Normative Power Europe: 
A Contradiction in Terms?

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Normative Power Europe:
A Contradiction in Terms?

Ian Manners

Abstract

Hedley Bull’s searing 1982 critique of the European Community’s ‘civilian power’ in international affairs serves as the point of departure for my discussion of the European Union’s ‘normative power’ in contemporary international society. The idea of using Bull’s examination of civilian power Europe as an entry point to a discussion on the value of using English School terms to study the EU may strike many as a contradiction in terms. I will attempt to use this paper to argue that two apparent contradictions are useful in this respect - the concept of an ‘EU Society’, and the idea of the EU’s international role being primarily normative, not economic or military.
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Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?  

Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one… (Bull, 1982)

With these now renowned words Hedley Bull, the pre-eminent writer of the ‘English School’ of international relations, dismissed the suggestion that the European Community represented a ‘civilian power’ in international relations and endeared himself to a generation of European Studies scholars. Bull was responding to the suggestions of writers such as François Duchêne who claimed that traditional military power had given way to progressive economic power as the means to exert influence in international relations (Duchêne, 1972, 1973).

Bull’s argument, and the position which it represents within the English School, form the starting point for my discussion of the international role of the European Union as a promoter of norms in the solidarist tradition. I will suggest that Bull was correct to argue that ‘from the perspective of “the return to power politics” of the 1980s’ the civilian power of the European Community was conditional upon the military power of states, as the pluralist tradition within the English School would expect. However, I will further claim that the developments of the 1990s in international relations have led the European Union to transcend both notions of military power and civilian power to become a normative power in international and world society. The idea of using Bull’s examination of civilian power Europe as an entry point to a discussion on the value of using English School terms to study the EU may strike many as a contradiction in terms. I will attempt to argue that two contradictions are useful in this respect - the concept of an ‘EU Society’, and the idea of the EU’s international role being primarily normative, not economic or military.

The English School, declared closed in 1981, has had relatively little interaction with European studies, despite the observation that ‘the European Union represents a very fully developed international society’ (Buzan, 1996: 263). However, as Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman have recently argued,

[T]he core concepts of the English School: international system, international society and world society, allow us to grasp the specificity of the European system of governance within a general framework, and to contextualise European integration both historically and within the current world system. (Diez and Whitman, 2000: 2)

The approach adopted in this paper is both theoretical and empirical, representing an attempt to explore the EU with the use of English School ideas, and similarly, to examine what the EU might bring to the English School of international theory. I am not in the slightest bit interested in examining who said what to whom about international society during the post-war period in Britain.  

1 This paper represents part of a wider project to reconsider the utility of ‘English School’ thinking for a variety of areas in the study of international relations (Buzan, 1999). For further information, consult http://www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/. I am indebted to Barry Buzan, Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman for their encouragement to participate in this endeavour, and Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) for enabling me to work in Copenhagen during October to December 2000, where this paper was written.

2 Like many writing on the ‘English School’ I think its name is not only inaccurate, but inappropriate. For a discussion of alternatives see ‘ES: English School, Enlightenment Scholasticism, or Eclectic Society’ in section II of this paper (page 14).

European Union. This will involve examining English School definitions, suggesting a missing tradition to the School, and looking at what, exactly, the School is. The second part will consider the two most common ways of discussing the EU as an international actor, a civilian power or a military power, and will then introduce my concept of a normative power. As part of this approach I will then consider what exactly normative power is, and why the EU represents a form of it. Then I will consider some examples of what I consider to be the exercise of normative power, and examine the case of the death penalty in detail. I will conclude by reflecting on two of the apparent contradictions in what the English School and the EU might have to say about each other.

I. Scenario for an Encounter

In imaging a scenario for an encounter between the English School and the study of the European Union, I am faced with the initial challenge of what particular elements of these two huge domains of world politics I should focus on - whether I should examine English School writings on the EC/EU (very slim), or English School ideas used by European integration writers (also very slim), or simply an encounter between the two canons of English School and European integration writings (huge). Invariably this will wind up being a fairly idiosyncratic snapshot of what I think would be most interesting in a brief encounter between two almost complete strangers.

I will structure this first encounter by focusing on five themes of ‘international society’, ‘super-states’, ‘new medievalism’, ‘pendulum’, and ‘pluralists’ versus ‘solidarists’. If anyone has heard of the English School it is probably because of the idea of an ‘international society’ of states (see below for fuller discussion) which is often read as the ‘international community’ where ‘international outrage’ or ‘international response’ sometimes take place. Surprisingly, I can only find six writers linking the ideas of international society to those of European integration - Martin Wight (1964), Barry Buzan (1993, 1996), Adrian Hyde-Price (1997), Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman (2000), and Roger Morgan (2000). Interestingly, Morgan sums up most of the ideas put forward by these writers when he argues that:

> Even though the European Union of today is a very different entity from the historic European ‘society of states’ which Wight analysed, the concepts he developed can help us understand the thing we have now; and indeed, that his approach has strong affinities with the interpretations of those present-day analysts who maintain that in the process of European integration, one way or another, ideas matter. (Morgan, 2000: 559-560)

Adrian Hyde-Price’s work in this respect is insightful, not only because it ties in with Richard Whitman’s ‘rethinking the European Union’ (Landau and Whitman, 1997) in the immediate post-Cold War period, but also because Hyde-Price recognised that ‘within this international society [in Europe], relations are conducted on the basis of international law within a complex institutional ensemble. The states within this community share common normative values associated primarily with human rights, liberal democracy and market economies’ (Hyde-Price, 1997: 23). Writing in the early 1990s Buzan and Hyde-Price were the among the first to appreciate that the English School concept of international society was a valuable way of approaching the role of the EU in the ‘new Europe’ (Buzan, 1993: 349-351).

The theme of ‘state or super-state?’ is one which should hold much resonance amongst integration scholars, but I could only find mentions in the work of six writers - Wight (1966), Bull (1977), James Anderson and James Goodman (1995), Diez (1997), and Yale Ferguson (1998). Both Wight and Bull argued that any shift from states to super-states (through integration for example) would not change the modern form of territorial sovereignty, simply change scale:

4 This is a extremely tentative first survey - I would be very grateful for any further references.
Practical problems of international politics are often described in terms of building a bigger and better state - a European Union [for example], without seeing that such an achievement would leave the problems of inter-state politics precisely where they are. (Wight, 1966 in Diez, 1997: 287)

Anderson and Goodman acknowledge Bull’s views on a European ‘super-state’ as being important if a postmodern adaptation to the demands for regional autonomy are to be found within EU governance (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 609). In contrast, Ferguson derides Bull’s idea of a fully integrated European Community as being ‘simply a nation-state writ large’ as being ‘positively silly’ (Ferguson, 1998: 194).

Bull’s theme of ‘new medievalism’ should be of interest to many writing on the multi-level governance of the European Union. However, I found only seven other writers using the idea - Anderson and Goodman (1995), Andrew Linklater (1996a), Hyde-Price (1997), Magnus Ekengren (1997), and Diez and Whitman (2000). All these writers find Bull’s new medievalism a useful means of thinking about the EU as ‘a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’ (1984: 254-255) because it seems to capture the ‘overlapping identities, authorities, sovereignties and jurisdictions’ of the new Europe (Ekengren, 1997: 82). In particular, it allows us to conceptualise the variety of ‘actors, authorities, loyalties and identities’ (Hyde-Price, 1997: 34) which multi-level governance models of the EU are seeking to explain in their emphasis on regional, national, and supranational authority (Anderson and Goodman, 1995: 605).

Adam Watson’s theme of a ‘pendulum’ swinging between hegemony and dominion in international relations has been used by Ole Wæver (1996b), as well as Diez and Whitman (2000) in the study of Europe integration. Wæver suggests that it is possible to use Watson’s pendulum to think about post-Cold War European security in terms of three empires (EC, Russian and Turkish). Diez and Whitman extend the metaphor to place applicant states to the EU in a suzerain relationship in EU international society (Diez and Whitman, 2000: 15).

The final theme is that of ‘pluralists’ versus ‘solidarists’ which I included as a point of interest - the separation between pluralist conceptions of international society based on the recognition of the principle of state sovereignty, and the solidarist conception of international society based on the recognition of the rights of individuals, not states. This division between pluralists (the Bull wing) and solidarists (the Manning wing) is one which runs through the English School writings on a variety of subjects from international order, international society, humanitarian intervention, minority rights and human rights. The reason I raise this theme here is because these sorts of questions, such as whether citizens of EU member states hold legal rights through direct law of the EU, or through their governments’ enforcement of such laws, are central to the study of the EU but I have yet to find any writings linking the English School to the EU in this respect. Having briefly considered the very brief encounters between the English School and the European Union, I will now turn my attention to a more far-reaching discussion of English School definitions, terminology and concepts.

**English School Definitions**

In order to get a sense of the insights which the English School may bring to the study of the EU’s international role it is useful to return to some of its basic definitions as presented by Bull in *Anarchical Society* (1977). As part of an attempt to clarify these insights it is also useful to compare how they can be situated within Richard Little’s recent pluralistic approach to Wight’s three traditions (Little, 2000), and to suggest what ‘tradition’ the English School missed.

The broadest, and most encompassing, concept presented by Bull was that of a world system defined as ‘the world-wide network of interaction that embraces not only states but also other political actors,
both ‘above’ the state and ‘below’ it’ (Bull, 1977: 276). Bull further contended that a world system was ‘emerging of which the system of states [international system] is only a part’ (Bull, 1977: 21). This world system was therefore composed of both sub-national actors (such as regional governments), state actors, and international actors (such as international organisations and supranational organisations), but clearly also left room for transnational actors (such as non-governmental organisations, transnational pressure groups, and multi-national companies). The focus of this approach is broadly positivist, with its study of ‘interaction’, but it rejects the notion that states represent the only actors within world politics. In this respect Bull’s world system would be instantly recognisable to scholars in the pluralist ‘paradigm’ in international relations with their focus on non-state actors, complex interdependence and globalisation. The concept of world system remains overlooked and underdeveloped by later English School theorists, despite the observation that just as an international society presupposes a world society, so an international system should presuppose a world system, as Bull contends. It might be suggested that Little could have included the concept of world system within a tradition of ‘positivism, pluralism and the world system’.

The second, slightly less encompassing concept presented by Bull was that of a world society defined as ‘not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built’ (Bull, 1977: 279). Clearly then, this concept went beyond that of a mere degree of interaction suggested by a world system, and somehow towards a common sense of human community. It still left room for the non-state actors in Bull’s world system, but placed an additional emphasis on common consciousness and perception. Little has argued that the concept of world society can be tied to that of Wight’s tradition of revolutionism and Critical Theory in international relations (Little, 2000: 411). However, there is a tension here in that Wight’s revolutionism was clearly intended to include Marxist thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein and his ‘world system’ theory set firmly in the structuralist ‘paradigm’ of historical materialism. But Critical Theorists try to distance themselves from the structuralism of Marxist thinking and its focus on historical materialism in order to refocus on the post-positivist approaches of discourse ethics (Linklater, 1996: 284). Thus, placing Critical Theory in the tradition of revolutionism is a move which still needs some choreographing. However, the concept of world society is clearly emancipatory in its goals and, like Critical Theory, challenges empirical claims about knowledge in a social world (Linklater, 1996: 279). The concept of world society is useful in overcoming the limitations of a national or international society (see below), as Jürgen Habermas has observed:

‘A sociology that construes ‘society’ almost always as an object delimited by the nation-state, in other words as a national society, encounters conceptual difficulties when it comes to a politically underdetermined structure such as ‘world society’ (Habermas, 2000: 37)

In contrast to international society (see below), world society and Critical Theory do not seek to challenge the rational or objective foundations of human existence, but do seek to support a human or subjective structure of communication and knowledge. Thus I suggest that the world society goals of Critical Theory are built on an objective (or positivist) ontology and a subjective (or post-positivist) epistemology.

The third concept presented by Bull was that of an international system defined as being ‘formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on another’s decisions to cause them to behave - or at least in some measure as parts of a whole’ (Bull, 1977: 10-11). In contrast to the ideas of a world system and a world society, the notion of international system is more limited in that it gives primacy to states and the interaction between them, rather than all of the

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human community. Similar to the concept of world system, this approach is broadly positivist with a focus on contact and mutual impact, although it disregards the idea that an international system is constituted by the beliefs of the people who inhabit it, be they humans or groups of humans. Steve Smith’s exploration of ‘positivism and beyond’ is helpful in defining positivism as ‘a commitment to a unified view of science, and the adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences to explain the social world’ (S. Smith, 1996: 11). Little has suggested that the concept of international system and the assumptions of positivism belong in Wight’s tradition of realism (Little, 2000: 404), a categorisation that few would disagree with. In contrast to world society (see above), international system seeks neither to challenge the rational or objective foundations of human existence, nor the rational or objective structure of knowledge. Thus I suggest that the concept of an international system is grounded in a positivist acceptance of the world as it is, built on an objective (or positivist) ontology and a objective (or positivist) epistemology.

The final concept presented by Bull, and for which the English School is best known, is that of an international society which ‘exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with each other, and share in the working of common institutions’ (Bull, 1977: 13). Again, in contrast to the concepts of world system and world society, the focus is on states, but international society goes beyond the simple description of interaction between them and looks instead at a common sense of international community. Like the concept of an international system, an international society leaves no room for the non-state actors of a world system and world society. Little has suggested that the concept of international society and the interpretivism of a self-conscious international community belong within Wight’s tradition of rationalism (Little, 2000: 408).

Many scholars using English School concepts have been keen to suggest that the notion of an international society represents a kind of via media between realism and idealism, and have recently tried to link to, or usurp, IR-variant social constructivism. Both R. B. J. Walker and Ole Wæver have pointed out that the English School could be interpreted as ‘a via media between the supposed extremes of realism and revolutionism’ (Walker, 1993: 32) or an ‘attempted rapprochement between reflectivists and rationalists’ (Wæver, 1996: 170), pre-empting Emanuel Adler’s call to ‘seize the middle ground’ (Adler, 1997). Paul Howe has also suggested that E. H. Carr’s scholarship ‘emerges out of the important middle ground between absolutism and relativism’ (Howe, 1994: 287). However, as Wæver has pointed out, it is Tim Dunne who has argued most consistently and persistently that ‘the English School is constructivist’ (Dunne, 1995: 368 in Wæver, 1999: 1). Iver Neumann, Wæver and Little all take issue with Dunne on the idea that the English School can be equated to IR-variant social constructivism in this way (Neumann, 1999: 32, Wæver, 1999; Little, 2000: 396).

This denial is important because, unfortunately, there are some inherent contradictions in the IR-variant of social constructivism. Because IR-variant constructivists were keen to establish themselves within the American social science of international relations they have had to reject the anti-foundationalism of the original formulations of Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s (1967) Social Construction of Reality which might have left them resting on ‘turtles all the way down’ (Brown, 1994). Instead they chose a different formulation of ‘ideas part-way down’ (Keohane, 2000), while leaving aside their ‘desire all the way down’ (Doty, 2000). This awkward combination of post-positivist ontology and positivist epistemology leaves IR-variant social constructivism as sounding ‘like being a little bit pregnant’ (Kinnvall, 2001). We are left wondering why it took international relations thirty

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IR-variant social constructivism appears to draw on three strands of social theory (interactionism, phenomenology, and linguistics) which many would argue are contradictory (Palan, 2000: 577). For the symbolic interactionist strand see Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969); for the phenomenological strand see Husserl (1913, 1962), Schutz (1972) and Roche (1973); for
years to read, understand, and (mis)apply basic social theory, especially as IR-variant social constructivism appears to be doing a disservice by ‘blunting radical critiques like postmodernism’ (Weber, 1999:435), while at the same time undermining the ‘great potential for constructivist thought in IR’ (Palan, 2000b: 598).

