

The Responsibility to Protect

Norm Development in a Liberal World Order

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
Democracy & Society

A PUBLICATION of the CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY and CIVIL SOCIETY

Democracy, International Actors, and Foreign Aid

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The Responsibility to Protect: Norm Development in a Liberal World Order

BY GORM RYE OLSEN

In the current century, there has been an interesting evolution of core values and principles guiding international political behavior. The development has taken place under the headline that governments have a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) their citizens against atrocities. The new set of principles are linked to the idea of ‘responsible sovereignty’ stressing that states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens against serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The most remarkable aspect of the debate is the fact it has touched upon two of the fundamental building blocks in the current international system namely the sovereignty of states and the principle of non-intervention in other states’ domestic affairs. The most controversial element in the emergence of new international norms is the call on the international community to intervene directly when a government is unable or unwilling to stop atrocities. Philipp Rotmann and others argue that the “debates around a responsibility to protect provide a unique opportunity to analyze the changing global order in a way that focuses on fundamental conflicts over sovereignty and [Cont’d, Page 3]

Linking Democracy Aid to Public Opinion Research: Findings from Sixteen Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

BY PAUL FRIESEN

Introduction

In the field of international development, the effectiveness of international democracy and governance aid¹ continues to be a pertinent point of debate. The success of aid designated towards the democracy and governance sector is nearly always assessed using corruption indexes or commonplace measurements of democracy such as Freedom House and Polity scores.² While these methods are relatively effective at capturing the long-term structural perspective of regime change, more specific evaluation attempts of democracy and governance aid remain elusive. In order to provide an alternative approach, this paper first reviews literature relating to the effectiveness of democracy aid, and then examines public opinion data across sixteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in order to compare citizen [Cont’d, Page 14]

DEMOCRACY, INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, AND FOREIGN AID

• *A Letter from the Director* •



This concludes another busy year for the Democracy and Governance program. Earlier this year in May we graduated our 8th class. We are extremely proud of our students and offer them our warmest congratulations! They are moving on to do wonderful and exciting things, and reflect the diversity of background and

interest that our program aims to attract. They are sure to succeed in anything they set their minds on.

This past semester we have also continued to forge new partnerships and opportunities for our students. Earlier this year we concluded our inaugural USAID study group. Under the tutelage of Prof. Jeff Fischer five students successfully conducted in-depth research on the causes of election violence, and provided USAID with new tools for predicting and reacting to such occurrences. The fruits of their labor can be found here (<https://government.georgetown.edu/USAID>). True to the quality of our program, our students did quite impressive work and this model of instruction is one that we aim to replicate with other U.S. government institutions. It is a real opportunity for students to combine an academic and practical learning experience.

In January 2015 we convened our first meeting of the new Democracy and Governance Advisory Board. This is an important addition to our program, and we are happy to report that several of the most prominent figures in the fields of democracy promotion, governance reform, and international development have joined us. Joining us for our first term are **Shari Bryan** (Vice President, NDI), **Thomas Garrett** (Vice President IRI), **Thomas Carothers** (Carnegie Endowment), **Larry Cooley** (President, MSI), **Eric Bjornlund** (Principal, DI), **Beatriz Casals** (Founder, Casals & Associates), and **Amb. Donald J. Planty** (President, Planty & Associates). The board is there to maintain our domestic and international profile, help ensure that our programming fits the job market needs, and to foster deeper partnerships between Georgetown and the practitioner sector. We are happy to have these fine individuals join our program.

This issue of *Democracy and Society* is dedicated to the topic of *Democracy, International Actors, and Foreign Aid*. Many date the inception of contemporary U.S. democracy assistance with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983. Since, the democracy promotion (and governance reform) community has proliferated greatly

in Washington D.C. and abroad. There are now dozens of organizations involved in training political parties, empowering citizens, reforming electoral laws and procedures, and reforming legislatures. Improving democracy and governance is now a part of development vocabulary, and gradually part of discussions on national security as well.

Yet, the record on democracy assistance is a matter of some debate, and no minor amount of controversy. It has become all the more important given the perception of democratic backsliding, authoritarian resurgence, and global uncertainty. The 1990s were in many ways the heyday of democracy assistance following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In the days following September 11, 2001, even though democracy assistance has become associated with regime change and external intervention, there has also been a greater focus on maintaining stable relationships with non-democratic countries to maintain global security. Meanwhile, the rise of new powers like China and Russia limits the ability of Western donors to leverage countries into democratic reform. Democracy assistance funding has been subject to real budget cuts in recent years.

We asked for submissions on the relationship between international actors, foreign aid, and democracy assistance. How has foreign aid and democracy assistance evolved? How effective has it been over the years? What are the current and future challenges the democracy promotion community faces? Our submissions for this edition include a thought provoking piece by Prof. Gorm Rye Olsen of Roskilde University in Denmark on the responsibility to protect. The rise of a power like China and its influence in arenas like sub-Saharan Africa is often cited as a reason that democracy promotion programs fail. Prof. Olsen argues for a more nuanced view, that analyzes the role of China (and other newly industrialized countries) within the context of a contested international order.

Two of our articles come straight from the frontlines of democracy promotion. Paul Friesen of the National Democratic Institute uses opinion data from 16 Africa to examine the relationship between democracy assistance and tangible outcomes. He argues that aid channeled through civil society organizations leads to stronger public acceptance of democracy. Aisha Kibwana, also of the National Democratic Institute, uses the case study of Nigeria to argue that measures of success and failure ultimately need to be contextualized. Our other submissions include a piece by Ph.D. candidate Alessandro Badella (University of Genoa) on U.S. democracy promotion in Cuba, and a book review by Ph.D. candidate Erum Haider (Georgetown University) of M.A. Thomas' book *Govern Like Us: US Expectations of Poor Countries*.

Finally I am pleased to announce that *Democracy and Society* itself has a new home. Our webpage has migrated to our main Georgetown page and can now be found at: <https://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-society>. The

new site will host our current issues, a full and easily accessible archive of past issues. This will also be the home to our new blog, which will re-launch in the fall semester. Please check in with the site later this year.

YONATAN L. MORSE (Ph.D., Georgetown University) is the associate director of the Democracy and Governance program.

OLSEN, Continued from Page 3

responsibility, universalism and exceptionalism, hypocrisy and selectivity.”¹

This short article touches upon some of the reactions to the changes in the international norms mentioned. The reactions of the European Union, the African Union and China are looked into in two steps. First the principled reactions are described and second, the reactions to the actual implementation of the principles of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the case of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 are dealt with. The reactions to the implementation are important because a number of commentators argue that the UN Security Council authorization to use “all necessary means to protect the civilians” in the case of Libya was exploited by the ‘West’ to carry out a regime change in Libya. The critics maintain that because the Western powers stretched the UN mandate to include regime change, Russia, China and others have opposed the implementation of the responsibility to protect the civilian population in Syria.²

The responsibility to protect

Some of the issues involved in the evolution of the basic international norms and values were formally debated at the 2005 UN World Summit. The changes in the international norms introduced by the UN summit are linked to the argument that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens (R2P) and that states therefore cannot do whatever they want to their own citizens protected by the dogma of state sovereignty and thus non-intervention into domestic affairs.³

In 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution no. 1674 aimed at protecting civilians in armed conflict. The resolution explicitly referred to the important role that a regional organization, for example the African Union can play to protect civilians. With the resolution, the so-called world society aimed at introducing a new norm in international politics by stressing the importance of protecting civilians against violations of their basic human rights. It was and still is highly controversial that resolution no. 1674 opened for the possibility that states under certain conditions may interfere in the internal affairs of other states in order to protect civilians against atrocities committed by their own state.

The rise of China: Conflict or cooperation

Not only can the debates on the principles of R2P tell us about the developing global order. The implementation of the principles can, moreover hint at how a rising power like China is locating itself within this new order. In the current decade, China has been on rise globally including in Africa mainly due to the significant volume of its trade and its foreign investments.

