he claims that the influence of domestic actors will differ depending on this determinant.
6.2 Is Pakistan Democratic?

Formally, Pakistan is a democratic state with a democratically elected Prime Minister and a parliament consisting of a Senate and a National Assembly (Government of Pakistan). In 2008 the Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) won the majority of the votes in the elections and Yusuf Raza Gilani was appointed head of the coalition government. In September the same year Ali Asif Zardari won an overwhelming majority of the votes in the Parliament and was thereby elected President. Zardari was elected shortly after he, together with Gilani, had threatened former President Musharraf with a charge of impeachment, which was the major cause for Musharraf’s resignation. To sum up, this could indicate that Pakistan is heading towards democracy. However, according to Philip Oldenburg, author of the book “India, Pakistan and Democracy – solving the puzzle of divergent paths” this label is not easily given. In fact, he argues that Pakistan is not democratic: “It [democracy] has only been restored as a façade for military bureaucratic rule for brief periods since then [Independence], including the present” (Oldenburg, 2010: 1). Others support this claim, describing the Pakistani system as “military-bureaucratic authoritarianism” (Jalal, 1995: 249). Indeed, as we will elaborate below there is a rather uneven distribution of power between the military establishment and the democratically elected leaders. Consequently, the military is granted a disproportional amount of power. If democracy implies fulfilling two criteria, free elections and separation of powers: “that no other power (such as the military) can veto decisions made by elected rulers “(Oldenburg, 2010: 4) then Pakistan can hardly be called a democracy as it has difficulties living up to the latter. Nonetheless, the question of whether Pakistan is a democracy or not is controversial. As it is not the main aim to explore this issue here, it suffices to conclude that there are indicators pointing towards the fact that Pakistan may not yet be democratic, only two years after the military regime resigned.

6.3 Ripsman and the Significance of Domestic Actors

In line with neoclassical realism’s notion of the power seeking individual, Ripsman argues that the primary aim of individuals comprising the executive is merely to sustain and enhance their own individual power status or position in a hierarchical order. Only after this aim is ensured the focus will be turned towards the preferred policy agenda of
the executive (Ripsman, 2009: 181). It is thus, first and foremost, those domestic actors who are able to ensure the power of the policy-makers that are most likely to be influential in shaping policy decisions. First of all, Ripsman asserts that a domestic actor must be in a position to either reward or punish the policy-makers if they do not comply with the given domestic actor’s demands. In a non-democratic state this implies that the domestic actor must be able to “[…] preserve the leader’s position or topple him/her” (Ripsman, 2009: 181). Secondly, Ripsman claims that policy-makers, due to their craving for power, will be prone to accommodate the demands of domestic groups “that have the capability to lead a coup or organize revolt against the regime” (Ripsman, 2009: 183). Ripsman mentions the military as such a domestic actor. In extension to this, Ripsman argues that a heavily charged public sentiment that could result in uncontrollable public unrest is also a factor that can influence the policy choices of the executive. Thus, if internal unrest is high and if it directly threatens the power position of the policy-maker, the executive will seek to minimize hostilities by accommodating public demands (Ripsman, 2009: 183).

Even though personal power may be of primary concern the political agenda is still of significance. Thus, if a domestic actor is relatively powerful it might be able to obstruct the agenda of the executive. In Ripsman’s words such actors (e.g. the military) can “[…] manipulate their power to obstruct to extract policy concessions” (Ripsman, 2009: 185). Finally, domestic actors may gain substantial influence if they are successful in shaping the national interest. As will be elaborated upon below this last point, however, is, according to Ripsman, rarely plausible.

Moreover, Ripsman focuses on the notion of autonomy. The level of autonomy of the executive is determined by its isolation from the legislature or, in a non-democratic state, its isolation from societal elites and institutions. Put differently, an executive is autonomous if it is capable of enforcing decisions without being strained to incorporate demands from domestic groups. He argues that domestic actors will have relatively low influence in a state with a highly autonomous national-security policy executive. Domestic actor’s influence is thus to a high degree determined by the level of executive autonomy (Ripsman, 2009: 190).
To sum up on Ripsman’s argumentation, domestic actors are most likely to be influential in policy making if they are (a) powerful enough to topple the executive, (b) able to reward the policy-makers if these choose to listen to the articulated demands or (c) successful in shaping the national interest and obstruct the agenda of the executive for the benefit of their own agenda.

6.4 Military Influence on Pakistani Foreign Policy

Pakistan has been under military control during a major part of its history. In fact the country has been subjected to military rule three times since 1947 – from 1958-1971, again from 1977-1988 and finally from 1999-2008. Pakistan is often characterized as a politically fragile country due to its history of military coups and recurrent declarations of martial law (Born et al, 2010: 223). After the resignation of Musharraf in 2008, Pakistan was again subjected to civil leadership and is now, as mentioned above, ruled by Ali Asif Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Notwithstanding this shift towards increased civil control, the military continues to be influential in policymaking, especially in decisions concerning nuclear-, foreign-, and national security policy (Cheema, 2010: 207; and Rashid, 2010). The military’s influence in these areas is, for example, evident in the composition of the National Command Authority (NCA), first put forward by Musharraf in 2000. The NCA is “comprised of both military and civilian representatives tasked with managing and coordinating nuclear weapon development, use and C4I” (Cheema, 2010: 203). At the time of Musharraf’s presentation of the NCA, there was widespread reluctance from the part of the Parliament to accept the civil-military structure of the NCA, as this would grant the military increased control over Pakistan’s nuclear forces and strategy. Today, however, the NCA is a formalized body (Cheema, 2010: 223). The influence of the military will be further elaborated below.