I would agree with Wæver that although there is some ‘small truth’ to the interpretation that international society and social constructivism may share an ontological and epistemological position, there is ‘great truth’ to the argument that the English School is not constructivist (Wæver, 1999: 1). Thus I would suggest that the concept of an international society is located in an intersubjective interpretation of the world through a subjective (or post-positivist) ontology, but explained through an objective (or positivist) epistemology. But I would distinguish between the ‘contradictory, open-ended framework’ of the ‘ethical debates’ surrounding international society and the ‘scientistic study of ideas’ in social constructivism (Wæver, 1999: 12).

Having briefly returned to the four core English School concepts of world system, world society, international system, and international society, I will now suggest how these might be adapted for the study of the European Union, before turning to the question of the ‘missing tradition’. As we have seen, the four core English School concepts differentiate between world inclusiveness and international exclusiveness, as well as between abstracted systems and self-conscious societies. But what happens if we turn our attention to a ‘multiperspectival polity’ (Ruggie, 1993: 172) being constituted by both state and non-state actors, as well as being both a system and a society? Diez and Whitman suggest that the European Union represents one example of such a political form, as ‘one finds strong elements of both international and world society in today’s EU’ (Diez and Whitman, 2000: 8). However, Diez and Whitman’s ‘scenario for an encounter’ tends to leave me a little confused by their differentiation between an ‘EU international system with a dense international society and a fairly developed world society’; a ‘European international system with a [less dense] international society and a [less developed] world society’; and finally a ‘global international system [with] a basic international system and a rudimentary world society’ (Diez and Whitman, 2000: 16). In contrast, I would suggest that it might be more fruitful to introduce two new types of system and society, built on adaptations of English School concepts set out above.

The first adaptation I would suggest is to introduce the concept of an EU system based on relations between EU states and EU citizens. This idea is arrived at by bringing together the concept of world system (contact and interaction between political actors) with that of international system (contact and interaction between states). Drawing on these two previously described concepts, we can see that an EU system involves the insights of the broadly-positivist approaches of world system pluralists and their focus on non-state actors (such as the Commission), with that of international system realists and their focus on state actors (such as the EU member states). Following this line of argument, the concept of an EU system would lead us to focus on positivist methodologies of empirical analysis, whilst accepting that there is a tension between the world system of the EC and the international system of the member states. Such a methodology would ensure that the debate over this tension would stay firmly in the realm of formal treaty powers and negotiation, whilst avoiding the realm of informal constitution of identities and knowledge. The introduction of a new concept of EU system is necessary because the EU’s system of governance fundamentally undermines the clear-cut distinction between domestic and international jurisdiction on which the world system and international system concepts are built. Interestingly, the first article of the Treaty on European Union formally defines the concept of EU system quite nicely: 'Its [the Union] task shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples.' As the

the linguistic strand see Wittgenstein (1953, 1969) and Bloor (1983). For discussions on social constructivism in philosophy, see Latour and Woolgar (1979); Hollis (1982); and Tibbetts (1986).
10 Including the European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice, Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions.
11 Including the European Council, Council of Ministers, Permanent Representatives, and COREPER.
concept of EU system is built on those of world system and international system, I would suggest that it is grounded in a positivist acceptance of the world as it is, built on an objective (or positivist) ontology and a objective (or positivist) epistemology.

The second adaptation I suggest is clearly to parallel the first by introducing the concept of an EU society based on the common sense of an EU community made up of member states and citizens which goes beyond that of the EU system of relations to examine the perceived commonality of the EU. Like the EU system, the concept of an EU society builds on the concepts of world society (perceived commonality of the human community) and international society (perceived commonality of a group of states). Again, by drawing on world society and international society concepts, we can see that an EU society includes the post-positivist approaches of world society Critical Theorists and their focus on the production of knowledge (such as asking about claims to knowledge in the EC), with the post-positivist approaches of international society interpretivists and their focus on intersubjectivities (such as pluralist or solidarist norms in the EU). Developing this approach further, the concept of an EU society would lead us to utilise post-positivist methodologies of discourse analysis, hermeneutic interpretation, and normative judgement, while accepting that there is a tension between the world society of the EC and the international society of the member states. Using such methodologies would ensure that the study of EU society would lead us to consider the ways in which evidence, knowledge and facts are generated, and how norms, values and identities are constituted. Just as the breakdown of the domestic-foreign frontier necessitates the need for an EU system, the concept of EU society becomes necessary in order to come to terms with the informal state and non-state societies which have grown within the EU as the separation between the ‘rational’ cooperation between member states and ‘revolutionary’ integration of the EC continues. Similarly, the sixth article of the Treaty on European Union formally defines the concept of EU society quite nicely: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.’ Thus, the EU society consists of an EC world society and member state international society which share principles of natural law in that they are based on human rights, rather than the rights which states grant their citizens. As the concept of an EU society is built on those of world society and international society, I would suggest that it is located within competing views of the way in which the world is best conceived, and competing views of the structure of human communication and knowledge. This combination suggests the interesting conclusion that, because of its contested nature, the study of EU society involves a subjective (or post-positivist) ontology and a subjective (or post-positivist) epistemology. The implications of this outcome are now discussed as part of the ‘missing tradition’. It might be helpful to illustrate the six English School concepts considered here with the help of a comparative diagram:

**Figure One: English School Systems and Societies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contact and interaction between political actors</td>
<td>contact and interaction between states</td>
<td>contact and interaction between states and people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>perceived commonality of the human community</td>
<td>perceived commonality of a group of states</td>
<td>perceived commonality of a group of states and a community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 For example, challenging the ‘facts’ of the *acquis communautaire*.  
13 For example, challenging the ‘norms’ of the *acquis politique*.  

The Missing Tradition?

The English School is neither English, nor a school. It is also neither a theory not a paradigm, which might go some way to explaining why it is relatively unknown in US international relations. In its broadest form the English School represents more than the *via media* or rapprochement of the ‘international society’ tradition (Walker, 1993: 32; Wæver, 1996: 170). Instead it represents a ‘pluralist approach … that aims to draw the disparate threads together’ (Little, 2000: 415), but in order to truly achieve this it is necessary for the English School to encompass at least one more ‘tradition’, and to draw attention to at least one absent component of English School international theory. As Little suggests, ‘from an English School perspective, a comprehensive understanding of International Relations must embrace all three traditions’, but in attempting to do so it is clear to me that the English School has crucially overlooked an aspect of its existing work (feminist theory) and is missing one tradition (relativism).

Being primarily situated in the post-war milieu of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, the foundational work of the English School should perhaps not be overly criticised for overlooking the crucial gender bias to its work, nor for the fact that it did not include a tradition of ‘postmodernism’ in its international theory. Given that the seven ‘central figures’ or ‘founding fathers’ (Buzan, 2000) of the school were male, we should be unsurprised that Wight’s three traditions had no space for feminist theory. As Christine Sylvester suggests, Hedley Bull’s defence of ‘traditionalism’ in IR during the 1960s revealed ‘the pervasiveness of gender power’ (Sylvester, 1996: 260). In the 1980s and 90s, as the body of people working on English School topics grew to 30 ‘regular contributors’, including four women and eight female ‘participants’ (Buzan, 2000), there is still little room for feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint, feminist postmodernism, or postmodern feminism. Unexpectedly, Cynthia Weber’s reading of Martin Wight’s ‘history’ leaves the ‘body’ of feminist identity in the footnotes rather than being more overtly represented in the performance (Weber, 1998). Perhaps it is true, as Tim Dunne suggests, that ‘from the academic ‘watchtower’ … princes kept the view … while all the women came and went’ unseen by the English School (Dunne, 2000: 228). A similar situation appears to exist for the academic prince who is to be found unaware of the ‘silent security dilemma’ resulting from the gender ‘blank spots’ for the Little Mermaid in the Copenhagen School of security studies (Hansen, 2000: 287). Any ‘comprehensive understanding of international relations’ clearly must attempt to engage feminist (re)visions of international relations if it is to escape the ‘relatively limited scope’ of the early English School (Little: 2000: 415).

The ‘missing tradition’ is clear enough, as both Carr and Manning seemed to have realised, the ‘three r’s’ which Wight developed in the 1950s were unable to account for the dependency of the fiction of

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15 Gender construction is a crucial cultural cleavage in world politics. I would suggest there are five such cultural cleavages: ‘territorial’ (states, regions); ‘gender’ (female, male); ‘appearance’ (race, ethnicity); ‘socio-economic’ (class, caste); and ‘belief-system’ (religion, ideology). These five cleavages are central to our understanding of the cultural construction of world politics. Given the English School’s origins in the works of a ‘South African apologist’ and an ‘itinerant Marxist’ (Dunne, 2000: 235) it seems strange that ‘appearance’ and ‘socio-economic’ cultural cleavages do not feature more prominently in its research.


17 Coral Bell, Claire Cutler, Jennifer Jackson Preece, and Cornelia Navari.


states and international society on the beliefs and imagination of people. Buzan has put this most coherently when he argues that:

Both Carr and, at much greater length, Manning make much of the fact that states (and therefore also the idea of a society of states) are in an important sense fictions, whose status rests on the strength and breadth of people’s willingness to believe in, or merely accept, their reality. (Buzan, 1993: 329)

Thus, Buzan argues that Carr understood that the most important ‘political power in the international sphere … [is] over opinion’ (Kubálková, 1998: 33). In this respect Carr appreciated that the power to shape the fiction of the state, the society of states, and the study of that power in political science was one and the same: that in natural sciences ‘facts exist independently of what anyone thinks of them. In the political sciences, which are concerned with human behaviour, there are no such facts’ (Carr, 1962: 22 in Kubálková, 1998: 33). Kubálková goes further to suggest that ‘when we examine … post-structuralist, post-Marxist Foucault’s idea of power-knowledge and discourse, Carr’s idea of ‘power over opinion’ comes to mind’ (Kubálková, 1998: 37). Similarly, Buzan also acknowledges the extent to which Manning understood that international society is a ‘communal imagining’ which is ‘like a game, and like any other game, it has to have rules and compliance with the rules’ (Manning, 1962: 19 and 112 in Wheeler, 2000: 22). Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne have pointed out the extent to which Bull’s ‘imagined community’ are similar to the pragmatism of Richard Rorty (Wheeler and Dunne, 1997: 51). Carr’s suggestions about power over opinions and no such facts, Manning’s ideas about the roles of imagination and the game of international relations, Bull’s imagined community, together with Buzan’s observations about the fictions of states and a society of states based on the production of knowledge and people’s willingness to accept that knowledge, lead me to the conclusion that the ‘missing tradition’ is that of postmodern relativism:

‘It is possible to conceive the world of postmodern knowledge as governed by a game of perfect information, in the sense that the data is in principle accessible to any expert: there is no scientific secret. Given equal competence (no longer in the acquisition of knowledge, but in its production), what extra performativity depends on in the final analysis is ‘imagination’, which allows one either to make a new move or change the rules of the game.’ (Lyotard, 1984: 52)

Manning appeared to understand that his ‘communal imagination’ constituted the social world, as his self-definition of international relations seems to suggest:

‘[I] saw my subject not so much as a branch of history or of conventional political science but rather as a species of political sociology, focused as it was on human history in its widest dimension, its world-wide dimension. I saw it in principle and in fact as a kind of sociology of

20 Der Derian points out that Kubálková was a participant in Bull’s term-long seminar on the idea of world society held at the ANU in 1975, thus such observations about the English School’s interpretation of Carr should not be ignored (Der Derian, 1996: 88-89).

21 Bull, Carr and Foucault have all been described as ‘anti-positivists’ (Bull in Nicholson, 1996: 130; Carr in Kubálková, 1998: 33; and Foucault in Calhoun, 1995: 131 n. 83). They have also all been described as empiricists (Calhoun, 1995: 131 n. 83; Guzzini, 2000: 176 n. 4), although Carr has been described as an ‘anti-empiricist’ (Dunne, 1998: 39 n. 5). On the difference between positivism and empiricism see S. Smith (1996) and Nicholson (1996).

22 I might have suggested ‘reflectivism’ or ‘reflexivism’ here. However, as Robert Keohane drew on the sociological concept of ‘reflective’ in 1988 (Keohane, 1988) without any apparent reference to its source (see Giddens, 1979: 71, 80 and 1984: 3-4) in an attempt to ‘deflect attention from the epistemological thrust of the ‘post’ challenge’ and sideline those he did not agree with in the profession of International Relations (see Kubálková et al, 1998: 18), it is inappropriate to use as a term to describe postmodernism. Similarly, as Mead’s term of ‘reflexiveness’ (Mead, 1934: 134) is used by Anthony Giddens to describe the ‘reflexivity of modernity’ rather than taking us ‘beyond modernity’ (Giddens, 1990: 36-52) in an attempt to deny the claims of postmodernism, it also seems inaccurate to use this term (see also Bloor, 1976: 4-5; Wacquant, 1989; Keat, 1989: 275-277; and Bourdieu, 1990).
Manning’s idiosyncratic phenomenology would lead us to expect his understanding of international relations to be founded on reality as essentially relative and subjective, with a focus on phenomena (such as states) as objects of perception. This expectation is born out in Dunne’s interpretation of Manning’s international society as being ‘reproduced by the actions of ‘those quasi-persons, the sovereign states” (Manning, 1975: xxiii in Dunne, 1998: 21, n. 44).

Building on these observations by Manning, Carr, Buzan, and Dunne, I would further suggest that the tradition of ‘relativism’ might find its expression in the English School through the concept of world imagination, as suggested by Manning and Lyotard. I use the term ‘world’ to convey the idea of Manning’s ‘social universe’, Buzan’s ‘fictional reality’ and Lyotard’s ‘world of postmodern knowledge’. I use the term ‘imagination’ to reflect Wight’s problem that international theory is ‘a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name ‘political theory’ is appropriated’ which, as Weber points out, ‘is a problem for Wight, for, as he continues, ‘international theory in this sense does not, at first sight, exist’ (Wight, 1966: 17 in Weber, 1998: 454). Thus a world imagination is supported by Carr’s political science with no facts, and which sustains the previous English School concepts through the power over opinion exercised through the performativity of world leaders, diplomats, entrepreneurs, and scholars. A world imagination might therefore, drawing on Buzan, be defined as being ‘the important fiction that states (and therefore also the idea of international), whose status rests on the strength and breadth of people’s willingness to believe in, or merely accept, their reality, is a world-wide imagination’.

In contrast to the previous English School concepts, the notion of world imagination is open ended in that it gives primacy to ideas, beliefs, opinions and discourses which sustain the idea of a world society, an international system, or a international society. Similar to the concept of international society, this approach challenges the conventional understanding of the way in which the reality of international relations is constructed, thus ‘anarchy is what imagination makes of it’ (see Wendt, 1992; and Shannon, 2000). Again, similar to the concept of world society, this approach challenges the conventional understanding of the way in which knowledge about international relations is built, thus ‘knowledge is always for something else’ (see Cox, 1981; and Linklater, 1996). Following this line of argument, and reflecting Little’s pattern of English School methodology, tradition and concept, I might suggest that the practices of postmodernism belong in the ‘missing tradition’ of Nietzchen relativism with the concept of world imagination.

Within the broad tradition of Nietzchen relativism, it is possible to identify three types of postmodern methodologies: deconstruction, genealogical reconstruction and dialogical imagination. (Der Derian, 1996: 84; and Bleiker, 1998: 479). Jacques Derrida’s methodology of deconstruction (Derrida, 1978, 1991) is central to postmodern readings of international relations, in particular that of intertextuality

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23 Manning was explaining his ‘openly pro-Apartheid politics’ to the International Court of Justice on South Africa in 1965. Given Manning’s ‘unique blend of phenomenology and jurisprudence’, together with the ‘idiosyncratic’ and ‘Byzantine subtlety of [his] philosophical approach’, we should not be surprised by the extreme relativism which he appeared to demonstrate under cross examination in the Court (Dunne, 1998: 21 n. 43, 52, 93).