Two opposing views can be identified on what it means that China is becoming a world power. On the one hand, there is the view that the rise of China (and other so-called developing countries) inevitably leads to confrontation and conflict between the ‘West’ and the rising power(s) because their interests and strategies are incompatible. It is argued that the current order cannot be taken for granted simply because the newcomers on the global scene do not feel ownership to the prevailing institutions and to the prevailing institutional order.⁴

On the other hand, there is the argument that the rise of China (and others) does not necessarily lead to confrontation and conflict. It might as well result in increased cooperation between the great powers of the world simply because China will gradually accept and abide to the prevailing norms and rules governing the international system. These norms and rules are basically Western. John Ikenberry maintains that the Western order has a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers such as China. “The Western orders’ strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration,” it is stated.⁵

The EU, the AU, and the R2P

Traditionally, emphasizing the need to respect human rights and the concern for civilians in conflict situations are considered an expression of ‘Western’ values. Therefore, the idea of a Responsibility to Protect can be seen as an attempt to promote Western values and institutions globally. Following the World Summit in September 2005, it is hardly surprising that EU statements began to express strong support for the R2P. It became clear that the European Union supported an understanding of the implementation of the R2P outside Europe which implied the empowerment of local actors. In relation to Africa, the position basically means that the EU should only play an auxiliary role and only in exceptional cases step in and temporarily fill the gap before the local actors or the UN can take over the responsibility to protect threatened civilians.⁶ Both the EU Commission and the member states have expressed the view that the best way of operationalizing the R2P is by preventing a conflict from escalating.

As far as the African Union is concerned, the R2P is written effectively into the AU’s founding treaty and basically the treaty is more in line with the notion of ‘responsible sovereignty’ than with the conventional emphasis on state

rights.⁷ At the same time, the localization of the R2P norm within the AU treaty goes hand in hand with the adherence to the principles of non-interference by non-African powers, which exists together with the duty of the Africans to take care of each other.⁸

China and the R2P

In historical terms, China has been very firm when it came to issues of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Beijing has strongly opposed any attempt to violate the sovereignty of states. This is exactly why it is so interesting how China has reacted to the R2P norms and not least to the implementation of these norms. In this context, it is relevant to stress that Beijing actually voted in favor of UN resolution 1674.

In general, the Chinese government has been supportive of the concept and the idea of a ‘Responsibility to protect’ as it was formulated at the 2005 World Summit. On the other hand, it is not to be neglected that China’s so-called ‘New Security Concept’ launched in 2002 stressed the respect for sovereignty especially in developing countries. Beijing also emphasized the requirement for the United Nations to play a “leading role in the settlement of disputes preferably through negotiations and reciprocity.”⁹ Sven Grimm argues that such arguments can be regarded as one of the strong selling points to African elites entering into a political dialogue with Beijing. Not least the principle of non-interference has a strong sounding board among African governing elites and therefore, it is also found in the provisions of the African Union side by side with the idea of ‘responsible sovereignty’.¹⁰

In spite of the formulations in the ‘New Security Concept,’ Beijing has altered its attitude since 2002 from no interventions at all to accepting interventions under certain conditions. China has expressed serious concerns regarding human rights and on several occasions, it has taken steps to improve the human rights situation in countries in Africa.¹¹ The first time, the change of position manifested itself in Africa was in the acceptance of a UN Security Council resolution on Darfur. The Chinese abstention from voting during the Libya crisis also has to be mentioned as an illustration of China’s new stand in the debate of state rights versus the rights of civilians.¹²

The bottom line seems to be that the Chinese government is developing a more and more open mind towards giving priority to protecting human rights and consequently accepting interventions under the strict precondition that it takes place under the framework of the UN.¹³

British and French decision-makers launched substantial R2P arguments in favor of an international intervention into Libya. 10 out of 15 members of the Security Council voted in favor of using “all necessary measures to protect civilians” which included the establishment of a no-fly zone for the Libyan air force. By abstaining from voting, China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil in effect supported the resolution. Resolution 1973 specified the purpose of the military action as humanitarian protection and it limited the means to that specific goal. Nevertheless, NATO ignored the restrictions against targeting Gaddafi directly resulting in what has been described as regime change.¹⁴

The outcome of the 2011 Libya intervention had significant impact in many respects. One is that the Western powers in the NATO-led intervention are responsible for the mission creep from protection of civilians to regime change. And because of this change of goal, it has been impossible to reach international agreement about doing something seriously in the case of Syria. Another consequence of the Libya mission is that the three actors dealt with here reacted in different ways to the outcome of the Libya campaign.

Starting with the last topic, following the Libya crisis a number of African states indicated a greater reluctance towards supporting future UN resolutions authorizing the use of force by non-UN forces. Also, a re-strengthening of the principle of non-interference in relation to the norm of R2P seems to appear among African political leaders.¹⁵ The same political positions were found when it later came to the crises in the Ivory Coast and Mali.¹⁶ Within Europe, the Libya crisis revealed strong ambivalences within the EU where some member states like Germany were very careful not to use the terminology of R2P whereas France and the UK were much more outspoken in favor of using R2P arguments.¹⁷

There is no doubt that the Libya campaign had serious consequences for the Chinese attitudes towards the whole idea of R2P including controversial issues like intervention and state sovereignty. First of all, Beijing had a feeling of being deceived and betrayed by the Western powers because the mission against the Gaddafi-regime developed from protecting human rights and civilians to resulting in regime change. Chinese representatives even used words like ‘conspiracy’ or ‘trick’ describing the behavior of the three Western powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council.¹⁸ In sum, the Libya war seems to have strengthened those who were skeptical about the new developments in international norms and principles.

Contours of a new international order

Alex Bellamy goes strongly against such an interpretation suggesting the Libyan crisis has had serious consequences for the prospects reaching international consensus on authorization of armed intervention into the Syrian civil war.¹⁹ First and foremost, China has never specifically pointed to concerns over Libya as a source of its decision to veto draft

The 2011 Libya war

When civilian protests appeared in several cities throughout Libya in early 2011, the regime under Muammar Gaddafi clamped down hard on the protesters. The repression was so brutal that a number of Western powers felt they had to do something to protect the Libyan civilian population. The

UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. Second, important emerging states like Brazil and India that were critical of the NATO operation in Libya have on several occasions voted in favor of draft resolutions on Syria. Third and in this context most importantly, the Security Council has used R2P arguments in resolutions more often after the Libya crisis than during the years 2005 to 2011.²⁰ References to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ were used in no less than 5 crisis situations after the adoption of resolution 1976. It was done in relation to Cote d’Ivoire (2011), South Sudan (2011), Yemen (2011), Mali (2012) and the Central African Republic (2013).

Summing up, Philipp Rothman and others argues that the debates on R2P provide us with an entrance to understanding the emerging global order and the conflicts and different interests within this order. No doubt, there are still deep divisions between the leading states which the Syrian tragedy so clearly emphasizes. On the other hand, it is important to stress that the intervention in Libya did not stop the evolution of new international norms and principles linked to the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens against atrocities and with it the possibility of armed intervention. The norms and values are still developing and in spite the new norms and values may be generally accepted at least within the UN Security Council, it is not to be neglected that the national interests of the big powers will still have a strong impact on world politics in many years to come.

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The Effects of Foreign Aid on Democratization: Nigeria as a Case Study

AISHA KIBWANA

There are many reasons why countries give aid. During the cold war, aid was given “to prevent friendly governments from falling under the influence of unfriendly ones.”¹ Developing nations were a battleground for Western capitalist and democratic ideology and Soviet communist ideology as each sought to expand its influence. Today, foreign aid policy has evolved to become more sophisticated and is given in a variety of ways such as official development assistance (ODA), concessional loans, and infrastructural investments and is channeled through different institutions such as a country’s government or directly via civil society organizations (CSOs).

