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The role of Organised Civil Society in the reduction of social risks: How inequality intervenes in civil society actors’ attitudes to co-engagement with migrant citizens in public and community life

El papel de la sociedad civil organizada en la reducción de los riesgos sociales: ¿Cómo la desigualdad interviene en las actitudes de los actores de la sociedad civil hacia el compromiso con los ciudadanos inmigrantes en la vida pública y de la comunidad?

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Abstract:

Social investment policy assumes that inequalities are unavoidable and focus on the reduction of new social risks within segments of the population. This requires the participation of Organised Civil Society (OCS) close to those at risk. With the economic downturn, inequality within the EU has become acute. Negative attitudes towards the vulnerable are increasing, while their participation in public life is weak. This article attempts to understand to what extent inequality influences the participation of migrants at risk and the scope of OCS actors to co-engage with them. The text is illustrated with data and responses from OCS actors based in a Barcelona district. The article suggests the link between participation and access to welfare, and how unequal access encourages stigmatised views among some actors. In conclusion, it argues that, to achieve greater participation, it is necessary to have a system that promotes solidarity and inclusion through redistributive policies.

Keywords: organised civil society, active citizenship, migrants, new social risks, social inequality.

Resumen:

La política de inversión social asume las desigualdades como inevitables y focaliza en la reducción de nuevos riesgos sociales en segmentos de la población. Esto requiere la participación de la sociedad civil organizada (SCO) próxima a aquellos a riesgo. Con la crisis...
europea, la desigualdad se ha hecho aguda y las actitudes negativas hacia aquellos en situación de riesgo van aumentando, mientras mantienen una participación débil en la vida pública. El artículo intenta entender como la desigualdad influye en la participación de estos inmigrantes y la predisposición de la SCO en coparticipar con ellos. El texto contiene datos y respuestas de actores de SCO de Barcelona. Sugiere una relación entre participación y acceso a la protección social y sostiene que el acceso desigual estimula opiniones estigmatizadas. Argumenta que, para mayor participación, es necesario contar con un sistema que promueva la solidaridad y la inclusión a través de las políticas redistributivas.

Palabras clave: la sociedad civil organizada, la ciudadanía activa, inmigrantes, los nuevos riesgos sociales, desigualdad social.

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1. Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, in order to adapt and link societies to market demands, most European Union (EU) nations started to approach their welfare regime reforms from the perspective of social investment in human capital. As a concept, social investment transforms the idea of a citizen with rights related to the welfare state to that of an active citizen (AC) related to the welfare mix institutions: the family, the state, the markets and Organised Civil Society (OCS).

This approach weakens the idea of universal social rights, as it assumes that inequalities are unavoidable. As a way forward, it seeks to build safeguards to avoid concentration of inequality within specific segments exposed to the new social risks (NSR) arising from demographic and economic changes (Esping-Andersen 1996:25). The strategy for reduction of NSR includes promoting and creating partnerships with the OCS. The organisations are required because of 1) their important role as advocates of citizens’ opinions and claims in public debates, 2) their capacity to deliver tailor-made service provision according to individual needs, and 3) the encouragement they give to citizens to participate in co-production of welfare and democratic life.

The participation in democratic life and capacity for political mobilisation, of people exposed to diverse types of NSR is generally weak. These groups are heterogeneous and do not seem to carry much weight in the political arena (Bonoli 2005). In the case of migrants, their low influence in democratic decisions is due to reduced or non-existent electoral rights and lack of interest from the political parties. The demands for social protection of migrant’s, as those of other groups exposed to NSR, must be contextualised within a heterogeneous and segmented society driven
by the logic of the globalised economy. In this scenario, the economic crisis exacerbates the already existing inequality within the European Union (EU). Therefore, the need for social mobilisation to demand legislation for disadvantaged groups becomes crucial. Given that the participation of those exposed to NSR is weak, Bonoli (2005) suggests that such legislation is likely to happen only through alliances and political exchange with other actors who possess greater political mobilisation. Theoretically speaking, the OCS is an incubator for such type of alliances. However, the current crisis seem to jeopardise the possibilities for such coalitions, as negative attitudes within society towards those exposed to NSR seem to be increasing (Taylor-Gooby 2013) (Achterberg, Van der Veen and Raven 2014: 215-226). Among those exposed are low-waged migrant workers (Centro de Estudios para la Integración Social y Formación de Inmigrantes 2012:33) whose presence in marginal jobs is motivated by aspirations to better standards of life for them and their relatives in their country of origin.

