

The foreign policies of European Union member states

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Publication date:
2000

Citation for published version (APA):
Manners, I., & Whitman, R. (Eds.) (2000). *The foreign policies of European Union member states*. Manchester University Press. <http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/catalogue/book.asp?id=1204320>

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Conclusion

Ian Manners and Richard Whitman

This study argues that it is time to adopt a distinctive approach to the foreign policies of European Union (EU) Member States. It now seems more appropriate to suggest that the Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policies objectives inside an EU context. The study finds that traditional explanations for foreign policy need significant modification in order to more appropriately engage in a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) of EU Member States. We now suggest that the foreign policy of the EU does not actually represent the European rescue of traditional foreign policy, given the transformation of these foreign policies by the globalised, post-Cold War, post-EU 'European condition'. We argue that these patterns of change do necessitate a significant reconsideration of FPA and its application to the Member States of the EU, but we also maintain that the many tensions we found present in our analysis render the whole notion of 'foreign policy' somewhat problematic.

In this study we have sought to construct and apply a comparative framework which is appropriate and original for the analysis of the foreign policies of EU Member States. Our framework had to be flexible enough to encompass such European diversity as found between 'nuclear states' such as Britain and France, and (post-)neutral states such as Austria and Sweden. In addition the framework would have to be rigorous enough to facilitate comparative analysis in a meaningful way. The framework we devised was able to account for the broad context in which foreign policies were being made through suggesting two elements of change – macro adaptation and micro socialisation. The framework was also able to account for the dynamics of policy making by looking at two elements of this process – domestic environment and bureaucratic mechanisms. Finally, the framework was able to account for the actions of implementing foreign policy through the consideration of policies realised within or without the EU competencies. Thus the framework proved itself more than adequate, and certainly original, in the way in which it

encompassed the sometimes juxtaposed factors in the broad context, dynamic process and implementation phase of Member States' foreign policies. As Tonra suggests in his chapter, capturing the features of a 'complex, collective policy-making system' such as is necessary in this study is no easy task if we are looking for meaningful insights.

The value of the framework and its comparative application is only one part of our argument for a distinctive FPA being suggested here. The other argument being put forward is that the study can be characterised by a number of tensions which are highly contextual to the foreign policies of EU Member States. These tensions could not be conceivably arrived at by applying generalisations, or 'questions that travel', from the study of foreign policies of states outside of Europe. In this respect it is useful to briefly present these tensions and the way in which they can be argued to be conditioning features of a distinctive FPA for EU Member States.

Tensions in the foreign policies of EU member states

The foreign policy analysis of EU Member States is subject to a number of tensions. First, there is tension between the need to adapt to the changes brought by EU membership and the post-Cold War environment. The tension here is between the benefits which adaptation may provide for an EU Member State and the desire to maintain the status quo of Cold War international relations that tends to be found amongst those states who believe this would negatively impact on their status as international 'powers'. This tension increases with interaction between Member States and the world outside Europe's door. Secondly, there are tensions between the constitutional/bureaucratic arrangements of foreign policy making within a Member State, public opinion of the citizens of that state, and the activities of socialised civil servants/political elite. These tensions tend to surface more when there is a period of rapid foreign policy change, when legislative approval is sought, or when public awareness is heightened. This tension will continue to increase as European solutions become more common.

Thirdly there is a tension between what may be considered 'foreign policy' and what may be considered 'external policy'. This tension focuses on the political diplomatic functions of a Member State government and its political economy functions. This will grow as the former continues to be retained as a symbol of statehood, whilst the increasingly important substance of the latter is Europeanised at an EU level. Fourthly, the tensions between competing centres of influence continue to seek to render notions of traditional foreign policy somewhat problematic. The abilities of non-state actors, sub-national actors and supranational actors to claim (or reclaim) the landscape of relations between peoples continues to increase through the processes of globalisation/localisation.

Finally there is a tension between foreign policy actions within or without the EU. Increasingly this is a false dichotomy as the realities of attempting to hold separate issues of a political-diplomatic nature from those of a political-economic nature, as well as trying to maintain a clear separation between issues of foreign policy 'special interest' from those of domestic policy 'general interest', tend to illustrate. As is often the case, an attempt to maintain a *domain privé* can be expensive in terms of political capital – as the case studies have illustrated, the costs of special relationships are often to be found hidden in the antagonisms which these can bring to the rest of the EU relationship.

Adaptation through membership

The study sought to consider the degree to which it was possible to recognise the adaptation through membership of the Member States' foreign policies. Following Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, the study used as its starting point the definition of adaptation taken from Ernst Haas as 'the ability of a political actor to change its behaviour so as to meet challenges in the form of new demands by altering the means of action'.¹ The study took care to differ from this implied focus in the use of the term 'political actor' and the potentially loaded response if this actor is assumed to be 'the state'. The authors were all asked to consider the impact of 'the changing external environment' including membership, treaty changes and the end of the Cold War. However, although the focus was clearly on the adaptation of foreign policy, the interpretation of the actor involved was left open. As the chapters demonstrate, this open interpretation still, inevitably, leads to a primary focus on the Member State as the political actor, but it is interesting to note that all the chapters avoided the pitfalls of attributing anything like a unitary-state rationality to the adaptation processes.

It is valuable to note the way in which many of the authors equated adaptation as meaning 'Europeanisation', despite the fact that the term was not used in this specific context by the editors. Drawing on Robert Ladrech, Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, this study characterises Europeanisation as an incremental process reorienting Member States' politics and policies towards the EU.² In his contribution to this study Ben Tonra in Chapter 12 went even further and defined Europeanisation of foreign policy as:

'a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making'.

Although not explicitly presented to all the authors in this formulation,

Tonra's definition does provide a valuable contribution to the argument put forward here that the 'complex system of collective European policy making' necessitates a distinctive analytical approach encompassing the transformational context, process and actions of the national foreign policies of EU Member States.

EU adaptation appears to play an important role in the 'modernisation' of Member States' foreign policies as they attempt to come to terms with the challenges of the 21st century. It provides the framework and the opportunity for Member States to adapt to the realities of post-Cold War global foreign policies. Those states that resist adaptation and the processes of Europeanisation are invariably doing so because they are also trying to resist the wider forces at work – to maintain notions of 'national' and symbols of their past. Indications of this were found in particular in the French and British cases, although it might be argued that this was also to be found in the Greek and Danish cases. In the French case, Europe provides the 'optimum multiplier of national power', but 'France must never surrender its independent role, and the status as one of the great historic powers and permanent member of the Security Council'. In the British case, on a 'core sovereignty issue [such] as foreign policy' successive governments have 'tried to use European level policy coordination as a means to strengthen national policy'. In the Greek case there is also evidence of the desire to maintain a veto over its 'national policies', although this is somewhat contradicted by its keenness for more EU foreign policy action (especially in the defence sector). The Danish position during the early 1990s had also been resistant to adaptation in the foreign policy sphere, largely because of its 'traditional ambivalence towards a Euro-centric model'. However, it now appears that since 1998 'Danish foreign policy has been liberated from its worst fear' by the patterns of evolution of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In contrast to these questions of resistance to adaptation, those states that embrace adaptation and the processes of Europeanisation appear to be doing so because they are using the EU as a means of overcoming their past – be it a fascist or authoritarian past, be it a colonial past, or be it a past marked by problems of economic development or of achieving economic growth, be it a neutral or non-aligned past. The chapters presented here illustrate the degree to which all four of these pasts can be addressed (or forgotten) through EU membership.

