

Conclusion

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12 Conclusion

Valuing principles in European Union foreign policy

Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners

... it is now clear that European Union is the best example in the history of the world of conflict resolution and it is the duty of everyone, particularly those who live in areas of conflict to study how it was done and to apply its principles to their own conflict resolution.

(Hume 1998)

Africa and the problems of that continent afford us a chance in Europe to re-describe ourselves, what we're about, our values system, our technology, our capabilities. In the end this is our neighbour that's in a crisis. And I think this can be as much for us as for them, in terms of believing in Europe. My kids, and their friends, and the people that come to our shows want to believe in Europe. But they want to believe in Europe that has beliefs, that has values, that has a vision.

(Bono 2005)

We have sought to understand how values and principles shape, and are shaped by, EU foreign policy relations with the rest of the world. Nobel peace prize laureate, John Hume, argued that it is the duty of everyone to understand the principles of the EU in order to resolve conflict worldwide. African aid campaigner, Bono, has reversed this argument in order to advocate that addressing the problems of Africa would give the EU a chance to re-describe its values system in a more positive way. Both of these voices from outside of academic debate remind us of the importance of valuing principles in the study of EU foreign policy. To conclude, we will try to value principles by considering what our analysis of EU foreign policy tells us about the EU as a normative political and social system. As stated at the outset, this book was aimed at providing some answers to these under-researched questions of the relationships between values, principles, foreign policy, the international identity of the EU (i.e. the way in which the EU is constituted, constructed and represented internationally), and the political identity of the Europeans.

In the book we have explored, through three conceptual chapters and eight case studies, the way in which a core set of values, principles and images of the world emerge through EU foreign policy, and thus constitute the international

identity of the EU. At the same time, we argue that such emergence reflects back into the identity-formation processes *within* the Union in mutually-constitutive routines and practices of political union. In the rest of this chapter we aim to bring together the ways in which principled foreign policy links to the overall processes of polity-building in the EU in five sections. We will start by briefly summarising specific values, principles and images of the world that we believe have emerged from the analysis of EU foreign policy in the case studies. Second, we consider the differences between universal and particular interpretations of values and principles in EU foreign policy. Third, we will look at the way in which values and principles are put into practice of EU foreign policy. Fourth, we will briefly reconsider the inter-relationships between ‘foreign’ policy and the ‘self’ of the European integration process. Finally, we will reflect on what we have learned about values, images and principles of the EU.

Summary – VIPs in EU foreign policy

The analysis of EU foreign policy, broadly defined to include relations between the EU and the rest of the world, confirms the emergence of a number of fundamental **values** found in the case studies. These include the prime value of *peace*, as well as the core values of *human dignity/rights*, *freedom/liberty*, *democracy*, *equality*, *justice/rule of law*, and *solidarity*. In addition to these prime and core values, the case studies suggest a number of derived or more recent values, such as *regulated liberalism/capitalism* and *ecological modernisation*. If we read *regulated liberalism/capitalism* and *ecological modernisation* as being complex interpretations of ‘good governance’ and ‘sustainable development’, then what is interesting about the case studies is the relative match with the constitutive values and principles identified in chapter two.

Clearly, none of these values are unique to the EU and its foreign policy, although the relative importance given to them is of central interest to this book. However, what is of greater interest and has been explored in the case studies is the way in which particular EU interpretations of these values have been translated into guiding **principles** of EU policy. These principles include conflict prevention principles in *peace*; conditionality principles (essential and fundamental elements clauses) for *human rights*, *democracy*, *rule of law*, and *good governance*; mainstreaming principles for *equality*; the precautionary and preventative principles for *ecological modernisation*; as well as associated principles such as UN authorisation, multilateralism, and ‘free and regulated trade’.

The **images of the world** that underlie the EU interpretation of its values and their translation into principles (and thus policies) seem to be broadly transformative, with a clear faith in human progress and in the power of legal frameworks. This EU image is based on a liberal understanding of foreign policy that combines the Kantian recipe for ‘perpetual peace’ – domestic democracy, an international *foedus* of democratic countries, and the development of cosmopolitan law (Kant 1795/1991) – with a Grotian faith in the positive effects of regulation and international law. According to this image the opportunity for

pacific transformation of international relations into a world politics for the better is still possible. Conflict prevention through structural foreign policy is understandable only within this worldview.

