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The European Union’s normative strategy for sustainable peace

Ian Manners

1. Introduction

‘[W]e wish to develop the potential of the EU as a peace project. (...) [M]ajor war is not the primary threat. Instead, a new threat, springing from domestic conditions, has emerged. Social, economic and cultural insecurity are a breeding ground for ethnic and religious conflicts, organized crime and undemocratic behaviour (...). In our view, the new situation demands a new approach to security. Increasingly, the need is to prevent conflicts from breaking out and to create the conditions for sustainable peace and security by democratic, political and economic means. But it will also be necessary, where conflicts break out and acute crises arise nevertheless, to send in peacekeeping forces’ (Hjelm-Wallen/Halonen 1996).

The international community is faced with far more than protracted wars and violent life-threatening conflicts, as the extract from the joint 1996 letter of the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers suggests. The social, economic and cultural insecurities identified by Lena Hjelm-Wallen and Tarja Halonen ten years ago have become the conflicts of our era. Their call for ‘sustainable peace’, addressing both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict, must be at the heart of any strategy for peace in the post-Cold War era (Peck 1998; Adedeji 1999). The fifth anniversary of the German Foundation for Peace Research provides an excellent opportunity to reflect on the European Union’s strategy for peace in the context of the dreadful events in New York, Bali, Madrid, London, and beyond. This is particularly true as the post-9/11 agenda of ‘total war on terror’ often appears to have obscured strategies for sustainable peace – the military means of intervention and peacekeeping seem to have overwhelmed the civilian means of human security (Manners 2006c).

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In my contribution I will focus on the role of EU member states and the EU itself in a strategy for peace. I shall argue that since 1950 the European Community, now Union has increasingly served as a normative power in the pursuit of world peace, primarily by pacifying relations between its member states. However, I shall also argue that EU policies beyond Europe, and since 1995 within Europe, have been part of a normative strategy for sustainable peace. By sustainable peace I mean resolving both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict in ways that guarantee, rather than enforce peace. As I shall explore throughout my contribution, the normative principle of sustainable peace should be considered the ‘prime norm’ in the EU, although the EU has historically been far more focused on structural issues of human security than peacekeeping.

To do this, I shall explore the EU as a normative power by considering three differing understandings of the word normative – ‘standard’, ‘should’, and ‘good’. First, as a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance, the EU exists as a differing ‘standard’ which transcends Westphalian norms. Here I shall look at the EU as a normative standard in world peace, and the extent to which this standard is shared with others around the world. Second, it is most important that we encourage discussion of the creative efforts the EU ‘should’ make in seeking to safeguard world peace. Here I will suggest that the EU embodies nine normative principles which should inform its relations with the world. Third, the extent to which the EU acts in an increasingly inclusive, reflexive, and cosmopolitical way as a ‘force for good’ in international relations is also crucial. Here I consider the EU as a force for common good using Dieter Senghaas’s ‘civilizational hexagon’ model of conflict analysis to understand the spread of sustainable peace conditions (Senghaas 1994, 2006). Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the way in which the EU’s differing existence (‘standard’), creative efforts (‘should’), and progressive actions (‘good’) are and should be part of a strategy for sustainable peace based on acknowledging our sharing of the world I call ‘European communion’.
2. Normative standard

‘The enlargement of the European Union will have far-reaching consequences. We all hope that a larger union will also be a stronger union that will make an even more decisive contribution to global progress and stability. That contribution will be badly needed because in this century, so many of the threats to our peace and security are global – from international terrorism (…) to (…) climate change (…). [T]he EU is a beacon of hope for peace and reconciliation, not only for Europe, but for the whole world’ (Annan 2003: 19).

My first understanding of ‘normative’ is the idea of a ‘standard’ of human conduct. In this respect it might be argued, as Kofi Annan has done, that the EU represents a ‘beacon of hope for peace and reconciliation’. Invoking the EU as a normative standard suggests the importance of ‘virtue ethics’ in world politics (Foot 1978). Here I shall look at five different areas of normative standards based on economics, society, environment, conflict, and politics. As part of this comparison, I shall rely on previous comparative aggregate data from the EU 25 states, weighted by population, with the ten most populous countries in the world (plus Canada, Australia and New Zealand). The obvious difficulties of differentiating between supposed Western standards and those of the EU make this a difficult task. The countries of the developed world, in particular members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), share far more than they disagree on. Despite this, I believe it is possible to identify normative standards that differentiate the EU from countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (see Lucarelli/Manners 2006).