This article attempts to understand to what extent inequality and, in a lesser extent, factors such as, 1) economic commitments of migrants with their families in their country of origin, and, 2) electoral past experiences, influence their participation as citizens of the local demos and the scope and attitude of OCS actors to co-engage with them. The empirical information presented as an illustration of this is based on Ciutat Vella, a city district in Barcelona, where 41.8% of the total population consists of foreign residents (BCN 2012). Migrant participation in the democratic life of the city is low, and it has been suggested that their participation in native OCS is also low (Ministerio de Sanidad, Política Social e Igualdad, 2011:18).

2. Article structure and methodology

The article begins with a description of how the concept of inequality and risk is approached by social policy. This is followed by an account of the role of OCS as an enabler of citizen participation within the welfare institution. The text then draws together responses from six civil society practitioners. These responses function as empirical confirmation for the argument presented. The responses are supported by 1) data on the socio-economic circumstances of migrants within the host country, 2) an analysis of the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and Economist Intelligent Unit Democratic Index (EIUDI) of the country of origin of migrants registered and non registered for voting in 2011 local elections.

The latter information helps to appraise the responses collected on the reasons given for low engagement, and to understand how a citizen’s status and past democratic experiences intervenes in their participation within OCS.

The selection criteria for the six representative groups interviewed was based on their geographical remit, sources of income, area of concern and activities for the
reduction of NSR. Three of the organisations approached do not receive state funding and are active in the spatial and environmental quality of the neighbourhood. The other three organisations receive state funding for the socio-economic inclusion of exposed individuals. None of the organisations function exclusively for the well-being of migrant residents. The respondents were asked three open-ended questions: 1) Do migrant workers participate in your organisation as volunteers? If the response was negative, 2) what do you believe are the barriers for their engagement, and 3) have you attempted to involve them?

3. The investment state’s definition of risk and the role of the OCS

The post-1945 universal welfare state system that partly influenced the modernisation of the Spanish welfare regime after the establishment of democracy, seeks to guarantee a baseline for wellbeing through a system of compensations for hardship. In this model, the concept of risk is best described in the Beveridge Report (1942) as the «Giant Evils» in society: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease. Programmes to manage these risks are funded by redistributive taxation and horizontal contributions. The social budget is directed to health, education, the provision of public housing, benefits for the unemployed and social insurance seeking to reallocate income across the life-cycle. The reforms of traditional welfare regimes into social investment regimes have taken place as a result of the need to adapt society to the neo-liberal economy based on the freedom of movement for capital, goods, services and people. As result of this socio-economic transformation, Western societies are being de-industrialised. They are becoming more culturally diverse and socio-economically stratified by class, age, gender, race and ethnicity. These changes unsettle social notions, such as the stable nuclear family structure, stable employment and solidarity among a specific community in which the social protection system was embedded. This transformation has contributed to a more individualistic vision of life in a global context. The instability and increased social diversity plays a central role in weakening public opinion and support for a distributive welfare state (Taylor-Gooby 2008:166) and, through the welfare reforms, legitimises the transformation of the concept of social citizenship and the role of social institutions.

While observing programmes to manage previously identified risks, the designs of the welfare reforms also focus on reducing NSR by, for example, reducing the 1) risk of poverty and social exclusion among vulnerable, poorly-educated social groups, 2) risk of unsatisfactory care arrangements as a result of an increased number of women entering the job market, and 3) risk of unsatisfactory coverage of retirement pensions due to the privatisation of pensions and flexible employment (Taylor-Gooby 2003).