According to documents leaked by Wikileaks Zardari fears a military coup and has appointed a successor in the case of his assassination. In fact he “has made extensive preparations in case of his own assassination” (NDTV, 2010). Furthermore, Musharraf has recently stated, that Pakistan is currently facing the prospect of yet another military coup. He argues that Zardari has been unable to respond efficiently to escalating

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18 Command, control, communications, computerization and intelligence network (Born et al, 2010: 200)
extremist militant activities and a disintegrating economy (Dawn.com, 2010). Cf. a newly leaked US cable, Zardari himself does in fact admit that the Pakistani government is loosing the fight against the Taliban: “I’m sorry to say this but we are not winning [the war against the Taliban]”, Zardari is reported to have written (NDTV, 2010).

Thus, judging from the history of military coups and the prospects of yet another coup on the Zardari government, it would seem as though the military consistently poses a threat to the existing regime. Applying Ripsman’s frame of reference, this may be the reason why the state leadership grants the military a rather substantial influence in important policy areas. Also, as we might recall, Ripsman asserts that domestic actors will be able to gain greater influence if they are capable of either rewarding or punishing policy-makers. The numerous coups conducted by the military can be seen as such punishment as it has been argued that the military has been eager to control Pakistani politics because it has found the civil leadership inadequate in dealing with questions of national security and the (conventional and nuclear) threat posed by India (Britannica, B).

Before assessing the different ways in which the military has influenced foreign policy decisions, it can be beneficial to further explore how this organization operates and its preferences. This will have consequences for how it influences foreign policy and more specifically the conflict with India.

6.5 The Military's Link to Militants in Kashmir

It is important to stress that there are different fractions of militants or jihadist groups operating in Pakistan and that these different groups have different agendas and relations to the military. The Taliban militants who are vehemently opposed to the governments “pro-American” agenda, often engage in violent clashes with the military and have planned and committed numerous suicide attacks on government and military goals. Moreover, when the Taliban took over the Swat valley in 2008 and imposed Sharia law, the military launched a large offensive to regain control of the valley. The militants in Kashmir, on the other hand, have so far refrained from turning against the military and the government. Contrary to the Taliban, these militant groups are heavily
dependent upon the support, or at least tolerance, of the military (Oldenburg, 2010: 208).

There are several indicators that point towards a connection between the military and the militants in Kashmir, both in the past and presently. When Musharraf seized power soon after the Kargil crisis, jihadi violence in Jammu and Kashmir increased dramatically (Swami, 2009: 148). In a recent interview Musharraf admitted that Pakistan, during his time in government, did in fact train militants to fight against India (Spiegel online, 2010). Additionally, during his time, the military leadership had close ties with militants such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and “[…] backed the group as a surrogate force against India” (Perlez, 2009). The link between the Pakistani military and the militants is further enhanced by the testimony of David Coleman Headley19, a Pakistani-American who earlier this year admitted being influential in planning the 26/11 Mumbai bombings in 2008. But more interestingly, Headley admitted that he had shared information on possible terror-targets within India, not only with the Lashkar-e-Taiba but also with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI operates directly under the military as its director-general is appointed by the Chief of Army Staff. Even though it is formally answerable to the Prime Minister, the ISI is by and large controlled by the military (Cohen et al., 2010). Thus, Headley’s statement provides a direct link between militant organisations and the Pakistani military (represented by the ISI). However, the extent of current military support for militants is a highly disputed question and difficult to either prove or refute. Nonetheless, with the history of the military-militant ties in mind, the possibility that the military is in fact still connected to organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba seems plausible. As previously established, the military is highly influential in Pakistani policy making. If the militants, on the other hand, are conceived as an autonomous domestic group, they do not have any direct influence on the shaping of policy decisions. However, if they are conceived as being attached to the military, they may exert influence indirectly by aiming to promote a certain political agenda nationally. Ultimately, the primary goal for militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba is the defeat of India in Kashmir (BBC, B). As we will now

19 Headley’s story is one of the most recent developments in the investigation of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
explore further, this goal seems to have been implemented in the military preference of maintaining focus on the conflict with India.

6.6 Conflicting Preferences

With regards to differing preferences between the military and the civil leadership, Scott Sagan argues that military preferences are not an expression of the national interest but do rather reflect organisational biases:

“[...] professional military organizations- because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests-display organisational behaviours that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war.” (Sagan, 1995: 48).

Indeed, military leaders will act according to a sort of bounded rationality deriving from their organizational standpoint and thus possibly make foreign policy decisions that are irrational, as they do not include broader considerations relating to the national interest. Military actors will tend to “[...] focus on their narrow set of responsibilities, which limits their perspective and often produces very narrow definitions of success and victory” (Sagan, 1995: 125). With this claim Sagan crosses swords with Waltz who, as described above, completely dismisses the notion that state behavior in the international system is in any way determined by domestic matters, such as biases of the leaders and organizational affiliations (Sagan, 1995: 51).