2.1 Economic standard

EU economic standards are generally characterized by reference to ‘solidarity’ – the belief in a social market economy characterized by income redistribution, government intervention, and stakeholder capitalism (Hutton 2002: 343). Many observers argue that the European economy is focused on ‘socially-regulated economic governance’ (Burgoon 2001: 62). This European capitalism is built on ‘a sounder foundation of social acceptability (…) [in which] income transfers and guarantees of European social security systems can be defended as a politically necessary insurance against discontent and social instability’ (Strange 1998: 111f). European economic solidarity involves government intervention and expenditure, rather than simple regulation. It also involves a commitment to tackling economic inequalities, including those caused by regional disparities and structural economic change.
The analysis of comparative data suggests that average levels of economic solidarity, measured in terms of inequality and poverty, reflect this European social market economy (Lucarelli/Manners 2006). While average GDP per capita in the EU remains among the highest in the world (with Luxembourg having the highest), this data suggests that European economic solidarity is reflected in relatively low levels of inequality and poverty. Among the developed world, average EU inequality is higher than that of Japan and Canada, but lower than the US, New Zealand, and Australia. In comparison, average EU relative poverty levels are the lowest in the developed world. I argue that members of the EU share a socially-constituted economic standard – they relate their high levels of development to the achievement of economic solidarity; they value their low levels of inequality because they believe them integral to their high levels of development; and as a result they cherish the lowest relative poverty levels in the developed world. This sharing of beliefs about development, equality and relative wealth contributes to the EU seeming fairly different to much of the world.

2.2 Social standard

EU social standards are also characterized by reference to ‘solidarity’ – the belief in a European social model encompassing social legislation, social welfare and social infrastructure investment. Although most authors agree that there is no one ‘European social model’, there is a strong argument that high levels of spending, broad social programs and considerable employment protection are found across Europe (Gough 1998: 90; Kleinman 2002: 57f). In addition, ‘a solidaristic wage policy’, ‘detailed social security provisions’, and ‘good social investment in human and social infrastructure capital’ are all seen to be part of these European social models (CMLR 1993: 445; Gough 1998: 90; Schulten 2002: 173). European social standards are located in ‘a certain normative core of social liberalism [which] still provides a formative background for social solidarity’ (Habermas 2003a: 10). These observations lead to the argument that ‘social legislation is one of the few fields in which Europe is a real world leader’ (CMLR 1993: 445).

The analysis of comparative data suggests that average levels of social solidarity, measured in terms of percentage of GDP spent by the government on education, health and the public sector, reflect this European social welfare commitment (Lucarelli/Manners 2006). This data suggests that average EU public expenditure on social welfare is the highest in the world. European social solidarity is reflected in high levels of public-sector education, health, and welfare provision. Among the developed world,
average EU public expenditure on education and health is below that of New Zealand, Canada, and the US, and broadly comparable to that of Australia and Japan. I argue that members of the EU share a socially-constituted social standard – they believe in high levels of public sector expenditure because of the importance they give to social solidarity; they value some of the most extensive public education and health systems in the world (shared with other industrialized countries) because they deem them integral to their commitment to social solidarity and development; and as a result they cherish some of the highest literacy rates and longest life expectancies in the world (UNHDR 2004: 139). This sharing of beliefs about education, health and social welfare contributes to the EU seeming noticeably different to much of the world.

2.3 Environmental standard

EU environmental standards are characterized by a commitment to a more ‘sustainable development’ – an attempt to reconcile economic growth with protection of the environment in both the short and long term (Baker 1997: 91). European environmental sustainability includes the mainstreaming of environmental issues into economic, development, and social policies, as well as legal commitments to the ‘precautionary principle’ (Baker 1997; Bäckstrand 2001; Usui 2003). Such progressive legalization has extended to including environmental protection in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as extraterritorial environmental measures by the EC (Desgagné 1995; Hedemann-Robinson 2000).

