Normative Power Europe
A Transdisciplinary Approach to European Studies
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As this book illustrates, the field of European studies is constituted by the need to constantly rethink how best to study contemporary Europe and the transformations which characterize it. European studies is, as Craig Calhoun neatly surmised, ‘always already there and still in formation’ (Calhoun, 2003a; see also Lindström, 2002; Manners, 2003; Rumford and Murray, 2003a, 2003b; Wallace, 2000; Warleigh, 2004). From my perspective, the field of European studies has been one largely defined by three analytical features. First, it primarily consists of multidisciplinary perspectives on Europe, including language and literature, history, politics, economics, law, geography, sociology, cultural studies, and more (for examples, see Sakwa and Stevens, 2000, or Gowland et al., 2006). Second, the field consists of interdisciplinary foci on Europe as a place, space, and idea (for examples, see Kofman et al., 2000; or Griffin and Braidotti, 2002). And finally a relative absence of transdisciplinary methods for examining Europe (for exceptions, see Passerini, 1998, or Guisan, 2003).

While a discipline can be a community of expertise which considers itself a comparatively self-contained, teachable and knowable domain; ‘multidisciplinary study involves employing two or more disciplines, in juxtaposition’ (Ellis, 2003). In this respect, multidisciplinary research involves scholars working in a fairly ‘self-contained manner’ while coming together to work on a shared problem (Denemark, 1999: 53; Lawrence and Deprés, 2004: 400). In contrast, interdisciplinary study goes beyond (multi) disciplinary comparison towards a more interactive and integrative approach between different disciplines.

Transdisciplinary scholarship is even more demanding, involving research and study around ‘complex heterogeneous domains’ in order to address complex phenomena (Denemark, 1999: 53; Lawrence and Deprés, 2004: 400). But whereas multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary work involves comparison of many perspectives, or cooperation between differing perspectives, transdisciplinary research is like standing on one’s head – the
reorganization of disciplinary practices in order to transgress and transcend pre-existing frames of knowledge organization:

Transdisciplinarity, understood as a critical evaluation of terms, concepts, and methods that transgresses disciplinary boundaries can be a means to [a] higher level of reflexivity ... As an epistemological and methodological strategy, transdisciplinarity proceeds from the insight that disciplines are conventionally thought of territorially, as independent domains with clear boundaries. In fact, however, disciplines are characterized by multiple interconnections and shot through with cross-disciplinary pathways. Consequently, the boundaries between them must be understood – much like physical territorial borders – as arbitrary products of social activity (Dölling and Hark, 2000: 1195–6).

Roland Robertson has argued that the complex convergence of disciplines in the processes of globalization demands transdisciplinary approaches under conditions of globality (Robertson, 1996: 128; see also Hodge, 2002). The emphasis in this chapter will be on this latter approach and will suggest a transdisciplinary approach to European studies I call ‘normative power Europe’. At the centre of this approach is an interest in the power of ideas of the common good, and their diffusion in a European context.

Ideas of the common good in Europe has been rarely conceptualized beyond notions of ‘national’ in European studies. Clearly a means of understanding and analysing contemporary Europe beyond national presumptions is an important but neglected theme in European studies. Although there have been discussions of postnational citizenship (Soysal, 1994) and postnational democracy (Curtin, 1997) in Europe, the analysis of the power of ideas of the common good that are neither merely national nor postnational has received less attention. However, the works of Craig Calhoun, Gerald Delanty, and Chris Rumford have addressed the idea of the common good in terms of the ‘collective good’, ‘good society’, or ‘social solidarity’ in ways that seek to go beyond theories of society located solely in terms of national, supranational, postnational, or civil society (Calhoun, 2003b; Delanty and Rumford, 2006). Calhoun suggests that ‘choosing inconsistency and a plurality of forms of social solidarity and collective identity’ is challenging, noting that ‘if Europeans choose the course of pluriform social organization … then they will be sailing in poorly charted waters and in need of serious theoretical work to make sure the taken-for-granted assumptions of nationalist discourse and its intellectual cousins do not close off attractive possibilities’ (Calhoun, 2001: 53–4). Delanty and Rumford argue that ‘in order to understand the nature of European material, cultural and political realities today a theory of society is needed’ (Delanty and Rumford, 2006: 6). They suggest that such a theory is needed in order to get a sense of the notion of the ‘good society’ that does not presume a link between EU integration and European society; places Europe and the EU within a global frame of reference; and provides a resource for both social theory and contemporary European studies (Delanty and Rumford, 2006: 3–5). The transdisciplinary approach suggested in this chapter is intended to follow these initiatives in order to better grasp the power of ideas of the common good and thus contribute towards theory development in European studies.