The investment state functions under the idea that reflection on risk and its management is primarily dependent on the individual and not the state, as was previ-
ously the case. The individual is deemed to have the capacity to systematically identify risks and interact with social structures to manage hazards. Individual perceptions of risk are indicators of subjective feelings of insecurity and uncertainty during the life course. These perceptions are influenced by individual factors, such as gender, education, ethnicity, age, and by institutional factors such as family, the labour market and welfare policy (Ejrnæs & Boje 2011:46-47).

In the case of migrants, institutional factors, such as a differentiated access to social protection system motivates feelings of uncertainty. For example, grey literature informs that out of date residency permits can lead to the criminalisation of migrants, unpredictable terms for remaining in the host country can facilitate abuse by employers, landlords and human traffickers. Consequently, the migrant perceives the risk of insecure documentation as an impediment to their economic integration. This integration is needed, not just to reach a normal standard of living, but also to fulfill economic commitments to their family in their country of origin. The migrant’s feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness brought about by their lack of rights to resolve the risks experienced in the host country are described by Agudelo-Suárez et al. (2009).

The policy assumption is that an individual can make rational choices about what is best for them in their social environment (Giddens 1999), and the role of the state is to invest in people and enhance their capacity to participate in the productive economy. This strategy gives priority to those segments of the population that are exposed to NSR, such as poverty and social exclusion. Therefore, as Jenson (2009:449-451) describes, policy focuses on equality in life chances, which implies redistribution of opportunities rather than redistribution of universal social rights. The main features of this approach are that social policy has to be productive rather than distributive and consumption-oriented. The emphases are on guaranteeing secure future investments in early childhood and a commitment to the economic activation of citizens. The premise for activation is that security will not only come from social protection, but from the individual’s capacity to adapt to change. The notion of job security is rare, and the idea is to prepare the AC to be mobile and flexible, as required by the global labour markets.

The socio-economic transformations referred to are part of the change of paradigm encompassed by the shift in the concepts and theory of social justice. Contemporary societies are not only more heterogeneous and segmented; they also experience a severe trend towards income inequality which creates the new working poor category of people that cuts across age, ethnicity and gender. In the context of a globalised economy, the number of those wanting to have a say in setting out frameworks is expanding while the chances for democratic participation are growing slimmer. As this article demonstrates, not all the working poor have possibilities and/or formal rights to participate and communicate perceptions of risk and claims for justice.
Fraser (2005) explains how the shift of paradigm affects the Keynesian theory of social justice. Pointing out that, in the past, intellectuals neglected to frame the participative role of individuals in the achievement of justice. In the post-Wesphalian paradigm she observes that, decisions about those who are subject to justice are increasingly viewed as political matters, and rather than being handled democratically, they are considered as a technical matter and left to the experts and the elites. Finally, the author sees that the dialogic approach to justice arising within civil society and reflected by some theorists needs to be framed in a theory of democratic justice. The emphasis of this theory is on aspects of social justice that are taken as matters for collective democratic deliberation and decision making. This framework allows the inclusion of all those wanting to have a say at every level, from meta-political to ordinary politics. The ideal conditions for such participation in democratic life are offered by Fraser (Fraser et al. 2004) (Palacio Avendaño 2009) in the Parity of Participation concept. This provides a framework for the ideal conditions for citizen participation based on three factors:

1) Fair redistribution of wealth and rights. A universal social protection system is crucial for sharing common concerns and participating in democratic decision-making to identify appropriate solutions. In this context, the role of the state is that of a strong institution that distributes equal rights and promotes reciprocity, solidarity and inclusion (Taylor-Gooby 2013; Portes and Vickstrom 2011).

2) Recognition of differences. The concept is embedded in the social justice ideal, where moral equality means people have the status to participate on an equal basis, independently of cultural differences.