Universal and particular – the specificity of VIPs

From our brief summary of the VIPs found in the book, it should become clear that of paramount importance are the ways in which particular EU interpretations of universal values shape the relationships between VIPs and foreign policy. Each of the values and principles considered in the book illustrate this specificity of VIPs in foreign policy, as the examples considered here will illustrate.

Peace is probably the most universally-recognised value and it would seem impossible to see it as a particularly EU value. However, the specific link that the EU has made between *peace* and the other values mentioned here is a particular feature of the EU. As Lucarelli and Menotti discussed in chapter nine, achieving lasting peace involves an understanding of the complex causes of conflict, alongside more conventional conflict prevention and crisis management. In this respect, the translation of other values into the principles of democracy promotion, international law promotion, sustainable development etc., are all seen as central to achieving peace. However, this imposes a broad understanding of peace which cannot be limited to the absence of war that is in tension with the use of ‘preventative intervention’.

Human dignity and *human rights* would also appear to be values of universal reach, but as we discussed in the introduction, and is made explicit in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, there are particular EU interpretations of these values. As Welsh discussed in chapter four, human dignity involves the sanctity of the citizen particularly in biotechnology (see also article 3: right to the integrity of the person in the Charter). As chapters seven to ten illustrated, human rights are valued principles in foreign policy relations with near and far neighbours, in conflict prevention and cooperation policy. However, what these chapters also suggest is that human dignity and human rights are not isolated values, but are interpreted within the context of other values and principles such as justice/rule of law.

Freedom and *liberty* are also seen to be universal values, understood as an absence of restraints and the possession of rights respectively. Again, the EU does appear to exercise particular interpretations of these values. As Balfour discussed in chapter seven, the EU’s foreign policy with its near neighbours involves broadly liberal interpretations of freedom and liberty, but with considerable emphasis placed on minority rights. In chapter eleven van den Hoven appears to support this broadly liberal reading of EU values, but qualifies it in the area of trade by arguing that the EU is far more regulated than liberal when it comes to freedom from regulatory intervention. Thus, EU interpretations of freedom and liberty are also shaped by their interplay with other values such as human rights (for minorities) and regulated liberalism (for trade).

Democracy is increasingly accepted as a universal aspiration, although substantial parts of the world have yet to experience it. As chapters seven to ten suggest, there is a particular EU interpretation of the value of democracy, including an emphasis on parliamentary government; a preference for proportional systems of representation; and a separation of the roles of head of state and head of government. In chapter seven Balfour argues that the value of democracy is compromised in regions (such as the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East) where stability is a concern, particularly since the 11th September agenda has displaced human rights and democracy. In chapter nine Lucarelli and Menotti distinguished the EU's support for humanitarian intervention with the US's support for pre-emptive action (which may lead to democratisation). Interestingly, it seems to be the case that the EU now appears to be in favour of intervention on humanitarian grounds, but not for the promotion of democracy. However, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are all clearly interlinked values in the EU's use of essential elements clauses, as chapters seven and ten suggested.

Equality should be a universal value, but is rarely practised. In this respect, the particular EU interpretation of equality is one that seeks to advocate the value of equality in the absence of widespread international support. As Peto and Manners suggested in chapter six, the EU's support for gender equality has led to the establishment of principles of equal pay, equal treatment, and equal opportunity within the EU, culminating in the mainstreaming principle. As this chapter illustrates, gender equality is also pursued in foreign policy through enlargement and development policy, although somewhat unevenly. In chapter ten Bonaglia, Goldstein, and Petito identified equality as a value to be promoted as part of the EU's human and social development policy. Again like the previous values, equality in both gender equality and development cooperation policy is not independent of other values such as solidarity and human rights.

Justice and the *rule of law* are held to be universal values, although their interpretation often reflects predominant power relations. As briefly suggested within the EU images of the world (above), the particular EU interpretation of these values places great faith in the importance of justice and law through both the *acquis communautaire* and international law more broadly. All of the case study chapters place considerable emphasis on the role of justice and law in ensuring the other values and principles are upheld, whether that be the precautionary principle (Welsh and Baker), gender equality (Peto and Manners), relations with near and far neighbours (Balfour and Panebianco), UN authorisation for intervention (Lucarelli and Menotti), good governance and trade regulation (Bonaglia, Goldstein and Petito; and van den Hoven).