Whether or not aid uplifts underdeveloped nations continues to be a contentious debate. Additionally, there is no globally accepted agreement on what constitutes the different components of foreign aid. For example, many question whether Chinese assistance to African nations should be considered “aid” in the traditional sense since China is a non-Development Assistance Committee (non-DAC)² country and extends its aid outside of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regulation.³ Critics of U.S. aid claim “there is little evidence that foreign assistance advances U.S. interests.”⁴ In fact, aid has been blamed for exacerbating corruption and worsening autocratic behavior in developing nations.⁵

Verbatim, in questioning how foreign aid impacts democratization in nondemocracies categorizes states into one of two: that states are either democratic or nondemocratic. Yet nations, and especially developing nations, are at different stages of democratization.⁶ Aid is given to countries that are on different points of the democratic spectrum. Furthermore, democratization is not a linear process. The growth and proliferation of democracy within nations is multifaceted affecting different areas of societies in different ways. Democracy and governance financing varies by political sector/political event, for example elections, political parties, and governance. Therefore, the more engaged and better financed a political institution is, the more likely it is to witness democratic gains. If more financing goes into political parties rather than the legislature, for example, political parties are likely to do better. Finally, it is difficult to measure democratic gains given that some aspects of

democracy are non-quantifiable and can only be measured in the long-term, such as the changes and internalization of democratic norms within a population; democratization efforts are generally long-term initiatives that may not be easily discernible immediately.

Thus, can “successes” or “failures” be adequately measured without bias? In failing to contextualize and define foreign aid and democratization adequately, and the effect of one on the other, we inhibit our ability to better evaluate the impact of democratization and are more likely to see failures than successes. This paper will examine Nigeria to prove the significance of contextualization.

Nigeria: A Nonlinear Multivariate Democracy

In the 1980s, Jean Herskovits wrote in *Democracy in Nigeria* that the Nigerian “government looks remarkably familiar to an American.” The handover of government from military rule to a civilian government “culminated in a change...as smooth as in a Western democracy.” Though largely corrupt and accepted as such by global standards, Nigeria had taken a revolutionary political step that “introduced democratic local government systems [that brought] government closer to the village,” and aimed to “counteract the malign effects of ethnic and regional politics.”⁷ By the 1990s, according to some, Nigeria’s “authoritarian culture” made it impossible for it to become a democratic country. The question then became whether or not “Nigeria [was] lacking in fundamental values and principles of democracy.” The excessive corrupt behavior of government officials, misuse of public institutions, and gradual “drifting towards one-party ‘dictatorship’” was making democratization efforts in Nigeria unattainable.⁸

Nigeria had a presidential election on 28 March 2015. It was an election that many doubted would be a success but ultimately exceeded expectations. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, a consultant at the Institute for Security Studies, stated the elections “went smoother than many had predicted.”⁹ Bill Ritter, an election observer for the Nigerian elections with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI),¹⁰ remarked on “the positive attitude of Nigerian voters...who were patient, waiting in line for hours to be accredited and in a different line again in the afternoon to cast their ballot.”¹¹ A Nigerian interviewed by CNN in the aftermath of the election had this to say: “The unity in the country is very very high. Spirit is high for everything to change.”¹²

Nigeria as a democratizing country demonstrates non-linearity of democratization for developing nations. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors sent an election observation mission this past election. For example, NDI has run programs in the country and engaged Nigerians for years prior to this election.¹³ NDI has worked in collaboration with and engaged Nigerian civil society through a variety of programmatic activities. In the most recent election, NDI’s partner in Nigeria, the Transition

monitoring Group (TMG)—a coalition of over 400 Nigerian CSOs—conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) [an election observation method that uses random sampling in selecting polling stations to observe in order to help verify election results] that helped ensure the transparency of and confidence in the electoral process.¹⁴ The use of social media throughout the elections undoubtedly had a serious impact on hindering vote rigging and the compromising of ballots.¹⁵ The Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria “adopted technological...innovations aimed at raising confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.” Electronic readers of biometric permanent voter cards were used, though with some malfunctions, to verify voter identity with much success.¹⁶ There were also peace rallies aimed to help quell pre and post-voting violence and extensive state driven and donor funded voter education drives.¹⁷

Given the nature of these elections and Nigeria’s past as a republic, it is difficult to claim that the country has collectively seen either a positive or negative trend as a democracy. A corrupt political elite exists in the backdrop, which has and continues to manipulate many political processes, even with the most recent democratic elections.¹⁸ Yet, Nigerians, previously thought incapable of espousing democratic ideals, decided for themselves that enough is enough as made evident by the Twitter hashtag #Nigeriahasdecided. Looking at the elections, it is also difficult to quantify what had the most impact. Did foreign aid, used on the PVT and voter education, help push for the internalization of democratic norms and recognition by many Nigerians of their indelible right to vote?¹⁹ Or, was it social media that helped in enforcing a watchful culture that hampered electoral rigging that had the most impact?²⁰ Similar funding efforts went into the 2007 elections when Former General Buhari lost due to electoral fraud. The process on paper was democratic but in reality, was mired in corruption.²¹ Had the 2015 electoral process failed and the country fallen into violence, would all the political efforts, though benefitting many citizens, be considered a “failure” and therefore the democratization process of Nigeria also deemed a failure? Ultimately, Nigeria’s peaceful and democratic elections are due to a combination of many factors, political and nonpolitical, and not one factor can be attributed to have largely impacted the process without the presence of the other aforementioned factors.

While political spacing can close and open at any given time and endemic corruption can severely hamper the democratic process, democracy can simultaneously flourish in other aspects of sociopolitical life. Freedom House gave Nigeria a 4 and 4.5 freedom rating in 2014 and 2015 respectively. With this rating, Nigeria is considered “partly free” to reflect both existing political and civil liberties in some places and lack of in others. This kind of an analysis, on the intricacies of democratization, is missing in the aid and democratization conversation when aid is discussed at a policy level. Herein lies the issue with oversimplification and the consequences have real life implications. By generalizing, we blind ourselves from seeing the small-scale changes in

the promotion of democracy. If we oversimplify our analysis of democratization, we are not getting the best answers and when there are discrepancies in the aid/democratization narrative, the impact is felt at the policymaking level. Generalizing democratic promotion and democratic successes or failures can affect the amount of funding that goes into development programming and especially democracy and governance (D&G) programming.²²

Conclusion

When countries are deemed democratic “failures,” funding decreases thereby slowing small-scale democratization processes, but it is these small processes that can bring about gradual change. The lack of sufficient monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks in D&G programming exacerbates the problem, as no robust frameworks exist that adequately measure democratization.²³ Not only is it important to define more succinctly what aspects of aid and democratization are being asked about at any give time, but it is crucially important to accommodate flexible frameworks that allow for contextualization and differentiation. It is imperative to begin by asking the right questions.

AISHA KIBWANA was a project assistant with the Southern and Eastern Africa team at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). She graduated from Rice University in Houston, Texas with a B.A. in Political Science and French.

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- 3 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is an international organization whose mission is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. Chinese aid to Africa is said to be close to the amounts allotted by the U.S. government though there “aren’t any mechanisms to accurately measure aid from non-DAC countries.” Malaka Gharib, “6 Surprising Facts About Chinese Aid to Africa,” Internet, <http://www.one.org/us/2013/04/30/6-surprising-facts-about-chinese-aid-to-africa/> (date accessed: 17 April 2015).
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10 NDI is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that works with local partners in countries around the world to democratically strengthen political institutions.

11 Bill Ritter, “Ritter: A Witness to Democracy in Nigeria,” Internet, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_27887862/witness-democracy-nigeria (date accessed: 14 April 2015).

12 “Nigeria’s Historic Election,” Internet, <http://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/04/01/pkg-purefoy-nigeria-election-buhari-winner.cnn/video/playlists/intl-boko-haram-nigeria/> (date accessed: 14 April 2015).

13 “Statement of the National Democratic Institute’s International Observer Mission to Nigeria’s March 28 Presidential and Legislative Elections,” Internet, <https://www.ndi.org/nigeria-election-observation-statement-march-2015> (date accessed: 14 April 2015).