The analysis of comparative data suggests that average levels of environmental sustainability, measured in terms of GDP per unit of energy use, ecological footprint, and CO₂ emissions, reflect this European commitment to sustainable development (Lucarelli/Manners 2006). This data suggests that average EU levels of energy use are among the more efficient in the world. Amongst the ten largest countries in the world Bangladesh, Brazil and Japan have higher levels of GDP per unit of energy use. As expected, the average EU ecological footprint and CO₂ emissions are higher than those of the developing world, but are lower than those of the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the emissions of Russia. I argue that EU members share socially-constituted environmental standards – they value more efficient levels of energy use because of their history of industrialization and urbanization; they believe in lowering their ecological impact and CO₂ emissions because this is integral to their ideas about achieving more sustain-
able lifestyles in densely populated Europe. This sharing of beliefs about energy use of sustainability, together with relative ecological impact and CO₂ emissions, contributes to the EU seeming sustainably different to much of the world.

2.4 Conflict standard

EU conflict standards are characterized by a commitment to a more ‘sustainable peace’ – resolving both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict (Manners 2006a). European sustainable peace involves addressing the structural causes of conflict through extensive development aid policies and support for bottom-up, local development programs that tackled the roots of inequality such as health, education, and infrastructure. In contrast, European states also contribute significant amounts of resources to military research, technology and forces, in particular through participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This uneasy compromise between peaceful development policies and interventionist military capabilities is further complicated through long standing European participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. This compromise has been demonstrated in the complexities of the three most visible military interventions involving European forces in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

The analysis of comparative data suggests that average levels of military expenditure and UN peacekeeping forces reflect this European commitment to sustainable peace (Lucarelli and Manners 2006). This data suggests that the average EU military expenditure is above that of most of the world, but significantly below that of the five militarised states of Pakistan, Russia, the USA, China, and India. The average contributions by EU member states to UN peacekeeping operations is significantly smaller than those of Nigeria, Bangladesh, Australia, and Pakistan, but greater than those of most of the developing world, in particular the insignificant contributions of China and the USA. Once more, I argue that EU members share socially-constituted conflict standards – they believe in contributing to extensive development aid programs and maintaining relatively high levels of military preparedness at the same time because of historical experiences of addressing the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict; they value participating in UN peacekeeping missions as integral to their internationalist commitment. This sharing of beliefs about contributions, capabilities, and commitments contributes to the EU seeming principally different to much of the world.
EU political standards are characterized by ‘cosmopolitical supranationality’ – the belief in multilayered politics shaped by a vibrant international civil society, more equal rights for women, the pooling of sovereignty, and supranational law. European cosmopolitical supranationality involves the recognition that domestic politics and international politics are deeply interdependent. It also reflects the post-war birth of cosmopolitan Europe as a reaction to the modern Europe of nation-states (Beck 2003; Habermas 2003a). The pooling of sovereignty within Europe has made all European states, and especially EU members, far more accepting of post-national politics in the 21st Century (Rabkin 2000; Ward 2003). The cosmopolitical perspective reflects this interplay between the solidarist activities of civil groups and the supranational legal structures above the state, or as Pascal Lamy put it, ‘the notion of cosmopolitics describes a new world that is coming into being (...). More generally, cosmopolitics may simply be about thinking globally and acting locally’ (Lamy 2004: 13, 20; see also Cheah/Robbins 1998; Archibugi 2003).

The analysis of comparative data suggests that average levels of cosmopolitical supranationality, measured in terms of density of international civil society, the empowerment of women and participation in cosmopolitan international law reflect these European political perspectives (Lucarelli/Manners 2006). This data illustrates the way in which average EU cosmopolitical activity is among the highest in the world. The average density of European international civil society is greater than most of the world, with only Australia, Canada and New Zealand close. The average level of women’s representation is higher in Australia, New Zealand and Canada than in the EU, although eight EU states have higher averages than Australia and New Zealand (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Spain). The average number of significant international laws ratified by EU member states is the highest in the world, with only New Zealand, Australia, and Brazil relatively close. I argue that members of the EU share socially-constituted political standards – they enjoy dense and active international civil societies partially because of their relatively internationalised public spheres; they value higher levels of women’s representation integral to their higher levels of development (particularly in Northern Europe); and they believe in actively participating in cosmopolitan international law in ways which make the EU seem significantly different to much of the world.
This combination of five normative standards socially constitute the appeal that EU normative standards are said to represent in world politics. It is important to note that statistical data proves nothing but might illustrate something. Figure 2 illustrates how these EU normative standards could be represented as a five-pointed star.