Solidarity is a cosmopolitan universal value, but not one that has been often shared in a world of states. The particular EU interpretation of this value is controversial because of the inherent tension between solidarity within the EU (through common policies, for example), and solidarity across the world (through development policies, for example). The EU value of solidarity in

foreign policy can be found in chapters ten and eleven where the policy of solidarity and the issue of regulated versus fair trade feature prominently. In chapter ten Bonaglia, Goldstein and Petito identified the development cooperation policy of solidarity as being important in projecting EU values of democracy, social justice and sustainable development. In chapter eleven van den Hoven contrasted the EU emphasis on free and regulated trade with that of the US on free and fair trade (fair to the US), but concluded that the EU promotes trade values at the WTO linked to social justice.

Regulated liberalism/capitalism was identified as an EU value by van den Hoven in chapter eleven, although made clear that this is by no means a universal value. This value should undoubtedly be understood in close relation to the values of justice/rule of law and solidarity already discussed. This relationship results in the operating principles of the EU, including the emphasis placed on good governance, multilateralism, and international coordination within the framework of the UN/WTO systems. As van den Hoven argues, the EU faith in international regulation emphasises that gains from economic trade should be redistributed. The value of regulation in EU foreign policy clearly extends beyond the WTO and the Doha development agenda, as agreements such as the European Security Strategy and the Constitution for Europe illustrated in 2003-04. Both these documents placed considerable emphasis on good governance, effective multilateralism, and the role of the United Nations.

Ecological modernisation was identified as an EU value by Baker in chapter five, although again this is not a universal value. Similar to regulated liberalism/capitalism, the value of ecological modernisation should be understood in close relations to the values of justice/rule of law and solidarity. This interplay between values leads to the crucial policy aim of mainstreaming sustainable development across all sectors of EU activity (TEU art. 2, TEC arts. 2 and 6). Baker suggests that the value of ecological modernisation leads to the EU operating principles of the polluter pays principle; the preventative principles, and the precautionary principle. Both Welsh in chapter four and van den Hoven in chapter eleven agree that the precautionary principle is central to EU foreign policy in the areas of science, foodstuffs, trade, and the environment.

What this brief review of the specificity of EU VIPs suggests is that there are two identifiable relationships between the universal and the particular in EU interpretations of values and operating principles. The first relationship involves a particular interpretation of a generally held value, such as human dignity/rights, freedom/liberty, and democracy. Such an interpretation takes place either because a universal value is translated by the EU into a specific principle, or because of the specific interpretation of a certain value in the light of other values or principles, that then produces a new value (e.g. regulated liberalism/capitalism and ecological modernisation). The second relationship involves attempts to promote such new values to a universal status, an attempt which meets resistance from a variety of directions, and thus involve interpretation and advocacy in foreign policy.

Principles and practice – VIPs in action

Having discussed the specificity of the EU value interpretation and operating principles, we will now turn to reflect on the ways in which VIPs are put into practice in foreign policy, including some of the limitations on action. Here we will briefly discuss six of the most common ways in which VIPs shape the conduct of principled foreign policy actions, together with five of the most common limitations and problems associated with these actions.

Structural prevention – the case studies suggest that the EU places a premium on addressing the causes rather than the symptoms of problems, through structural foreign policy characterised by transformation rather than conservation. This strategy becomes apparent throughout the case studies, although appears particularly acute in Baker, Balfour, Lucarelli and Menotti's chapters on the environment, relations with near neighbours, and coercive intervention. Keukeleire has argued that structural foreign policy is a central feature of EU foreign policy, and within this book we have found several ways in which VIPs shape structural prevention in policy practice, including institutionalisation, regulation, multilateralism, partnership, and solidarity.

Institutionalisation – the case studies suggest that the EU slowly institutionalises principles through policies, treaties and legal arrangements. Thus we can notice the steady institutionalisation of policies, in particular through a variety of attempts at mainstreaming. Baker looks at sustainable development mainstreaming since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, while Peto and Manners discuss the role of gender mainstreaming, and Lucarelli and Menotti look at conflict prevention mainstreaming since the 2001 Gothenburg Council.