14 A PVT is also referred to as a quick count. Sample polling station observers are deployed all over the country to a handful of polling stations to observe both the voting and vote-counting procedures. The observers collect data that is aggregated to gauge the quality of the electoral process and predict or help verify the official electoral results. Large discrepancies between aggregated data and the official results can serve as an indicator of fraudulent and/or flawed electoral activities. *Ibid.*

15 Adu L. Oseni, “Nigeria: Social Media Revolutionizes Nigerian Election,” Internet, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201504141451.html> (date accessed: 15 April 2015).

16 *Ibid.*, “Statement of the National Democratic Institute’s International Observer Mission to Nigeria.”

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18 “Freedom in the World: Nigeria,” Internet, <https://www.freedomhouse.org/freedom-world/2015/nigeria> (date accessed: 17 April 2015).

19 For more examples of some of the election preparations done in Nigeria prior to the election, see “Statement of the National Democratic Institute’s International Observer Mission to Nigeria.” Other organizations and donors also conducted their own pre-electoral programming.

20 Oseni, “Nigeria: Social Media Revolutionizes Nigerian Election.”

21 Antony Goldman, “Nigeria Elections 2015: What Went Right?” Internet, <http://africanarguments.org/2015/04/13/nigeria-elections-2015-what-went-right-by-antony-goldman/> (date accessed: 15 April 2015).

22 Aid funding for D&G programming has decreased in the last year.

23 The state of M&E evaluation in D&G programming was mentioned by an NDI colleague of mine, M&E expert Tina Byenkya, during an informal conversation on the effects of foreign aid on democratization.

U.S. Democracy Promotion in Cuba: A Three-Pillars Approach

ALESSANDRO BADELLA

U.S.-Cuba relations have been widely studied from different perspectives and certainly represent a fascinating case study in International Relations (IR). However, from the perspective of democracy promotion,¹ the Cuban case deserves more attention. Given that democracy promotion has historically been an important component of U.S. foreign policy,² the growing interest in democracy promotion after the end of the Cold War, has influenced relations with Cuba.³ This paper aims to present an analysis of the latest U.S. efforts to democratize Cuba in the framework of three different “pillars” of U.S. democracy promotion: the state-to-state relations, U.S. public diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy. As I argue, these three elements are all shaping U.S. democracy promotion in recent times, and these three “pillars” are vividly present in Obama’s most recent moves with Cuba.

The first pillar: State-to-state relations

U.S.-Cuba state-to-state relations have always been complicated since the imposition of the economic embargo in the 1960s⁴. The presence of a pro-Soviet government (during the Cold War) and the absence of democratic elections have been necessary conditions to cut state-to-state relations with the revolutionary Cuba. However, the lack of formal diplomatic relations has been contrarily tied to the promotion of liberal democracy by the U.S. After the codifications of 1992 and 1996, the Cuban embargo became an instrument to impose a “democratic conditionality” in U.S.-Cuba relations.⁵ In other words, the U.S. has been using economic sanctions over Cuba as a democracy promotion instrument. In fact, as Cox and Drury noted, economic sanctions could be “democratic,” meaning they could be used by democratic countries to target non-democratic states in order to persuade the latter to start political and economic reforms that would lead to democratization.⁶ This is the case with Cuba.

As state-to-state relations are a component of the promoter’s strategy to promote democracy in foreign countries, along with the relationship between the promoter(s) and the target’s civil society,⁷ the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U.S. (apart from Obama’s openings in the last few months) represents a peculiar element in U.S. democracy promotion on the island. In fact, the embargo has been dominating U.S. top-down approaches in democracy promotion in Cuba.⁸

The second and third pillars: “public diplomacy” and “citizen diplomacy”

The second and third pillars are related to the so called “people-to-people’s diplomacy,” or the contacts between U.S. government\agencies and citizens with the people of a third state (in this case, with the Cuban people, or the Cuban civil society). The promotion of civil society in non-democratic countries has been part of the Western strategy of democracy promotion worldwide.⁹ Cuba is not an exception. Since the 1990s, outreach to the Cuban people has been a complementary strategy to the external economic blockade.¹⁰

These efforts of “people-to-people’s diplomacy” are generally conducted through local and international NGOs,¹¹ but also using so called “public diplomacy.” Even if the term “public diplomacy” has different meanings and applications (especially after the diffusion of the new media and social networks) without a solid theoretical framework.¹² The concept could be defined as an instrument of soft power¹³ that implies “the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies.”¹⁴ In its origin, “public diplomacy” encompassed mainly “state-sponsored programs,”¹⁵ in which the federal agencies were the only actors validated to conduct such efforts to reach out to foreign public opinion. In the Cuban case, *Radio and Television Martí* (based on the previous experience of *Radio Free Europe*) and the USAID programs in Cuba can be included in this definition.¹⁶

However, the development of international travel and communication technologies has gradually disrupted this state “monopoly” on “public diplomacy.” This “revolution” created a new way to advance a state’s interest among foreign public opinion. This is the essence of the so called “citizen diplomacy.” Ordinary citizens may have the right, the responsibility, or the will to contribute to their country’s foreign policy, becoming diplomatic agents themselves, or what Mueller (2009) called “citizen diplomats.”¹⁷ In the case of Cuba, “citizen diplomacy” can be associated with diaspora and family (personal and economic) contacts, academic and cultural exchanges.¹⁸ These are forms of people-to-people’s contacts in which the state is responsible for their strategic steering, but it represents more the guarantor for these contacts to happen: for example, the U.S. government could give American universities the right to activate exchange programs in foreign countries (in Cuba like elsewhere in the world), but it cannot oblige them to do so, nor can it emphasize a political agenda in regards to research or teaching activities abroad.

Three “pillars” in action: U.S. democracy promotion in Cuba

Obama’s recent openings to the Cuban government can show the development of U.S. democracy promotion in Cuba along the three different pillars mentioned above. Firstly, Obama’s criticisms to the practice of blocking the

Cuban economy as a tool to foster a democratic transition on the island re-launched a potential political and economic engagement of the Cuban government as a way to create a friendlier environment for U.S. democracy assistance on the island, avoiding further tensions and misunderstandings.¹⁹ These represent probably the most remarkable form of engagement with Havana since the Carter administration.²⁰ Engaging non-democratic regimes and cultivating friendly relations with them in order to promote democracy, the so called “transformational diplomacy,”²¹ has been used with Latin American military regimes (both Argentina and Chile in the 1970s) during the Cold War, and it seems that the Obama administration is following this approach. Moreover, the top-down approach has become a complementary strategy to the expansion of U.S. “public diplomacy” (or the bottom-up approach). In 2010, Hillary Clinton wrote that “public diplomacy must start at the top,” highlighting the need to fully engage the governments of the country that the U.S. wanted to deliver their message to.²² At a more general level, this form of engagement could be seen as a strategy to refrain from Bush’s vibrant rhetoric on “exporting” democracy and the backlash of such a strategy, while making democracy promotion more “sustainable” for U.S. interests abroad.²³

Under Obama, U.S. democracy promotion strategy in Cuba has gradually reconfigured, even if without abandoning the role of “public diplomacy,” while opting for a reinvigoration of “citizen diplomacy,” which has been considered a “new” instrument to advance the empowerment of Cuban civil society and the transitional process. First of all, in recent years, the two main components of U.S. “public diplomacy” in Cuba, *Radio and Television Martí* (RTM) and the USAID projects on the island, have been highly criticized by federal agencies and congressional services for their lack of transparency in the management of funds and resources, their ineffectiveness and inefficiency.²⁴ However, the Obama administration never completely abandoned the way “public diplomacy” operates in Cuba. For example, the U.S. administration and Congress never dramatically reduce the funding allocated for democracy promotion in Cuba through USAID programs and RTM.²⁵ According to the last report of the OIG, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting still continues to be “engaged in an aggressive campaign to distribute weekly its television programming content via broadcast, Internet, and even hand-to-hand, via digital video disks (DVDs) and flash drives.”²⁶ The main innovation under Obama is related to the “technologization,” and the construction of new media infrastructures to help the Cuban people communicate with each other. A declassified document, dated August 2008, revealed that USAID’s new strategy in Cuba “is not telling Cubans how or why they need a democratic transition, but rather, the Agency wants to provide the technology and means for communicating the spark which could benefit the population.”²⁷ Projects such as (the aborted) *Zunzuneo*²⁸ and (the currently running) *Piramideo*²⁹ revealed the attention of U.S. agencies to the

construction of such infrastructures. Under Obama, some U.S. corporations received million dollar contracts to run these activities.³⁰