Figure 2: EU normative standards

3. Normative should

‘[I]t is now clear that European Union is the best example in the history of the world of conflict resolution and it is the duty of everyone, particularly those who live in areas of conflict to study how it was done and to apply its principles to their own conflict resolution’ (Hume 1998).

My second understanding of ‘normative’ is as a guide for what ‘should’ be done in human conduct. As Nobel Peace Prize laureate John Hume has suggested, the normative principles of the EU provide a guide or example of what should be done in conflict resolution. In contrast to the virtue ethics of normative standards, invoking the normative principles of the EU suggests the importance of Immanuel Kant’s ‘deontological ethics’ (moral duties) in the study of world politics (O’Neill 1990). Here I shall look at nine normative principles that should guide the EU in world politics.
3.1 Sustainable peace

The prime EU normative principle is peace – Robert Schuman’s opening words on 9 May 1950 provided the historical raison d’être for European integration; ‘world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’. Reiterated again in the preambles of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), and the Treaty on European Union, article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe was to establish peace as the EU’s primary objective: ‘1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is sustainable peace (see Manners 2006a). As discussed under EU conflict standards above, the EU approach to conflict prevention emphasizes addressing the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war ‘becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. The EU policy emphasis is placed on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue, and enlargement as part of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. However, the EU’s growing civil and military operational capacity also has a sustainable peace mission with its focus on ‘peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (article I-41, Constitution for Europe).

3.2 Social freedom

The second EU normative principle is freedom – liberty within a social context. Liberty, similar to the principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights, was codified as founding principles by the revised article 6 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union after the Amsterdam summit in 1997. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted at the Nice European Council in December 2000, and incorporated into the Constitution for Europe develops the EU understanding of liberty. Title II of the Charter sets out 19 freedoms, starting with article II-6: ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is social freedom. Liberty within the EU operates within a distinctive socio-legal context. Thus, liberty is always just one of several rights held alongside other, equally important, principles such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. Therefore, within the EU social freedom is circumscribed by
the need to ensure that other normative principles are not compromised by unwarranted freedoms, such as anti-social behavior, hate crimes, inflammatory speech, and pornography. The wider implications of EU social freedom are significant, not least in references to ‘protection of children’s rights’ as a foreign policy objective, as EU extraterritorial legislation on ‘sex tourism’ illustrates.

3.3 Consensual democracy

The third EU normative principle is democracy – the promotion of a particular form, organization and philosophy of political life. The participation and requirements of democracy have been a constitutive principle of the EU since its birth, with Schuman arguing in the French National Assembly in 1948 that ‘we intend to prepare for its [Germany’s] admission to a peaceful, democratic organization of European nations’. Thus, from the inception of the ECSC and ECs until 1970, democracy was the membership condition of the EC. This principle was clarified in the 1970 Luxembourg Report which stated that a ‘united Europe (…) must assemble democratic states with freely elected parliaments’. Following the end of the Cold War and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe, the EU was far more explicit in the promotion and requirements of democracy for membership (Copenhagen Criteria 1993), for development aid (Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development 1991; conditionality clauses 1995), and in its foreign policy provisions.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is consensual democracy. Consensual democracy is the operating principle within the majority of EU member states and includes proportional representation electoral systems, coalition governments, and power sharing among parties. Similarly, the EU itself is a consensual form of polity, with PR and power sharing in the European Parliament, non-majoritarian voting in the Council (either Qualified Majority Voting or unanimity), and power sharing amongst all the member states. The EU has helped to spread consensual democracy into Central and Eastern Europe as part of the transition and accession processes.