Historical experiences

Historical experiences of fascism or communism are surmounted, as in the cases of Germany, Spain, and Italy, through EU membership. As the German case illustrated, the move to a Berliner Republik suggests that the 'historical other' in this case may be fading out of memory. Although a

'sense of guilt and shame about its Nazi past' and 'historical fears of German hegemony' may still be present, the current debate on normalisation indicates that EU membership provides an opportunity for Germany to become a 'normal civilian power'. Similarly, membership has provided a means for Spain to recover an international confidence in the post-Franco era. As was noted in the chapter, 'a quarter of a century after the death of General Franco, Spain can consider itself as an established middle-ranking power which enjoys considerable international prestige'. In the case of Italy, it seems to 'need' the EU more than most as a means of providing a 'barrier' between itself and its previous or other self. In this case adaptation to membership has provided 'a set of behavioural rules' which are part of 'Italy's path towards ... modernisation'. This is particularly interesting in the military sector where the 'legacy of fascism' has led to low 'prestige of the military'.

Colonial experiences

EU membership can help colonial experiences to be overcome, as in the cases of France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium, although for larger Member States this is more problematic. For France the EU 'with its pacific reputation and freedom from the taint of imperialism, is a particularly useful vehicle'. For Britain, its Commonwealth relations are 'becoming increasingly less important as an arena' in favour of EU, or bilateral Franco-British, policy in areas such as the Lomé Convention and Africa, although the status of Gibraltar remains problematic. The EU has provided a crucial mechanism for Portugal to help overcome the tragic legacy of its colonial empire. As has been previously stated, it may be possible to argue that Portuguese foreign policy has been shaped by 'the lessons learned ... in solving the colonial problem'. In the case of Belgium the EU provides a means of increasing 'the effectiveness of its own foreign policy' or 'the possibility of "dumping" the intricate and intractable situation in Central Africa'.

Interestingly EU membership has also helped Ireland in its post-colonial rehabilitation to the degree that it has now achieved 'Celtic tiger status'. For Ireland EU membership has provided an opportunity to change an 'overwhelming bilateral relationship' with Britain to one 'balanced more equitably'.

Economic development

The problems of economic development are addressed by EU membership, as in the cases of Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. As the most economically-backward founding member, Italy has been able to enjoy the 'benefits of membership – markets, modernisation, status' while improving 'the country's overall economic and trade performance'. For Ireland membership of the EU has provided 'significant material benefits'

in the form of 'financial transfers from the Community budget' and reduced its 'asymmetrical economic dependence' on Britain. In Greece the questions of economic development are still being addressed, but in terms of avoiding the 'economic suicide' of other Balkan states, EU membership has provided it with 'a European orientation' which is now leading to prosperity. In the cases of Spain and Portugal membership proved itself to be a moderating influence on foreign policy, allowing tough changes to be made, and domestic opposition to be overcome. It also appears to have led to a degree of cross-party consensus over most major areas of foreign policy. In Spain this was most noticeable in the position of the Socialist Party's equation of the two terms Europeanisation and modernisation, as 'the utilisation of European integration as the key element in the all-embracing policy/*leimotif* of modernisation'. In Portugal this was seen in the collapse of the backward-looking authoritarian regime and reorientation towards a 'liberal west European' democratic future within the EC.

Post-neutrality

Finally, neutral or non-aligned positions are adjusted, as in the cases of Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden. Although all four seek to retain their international positions on the question of neutrality, it does appear as if membership of the EU has provided a means of redefining the exact nature of these positions in a post-Cold War world. In all four countries, their participation in a post-Cold War EU with a common foreign and security policy raises the question of whether they should now be realistically considered post-neutrals. For Ireland, the last twenty-eight years of membership have not raised any serious questions about its non-participation in European defence arrangements. However, it is now an open question of whether its 'initiatives on arms control and nuclear disarmament' are the only security issues in which Ireland is an active participant in the early 2000s. In this latter period the changed security premise in Europe has led Austria, Finland and Sweden to question their own 'neutral' status. In these three countries it now seems more appropriate to adopt the term 'non-aligned' to describe the way in which their foreign policies have adapted to membership. In Finland and Sweden this adaptation has gone as far as using the term 'non-participation in military alliances'. The Austrians appear to have gone further towards 'reconsidering the value of neutrality', although in all three cases this is done with great caution and with regard to public sentiment.

What is interesting is the degree to which the adaptation to EU membership changes foreign policy orientations and mechanisms. But it is also worth noting that adaptation is more a function of attitude than time, as the contrasts between the changes in the EU's youngest members over the past five years and the oldest members over the past forty years help illustrate. In the cases of all but two Member States adaptation has proved a

means of achieving innovation within domestic politics and external orientation. As has been discussed above, this adaptation may be a means of dealing with four types of issues described as 'historical experiences', 'colonial experiences', 'economic development', and 'post-neutrality'. Only in the cases of France and Britain has adaptation been seen as a mixed blessing in foreign policy terms. In both France and Britain the tensions between 'trying to use EU membership to manage and adapt to changes in the international system' whilst trying to 'fight to retain national freedom of action and historic political assets at all costs' ultimately means that adaptation through membership has proved elusive in these two cases.

Socialisation of foreign policy makers

The question of the socialisation of foreign policy makers was considered in this study as a means of understanding the way in which membership can shape ways of thinking amongst policy making elites. However, analysing the socialisation of political actors can be notoriously difficult to do, particularly when using traditional (or 'rational-actor') methodologies. Fortunately, the authors involved in this study were able to blend traditional with more critical methodologies (based on interview and discourse approaches) in order to gain greater insight within their analyses. It is valuable to consider the discourses used within the chapters to refer to processes of socialisation as a form of analysis. While some talked of consultation 'reflexes' or 'habits' in policy making (see, for example, Chapters 2 and 3 on Britain and France), others interrogated notions of 'collective identification' and the 'identity' of policy makers (see, for example, Chapters 4 and 12 on Denmark, Ireland and Germany). The challenge here is to contrast the differing ways of talking about the policy-making processes in order to gauge the extent to which varying degrees of socialisation have, and are, impacting on foreign policy.

Reflexes

In three cases the language of 'reflex' was used to describe the socialisation of foreign policy makers into differing patterns of thinking and behaviour. In Germany its 'reflexive' tradition in foreign policy making has been important in 'enmeshing' it in European norms and common policies. In both the British and Danish cases attention was drawn to a 'first reflex' which had historically involved the non-EU partners of Nordic countries (in the Danish case), and the United States (in the British case). However, in both cases attention is drawn to the gradual breakdown of these reflexes as Anglo-American coordination in economic and foreign policy weakens, and the Nordic cooperation changes with the admission of Sweden and Finland to the EU.

Habits

It is worth noting that in six of the states 'habit' forming practices were identified by the authors as being important. In France these habits of working together were seen as being crucial in maintaining the Franco-German relationship by 'fostering mutual respect and a shared understanding' which 'retained some continuity across administrations and presidencies'. In the Netherlands and Belgium the long timescale (over the past thirty years) involved in cooperating within the EU foreign policy processes ensured that the 'fully internalised habits of working together' led to the definition of policy positions for these two states. The role of the EU's foreign policy-making mechanism was also identified as being important in 'creating habits of thinking' in the case of Irish and Danish diplomats. Even for later joining states, 'the habits of working together have gradually altered' behaviour and interests for Greek foreign policy makers.