6.6.1 Military preferences

Following Sagan’s logic, the military will seek to maximize its own utility and thus fulfill its own interests in order to preserve its prerogatives as far as possible. This implies that the military will seek to accumulate the largest possible share of the budget and stock of resources, e.g. weapons and staff (Sagan, 2003: 64). In Pakistan, defence spending has increased from $5.13bn to $6.41bn – an increase of $1.28bn from the previous budget. According to Pakistani Journalist Ahmed Rashid, this augmentation occurred at the expense of the government’s budget “for development, education and health” (Rashid, 2010). Furthermore, the military has recently presented a “wish-list” to the US asking for i.e. “helicopter gunships and drone technology” (Haider, 2010).
Supporting Sagan’s view of the military, Husain Haqqani, director of Boston University's Center for International Relations states:

“The military wants to continue not only to spend on better equipment but for more privileges for itself. So if you go to Pakistan, the best neighborhoods are the military neighborhoods. They're called defense housing estates. Nowhere else in the world does the military get involved in large-scale business as the Pakistani military has” (NPR, 2007).

But, as stated above military interests can also be expressed in more indirect ways. The military primarily continues to prioritize the alleged security problem posed by India (Rashid, 2009). According to Stephen Cohen, scholar in India-Pakistani security issues, the Pakistani military continues to “see things through an India-tinted lens” (Cohen et al, 2009), which has the consequence that all security issues seem to be connected to India in one way or another. It can be argued that this tenacious focus on India serves the parochial interests of the military as the insistence on such an enemy-image gives legitimacy to continued military influence on foreign- and security policy. In this respect, Sagan argues that the military will often “be biased towards offensive operations, to resist civilian interference in professional matters” (Rajagopalan, 2007: 274).

Additionally, India might be representing a sort of wounded pride for the military, as it was more or less due to Indian endeavor that Pakistan was cut in half in the 1971 Bangladesh war, which completely undermined Pakistani military efforts to hinder the secession (Cohen et al. 2009). Similarly, the repeated clashes on the Siachen glacier in the 1980’s also manifested the inferiority of the Pakistani military to India, as India finally managed to acquire control of the glacier in spite of several Pakistani attempts to do the same and to defeat the Indian forces (Basrur, 2008: 50). These examples indicate that the Pakistani military may be holding on to the notion of the Indian threat due to Pakistan’s history of defeat to India and more specifically due to the history of the Pakistani military’s inferiority to the Indian military. As was the case with Kargil in 1999 this history has made the military want to seek revenge. It can be argued that
maintaining an image of India as the accumulation of all evil may help to legitimize aggression such as the infiltration of Kargil.

In the cases where the military supports militant groups, these can be seen as merely an extension of the military and thus serving the interests of this. The enduring resistance of militant groups in Kashmir goes well in line with the military’s aim of maintaining focus on the conflict and thus maintaining the picture of an unremitting enemy. I.e. the involvement of the ISI in the 2008 Mumbai bombings and its ties to the militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba during this event underlines the bias towards maintaining a relatively tough line with India on the Kashmir issue. Applying Ripsman’s logic, the military’s high degree of influence on Pakistani politics could be explained by its attempts to define the national interest as the maintenance of an offensive stance against India, perceiving this as the largest threat to Pakistan’s integrity and survival.

6.6.2 Preferences of the civilian leadership

The civil leadership, on the other hand, seems to be adopting a more pro-western approach as current President Ali Asif Zardari often proclaims his commitment to fight Pakistani based militants and generally claims that he wants a more peaceful relationship with India. His commitment to this is widely supported by the US that sees Pakistan as its ally in the fight against terrorism (Sciutto, 2009). In 2008, he took a drastic turn away from former government’s customary discourse as he referred to the militants operating in Kashmir as “terrorists” and not “freedom-fighters” as they have previously been labelled. Moreover, he banned the Jama’at ut Dawa, an organization that has been accused of having close ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba (Loudon, 2008).

Although Zardari often states that the top priority of his government is the socio-economic development of the country (Daily Times, 2010) it would be misleading to conclude that Zardari is unambiguously aiming towards this end. He has, on several occasions, been accused of not doing enough to relief the millions of victims of the floods earlier this year. The international society has been reluctant to send relief-aid to Pakistan due to allegations of comprehensive corruption within the government. In fact:
“The government has declined to carry out a cabinet reshuffle, root out corruption, set up civilian task forces to carry out flood relief or create transparent mechanisms for dispersing Pakistani and Western aid for the floods despite overwhelming public demand.” (Rashid, 2010).

Regardless of Zardari’s true intentions it is clear that what he (officially) expresses as being the top priority for Pakistan differs significantly from the aims of the military. Having elucidated the conflicting preferences, it is now interesting to assess in which way the consequences of the influence from domestic actors has affected the conflict between India and Pakistan.

6.7 The Consequences of Military Influence for Indo-Pak Relations

Firstly, as mentioned above, the military continues to portray India as Pakistan ultimate archenemy. This stance is conflicting to President Zardari’s who, probably due to the pressure from the international society, emphasises targeting terrorist organisations operating from within the country. Noting that the military has been connected to organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, they express no will of prioritizing this over the conflict with India:

“It [the military] dictates the government's foreign and national security policy, and has stymied attempts by the civilian government to […] clamp down on the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the most powerful militant group in the country that allegedly carried out the Mumbai attacks of 2008 in which 174 people were killed.” (Rashid, 2010).