3.4 Associative human rights

The fourth EU normative principle is human rights – one of the most visible and promoted norms of the post-Cold War era. Alongside democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights was made explicit in the December
1973 Copenhagen Declaration on ‘European Identity’ (Manners/Whitman 1998: 236). Within Europe, human rights law had been progressively developed through the European Convention on Human Rights, and the interpretations of the European Court of Justice during the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the 1977 joint declaration recognising human rights as general principles of law. The 1980s saw the European Parliament being particularly proactive in advocating human rights, while the renegotiations of the Lomé Conventions provided the first examples of human rights promotion, finally enshrined in the 1989 Lomé IV Convention. By the 1990s, similar to democracy, human rights were given prominence in the Treaty on European Union (first through article F, then article 6) and are now promoted through conditionality clauses in enlargement and development policies.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is associative human rights. Associative human rights include both individual human rights and collective human rights. These are associative because they emphasize the interdependence between individual rights such as freedom of expression and collective rights such as the right of association. The associative nature of EU human rights has developed since 1973 through the 1986 Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the Community on Human Rights and the 1991 Resolution of the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development. All of these documents emphasize the universality and indivisibility of these associative human rights with consensual democracy, supranational rule of law, and social solidarity (see also article III-292, External Action general provision, Constitution for Europe).

3.5 Supranational rule of law

The fifth EU normative principle is the rule of law – the political foundations provided by just legal systems and equal protection for all. The rule of law is seen to be essential for ensuring the stability and success of the other liberal-democratic principles of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Hence, these four principles are to be found promoted in through development aid, CFSP, and the Copenhagen membership criteria, amongst others. The Constitution for Europe sought to ensure that the rule of law continued to be promoted in external action and international relations, but with additional references to ‘the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (article I-4).

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is supranational rule of law. As suggested under EU political standards above, the
EU principle of the rule of law is supranational in three senses – communitarian, international, and cosmopolitan. First, the EU principle of communitarian law promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the *acquis communautaire* – the supranational rule of law within the EU. Second, the EU principle of international law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational law above and beyond the EU (Manners/Whitman 2003: 399). Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals (Manners 2002: 241).

### 3.6 Inclusive equality

The sixth EU normative principle is equality – the legal prohibition of discrimination together with proactive policies to promote equality. Equality has recently become one of the most promoted constitutive principles discussed here, moving from a relatively narrow focus on preventing discrimination based on nationality to the far broader and prominent value of equality in article I-2 of the Constitution for Europe. In the 1990s, the focus of equality expanded beyond nationality to include equality between men and women (TEC article 2), protection of minorities (Copenhagen Criteria), and ‘action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ (TEC article 13).

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is a more inclusive, open ended and uninhibited understanding of which groups are particularly subject to discrimination. Hence, the Constitution for Europe included references to the prohibition of discrimination ‘based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’ in article II-81 (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, emphasis added). One weakness with the implementation of this principle is the extent to which discrimination based on nationality is still widespread in a majority of member states. This is particularly true of employment practices in consensual societies that promote homosociality (Roper 1996).

### 3.7 Social solidarity

The seventh EU normative principle is solidarity – the promotion of the social economy, the social partnership, and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the developing world. Alongside the principles of demo-
cracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, social solidarity has been emphasized as a value in the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration, 1986 Foreign Ministers Declaration, 1991 Council Resolution, 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, and the Constitution for Europe. The Charter of Fundamental Rights makes these principles explicit with its Title IV on solidarity, including workers’ rights, family, health and social security rights.

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle is social solidarity. The extensive understanding of social solidarity became clear as the objectives of article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe referred to ‘balanced economic growth, [and] a social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’, combating ‘social exclusion’, as well as promoting ‘social justice and protection’, inter-generational solidarity, and social solidarity among (and between) member states. The principle of social solidarity goes beyond inner-EU relations to inform and shape EU development and trade policies as article I-3 also illustrates when it refers to the Union’s contribution to ‘solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty’.

3.8 Sustainable development

The eighth EU normative principle is sustainable development – a commitment to ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland 1987: 5). This commitment, and the difficulties of reconciling economic and environmental interests, has evolved slowly since the initial 1972 declaration by heads of member states on Europe’s environment (Baker 1997: 92). The December 1988 Declaration on the Environment, the June 1990 Declaration on the Environmental Imperative, and the Treaty on European Union all contributed to the codification of the value of sustainable development in the Fifth Action Program on the Environment and Sustainable Development (Manners 2000a: 77).