26 I should note that just as ‘postmodernism’ cannot be defined, other than ‘an incredulity towards metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv), so ‘postmodern methodology’ is something of an oxymoron. However, Lyotard does encourage us to ‘wage a war on totality’ (normative war); ‘be witnesses to the unrepresentable’ (vocal witnesses); ‘activate the differences’ (local and particular); and ‘save the honour of the name’ (diferends). I read this as a sign to participate in ‘postmodern science as the search for instabilities’ (Lyotard, 1984: 53-60).
through examining a chain of texts (Brown, 1994: 222-227; Der Derian, 1996: 87-92). Michel Foucault’s methodology of genealogical reconstruction (Foucault, 1977, 1984) can also be used in postmodern (re)readings of international relations ‘to trace the history of a contested idea without boiling it down to an ahistorical essence’ (Brown, 1994: 229-230; Der Derian, 1996: 92-94). Mikhail Bakhtin’s methodology of dialogical imagination (Bakhtin, 1981; Todorov, 1984) allows ‘a constant interaction of meanings, of points of view, of otherness, resisting any reduction to a single position, a monologue’ (Brown, 1994: 228-229; Der Derian, 1996: 95-97). These methodologies, located in Lyotard’s ‘postmodern science’ are aimed at ‘producing not the known, but the unknown’ in order to ‘wage a war on [the] totality’ of metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984: 53, 82).

Wæver has pointed out that there is a common presumption that the post-positivist ‘turn’ in international relations was, in some strange way, a response to the 1979 publication of Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics (Wæver, 1999: 10). For example, Vendulka Kubálková suggests that ‘Waltz’s new theory of realism … set off the processes I describe as catharsis and the creation of the ‘post’ movement’ (Kubálková, 1998: 34-5). In some respects this is an extraordinary claim, given the impact which the work of French structuralists, post-structuralists and post-modernists has had on literature, culture, sociology and philosophy during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, culminating in Jean-François Lyotard’s 1979 ‘report on knowledge’ - The Postmodern Condition. These writers were responding to three French revolutions during the 1950s and 1960s – the existentialist writings of Sartre, the anti-colonial revolutions in North Africa and Indochina, and the student revolts of 1968. The postmodern political writings which followed them were a response to the rethinking of reality in western philosophy, not the neo thinking of realism by Waltz.

I would suggest that the concept of a world imagination shares an intersubjective interpretation of the world with the concept of an international society through a subjective (or post-positivist) ontology. Similarly, a world imagination shares a human or subjective structure of communication and knowledge with the concept of a world society through a subjective (or post-positivist) epistemology. Thus I suggest that the world imagination of Nietzschean postmodern relativism is created through a subjective (or post-positivist) ontology and a subjective (or post-positivist) epistemology.

Thus alongside Wights’ three ‘r’s of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism, it is possible to suggest a fourth ‘r’ of relativism as represented by a focus on world imagination presented here. This would be an important move for three reasons - (post)modernise, balance, and dialogue. Firstly, the English School is largely seen as being incredibly backward and inward looking, with a focus on ‘classical’, ‘traditional’ and ‘realist’ study of international relations. Wæver and Dunne both admit that the

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30 ‘Postmodern science - by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, ‘fracta’, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes - is theorising its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge.’ (Lyotard, 1984: 60).
34 For examples see: ‘classical wing of realism’ (Gilpin, 1990 in Dunne 1998: 5); ‘realist theorists of the day’ (Ruggie, 1993: 146); ‘traditionalist’ (George, 1994: 77-83); ‘classical realism’ (Jackson, 1996: 211-213); ‘traditionalism’ (Sylvester, 1996: 260); ‘reformist realists’ and ‘British ‘traditionalism’” (Wæver, 1998: 711).
English School is seen as a ‘respectable, traditional approach’ which many criticise for being ‘just a tamer version of realism’. (Wæver, 1996: 196; and Dunne, 1998: 5). Nick Rengger suggests that one option ‘would be to move beyond the relatively straightforward communitarianism manifested in the classical school [English School] and … into postmodern interpretations of our contemporary circumstances’ (Rengger, 1996: 74). Following Rengger’s suggestion may overcome the problem that the image of the classical, traditional, realist approach dissuades many from examining English School ideas and certainly is a hindrance in encouraging a forward looking research agenda. Thus the introduction of more recent insights from the (post)modernisation of international relations would help the School enter its sixth decade as a healthy and more balanced research enterprise.

Secondly, as Wæver argues:

‘The English School … can easily be linked to more or less post-modernist notions, an emphasis on the cultural colouring of international systems and especially the general ‘radical’ interest in thinking the basic categories of the international system instead of taking them as mechanical givens.’ (Wæver, 1996: 169-70)

But if the English School is ‘linked’ with ‘more or less post-modern notions’ in an attempt to provide a via media, rapprochement, or middle ground (Walker, 1993: 32; Howe, 1994: 287; Buzan, 1999: 4; Wæver, 1996: 170; Wæver, 1999) in the study of international relations then it will first have to come to terms with post-modern insights in order to provide balance to its claim to represent a pluralistic methodological approach. If the English School is able to find such a balance then it may be possible to allow a dialogue between a variety of writings which may blend or may clash (Barthes, 1977: 146 in Der Derian, 1996: 84).

Finally, the inclusion of postmodern writings is innate to the idea that ‘the English School approach [is] informed by methodological and ontological pluralism’ (Little, 2000:414). As the school appears to have already embraced the post-positivism of interpretive method and ontology found in Grotian rationalism, and the post-positivism of the ‘collapsed subject/object distinction’ (Linklater, 1996; 281) found in the epistemology of Kantian revolutionism, then the combination of these two approaches should not be as insurmountable as might be thought. As Wæver (1999) and Little (2000) have argued, the important contribution that the English School has to offer is its commitment to forego closure in favour of the ‘continuous coexistence and interplay’ (Buzan, 1999: 4) which a dialogue between these diverse approaches might provide so that ‘the many stories about international politics’ (Weber, 1999: 446) might be heard.

Having now considered the three English School concepts of international system, international society and world society, as well as suggesting a missing concept of world imagination, I have tried to indicate how these relate to ontological and epistemological questions with the help of a illustrative diagram (below). I will now turn to the question of what I think the English School can bring to the study of international relations and the European Union.
ES: English School, Enlightenment Scholasticism, or Eclectic Society?

This section asks the question of what exactly is the English School and what does it have to contribute to the study of International Relations generally, and the study of the European Union specifically? I have distilled the first question, regarding the nature of the English School into three simplified ‘ES’ positions which I have labelled ‘English School’, ‘European Scholasticism’, and ‘Eclectic Society’. Unlike practically every other scholar engaged in this kind of representational manoeuvre, I do not intend to seize the ‘middle ground’ - as the previous section set out, my personal approach is very much in favour of the broadest position - that of ‘Eclectic Society’. The ‘English School’ position is the narrow approach, which reflects the way in which most scholars unaware of the ES equate it to the concept of ‘international society’ and not much else. This approach to ES is centred on the British Committee and the study of Wight’s rationalist tradition of International Society. Of the three ES positions this is clearly the most traditional and the narrowest as it seeks to exclude the ‘many unsettling and disturbing insights’ which a broader approach might bring (Waever, 1999: 1). The ‘Enlightenment Scholasticism’ position seeks a more pluralistic approach and equates most closely to the broad parameters of the English School offered by Richard Little. This approach to ES moves beyond the claims to being a via media school on an exclusionary basis, and instead suggests that Wight’s three traditions are all part of the pluralistic ontology and methodology of the ES. I use the term ‘enlightenment’ because this position does not seek to fundamentally challenge the role of epistemology as developed in the previous 300 years of enlightenment philosophy. I use the term ‘scholasticism’ to suggest that this position involves an adherence to the three ES traditions, but also the method of dialogue between these traditions. The ‘Eclectic Society’ position is more inclusive and equates most

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35 The figure uses four partnerships: positivism and interpretivism/constructivism share a normative approach to epistemology in a kind of ‘utopian-positivism’; positivism and Critical Theory share a dislike of anti-foundationalism and a kind of ‘utopian-realism’; interpretivism/constructivism and postmodernism share a ‘reflective’ ontology; Critical Theory and postmodernism share a post-structural epistemology. Note that there are no lines on the figure - the notions of subjective and objective are relative to each other, not absolutes.

36 Given that the English School sought to modify ‘classical ideas from the European international society’ (Makinda, 2000: 211) drawing on the works of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), an Italian diplomat and political philosopher; Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist and diplomat educated at the University of London and Swedish ambassador in Paris; and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a German philosopher, it might be more appropriate use the name ‘European School’. This becomes more apparent if we include a tradition of ‘postmodern relativism’ drawing on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), a German philosopher who was professor of Greek at Basel University. This might go some way towards Knud Erik Jørgensen’s search for ‘secret’ continental IR theory (Jørgensen, 2000).

closely to the ‘more contradictory, open-ended framework’ offered by Ole Wæver (Wæver, 1999: 12). This approach to ES extends Wight’s three traditions by including a fourth, that of postmodern relativism, in order to better capture the ‘multiple realities of the ES’ (Wæver, 1999: 12). Furthermore, this position moves beyond the constrictions of enlightenment scholasticism to include the postmodern deconstruction of epistemology over the past 30 years for, as Robert Jackson argues, ‘there is nothing to prevent any approach which acknowledges the humanistic and thus fundamentally normative character of international relations from being taken up and incorporated’ (Jackson, 1996: 214). I use the term ‘eclectic’ to indicate the use of the four traditions and methodologies, not just following one tradition or approach, and is taken from Samuel Makinda’s call for ‘self-conscious eclecticism’ in ES (Makinda, 2000).38 I use the term ‘society’ as an indication that this position extends the scope of the English School to include those working on international theory in a cosmopolitan society which ‘incorporates insights from positivist and post-positivist theories’ (Makinda, 2000: 207).

Figure Three: ES and International Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical Traditions</th>
<th>English School</th>
<th>Enlightenment Scholasticism</th>
<th>Eclectic Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grotian Rationalism</td>
<td>Grotian Rationalism, Machiavellian Realism, and Kantian Revolutionism</td>
<td>Machiavellian Realism, Grotian Rationalism, Kantian Revolutionism, and Nietzschean Relativism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretivism/Constructivism</td>
<td>Interpretivism/Constructivism, Realism, and Critical Theory</td>
<td>Interpretivism/Constructivism, Realism, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermeneutic Interpretivism</td>
<td>Hermeneutic Interpretivism, Scientific Reason, and Normative Judgement</td>
<td>Hermeneutic Interpretivism, Scientific Reason, Normative Judgement, and Postmodern Science</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure three (above) illustrates these three positions on the nature of ES and their relationships to philosophical traditions (adapted from Wight), ES concepts (adapted from Bull), international theories (adapted from Little), and methodology (also adapted from Little). The missing voice here is that of Barry Buzan as the leading figure in the call to ‘reconvene’ the English School, and its current chronicler - see version seven of ‘The English School: a Bibliography’ (Buzan, 2000). On first inspection, Buzan takes an agnostic view of the question of the nature of the ES and how inclusive it should be by merely seeking to ‘list’ the key works related to the English school. However, like all empirical undertakings, this listing performs a normative function as a closer reading makes it clear that he takes a ‘wide rather than a narrower view’ (Buzan, 2000). Given that his list includes Chris Brown, James Der Derian, Andrew Linklater, Iver Neumann, and Ole Wæver as ‘regular contributors’, as well as Mathias Albert, Jens Bartelson, Jim George and Cynthia Weber as ‘participants’, I would suggest that Buzan might be willing to subscribe to the broader position. It would be a strange school indeed which

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38 Owen Greene also calls for an eclectic approach: ‘In the spirit of this new ES initiative, we should draw eclectically on past writings and scholars from all ‘schools’.' (Owen Greene, February 2000 response to Barry Buzan’s call to Reconvene the ES) http://www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/greene1.htm
encouraged post-modernists such as Der Derian or Albert, and post-structuralists such as Neumann or Wæver, to contribute and participate, but then denied the validity of their work to the study of international theory.

A closer reading of Buzan’s 1999 proposal for reconvening the English School (Buzan, 1999) reveals a number of insights which indicate his understanding of the need to utilise a multi-paradigm or methodologically pluralist approach, rather than competing paradigms, which transcends the binary oppositions of international relations theory (Buzan, 1999: 2-4). In particular, Buzan identifies the need for ‘core theoretical and definitional debates about the nature of international and world society, how they relate to each other, and how they are constructed and deconstructed’ (Buzan, 1999: 10). I leave the final word to Wæver who persistently argues for keeping ‘some of the post-structuralist impulses alive’ in order to avoid losing ‘important dimensions of a reinvigorated English School’ (Wæver, 1998: 131).

Moving beyond the preceding discussion of the extent to which the English School is a conversation of one, three or four ‘traditions’, we can now begin to address the question of ‘what, exactly, does it have to contribute to the study of International Relations?’ In order to give my interpretation of the English School’s contribution, I am going to try to develop the idea of the ES approach as representing an ideational exploratory pyramid as a heuristic device. But first, it is worth reminding ourselves of the view of the ‘discipline’ of international relations from the top of the pyramid:

‘An empire collapsed and many, if not most, practitioners of international relations were entirely unprepared. It seems that precisely when theories of international relations should have best served us, they failed rather strikingly overtaken, as it were, by politics itself’ (Elshtain, 1995: 272).

‘For the last forty years the academic discipline of International Relations has been dominated by positivism…. Once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest…. Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons.’ (S. Smith, 1996: 11 &13).

‘My fear is that statements such as ‘all these theories and yet the bodies keep piling up’ might be used to foster a ‘back to basics’ mentality which, in the context of international relations, implies a retreat to the comfort of theories and understanding of theory which offers relatively immediate gratification, simplistic solutions to complex problems and reifies and reflects the interests of the already powerful’ (Zalewski, 1996: 352).

‘Rumours of the death of IR … are premature…. Not even ageing and other cruel temporal tricks … have blighted IR’s blockbuster appeal - something one surely could have expected after IR’s failure to predict the end of the Cold War or to come up with a compelling vision of the future (not to mention a coherent theory of the present)’ (Weber, 1999: 435-436).

‘As a discipline, IR has accumulated a huge intellectual balance of trade deficit. Little produced in the discipline has found its way into other disciplines. IR scholars do not seem to lead or influence public debate. The past decade was characterised by tumultuous and far-reaching changes that exposed the irrelevance of the discipline’s accumulated knowledge about international relations’ (Kubálková, Onuf, and Kowert, 1998: 6).

‘Those who are aware, with at least some vague recognition, of the theoretical fields of economics, law or sociology are rarely conscious of any such body of work pertaining to the international. At the same time, the increased awareness of matters international in other social sciences, notably geography, history and sociology, has paid little attention to the work of IR
specialists. The result is, in the broader intellectual climate of the times, IR remains largely an ‘invisible discipline’ (Halliday, 1996: 319).

Buzan has implicitly acknowledged these six views of the ‘discipline’ when he suggests that the English School offers a ‘great conversation … avoiding the mistake made by much of traditional mainstream IR of splitting into contending realist and liberal (and radical) streams. This mistake perhaps goes a long way towards explaining why IR theory has made so little impact outside of its own circle’ (Buzan, 1999: 9). Fortunately for the ‘invisible discipline’ he may be correct, as Steve Smith has also acknowledged that ‘those who worked either in the so called ‘English School’ or at the interface between international relations and political theory … never bought into the positivist assumptions that dominated the discipline’ (S. Smith, 1996: 13). But what might a ‘great conversation’ around the English School contribute to the ‘ethical and practical horizons’ of the invisible discipline?