The intention in this chapter is to develop a normative power approach to European studies that can be applied across and beyond its constitutive disciplines in order to interrogate and transgress the ideas and spaces on/of Europe. Students of European studies should be aware that there are some very good reasons why there has been a relative absence of transdisciplinary approaches. The participating disciplines of European studies have differing acceptable practices, known as ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1962), in terms of analytical questions, theories and methods. Furthermore, Ben Rosamond has suggested that concepts such as ‘normative’, ‘power’, and ‘Europe’ are among the most contested concepts in the social sciences.1

In four parts this chapter will first explore the terms ‘normative’, ‘power’, and ‘Europe’, before applying the approach to an example. In each part I shall explore one of the terms as a means of illustrating how such a
transdisciplinary approach may contribute to understanding Europe. Part one examines three different approaches to normative ethics – ‘virtues’, ‘deontology’, and ‘consequentialism’ – in order to make sense of ideas of the common good. Part two looks at three different types of power – ‘relational’, ‘structural’, and ‘normative’ – as a means of understanding the power of ideas of the common good. Part three considers three different means of understanding Europe – ‘civilizational’, ‘categorical’, and ‘cultural’ – to show how the power of ideas of the common good shape our means of comprehending contemporary Europe. Part four will attempt to apply the approach to the question of a European counter-terrorist response. I have chosen this example because of the challenges it presents to contemporary Europe and as a means of illustrating the way a normative power Europe approach opens up transdisciplinary thinking across and beyond disciplinary thinking.

NORMATIVE ETHICS

As a first step towards a more transdisciplinary European studies, I will look at the way different approaches to normative ethics help us make sense of ideas regarding the common good. By the ‘common good’ I mean the idea of general wellbeing shared by all members of a society. This notion of common good obviously leaves open the discussion of who are members of a society and what might be their general well being. For example, does the common good apply to local communities, larger ‘nations’, Europe, or the whole of humanity? Similarly, is the general well being to be found in equality or freedom, for example? The study of normative ethics therefore involves asking what ideas of the common good are considered important, by whom and why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact these ideas have on actions taken by groups and societies, in order to understand which actions are considered right or wrong. In this respect it is usual to distinguish between three approaches to normative ethics – virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and consequentialist ethics – each of which I shall briefly consider within the context of European studies.

Virtue ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of the three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (Hursthouse, 2003: 3).

Virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse draw on Aristotle’s notion of virtue in terms of character traits or dispositions (Foot, 1978; Hursthouse, 1999). This tends to put the emphasis on teaching and education as part of the social and personal development of moral virtue. However, as Slote puts it, ‘[V]arious forms of virtue ethics play down the importance or even deny the existence of generally valid moral rules or principles, and claim that morality is most fundamentally to be understood in terms of inner traits, virtues, that cannot be cashed out in terms of rules or goals’ (Slote, 1995: 900). In terms of thinking about transdisciplinary European studies, virtue ethics encourage us to look at the character or traits which guide differing groups and their idea of the common good.