Regulation – the case studies illustrate the way in which the EU shows a particular faith in regulation. This emphasis on regulation within the EU leads to championing of international and global attempts to create and strengthen regulatory authorities. All the case studies examined the way in which EU treaties, conventions, and policy principles lead to different forms of regulation in foreign policy. Examples of such regulation include the way in which the introduction of regulations concerning human rights and democracy have led from Luxembourg 1970 to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000, and the impact this has had on foreign policy.

Multilateralism – the case studies also illustrate the way in which the EU's attempts at international regulation take the form of the creation and support of multilateral institutions. As discussed, the relevance of multilateralism for the EU had been reinforced in 2003 by Solana's 'European Security Strategy' and by the Commission's communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU's relations with the UN (Commission 2003e). In chapter nine Lucarelli and Menotti explored the way in which, in the post-2003 period, multilateralism has become a constitutive feature of the EU.

Partnership – the case studies also suggest that the EU tends to try to work in partnership with other actors, states, and institutions, in particular by emphasising political dialogue, constructive engagement and positive conditionality.

The EU seems particularly opposed to the use of sanctions and negative conditionality, although there are many examples of their use. Chapters eight and ten both encountered the way in which EU foreign policy tried to work in partnership with other parts of the world. Panebianco engaged with the trouble question of the EU's strategic partnership with Russia in chapter eight. In a different context Bonaglia, Goldstein and Petito considered the partnership agreements the EU has developed with the ACP countries as part of its development cooperation policy.

Solidarism – finally, the case studies show that the EU tends towards solidarist solutions with a focus on individuals, rather than pluralist claims of national/cultural exceptions, as discussed by Jørgensen in chapter three. Thus implementation is often bottom-up (focused on individual needs), rather than top-down (focused on governmental role). Such a solidarist approach usually entails working closely with civil society, NGOs, social movements and the 'social partners' both within and without the EU. In chapter seven Balfour examines the emphasis placed on the EU bottom-up approach to encouraging democracy, including support for local development and 'ownership'. Interestingly, Balfour juxtaposes the merits and tensions inherent in EU practices of a bottom-up approach to democracy assistance with a top-down approach to partnership and political dialogue.

Problems of inconsistency – alongside the common strategies of VIPs in foreign policy, are five problems encountered in policy actions, the first of which are the problems of inconsistency. The case studies suggest that there is a central tension in EU foreign policy between the need for consistency in the application of principles, and the need for pragmatism in dealing with different issues and actors. This tension manifests itself in a whole range of global relations where, on one hand, horizontal coordination and consistency demands one approach (i.e. negative conditionality), but where, on the other hand, constructive engagement and pragmatism demands another approach (i.e. positive conditionality). A further complicating tension exists between the EU foreign policy and the member states' foreign policies. This produces further inconsistencies, not only over time but also over cases (see double-standards). The EU's inconsistency is particularly denounced in the case of EU's democracy and human rights promotion policy, as both Balfour and Panebianco's chapters illustrated in this book.

Problems of double standards – these are frequently raised in the areas of democracy and human rights promotion, but are also relevant in the interpretation and relevance of international law. The construction of an EU international identity distinctively shaped by claims of normative power cannot afford to dismiss problems of inconsistent support and respect for international law. Any such inconsistencies, as sometimes seen in the debates over the use of force, undermine the normative power of EU foreign policy. For example, the EU has adopted two different positions in regard to armed interventions in Kosovo 1999 and Iraq 2003. In the first case, the intervention was considered acceptable and 'legitimate' because it was pursued in order to stop severe violations of human

rights, despite being illegal without UN authorisation. In the second case, intervention was considered unacceptable and illegal because it was without UN authorisation. This is a clear example of the most problematic aspect of a 'full spectrum' EU foreign policy and its acquisition of the use of force. As Lucarelli and Menotti explore in chapter nine on the use of force, there is a clear need for a VIPs-informed EU to clarify the relationship between structural foreign policy and humanitarian intervention if it is to develop its normative power in world politics.