3) Representation of all interests, opinions and claims in the OCS dialogue within the political sphere. Mutual recognition entails the fair representation of needs according to the opinions and claims of those exposed to risk, rather than the interpretation of these risks by others. In a stratified society where inequality is acknowledged as unavoidable, certain groups enjoy more power and resources than others to express and communicate their needs. Fraser (2013a: 58) rightly observes that, in this situation, communication is also stratified. This is to say that while the needs of those exposed to NSR are recognised in the discourse, those exposed to exclusion and poverty are arguably excluded from the debate.

3.1. The OCS role in the management of NSR

The investment discourse maintains that citizen participation in the OCS is meant to stimulate an individual’s interest in political life and events within their society and, therefore, strengthen their feelings of belonging. Within this concept, the role allocated to the OCS is two-fold: Firstly, as welfare institutions, to meet the needs of a differentiated population by providing services and opportunities for participation and, secondly, to represent the preferences of a diverse number of actors within public debates. This
representation in public debates is often made on behalf of those described by Beck (2009:496) as not benefiting from reflection on risk, and/or any real scope to define their own risks. Beck’s argument applies to the case of migrants. Theoretically, host societies who experience a certain standard of life are able to collaborate with migrants to create debate on social injustices and to encourage the democratic and communal engagement of new residents. Migrant perceptions of risk play an important part in the understanding of many migrants’ participation in the public sphere, such as the case of highly active migrants investigated by Vogel (2008).

The following classification serves to interpret how OCS respondents perceive migrant exposure to NSR and their possibilities for participation in the OCS. Civil society is considered as a space of non-domination, populated by formal and informal organisations searching for consensus for social transformation. Within the OCS, individuals and their organisations share views of justice that are somehow influenced by the free market and social protection world views (Fraser 2013b) defined as individualistic or egalitarian (Oltedal et al. 2004:17-25). Those with individualistic views are concerned about the obstruction of their freedom by third parties. This could be represented by restrictions imposed by government on their activities, or deviations to their agenda introduced by non-invited groups or individuals. The individualist perceives risk as an opportunity to build social and economic capital. The opportunity ends when the freedom of the group is threatened. Self-preservation is natural for this group, and they do not require state intervention to protect them. Individualist groups believe in social order, as they support the democratic institutions and, frequently, they are not indifferent to those exposed to NSR. However, their contribution to the reduction of risk as defined by the investment state is discretionary. The egalitarian world view is reflected in groups concerned with social justice, and they are opposed to the exposure to risks that inflicts social exclusion. Egalitarian groups enact with the state by providing services and by promoting participation in democratic life. These organisations communicate demands and share perceptions of risk as defined in their agreements with governments. In this case, the government and the organisation agree on practices to be delivered by the latter in order to assist people facing certain types of NSR.

To summarise this section, the investment model focusses on equality in life chances, rather than universal redistribution of wealth and rights. Within the social investment paradigm, the citizen is viewed as a rational actor who chooses what is best for them. The welfare institutions of the OCS play a role in meeting the needs of a differentiated population, as well as representing and aggregating their preferences within public debates. Experienced host societies are able to collaborate on highlighting the injustices experienced by the new residents and encourage those exposed to NSR to articulate their claims for social justice. The ideal conditions for migrant participation are based on recognition of differences, redistribution of wealth and rights, and representation of all individuals’ interests within the public sphere.
4. The case study

In Spain, the welfare state is based on social insurance. Entitlements depend on life-long employment, which helped to reinforce the male-breadwinner logic of social protection and that wellbeing responsibilities lie with the family (Esping-Andersen and Myles 2008).

Social investments are made primarily to adapt the skills of those at risk in a dual labour market, where both highly protected workers and unprotected temporary workers exist simultaneously (Ejrnaes and Boje 2011). In 2008 it was reported that, in Spain, the risk to social exclusion for poor migrant working populations from non-EU countries is double than that of the native citizen (Eurostats 2011:64). Often Migrants’ are recipients of a lower income than the median (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Catalunya 2011). Their Lower educational attainment influences the type of employment available, often in marginal job market positions (Pajares 2010: 45-53), and exposes individuals to a higher risk of unemployment than the median (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2011: 3).