Furthermore, the more significant change happened in the realm of “citizen diplomacy.” Obama inaugurated (in 2009 and 2011, and then in late 2014) the relaxation of travel and remittance rules to the island as a tool to further advance the empowerment of the Cuban civil society. In fact, according to Obama, “measures that decrease dependency of the Cuban people on the Castro regime and that promote contacts between Cuban-Americans and their relatives are means to encourage positive change in Cuba.”³¹ Obama’s “citizen diplomacy” towards Cuba was revealed at its best in his December 17 speech. The announced changes in U.S. policy were presented as a striking modification of the American stance over “the Cuban people” and this term seems intentional. Moreover, in the same speech, Obama wished for the participation of representatives from Cuban civil society at the next Summit of the Americas in 2015, while he made clear that the U.S. would “continue to support civil society there.”³² In other words, the main target for the U.S. in the (updated) relations with Cuba is Cuban civil society and Obama’s changes were presented as a way to “further engage and empower the Cuban people”³³ through the use of expanded channels of communication with the island, such as remittances and family travels.

In conclusion, the U.S. is not giving up the commitment to promote democracy on the island,³⁴ even U.S. democracy promotion in Cuba under Obama is facing a strong evolution in all the above mentioned “pillars.” Despite the evaluation of the (in)efficacy of such a strategy,³⁵ Obama’s evolution in democracy aid to Cuba implies a more cautious but also “variegated” strategy to engage the Cuban government on issues of common interest and the Cuban people separately.

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ENDNOTES

1 In this paper, the term “democracy promotion” refers to different mechanisms, from coercive interventions and conditionality to external support to the civil society in non-democratic countries, used by Western “promoters” to help the democratic forces and transition in foreign (and non-democratic or partially democratic) countries, see Peter Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

2 Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Michael Cox and others (eds.), *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (London: Routledge, 2013).

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(Part 1),” *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 6, no. 2 (Winter 2014): 157-188; Lars Schoultz, “Blessing of Liberty: The United States and the Promotion of Democracy in Cuba.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 397-425.

4 For a more comprehensive history of US-Cuba relations after the Revolution see Lars Shoultz, *That Little Infernal Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

5 Adreas F. Lowenfeld, “Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act.” *American Journal of International Law* 90, no. 3 (July 1996): 419-434.

6 Dan G. Cox and A. Cooper Drury, “Democratic Sanctions: Connecting Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (November 2006): 709-722.

7 On the trilateral relations between sponsor, targeted state and civil society (in the targeted state) see Peter Burnell, “Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for a Grand Strategy.” *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2004) 100-116.

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10 See David Seaman, *U.S. Democracy Promotion – The Case of Cuba* (Leverkusen Opladen: Buldrich Unipress, 2010): 81-93.

11 Alison van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry* (New York: Earthscan, 1998).

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14 US Defence Science Board, “Report of the Defence Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Internet, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf> (date accessed: 20 March 2015).

15 US Department of State, *Dictionary of International Relations Terms* (Washington DC: Department of State Library, 1987) 85; Edward E. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. “What is Public Diplomacy?” *The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Internet*, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy> (date accessed: 20 March 2015).

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Radio Campaign against Castro (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2012). For an account on USAID programs in Cuba see USAID, <http://www.usaid.gov/cuba/our-work> (date accessed: 20 March 2015).

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20 William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, *Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). As LeoGrande and Kornbluh show, the US never completely refrain from maintaining contacts with Havana regarding issues of mutual interests, even if without any general appeasement of the bilateral relations. Obama’s moves with Cuba seem to follow this path with a new pace.

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
35 For a criticism about the inefficacy of the “liberal deal” with Cuba (relaxing the economic pressure in exchange for political and economic reforms in Cuba) see Gordon Adams, “The Liberal Fallacy of the Cuba Deal.” *Foreign Policy*, 19 December 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/19/the-liberal-fallacy-of-the-cuba-deal-us-castros/> (date accessed: 20 March 2015). Moreover, the literature seems to be cautious on evaluating positively the effects of people-to-people’s contacts and the remittances on the democratization and economic liberalization process: the determinant influence of such contacts could be asserted only in the presence of certain conditions, see Tobias Pfütze, “Does Migration Promote Democratization? Evidence from the Mexican Transition.” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 40, no. 2 (May 2012): 159-175; Tobias Pfütze, “Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 2014): 295-307; Angela O’Mahony, “Political Investment: Remittances and Elections,” *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 43, n. 4, ottobre 2013, pp. 799-820; Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow, “Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behaviour in Mexico.”

Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 1, (February 2009): 119-148; Abel Escribá-Folch and others “Remittances and Democratization,” Pennsylvania State University, January 2013, http://www.upf.edu/pdi/escriba-folch/_pdf/Escriba_Remittances.pdf (date accessed: 20 March 2015). As some scholars recalled, the effects of the Cuban-American remittances to the island is not an exception, as they could foster divisions or grant benefits both to the independent civil society and the Cuban government, see Susan Eckstein, “Remittances and Their Unintended Consequences in Cuba.” *World Development* 38, no. 7 (July 2010): 1047-1055.

Book review

Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries by M. A. Thomas, Columbia University Press, 2015

REVIEW BY ERUM HAIDER



At the end of the Berlin Conference in 1885, territories in Africa acquired uncontested boundaries that were under sovereign control of individual European powers. Many of these paper states amounted to little more than a port at the edge of the continent or along a river, and a few roads linking strategic posts. A single colonial officer — typically a young unmarried man — often embodied the

colonial state, with oversight over a territory the size of a “large or medium English county.” Well over a century later, a World Bank staffer asks the author whether she has seen the Ministry of Finance of South Sudan: “It’s a guy. In a trailer. Yet somehow everyone expects him to do everything that a ministry of finance does.”

M.A. Thomas’ *Govern Like Us* is a story of South Sudan’s guy-in-a-trailer and others like him in the developing world. It begins, however, with his colonial predecessor. The appeal of *Govern Like Us* is precisely the political and historical context Thomas brings to what is essentially a practitioners book.

Poor governments govern differently. Often, they govern poorly. This simple observation nonetheless enables us to peer deeply into the state, a category that is remarkable for its versatility and ultimately its hollowness. States are sovereign territories, argues Thomas, but many of the poorest states inherited territories before they inherited sovereignty. Thomas’ volume reverberates with the work of Weber, Tilly and Herbst, which is possibly why this study is exciting and frustrating in equal measure. She’s a political scientist and

a policy practitioner, and inevitably must sacrifice one for the other.

States, beginning with the colonial state, employ mixed strategies to control territories where sovereignty was not built from the bottom up. These include coercion, but also patronage. The pre-Revolution state in France under King Francis I regularly created and sold bureaucratic positions to generate revenue, Thomas suggests political actors in industrialized countries also maintain careful ledgers of favors. Patronage radiates from these centers, this study suggests only that in poor countries, it radiates further. Several political economists (LSE’s Mushtaq Khan comes to mind) confirm empirically that rent-seeking closes the gap between the market value for public goods and services and the heavily subsidized rate most governments in developing countries offer services at. One of Thomas’ central claims is that we have yet to evaluate the true “cost” of governance — how much would it cost to provide universal education, for example — so it is impossible to know just how great the shortfall is. This makes her ultimate argument, that poor governments need more revenue, all the more puzzling.