Norms

A more difficult issue concerns the degree to which foreign policy makers are socialised into 'norms' of behaviour and thinking. In six of the states the authors commented on the way in which European and international norms were becoming integral to the foreign policy-making procedures under examination. In the cases of Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, explicit reference to the importance of international norms in shaping foreign policy was made. In Britain the 'growing importance of international rules, norms and procedures' is seen as being a significant factor in this respect. Similarly, in Denmark the principal foreign policy norms are those of 'collective security, the rule of law and self-determination'. In the Netherlands the element of foreign policy given highest priority is 'the implementation of human rights norms' which, it is observed, often brings it into conflict rather than harmony with its European partners. In addition to these international norms, in the cases of Germany, Spain, Denmark and Ireland there were references to European norms. The distinctive nature of these norms was spelt out most explicitly in the German case as being 'transparency, consultation and compromise' which maintain 'stability and predictable relations in foreign policy'. In Spain the achievement of 'European norms' was seen to be a means of returning to European and international normality and responsibility in the post-Franco period. For Danish and Irish foreign policy makers participation in the EU system involved 'a consequent internalisation of norms' which are implicitly European in their conception.

Identities

Finally, the language of identity construction was used in the analysis of seven Member States, signifying the role of self-definition (and redefini-

tion) in the socialisation of foreign policy makers. In the cases of Denmark and Ireland it was noted that 'a degree of collective identification' appears to exist which 'internalise[s] the aims of collective foreign policy making'. For German, Swedish and Finnish foreign policy makers 'a European identity ... is formulated in a language characterised by ... notions of a shared European destiny' and the incorporation of this 'European identity and priorities' into the discourses of the governing elite is an indication of shared practices being incorporated into shared identities. There is also evidence of the European orientation and practices in Greek foreign policy making transforming the 'traditional identity' of policy makers through altering the attitudes, self images and interests of those involved. However, in the British case the long timescale of often intense interaction and collaboration 'does not appear to have led to a new and wholly different European identity' for its policy makers.

In the cases of four of the Member States the question of perception of EU membership was raised by the authors. It was argued in each case that the EU acted as an opportunity or multiplier of foreign policy activity. For France 'Europe is about adding, not subtracting', whilst for Britain membership 'is not a zero-sum game' but offers 'a multiplier effect' in the foreign policy sphere. However, in the Danish and Irish case it is noted that the 'participants do not see this process as a zero-sum game', but as a means by which national and EU interests 'are defined together'.

The EU membership does not simply involve legal and political commitments to a union, it provides a community, a textured environment, a part in a process, a social sphere for continued and intensifying interaction. But this socialisation is also part of a broader process of globalisation where links with others, often outside of a geographical context, are intensified. Notions of who is 'local' (in terms of close contacts) and whom one identifies with (in terms of social meaning) are increasingly shaped by the European nature of those involved in the integration process. But we should not be surprised if the opposite is also true – those not directly involved in this process feel disaffection as they seek meaning and community outside of this European context and inside a 'traditional' context of a 'nation-state'. As has been demonstrated in the chapters on the larger Member States, the socialisation processes are less pronounced in the foreign policy processes of France, Britain and Germany. In contrast the chapters on most smaller Member States all draw attention to the importance of socialisation in foreign policy making in Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. It would therefore appear that the impact of socialisation is more noticeable in smaller, rather than larger Member States, although this is by no means the only determining factor. In contrast, this also appears to indicate that length of membership is not as an important factor in socialisation as one

might think, with French and German membership being ten times longer than that of Finland and Sweden.

Like adaptation, socialisation forms part of a broader pattern that is shaping both foreign policy and the relationship between Member States and the rest of the world. Those engaged in foreign policy activities have their understanding shaped by the social interaction in which they engage. This in turn shapes the way in which they think about foreign policy and notions of what actually constitutes the 'foreign'. But this process is part of the larger processes of interdependence, shaped by the (freer) movement of people, their experiences and the way in which they interact through travel, personal contact, communication, and shared cultural meanings.

Domestic factors in the policy process

The role of domestic factors can be examined by considering the five elements considered most important by the authors in shaping the foreign policy process – the constitutional design, the role of sub-national governments, the relationships between governments and parties, the role of special interest groups, and the breakdown of the domestic-foreign distinction. Although each of these factors is considered separately here, it is worth remembering that the interplay between them is significant in each national context, particularly if there are active cross-cutting coalitions of interest at work.

Constitutional designs

The first element determining the influence of domestic factors on the foreign policy process identified in this study is the constitutional design of the Member State under consideration. The constitutional design plays a significant role in determining the nature of government, who the lead actor in foreign policy is, what role the political parties play, and the role of parliamentary oversight. All but one of the EU's Member States have governmental systems based on a combination of proportional representation electoral systems and coalition governments which tends to lead to these systems being termed 'consensual' in nature. In Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Finland the governments consist of coalitions of between two and five parties in power sharing arrangements. However, it should be noted that France has a two-round majority voting system, while Germany and Italy have mixed voting systems. Elsewhere EU governments are in power with slender majorities or are in power with a minority government which relies on the help of other parties. With one or two exceptions the constitutional design of EU Member States tends to produce patterns of consensual democracy, which relies on consultation and bargaining amongst political groups to achieve policy. The main exception to this pattern is Britain with its 'first

past the post' electoral and governmental systems which is not based on consensus politics, although Greece also has a tradition of single-party majority government.

Constitutional designs are also responsible for defining who the lead actor in foreign policy is, and in particular the differences between parliamentary systems and presidential systems. In the European context there is a distinction to be made here between the semi-presidential systems of France and Finland, and the parliamentary systems of the rest of the EU. In the French case, the role of the President is crucial in shaping foreign policy, even when there is a cohabitation of Socialist Prime Minister and Gaullist President, as is the situation from 1997 to 2002. In Finland joining the EU led to an interesting debate where the role of the President in foreign policy was reduced in the area of EU relations in order to adapt to membership (made easier because both were from the Social Democratic Party). In March 2000 the consolidation of the Finnish Constitution ensured that its foreign policy is headed by the President in conjunction with the Council of Ministers, in effect leading to a more parliamentary system involving the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in frequent consultations. Although not strictly a semi-presidential system, the Portuguese case showed that the turbulent relationship from 1986 to 1995 between the Prime Minister and the President did not significantly impact on foreign policy making because of the 'consensualism and continuity at the elite level' and the fact that both the Socialists and Social Democrats provided 'consensual political support for foreign policy within European integration parameters'. Since Jorge Sampaio's election in 1996 the Portuguese President has played a less proactive role (as the President's constitutionally-defined role might suggest).

In contrast, the parliamentary systems have a clearer line of decision making between the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, although in the case of six of these states the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister are held by people from different parties. This coalition relationship is most obvious in the case of the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Social Democratic Party) and the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Green Party), although Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands also have power-sharing relations. Only the states of Britain, Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden are currently parliamentary systems with prime ministers and foreign ministers of the same party, although this also happens to be currently true in France and Portugal. In terms of actual foreign policy making these relationships are not as conflictual as might be supposed, as the mostly consensual nature of European politics, combined with years of coalition experience, helps provide for smooth governmental relations. However, it is worth bearing in mind that none of these constitutional arrangements for foreign policy making bears any resemblance to that found in the United States.