Virtue ethics and their emphasis on the moral character of social groups encourage a focus on the interpretation of virtues such as ‘benevolence’, ‘generosity’, or ‘justice’. Such an interrogation inevitably involves examining the means through which such virtues become established and the extent to which a group shares them. The establishment of virtues through education, religion, or other social practices clearly form an important part of understanding the shared basis of the common good. General examples of such virtues might include classical
merits such as temperance, prudence, fortitude, or justice. More religious virtues such as faith and charity entered the catalogue of valued qualities at a latter stage. It is also worth considering the way in which derivations of such virtues entered the discourses of European enlightenment in modern times. Hence, the French revolution championed the virtues of liberty, equality, and ‘fraternity’ (solidarity), while the European Union (EU) seeks the virtues of unity and diversity.

An example of a virtue ethics approach to ideas of the common good in Europe may be found in the Austrian sanctions crisis in 2000. During the 1990s the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the EU had been busily institutionalizing post-Cold War virtues such as human rights and democracy as part of providing moral maps in the ‘new Europe’ (Manners, 2002: 242–4; Merlingen et al., 2001: 63–4). In February 2000 the creation of a new Austrian coalition government including the neonationalist Freedom Party (FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider directly questioned these virtues. A mixture of reasons, including the role of party groups within EU member states and shared ideas of virtuous politics across the EU, led to the imposition of bilateral sanctions by the 14 other members of the EU between February and September 2000.

The importance given to the virtues of human rights and democracy as ethical reasons for the sanctions is central to understanding the Austrian crisis. Public reasoning and debating of the problems of interfering in the domestic politics of another EU member state were to be increasingly heard throughout the seven-month period, particularly in smaller member states and those that had their own neonationalist concerns (Gingrich 2006: 200–1; Merlingen et al., 2001: 73). Concerns for the counterproductive consequences of the sanctions within Austria were also to be heard, with many commentators pointing to ‘widespread anti-EU sentiments’ in Austria, and increasingly beyond (Howard 2001: 26; Merlingen et al., 2001: 73). Despite these concerns with foreign interference and counter-productive consequences, it was the perceived virtues of the principles that held the sanctions in place until September 2000. It was then that the committee of Ahtisaari, Frowein and Oreja, mandated by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), whilst criticizing the FPÖ, argued that the Austrian government itself had complied with common European values (Falkner 2001: 11; Merlingen et al., 2001: 72). This decision was made easier by Haider’s resignation of the leadership of the FPÖ and the marginalization of the FPÖ by the Christian Democrats within the coalition government (Gingrich 2006: 231; Happold, 2000: 963).

**Deontological ethics**

The central thought of Kant’s account of public reason is that the standards of reason cannot be derivative. Any appeal to other external authorities to buttress our reasoning must fail. Just as a learner cyclist who clutches at passing objects and leans on them for balance thereby fails to balance at all, so a would-be reasoner who leans on some socially or civilly constituted power or authority which lacks reasoned vindication fails to reason (O’Neill, 2000a: 52).

Deontological ethicists such as Onora O’Neill draw on Immanuel Kant’s notion of public reason in terms of duties and rules governing action (O’Neill, 2000b; Reiss, 1991). As O’Neill’s quote illustrates, unlike virtues, a deontological approach involves reasoning the merits of action without reference to, or derivation from an external authority. Roger Crisp clarifies the difference between this approach and that of consequentialism thus – ‘[D]eontological ethics [are] moral theories according to which certain acts must or must not be done, regardless to some extent of the consequences of their performance or non-performance’ (Crisp, 1995: 187). In contrast to virtue ethics, a deontological approach to transdisciplinary European studies emphasizes the rationalization of duties and rules.
which guide differing groups and their idea of the common good.

Deontological ethics move the focus beyond the character of social groups towards an understanding of group actions and inactions. O’Neill and other neo-Kantians seek to emphasize the progressive and expansive role of public debate and reasoning in creating the rights and duties held to be important within a group. An awareness of the promotion of such rule-governed behaviour through domestic and international law is central to making sense of this shared idea of the common good. Unlike virtue ethics, deontological ethics provides few absolute merits which might be pursued, rather the approach emphasizes the means through which actions are motivated and practised. In this respect, much weight is placed on the establishment of law, including both rights and duties, in the pursuit of the common good. Both advocates and detractors of European integration have argued that Europe has become a ‘Kantian paradise’ governed by domestic and international law such as the ‘acquis communautaire’ of the EU (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2004: 71–3; Menon et al., 2004: 9).