Thomas clearly prefers “patronage” and “clientalism,” which are universally applicable, to the more squarely Third-World “corruption.” Good research has shown that government shortfalls in health and education are regularly made up with cheap private services. The more troubling scenario is when groups are excluded from limited government resources on non-monetary basis: caste, race, ethnicity and gender. In Thomas’ dissection of the corruption of poor states, the power imbalance between patrons and clients is lost. The theorist might wonder at post-Enlightenment ideals of equal and free access to safety, justice and basic needs that are demanded of states that are patently unable to govern more than a few kilometers outside the capital city. The practitioner, it seems, faces another dilemma entirely: that of funneling billions of dollars into this staggeringly broken system. Which really leads to Thomas’ solution to any of these problems, each more unpalatable than the last. Her call to destigmatize, or at least decriminalize, poor governance is certainly commendable. And she is simultaneously aware that some poor states govern better than many middle-income states, and that rewarding one while punishing the other isn’t straightforward. Ultimately her hope of finding a “more modest, people-centered approach” involving “like-minded partners” in poor states resonates with much the same hollowness that led us here in the first place. There is little engagement of the politics — the indigenous, people-driven politics — that form states. While her grasp of the history of the French bureaucracy makes for a vivid read, the story of the peasantry that ultimately rebelled against the unjust system and formed the modern democratic French state slips through. Although her engagement with colonial politics infuses what would’ve been an arid policy-centric book with fresh air, the messy political process of decolonization, democratization and state formation (none of which, incidentally, required USAID funding) is lost.

That such a book needs to be written at all is a sobering reminder of the gulf that separates practitioners of development from the fundamentals of political and economic history. While Thomas does a commendable job of distilling some basic context of the countries the international aid sector operates in, a crucial — perhaps *the* crucial — missing link is the murky bureaucracy of international aid itself. An industry fueled by powerful states, that finds itself unable to account for its own spending in the developing world. In chapter seven, for example, Thomas notes that Ethiopia announced the purchase of a fleet of battle tanks a day after the UK foreign office announced a \$60 million “emergency food aid donation.” A reader might be tempted to interrogate the donors — if you’re going to run the country, why don’t you run the country? The answer, extrapolating from Thomas’ own investigation, is incentives. Donor countries may be well aware of what it would cost to rid the world of malaria, but may simply lack the incentive to do so. The people who are hired to implement these multi-billion dollar aid programs — the practitioners — may not necessarily lack the knowledge it takes to fix the system. They may, in fact, be entirely aware of the inconsistencies and the dangerous, distorted incentives it takes to keep the international aid and foreign policy machine chugging along.

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perceptions of democracy against levels of democracy and governance aid allocation. This paper argues that foreign democracy aid channeled through civil society organizations is associated with increased rates of public acceptance of democracy within the region.

Democracy Aid and Regime Change: A Complex Relationship

Since the Third Wave of Democracy, scholars have increasingly sought to gauge the effectiveness of the Western countries’ influence on foreign polities through different types of aid. While a well-known study by Knack (2004) found no relationship between foreign aid and Freedom House or Polity IV scores, more detailed and rigorously tested efforts³ have since suggested that foreign aid is often positively related to a developing country’s movement towards democracy.⁴ The efficacy of democracy aid per dollar may differ significantly depending not only on the specific political and economic characteristics of the recipient country, but also on the global political climate, the donor country, and whether the recipient also receives competing aid packages from non-Western sources. The myriad of influencing factors is also complicated by the difficulty of accurately observing, measuring, and comparing tangible change within the democratic institutions and public attitudes of a country.

While there is no convincing consensus relating to the efficacy of democracy aid, scholars have generally found that over the long-term, democracy and governance funding may indeed be directing developing countries towards democracy. One finding suggests that a 100 percent increase in democracy aid, on average, is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in Polity scores by country years.⁵ Another analysis using Freedom House scores finds that, on average, a doubling of democratic assistance is associated with a 7 percent increase in a country’s democracy score over a 25-year period.⁶ Quantitative analysis has also suggested that democracy aid has been more effective in the Post-Cold War period, that countries experience diminishing marginal returns to democracy aid as they become more democratic, and that increased aid from non-Western sources is generally associated with democratic recession.⁷

Democratic Shifts in Sub-Saharan Africa

In general, there are two avenues for affecting regime change through foreign aid. The conditioning of any type of aid (most commonly attached to multiparty elections and human rights standards) represents one of these avenues. The other main vehicle for change is the direct investment in democracy promotion through the funding of programs typically centered on governance building and civil society

support.⁸ Sub-Saharan Africa has historically remained heavily reliant on foreign aid, which creates the opportunity for what Levitsky and Way (2010) call high levels of *Leverage* between Western donors and many countries within the region.⁹ Largely due to the conditioning of Western aid to the holding of multi-party elections, the number of self-proclaimed single-party systems fell from 29 to 0 between 1989 and 1994, as autocratic leaders repositioned their regimes for the post-Cold War era.¹⁰ The number of elections held per year has also proliferated at an astounding rate. From 1960-1989, the continent held less than one election per year on average, but from 1990-2012, that figure jumped to almost seven.¹¹ However, this expansion in electoral activity has not been matched by an equal increase in political competition.¹²

Table 1: Democracy and Governance Aid Distribution

Sixteen African Countries	2001-2010 D&G Aid	2001-2010 All Aid
Civil Society ¹³	8.19%	1.24%
Legislatures and Political Parties	0.06%	0.01%
Legal and Judicial Development	3.26%	0.49%
Decentralization and Support for Sub-national Governments	1.04%	0.16%
Government Capacity Building ¹⁴	84.44%	12.74%
TOTAL	100%	14.64%

The direct impact of funds assigned to democracy and governance programs is more challenging to observe in Sub-Saharan Africa. In one analysis Goldsmith (2001) finds a positive but miniscule relationship between governance funding and decreased rates of corruption in the region.¹⁵ Research has also shown that an increase in democracy aid is tied to lower rates of electoral misconduct.¹⁶ Dietrich (2013) observed that more recently donors are increasing their support to African civil society groups, largely due to concerns of inadvertently strengthening authoritarian state structures in the context of hybrid regimes.¹⁷ However, as the second column of Table 1 shows, civil society spending still makes up only 8.19 percent of the total democracy aid in the Sub-Saharan African countries examined, with the vast majority of democracy aid (84.44 percent) going towards government capacity building. The third column of Table 1 shows that all democracy and governance aid represents just 14.64 percent of overall foreign aid to these countries, with civil society funding representing 1.24 percent of total foreign assistance.

The Supply and Demand of Democracy

In order to approach the quandary of democracy aid effectiveness from a fresh viewpoint, this paper replaces the heavily relied upon Freedom House and Polity democracy indicators in search of new variables that also attempt to capture movements from or towards democracy. Scholars from the Afrobarometer, an African-led public opinion research organization, have developed alternative measurements to examine the prevalence of democratic ideals and perceptions of democratic institutions in African countries. By utilizing these data from a selection of African countries,¹⁸ changes in public opinion may be compared alongside variations in funding from international donors. Instead of relying on expert opinion, this method captures the extent to which Africans actually desire and observe regime change over time. In the way, public opinion may be used to triangulate expert rankings of regime change since both types of measurements exhibit differing methodological vulnerabilities. By compiling data from questions regarding popular support for democracy as well as the rejection of military, one-party, and dictatorial regimes, the Afrobarometer team has developed a new measurement called *Demand for Democracy*. In a similar fashion, survey questions relating to the public's perceived extent of democracy and satisfaction with democratic institutions are indexed into a country's *Supply of Democracy*.¹⁹

While regression testing is unavailable due to the small sample size, changes in the supply and demand of democracy for twelve countries from 2001-2011 and four countries from 2003-2011 are compared to levels of funding by specific aid sectors relating to democracy and governance promotion through the use of the aiddata database.²⁰ In the spirit of a quasi-pre-test/post-test experiment, this allows for some control over specific country characteristics such as religious and ethnic make-up, population size, land size, natural resources and other slow-moving or fixed variables. While several alternative explanations for the recorded shifts in the supply and demand of democracy remain absent from this analysis, the specificity of these instruments provides argument for a relationship between certain types of democracy aid and the observed changes of democratic supply and demand. Using regression analysis, Bratton (2012) discovers that the public's perception of the state of the economy, freedom of expression, and fairness of the previous election are all significantly and positively related to the supply of democracy in the Afrobarometer surveyed countries.²¹