Problems of efficacy – as Jørgensen (1998) has previously argued, measuring the success of EU FP is a highly complicated task, which is made more difficult by that observation that it is easy to see when it fails, but difficult to spot when it succeeds. It is precisely because the principled foreign policy valued by the EU has such high aspirations that questions regarding efficacy have been raised since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. As Manners interrogated in chapter two, the Constitution for Europe defined the Union's objectives as the promotion of peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples, as well as contributing to the greater good in the wider world. Could EU foreign policy ever be able to achieve these objectives? Clearly, valuing principles in foreign policy creates objectives which are both bold and open-ended in their aspirations, but could the EU ever be effective in achieving goals such as peace, the sustainable development of the earth, the eradication of poverty, or the promotion of human rights? Clearly these are some of the most important issues to be addressed in the 21st century, but the challenge for the EU is to demonstrate the relevance and efficacy of its principled foreign policy in ways which are satisfactory and credible in the overall creation of a European *polis*.

Problems of multilateralism and the value of solidarity – multilateralism has undoubtedly represented one of the pillars of the Cold War world order during which multilateral institutions such as the UN and Bretton Woods were created and developed (Ikenberry 1996). The end of the Cold War has not yet brought an end to multilateralism, but problems associated with the role of the US as benevolent leader and good transatlantic relations are threatening the continued success of multilateralism. As many of the chapters explored in this book, the crisis of US unilateralism and subsequent consequences for EU support of multilateralism covers almost the entire spectrum of EU foreign policy from the external consequences of internal policies (Walsh, Baker, Peto and Manners) to external actions in world politics (Lucarelli and Menotti, Bonaglia, Goldstein and Petito, van den Hoven). However, as van den Hoven argued in chapter eleven, the breakdown of the WTO negotiations in Cancun was caused not by the failure of multilateralism, but the success of EU-US bilateralism and their absence of solidarity with the rest of the world's agricultural exporters. Thus the problems of multilateralism in the post-Cold War world are clearly related to the changing value given to solidarity, and whether that solidarity is limited to the state, the union, the transatlantic, or the world.

Problems of structural prevention through democracy promotion – the idea of structurally preventing conflict through the spread of democracy is certainly not unique to

the European Union. In the post-Second World War period the Wilsonian tradition of American foreign policy led the USA to use democracy as a foreign policy pool (Chomsky 1992, Mead 2001). Similar to multilateralism, in the post-Cold War period the interpretation of this tradition on the two sides of the Atlantic has now dramatically diverged. This inevitably draws a dividing line between an EU and US understanding of the relationship between the two core values of peace and democracy and their interpretation into foreign policy. This became evident in chapters seven and eight where Balfour and Panebianco looked at the limits of EU's democracy promotion policy with its near and far neighbours. In the present global conditions of promoting security concerns over the values of democracy and human rights, the EU clearly needs the help of both its member states and the US in promoting sustainable peace through the democracy and human rights.

Foreign and self – VIPs in the integration process

The proposition of this article is that, as a working assumption, the European Union has an identifiable and coherent international identity that is not a synonym for 'foreign policy' or 'external relations'. . . . In defining the concept of international identity there is an interrelated requirement to explore how this international identity is both constructed and represented.

(Manners and Whitman 1998: 246)

We have so far considered the specificity and practices of VIPs in EU foreign policy, without reflecting on their impact on the EU itself. Drawing on the arguments of Manners and Whitman from the 1990s, it is clear that we need to understand how VIPs contribute to the integration process itself through constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union (see also Manners and Whitman 2003). Our analyses of the specificities and practices of VIPs in foreign policy suggest a close relationship between valuing principles in foreign policy and self-constructions of the EU polity. The theory and case study chapters seem to point to two processes at work in the construction of the international identity of the EU involving a self-learning process and an identity-construction process.

The European Union's self-learning process

The first aspect of VIPs in the integration process brought out by the chapters emphasise the self-learning process which the EU experiences in engaging in principled foreign policy. By this we mean that through attempting to innovate and conduct principled foreign policy, the EU institutions, members, and participants find themselves developing mutually-constitutive routines and practices, many of which may never have been intended. The chapters identified three types of self-learning processes linking together principles from different policy areas and arenas that we term externalising, transferring, and reconstituting.