In order to answer this question I want to use my own ‘world imagination’ in order to (re)build an ‘exploratory pyramid’ out of the some of the rubble left by our six commentators above. Unlike the foundational constructions of physical pyramids my building pieces are round, not square, and I will imagine my ideational pyramid from the top down (see illustration below). The first building piece is that of the English School traditions and concepts looked at in the previous section which provide a pluralistic methodology, together with broad theoretical approaches, with which to explore international relations. This English School piece rests on, and is concerned with, two central pieces of investigation - the pluralist conception of international society, and the solidarist conception of international society. In this manner, the English School approach involves examining international relations as if states are the principle agents in international law and international society (pluralist conception), or as if individuals are the principle subjects in international law and international society (solidarist conception).

These two conceptions support and inform English School investigations, but are themselves resting on, and are concerned with, three beliefs in international relations - the belief that international relations are anarchical, the belief that international relations are hierarchical, and the belief that international relations are egalitarian. Whereas the distinction between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international relations is a difficult and controversial one, the consideration of pluralist norms is informed by the belief that international relations is either anarchical (with no world governance and weak international law) or hierarchical (with some system of order and some international law). In contrast, the consideration of solidarist norms is informed by the belief that international relations is either hierarchical (with some system of order and some international law) or egalitarian (with a strong system of world governance and strong international law).

These three beliefs support and inform pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international law and international society, but are themselves resting on, and are concerned with, four crucial values in international relations - order, security, justice, and emancipation. These four values are both the subject and object of study in international relations, and in particular are central to English School research over the past forty years. The distinctions between anarchical, hierarchical, and egalitarian beliefs in international relations are both normative (how should the world be?) and positivist (how is the world?), but are informed by different core values. Hence the study of anarchy is informed by an assumption that the values of order and security are central to the composition of international relations in the absence of governance and international law. In contrast, the study of hierarchy is informed by an assumption that the values of security and justice are central to the composition of international relations with some system of order and some international law. Finally, the study of equality is informed by an assumption that the values of justice and emancipation are central to the composition of international relations in the presence of a strong system of world governance and strong international law.
Although this is a complex and nebulous way of representing what contribution the English School might make, it has the advantages of being non-deterministic, inclusive, and preventing closure. I would make four observations on this ‘exploratory pyramid’ regarding macro-micro approach, referent objects, methodology, and normative dimension. Firstly, although I have ‘imagined’ the pyramid as a top-down macro-theoretical deductive approach to international relations by beginning with the English School traditions and ending with international values, the pyramid could be imagined as a bottom-up inductive approach. In this direction research could start with a micro-issue located in or between the international values (such as military intervention or poverty) and examine what it tells us about international values, international rule and the conversation of the English School. In the example of military intervention, this could involve an interrogation of values such as order (the maintenance of international order), security (the military security sector), and justice (the question of state sovereignty). In contrast in the example of poverty, this could involve an interrogation of values such as security (the economic security sector), justice (debt reduction negotiations), and emancipation (freedom from poverty).

Secondly, the exploratory pyramid explicitly does not predetermine what or who the referent object(s) are or should be. This in a crucially deterministic question in English School research - if the referent objects are presumed to be states rather than people then the normative questions tend to be drawn
towards foci such as anarchy and order. In contrast, if the referent objects are presumed to be people rather than states then the normative questions tend to be drawn towards foci such as justice and emancipation. The exploratory pyramid allows, indeed encourages, the study of the world 'population' of referent objects - people, collectivities, states, transnational and supranational actors, as the conversation of the English School would expect. Thirdly, the question of methodology is determined by the nature of the conversation used to interrogate the exploratory pyramid - thus the dialogue (trialogue/quadralogue) between the traditions would be essential during every stage of research. This is important for it ensures that insights from the ES international system are as important to a conversation on emancipation, as insights from the ES world society might be to security (or ES world imagination to order). At the same time this conversation ensures that a pluralistic methodology is encouraged throughout the exploratory pyramid, hence no closure. Finally, I would suggest that the exploratory pyramid encourages us to come to terms with the dynamics, rather than dialectics, of normative questions. By including international values such as order and justice, security and emancipation, it ensures that the positivist assumptions of anarchy engage with the normative assumptions of society and continue along Bull’s alternatives paths to world order developed in The Anarchical Society.

It seems strange that the closed doors to dialogue and development in international relations are marked ‘in’ - ‘incommensurable’ and ‘indeterminate’. The notion that debate amongst the ‘paradigms’ of international relations is incommensurable is one of the core narratives within the discipline, just as the incommensurability of waves and particles was an undisputed narrative within physics prior to the 20th century. The English School seeks not to commensurate the elements of the traditions, but by assuming that all ‘elements always operate simultaneously (i.e. methodological pluralism), it also transcends the assumption often made’ that competing ‘approaches to IR theory are incommensurable’ (Buzan, 1999: 4). The notion that a methodologically pluralist approach to the analysis of international relations is indeterminate is a second core narrative within the discipline, just as the indeterminacy of chaotic systems was an undisputed narrative within mathematics prior to the development of chaos theory in the 1970s. The English School seeks not to determine which element of the traditions are right or wrong, but assumes that all ‘of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are in relation to each other’ (Buzan, 1999: 4).

It should be borne in mind that the English School exploratory pyramid I have imagined here is not a theory or metatheory, it is simply a means to encourage a conversation in international relations which escape the binary dualisms which mark the invisible discipline like no other in social studies/sciences. Such a dialogue would need to be a trialogue, quadralogue, or perhaps ‘heterologue’ (Der Derian, 1996: 85) between the traditions, with the intention of achieving a 'great conversation' which allows 'polyphonic discourse' (Bakhtin in Calhoun, 1995: 95 n. 43 & 125 n. 10; Der Derian, 1996: 85). Wæver suggests that such a conversation would be possible as the traditions 'do not compete for explaining 'the same'. They each do different jobs' (Wæver, 1996: 174). This is not the same as arguing for a Taoist yin and yang synthesis as suggested by Lao Tzu (or the dialectical thesis and antithesis suggested by Hegel), the English School admits that it may not be possible to resolve conflicts between the traditions in international relations.

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39 Wæver relies on Stefano Guzzini when he argues that 'the incommensurability thesis can by definition not have proven itself beyond doubt' (Wæver, 1996: 179 n. 20 and 170-174).
40 Little acknowledges Guzzini's criticism of pluralist approaches for their indeterminism, but suggests that the normative ends determine the science of the means (Little, 2000: 415 and 418 n. 27).
41 This may be because international relations is an American social science - hence it is born out of a binary-state: American/anti-American, democrats/republicans, science/religion, positivist/post-positivist.
42 This is not unlike the 'standard model' of the universe that differentiates between eighteen particles which each do different jobs – twelve fermions constitute matter, six bosons carry force. Physics does not see the existence of four different types of force as a problem as they do not compete for explaining 'the same'. Unlike some in international relations, most researches in physics are agreed on one thing – the standard model is just an approximation for reality.
43 The close resemblance of Hegel's dialectic synthesis to Taoist synthesis appears to be no coincidence as Hegel read and taught Taoism early in his career (Kinnvall, 1995: 46).
In order to help explain what the English School has to contribute to the study of international relations, and to illustrate what it might bring to the study of the European Union, I will use the example of the EU as a promoter of norms in international relations. Using a top-down, macro-theoretical, deductive approach would begin by thinking about the role of the EU in international relations using the English School pluralistic methodology. This would involve studying the EU in the international system using positivist methodologies involving scientific reason, such as looking at the behaviour of the EU in its relations with other states. Secondly, we would need to look at the EU’s role in international society using interpretivist methodologies involving subjective viewpoints, such as asking questions about how the EU conceives of itself in its relations with other states, and how these states view the EU. Thirdly, it would be important considering the EU’s position in world society using critical methodologies involving normative judgement, such as uncovering the motivations behind the EU’s policies. Finally, if an English School pluralistic methodology involved Nietzschean relativism, this would entail questioning the validity of the EU as part of a world imagination using postmodern science to deconstruct and reimagine a genealogy of the EU as an international identity. But this is just the starting point – after beginning to think about the EU in this way, such a study would proceed by considering the behaviour of the EU’s through an examination of the types of norms it promotes, whether pluralistic or solidaristic. In both these cases the challenge would be to consider whether these norms are part of the discourses of an international system, an international society, a world society, or a world imagination.

English School Discourses in EU Studies

The conversion envisaged within the methodological pluralism of the English School already has at least four or five groups of voices who are heard within the study of the EU, but rarely in anything other that arguments. Similar to the problems of the invisible discipline discussed previously, these groups of voices struggle to be heard in their research, and so may benefit from a heterologue within the English School approach. Within the positivist approach there are two diametrically-opposed schools of thought to the study of the EU – the ‘California School’ and the ‘Harvard School’ (Manners, 2000: 19-20). Drawing on the world system ontology and using positivist methodologies, but located within a pluralist tradition the California School argue that the EU is best understood as a form of ‘supranational governance’ above the state and part of a world-wide network of interaction which drives the functional need for more integration.\(^{44}\) Sharing the same positivist methodologies, but located in the opposing realist tradition of an international system is the Harvard School which disagrees with the world system discourses and believes that the EU is better understood as a ‘rational-institutional’ framework for the choices of its member states who have contact, but few commonalties between themselves.\(^{45}\)

In contrast to simple dichotomies presented in these positivist writings is the work of the somewhat misnamed ‘Copenhagen School’ located in the interpretivist approach of an international society and using broadly intersubjective methodologies to study the EU (Manners, 2000: 21). The Copenhagen School disagrees with the positivist approaches of the California and Harvard Schools and instead argue that the EU is a social construction which exists because a group of states conceive of themselves as having common values, interests and norms.\(^{46}\) Whereas these three approaches represent examples of world system, international system and world society discourses in the study of the EU, it is far less common to find world society and world imagination discourses. A few scholars are to be found using the normative approaches of world society discourses, derived from the Frankfurt School, in the study of questions of citizenship, sovereignty and community in a Europe Union which goes ‘beyond the

\(^{44}\) For examples of world system discourses in the study of the EU see Sandholtz (1993), Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet (1998).


\(^{46}\) For examples of international society discourses in the study of the EU see Jørgensen (1997), Jørgensen, Christiensen and Wiener (1999).
nation-state. Finally, we can find a few scholars working on the EU from post-structural/postmodern perspectives using world imagination discourses to deconstruct or (re)imagine an EU which is an important fiction because its existence, and the process of integration which supports it, are part of a common belief about an imagined community. Although it is rare to find a direct admission of this, because the hegemonic narratives in EU studies do not permit it, this research finds its genealogical roots in the theories and techniques of the French post-structuralists and Parisian postmodernists. It is rare to find these five groups of voices, or four approaches to the EU engaged in dialogue about the study of European integration, as opposed to attempting to legitimate their ‘truths’ and delegitimate the other’s ‘untruths’. An example of this talking past each other, rather than communicating, can be found in the exchanges between the ‘prince’ of the Harvard School and the ‘mermaids’ of the Copenhagen School – the former smelling ‘something rotten’ emanating from Denmark, while the latter ‘wax desperate with imagination’.

Moving beyond the English School discourses as presented by Bull, we can see that discourses of the two new adaptations proposed above (EU system and EU society) are also to be heard in the study of the European Union, albeit in limited formulations which have not found their way into the mainstream of research on the European Union. The discourses of EU system, with their focus on world system and international system, are to be found in their most extreme scientistic formulations in the work of writers found in the journal European Union Politics (EUP), as an overview of EU science found in the first issue makes clear:

In certain areas scholars have not fully utilized the models applied to other political systems, but EU scholarship has taken a great leap forward in the past few years. But we are into a new phase of normal science rational choice institutionalist explanation of the EU. (Dowding, 2000)

As Keith Dowding proudly proclaims, ‘we are into a … normal science of rational choice institutionalist explanation’ in the analysis of contact and interaction between states and people through a fetishising of positivism in the study of the EU. The work of this ‘scientistic school’ of EU system analysis represents a minor, yet fundamentalist sect of integration studies, but has recently been bolstered in its claim to ‘reality’ through the publication of its clarion, the EUP. Unlike the California or Harvard Schools, the primary focus of the Scientistic School is not on the world system of political actors, or the international system of state interaction as it accepts the coexistence of both. Instead the School seeks to focus on the methodology of research, as its editorial statement makes clear with its references to the ‘scientific newcomer’ based on ‘scientific progress’ in a shared ‘scientific approach’ (Schneider, Gabel, Hix, 2000). By claiming the narrative norm (see below) of scientism, the editors then ensure that all other forms of discourse are found to be not normal or subnormal as their ‘unifying approach’ is the ‘most advanced and methodologically sophisticated’ which analyses the EU in a ‘systematic and sophisticated way’ to ensure the ‘highest academic standards’.

Fortunately this norm of scientism is largely ignored by most studies of the EU, but it is worth briefly considering why this approach to an EU system is deeply flawed social science which cannot be used to study human systems. It is clear that much of the Scientism School evangelises the quantitative methods courses which its disciples studied as part of their doctoral training to the extent that they

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48 The European Union primarily exists in our minds, it is very difficult to find its physical form, particularly as it is sustained through human interaction and written laws, hence its essence is a body which can never be seen - its acquis communautaire, and it has no ‘legal personality’. This particular existence has ‘such a grip on our collective imagination that the genesis of alternative forms of community become virtually impossible’ (Ullock, 1996: 428). For other imagined communities see Anderson (1991), Chatterjee (1991), Ullock (1996), or Wheeler and Dunne (1997).


have demonised the qualitative courses they would have taken at the same time. For this reason the
Scientism School seeks to beatify numbers and their analysis, and in the absence of numbers they seek
to worship them into being, thus ensuring the manifestation of an EU system. I will briefly review the
three most unsustainable forms of writing in the scientistic style - ‘numbers about public opinion’
‘numbers about voting’ and ‘numbers about parties’ which I will briefly review here. Writing on
‘numbers about public opinion’ has a long history of production going back to 1973 when there were
first numbers to write about in the form of the Eurobarometer surveys. The surveys are an excellent
means of getting a sense of what representative samples of people from each member state think about
the idea of the EU - no more, no less. The people of Europe, and therefore any sample of the
Eurobarometer, in general do not feel that they know much about the EU, hence the subjectivity of the
method is compounded by the lack of self-perceived knowledge. The July 1999 Eurobarometer
demonstrates these confused subjectivities perfectly – Sweden demonstrates the least support for EU
membership with 33% of respondents feeling membership is a ‘bad thing’ (against 34% feeling it is a
‘good thing’), but is also the second most ‘attached to Europe’ (71% attached against 18% not
attached). On the basis of this it seems extraordinarily unscientific to assert that ‘EU citizens structure
their attitudes towards integration according to … their affective allegiances to these [EU] institutions
and their utilitarian appraisals of institutional outputs and performance. (Gabel, 1998: 10-11). As
Gelleny and Anderson argue in EUP, ‘citizens employ utilitarian considerations when assessing political
authorities even … when they have little information about them’ (Gelleny and Anderson, 2000). Thus
it is clear that it is not possible to distinguish between affective and utilitarian support for the EU, or
even support for the EU itself, on the basis of opinion polls because they tell us nothing about how the
social system in which ‘respondents ’ live mitigates their beliefs and opinions.