One may hypothesize that higher levels of democracy aid would support increases in both the supply and demand of democratic institutions. Table 2 displays the changes in both demand and supply of democracy for the sixteen countries examined, along with the amount of dollars per capita that each country received from 2001-2010 in civil society strengthening and government capacity building. Countries with large populations like South Africa and Nigeria

Table 2: Supply and Demand Changes compared to Aid Allocation per Capita

2001-2011	Civil Society Spending per Capita (USD)	Gov. Capacity Spending per capita (USD)	Supply of Democracy Change	Demand for Democracy Change
Cape Verde*	22.59	640.45	+17.5%	+11.5%
Zimbabwe	22.12	5.22	+8.5%	+4.0%
Zambia	14.38	171.72	+12.0%	+7.8%
Malawi	13.56	98.84	-5.0%	+3.0%
Mali	12.77	164.51	-19%	+0.3%
Lesotho	12.57	172.32	+12.5%	+14.0%
Mozambique*	11.43	199.84	-14.5%	+11.3%
Tanzania	11.41	189.56	+19.0%	-0.2%
Ghana	9.81	214.64	+15.0%	+5.3%
Senegal*	9.78	84.62	+11.0%	+11.8%
Uganda	9.29	98.29	-3.5%	+13.8%
Namibia	8.23	37.50	+1.0%	+16.0%
Kenya*	7.50	37.89	-33.0%	-6.3%
South Africa	6.39	8.04	+6.0%	+5.0%
Botswana	3.99	823.64	-3.5%	+1.3%
Nigeria	1.63	8.44	-29.0%	-7.0%
Average	12.54	184.72	-0.3%	5.6%

*2003-2011 only due to data availability

experience low levels of aid per capita, while countries with smaller populations like Botswana and Cape Verde received around one hundred times the amount government support funding per person. Civil society aid also follows this same trend, but to a lesser extent. In Zimbabwe, donors clearly saw a strategic opportunity to subvert the authoritarian regime by investing a significant amount of funding in civil society organizations, while virtually cutting off direct government support. The countries with more advance economies and higher democracy rankings within the group (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia) received fairly low levels of civil society spending.

In regards to shifts in the supply of democracy over 2001/2003-2011, Kenya and Nigeria especially see significant decreases, likely due to the occurrence of serious destabilization and political-motivated violence surrounding elections in each country over this period.²² Decreases in demand for democracy are also observed in each of these countries, as citizens absorb the harsh reality of violence and power struggle surrounding competitive elections. Across the sixteen countries, citizens' confidence in the vitality of their democratic institutions stagnated over the decade with the supply of democracy decreasing by 0.3 percent; however, public demand for democracy increased on average by 5.6 percent. The static trend observed in the supply of democracy variable over this period reflects a larger phenomenon, as worldwide Freedom House scores have plateaued worldwide since around 2006.²³

Though each of the examined countries were subject to a variety of unique political, economic, and social circumstances over this period of time, civil society funding is shown to have a strong connection with the Afrobarometer data as displayed in Chart 1. The general trend shows that as

civil society spending per capita increases, the change in demand for democracy by citizens is also expected to increase. The relationship between these two variables is correlated at 0.61 ($p < 0.05$), and change in the perceptions of supply of democracy is also positively correlated with civil society spending at 0.40, but just fails to reach a meaningful level of significance at the $p < 0.10$ level. Not surprisingly, the changes in the supply and demand of democracy are also strongly associated with one another, exhibiting a correlation of 0.55 ($p < 0.05$). These findings greatly suggest that civil society aid bolsters citizens' backing of democracy.

Chart 2: Civil Society Spending per Capita





Chart 2 demonstrates these findings by displaying the average levels of civil society aid per capita on the vertical axis in dollars. On the horizontal axis countries are separated into groups that experienced either an increase or decrease on the supply and demand indexes. On average, countries whose citizens believe their country has moved away from democracy between 2001-2011, received an average of \$8.90 per capita of civil society spending from foreign donors. In comparison, countries whose citizens' believed their country was moving

towards democracy received an average of \$15.38. A t-test confirms that the difference between these groups is statically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. In a similar manner, the three countries that experienced a decrease in demand of democracy over the same period received an average of \$7.83 per capita of civil society spending, compared to an average of \$13.63 across the other thirteen countries that observed an increase in demand.

Aid from the other sectors that are generally considered as democratic aid (Legislature and Political Parties, Legal and Judicial, Local Government, Government Capacity Building) fail to see any meaningful

Chart 1- Civil Society Spending per Capita and Changes in Demand of Democracy



correlations with shifts in either the supply or demand of democracy across the sixteen countries. As observed in Table 1, three of these funding categories: Legislature and Political Parties, Legal and Judicial, and Local Government represent a minute portion of total foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African countries. Meanwhile, government capacity building aid does not exhibit any meaningful relationship with either the supply or demand indicators even though this sector is well funded. Aid allocated for this purpose may potentially slow democratic consolidation through the strengthening of incumbent rulers, or perhaps citizens do not directly observe or associate state building with democratic consolidation. Either way, the findings presented here suggest that foreign donors have received stronger returns in terms of democracy promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa through civil society support.

Conclusion

A host of country-specific characteristics create a challenging set of circumstances for understanding the effectiveness of democracy aid. Several studies have shown that democracy aid is strategically allocated to countries depending on the country's economic conditions, history of colonization, level of democratic consolidation, as well as the strategic importance of the recipient country to the donor country. Furthermore, matters including a government's level of corruption, the existence of basic democratic institutions, and the recipient's dependence on aid may all influence the effectiveness of democratic promotion. Though scholars point to a worldwide "Democratic Recession" since the mid-2000s, public opinion research also shows that African citizens are, on average, demanding more effective democratic institutions across the continent. The correlations found between measures of both democratic supply and demand in Sub-Saharan Africa and higher rates of civil society funding provides a strong argument for donors to continue supporting this sector as an effective instrument for democratic change.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright. "Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 1 (2015): 216-234. Dietrich and Wright generally define "Democracy and Governance foreign aid," as funding allocated towards the judiciary, legislature, civil society organizations, elections, anti-corruption agencies, and government capacity building. See Table 1.
- 2 The following papers relying on Freedom House, Polity or both: Knack (2004); Dietrich and Wright (2015); Findley, Hawkins, Nielson, Nielson,

and Wilson (2010); Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, Seligson, and Azpuru (2006); Nielson and Nielson (2010); Kersting and Kilby (2014).

- 3 Michael Findley, Darren Hawkins, Rich Nielsen, Dan Nielson, and Sven Wilson, "To Empower or Impoverish? The Sector-by-Sector Effectiveness of Foreign Aid," *AidData Oxford Conference*, (2010): 22-25.
- 4 Stephen Knack, "Does foreign aid promote democracy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (2004): 251-266.
- 5 Richard Nielsen and Daniel Nielson, "Triage for democracy: selection effects in governance aid," *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, Washington, DC. 2010.
- 6 Erasmus Kersting and Christopher Kilby, "Aid and democracy redux," *European Economic Review* 67 (2014): 125-143.
- 7 See Knack; Kersting and Kilby.
- 8 Dietrich and Wright, 217.
- 9 Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*, Cambridge University Press, (2010): 236-237.
- 10 Michael Bratton, and Nicholas Van de Walle, *Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective*, Cambridge University Press, (1997): 182.
- 11 Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, "Africa's Waning Democratic Commitment," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 101-113.
- 12 Dietrich and Wright, 219.
- 13 "Civil Society" includes funding for: Democratic Participation, Election Observation, Human Rights, Media, and Women's Political Participation.
- 14 "Government Capacity Building" includes funding for: Economic Planning, Monetary Policy, Budget Support, Government Administration, Public Sector Finance and Policy Management.
- 15 Arthur Goldsmith, "Foreign aid and statehood in Africa," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (2001): 123-148.
- 16 Dietrich and Wright, 232.
- 17 Simone Dietrich, "Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation*," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 698-712.
- Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, Mitchell A. Seligson, Dinorah Azpuru "Effects of US foreign assistance on democracy building: Results of a cross-national quantitative study," Final report, prepared for USAID (2006). Finkel et al. finds strong evidence that aid marked for civil society strengthening has had a noticeable impact on the vibrancy of media and election support activities in developing countries.
- 18 Selection includes all countries in which the Afrobarometer collected data in either Round 1 (2001) or Round 2 (2003) and Round 5 (2011). < <http://www.afrobarometer.org/>>
- 19 Michael Bratton, "Trends in Popular Attitudes to Multiparty Democracy in Africa 2000-2012," *Afrobarometer Working Paper* (2012): 4.
- 20 Michael J. Tierney, Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley, Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks, "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1891-1906.
- 21 Bratton, 11.
- 22 For example: Kenya elections in 2007, Nigeria elections in 2011
- 23 Larry Diamond, "Facing up to the Democratic Recession," *Journal of Democracy* 26 no. 1 (2015): 141-155.