Externalising principles involves a process in which principles that were developed in internal policy areas are applied in EU foreign actions in the related policy area. The chapters included many examples of externalising principles, but Baker's chapter five illustrates keenly the example of the preventative principle in the area of environmental protection. The principle was first spelt out in the Commission's first Environmental Action Programme of 1973-76; it was then introduced in the Treaties with the Single European Act, than mainstreamed with the Treaty on European Union together with sustainable development. The process of externalising principles involves self-learning because it is often unintended, has consequences for the EU polity as a whole, and involves different areas of the EU learning a little more about themselves.

Transferring principles involves a process in which principles that were developed in one policy area are applied in other policy areas, both internally and externally. As previously discussed under the practice of 'institutionalisation', the practice of mainstreaming involves transferring values and principles from the area and arena in which they were developed in order to spread them across the EU. As Baker, Peto and Manners, and Lucarelli and Menotti considered in this book, transferring policy areas through the mainstreaming of sustainable development, gender, and conflict prevention is a particularly contentious self-learning process as differing areas of EU policy are encouraged to confront prejudices in the process of learning a little more about the rest of the EU.

Reconstituting principles involves a process in which principles that were developed in response to a particular problem become far more important than was originally intended as concerns regarding inconsistency and double standards contribute to the reconstitution of other policy areas. For example the way in which the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement have come to reconstitute the EU's habitus and international identity. In instrumentalist terms this process where principles, even if enunciated in rhetorical terms, have the effect of changing policy in a range of areas have been thought about in terms of 'rhetorical action' (Schimmelfennig 2003). Similarly, the role which networks of transnational advocacy activists play in mobilising around policy principles, in order to bring about change in other areas or arenas has been thought about in terms of a 'boomerang effect' (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The case studies suggest that the process of reconstituting the EU through self-learning is less instrumental and more reflexive than rhetorical action and the boomerang effect advocate. On this basis we argue that values and principles have the effect of reconstituting the EU 'habitus' by changing the way in which socially acquired and embodied systems of cultural reproduction adapt to innovation and advocacy of values and principles in one area of policy making (see Bourdieu 1977).

Clearly the EU's self-learning process in constructing its international identity involve constant and complex interplay between externalising, transferring, and reconstituting processes at the interfaces of self and foreign. This is no more clearly illustrated than by the values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law which run through most of the chapters of the book. Left implicit in the early decades of the Community, they are only explicitly mentioned in reference

to the Federal Republic of Germany. During the era of détente, the Helsinki process, and enlargement from the 1970s onwards, these values become more explicit signifiers of the EC and its identity. With the end of the Cold War, these values have transgressed their original context to become both criteria for membership and conditions for aid, as Balfour, Panebianco, Bonaglia, Goldstein and Petitò explored. By the Amsterdam Treaty these values have come to reconstitute the EU and are constitutionalised as article 6 principles. This then leads to their pronouncement as the Union's values in article I-2 of the Constitution for Europe. Finally, as this book has explored, the processes of externalising, transferring, and reconstituting ensure that democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have become constitutive values of the EU's international identity in the 21st century.

EU foreign policy and identity

If values, principles, and self-learning processes influence EU foreign policy, so also do policy failures or omissions of policies feed back into EU self-perceptions and constructions. In the respect the EU's self-representation has been constantly challenged by perceived disagreements or failures of common foreign policy, most clearly with the conflicts in Yugoslavia 1991-95, and Iraq 2003. Conflicts and political crises such as these have probably done more to initiate public debate and awareness about the existence of a EU international identity, than have any attempts to cultivate common cultural roots (for examples, see Lucarelli 2000; and Levy, *et al.* 2005). As Lucarelli, Manners, and Jørgensen discussed in the theory chapters, the reason for this impact of EU foreign policy on its identity has to do with the peculiarities of the processes of identity building in the complex and evolving political system of the EU. As Lucarelli argued in chapter one, EU political identity is clearly a constructed phenomenon that does not need to rely on the recognition of common cultural roots. Indispensable elements of this phenomenon are the politics, policies and common historical experiences of the EU (Cerutti 2001a, 2001b, 2003).