As table 1 shows migrants in Barcelona are occupying temporary employment positions, most of them in the service industry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contracts to migrants in year 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The type of employment contract has an effect on the immigration status of non-EU workers, which is not the case with EU nationals. That is to say, the legal system

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segregates migrant workers into different resident statuses: EU nationals enjoy rights such as that of freedom of movement and residence without the necessarily to be employed legally, while non-EU nationals can only obtain a resident permit through legal employment and their geographical freedom of movement is restricted. That is, they are not authorised to move freely across the national territory in response to employment demands and the process of family re-union is more complex than in the case of their counterparts (España 2000). For both groups access to the health system is subject to employment contributions, as is also the case for Spanish nationals (España 2011). Access to free education and free association is only available for those with residency permits (Chueca Sancho 2010).

### TABLE 2: Migrants residents in Ciutat Vella: Housing conditions and personal security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Housing profile</th>
<th>Personal Security</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrant househo</td>
<td>mix househo</td>
<td>More than 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciutat Vella</td>
<td>24,3%</td>
<td>17,3%</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pop. 41,8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-nat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>8,8%</td>
<td>9,8%</td>
<td>3,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pop. 17,4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-nat.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BCN-2 (2011); BCN-3 (2011); BCN-4 (2012)

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However, the lack of a residence permit does not prevent migrants from working illegally if the controls are weak and internal demand for migrant workers is high (Finotelli 2012: 193; 202). Molina (2012) provides an illustration of how, after 2008, many migrants had to rely on irregular work, due to either the scarcity of jobs or because their illegal employment status did not allow them to fulfil the legal requirements for obtaining a residence permit. This vulnerability is linked by Añón (2010:253-254) to their conditional access to social protection and civil rights. The author points out that legal segregation has an impact on the quality of the democracy, as individual precariousness and legal insecurity intervenes in migrants’ invisibility and affects the process of social inclusion.

Table 2 show a number of key indicators suggesting outcomes related to the differential treatment experienced by migrants in the Catalan society. In Ciutat Vella, Migrants reside in overcrowded housing within vulnerable neighbourhood. The above table suggests a link between material deprivation, ethnicity and personal security. The number of crimes reported in the area was three times as high as the median. Furthermore a National estimate of the proportion of migrants detained in prison in 2012 was around 45% of the 16,590 individuals in captivity. A portion of foreigners in detention are not regularised migrant workers, but they have been living in the country for several years. Many of them have established family, social and employment networks. Typically these arrests are taking place in neighbourhoods with a high density of migrant residents (Moran et al. 2012:1, 8,12).

4.1. The democratic participation of migrants in Citat Vella

Since 2009 some new categories of migrants have the right to vote in municipal elections, as previously was the case with EU nationals. This is the situation for nationals from EU accession and non-EU countries that have reciprocity agreements with Spain. These are Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Island, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay and Peru. In previous years, a number of civil society organisations campaigned and participated in various public debates regarding the granting of political rights to migrants (Zapata-Barrero & Zaragoza 2009). Before the 2011 municipal elections, civil society organisations representing migrants’ interests enacted with the state in an information and encouragement campaign targeting the above nationals who were able to vote for the first time (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración - Foro Integración 2011).

For foreigners, the right to vote is subject three conditions: 1) being a national of a country that signed a reciprocity agreement with Spain, 2) having been resident in Spain for 5 years, and 3) being enrolled on the electoral register (Moya and Viñas 2010; Cebrián 2011:7). Residents from countries which do not have a reciprocity treaty are numerous within the study district. Registration for non-Spanish individuals is compulsory. For those whose postal address is not registered by the police, the procedure entails visiting a police station, paying a fee and receiving a certificate that will allow the individual to register.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the proportion of migrants that have registered for voting versus the Human Development Index (HDI 2013 and EIUDI 2011). The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of migrants resident in Ciutat Vella. The number registered was obtained from the Spanish Office of National Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2011)) and the number of people resident in Barcelona was obtained from the statistics office of Ayuntamiento de Barcelona (2011). In both tables, the white bubbles represent non-EU residents without voting rights; the shaded bubbles represent non-EU residents with voting rights and the blue and green bubbles show residents from other EU countries respectively. The X axis shows the HDI and EIUDI of the migrants countries of origin, and the Y axis contains the percentage of registered individuals.