The unwillingness of the military to deal firmly with militant organisations can also be perceived as an indirect support for these. Terrorist attacks carried out on Indian soil or in Indian held Kashmir has previously been perceived as giving rise to crises such as Parakram in 2001-02 and has thus created tensions and cold air between the adversaries. Moreover, in 2008, shortly before the bombings “The Home Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad and agreed to begin cooperating against terrorism and to
bring the Federal Bureau of Investigations of Pakistan and the Central Bureau of Investigation of India in close contact to that end.” (Nawaz, 2008). However, the attacks on the parliament in New Delhi completely impeded the peace process and did thus once again cause tensions and regression.

The internal disagreements within Pakistan seem to have the consequence that the country is not acting unitarily in decisions on foreign policy. According to Sagan, the government leaders are “[...] intending to behave rationally, yet sees their beliefs, the options available to them, and the final implementation of their decisions as being influenced by powerful forces within the country” (Sagan, 2003: 50-51). It is obvious that there is more than one centre of power and that the different centres have equally different agendas. The lack of unity and the consequences of this for foreign policy decisions were, as outlined above, evident in the decisions Pakistan made during the Kargil crisis. The crisis displayed a situation in which the military and the civil leadership held markedly different views as to how to approach the situation (Cf. Chapter 5). Additionally, prior to the crisis in 1998, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee signed the Lahore-agreement – a peace agreement that pledged them to “‘intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir’” (BBC, C). However, when Pakistani troops infiltrated Kargil in 1999, the Lahore agreements were cancelled. Musharraf, who at that time was Chief of Army Staff, was the architect behind this infiltration, which according to Sharif himself took place without his knowledge and consent (Dittmer, 2005: 242). Not only does this example display differing opinions on how to approach the conflict with India, it also shows the consequences on stability that the military influence has had.

As mentioned above, the militant groups have not directly been able to exert influence on foreign policy making, but they have had an indirect impact through the ties to the military. However, as we will now develop, Pakistani militants may, quite paradoxically, have had a substantial influence on Indian foreign policy as terrorist attacks committed by e.g. the LeT have several times resulted in New Delhi taking action against Pakistan. In this respect, it is worth noticing that India has conceived terrorist attacks as an
expression of Pakistani aggression and not as aggression from independent domestic groups. Thus, India asserts that Pakistan has acted unitarily and that the attacks by the LeT are merely expressions of state behaviour.

Indeed, terror attacks carried out by Pakistani militants have dramatically determined the course of Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan. In 2001, for example, the attempted terror attack on the Indian parliament created a public outrage and a sentiment by Pakistan of wanting revenge on India. Thus, the government was under substantial pressure and one of the reasons for the extensive mobilization of forces under the operation Parakram was the need to accommodate this pressure. As expressed by Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh, Operation Parakram was an attempt to “contain the national mood of ‘teach Pak[istan] a lesson’” (Raghavan, 2009: 247). Similarly, following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India did in fact contemplate significant retaliation, but ultimately abstained from this due to the risk of conflict escalation into nuclear war (Narang, 2010).

Moreover, the impact of the Pakistani terrorist organisations (and thus indirectly or directly the Pakistani military) on Indian foreign policy making is clear when considering India’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine. Although still in the making, it allows the military to respond immediately to Pakistani provocations, and was largely the result of the inability of the Indian army to respond to the 2001 Parliament attack (Karnad, 2007: 93-94).

"[The doctrine] envisions prepositioning holding [sic] and armored units closer to the international border to enable surprise offensives against Pakistan from a 'cold start.' The aim is to reduce Indian mobilization times to enable the Indian military to rapidly achieve limited objectives below Pakistan's nuclear threshold and before international pressure forces Indian offensives to halt.” (Narang, 2010)
This necessity for swift action does not only deny the Pakistani leadership time to act, but also takes decision-making out of the hands of the Indian civil leadership. Hereby calm and cautious political statesmanship is circumvented. The control of escalation is as a result placed in the hands of the military on both sides, organisations that, according to Sagan, have a tendency to pursue limited tactical goals and not overall strategic ends. This could prove to be rather dangerous (Narang, 2010). If the Indian military had responded immediately to the 2001 attempted terrorist attacks in New Delhi there is no saying as to how the conflict would have evolved. The relatively long response time allowed the Indian leadership to assess the seriousness of this rather critical situation and instigate in diplomacy and statesmanship (Raghavan, 2009: 251).

To sum up, it is clear that militant groups have had a huge influence on the course of events in the conflict, both during military and civil leadership. Furthermore, in the times of civil rule the military has been highly influential in foreign policy decisions.

6.8 The Importance of the International Factors for the Conflict

While acknowledging the influence domestic actors could exercise, structural international determinates should not be disregarded. In fact, in order to express all nuances of the neoclassical realist enterprise (their theorising of structural and domestic factors), an example will be offered to show how international pressures could, together with domestic factors, interplay in influencing foreign policy. The example of 2001 will be used, as the international pressure upon Pakistan was particularly noticeable at the moment.