An example of a deontological ethics approach to ideas of the common good can be seen in the genetically modified (GM) food crises from 1998 to date. Since its inclusion in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, the precautionary principle has become an important feature of European international environmental law (Douma, 2000; Welsh, 2006). In February 2000 the European Commission’s communication argued that the precautionary principle should be applied when ‘preliminary objective scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection’ (European Commission, 2000: 3, 10; Baker, 2006: 87; Douma, 2000: 141). The precautionary principle provides a rule-based approach to dealing with uncertainty and risk to life through a reasoned legal principle for action based on the principle that ‘prevention is better than cure’. However, the importation of GM maize and soya beans from the US during 1996–1997 raised public concern, particularly following the 1996 BSE crisis, regarding the need for a precautionary approach to the uncertainty and risk associated with genetic modification, production and impact in Europe (Carr 2002: 32; De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999: 748–51; Sicurelli, 2004: 11–12). A mixture of reasons, including the conflicting motivations of international agribusiness and more local organic farming, led to a precautionary moratorium on the importation of GM products into Europe from 1998 to 2004 (Carr, 2002: 33; Karlsson, 2006: 49; GMO Compass, 2006).

The importance given to the role of the precautionary principle as a reason for the moratorium is crucial to making sense of the GM food crisis. The virtues of the precautionary principle and its application to GM food appear contradictory, with advocates of ‘freedom’ (primarily international agribusinesses such as Monsanto and Syngenta) clashing with supporters of ‘justice’ and ‘prudence’ (primarily advocates of local empowerment and international environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth). Similarly, the consequences of such a precautionary approach are mixed, with concerns about the long-term impact on European bioscience contrasting with the significant consequences for biodiversity of pesticide toleration and transgenic hybridization. Despite these differing virtues and consequences, European support for the precautionary principle in international law ensures that, years after the moratorium ended, most Europeans have a deep suspicion of GM foods with low levels (below 1%) of GM crop plantation in Spain, Portugal, Germany, France, and the Czech Republic. The WTO ruling in September 2006 on the transatlantic trade dispute over GM foods makes clear that high stakes, large uncertainty, and intense normative disputes over GM products cannot and should not be resolved through ‘normal’ scientific and
politics means, prompting a need for extending peer communities, and ensuring the more consistent application of the 2003 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which is widely supported in Europe (Bäckstrand, 2003; De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999; Friends of the Earth 2006; Healy, 1999).

Consequentialist ethics

It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are an Aristotelian ... you will deal with a borderline case by considering whether doing such-and-such in such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or an act of injustice; and accordingly you decide it is or it isn’t, you judge it to be a thing to do or not ... The consequentialist has no footing on which to say ‘this would be permissible, this not’; because by [their] own hypothesis, it is the consequences that are to decide (Anscombe, 1958).

Consequentialist ethicists such as Elizabeth Anscombe draw on and develop the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in order to argue for normative ethics based on the outcomes of actions (Darwall, 2002; Geach and Gormally, 2006). Unlike the neo-Aristotelian or neo-Kantian approaches, Anscombe argued that a consequentialist approach did not judge ethical cases on their own merit, but looked towards the consequences of action or inaction for guidance. James Griffin clarifies that ‘consequentialism [is] a term now used for the view that all actions are right or wrong in virtue of the value of their consequences’ (Griffin, 1995: 154). Unlike virtue and deontological ethics which focus on motivations, transdisciplinary European studies using a consequentialist approach involves analysing the consequences of actions and their implications for differing groups and their idea of the common good.