The role of parliamentary oversight is also an important factor in shaping foreign policy, particularly in those political systems which cherish open and participatory government. These more open democracies are mostly found within the Nordic tradition of government which in the EU is seen in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. In the Swedish Riksdag, parliamentary oversight is provided by the Advisory Committee on EU Affairs, in the Danish Folketing it is provided by the Foreign Affairs Committee and Committee on Europe, whilst in the Finnish Eduskunta it is provided by the Foreign Affairs Committee. This contrasts strongly with the position in France, Britain and Italy where foreign policy is said to be largely 'unaccountable' (in the French case) with parliamentary scrutiny and oversight considered 'rather ineffective' (in the British case).

Sub-national governments

The second element determining the role of domestic factors is the degree to which Member States may be considered a centralised or decentralised state. Although this is also a function of constitutional design, it is usually shaped by historical factors and questions of diversity within a Member State. Again the EU Member States represent very different positions on a wide spectrum of degrees of centralisation, which is a significant contributing feature of the role of domestic factors in shaping foreign policy. At one end of the centralisation-decentralisation spectrum lies Belgium with its 'federated entities' of regions and communities which are represented within the Union by six different delegations: Federal Government; Flemish Government; Walloon Government; Government of the German-speaking Community; Government of the French-speaking Community; and the Brussels Capital Regional Government. Although the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs retain competence in foreign policy, given the difficulties in differentiating between domestic policy, European policies and foreign policy encountered in this study, the lack of legal hierarchy leaves 'a rather small foundation for Belgian foreign policy'. Next on this spectrum come the federal states of Austria and Germany with the principles of 'subsidiarity and power-sharing' providing the constitutional means for the provinces and Länder to influence foreign policy. In practice both these states leave the definition of most foreign policy (as distinct from European policy) to the federal government, although it was noted in the German case that the Länder have developed 'extensive competency as sub-national actors in foreign economic policy'. After these federal states we find Spain and Italy next in terms of decentralisation, although the Spanish autonomous communities have far greater influence than the Italian regional administrations. In the Spanish case the external activity of the autonomous communities (in particular Catalonia), and the dependence of the government on the support of the Catalan Nationalist Party since 1993, has

enhanced their role in foreign policy making. To a lesser degree a similar pattern developed in Italy during the immediate post-Christian Democratic Party period of 1990-95 with the behaviour of the regional administrations of north-eastern Italy during the collapse of Yugoslavia and the rise of Umberto Bossi's Northern League. Although in contrast this has not led to the same degree of influence over foreign policy as the autonomous communities in the case of Spain.

The only other state worth considering in terms of the impact of decentralisation on foreign policy making is Britain. Since the creation of devolved regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland during 1999, the question of the external role of these parliaments and their influence on British foreign policy has been raised (particularly in terms of relations with other EU states).³ However in Britain, as with the cases of the eight other Member States not mentioned above, the impact of sub-national, regional, or devolved parliaments is currently limited in national foreign policy making. There are several reasons for sub-national governments' external relations or 'paradiplomacy'⁴ not having as much of an impact on Member States' foreign policies outside the five cases already discussed, but the absence of significant sub-national identities which have a political or constitutional form remains the main explanation.

Political parties

The third domestic element which has a significant impact on foreign policy making is the role of party politics and their relationship to the government in power. The party political orientation of the government in power in shaping foreign policy appears to be of decreasing relevance in the cases studied here. Most of the cases spoke of party political consensus over the issue of EU membership and foreign policy objectives. What is interesting here is the speed with which, in general, this picture has changed in the last twenty years. There are smaller parties and groups on the far left and far right of most domestic EU political spectra (for example the Communist Party in Portugal and Freedom Party in Austria) which hold more extreme views on foreign policy and EU issues. However, a combination of three factors has led parties across the EU to hold far more similar views on foreign policy issues (despite what they might say in public pronouncements). First, the increasing acceptance of the neo-liberal or free market philosophy in the post-1970s period has tended to minimise the political-philosophical differences between parties. Secondly, the collapse of the Communist bloc and the political alternative it represented has led to a crisis of socialism across Europe. Thirdly, as this study has examined, participation in the EU's dual-decision-making procedures (in the areas of external relations and CFSP) appears to have changed the views and expectations of many of the European political parties on foreign policy issues.

Interest groups

The fourth domestic element is the role of special interest groups in the foreign policy making process. Given the secretive nature of political lobbying and the difficulties of gauging the success of media campaigns, the degree to which these groups are able to influence and shape foreign policy is difficult to judge. However, the role of interest groups was identified across the cases studied here and can be divided into the economic sector and the non-economic sectors, although clearly these are not always so easily delineated. Special interest groups active in the economic sector consist of employers and industrial groups on one hand, and trade unions on the other. Employers groups and federations of industries were seen to be active in Spain, Denmark and Sweden, in addition to the role of the Bank of Italy. The French case gave some interesting insights into commercial interest group lobbying in the arms trade, heavy industrial and high tech industries. In particular, the example of where interest groups are found to be lobbying against one another on the question of French foreign policy towards China, Taiwan and Korea helps illustrate activity which is more commonplace across the EU than was studied here. In contrast, the role of trade unions attempting to shape foreign policy was identified in the Spanish, Danish and Swedish cases, although their influence pervades the policies of left-leaning political parties across Europe.

Special interest groups active in the non-economic sector consist of religious organisations, diaspora groups, global issue groups, and anti-EU groups. The role of religious organisations found in the cases included the powerful influence of the Catholic Church in Italy and the Orthodox Church in Greece. Also found to be influential in the cases were the diaspora groups resident in EU Member States, the two most powerful of which were the Algerians in France and the Cypriots in Greece, although many EU capitals have such groups seeking to shape their hosts' foreign policies (the Kurds for example). Global issue groups included peace and disarmament groups (such as PANA, CND and Saferworld), environmental groups (such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth), and human rights groups (such as Amnesty International). The influence which such groups can exert through lobbying and public campaigns was recently demonstrated in the 1995 case of the relations between the former Nigerian government, the Shell Oil company, and the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The final type of interest group in the non-economic sector are those anti-EU groups common in Member States and which seek to reduce participation in EU activities, including foreign policy cooperation. Examples of these types of group were found in Denmark in the form of the June Movement and the People's Movement Against the EU, although there are similar examples to be found in the other Nordic states, in Britain (the UK Independence Party) and in Austria (the Freedom Party).

Domestic-foreign distinction

The final element determining the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is the breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign issues. The problems which this breakdown presents to the analysis of foreign policy making has recently been identified by authors such as Michael Smith, Roger Tooze and Jens Mortensen who point out that this distinction is fast being eroded because 'trade policy has ... grown into one of the most important foreign policy instruments in the 1990s'.⁵ Clearly this change presents significant problems for the study of foreign policy in EU Member States as trade policy is largely a function of external relations, which is regulated by the Commission, rather than the foreign ministries. In the study a number of authors referred explicitly to this breakdown which leads us to 'the overwhelming conclusion that it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between European foreign and domestic policy', as is the case in Britain.

Thus, for EU Member States the domestic-foreign frontier blurs into obscurity as most areas of economic, and increasingly political, activity are Europeanised. This Europeanisation of domestic issues is not simply about the infraction of the EU into the formerly 'national' sphere. It involves the complicated realities of the management of multifaceted interactions amongst the advanced industrial societies of Europe. In this environment of multi-interaction (economic, political and social), issues that might have formerly been dealt with in the capitals of Europe are increasingly referred to the capital of the EU – Brussels. So the boundary around fifteen domestic spheres is both broadened and permeated by the impact of EU membership. But this raises the 'paradox' of relations between EU states – are they still to be considered 'international' and the activity to be one of 'foreign' policy. Perhaps it is now more appropriate to consider them as 'intranational' and the activity of 'European' policy. In many ways the foreign policies of EU Member States are still coming to terms with this paradox of inclusion-exclusion or self-other.