Ripsman has developed a framework for understanding when the international pressure is of importance. Ripsman states that when the state is subjected to a high-threat environment internationally, it will be confronted with essential security issues and consequently neglect domestic actors: “when the margin of error is minimal, the

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20 The military leaders would most likely pressure the civil leadership for action stressing the importance of swift action that”could allow military logic to outpace political deliberation. ” (Narang, 2010)

21 Ripsman does not explicitly define a high-threat environment, but does oppose it to a low-threat environment. Understanding Ripsman’s theoretical framework (primacy to structural factors) one could deduce that by threat, he implies that the survival of the state is threatened.
national security executive will have powerful incentives to ignore domestic political interest and formulate security policy with the overriding goal of securing the state” (Ripsman, 2009: 188). Thus, when international pressure is high, domestic issues will, by necessity, be disregarded. He does on the other hand argue that during a low-threat environment, domestic actors tend to be more important. Furthermore, Ripsman nuances, adding that under specific circumstances of internal turbulence that could threaten the position of the executive as such, domestic factors could in fact compete with international pressures for influencing foreign-policy: “when public sentiment is so completely charged and leaders fear a revolution or widespread unrest, leaders may change or tailor their policies to public preferences” (Ripsman, 2009: 183). Thus, even in a situation of high-threat, domestic factors could influence state behaviour.

In Pakistan, a rupture came in 2001 after the terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington DC, and the parliament in New Delhi, as international pressure was immediately put on Musharraf to end the violence of the terror-organisations operating in the eastern and western part of the country22. Consequently, Musharraf dramatically changed his policies regarding militancy in Kashmir and Pakistani Talibans. The pressure was mainly channelled through the US who proclaimed that al-Qaeda was located under the protection of the Afghan Taliban government, which in turn had connections to the Pakistani Taliban. The US exercised pressure on Pakistan through the articulation of the “war against terror”, the “with us or against us” discourse, and more generally through the increasing attention to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist groups in Pakistan (Oldenburg, 2010; 165).

The US president George Bush and Musharraf did in 2001 initiate a transnational relationship, where the latter complied with the demands of defeating terrorists announced by the former. In fact, Musharraf, faced with the prospect of seriously upsetting the US and the risk of being imposed further sanctions, promised to take a tough line with terrorists and stated that Pakistan would “not allow its soil to be used by terrorists” (Swami in Ganguly and Kapur, 2009: 162). Indeed, “Pakistan announced

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22 As has been developed earlier, the militants in the eastern and western part should be distinguished. Nonetheless, some argue that they are connected: “Given that many of the Islamist terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir were intimately linked to al-Qaeda, the United States may have welcomed Indian coercive pressure for Musharraf to act against them” (Swami, 2009:154)
that it would join the global coalition against terrorism and offered immediate tangible aid to include military bases” (Collins, 2008; 6). Moreover, the reason for the Pakistani willingness to conform to the US demands of confrontation with terrorism could be explained by Pakistan’s need for resources and political support in its contest with India (Collins, 2008: 2). Pakistan made agreements with the US concerning military and intelligence support, allowing the US to establish facilities and provide military personnel. Furthermore, the US was granted access to military bases (Collins, 2008; 7).

Pakistan has traditionally been an ally of the United States. But, interestingly, during the period before 9/11, the relation between Pakistan and the US had been estranged due to several imposed sanctions on Pakistan, mainly caused by the country’s development of a nuclear program. These sanctions lead to increasing economic debt and vulnerability of Pakistan, who previously had depended upon US economic generosity (Oldenburg, 2010: 165).

The relation did, however, ameliorate when the sanctions were lifted in 2002, as Pakistan expressed willingness to cooperate. In fact, Pakistan profited economically by the upheaval of the sanctions “Musharraf’s 2001 U-turn solved Pakistan’s immediate economic problems” (Oldenburg, 2010; 165) Moreover, since Musharraf complied with US demands in 2001, the US has continued to support Pakistan economically and militarily: “Over the past ten years, Washington has spent almost six billion dollars on the FATA, 96 percent of them on military activity, and just 1 percent on development”(Gregory in Cohen et al., 2010).

Thus, the dramatic change in policy by Musharraf with the adoption of a rather harsh line towards terrorism within the country could imply that Pakistan was subjected to international pressure and a high-threat environment, mainly from the US.

Recalling Ripsman’s theory, which implies that in circumstances of high-threat, domestic actors should matter less, this is confirmed in the Pakistani example. Indeed,

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23 Indeed, the US had previously supported the Pakistani military during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where Pakistan had been the main ally to contain Soviet expansion (Collins, 2008; 2). Some argue that this influence was constant “Whether it is the military in office or some form of electoral democracy, Pakistan has always been a client state of the US, except possibly in the period of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto”(Oldenburg, 2010; 164).
Pakistan did conform to international pressures by neglecting, limiting and openly defeating domestic actors, and thus diminishing their influence by acknowledging the structural international pressure.

Nonetheless, other empirical data indicate that the international pressure was not the only force at play. In fact, controversy reigns over the extent to which Musharraf actually complied with international demands. Indeed, many agree on a more modest account of President Musharraf’s willingness to support the US agenda. Firstly, some claim that the flow of militants into Kashmir did not decrease in the following years, which could indicate that the engagement of Musharraf was weak. In an interview with the Washington Post in 2002, officers from the Pakistani military even stated that: “support for insurgents fighting in Kashmir remained central to Pakistan’s strategy” (Basrur, 2008: 62). Secondly, Musharraf may have done little to reduce their activities: “While Pakistan did indeed arrest several senior members of terrorist groups operating against India, their infrastructure remained untouched” (Kapur, 2009; 151) Bush pronounced his dissatisfaction in 2002, referring to Musharraf: “We and other are making it clear to him that he must live up to his word” (Swami, 2009; 152).