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle involves an emphasis on the duel problems of balance and integration. The EU principle of sustainable development is intended to provide a balance between uninhibited economic growth and biocentric ecological crisis: ‘it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development’ (preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and ‘shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth’ (article I-3 of the Constitution for Europe). In parallel, the principle also involves the integration, or mainstreaming, of sustainable development into the policies and activities of the
Union (articles II-97 and III-119 of the Constitution for Europe). The EU seeks to promote these principles of sustainable development beyond Europe through its enlargement, development, trade, environmental and foreign policies (articles I-3 and III-292 of the Constitution for Europe).

3.9 Good governance

The ninth EU normative principle is good governance – the provision of open, participatory and democratic governance without creating hierarchical, exclusionary and centralized government. Good governance is the most recent principle to develop within the EU, specifically reflecting its external promotion through enlargement and development policies, and the concerns of internal accountability and democracy within the EU. The value has its origins in the dual concerns for encouraging stable institutions through the accession process (1993 Copenhagen Criteria) and the international spread of human rights, democracy and development through good governance (1991 Council Resolution).

The particular EU interpretation of this normative principle emphasizes quality, representation, participation, social partnership, transparency and accountability in ‘the democratic life of the Union’ (Constitution for Europe). The EU principle of good governance has two distinctive elements that have both significant internal and external consequences – the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Since the Commission Presidency of Romano Prodi, 1999–2004, significant emphasis has been placed on the promotion of good governance through the participation of civil society in order to encourage openness and transparency, as well as to facilitate democratic participation (articles I-47 and I-50 of the Constitution for Europe). In parallel, the unilateral invasion of Iraq has ensured that member states have strengthened their commitments to the promotion of ‘an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ (article III-292 of the Constitution for Europe).

The complex interaction of these nine normative principles that should guide the EU’s actions in world politics can be represented in figure 3.
4. Normative good

‘The European Union has immense potential. It has considerable resources. It includes some of the world’s most experienced and progressive development partners. It benefits from a wealth of knowledge, expertise and ideas. And it manages a range of political and economic policies with a tremendous impact on developing countries. I am primarily thinking here about the Union’s trade, agricultural and foreign policies. By bringing all this together, the European Union could be a tremendous force for good and for global development’ (Short 2003).

My third understanding of ‘normative’ is as a means of judging the ‘good’ in human conduct. Clare Short, former British Secretary of State for Development, has argued that the EU could be a tremendous force for good in global development. Unlike virtue or deontological ethics, invoking the normative force of the EU suggests the importance of consequentialism ethics in the study of world politics (Anscombe 1958). Here I consider the EU as a force for common good using Dieter Senghaas’s ‘civilizational hexagon’ model of
conflict analysis to understand the spread of sustainable peace conditions (Senghaas 1994: 2006). However, whereas Senghaas’s model was developed for resolving conflict within states, I will take the step of applying the model to the EU and its member states. Senghaas’s hexagon model has six ‘cornerstones’ which together provide conditions for the peaceful regulation of conflict and the diffusion of common good in world politics (see Senghaas 2006: 4f; Zürn 2000: 21ff).

The legitimate monopoly of force within a community, whether national, international, or transnational, is ‘of paramount importance for any modern peace-order’ (Senghaas 2006: 4). As discussed above, the EU normative principle of sustainable peace is the prime norm of the post-1950 European peace order where ‘conflicts over identity and interests [occur] through argument rather than violence’ (Senghaas 2006: 4). Within this peace-order, conflict and force between member states is unthinkable and illegitimate. Even the use of force outside of the Union is often subject to the legitimizing institutions of the UN, NATO, or the EU.

The rule of law ensures that the monopoly of force does not become ‘the arbitrary behavior of dictatorial rule’ (Senghaas 2006: 4). As discussed, the EU normative principle of supranational rule of law is a core norm in ensuring that ‘the rules of the game’ for the shaping of opinion and the political will, as well as for the decision-making process and the enforcement of law’ (Senghaas 2006: 4) in the EU is embedded in legitimizing institutions beyond the member state.