The EU experiences legitimacy and credibility crises when the Union does not perform the foreign policy its citizens expect it to perform. In these cases, regardless of the complexity of the EU foreign policy decision-making system, any inaction which implies stepping back from the EU's proclaimed principles and values is often perceived as representing a challenge to the EU's identity. In adopting a post-nationalist perspective, we believe that there is a clear relationship between values and principles in the EU foreign policy on the one side, and the EU identity on the other. For this reason we would suggest that the two huge current challenges to the EU – connecting the Union to its citizens and developing its international presence – are deeply interlinked. The first aspect of this challenge involves constructing an EU polity that extends democratic accountability and legitimacy for its institutions – well beyond any populist or academic perceptions of a 'democratic deficit'. The second aspect is shaped by EU citizens' awareness of the EU as a political entity which involves their recognition

of a set of EU values and principles as being representative of themselves. Such awareness needs the interpretation of seemingly abstract values into more concrete principles of action and, ultimately, effective policies. As we have seen throughout the book, similar values can have very different interpretations into principles and ultimately policies, and it is only by looking at these interpretations that we fully understand the set of social and political values and principles that constitute the core of the EU identity.

Drawing these arguments over the processes of self-learning and identity construction together, we would suggest that VIPs play an important part in the integration process, but one that is undoubtedly constrained by the difficulties of connecting citizens and the public sphere together in an understanding of the EU polity itself. It is unfortunately the case that while the self-learning processes has resulted in a fairly agreed settlement on some core values and principles; these are largely outside the EU public sphere. Similarly, while high-profile problems of common EU policy capture the public attention in crises such as Yugoslavia or Iraq, there is rarely any recognition or understanding of why the EU polity is unable to deal with such disagreements between member governments. These combinations of EU-level processes, international crises, vacant public sphere, and absence of citizens' comprehension unfortunately ensures that while the EU may have an identifiable and coherent identity in world politics, it is probably one that is clearer to non-citizens (see Rifkin 2004) than EU citizens.

On reflection – what we have learned

We started our study by asking, like Chris Patten, 'do we have in Europe any remaining value-driven visions of the world?' and have begun to conclude, like John Hume and Bono, that the EU has principles and values but perhaps not one vision. Through the book we have seen many examples and illustrations of the way in which the EU values principles in its foreign policy, stretching from science, environment, and gender policies to conflict, development, and trade policies. On the basis of these contributions we argue that principled foreign policy is not simply the external actions of a consolidated polity, but in the case of the EU is part of constituting the political and international identity of the Union itself. On reflection, we suggest that there are a number of aspects to this political constitution which we need to think about, including rethinking EU foreign policy itself, identifying the specificities and practices of VIPs, the habitus of EU foreign policy, normativity and pragmatism, and the question of EU visions of the world. Furthermore, departing from this study, we can speculate about the exportability of the research model here employed.

Rethinking EU foreign policy itself is no longer a methodological choice but an analytical necessity. The idea that foreign policy analysis should be constrained to studying the traditional role of member states, with an emphasis on executive actions and sharp distinction between internal and external policies is rendered obsolete in the study of EU foreign policy (see a similar discussion of

member state foreign policy in Manners and Whitman 2000). As recent works on EU foreign policy concur, the study of the EU in world politics must go beyond the simple study of CFSP, ESDP, and external relations (see H. Smith 2002; K. Smith 2003; Carlsnaes, *et al.* 2004; Bretherton and Vogler 2005; Elgström and Smith 2006). At the same time, also the traditional distinction between EU foreign/external relations experts and EU public policy experts should be overcome. As we have shown, EU foreign policy cannot be understood without reference to both the EU integration process and EU public policies, both due to the externalisation and transferral of values and principles from domestic to foreign sectors and across time, and because of the close, reconstitutive relationship between the process of identity building within the EU and its international role.

Our analysis of this rethought EU foreign policy has argued that a number of values are shared with other international actors, but have a particular interpretation and translation into principles and policies. This translation helps us better understand the character of the EU and the relationships between its foreign policy and the process of European integration. In this way we believe we can shed more light on the relationship between the EU as a process and as an actor in order to make sense of the links between process and actorness. This linkage is particularly important in the study of EU foreign policy because, as we have discussed, the co-constitution of self and foreign in the integration process is not shared with many other polities.