Program Highlights

❖ On January 30th, 2015 **Ann Weber**, D&G class of 2016, organized an “Insider Tour” of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum for students. The group met with Museum staff involved in international outreach programs and genocide prevention work, including initiatives to combat anti-semitism in Eastern Europe and the MENA region, State Department visits, creation of an upcoming exhibit on mass atrocities in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, genocide prevention work with US and international military, and an early warning system for genocide prevention.



❖ On February 11th, 2015 the Democracy and Governance Program in partnership with the African Studies Program hosted former president of Ethiopia **Dr. Negasso Solan**. Dr. Solan, a NED Fellow, delivered a talk titled *The Role of Democracy Building in a Multi-Ethnic State: The Case of Ethiopia*.

❖ On March 23rd, 2015 **Prof. Josep Colomer** delivered a talk on his recent book, *How Global Institutions Rule the World*. The book examines the ability of international institutions to make decisions and their compatibility with democratic principles.

❖ On March 26th, 2015 the Democracy and Governance Program welcomed its accepted students to our annual Open House. We were pleased to have **Robert Benjamin**, senior associate and the regional director of Central and Eastern Europe programs at the National Democratic Institute join us.

❖ May 15, 2015 was the Georgetown Graduate School's Commencement Ceremony. We were extremely proud to graduate the following students: **Ugur Altundal, Jie Bai, Emily Kehrt, Matthew Mainuli, Kellen McClure, Maria Regina Reis, Weiyi Wang, Zhichao Yi, and Yu Zhang**.

❖ The Democracy and Governance Advisory Board held its inaugural meeting in January. The board brings together some of the best individuals from the democracy promotion and international development community. The current members are **Shari Bryan** (Vice President, NDI), **Thomas**

Garrett (Vice President, IRI), **Larry Cooley** (President, MSI), **Eric Bjornlund** (Principal, DI), **Thomas Carothers** (Carnegie Endowment), **Beatriz Casals** (Founder, Casals and Associates), and **Amb. Donald Planty** (Founder, Planty and Associates). The board discussed ways to maintain the prominence of the program as the premier host for democracy and governance studies, and ways to ensure that our curriculum matches the job market needs.

❖ The program's inaugural USAID study group concluded its research and delivered its findings this spring. Under the tutelage of **Prof. Jeff Fischer**, five students (**Jie Bai '15, Sibghat Ullah '16, Tyler Knarr '16, Javier Pena '16, and Cabell Willis '16**) delved into the causes and reactions to electoral violence. Their results can be found at: <https://government.georgetown.edu/node/1441>.

❖ A new **Executive Education** initiative was created by the Democracy and Governance program. In an effort to bridge the gap between theory and practice even further, there are now new summer short course offerings on the theme of **Electoral Integrity**. There are currently three short courses on the topics of *Election Technology*, *Election Violence*, and *Election Malpractice*. Each lasts two full days and combines theoretic and practitioner perspectives. More information can be found at: <https://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-governance/executive-education>.

❖ D&G Program welcomes **Dr. Georges Fauriol** as the instructor for GOVT 550: Democracy Promotion. **Dr. Fauriol** is currently the Vice President of Programs - Planning, Grants Management, Compliance, and Evaluation at the National Endowment for Democracy. He is also a former Senior Vice President and Acting President at the International Republican Institute.

Faculty Awards and Publications

❖ **Prof. Yonatan L. Morse** received the Harold N. Glassman Award from Georgetown University for his dissertation *Party Matters: The Sources of Regime Competitiveness and Hegemony in Post Cold War Africa*.

Student and Alumni News

❖ **Andrew Mandelbaum**, D&G class of 2008, has co-founded the Moroccan non-profit SimSim-Participation Citoyenne. The organization is implementing the second year of its Nouabook.ma project, which helps citizens ask

Call for Papers: *Democracy & Society* • Volume 13, Issue 1

Democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Resurgence

Since the end of the Cold War, the performance of nascent democracies has been the primary focus of political scientists around the world. This paradigm shift has produced a new body of research that recognizes the growing resurgence in authoritarian-type regimes that threaten democratic development in their respective countries. Given the unsuccessful democratic outcomes in states with recently deposed regimes, is the world in a state of “democratic decline,” as some experts warn? With the Arab spring and South Asian cases in mind, should observers be pessimistic about the current condition of democratization? Also, with major actors like China and Russia openly pursuing nondemocratic policies, how can we assess the role of authoritarian politics on the international and domestic levels?

We are seeking articles that address the following questions:

“Hybrid Regimes” and the Democratic Grey Area

How do autocrats use features of democracy to preserve their power, such as elections or courts? What institutional factors can make states susceptible to democratic erosion? Is it useful to analyze cases in terms of “democratic-ness” and is further research necessary for conceptual clarity?

Protest, Oppositions, and Response

How do alienated populations express their opposition to a regime through various modes of Civil Society? Are protest movements more successful when they promote democratic principles or are organized into formal political parties? What can we learn from response tactics perpetrated by incumbent regimes?

The Military as an Arbitrator

What can we draw from the historically salient relationship between militaries and authoritarianism? What incentives may be present that influence armed forces to keep their distance from politics or openly seize power?

International Relations and Modern Authoritarianism

Do autocratic governments face strained relationships with democracies? How is international diplomacy affected by the politics of a dictatorial or “hybrid” regime? What can we discern about the continued power of states that reject democracy as a preferred form of government (I.E., China, Russia, Turkey, etc.)?

Variations on these themes will be accepted, as well as research that is relevant to these themes.

Please visit, <https://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-society> for more information about *Democracy & Society* and <http://government.georgetown.edu/cdacs> for more information about the M.A. in Democracy and Governance and the Center for Democracy and Civil Society.

questions to their members of Parliament, and encourages the latter to respond online and in public.

❖ **Mariel Leonard**, D&G class of 2011, presented a poster on “Achieving Post-Conflict Stability Through Civil Society” at the APSA Political Networks conference in Portland Oregon on June 17, 2015. She is a part of a team of researchers at Westat that is conducting on-going research into the prevalence of honor-based violence in the US.

❖ **David Jandura**, D&G class of 2011, is currently based in Tunis, Tunisia, providing direct technical assistance to Libyan civil society and constitution drafters, in Libya’s constitution drafting process.

❖ **Yuan Li**, D&G class of 2012, currently serves as Center Manager for the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy (Brookings Institution). Before joining Brookings,

Yuan Li worked as a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

❖ **Andrea Murta**, D&G class of 2013, left PwC and since January she is the head of the Americas at the Business Intelligence division of a company called The Risk Advisory Group (www.riskadvisory.net). She coordinates the anti-corruption corporate investigations in the Americas over here.

❖ **Pablo Estrada**, D&G class of 2014, works since September 2014 as advisor to Counselor Benito Nacif in Mexico’s National Electoral Institute. He attends issues related to the administration of the Institute, regulation of electoral polls and surveys, and the organization of electoral processes. As well, during falls he teaches the course “Sociology and political science” to BA in International Relations students at Anáhuac University.



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