The ‘range and wealth of [the] many interdependencies characterising modern societies’ can ‘lead to a fragmentation of conflict’ and more ‘peaceful social relations’ (Senghaas 2006: 4f). The core EU normative principle of social freedom contributes to the changing interdependencies of European societies which, if socially moderated, should ameliorate some of the potentially negative consequences of ‘complex environments such as modernising and modern societies’ (Senghaas 2006: 4f).

Democratic participation ‘is not a luxury but a necessary precondition for the peaceful resolution of conflicts’ (Senghaas 2006: 5). The core EU normative principle of consensual democracy contributes to ensuring a wider public engagement for minority groups, helping to escape discrimination and violence associated with the tyranny of the majority (Senghaas 2006: 5). At the EU level democratic participation occurs for and with the people, while member states are responsible for democracy by and of the people (Schmidt 2004).

‘Continual efforts to ensure social justice’ are crucial to ensure that modern capitalist societies do not develop ‘deep social fissures’ (Senghaas 2006: 5). The EU normative principle of social solidarity is therefore im-
important in ‘efforts to achieve social justice and fairness [which] give substance to constructive conflict management’ (Senghaas 2006: 5).

Building on these five cornerstones of peace, law, interdependence, democracy, and social justice, is the final point on the hexagon of constructive conflict management (Senghaas 2006: 5). A culture of constructive conflict management based on compromise and tolerance is at the heart of the EU’s normative power to promote conciliation over the causes of conflict (Manners/Whitman 2003: 390). The importance of conciliation to constructive conflict management will now lead me to conclude that the application of Senghaas’s model requires a final step – the acknowledgement of our sharing of the world I call ‘European communion’. Based on Senghaas, this hexagon of factors shaping EU normative good in world politics can be represented in figure 4.

Figure 4: Civilizational hexagon

![Civilizational hexagon diagram]

Source: Senghaas 2006: 6
5. European communion

‘A bellicose past once entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts. They drew a conclusion from that military and spiritual mobilization against one another: the imperative for developing new, supranational forms of cooperation after the Second World War. The successful history of the European Union may have confirmed Europeans in their belief that the domestication of state power demands a mutual limitation of sovereignty, on the global as well as the national-state level’ (Hjelm-Wallen/Halonen 1996).

The EU’s normative strategy for sustainable peace involves interrogating how the EU and its member states promote normative policies that go beyond the short term, and into the sustainable. In particular the potential appeal of EU normative standards; the possibility of a new form of EU normative power as a guide to what should be done in conflict resolution; and the normative force for common good the EU can be, based on Senghaas’s hexagonal model. This normative appeal, new normative power, and progressive force for common good are and should be based on acknowledging that the EU shares the world with others – a crucial sharing constitutive of EU normative power I call ‘European communion’. As the opening quote from Hjelm-Wallen and Halonen suggests, supranational forms of cooperation, the domestication of state power, and the mutual limitation of sovereignty are beliefs shared with the ‘global level’, in a process I call ‘communion’ (sharing). For me, what is important about the European communion is that it is not merely a con/federation of European states, but that it is a tripartite sharing of Europe and the world.

Thus I conclude by suggesting that the EU normative strategy for sustainable peace involves a recognition of a European communion of three shared political communities/union (hence ‘comm-union’). These sharing processes can be located in political theory by drawing on cosmopolitan and communitarian theories (Manners 2006b). Hence, cosmopolitan political theory, as interpreted through the work of Rawls, Held, and Linklater, suggests that the EU’s external actions will be shaped by concerns for humanity as a whole, or individual human rights. In contrast, communitarian political theory, as interpreted through the work of Walzer and Frost, suggests that the EU’s external actions will be shaped by the concerns of European political communities. In this respect communitarian theory makes two suggestions regarding the EU’s external actions, one supranational, and the other intergovernmental. Firstly, supranational communitarian theory suggests that the EU’s external actions will be shaped by the concerns of the EU as a whole (the ‘European community’). Secondly, intergovernmental
communitarian theory suggests that the EU’s external actions will be shaped by consensus-seeking amongst the governments of the member state communities. This tripartite distinction between state, supranational, and cosmopolitical communities/union can be illustrated thus:

Figure 5: European communion

Reference