As with the two previous factors of adaptation and socialisation, the problems associated with the domestic-foreign frontier are not solely a function of EU membership – they are increasingly a reality for all states as the interconnectedness between their societies leads to many questions regarding the policing of the frontier of the state, and the role of foreign policy making in regulating relations between states. In some respects this has led to the observation that foreign policy cooperation/integration within the EU actually presents an opportunity in the face of these challenges to reformulate the domestic-foreign frontier at a European level – and thus might represent the 'rescue' of European foreign policy (see below for a fuller exposition of this rescue).

Bureaucratic politics in the policy process

The question of the role of bureaucratic politics in the policy process is as problematic as that concerning the socialisation processes and takes us into the world of institutional structure and inter-ministry conflict. There are three major issues which need to be addressed here regarding the questions of autonomy and command, the relationship between the foreign ministry and other ministries, and the question of who is responsible for coordinating foreign policy, particularly in a European context.

Autonomy and command

The first issue to be addressed is the question of autonomy and command in the bureaucratic structures under analysis. Implicitly this question is tied up with those issues raised in the previous section concerning the roles of a president, prime minister, coalition partners and parliamentary oversight. However, the determining factors here are broadly about the degree to which any foreign policy making bureaucracy is characterised by centralisation or autonomy in decision making and implementation, as well as how efficiently the lines of command function. To illustrate just how different these factors can be we only have to compare the 'permanent symbiosis between the Élysée and the Quai d'Orsay' in the foreign policy making of the French Fifth Republic with the binding '*einheitliche Stellungnahme*' (a common position agreed by the Austrian provinces) which the federal foreign minister may be trying to use as a basis for foreign policy making.

At the top of this bureaucratic structure lies the presidential and/or ministerial staff and their cabinets which, as discussed previously, can be working in harmony or conflict, depending on constitutional, coalition and domestic pressures. The crucial relationships here are those with the ministries and staff below this top level of decision making. It is helpful to consider three contrasting types of relationship here to illustrate the different ways these lines of command and communication can work. In the French case the President at the Élysée, with diplomatic counsellors, will work closely with the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign Minister and Ministry, as well as other significant ministries as necessary (such as the Defence and Finance Ministries), all in 'uninterrupted contact' and 'informed of the same events'. Compare this dynamic image with that in the German case where the *Bundeskanzler* is responsible for 'the overall coordination and guidelines of ... foreign policy' which, following extensive consultation and adjustment with the coalition partners and ministries may be implemented by the Foreign Minister. Finally, compare the images of French dynamism and German 'reflexive' consultation, with those of the British 'tightly organised and highly centralised policy making process' but which provides 'little flexibility once a British position is

established'. These three examples help to illustrate that the relations between the top decision making level with the ministers and ministries responsible for implementation can be crucial in determining the efficiency and flexibility on foreign policy issues.

Below this level lie the ministries, secretariats, and committees dealing with both foreign policy and European policy. One of the crucial elements raised in the case studies is the quality of the staff in both administrative and diplomatic posts. Another comparison that is useful here is that between the Greek and British case, although in terms of size of foreign ministries this is a little unfair. In the Greek case the 'problem of clientelism in the recruitment process' leads to a bureaucracy which is 'characterised by weak administration'. In contrast, the high level of 'cohesion across the political elite concerning British foreign policy objectives' means that 'few quibble with the efficiency of British foreign policy making'.

It is important to note that there is no one model for the bureaucratic arrangement of foreign and European ministries across the Member States, but there are varying degrees of autonomy for the ministries and the permanent representation. The departments with the greatest autonomy are to be found in the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Germany. In the Netherlands traditional departmental autonomy has been an important feature of its foreign policy mechanisms. The Danish and Irish foreign ministries are able to benefit from bureaucracies characterised by 'flexibility and adaptability' rather than 'structure and hierarchy'. Although the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has limited autonomy, the permanent representation for which it is ultimately, via the Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the EU, responsible does 'enjoy a fairly high degree of autonomy'. In Portugal the post-1994 reforms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs laid the emphasis on 'decentralisation but better coordination'. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a high degree of autonomy, but as the case illustrated, it often finds itself having to deal with internal disputes (as with the case of EU relations with Turkey) and inter-ministry disputes with the Ministry of National Economy (renamed from the Ministry of Coordination after EU membership). The very nature of the German federal arrangements and the patterns of coalition governments have tended to lead to relatively high autonomy for the German Foreign Ministry as well. The departments with the least amount of autonomy are to be found within the 'hierarchical form of authority' and 'highly centralised system' of 'tightly focussed ... horizontal coordination' which characterise the French and British foreign policy mechanisms respectively. In the French case this coordination within the EU is provided by the SGCI⁶ answerable to the Prime Minister, whilst in the British case EU coordination is provided by the European Secretariat in the Cabinet office, also answerable to the Prime Minister.

Coordinating foreign policy

The cases demonstrated two interesting dynamics at work shaping the role of the Foreign Ministries and the task of coordinating policy within the EU. On the one hand, most of the Member States were in the process of consolidating their EU-policy coordinating mechanisms in the office of the Prime Minister, mimicking the success of the French and British systems. In Germany this has led to the Chancellor's Office playing a more important role in coordinating policy. Similarly in Italy the Prime Minister's office (at the Palazzo Chigi) 'has significantly increased its competencies and supervisory role'. In Spain there is also 'continued centralisation of the policy process around the Prime Minister, who remains the key figure in the field of foreign affairs'. Whilst in both Sweden and Finland the Prime Ministers have assumed responsibility for formulating and coordinating EU policy, providing a 'effective counter-weight' to their often 'cumbersome consensual approaches to policy making'.

On the other hand, most Member States are now witnessing the expansion of the external relations of 'domestic ministries' as they increasingly 'conduct their own foreign policies' with other Member States' 'domestic ministries' through the EU's technical councils, the Commission and the ECB. The increasing activism of other ministries such as finance and trade, was directly acknowledged in six cases (Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and Finland) where their 'autonomous diplomacy' was bringing into question the role of the Foreign Ministry. In the case of Britain it was even remarked that it was 'established practice' for 'individual departments [to] contact the Commission and UKREP bypassing the Cabinet Office and FCO'. The dynamic at work here is that as the activity and autonomy of these other ministries increases so 'the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decreases in proportion'.

The explanation for these two dynamics lie in the explosion of EU-oriented managerial tasks for the foreign ministries and the loss of non-Europeanised foreign policy tasks, both of which attest to the degree to which the Europeanisation of domestic and foreign policy has made inroads towards the office of the prime minister. As Tonra has said, it serves as 'the best illustration of the fact that foreign policy is no longer quite so "foreign".' What the cases seem to be saying is that the future tasks of foreign ministries will lie in the areas of coordinating the external relations of other ministries and providing monitoring, communication and representatives services – what might be termed 'coordination services'.