Musharraf’s reticence can be explained by domestic instabilities. Musharraf’s promise to the US did in fact create outrage among several of the militant groups within the country and resulted in direct attempts on his life (Swami in Ganguly and Kapur, 2009: 155). Thus, even though the military government under Musharraf did initially support organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) as a weapon in the conflict with India, when Musharraf (officially) changed his politics, it soon became evident that these organisations who “had backed his rise to power, and his nation’s superpower patron” (Swami, 2009: 154) had a will of their own and had no intentions of blindly obeying government orders. It is difficult to evaluate if what Ripsman refers to as a charged public sentiment was at play or not, but it is clear that internal disagreements could have inhibited Musharraf from responding whole-heartedly to the international pressure.

\[24\] As has been developed, the relation between the military and militancy is diffuse in Pakistan. Moreover, the anti American movement in the country is strong, which could have inhibited Musharraf: “Pakistanis are more anti-American than almost any people in the world” (Oldenburg: 2010; 163).
Some note that Pakistan is, on the basis of these complex pressures “[…] a vulnerable ally in the war on terror” (Ganguly, 2009:151), and Musharraf has even been described as “[…] walking a tightrope as he has sought to balance demands from the US to crack down on extremism in Pakistan and the demands from an increasingly vocal and anti-American constituency.” (BBC, D)

Thus, a complex picture appears. Ripsman offers a framework for understanding the limits of structural as well as domestic pressures, which is clearly reflected in the example above. It is clear that no factor can be taken into account independently. Indeed, Musharraf’s decisions may have emerged from a complex set of international pressure, and could partly have been conditioned by the domestic pressure. Recalling one of the main notions of neoclassical realism this example is particularly fruitful for understanding the interaction between structural and domestic factors: “[…] international imperatives [are] filtered through the medium of state structure” (Lobell, et al, 2009: 3).

6.9 Sub-conclusion

The Pakistani military has been influential within important domains such as nuclear-, security-, and foreign policy. Ripsman argues that the amount of influence is, among other factors, determined by the domestic actor’s capability to threaten the very foundation of the government executive. This seems to have been the case in Pakistan as the military several times has shown its capability to topple the government and is currently threatening the Zardari government. Moreover, the question of whether militant groups, mainly in Kashmir, are connected to the military is crucial, as this implies an indirect influence by the militants. The connection can nonetheless not be established with certainty, but as explored above, several indicators point in that direction.

In the India-Pakistan conflict it seems that the conflicting preferences, such as the disagreement on whether or not to maintain focus on India as the primary concern for the state, have had substantial consequences. E.g. in 1999 the disagreements resulted in an abrupt end to the Lahore peace talks between India and Pakistan, due to Musharraf’s initiation of the infiltration in Kargil that, allegedly, took place without the complete
knowledge of former Prime Minister Sharif. The influence of militant groups (and thus perhaps also the military) on the course of events was evident in 2008 when the 26/11 Mumbai attacks put an end to the tentative peace talks.

Finally, within the frame of neoclassical realism, the impact of international structural pressures on domestic influence in policy decisions has been explored. As is evident from the situation after 2001 and Musharraf’s reluctance to respond whole-heartedly to the pressure from the US, it seems fair to conclude that domestic actors continue to be relevant, even though they may in a high threat environment, at least officially, be tamed by the executive.

7 Conclusion

To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict?

Recalling the logical structure of the paper, we here wish to reconcile the three analyses and offer a coherent synthesis of the results in relation to the research question. In order to gather the threads it is beneficial to shortly reflect upon the main results of the three analyses.

Firstly, the aim with the thesis was to explore if there is nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, based upon Waltz three requirements. After having undertaken this analysis, we can conclude that Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear deterrence are in fact fulfilled in both countries. Thus, from a neorealist perspective, is it then possible to deduce that stability reigns between India and Pakistan as a result of nuclear deterrence? Taking a point of departure in neorealist assumptions and nuclear deterrence theory, there is indeed stability between India and Pakistan, as no major war has taken place between the countries, and more importantly, nuclear war has been avoided. Nuclear deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural level.

Acknowledging the limited scope of neorealism, as this perception solely can be used
for evaluating stability on the higher levels, the SISP and theories that include domestic factors have been applied in the two antitheses to gain additional insights.

The SISP reveals inconsistencies in the Waltzian understanding of stability, as major conflicts have taken place between India and Pakistan, namely the Kargil Crisis in 1999 and the Twin Peaks crisis in 2001-2. Can it, based upon this, be concluded that nuclear deterrence has not enhanced stability between India and Pakistan?

First of all, from the analysis above one could deduce that nuclear deterrence has allowed the two adversaries, especially Pakistan, to initiate crises as they have been sheltered by their nuclear deterrence capabilities. Thus, from this point of view it could be concluded that nuclear deterrence has, in fact, *not* enhanced in the conflict on the lower levels.

That said, even during crisis it is possible to identify a certain sense of cautiousness from both sides, which is likely to depict the relative effectiveness of nuclear deterrence to ensure the absence of large-scale war. Thus, the ability of deterrence to create some sense of stability should not be dismissed. Nuclear deterrence has thus enhanced stability to the extent of limiting the scale of, but not preventing, conventional war. As mentioned, the SISP does not offer an opposition to neorealism nor does it reject the main notions of nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, the SISP underlines the fact that nuclear deterrence should not be perceived naively as assuring complete stability, but as a means of limiting the extent to which wars can threaten stability.