Writing on ‘numbers about voting’ follows a similar style of reductionism in which authors such as
Widgren, Lane, Hosli, Raunio, and other disciples see the numbers attributed to voting in the Council
of Ministers and equate this to ‘voting power’ through extraordinarily inventive ‘indexes’. There is
only one small problem with this equation and high level of mathematics on voting numbers – there is
absolutely no evidence that power in the Council of Ministers is equivalent to number of votes. Indeed
the best defences that can be heard about this small unsustainability in this work is that it does not
matter if there are no votes taken in the Council, what is important is that there are numbers, or that
the numbers must reflect power in the Council because otherwise there would be no point in having
them. Writing on ‘numbers about parties’ is also similarly imaginative in the lengths it will go to use
numbers, as the tales by Raunio, Hix, and others serve to illustrate. Much of the focus of these stories
is on the voting patterns of EP party groups, in particular looking at the way in which these form
coalitions, cohere, and influence policy. Interestingly, the one element these numbers tend to overlook
is MEPs – it is quite rare to find references to them as people in amongst the mathematics. Given that,outside of the two main parties (PPE-DE and PSE), the average political group has only 30 members
or an average of 2 MEPs from each country, we might think that individual MEPs would be important
as people. Even in the two main parties the predilections of individual MEPs are important, as we are
reliably informed by Hix, during the five years 1989-1994 an average of 8% of members of these two
parties voted against their group during every single vote, which represents about 16 MEPs behaving
like individuals (Hix, 1999b: 177).

On the basis of these three examples I would argue that the scientism of current EU system analysis
does much damage to the views of the EU built on world system and international system discourses.

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51 In fieldwork during April-May 2000 72% of respondents felt they ‘knew nothing’ or ‘knew a bit’ about the EU,
53 For examples of this imaginative work see: Widgren (1994), Lane and Meland (1995), Hosli (1996), Raunio and Wiberg
54 Simon Hix at University Association for Contemporary University Studies Conference, Budapest, May 2000.
56 For examples see: Raunio (1998), Hix (1999a).
Fortunately the Scientistic School’s work is primarily intended for consumption outside of Europe, but if English School insights based on the methodology of positivism are to have any relevance in the study of the EU they will first have to overcome the legacy of this work. Like the EU system, the discourses of my second adaptation, EU society, has also yet to find its way into the mainstream of research on the EU but this is not because its extreme scientism is unacceptable to the study of social science. I would argue quite the opposite, that the current writings on EU society are unheard because much of the research on the EU takes place in a social science setting which has difficulties coming to terms with social theory in particular, and cultural theory in general. There is much interesting work using EU society discourses of international society and world society which looks at the perceived commonality of member states and the European Community, if one is prepare to look for it. Much of this work is to be found in social and cultural theory, rather than political science or international relations, and can be roughly distinguished into three areas of writing – semiotics, identity, and international identity.

Using the discourses of interpretivism to describe the perception and intersubjectivitive role of symbols, and the discourses of Critical Theory to make sense of the meaning and power of such symbols, semiotic writings are starting to complete the Piercian triangle of icon (resembling), index (connection) and symbol (concept). In order to come to terms with the symbolism of the EU and its relationship to perception and meaning we need to develop means of talking about the iconic qualities of EU society such as in flags, the indexic qualities of EU society such as feelings of sameness, and the symbolic qualities of EU society such as nationhood. There are a few examples of this work in an EU context, including the ‘signs of nations’, ‘cultural semiotics’ and ‘symbolic politics’ of Ulf Hedetoft (1995, 1997, 1998) and the ‘symbolising of boundaries’ by Cris Shore (2000), as well as the ‘substance and symbolism’ of the EU (Manners, 2000b). As Shore points out, to dismiss invented traditions, citizenship, and currency as ‘merely symbolic’ is ‘to miss the point about the importance of symbols as repositories of meaning and agents of consciousness’ (Shore, 2000: 77). For the study of the consciousness of common values in the EU it is obviously crucial that we understand the meaning of symbolic agreements and the way in which they shape the discourse of EU society (Manners, 2000b: 263).

Related to, but different from, the semiotic writings are those with a focus on identity in EU society, an area of writing which has become enormous since the end of the Cold War in Europe. In an EU context this writing is central to the understanding of world society discourses within EU society, particularly in the reading of difference and diversity. Indeed ‘identity’ has come to assume a similar iconic status in EU studies which ‘globalisation’ has in international relations - little can be written without reference to the icon, although often ignoring the indexic connection. Fortunately there is some writing which goes beyond the icon and considers the relationship of identity to questions of self, diversity, nationalism, security, and finally culture and integration. On constituting the self, and constructing the other, in Europe it is worth reading the works of Oommen (1994a), Derrida (1992), Doty (1996), van Dijk (1997), Neumann (1999), and Diez (2001). The diversities of identity in the Europe are interrogated well in Tomasi (1994), Zetterhorn (1994), Sorenson (1995), Shelley and Winck (1995), Wintle (1996), and on multiculturalism - Modood and Werbner (1997). The central question of nationalism and identity is omnipresent in writing about EU society, but I think the works of Zetterhorn (1994), Hedetoft (1994, 1995, 2001), Oommen (1994b), and Delanty (1995) are essential reading in a very confused conversation characterised by much compounding of essential and constructed identities. In the study of identity and security in the EU some inroads have been made through the work of the Copenhagen School of security studies (Waever et al., 1993; and Waever, 1994) but there remains much tension in these approaches when trying to aggregate the existential and ontological securities of individuals, groups/societies and states.\(^{57}\) Whereas ontological security raises

\(^{57}\) It is important not to confuse the ‘Copenhagen School’ of security studies (Buzan, Waever, Kelstrup, Lemaître, Hansen et al) with the ‘Copenhagen School’ of integration studies (Jørgensen, Christiansen, Wiener, Risse et al). When coining the term ‘Copenhagen School’ McSweeney was explicitly referring to the former, while Moravcsik thought he was talking about the latter. Only Diez and Hansen have engaged in both Copenhagen Schools.
questions about ‘confidence and trust in the natural world as it appears to be’ (Giddens, 1984: 50 375), existential security focuses on the ‘forces of liberalisation and modernisation [which] may produce social and economic dislocation as well as personal uncertainty and insecurity’ (Kinnvall, 1999: 12). The twin challenges of existential and ontological security have yet to be interrogated in the analysis of EU society and identity, especially as its member states appear to have become ‘too small for the big problems in life, and too big for the small problems of life’ (Bell, 1987 in Giddens, 1990: 65). Just as identity is the index of being, so culture is the language of meaning, an understanding which is rare in political science but in the study of EU society the culture of Europe is in an important tri-symbiosis with the processes of integration and globalisation (Manners, 2002). Thus all the works mentioned here are written in the language of culture and integration which attempts to come to terms with a common sense of community within and between member states of the EU and their citizens.

The third group of writings are those that move beyond the focus on identity within the EU and attempt to come to terms with how such identity constructions shape and mediate between the EU and its contact with the rest of the world. The idea of using the EU as a referent object for identity construction was first developed in the mid-1990s by scholars inventing the term ‘international identity’ of the EU (Whitman, 1994, 1997, 1998; Manners, 1997; Manners and Whitman, 1998). The focus of this approach to EU society is to see how world society and international society discourses shape and are shaped by, interaction with peoples and states outside Europe. Thus one element of the EU’s international identity is its internal construction, or internal dialogue (dialogic) about itself, contrasted with the second element of the way in which this internal dialogue mediates with interaction and communication with the ‘outside’ world. These ideas appear to be used in Cederman’s (2000) forthcoming work on Constructing Europe’s Identity, and will be formulated into a discussion about the role of national, economic, interregional, and security facets in shaping the international identity in The European Union’s Foreign Policy: It’s Network of Global Relations (Manners and Whitman, 2001). The one tension which remains in this international identity literature is over the extent to which it is possible to conceive of the EU as a referent object, as clearly the EU does not yet consist of all of Europe, and as an object is constructed (and deconstructed) by the constitutive effects of integration and globalisation (Manners, 2002).

What is apparent from these two mutually-alien discourses of EU system and EU society is that it would seem they could benefit from talking to each other, if only to understand the extent to which they are two universes in the language of the EU. It seems that any attempt to bring the English School to the study of the EU (or vice-versa) will have to come to terms with the apparently insurmountable diversity of methodological pluralism. However these walls in EU studies are not completely solid, as a similar discussion about methodological pluralism has been taking place in the study of the foreign policies of EU member states for the past few years, prompted by the need to be familiar with both IR theories of foreign policy, and theories of integration. Thus scholars working on the relations between and around EU member states have had to deal with the difficulties of studying a process which is as much social as it is rational. As with the English School, Waever has played a role in drawing researchers attention to the problems of general theorising which the US domination of foreign policy analysis (FPA) has created (Waever, 1990). In particular he encourages a ‘synthesising perspective which is not a harmonising grand theory … but points to an emerging new attitude’ in the relationships of different IR and middle range theories (Waever, 1994: 272). Helen Wallace shares this perspective when, in reviewing the work of one of the Harvard School she commented that ‘space needs to be made for irrationality, for confusion and for mistaken judgements’ (Wallace, 1999: 158). Brian White has echoed Waever and Wallace’s words when he suggests that ‘European FPA can tentatively be characterised as more eclectic epistemologically, focused on more limited theoretical advances … and contextual ‘middle range’ theories’ (White, 1999: 59). Roy Ginsberg agrees with White when he says that ‘naturally a balance must be struck between a theoretical à la carte approach and an overly general theory’ (Ginsberg, 1999: 450). Ben Tonra is more vociferous when he argues that ‘it is evident that a model of FPA needs to be able to account for identity, beliefs, norms and expectations arising from a unique endeavour of political integration’ (Tonra, 2000). Such a model cannot assume any trajectory or
direction in these ‘non-rational’ variables, but it must – at least – promise to come to terms with them’ (Tonra, 2000). Finally, the necessity for methodological pluralism in the study of EU FPA has been stated as part of a ‘distinctive approach which does not propose a grand theory, merely a synthesising perspective based on trying to both understand irrationality and explain unique patterns of behaviour through a combination of theoretical approaches’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000). Such a combination of theoretical approaches could easily be found within the English School conversation as suggested previously. Having examined the concepts of the English School, suggested a missing tradition and a possible exploratory pyramid, and briefly considered what the ES might bring to the study of European integration, I will now turn my attention to the focus of Bull’s article eighteen years ago – the international role of the (now) European Union.

II. International Role of the European Union

Civilian Power Europe

On the 9th May 2000, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Schuman Declaration on ‘Europe Day’, the European Union issued publicity material declaring ‘50 Years of Solidarity, Prosperity and Peace’. Although the claim to being solely responsible for the achievement of peace is questionable, the slogans do reflect the fact that since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the ECs/EC/EU have ‘domesticated’ relations between member states. As François Duchêne was to suggest in the early 1970s, Europe at age 20 represented a ‘civilian power’ which was ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ (Duchêne, 1972, 1973). In the intervening two decades Duchêne’s civilian power concept has been much debated by scholars of the international role of the EU, although by 1991 ‘the demise of a two-bloc Europe removed the primary constraint upon the development of the European Union understood as a civilian power’ (Whitman, 1998: 144).

However, as Romano Prodi has recently pronounced, the concept still holds much power in the minds of Euro-elite:

> ‘We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategy security’ (Prodi, 2000: 3).

Hence the status of the EU as a global civil power or civilian power is one which still is central to a discussion of its role in international relations. Kenneth Twitchett and Hans Maull have both defined civilian power as involving three key features which I interpret as being the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems; the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress (Twitchett, 1976: 8 in Ginsberg, 1999: 445; and Maull, 1990: 92-93 in K. Smith, 2000: 12). Karen Smith has been the most consistent advocate of the benefits of a civilian power Europe and its contribution to ‘a different kind of international relations’ based on renouncing force between its members (K. Smith, 2000: 28). As Smith makes clear, echoing Wight and Bull’s words, the movement away from a civilian power and towards a military power ‘would represent the culmination of a ‘state-building’ project. Integration would recreate the state on a grander scale’ (K. Smith, 2000: 27).

It was this notion of civilian power which Bull criticised in 1982 for its ineffectiveness and lack of self-sufficiency in military power. Bull’s remedy was to suggest three reasons why the EC should become more self-sufficient in defence and security: the divergence of interest with American policy; to retain the balance of military power with the Soviet threat; and to regenerate itself through an independent

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59 See also K. Smith (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) for studies on the use of civilian power in EU relations with eastern Europe and third countries.
military posture. This self-sufficiency was to be achieved through seven steps: the provision of nuclear deterrent forces; the improvement of conventional forces; a greater role played by West Germany; more involvement of France; a change of policy in Britain; careful co-existence with the Soviet Union; and careful co-existence with the United States. Bull’s solution, unimaginable in the second Cold War of the 1980s, was to turn the EC into a military power Europe.60

Military Power Europe

Since the defeat of the European Defence Community by the French national assembly in 1954, the question of the EU assuming a military dimension had remained taboo until the agreeing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1991. As Whitman has suggested, ‘the TEU had signalled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union’ (1998: 135-6). Article J.4.1 of the new treaty shattered the taboo by boldly proclaiming that:

“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common foreign policy which might in time lead to a common defence.”61

The expectation was that the move from the single structure of the EC to the three pillar structure of the EU was part of a fundamental shift from civilian to military power, assuming that the development of a common foreign and security policy was towards a fourth pillar of defence policy (Manners, 1994). However, for the next seven years the expectations of foreign policy and military power were not matched by the hoped-for achievements of the EU, a disappointment which Christopher Hill felt was a ‘capabilities-expectation gap’ grounded in unreal expectations which Helene Sjursen termed an ‘eternal fantasy’ (Sjursen, 1998).62 A counter-balance to these analyses of the failure of military power Europe has been provided by Wæver (1996c), Trine Flockhart and Wyn Rees (1998), and Jørgensen (1998), who question how best to measure the success of the EU and suggest that perhaps it should be evaluated on the basis of what has not happened, rather than what has happened.

However, the trend towards military power Europe appears to be moving from symbolic to substantial achievements as the June 1999 Cologne European Council committed the EU to having a 60,000 person Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) ready to react by the end of 2003 (Whitman, 1999).63 While the formal preparation for the Petersberg Tasks of the RRF might be seen by some as evidence of movement towards a military power Europe, others have argued that these tasks are still within the remit of a civilian power as the questions of defence and nuclear capability still remain within the remit of NATO (Jørgensen, 1997; K. Smith, 2000).64 Duchène argued convincingly that ‘the one thing Europe cannot be is a major military power’ because of the questionable value and use of nuclear weapons, which would have to be controlled by ‘a European President’ (Duchène, 1972: 37).

Bull’s discussion of the utility of military power, and the futility of civilian power, was predicated on an understanding of the EC as being centred somewhere between the capitals of France, Germany and

60 Dominique Moïsi commented that in his Gaullist European vision ‘Bull described the world as it should be and not as it is’ (Moïsi, 1983: 165).
61 At Amsterdam the article was altered to ‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide’ and renumbered to Article 17.
64 The 1992 Petersberg Declaration by the WEU is now referred to in Article 17.2 of the TEU: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
Britain and the bureaucrats of Brussels. His article was built on two assumptions - that the ability to become a powerful actor in international affairs involves the exercise of military power; and that this actorness involves a movement from intergovernmental cooperation towards supranational integration through ‘an appropriate form of political and strategic unity’ (Bull, 1982). This second assumption is similar to the simple dichotomy which presupposes the ‘debate’ between the California and Harvard Schools which I have already discussed. Both of Bull’s assumptions may have been sustainable during the Cold War, but with the transformations in international relations since his death we have to look beyond notions of civilian and military power in order to conceptualise the EU as normative power Europe.