In developing these linkages between values, principles and policies, as well as between process and actorness, we have argued that VIPs are important in our understanding of the habitus of EU foreign policy. In this respect we have suggested that there are tensions between VIPs and the way they are put into practice, such as problems of inconsistency, double standards, and efficacy, all of which are part of challenging the existing socio-political system of dispositions regarding the 'ethicacy' and efficacy of discrete foreign policy actions. Secondly, we have also suggested that values and principles discretely developed in one policy area often externalise, transfer or reconstitute themselves into other area or arena. It is this combination of both critical reflection on the problems of practice and translation from one area or arena to another that contributes to a more reflexive EU (see Bourdieu 1990).

Encouraging the construction of a more reflexive EU habitus will not necessarily lead to any simple resolution of tensions between normativity and pragmatism in EU foreign policy. As most of the case studies illustrated, there are always tremendous normative difficulties involved in attempting to engage in principled foreign policy, as EU relations with Bosnia, Kosovo, the near neighbours, Russia and China make clear. However, as Jørgensen argued in chapter three such tensions should not cause us to continue any detour away from the study of VIPs. Indeed, as Balfour picks up in chapter seven, the EU seems to show a strong tendency towards a 'flexible adherence to principles', as scholars such as Jack Donnelly and Chris Brown advocate. We argue that simply because the EU may be starting from a poor position in international relations, this

should never stop it from trying to head towards a better direction – that it should profess normative values and practice pragmatic principles.

We should also reflect on the question of EU visions and images of the world, be they plural and contradictory. As Jørgensen discussed in chapter three, there are many images of the world held in international relations generally, so we should not be surprised if the EU reflected this plurality of perspectives. In chapter two Manners argued that EU images of itself were also plural and were to be found somewhere in between a Europe of states, a European state, and Europe as a participant in the state of humanity. It is this continuing disagreement and confusion over what the EU itself is that leads to a lack of consistency and continuity of the activities it carries out – national, supranational, and international policy practices continue to co-exist. As we have discussed above, this plurality of images and visions seems broadly transformative in combining Kant's three articles of peace with a series of values that seek to strike a balance between individualist liberal democracy and collectivist social democracy. Hence, EU images of the world seek to accommodate a world of democratic states, a European supranational federation, and global cosmopolitan law, with all the contradictions which this sometimes involves, ranging from communitarian particularisms to cosmopolitan universalisms. We do not consider this absence of one, overarching EU vision or image of the world to be a bad thing *per se* – if Europeans have learnt anything during the last 100 years of brutal history, it must be that any totalising vision, ideology, or metanarrative is inherently dangerous. However, we believe that the failure on the side of political elites to shape a *public-political discourse* around different, even competing, visions of EU/Europe is highly problematic. The current political debate on the EU presents elements of competing visions (e.g. liberal EU vs social EU) which however fail to produce alternative political programmes around which public debate could be articulated. Such a failure allows for national public debates to prevail on a genuine European one, slowing down the development of a European public sphere and inhibiting progress in the integration process, as the 2005 referenda on the approval of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands have shown.

Finally, we conclude with a reflection on what we have learned from this study as far as general research on foreign policy is concerned: is the research framework applicable to other cases? What are the lessons with which other studies could start working? We believe that studying VIPs in the foreign policy of other relevant international actors such as the China, India, the US, Japan, or Iran would not just be possible but highly necessary in that it would contribute to providing content to a lively debate on clashes among values and cultures which so far has not been substantiated by close analytical scrutiny. There are at least three lessons from which such studies could start.

The first lesson is the importance of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy not only in the rationalistic sense of the formation of interests in a two-level game, but also in the sense of looking at the dynamic interrelationship between a political community and the external world, with the aim of investigating the

degree of mutual influence. The second lesson is the observation that in the relationships between values, political identity and politics, values do not count much in isolation from the normative framework in which they are embedded, rather they assume meaning, give sense to the political identity of the members of the community, and finally influence policy on the basis of how they stand in relation to other values and principles of the normative framework in which they are embedded. Most frequently, what differentiates political communities is not a list of values, but the relationship that a political community construct among these values, their hierarchical order, and their peculiar translation into guiding principles. Finally, the last lesson concerns the framework in which a specific translation takes place. Such a context is highly influenced by historical experiences but also by the cultural identity of the community of reference. Cultural identity is a relevant element of foreign and international policy, but in order to understand the way it operates it is indispensable to analyse its impact on the political identity of the group, through its influence on values interpretation and translation into political practices.