By applying the neoclassical realist framework for understanding stability, interesting factors have appeared. After having explored the “gap underneath” nuclear deterrence, the instability of the conflict has emerged as a certainty. From the analysis of the influence of domestic actors, such as the military and militant groups, it is evident that they are capable of influencing policy-decisions.

However, the fact that the military – and through them the militant groups – is highly influential is not necessarily a problem in itself. It does, however, become problematic if this actor does not share the preferences and goals of the political leadership. This is important because the state will, in this case, not act unitarily. In this respect it is
interesting to note that throughout the conflict India has perceived Pakistan as a unitary actor. When Pakistani militants have carried out attacks on India, the Indian government has responded with aggression towards the state of Pakistan as a whole, and not directly towards the militant groups. Whether or not Pakistan has in fact acted unitarily is difficult to assess. The 2001 attacks on the Parliament could arguably be viewed as an aggression from a unitary Pakistan as the connection between the Musharraf government and the militants during this period has been established. In 2008, on the other hand, it seems that Pakistan did not act unitarily and that the Mumbai bombings depict the differing preferences of the military and the Zardari government respectively. In this case, the lack of unity in Pakistan resulted in an abolition of the peace-talks and an enhancement of the hostile environment between the two adversaries. Furthermore, recalling the ability of militant groups, whether military-backed or not, to put an end to several rounds of peace dialogues between India and Pakistan and their role as a catalyst for India to initiate the Twin peaks crises, it is evident that domestic actors have been capable of influencing the stability of the conflict. Additionally, it is worth noticing that although the adversaries were ultimately deterred from taking the crisis to the next level, the Twin Peaks crisis was frighteningly close to escalation. Furthermore, the development of the “Cold Start” doctrine by India indicates a future in which the violent acts of militant groups may have disastrous ramifications as the doctrine allows a faster escalation of a crisis than has been the case so far. Thus, domestic actors have not only been capable of upsetting stability, they have in fact been influential enough to seriously challenge the deterring effect created by nuclear weapons.

Thus, in similarity to the first antithesis it is possible to conclude that the scope of nuclear deterrence is limited to the higher levels of stability and, more importantly, that it does not prevent domestic actors from disrupting stability primarily on the lower levels.

However, in regards to this, it is necessary to reflect upon the question of whether it has ever been the aim of nuclear deterrence to create stability on the lower levels. The neorealist understanding of stability as absence of war does not exclude the possibility of low-level conflict. Indeed, in the neorealist understanding, the prevention of large-scale war is the closest we will ever get to stability and peace. Moreover, the neorealist
framework does simply not include domestic actors because it does not believe that domestic factors can cause substantial threats to the efficiency of nuclear deterrence. The “level-of-analysis” problem is hereby evident to its full extent.

Taking all the indicators of instability into account, one might ask: has nuclear deterrence really enhanced stability? The answer to this question is less straightforward than it might appear. Firstly, the efficiency of nuclear weapons to prevent all-out war is difficult to assess and it is impossible to properly evaluate the effects of nuclear deterrence on stability. Indeed, the influence of nuclear deterrence cannot be separated from other possible influences upon the conflict between India and Pakistan and can thus not be explored isolated. Secondly, it is impossible to evaluate how the conflict would have evolved, had India and Pakistan not acquired nuclear weapons. Finally, as mentioned earlier, it is not possible to say when nuclear deterrence works, only when it does not.

Moreover, it has been interesting to assess the years since 1998, when both states tested their nuclear weapons. At the time of the acquisition there was a widespread positive (and somewhat romanticised) sentiment towards the ability of these weapons to settle the protracted dispute in Kashmir: “[…] nuclear deterrence may, […], usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the requisite incentives for resolving all outstanding issues, especially Jammu and Kashmir” (Ahmad, 1999: 125). So far, the presence of nuclear weapons in the conflict has not had the expected effect. Quite on the contrary, the conflict, even in the nuclear-era, has been dominated by crises and cold air. Currently, all attempts to enhance stability and peace have been obstructed and the conflict remains highly unstable.

Thus, based on the results from the above analyses, the final conclusion is that nuclear deterrence is likely to have been a strong factor in restraining the adversaries from escalating the crises in 1999 and 2001-02 respectively. That said, even if deterrence is effective in ensuring high-level stability it has been completely incapable of (a) solving the issues between the countries such as the dispute over Kashmir and (b) ensuring stability on the lower levels.
8 Afterthoughts

It is possible to take the reflections one step further. After having concluded that nuclear deterrence does not enhance stability on the lower levels, and knowing that this instability in turn could lead to instability at the higher levels, one might question the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as a mean of creating stability. In fact, with the introduction of nuclear weapons, the aim of wars should have changed from winning them to preventing them. At the time, the introduction of nuclear weapons was justified by realist assumptions; in a world determined by anarchy, the acquisition of nuclear weapons was perceived as a stabilizer as any initiation of war could lead to a nuclear retaliation with disastrous consequences.

As rationality is deeply embedded in the question of nuclear deterrence, the question of to what extent this rationality can be relied upon should be posed. Will the legal-rational Weberian state continue to have the monopoly on violence, and thus on nuclear weapons when power centres are increasingly dispersed? Can rationality be guaranteed? Various “What if” scenarios have been inherent to the question of nuclear weapons and have suffered from lack of verification. But, again, despite the fact that the argument have been endlessly repeated, the relation between India and Pakistan reminds us that such considerations remain of imminent importance and deserves further focus.