**Normative Power Europe**

The European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself. (Duchêne, 1973: 20)

Returning to Duchêne we can see that although he was broadly concerned with the limitations of a civilian power located in an economic framework, he was also aware that the ‘international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards’ was crucial in order for the EC to avoid become a ‘victim of power politics’. In particular he was interested in the normative power of the EC as an *idée force*, starting with the beliefs of the ‘founding fathers’ and extending through its appeal to widely differing political temperaments (Duchêne, 1973: 2 and 7). The idea of normative power in the international sphere is not new, in 1939 E.H. Carr drew on Bertrand Russell’s 1938 distinction between economic power, military power and power over opinion (Russell, 1938 in Carr, 1946: 108). Elements of this normative power can also be found in the critical perspective of Johan Galtung when he says that the ‘ideological power is the power of ideas’ (Galtung, 1973: 33). Galtung argues that ideological power is ‘powerful because the power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient’ and comes through culture. He differentiates between channels of power (ideological power, remunerative power and punitive power) and sources of power (resource power and structural power), a distinction he argues is ‘fundamental, because it is on the latter that the European Community is particularly strong, even more so than the United States’ (Galtung, 1973: 36).

One of the problems with notions of civilian power and military power was highlighted in the debates during the late 1970s and 1980s following Gunner Sjöstedt’s attempt to formulate a means of assessing the actorness of the EC using seven properties (Sjöstedt, 1977). The focus here was on agency in the international system and the capabilities for the EC to act in international relations. Undoubtedly one of the factors behind this focus on actorness was the developments within the EC to strengthen European Political Cooperation (EPC) following the 1981 London Report, the 1983 Solemn Declaration on European Union, and the 1986 Single European Act which gave EPC a treaty basis. This search for actorness was to continue in the 1990s with Hill’s ‘capabilities’ (Hill, 1993) and Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘requisites’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999) as the EU was created.

However, one the problems with this actorness debate and the focus on civilian versus military power was the unhealthy spotlight on how much like a state the EU looked. During the 1990s two groups of scholars tried to overcome this tendency to try to measure ‘stateness’ by using the concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘international identity’. David Allen and Michael Smith developed the notion of ‘presence’ as means of moving the debate beyond institutional analysis and towards a focus on western

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65 The properties were: a community of interests; a decision-making system; a system for crisis management; a system for the management of interdependence; a system for implementation; external communication channels and external representation; community resources and mobilisation system.

66 The requisites are: shared commitment to values and principles; ability to identify policy priorities; ability to negotiate with others; use of policy instruments; and domestic legitimacy.
Europe’s tangible and intangible presence in the international arena (Allen and Smith, 1990, 1998). Building on Allen and Smith’s work, the concept of ‘international identity’ was introduced in an attempt to come to terms with the complex processes and interactions through which the EU is ‘being’ or ‘becoming’ determined by both similarities and differences among its multiple identities and others (Whitman, 1994, 1997, 1998; Manners, 1997; Manners and Whitman, 1998).

This move has been important for the simple reason that it shifts the focus of analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU’s institutions and towards an admission of the need to include cognitive processes, including both tangible and intangible elements. If the TEU declares that the EU is resolved to reinforce ‘the European identity’ and ‘assert its identity on the international scene’ in order to ‘promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world’ then we need to seriously consider the core norms through which such an identity is internationally constructed. As Karen Smith has argued, ‘the normative dimension’ is important because ‘the debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity’ (K. Smith, 2000: 27).

Thus the notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the *idée force*, ‘power over opinion’, or ‘ideological power’, and the desire to move beyond the debate over state-like actorness through an understanding of the EU’s international identity. In order to clarify these three different representations of the EU’s power in international relations, it is worth comparing civilian, military and normative power Europe:

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<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Normative</th>
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<tr>
<td>Carr</td>
<td>economic</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galtung</td>
<td>remunerative</td>
<td>punitive</td>
<td>ideational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manners</td>
<td>ability to use economic instruments</td>
<td>ability to use military instruments</td>
<td>ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’</td>
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What I am suggesting here is that the European Union represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature utilising economic tools, nor a military power of a supranational nature using armed force, but a normative power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles.

The addition of the concept of normative power to the current debate over the international role of the European Union allows us to add an all important new dimension to the one-dimensional debates over whether the EU is primarily a civilian actor or is becoming a military actor. These debates have tended to oscillate on what Christopher Hill calls ‘the federal question’ – the extent to which the EU is becoming a federal polity capable of utilising military force, rather than remaining a confederal polity capable only of using economic instruments. At one end of this debate is the assumption that an EC which is built on economic integration, but with military capabilities reserved for intergovernmental cooperation (within NATO) of its member states, will always remain a civilian power. At the other end is the assumption that if the EU develops military capabilities then it will become more federal (or vice-versa) and will thus become a military power. The exact position of the EU along this intergovernmental cooperation – supranational integration line is the subject of much debate, particularly in the US where opposing camps tend to situate themselves at the two most extreme

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67 The strands of the presence are: initiator, shaper, barrier, filter, to which they later added facilitator and manager.
positions. Hence Branch and Øhrgaard have described these two-dimensional scholars as being ‘trapped in the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy’ (Branch and Øhrgaard, 1999) by ‘insisting that the EU must conform to one overall conceptual model or another’ (W. Wallace, 2000).

What these approaches miss is the extent to which the EU is a fairly unique example of ‘co-integration’ possessing elements of both intergovernmental and supranational decision making (Manners, 2000: 28-29). The introduction of the idea that the EU represents a normative power in international relations allows us to escape the ‘dichotomy trap’ by considering the extent to which its ‘co-integration’ allows the development of characteristics of governance and international identity which transcend the limitations of states and international society. This added dimension helps us to explore how a normative power Europe is different to a civilian power Europe or a military power Europe, as figure six illustrates below. As mentioned previously, the differences between a civilian power Europe and a military power Europe tend to focus on the cooperation vs. integration questions of whether the EU primarily represents a civilian form of governance or is becoming a military form of government (co-integration?). The differences between a civilian power Europe and a normative power Europe focus, in my mind, on the extent to which the EU is primarily using economic power as a form of coercion or is primarily changing notions of the role of economics in international relations. In civilian power terms the instrumental role of economic power is central to the approach, whereas in normative power terms what is more important is the degree to which international economics are domesticated into concerns about distributive justice. In contrast, the differences between a military power Europe and a normative power Europe are over the extent to which the EU is primarily using military power as a form of coercion or is primarily changing notions of the role of force in international relations. In military power terms the instrumental role of military power is central to the approach, whereas in normative power terms what is more important is the way in which international violence is pacified into concerns about mutual problems. These three differences of co-integration, domestication and pacification can be thought about in this way:

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68 The worst exponents of such dichotomous writing are Wayne Sandholtz and Alex Stone Sweet, Andrew Moravcsik, and Walter Mattli, all of whom seem very keen to explore the ‘state of the Union’ as if it were either a state or a union of states (Branch and Øhrgaard, 1999; W. Wallace, 2000).
The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis (see below), but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international relations. Thus my presentation of the EU as a normative power has both an positivist quantity to it - that the EU acts to extend its norms into the international system, and a normative quality to it - that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system. The positivist quantity is a problem-solving theory - 'it takes the worlds as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action' (Cox, 1981). This leads me to attempt to explain what norms the EU is projecting and how. In contrast, the normative quality is a value theory - 'we attempt the complicated task of explaining the meaning of, setting out the relationships which hold between, and seeking to evaluate different comprehensive patterns of core normative concepts' (Frost, 1994: 110). This therefore leads me to seek to understand the value of the norms the EU is projecting and why. In order to achieve these two goals, it is necessary to ask 'what is normative power?'

What is Normative Power?

The study of international norms in academic circles has exploded over the past ten years, a reflection of both the impact of the end of the Cold War and the popularity of social constructivism (in its IR variant). There are several surveys of this literature which give a sense of the way in which the debate has developed, for example Ann Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms’ (1996), Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998), Vaughn Shannon, ‘Norms Are What States Make of Them’ (2000); and Hendrik Spruyt, ‘The Normative Basis of the Modern State Order’ (2000). What is strange about much of this literature is the tendency to overlook the centrality of international norms in the study of international relations prior to the mid-1980s, and in particular the concern which the English School placed on solidarist international norms in international law, humanitarian intervention and human rights.

Discussion on international norms tends to consider three relatively distinct groups which can be expressed as moral norms, social norms and utilitarian norms. Utilitarian norms (or regulative norms) are those which 'help states coordinate and collaborate so as to maximise utilities' (Keohane, 1984 and Goertz and Diehl, 1989 in Shannon, 2000: 295), assist 'order and constrain behaviour' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891) and which 'serve functional purposes: they regulate behaviour, reduce uncertainty by institutionalising conventions, signal expectations, and reveal information' (Spruyt, 2000: 69). Social norms (or constitutive norms) are those which are 'constitutive of actor identity and interests' (Jepperson et al, 1996 in Shannon, 2000: 294-5), help 'create new actors, interests, or categories of action' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891) and which can be 'understood as a matrix of constitutive principles that govern the behaviours of members of a given social group' (Spruyt, 2000: 68). Moral norms (or prescriptive norms) are those which are 'irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of optimising mechanism' (Kratochwil, 1984 and Ester, 1989 in Shannon, 2000: 295), represent the ‘prescriptive quality of ‘oughtness” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891) and which ‘refer to rules that distinguish moral from immoral actions and behaviours’ (Spruyt, 2000: 67). Thus, these three groups suggest that it might be possible to distinguish between utilitarian norms situated in a rational context, social norms situated in an intersubjective context, and moral norms situated in a judgemental context. If we accept that these three norms are valid then it might be possible to suggest they may be combined into a definition of a norm as being:

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70 None of the authors mentioned seriously consider any literature written prior to 1983, most seem to agree that the study of international norms began with Stephen Krasner, Friedrich Kratochwil, or Robert Keohane in about 1983 or 1984. Interestingly, this roughly ties in with the ending of the British Committee of the English School which had explicitly studied international norms for the previous twenty-five years.
A principle or standard of correctness that reflects people’s expectation of behaviour, is binding upon the members of a group, and serves to regulate action and judgement (Longman Dictionary).

However, there is a problem here, for the most obvious definition of ‘norm’ tends to be overlooked, as it is primarily taken to be an ‘abbreviation for normal’ (Longman Dictionary). This is an immensely important claim, for as Roland Bleiker argues, ‘the ability to define normality interferes with virtually all aspects of the international’ (Bleiker, 1998: 447). Finnemore and Sikkink appear to recognise this when they suggest that ‘one logical corollary to the prescriptive [moral] quality of norms is that, by definition, there are no bad norms from the vantage point of those who promote the norm’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892), thus bad norms are not normal. Florini puts this well when she argues that it doesn’t really matter how a norm arises, what is important is that it arises: ‘No matter how a norm arises, it must take on an aura of legitimacy before it can be considered a norm’ (Florini, 1996: 365). Thus I would suggest that one more norm needs to be introduced into the discussion of international norms - that of narrative norms (or legitimation norms) which legitimate certain narratives, such as the metanarrative of scientific knowledge, but delegitimate other narratives, such as the paradoxes and incommensurabilities of social knowledge.¹¹ The recognition of narrative norms allows us to acknowledge that grand narratives are just that, and ‘that the activities of thought have another vocation: that of bearing witness to differends [silences]’ (Lyotard, 1993: 10).¹²

Thus an international norm is probably best understood as being a shorthand way of expressing what passes for ‘normal’ in international relations, with all the problems of contestation which this provokes. Normative power, as understood here, is therefore the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international relations, and which will undoubtedly have utilitarian, social, moral, and narrative dimensions to it, just as it will undoubtedly be disputed.

The EU’s Normative Basis

The broad normative basis of the European Union has been developed over the past fifty years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. It is possible to identify five ‘core’ norms within this vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the acquis communautaire and acquis politique. The first of these is the centrality of peace found in key symbolic declarations such as that by Robert Schuman in 1950, as well as the preambles to the European Coal and Steel Treaty in 1951 and the Treaty establishing the European Communities (TEC) of 1957. The second is the idea of liberty found in the preambles of the TEC and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1991, and in Article 6 of the TEU which sets out four foundational principles of the Union. The third, fourth and fifth norms are democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, all of which are expressed in the preamble and founding principles of the TEU, the development cooperation policy of the Community (TEC, Article 177), the common foreign and security provisions of the Union (TEU, Article 11), and the membership criteria adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.

In addition to these core norms, it is also possible to suggest four ‘minor’ norms within the constitution and practices of the EU, although these are far more contested. The first minor norm is the notion of social progress found throughout the acquis communautaire et politique of the EU, but in particular the preambles of the TEC and TEU, the objectives of Article 2 (TEU) and Article 2 (TEC), and the central

¹¹ The notion of postmodern norms is massively problematic given the philosophical basis of relativism. However, I read Lyotard’s ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, ‘war on totality’, ‘witnesses to the unpresentable’, and activation of ‘the differences’ as claims to equality of knowledge, presences, differences, and persons. (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv and 53-60).

¹² Lyotard’s fifty years of political writings have sought to unveil narrative norms which repress the voices of ‘young people, immigrants, women, homosexuals, prisoners, or the people of the third world’ in a search for ‘justice in politics’ (Lyotard, 1993: 169 and 29).
focus of both the EC’s social policy and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). The second minor norm is combating discrimination found in Article 13 and Title XI of the TEC, as well as the protection of minorities found in the Copenhagen criteria. The third minor norm is that of sustainable development enshrined in Article 2 (TEU), Article 2 (TEC) and the all-encompassing Article 6 (TEC). The fourth minor norm is the most recent and has yet to find any formal expression in Treaty form, but is implicit in the Copenhagen criteria. This norm is the principle of good governance as found in recent Commission papers on ‘EU Election Assistance and Observation’ (COM(2000) 191 final) and ‘European Governance’ (SEC(2000)154/7 final), as well as Romano Prodi’s inaugural speech to the European Parliament (Prodi, 2000a).

These norms clearly have a historical context to them, thus peace and liberty were defining features of west European politics in the immediate post-war period. The norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights grew later when it was important to distinguish democratic western Europe from communist eastern Europe. These became defining features of transition from communist rule in the immediate post-Cold War period as the Copenhagen criteria demonstrate. The norm of social progress became an important counter measure to the drive for liberalisation in the Single European Act (SEA) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The desire to combat discrimination also arose from progressive social legislation and the concerns regarding racism and persecution of minorities in the early 1990s. The norm of sustainable development became important following the Rio Earth Summit when it was included in the treaties through the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA). Finally the norm of good governance is becoming vital in the aftermath of the resignation of the Commission in 1999 and the concern for double standards in pursuing the EU’s demands for democratic reforms in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).

The norms suggested above are not simply declaratory aims of a system of governance (such as the preamble to republican constitutions), but represent crucial constitutive features of a polity which creates its identity as being more than a state. In the post-Cold War era, it is no longer enough for the EU to present itself as ‘merely’ a form of economic government for the management of global economies, as the increasing resistance by its citizens to economic liberalisation suggests. The reinforcement and expansion of distinctive norms allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts. This desire for greater legitimacy through the fundamental rights which the EU represents has most recently found expression in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted at the Nice European Council in December 2000. The Charter restates and re-emphasises the core and minor norms, with the exception of good governance, with the aim of ensuring that basic political and social rights become more widely known to the EU citizenship. All of
these rights were previously ‘hidden away’ within the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, the European Social Charter of 1961, Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989, and the lessor known principles and provisions of the EC/EU treaties. Because of this ‘the charter does not establish any new power or task’ (Article 49) and will not form part of the EC/EU treaty base. This new normative direction for the EU in human rights and fundamental freedoms has been questioned in those member states with more internationalist orientations. The debate in Sweden over the Draft Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union has asked why this role is necessary, given the roles of the Council of Europe and the United Nations in these areas.  