Bureaucratic conservatism

The question of the influence of bureaucratic process is one of the most interesting aspects of the impact of EU membership in shaping the foreign

policies of its Member States. It is the bureaucratic design which shapes the way in which a state, its government, its civil servants and its citizens are able to interact with other similar hierarchical arrangements in other Member States and in non-Member States. The bureaucratic structure has both a formal and an informal component to it. The informal politics of the 'multi-interactional' world of foreign policy making can often be as important as, if not more than, the formal politics of 'international relations'. Once again these ideas of 'informal circles of consultation' or the impact of 'habits of cooperation' have long been identified as being crucial in the process of *engrenage*, *Verflechtung*, or the 'locking in' of foreign policy elites in informal patterns of policy making.⁷

What is interesting here is the remarkable conservatism which most EU Member State bureaucracies have demonstrated in coming terms with foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. We should not be surprised at this, however. As early as 1978 Christopher Hill identified the way in which conservatism in foreign policy administrations inhibited change, a situation which appears to have changed little in the intervening twenty-two years contrary to claims that foreign ministries have 'responded to the demands of managing access rather than focussing on ... gatekeeping'.⁸ Without exception the traditional structures of a foreign ministry with a foreign minister in charge of foreign policy have been maintained, if not strengthened.

Foreign ministers have adapted to the demands of EU membership by taking on board the task of coordinating external relations in response to the needs and demands of these new conditions. But as the cases studied here demonstrate, other ministries have developed external relations in response to the needs and demands of EU membership and broader international demands. In every case the task of coordinating these cross-cutting responses fall to a European minister who is always subordinate to the foreign minister. It has been observed by many that these arrangements look increasingly anachronistic in a regionalised/globalised world. Many would argue that the foreign ministers and their ministries have been usurped by the finance and economic ministers as the EU's, and its Member States' real ability to influence foreign relations lie in their economic weight. As Paul Kennedy comments in Chapter 6 on Spain, a more accurate measure of foreign policy strength has become the ability to 'punch over [a state's] *economic weight*'.

Within the EU: constriction or opportunity?

The question of whether the EU represents a constriction or an opportunity for the foreign policies of its Member States is central to this study. It is not as simple a question to answer as might be thought, as the four factors outlined above, adaptation, socialisation, domestic factors and

bureaucratic factors, will all shape the response in the Member States under consideration. The degree to which the EU is seen to represent a constriction or opportunity is thus dependent on to whom, in what context, and when the question is asked. As has been discussed previously, membership can be seen as an opportunity to use integration to modernise a country, particularly in terms of its foreign policy outlook. Examples of this can be found in the chapters on Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, all of which refer to modernisation. More recently we have seen modernisers on the left in Britain (New Labour) and Germany (SPD) attempt to use membership as a means to propagate/popularise the policies of the 'third way' and the '*neue Mitte*'. As has also been seen, the institutionalisation provided by EU membership can help to imbed norms and international obligations as a means to overcome a poor history in this respect, as was seen in the post-fascist/post-colonial cases.

In terms of more explicit advancement of national foreign policy goals, especially in comparison to other Member States, the EU can provide opportunities to take a leadership role. An example of this was seen in the case of Spanish leadership in the Euro-Med initiatives taken from Italy and France. The EU was also seen to provide opportunities for leadership in traditional diplomatic parlance by 'punching above its weight' (as in the case of Britain) or, perhaps more importantly, 'punching over its economic weight' (as in the case of Spain). Examples in these two cases were found in the important role given to British and Spanish diplomats such as Javier Solana (Secretary-General of NATO and High Representative for the CFSP), Carlos Westendorp (chair of the 'reflection group'), Felipe Gonzalez (EU special representative for Yugoslavia), Miguel Moratinos (EU special representative for the Great Lakes region), Peter Carrington and David Owen (EU special envoys to Yugoslavia), Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson (KFOR Commander), and George Robertson (Secretary-General of NATO).

'Extensive' foreign relations

A more important factor in explaining whether EU membership can be viewed as a constriction or an opportunity for foreign policy action is the pre-existing orientation of external relations which Member States may have. Although it would be wrong to see these orientations as overly deterministic, it is possible to talk about three patterns of external relations which may shape the way in which membership impacts on foreign policy actions. The first discernible pattern is that seen in Member States which have an extensive network of external relations outside the EU, which affect its foreign policy behaviour and the way in which it interacts with the EU and other Member States. Clearly the two premier examples of this pattern are to be found in the British and French cases, although it is far too simplistic to argue that this represents the only, or most deter-

mining, factor in explaining their foreign policies. In this pattern of external relations, the EU is more often perceived as a constriction, or simply as a means to amplify national foreign policy.

'European' foreign relations

A second pattern may be seen in Member States which have a less extensive network of foreign policy relations than Britain and France, and which tend to work through the EU. In this pattern the Member State involved often seeks to work with the EU or defers most foreign policy prerogatives to the Union. It might also be argued that the EU presents an opportunity within which to hide difficult decisions, or the absence of any preconceived policy. Within this pattern of external relations are two types of Member State – smaller states without the capacity or desire to engage in extensive external relations, and states which for historical reasons wish to enmesh themselves in a European rather than national system of foreign policy making. Examples of the smaller state might be found in Portugal or Ireland, as was argued in the Irish case when it was stated that policy makers 'are quicker to welcome restrictions on the ambitions of larger Member States than they are to bemoan the same limitations being placed on themselves' because of the question of size. Examples of the 'European' state include Italy and Belgium, both of which find EU solutions to difficult historical and domestic problems. An important additional point here is whether the EU can provide a balance between 'Europeanist' or 'Atlanticist' foreign policy trends which satisfy internal tensions. As has been seen in the cases of Spain, Italy, Greece, and to a certain degree Denmark, this second pattern of foreign policy can be viewed as a solution to the tensions between pro-European (read 'EU' or 'anti-US') and pro-American (read 'NATO' or 'anti-EU') forces within these countries. Clearly in this pattern of external relations, the EU is more often perceived as an opportunity for foreign policy action (or perhaps as an excuse for national foreign policy inaction).

'International' foreign relations

A third pattern can be observed in those states which may not have an extensive network of foreign policy relations, but tend to work through other international organisations such as the UN, NATO, or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Within this pattern a Member State may seek to act independently of the EU or in concert with the EU in order to assist their foreign policies. Thus not all Member States feel constrained to participate solely in EU foreign policy activity, and may well seek to avoid doing so because of the implications for further integration. This pattern of international rather than European foreign policy relations may also be related to the Cold War experience of a country, in particular its status as neutral or non-aligned. Additionally,

this pattern of activity might be directly related to a multilateral foreign policy orientation within a Member State. Examples of the 'international' pattern may be found in the cases of Austria, Finland and Sweden, all of which are active in the OSCE and UN. Examples of the 'multilateral' pattern may be found in the case of Germany which, through its *Sowohl-als-auch* approach pursues its foreign policy through the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN. In this type of pattern EU membership represents not so much an opportunity or a constriction, but merely another forum for its foreign policy (as traditionally conceived).

For the EU Member States participation in the Union represents a mixed blessing for their foreign policy activities. On the one hand it forces them to confront the rigidity or flexibility in their foreign policy making within a European framework, while on the other hand it tends to underline the paramount role which non-traditional foreign policy (external or economic relations) has come to be assume in the twenty-first century.