In Figure 1 the vertical line marks Spain’s HDI. The assumption made is that those to the left of the line migrated to gain better earnings and standards of life. The HDI is composed of indicators comprising education (measuring schooling and expected years of schooling), length of life and health, life expectancy at birth, and growth of national income per capita. The data is used to establish and compare the socio-economic circumstances experienced between migrants from countries with a lower HDI and those from countries with a higher HDI. In the case of migrant workers, the HDI intervenes in the reasons for migration and, as the above graphic suggests, in democratic engagement. The HDI indicates something about the level of migrant’s education and the type of employment for which they can qualify. It may also indicate economic responsibilities for those left at home. Figure 1 shows a strong corre-
lation between registration and the HDI. At the top of the graphic are EU nationals from countries with a very high HDI. Most of the nationalities represented have been eligible to vote in local elections since 1992. The drivers for migration of this group are not economic, as they can reach the same or higher standards of living in their own countries. The higher rates of registration for this group suggest experience in full democratic regimes and feelings of cultural, economic and social comfort in their new surroundings.

**FIG. 2.** Participation in registration of foreign residents for voting in municipal elections plotted against the Democratic Index according to the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2011 (EIUDI 2011)³. The bubble areas are proportional to the number of residents in Ciutat Vella. The white bubbles represent migrant without voting rights Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (2011), BCN-4. (2011), Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2011)⁴

In Figure 2, the EIUDI is composed of indicators: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political cul-

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³ This Index is compiled the Intelligent Unit of *The Economist* magazine and, as such, reflects the political orientation of this organisation.
⁶ Human Development Index. 2013.
ture. A high score signifies a more advance democratic system. The figure shows certain coloration between the HDI and DI regarding electoral registration. In both figures, at the bottom of the graphic are those residents without voting rights, most of them from non-fully democratic and poor countries. Although in most cases these residents are active participants in the local economy, they are paradoxically silenced by the formalities of the host democratic system. In the middle of the graphic there are EU and non-EU nationals, most of them exerting their voting rights in Spain for the first time. The registration of EU nationals in this group is higher than that of non-Europeans. This fact suggests that electoral traditions and socio-economic differences act as barriers for participation. The two hypotheses to interpret the difference in registration within this group are: the first is that the Europeans have slightly more successful experiences of democratic life in their home countries. The second is that the European citizens enjoy better rights for residence that make them feel more secure and able to plan their lives, and they feel politically integrated by the fact of being EU citizens. The answer to the first hypothesis is complex and requires further studies as the DI composite is made according Western traditions and does not contemplate diverse relevant participative processes occurring beyond the West. The second hypothesis can be verified according to the theory of Parity of Participation (Fraser et al. 2004; Palacio Avendaño 2009). In this middle group, migrant citizens are recognised as part of the demos where they also have the opportunity of being elected as representatives of specific interests. The fact that EU citizens have better residence rights and more optimistic experiences about the benefits of democratic elections than their counterparts suggests that a citizen’s status influences their individual registration.

The case of the Ecuadorians and Colombians in Citat Vella highlights another aspect of representation. These nationals have community representatives in mainstream parties that are sympathetic to immigrants (Lladó, 2011). Their turn-out was lower than expected despite the considerable efforts of their community organisations. Economic responsibilities and legal vulnerability are interpreted by a community leader as follows: Economic concerns accentuated by the crisis... conspire against the participation of the Ecuadorian migrants. (A. Cedeño, Presidente de la Federación de Entidades Ecuatorianas, 2011). Part of the blame for the low registration is placed on the disinterest of Spanish political parties to view migrants as citizens, and not just as workers. This was expressed by a migrant community leader: People still do not feel like a citizen. Despite that, many are aware that they can vote, but they could not care less...there is disaffection because immigrants believe that the winning party will end up giving them back. Later, he added that the immigrant is perceived as a worker and not as a citizen, and the politicians are comfortable and uninterested in the migrant vote (Bonomi 2011).