Although consequentialist ethics share an emphasis with deontological ethics on the rights and wrongs of group actions, the focus of this approach is on the interplay between actors and consequences. The implications of this approach are significant for debates regarding the relationships between Europe and the rest of the world, for example raising questions about the merits of European aid and trade. This also introduces the problem of value pluralism and the extent to which the merits of differing consequences may themselves be moral choices (Reader, 2000: 356). This problem has become widespread in debates regarding the relative merits of pursuing the 1992 UNCED Rio and 2002 WSSD Johannesburg sustainable development agenda; the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals; the 2001 DoHa Declaration; and the 2002 Monterrey Consensus at the same time, with very different consequences (Manners, 2007).

An example of a consequentialist ethics approach to ideas of the common good in Europe might be seen in the Kosovo intervention crisis during 1999. During the 1991–1995 war in Yugoslavia, many European states became convinced that never again would such large-scale massacres of civilians occur while neighbouring states and institutions failed to act (Malmvig, 2006: 64–5). The violence in Yugoslavia did not end with the November 1995 Dayton Accords, and by mid-1998 Europeans were concerned at the escalation of violence by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian security forces (Latawski and Smith, 2002: 216). A ceasefire arranged by Richard Holbrooke with Slobodan Milosovic in October 1998 was soon broken by the KLA, escalating atrocities by Serbian security forces. The EU Forensic Expert Team in Kosovo investigated three sites (Klecka, Volujak, and Racak) involving approximately 200 civilians executed between August 1998 and January 1999, in part contributing to the Rambouillet peace talks in February and March 1999 (Friis and Murphy, 2000; Rainio et al., 2001). The collapse of these talks coincided with a renewed Serbian offensive against the KLA, leading to the launching of NATO's Operation Allied Force in late March 2006, and the fleeing of over 800,000 Kosovar refugees by the time the aerial bombardment ended in early June 2006 (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 767; Huysmans, 2002: 602).
The importance given to the anticipated consequences of military inaction are critical to appreciating the Kosovo crisis (Malmvig, 2006: 76). From June 1998 to March 1999 members of NATO began preparing for direct military involvement in Kosovo, fearful of consequences similar to Bosnia should they not intervene. By the beginning of March 1999 approximately 7,000 personnel (out of a planned 25,000) from the UK, France, Germany, and Italy were deployed in Macedonia in advance of a NATO activation order (House of Commons, 2000). The virtues of ‘temperance’ in dealing with Milosevic and the warring parties in Kosovo, as well as ‘prudence’ in taking direct action, were dispensed with in favour of a two-month NATO air campaign. In a similar way, the deontological reasons for non-intervention, including the absence of a UN Security Council mandate and dispensing with questions of sovereignty in international law, did not prevent NATO action, despite opposition from within some member states (particularly Greece and Germany) (Friis and Murphy, 2000: 768–9; Latawski and Smith, 2002: 216). The longer term consequences of the Kosovo crisis were a ‘wake-up call for European leaders and European public opinion’ emphasizing the need for a ‘shared commitment to humanitarian values’ in a ‘pan-European community of values’ (Huysmans 2002: 600; Lavenex, 2001: 856; Solana, 2000: 28).

**Relational power**

Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that ‘they are’ ‘in power’ we actually refer to ‘them’ being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with, disappears, ‘[their] power’ also vanishes (Arendt, 1969: 44).

As Hannah Arendt observed, relational power is the ability of groups to act in concert. The notion of relational power places the emphasis on concerted action, but it also recognizes the transient nature of such power which can disappear and disperse as quickly as it appeared (Arendt, 1963: 175; Guisan, 2003, 2005: 462–3). In this respect, ‘power is to an astonishing degree independent of material factors, either of numbers or means’ (Arendt, 1958: 200). Susan Strange suggests that in its most simplistic formulation, ‘relational power, as conventionally described by realist writers of textbooks in international relations, is the power of A to get B to do something they would not otherwise do’ (Strange, 1988: 24). In transdisciplinary European studies, relational power is to be found wherever such groups are taking...
concerted action, for example in the rise of ‘third way’ social democratic governments across Europe during the period 1998 to 2002.