What is clear is that EU membership involves asking some difficult questions of foreign policy practices, or the absence of them. The challenges and responses this presents can be considered through looking at notions of the 're'-formulation of foreign policy in terms of 'retreat', 'remove', 'rescue', and 'renationalise'. There has, since the crisis of confidence in European states during the 1970s, been much debate about the degree to which the state can be described as being 'hollowed out' and its ability to conduct meaningful foreign policy as being in 'retreat'.⁹ Although the strongest assertions of this approach are denied by most, it is now widely accepted that the European state is 'learning new strategies of governing, including collective action at the EU level'.¹⁰ Hubert Vedrine's argument presented earlier illustrates this point, that even for a larger Member State like France 'sovereignty is already formal or illusory, and the exercise of common sovereignty permits the recovery of a little of what has been lost'. These new strategies of response to the 'retreat', or at least 'reformulation' of EU Member States can be conceptualised in foreign policy terms in three ways.

Remove to Brussels

The first response is the attempt by Member States to 'remove' many of the activities of foreign policy making from state capitals to Brussels. It is important to note that this 'Brusselisation' of foreign policy does not mean the wholesale communitarisation of foreign policy making and implementation within the European Community. As David Allen has argued, the Brusselisation of foreign policy making is facilitated by the 'steady enhancement of Brussels-based decision making bodies' such as the Political Committee of the Council of Ministers,¹¹ although some might wish to include decision making within the NATO Headquarters or the Western European Union (WEU) Headquarters, both located in

Brussels. David Spence goes further when he points out that as the Political Committee is, in theory, subordinate to the COREPER, this 'has implied a shift of focus from national capitals to Brussels'.¹²

EU rescue

The second response goes further than simple 'removal' by attempting to 'rescue' the foreign policies of Member States by using membership of the EU as 'the means by which Member States made their positions less rather than more vulnerable'.¹³ In broad terms this second strategy goes far beyond the strategy of simple removal by Europeanising a Member State's foreign policy in an attempt to improve or strengthen its relations. From this perspective, the EU is often presented as an intergovernmental mechanism for rescuing and strengthening the state and its foreign policy.¹⁴ But once again, as David Spence has made clear, the extent to which Europeanisation can 'rescue' foreign policy from the pressures of the supra-national, the sub-national, and the transnational needs to be questioned:

... the Europeanisation of domestic policy in EU Member States has tended, in all Member States, to require more rather than less of foreign ministries, given the supranationality of the EU process, the consequent blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic policy and the continuance of the foreign ministry's gatekeeping role on the margin of the domestic-foreign policy divide.¹⁵

Renationalisation of foreign policy

The final response to any perceived 'retreat' of Member States' foreign policies is more recent, and for some reflects the crisis of post-Maastricht CFSP, particularly in light of the embarrassing failures (shared with the most powerful state in the world) in the Balkans. This response would appear to be the 'renationalisation' of foreign policy as a means of dealing with the 'failure to progress' through the reassertion of 'traditional national foreign policies' identified by Christopher Hill, William Wallace, David Allen, Michael Smith and Esther Barbé. It is important to note, as they do, that even though 'renationalisation' is 'freely discussed' and a 'drift apart' has been noticed by some, 'vested interest' in the still early stages of the CFSP makes this argument questionable.¹⁶

As was noted under 'adaptation' in the first section above, the contrasting benefits of 'removal', 'rescue' or 'renationalise' in response to a perceived 'retreat' depend on the viewpoints of those engaged in the foreign policy processes under discussion. For post-colonial states such as France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal the use of development policy and external relations provides a convenient conduit for a 'rescue' of these relationships in the guise of a less historically 'loaded' EU policy. For smaller Member States such as Denmark, Ireland

and Greece the EU can represent a rescue of their non-security policies, but the pressure to 'remove' security interests to Brussels is fiercely resisted. For the (post-)neutral states of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the removal of aspects of their Cold War security stance to Brussels provides a means for overcoming domestic resistance, as well as seeing the human rights and development policies of the EU as a means for rescuing, or at least advancing, these issues on a larger stage. But these strategies are not without problems – as was mentioned under 'bureaucracies' in the previous section, vested interest in maintaining the status quo tends to view these developments with suspicion and may seek to find a pretext for the 'renationalisation' of elements of foreign policy, particularly in the larger foreign policy infrastructures of France and Britain.

Without the EU: special relationships and special interests

The final factor considered in this study was the question of the role of the foreign policies which Member States attempt to keep separate or private from the EU context. In the absence of any federal-EU authority with responsibility for foreign relations, Member States would obviously like to pick and choose which aspects of their foreign policy they share, and which they retain. Throughout this study we see that each case under consideration has a range of relationships and interests they see as 'special' and beyond the realm of European consultation. As Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius have highlighted elsewhere in the case of one of the EU's newest members (Sweden): 'tacit understandings exist among the Member States as regards "special interests". These base lines are recognised by other members as areas where the country in question has priority, and where it is difficult to pursue an assertive policy line'.¹⁷

Domain privé

Not all these 'special interests' are as strictly ring-fenced as a *domain privé*. There appears to be a dynamic, or a form of hierarchy, to these special issues which we may describe as four 'rings of specialness'. At the core of these rings of specialness is the *domain privé* which encompasses issues deemed 'national security' as they are central to the sovereign discourses of certain Member States. The three clearest-cut policies of this *domain privé* are to be found in the sovereign discourses surrounding security issues and policies. The first security issue is that of the nuclear-armed states of the UN Security Council – France and Britain. The second security issue concerns the 'national issues' of defence found in the EU's only Balkan state – Greece. The third security issue is the security policies of the EU's neutral, non-aligned, and NATO-only states of Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Denmark. In all three areas, and for all eight

states, these questions of security are acknowledged by all Member States as being beyond discussion – laying in a private field.

Bilateral relations

Outside of this inner ring of specialness lies the second ring of bilateral relations which are considered, by the participants, to be of special significance and therefore outside of 'normal' EU foreign policy discussions. These bilateral relations come in two varieties: those of 'special relations' (a form of strong bilateralism) and those of 'semi-independence' (a form of weak bilateralism). In terms of special relations it is fairly common to focus on those traditionally between Britain and the United States (primarily in the defence field), decreasingly between France and Germany (mainly in the integration field), and increasingly Germany's relations with Israel, Poland and the United States. In terms of semi-independence, we can look at the Benelux cooperation, the Nordic relations (particularly in terms of Nordic roles in the UN), the relations of energy-dependent Member States with suppliers (such as Italy with the Maghreb), and several Member States on immigration issues (including both sending states, such as Italy and Ireland, as well as receiving states such as France and Britain). Whilst this ring of specialness based on bilateral relations is more dynamic than the previous inner ring, it still involves Member States exempting from discussion those relations which are acknowledged outside of foreign policy actions.

European multilateralism

The third ring of specialness, lying outside of bilateral relations, can be characterised as European multilateralism, and is becoming more important in the post-Cold War period. European multilateralism consists of a mixture of issues which are regional, normative, or post-colonial in nature and which may be found to be a 'special issue' in the language of one or more Member State. The regional issues are those foreign policy relations which have been significant for historical or proximity reasons, such as those that France, Spain and Italy have with the other (non-EU) Mediterranean states, as well as relations between France/Britain and the Middle Eastern states. The normative issues are those foreign policy issues of significance for reasons of justice and equality, such as the issue of human rights for the Netherlands and Austria, and the question of developing countries for the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. Covering similar relations, although not necessarily for similar reasons, are the post-colonial issues which are held to be special for Britain and France (especially in Africa), Belgium and the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In all three of these areas of European multilateralism, attempts are made, by differing Member States, to attach special meaning or importance to the issues under consideration. As might be expected, this ring of special-

ness is far more dynamic than the two inner rings and it is in this area that we might see the most interesting debates over foreign policy competence, as all three issues seem destined to become more 'Europeanised' in the near future.