The article continues with a description of the role of the local OCS and the efforts and perceptions of its actors regarding migrant engagement in democratic and communal life.
4.2. The communal engagement of migrants as interpreted by OCS actors

The Spanish state legally acknowledges registered civil society organisations under the name of the Third Sector. These groups are recognised by their contribution to society, the promotion of social cohesion, their support to local development and their contribution to the social and economic inclusion of individuals and families at risk of exclusion. As defined by the state, the key function of the welfare institutions is their instrumentality in implementing social policies (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigracion 2011; Consell Economic i Social de Barcelona 2012:134). The importance of OCS in the social life of the Catalonia region is illustrated by the existence of 7500 registered organisations in which 245000 citizens engage as volunteers. The majority of the organisations are based in the city of Barcelona (Observatorio del Tercer Sector 2013). The Municipal working plan on immigration for 2012-2015 (Ayuntamiento de Barcelona 2012) envisages a positive intercultural relationship where neighbourhood organisations act as convenors and builders of activities that could foster relationships between residents of diverse origins.

In the local arena, registered organisations enact with public policy and/or by working towards the reduction of NSR risks. The unregistered groups work towards correcting and preventing spatial/environmental problems, while offering access to socio-cultural opportunities. How the organisations perceive and act on NSR and environmental/spatial problems is noted in the written mission statements of the six organisations interviewed for this article. These statements echo concerns that are also expressed in resident surveys on unemployment, personal security, economic problems, immigration, lack of environmental and spatial sustainability, poverty and Inequality (Consell Economic i Social de Barcelona 2012:147).

Egalitarian and individualistic approaches towards migrant engagement were noted in the responses received from organisations that do not receive state funding. Both types of respondents make attempts to attract migrants by, for example, publishing their activities in different languages and/or liaising with migrants organisations. The distinction arises between those who need the relationship to support the debate/agenda of already established groups, and those who are open to a flexible coming and going of residents and who appreciate the migrants’ skills. The former is the case for two organisations concerned with particular issues related to anti-social behaviour and the environmental degradation of specific spaces, and the latter is an organisation that was interested in sharing a communal garden with migrants. Despite the different approaches, all respondents coincided in that there was little or no engagement of migrants as volunteers and/or participants in communal activities. The respondent from one of the individualistic organisations stated that one of the reasons for the absence of migrants is that the profile of the migrant workers does not coincide with that of the individuals attending the meetings... migrants and migrant groups that assist individuals, have too many problems for them to be concerned with environmental issues. This comment not only confirms the material barriers experienced by migrants in order to...
attend meetings, but also indicates the type of profile that qualifies individuals for the weekly discussions organised by the group. This statement could be considered as lack of interest in engaging with migrants and vice-versa. The respondent from the egalitarian organisation sees the inclusion of migrants as a process in which the first contact is made through communal meals and the migrant’s children participating in activities.

The programmes of state-funded organisations could be defined as being in the egalitarian camp. However, in the interviews, the social workers’ interpretation of migrant exposure to NSR precluded the perception of migrant workers as citizens who are fully able to participate on equal grounds.

According to the respondents, the reason for the low participation of adult migrants is that they have to work to support themselves and many also have family responsibilities in their home countries. If the migrants have a job they will not come here to volunteer when they can do other things. They have responsibilities to their families in their own countries and have to send them money. When they [migrant workers] go to the organisations, it is just for the service provision. Many cannot go to the public social services because they have no papers, so they go to the organisations. Grey literature shows that, currently, an important proportion of migrant users of welfare organisations do not hold work permits.

As Bonomi (2011) commented, this study noted that most interviewees perceive the migrant as a worker and not as a co-participant in OCS activities. In the case of two groups that enact with the government on different aspects of employability strategies, the idea of the migrant as a volunteer within those groups is not considered as a priority for the social inclusion of new residents within society.