There are important reservations to be expressed here regarding the presentation of the EU’s norms as being all good. It is clear that several of these norms are contested within the EU, as well as without. Thus while the core norms are generally universal within the EU, there are a number of important exceptions, particularly within the norm of human rights. However, it is in the area of minor norms that the greatest contestation of their universality is found. The norm of social progress may be weak in those member states embracing neo-liberal economic philosophies, problems of discrimination are endemic throughout most of the EU, the norm of sustainable development is really only found in northern Europe, while the norm of good governance is supposed to be weakest within the EU itself. It is often humorously suggested that if the EU applied to join itself it would be turned down for being undemocratic. There are three reasons why this is so, first the EC was originally conceived as being technocratic rather than democratic by its six founding member states. Second the case for transparency is routinely suppressed by its member states, as in the Solana secrecy case. Third the precondition for effective multi-level governance, subsidiarity, remains largely ignored by the Union’s member states, hence obvious candidates for local decisions (e.g. agriculture and culture) are decided at the Union level, while equally obvious candidates for European decisions (e.g. foreign policy and Eurozone taxation) are decided at the state level. In all three cases the reason why the EU is undemocratic is because its member states like it to be so.

If it is accepted, for now at least, that the EU has a normative basis to it, then where does this place it within the English School’s approach to the study of international order? On first examination the EU appears to fall broadly within the pluralist tradition of rationalism as portrayed by the English School. Most of the norms previously discussed reflect rights and duties which citizens hold in respect of their respective member states. The preservation of the first four core norms would appear to be the responsibility of the member states alone, while the EU has as its task the role of ensuring that member states do not destabilise international order by challenging these norms.

However, a second examination reveals that the EU actually serves to protect the norms of both its member states and its citizens. The practice of the European Court of Justice has steadily extended the fundamental rights of Community citizens through case law which ensures that they are equivalent to the primary law in the Community legal hierarchy. Additionally, the enshrining of fundamental rights in the treaties through article 6 of the TEU ensures that basic rights for EU citizens are no longer overlooked. In particular, the norms of human rights and fundamental freedoms, liberty and non-discrimination have been developed through forty years of case law including the rights of human dignity (Casagrande [1974] ECR 773), freedom of association (Gewerkschaftsbund, Massa et al [1974] ECR 917, 925), and non-discrimination (Klöckner-Werke AG [1962] ECR 650). Thus a deeper analysis demonstrates that the EU falls within the solidarist tradition of the English School with its fundamental freedoms focussed on the legal rights of the citizens in respect of the Community itself.

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74 On 26th July 2000 12 members of the COREPER adopted the Solana secrecy decision to classify all documents concerning security, defence, military, and non-military crisis management issues as ‘secret’. This blanket move was opposed by the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland. See Statewatch News - http://www.statewatch.org/news/
Where does Normative Power come from?

Just because we might accept the normative basis of the EU, this does not make it a normative power so we need to ask where normative power comes from. I suggest that the EU’s normative power stems from a variety of different factors shaping norm diffusion in international relations which represent a combination of power by example (symbolic normative power) and power by relations (substantive normative power). These six factors, drawn from Whitehead (1996), Whitman (1998), Manners and Whitman (1998), and Kinnvall (1995) are:

- Contagion - unintentional diffusion by EU
- Informational - strategic and declaratory communications by EU
- Procedural - institutionalisation of relationship by EU
- Transference - exchange of benefits by EU and third parties
- Overt - physical presence of EU in third states and organisations
- Cultural Filter - cultural diffusion and political learning in third states and organisations

Contagion diffusion of norms is entirely symbolic normative power resulting from the unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors (Whitehead, 1996: 6). Examples of this are to be found in David Coombes discussion of how the EU leads by ‘virtuous example' in exporting its experiment in regional integration (Coombes, 1998: 237-238). Such regional replication or mimétisme can clearly be seen in the attempts at integration currently taking place in Mercosur. Informational diffusion is the result of largely symbolic normative power found in the range of strategic communications, including new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as Presidency démarches from the Presidency of the EU (for example Sweden) or the President of the Commission (currently Romano Prodi). Procedural diffusion involving symbolic and substantial normative power involves the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as an interregional cooperation agreement, membership of an international organisation or enlargement of the EU itself. Examples of these three procedural factors might be the inter-regional dialogue with Southern African Development Community since 1994, or the membership of the EU in the World Trade Organisation, or the current enlargement negotiations taking place with the accession countries of central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

Transference diffusion takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantial normative power. Such transference may be the result of the exportation of community norms and standards (Cremona, 1998: 86-90) or the ‘carrot and stickism’ of financial rewards and economic sanctions. Examples of transference diffusion can be seen in the impact of the PHARE and TACIS programmes in the countries of central and eastern Europe, as well as the European Development Fund in the Lomé states. Both procedural and transference diffusion are now facilitated by the conditionality which is required in all EC agreements with third countries (K. Smith, 1998b; Cremona, 1998: 81-86). Overt diffusion occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations. Overt diffusion involves both symbolic and substantial normative power, examples of which include the role of Commission delegations and embassies of member states, or it may involve the presence of the troika of foreign ministers, the President of the Commission, or even monitoring missions like those deployed in the former Yugoslavia. The final factor shaping norm diffusion is the cultural filter which mediates the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organisations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms (Kinnvall, 1995: 61-71). The cultural filter is not so much symbolic or substantial as it is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion. Examples of the cultural filter at work include the diffusion of democratic norms in China, human rights diffusion in Turkey, or environmental norms in Britain. These six factors contribute to the way in which the EU norms are
diffused, but in order to get a sense of the extent to which these factors work it is worth looking at
what common interests, or norms, the EU seeks to ‘normalise’ in international relations.

The EU’s Common Interests

The Member States of the Union have many common interests. The Union must increase its
influence in world affairs, promote values such as peace and security, democracy and human
rights, provide aid for the least developed countries, … [and] prevent major damage to the
environment. (Commission, 1997)

According to this declaration, the common interests of the EU’s member states may be read as being
centred around the promotion of values such as ‘peace and security’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’,
development aid’, and ‘environmental protection’. On the basis of these common interests and values I
intend examining the extent to which the EU promotes these normative values in international
relations through looking briefly at five examples which, I would argue, may serve as cases studies of
the use of normative power. Drawing on Barry Buzan’s suggestion of examining five sectors of
security for a more complete analysis, these five case studies might be seen to fall into the areas of
military concerns (peace and security), political concerns (democracy), societal concerns (human rights),
economic concerns (development aid), and environmental concerns (environmental protection).
Although these case studies are by no means chosen at random, it is hoped that their wide distribution
across a broad pattern of EU international action will allow some insights to be gained into the EU’s
pursuit of international norms.

Over the past five years the EU has increasingly been exercising normative power in its areas of
common interest as it seeks to shape international norms in its own image. In the area of peace and
security the EU has played an important role in the campaign against antipersonnel landmines (APL)
which led to the Ottawa Convention. The EU is at the forefront of the fight against landmines, with
more than 60 million mines lying hidden and a stockpile estimated at some 250 million. In 1999 the
total EU contribution to external mine action amounted to €103 million, making the Union the largest
contributor world-wide (Commission, 2000b). In the area of peace rather than security the EU has
been playing a central role in the negotiations to create the International Criminal Court (ICC),
including building the momentum that carried along its more ‘reluctant governments’ - Britain and
France (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In the area of democratisation the EU has been an active agent in
the provision of election assistance and observation (EAO) and has recently developed guidelines
which go beyond simple observations and towards the principles of good governance. In the area of
human rights the EU has developed a pro-active policy of being at the vanguard of the abolitionist
movement against capital punishment and the death penalty (DP) (see below). In terms of development
aid the EU followed the lead of the Jubilee 2000 movement in its demands to drop the debt for the
world’s poorest countries and to revise the highly indebted poor countries initiative. This has resulted
in the recent everything but arms (EBA) commitment by the EU to open up its markets to these
countries for tariff-free trade in all areas except arms. Finally, the EU has developed a European climate
change programme (CCP) to take to the failed COP6 (conference of the parties) negotiations recently
held in the Netherlands in an attempt to move beyond the commitments given at Rio and Kyoto.

These six examples help illustrate the extent to which the EU is a different kind of international actor, a
normative power, for five reasons:

- State Sovereignty – EU impinges with impunity
- Solidarist Society – EU intervenes in support of individual
- Non-material Benefits – EU action is costly, not beneficial
- The Unusual Suspects – EU often faces international opposition from the strangest partners
- Normative Power - EU does not behave as a state or a super-state
The EU impinges on state sovereignty with impunity because it is not a state and is founded on the notion that sovereignty is flexible rather than rigid. Thus the EU seeks to intervene in the domestic concerns of states in violation of principles of international sovereignty, as demonstrated in the case of the death penalty. Because of its solidarist basis, the EU sees nothing wrong with intervening in support or persecution of individuals in a solidarist society of international actors, for example in the case of the international criminal court. These six examples suggest that the EU seeks non-material benefits in its international relations in a way that is not often understood in politics - indeed its actions in the climate change negotiations and the debt reduction initiatives suggest that its normative power is often costly, not beneficial in these terms.

All six examples suggest that the notion of international norms representing another means for the West to repress the Rest is somewhat misleading here. The notion of the West being the rich, developed, capitalist states of the OECD is rejected as the USA, South Korea, and Japan find themselves at odds with the other OECD states led by the EU. Thus the EU often finds its normative power resisted by the unusual suspects such as the US, China, Congo, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the example of the death penalty (Economist, 2000: 23). Finally, the EU appears to be, very slowly, reshaping ‘normal’ in the international system, because it does not behave as a state or a super-state. Thus the process of norm diffusion is assisted by such factors as contagion and the cultural filter when the EU works with civil society and NGOs to go beyond ‘traditional’ tools such as economic and military power. In particular the important role of NGOs such as the International Red Cross (APL), Human Rights Watch (ICC and DP), Amnesty International (DP), Oxfam and Jubilee 2000 (EBA), as well as Greenpeace and World-Wide Fund for Nature (CCP) have all served to shape and amplify the normative power of the EU. In order to further illustrate the way in which the EU is pursuing a solidaristic international society through the use of normative power, I will now consider one of the case studies in greater depth – the EU’s fight against the death penalty.

The EU’s International Pursuit of Human Rights: the Abolition of the Death Penalty

Although Article 3 of the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights, and Article 2 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), both affirmed the right of everybody to life, it was to take over thirty years before European states were to attempt to enshrine this right in international law through the 1983 Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR on the abolition of the death penalty. Only six years later the UN was attempting to follow this lead through the 1989 Second Optional Protocol (OPT2) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), aimed at the abolition of the death penalty. By the time Protocol No. 6 entered into force in 1985 (with five ratifications), only nine of the current fifteen members of the EU had abolished the death penalty for all crimes, and 23 out of the 41 current members of the Council of Europe still had the death penalty on their statutes (Council of Europe, 2000; and Amnesty International, 2000c). The story of the abolition of the death penalty is therefore a relatively short and recent one, concerning itself with how the idea that the death penalty was not a sovereign issue of criminal justice, but an international issue of human rights, became the norm.

There are three factors which led the EU to work towards the international abolition of the death penalty, all of which are rooted firmly in the human rights discourses of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Firstly, the role of the Council of Europe was instrumental in ensuring that from the mid-1980s onwards the abolition of the death penalty had become a significant norm in western Europe. However, it is important to remember than prior to 1990 only six of the twelve EC states had abolished the death penalty and only eight of the twelve EC states had ratified Protocol No. 6 of the ECHR, thus the norm was symbolically important, but had not been substantiated in law by half of the EC. The second factor was not just the Council of Europe, but the end of the Cold War which was to provide the impetus for a rethinking of what it meant to be a democratic, liberal European state. This rethink involved both western and eastern European states in a reinforcement of the principles of the ECHR
as prerequisite membership conditions for joining the first of western Europe’s three clubs (the others being NATO and the EU). In June 1996 the Council of Europe made immediate moratoria and ratification of protocol no. 6 explicit prerequisites for membership, as well as calling for those member states who retained the death penalty but did not use it to abolish it in law. Thus between 1989 and 2000 the six outstanding EU states and eleven of the applicant states abolished the death penalty and ratified Protocol No. 6 (see appendix one: death penalty record). The finale to this period occurred with the 1998 abolition of the death penalty and the 1999 ratification of protocol no. 6 by the final EU state, the UK, following the election of a progressive government in 1997.

The third factor was the crisis of confidence in the EU which characterised the period 1992 to 1997 and provided an opportunity for EU institutions and member states to reflect on how best to revitalise the EU in order to recover from the ‘post-Maastricht blues’. One route was to try to strengthen the EU’s commitment to human rights through the EC acceding to the ECHR, but in March 1996 this path was blocked by an ECJ ruling that the Community was not competent to ‘adopt rules or conclude international agreements on human rights.’ The insertion of new ‘founding principles’ in Article 6, together with corresponding references to applicant states (Article 49) and sanctions for failing to respect these principles (Article 7), demonstrates the extent to which the Treaty of Amsterdam agreed in June 1997 marked a move towards greater importance for these principles in the EU. Specifically, the Declaration to the Final Act on the abolition of the death penalty spelt out that this was one principle on which all member states were in agreement:

The Conference notes that the death penalty, the abolition of which is provided for in the above mentioned protocol [protocol no. 6] signed in Strasbourg on 28 April 1983 and which entered into force on 1 March 1985, is no longer applied in any of the Member States of the Union, a large majority of which have signed and ratified the Protocol in question. (Declaration to the Final Act, Treaty of Amsterdam)

Thus, with the signing in 1997 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU was in a stronger position to pursue the abolition of the death penalty as a broader international policy initiative. This coincided with momentum building within the European Parliament (EP) in April 1997 for greater respect for human rights including a European declaration on fundamental rights and the abolition of the death penalty by member states (at this time only Britain). In June 1997 the EP adopted a resolution on the abolition of the death penalty aimed at all European states and calling on them to ratify OPT2. In addition the Parliament suggested the EU should table a resolution at the UN General Assembly on the universal moratorium on executions. By the end of 1997 it was clear that the EU had changed direction on the question of human rights, giving a treaty basis for the first time and taking a route away from the ECHR and towards the independent pursuit of a universal moratorium. This change was summed up in the Declaration annexed to the Presidency’s conclusions following the Luxembourg European Council summit in December 1997 regarding the forthcoming celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights during 1998.

For the European Union 1998 was ‘Human Rights Year’, marked by three important developments on the abolition of the death penalty which were to place the issue at the forefront of its pursuit of international norms. The first was the June 1998 guidelines for EU policy towards third countries on
the death penalty issued by the Council of Ministers which set out the objectives and means of intervention in third countries.\textsuperscript{81} These guidelines set the tone for an expansion of tasks including démarches from the Presidency, involvement in individual cases, human rights reporting on the death penalty, and the general pursuit of an abolitionist international norm.\textsuperscript{82} The next development grew out of these operational guides when the Presidency began issuing démarches, starting with the Austrian presidency writing to George W. Bush on the case of Stan Faulder v. Texas in December 1998. This pattern of addressing directly the parties involved followed one already established by the Parliament, in particular the EP delegation for relations with the US congress. The final development was the decision by the Council to begin presenting an EU annual report on human rights which would systematically report and assess human rights in the EU and EU action on human rights in international affairs. After the ‘Human Rights Year’ the EU’s abolitionist policy became more overt through the extensive use of declaratory measures and the inclusion of references in its human rights communications. Following the Austrian Presidency’s single declaration in 1998, the German Presidency made two declarations, the Portuguese seven and the French six declarations.\textsuperscript{83}

Although it is probably too early to accurately assess the full impact of the EU’s normative power on this subject, it is possible to make three broad observations on its exercise of power. Firstly the EU is clearly trying to symbolically reorder the discourse of international society through its engagement with the super-executioners, China and the USA. With both these states the EU is using informational and overt means to raise the issue of the death penalty through Presidential and Parliamentary statements, démarches, and dialogue (Patten, 2000a), as well the use of the delegation offices such as in Washington. What is self evident about this engagement is the extent to which the EU is clearly not going to change the minds of the governments, but contributes towards raising the issue to the international level. Secondly, the EU has sought to raise the issue on a bilateral and multilateral basis as a means of shaping the dialogue between other states. The presidencies of Finland and Portugal (July 1999 - July 2000) raised the issue of the death penalty on a bilateral basis with over twenty countries (Patten, 2000c).\textsuperscript{84} The EU has also raised the issue multilaterally in the UN through a memorandum and speech by the Finnish Foreign Minister, Tarja Halonen, to the 54\textsuperscript{th} UN General Assembly in September 1999; and the introduction of a ‘Resolution on the Death Penalty’ to the 55\textsuperscript{th} and 56\textsuperscript{th} sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in 1999 and 2000 (UN ESC, 1999, 2000). In the 55\textsuperscript{th} session the resolution on the death penalty was adopted by 30 in favour to 11 against with 12 abstentions with the voting as follows:

\textbf{In favour} [30] - Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela.