9 Alternative Approaches and Perspectives

Throughout this project we have explored how deterrence has had an impact on the relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, and how domestic actors have an imminent role in affecting the stability in the Indo-Pak relationship. We believe that the method and the approach we have chosen in order to answer our research question are valid and well founded. Nevertheless, we are aware that when analysing the India-Pakistan conflict, there are other ways in which we could have approached the problem.

Firstly, if we had the possibility to acquire first hand empirical data instead of having to rely solely on secondary sources, the focus could have been different. In fact, having the possibility to explore the domestic instabilities and their consequence for the stability of
the nuclear relation through interviews could have been particularly enriching for the analysis of domestic factors. Their accounts could for example have nuanced the military’s intentions and interpretations in regards to the Kargil war, or the preferences of the militant groups in Pakistan regarding India. This could have permitted us to efface the inherent bias of secondary sources and allowed us to understand the complexities at another level.

Furthermore, the international pressures upon Pakistan and India and how this pressure influences the Indo-Pak relation could have been further explored. Except for the US, another actor that could have been worth taking into account is China. China is influential in the region, and it could have been prolific to explore the extent of China’s involvement in the conflict. The relation between India and China has historically been tense, and Pakistan, who traditionally has been supported by China, has been used as a strategic hedge against India.

Indeed, the tensions between China and India stem from a history of deep-rooted prejudice, dispute over border issues and competition for resources (Malik, 2009; 1148). However, even though Beijing and New Delhi face disagreements, their economic ties are flourishing, and thus bridge their bilateral relationship. As Malik, professor in Asian Geopolitics and Proliferation, states, “Both have begun to behave like normal neighbours — allowing trade and investment and promoting people-to-people contact” (Malik, 2009; 1147). Thus, the relationship between India and China is improving due to increased trade, and this could result in China taking a more neutral stance on the Indian-Pakistan conflict (Curtis, 2009). In parallel, the situation between Beijing and Islamabad has changed (Chang in Salama, 2009). In fact, China is distancing itself from its old ally, which for instance is indicated by Zadari’s visit to China in 2008, where he appealed for financial aid. Even though China granted Islamabad $500 million, it was less than Zardari had expected. Furthermore, Beijing is increasingly preoccupied with the security in Pakistan, as Pakistani militants has targeted and attacked Chinese citizens (Curtis, 2009). Beijing is, moreover, troubled by the fact that Chinese Uighur

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25 Zardari did not receive even close to the $14 billion needed to stabilize Pakistan (Salama, 2009).

26 China has publically expressed its concerns over these attacks, which include “a kidnapping in Islamabad, the murder of three Chinese officials in Peshwar and a suicide bomber attack on a group of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan in 2007” (Curtis, 2009).
separatists are finding safe havens and receiving “[…] sanctuary and training on Pakistani territory” (Curtis, 2009). Thus, it can be argued that tensions are rising between China and Pakistan, and as Sayem Ali, an economist with Standard Chartered Bank in Karachi stated: "The cooperation [between Beijing and Islamabad] we saw during the Musharraf era just isn't there anymore” (Ali in Salma, 2009).

In other words, China and Pakistan are still working together to hedge India, however, the relation has altered towards a less amiable relation. The Sino-Pakistani nexus, on the other hand, is reinforced as the two states are approaching each other in trade issues.

The influence between China, Pakistan and India is thus interesting for an assessment of international pressures and structures that could influence the stability between the countries.
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## Appendix 1: Indian Nuclear Forces, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type/designation</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Payload (kg)</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage 2000 H/Vajra</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>Squadron 1 or 7 at Gwalior Air Force Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaguar JS/IB/Shamsher</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>4,775</td>
<td>At Ambala Air Force Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-based missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pithvi I</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Nuclear version entered service after 1998 with the army’s 333rd and 355th Missile Groups. Will be converted from liquid-fuel to solid fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni I</td>
<td>700+</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Possible launch in spring 2010. Deployed with the army’s new 334 Missile Group in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni II</td>
<td>2,000+</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Under development. Fourth and fifth army launches in 2009 failures. 5th launch on May 17, 2010 successful. Deployment with the 335th Missile Group in 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni III</td>
<td>3,000+</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Under development. Fourth test-launch on February 7, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea-based missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhanush</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Under development. Extended-range naval version of Pithvi II. Sixth test on December 13, 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norris and Kristensen, 2010:79
Appendix 2: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009

**PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FORCES, 2009**

We estimate that Pakistan has produced 70-90 nuclear warheads that can be deployed on the following delivery vehicles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>RANGE (km)</th>
<th>PAYLOAD (Kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16A/B</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1 bomb (4,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage V</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1 bomb (4,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaznavi (Haf-3)</td>
<td>~400</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen-1 (Haf-4)</td>
<td>450+</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen-2 (Haf-6)*</td>
<td>2,000+</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghoori (Haf-5)</td>
<td>1,200+</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babur (Haf-7)*</td>
<td>320+</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (n/a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra’ad (Haf-8)*</td>
<td>320+</td>
<td>Conventional or nuclear (n/a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missile payloads may have to be reduced to achieve maximum range. Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary according to flight profile and weapon loading.
*Under development.

Source: Norris and Kristensen, 2009:84