The statements below are the views of two respondents for this article:

- For the migrant it is difficult to engage as their priorities are others...however what we are doing is those who receive training for employment they have an obligation to give back to society, for example, those training themselves as waiters are sent to serve in organisations.

- The idea to involve the migrants as volunteers is interesting but is a difficult challenge. Their perception of the function of the organisations is that of service provision...and most do not go hungry and homeless, all that they can take outside work is a bonus.

5. Discussion and conclusion

Although migrants have the capacity to reflect on risks, as demonstrated by an individual’s decision to migrate in order to reduce risk occurring in their homeland,
they do not have the scope to reflect on risks occurring in the host country. The data presented shows that migrants are often constrained in participating democratically by rules and conditions imposed on them by electoral and/or social protection system. Fraser’s idea of parity of participation serves to identify that, in the case of migrant worker with voting rights; the ability to participate in the redistribution of rights is linked to interest to participate in democratic life. This is observed in the attitude of non EU nationals with rights to vote but with more limited access to social protection versus the attitude of the EU nationals who are less conditioned by the system. The data also demonstrates past democratic experiences in the migrants’ home countries are linked to attitudes in electoral participation within the host society. These experiences are related to political culture in general and civil liberties that allow the individual to communicate risks and influence policy via the democratic process.

The theory of democratic justice helps to identify the extent to which migrants exposed to NSR are considered by the native OCS actors who, potentially, are able to facilitate the formation of alliances in support of social justice. Migrants workers from less developed countries (with and without voting rights) seem to be absent as volunteers/participants in the community life of the organisations approached, that is to say that there is no representation of their interests within these organisations. The OCS respondents seem to interpret the absence of migrants from a socially-integrated position. The illustrative comments offered express recognition regarding the migrants’ economic and cultural barriers to participation. As some of the responses reflect, this type of recognition is not free from stigmatisation. There is a perception of migrants living on the margins of society with a different social and economic agenda than that of the host OCS, and citizens in general.

For social investment policy making, the role of the organisations is to define different types of hazards and engage in actions, either independently or in collaboration with other welfare institutions, whose aim is to reduce risks and avoid future problems. This occurs in an objective manner. All groups approached for this study, including those participating in government programmes, shared similar views on the migrants’ motives for living in Ciutat Vella, and the new risks are interpreted as other people’s problems. Migrant’s experiences of inequality are recognised, interpreted and communicated by those organisations enacting social policy. However the respondents perceive migrants as service users, rather than as citizens able to contribute in the achievement of social justice. It is arguable that feelings of belonging can be promoted by asking an individual to contribute to society through using their acquired skills to serve in a segregated labour market. In my opinion, to invite a migrant to ‘donate’ work as a waiter during an OCS gathering could be seen as an act of disempowerment. It would also be particularly problematic if that migrant has not previously had the opportunity to participate as an engaged citizen within the group in question, perhaps in intelligent debates, in the organisation of the activities, or as a keynote speaker. That is to say, although the state invests in employment
strategies, a migrant with unequal access to social protection is the recipient of training funding to enable them to work in low-paid labour market positions. This does not free them from poverty and continues to exclude them from life opportunities, such as participating in the community where they live. I believe that the antidote for this stigmatisation and the recognition of moral equality falls to the state in their promotion of reciprocity, solidarity and inclusion via a universal system of social protection. When this occurs, the challenging role of the OCS in relation to the formation of social alliances can be possible, as all civil society participants can experience a sense of democratic justice based on moral equality.

To conclude, social inequality influences stigmatised interpretations of migrants’ needs, engagement, and function in the segregated labour market. Stigmatised recognition by others exacerbates the misrepresentation of migrants’ interests and demotes the formation of alliances for social justice. In common with other authors, this article argues that how migrant engagement is appraised and specific needs interpreted in civil society depends largely on the existence of a strong welfare regime that promotes solidarity and inclusion via the universal re-distribution of rights. Only through the action of sharing equal access to social protection and opportunities will migrant and host residents find a common ground to problems and find solutions.

6. References


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