Transitional relations

The outer ring of specialness is by far the most dynamic of the four, consisting of special relations and issues which are in a transitional phase and are usually in the process of being communitarised in one form or another. If we think of those foreign policy issues which are the most difficult to place clearly within any one particular policy-making sphere then they are often to be found in this ring. These policies are considered special by perhaps one or some Member States, but are increasingly being drawn into the European sphere. Thus, relations between Member States and neighbouring applicant states would be found here, as well as relations which have a significant economic content to them, and relations which were formerly inter-national in nature, but are now more inter-regional in reality. This ring of special relations is really one full of questions rather than clear-cut answers – how might we best think of German–Polish relations after enlargement? Where do Anglo–South African relations stand in a dispute over free trade? And should Spanish–Argentinean relations be thought of as more special than EU–Mercosur relations?

The chapters present evidence that most Member States have relationships and interests they consider 'special' and worthy of bilateral, rather than multilateral or EU foreign policies. However, not only can these special interests problematise their entire membership, they can also require large amounts of political capital at the bargaining table in order to maintain. Interestingly the case studies here indicate that even some of the traditional special interests of the EU's Member States are in flux. As we have seen, Britain's special relationship with the USA is only really maintained in the security field, and indeed is shared with Germany. Two chapters both seemed to be demonstrating that the Franco–German special relationship is not what it once was, particularly with the absence of François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. Similarly, two of the authors were both able to show how the Netherlands and Austria have been able to lift their special issues of human rights onto the EU table in the post-Cold War era. Finally, we saw how the formerly special Nordic relationship has been subsumed within Baltic and EU relationships. Thus, notions of specialness and how they are Europeanised or maintained in a *domain privé* are more fluid concepts than was initially thought, which tells us as much about the distinctly post-Second World War context of many of these issues as it does about the impact of EU membership.

Conclusion: distinctive foreign policy analysis

This study attempted to formulate and utilise an approach to the foreign policies of EU Member States which was both distinctive and appropriate. The study formulated a framework that would allow the contributors to explore the foreign policies of individual Member States, while at the same time facilitating comparison in a search for broader insight. The study utilised the first new framework since William Wallace and William Paterson last aired these questions in 1978. The framework captured elements of context, process and implementation in a way which provided insights which are significantly distinctive and appropriate to the twenty-first century 'European condition'.

It is recognised here that appropriate analysis needs sensitivity and insight into the unique processes that constitute the EU, its Member States' domestic conditions, and the foreign policy-making processes within these Member States. As Helen Wallace has recently argued, theoretical and methodological space must be left for explanations which are intrinsically irrational, based on a combination of middle range theories which may not be metatheoretically consistent in their approach, but which can help to broaden our understanding: 'space needs to be made for irrationality, for confusion and for mistaken judgements'.¹⁸ Or, as Brian White is arguing for in the foreign policy analysis of the EU, 'European FPA can tentatively be characterised as more eclectic epistemologically, focused on more limited theoretical advances . . . and contextual 'middle range' theories'.¹⁹ Our approach attempts to adopt a more appropriate methodology which is suitable for the European context, takes into account processes of integration and socialisation, and is applicable to post-Cold War EU Member States. This approach was summed up very neatly by Ben Tonra in Chapter 12 of this book:

To get an understanding of all of these issues it is indeed necessary to move beyond the rather sterile template of traditional (US-centric) FPA with its state-centric focus upon complex bureaucracies and allegedly rational, utility-maximising actor . . . it is evident that a model of FPA needs to be able to account for identity, beliefs, norms and expectations arising from a unique endeavour of political integration. Such a model cannot assume any trajectory or direction in these 'non-rational' variables, but it must – at least – promise to come to terms with them.

The second distinctive element of the study is the number of insights which the comparative approach adopted has revealed and which will be briefly restated here.

Separable, not separate

The study consistently finds that the analysis of Member States' foreign policies is separable, but not separate from the EU context. It is not

possible to convincingly study one of the foreign policies considered here without accounting for the impact of, and adaptation to, the EU. The comparative framework provides insights into a number of adaptation strategies found in the Member States, but it also demonstrates the degree to which resistance to change is present. The extent to which states like France and Britain attempt to maintain the status quo of foreign policy coordination through intergovernmental means is interesting. Also valuable is the way in which states like Austria, Finland and Sweden use EU membership as a means of adapting from neutrality to post-neutrality.

Context, not abstract

The analysis of Member States' foreign policies is situated within a distinct social context involving high levels of interaction between a relatively small number of policy making personnel, rather than an abstract condition of autonomous decision making located in some form of 'international system'. The study finds that this leads to a degree of socialisation for many of those involved in foreign policy making, although crucially this was not a consistent pattern across all the cases. It is noticeable that policy makers in larger Member States (such as Britain, France and Germany) as well as in more geographically remote states (such as Greece) are less socialised than others. It is also suggested that there is sometimes a tension between this socialised elite and public opinion on foreign policy issues.

European, not domestic

The study supports the view that increasingly the boundary between domestic and foreign policy is permeated as the Member States become part of a 'multilevel political system', in Carole Webb's words. The problems of distinguishing between domestic policies, European policies and foreign policies is heightened, not resolved in this study. As the Secretary-General of NATO has argued, 'European politics are now domestic politics with a vengeance'.²⁰ If this is true then it may now be more appropriate to talk of Member States' residual foreign policies as being those that have not been Europeanised, and are maintained for their security role (such as defence) or their symbolic role (such as diplomatic missions).

Coordination, not policy

The study finds that foreign ministry bureaucracies are fast having to adapt to the new demands of policy making, coordination and representation. But while this adaptation involves an expansion of scope for most ministries, it is also leading to a change in role from foreign policy to foreign coordination of the policies of other ministries. In the case of certain states, such as Belgium, the foreign ministry might be heading towards a role as an 'escort service' for other ministries. Although this

may be a little unfair, the study finds that foreign ministries are playing a broader role in terms of coordinating relations between other departments and the EU, but are having greater difficulty in the making and conduct of traditionally conceived foreign policy. As Michael Smith has argued, one crucial reason for this is that the importance of foreign policy has been displaced by the rise of foreign economic policy, which is increasingly made by a partnership of trade ministries and the Commission.²¹ It may be more accurate, therefore, to talk of foreign ministries playing the role of coordination services rather than policy makers.

With or without EU

Lastly, the study finds that the combination of the four insights spelt out above make it difficult to talk of one clear-cut boundary between those policies which are 'Europeanised' or conducted through the EU, and those policies which are retained or excluded from the EU as a *domain privé* because of their 'special' status. Instead the cases analysed here provide evidence of 'rings of specialness' which allow a dynamic interpretation of a range of policies from a central core of a *domain privé* on security issues, through bilateral issues and European multilateral issues, to a number of transitional issues in the process of being Europeanised. Thus, the study confirms its initial assertion that it now seems more appropriate to suggest that the EU Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policies objectives inside an EU context. And, as we argued at the beginning of this chapter, if such a transformation has taken place then a distinctive approach must be adopted which is able to go beyond de-contextualised explanations and some way towards a more appropriate understanding.

Notes

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