\textbf{Against} [11] - Bangladesh, Botswana, China, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Sudan and the United States.


Given that, out of the 147 countries that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only 43 have ratified the second optional protocol (OPT2) aimed at the abolition of the death penalty.
penalty, the success of this resolution was quite remarkable. It would be expected that the super-executioners, China and the US, would vote against the resolution, but what is more remarkable is that the Russian Federation voted in favour, and that the Democratic Republic of the Congo and India abstained. This was despite the fact that both Russia and India retain the death penalty, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the world’s six super-executioners. Following significant revisions of the draft resolution by retentionist states, Finland and the EU realised that it was better to withdraw the initiative rather than pass a ‘fatally flawed text’ (Patten, 2000c). Finally, it does appear that, broadly speaking, the international pursuit of the abolitionist norms is having an effect as the four last years have seen 15 countries abolish the death penalty for all crimes (Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Cote D’Ivoire, East Timor, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Malta, Nepal, Poland, South Africa, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UK) and 3 countries abolish the death penalty for ordinary crimes (Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Latvia). This compares well with the 44 countries who abolished the death penalty in the previous 30 years from 1976-1996 (see appendix one and Amnesty International, 2000c). Clearly it is not possible to attribute all these abolitions to the normative power of the EU alone, as the role of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation of American States are obviously important, although neither of these last two organisations actively pursues abolition outside of their membership. However, I would suggest that there have been a number of cases where the EU has played an important, if not crucial, role in bringing about abolition in five different types of situation.

The first situation is found in the cases of Cyprus and Poland, both members of the CoE and applicant states to the EU, but both of whom have only ratified protocol no. 6 of the ECHR in the last 12 months (Cyprus in January 2000 and Poland in October 2000). In the case of Cyprus it is difficult to argue that the abolition was a response to joining the CoE in 1961, or the response to signing the CCPR in 1969. In Poland the case is less clear cut as it only joined the CoE in November 1991, and signed the CCPR in March 1977, but this raises the question of why it only ratified protocol no. 6 in October 2000, eight years after its near neighbours the Czech Rep., Slovakia, and Hungary. I would argue that in both these cases (and Malta) abolition of the death penalty was related to procedural factors introduced in EU pre-accession negotiations from 1998 onwards, not joining the CoE over ten years earlier.

The second situation is seen in the cases of Albania and Ukraine, both members of the CoE but neither applicant states to the EU, although they have also both ceased using the death penalty for ordinary crimes and ratified protocol no. 6 in the last nine months (Ukraine in April 2000 and Albania in September 2000). In the case of the Ukraine, the CoE managed to get President Kuchma to issue a moratorium on executions when joining in November 1995, but it still conducted 167 executions in 1996, second only to China (Checkel, 1999b). It was only after the EU Declaration and Guidelines setting out the importance of abolition in June 1998, and the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine adopted in December 1999 restating this objective, that the Ukraine finally abolished the death penalty legally in December 1999. Similarly, Albania also committed to abolish the death penalty when joining

85 Amnesty International report that 85% of the world’s 1,813 recorded executions in 1999 were carried out in just five countries - China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the USA. The sixth country is Iraq where numbers are reported to be in the ‘hundreds’, but the exact figures are unknown (Amnesty, 2000c).
87 The Organisation of American States adopted the ‘Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty’ in 1990. So far Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela have ratified the protocol, and Paraguay has signed but not ratified (Amnesty International, 2000d).
88 Cyprus acceded to OPT2 in September 1999 and Poland signed OPT2 in May 2000.
89 Presidency statement on abolition of death penalty in Cyprus, Bulletin of EU, 1/2-2000, point 1.6.10.
the CoE in July 1995, but did not do so despite repeated warnings from the CoE and a visit from the Human Rights Watch Committee for the Prevention of Torture. Again, it was only after the pressure brought to bear by the EU as part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Asia in June 1999, and the threat of removing support for legal reforms, that the Albanian government finally removed the death penalty for ordinary crimes from the statutes (although retaining it for exceptional crimes) in October 2000. In both these cases I would argue that direct EU pressure led to action on the death penalty in 2000, not joining the CoE five years earlier.

The third situation is that found in the cases of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan neither of which are members of the CoE or applicant states to the EU, and both of which have abolished the death penalty in the last two years (Azerbaijan in 1998 and Turkmenistan in 1999). It is not possible to argue that the EU action led directly to these abolitions, but in both cases the EU norm played a role in shaping the activities of the governments. The parliament of Azerbaijan adopted a law abolishing the death penalty in February 1998, a move that was formally welcomed by the EU, however on accession to COP2 of the CCPR with reservations in January 1999, the governments of France, Germany, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands all formally registered their objections to the reservations. A contrasting recognition of abolition was received by the Turkmenistan government following its abolition of the death penalty and accession to COP2 in January 2000. Although neither of these actions provide proof of direct EU involvement, I would suggest that EU norms passed by contagion, informational and transference diffusion through the Technical Assistance for CIS (TACIS) programme contact and participation in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (Azerbaijan’s PCA entered into force July 1999 and Turkmenistan signed, but did not ratify its PCA in May 1998).

The fourth situation is seen in Nepal and the Philippines, both of which took actions on the death penalty in the last 18 months, and neither of which are even remotely European (Nepal abolished the death penalty in June 1999 and the Philippines introduced a moratorium on executions in April 2000). I would suggest that both these cases are examples of norm diffusion by contagion and information as their participation and voting record in the 55th session of UN CHR in April 1999 appears to indicate. After voting in favour of the EU resolution Nepal abolished the penalty two months later, while the Philippines abstained from voting even though it still retained the penalty, but a year later it introduced a moratorium. During the same period similar cases in South Africa and Cote D’Ivoire reinforce the suggestion that as abolition becomes a norm, so countries with which the EU has little direct contact feel the need to conform.

The final situation is that of Turkey and Russia, both of which present the Council of Europe and the European Union with extremely difficult challenges on the question of human rights and the death penalty. I would argue that although neither has ratified the protocol no. 2 to the ECHR, or acceded to COP2 of the CCPR, the CoE and the EU have played an important external role in bringing pressure to bear on these two countries. The first process of overt norm diffusion has been through a join CoE-EU public awareness campaign established in 1999 at a cost of 670,000 Euros over two years to provide information for the general public, legal experts and parliamentarians in Albania, Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine (Patten, 2000c). The second process has been procedural norm diffusion in the accession process for Turkey and the informational norm diffusion for Russia in the Common Strategy. Since the 1998 process of accession talks began with the twelve associated countries, Turkey has been made constantly aware that its human rights standards present the largest barrier to entry, particularly in

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92 Neither the Ukraine or Albania has yet acceded to OPT2.
94 Presidency statement on abolition of death penalty in Turkmenistan, CFSP 5557/00, Brussels, 24 January 2000;
95 Presidency statement on abolition of the death penalty in Nepal, CFSP 8663/99, Brussels, 2 June 1999; Presidency statement on the introduction of moratorium on executions in the Philippines, Bulletin of the EU, 4-2000, point. 1.6.16.
Ian Manners

the case of the EP. The EU Presidency, and especially the EP, was exceptionally active in ensuring that the death sentence on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was commuted and that the PKK gave up its armed struggle (Council, 1999: 41). It is absolutely clear that Turkey will have to move beyond its 1984 moratorium and abolish the death penalty before it can even begin to negotiate membership. In the case of Russia the EU’s Common Strategy adopted in June 1999 explicitly states that ‘The European Union shall focus on the following areas of action in implementing this Common Strategy: by enhancing programmes to promote the abolition of the death penalty’.96 However, the reality is that Russia continued to execute in 1999 (Amnesty International, 2000b) and remains relatively impervious to norm diffusion, which leads to the suggestion that ‘the most consistent efforts to apply normative pressure on rights/citizenship issues in Russia come from outside’ including INGOs, the CoE and the EU (Checkel, 1999a). Clearly in these two cases Kinnvall’s ‘cultural filter’ is leading to very slow adaptation (in the case of Turkey) and rejection (in the case of Russia), as the construction of knowledge is shaped by the social and political identity of Russia as being another ‘super-executor’ along with the USA and China, rather than a ‘normal’ European state – it is now the only country in Europe to continue to execute.

It is clearly wrong to argue that the pursuit of abolitionist norms in international relations is for the benefit of a domestic audience or to serve domestic interests as the EU recognises when it admits that in some member states ‘the political decision towards abolition was not taken with the support of the majority of public opinion.’97 Indeed I would argue that the vast majority of EU citizens are largely unaware of its campaign to abolish the death penalty, which completely undermines the domestic audience argument. It may be the case that the EU seeks to be in the ‘abolitionist vanguard’ in order to emphasise its distinctive international identity in contrast to ‘the other’- in particular the US and China. As the writings on identity in EU society would lead us to expect, the process of constructing the other in the European Union is an important part of constituting the self as a different, and principled being. The 1999 Annual Human on Human Rights supports this analysis when it says that ‘opposition to the death penalty has become one of the most visible elements in the EU’s human rights policy globally’ (Council, 1999: 41).

This brief study of the EU’s pursuit of the international norm of death penalty moratoria helps illustrate the way in which the EU represents a normative power in world politics. In this case its normative power can be seen in the way in which it shapes the norms surrounding the question of the death penalty, nicely summed up in this extract from the 2000 Annual Report on Human Rights:

> Capital punishment raises a range of philosophical, religious, political and criminological questions. The EU countries have all concluded that the death penalty is a uniquely inhuman and irreversible punishment. (Council, 2000: 46)

The EU’s utilitarian norms are situated in a discussion of the criminology of the issue, with the use of discourses focussing on ‘miscarriages of justice’, ‘lack of scientific evidence’, ‘incapability of rehabilitation’, and ‘irreversibility’. These norms focus on the science and usefulness of capital punishment as part of a discussion about the functionality of the death penalty in law. The EU’s social norms instead reinforce the ‘common values’, ‘common heritage’, and ‘common ground’ of human rights and dignity. The emphasis in this discourse is on the social constitution of a political order, of which the EU and the ‘international community’ are an important part. The EU’s moral norms involve invocation of ‘moral authority’, ‘humanity’, and ‘principles’ as part of a prescriptive discourse which is situated in claims to ‘humanistic values’. Finally, narrative norms speak of ‘progressive legislation’, ‘advanced legal systems’, and ‘progressive development of human rights’ in a discourse rich in references to enlightenment values and counter-claims of ‘backwardness’. In this way the EU seeks to shape the normative discourse by invoking four patterns of language which help to reconstitute what

passes for normal in international relations. This normative power is not inconsequential, in the past ten years it has helped accelerate an abolitionist movement which has attracted 40 new converts swelling the number of abolitionist states to 108 and reducing the number of retentionist states to 87 (Amnesty International, 2000c). The near future appears to herald an intensification of the normative drive to abolition as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has the right to life as its second article - ‘No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’. Although the charter will remain outside the acquis communautaire in the immediate future, it is inevitable that the ECJ will draw on it for inspiration when ruling of cases on human rights and individual liberties - and we all know what happen to a charter with a similar status in 1991 (the social charter). Similarly, the accession of the Swedish Presidency to power in January 2000 looks likely to extend the role of the European Union in the exercise of normative power as its programme makes clear - ‘we want particularly to emphasise the rights of the child, human rights for women, freedom of information, the freedom of the media and the fight to abolish the death penalty’ (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2000).

Conclusion: A Contradiction in Terms?

‘Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical…. It is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms’ (Rosecrance, 1998: 22).

In this paper I have tried to argue that an encounter between the English School and the European Union would be productive for both sides as it would raise our awareness of the extent to which we need to consider new concepts (such as EU system and society) in the English School as well as new concepts (such as normative power and international society) in the European Union. I have gone further to suggest that both the English School and studies of the European Union could benefit from reflection on the role of different ontological, epistemological and normative approaches to their world views. In particular I have set out some of the arguments and insights which the inclusion of postmodern readings of international relations and international norms, through the use of concepts such as ‘world imagination’ and ‘narrative norms’, as well as the idea of ‘postmodern science’. Richard Rosecrance has argued that Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical - I would agree with that interpretation, but this raises the question of ‘how can we possible know this?’ I think we are faced with two contradictions in this paper, both of which I think are resolvable:

First Contradiction in Terms: EU Society

How can the European Union, made up of member states and the inhabitants of those states constitute a society - surely this is a contradiction in terms? I have argued that it is possible to think about the ‘perceived commonality of a group of states and a community’ as an ‘EU Society’ by looking at both the extent to which the EU member states form an international society and the degree to which the EU represents a regional form of world society. The EU’s international society is characterised by a degree of consciousness of commonalities and willingness to be bound by a highly organised rules-based institution. The EU’s world society clearly goes far beyond a degree of interaction towards some genuinely common values, such as human rights, and EU-wide concerns, such as environmental and food safety issues, which serve as a human basis for rules-based institution. EU society is not a contradiction in terms - it is clearly neither a ‘national’ society, traditionally conceived, nor only an international society of states, but lies somewhere in between. Perhaps the EU society is more like a neo-mediaeval society with competing claims to difference and similarity according to culturally-constructed cleavages such as nationality, gender, appearance, socio-economic status, and belief-system.
Finally, I have argued that not only is normative power the most important form of international power, but that the EU represents an important example of a political entity changing notions of what constitutes ‘normal’ in international relations. The EU, like many political actors, has the economic tools of a civilian power, and is acquiring the armed forces of a military power, but I would suggest that these are secondary to its ability to shape the ideational constitution of international relations through the effects of contagion, informational diffusion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference diffusion, overt diffusion and the effect of the cultural filter. In this way the EU could be described as ‘an internationally active Union based on the principle of solidarity’ in the pursuit of solidarist norms in international society (Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2000).
### Appendix One: Death Penalty Record

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Abolition</th>
<th>Protocol No 6</th>
<th>OP2 Ratified</th>
<th>1984 OPT2</th>
<th>1989 OPT2</th>
<th>1999 Executions</th>
</tr>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>before 1972</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>before 1972</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Y (FRG)</td>
<td>Y (FRG)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<td>Y (Yugoslavia)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>A (Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>Y (Yugoslavia)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Y (USSR)</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herz.</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>A (Yugoslavia)</td>
<td>Y (Yugoslavia)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A (USSR)</td>
<td>Y (USSR)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>A (USSR)</td>
<td>Y (USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1999 *</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>A (USSR)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2000</td>
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* Abolished for ordinary crimes (not all crimes)
AiP Abolitionist in Practice (retained but not used)
# Czech Rep. and Slovak Rep. separated in 1993
ψ As part of Yugoslavia
† Russia has signed but not ratified Protocol No. 6

OPT2 aiming at abolition of death penalty - votes in UN in 1984 and 1989 - Yes, No, Abstain
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