The ‘red tidal wave’ of the left that swept across Europe during the late 1990s is an interesting example of the strengths and weaknesses of the exercise of relational power (Bell and Shaw, 2003: 1; Ovenden, 1998). The election of the centre/left governments of Romano Prodi (1996), Tony Blair and Lionel Jospin (1997) and Gerhard Schröder (1998) brought widespread expectations that the political parties of the left would, for the first time, be able to act in concert (Economist, 1998; Ladrech, 2003; Walker, 1998). Most believed that sharing power in 13 West European governments would allow the use of relational power to pursue the political agenda of the ‘third way’, ‘new centre’, or ‘democratic socialism’ (Economist, 1998; Walker, 1999). Such relational power was intended to shape the post-Cold War European agenda of political, economic, social, and foreign policy based on principles such as community, responsibility, accountability, and opportunity (Halpern and Mikosz, 1998; Dickson, 1999).

The relational power of the four social-democratic governments in Germany, France, Britain and Italy, together with the support of the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece (and six others), was hoped to reinvent governance, regulate capitalism, achieve social justice, and pursue liberal internationalism in foreign policy (Halpern and Mikosz, 1998; Judis, 2002; Stiglitz, 2001). Following Strange, the expectation would be that if some of the most powerful states in Europe sought to exercise relational power over these issues, then a leftward agenda should have been achievable. However, as early as 2003 the term ‘crisis’ was being used by the left after Silvio Berlusconi (2001) and Jean-Pierre Raffarin (2002), as well as Jan Peter Balkenende and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, came to power (Bell and Shaw, 2003: 1). It seems clear that in order to understand the weaknesses of relational power we need to understand the role of structural power in resisting the agenda of the ‘third way’, as well as the problem which the normative power of social justice has in articulation across Europe and the world.

**Structural power**

Structural power ... is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people, have to operate. ... Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. The relative power of each party in a relationship is more, or less, if one party is also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship (Strange, 1988: 24–5).

In contrast to Arendt, Susan Strange argued that structural power is found in the shaping of the environment within which relations take place. The notion of structural power places the emphasis on determining frameworks, rather than the concerted actions of relational power. In this respect we can distinguish between the importance of the ‘agents’ in relational power and the role of the ‘structures’ in structural power (see Giddens, 1979). The emphasis on power structures in areas such as security, production, finance, knowledge and welfare advanced by Strange (1988) is related to Marxist critical theory with its emphasis on structures of production and social relations. Unlike relational power, structural power in transdisciplinary European studies can be found wherever social, economic, and knowledge-based relations are determined by the emerging dominance of transnational media corporations in Europe from 1996 onwards.

In the mid-1920s a small number of major Hollywood studios controlled film production, and 70 years later the transnational media corporations that own these ‘seven sisters’ of cinema now dominate the global media industries of film, television, radio,
music, newspapers, periodicals, and books (McChesney, 2001). As the Council of Europe’s report on ‘Transnational media concentrations in Europe’ argued in 2004, the rise in media concentration since 1994 had reached new levels through the domination of transnational companies that weakened national regulations and competition rules (Council of Europe, 2004: 7). The deregulation of US media ownership rules in 1996 (the Telecommunications Act), together with the liberalization of the EU market for media (the 1989 Television without Frontiers Directives revised in 1997), prompted a series of mammoth media mergers including Disney and ABC (1995), Time Warner and Turner/CNN (1996), Viacom and CBS (1999), AOL and Time Warner (2000), Vivendi and Seagram (2002) (Jung, 2003; McChesney, 1999). By 2004 the eight globally dominant transnational corporations were Time Warner, News Corp, Viacom, Disney, Bertelsmann, NBC Universal, Sony, and Vivendi Universal, of which only Bertelsmann (Germany) and Vivendi (France) are European (Jung, 2003, Nordicom, 2005a).

While some report the relative success of European companies such as RTL/Bertelsmann, Canal+/Vivendi, and the BBC in resisting the power of the non-European corporations to structure European media, this must be considered premature (Council of Europe, 2004; Esser, 2002; Nordicom, 2005b).

Simply looking at traditional, terrestrial broadcast media in Europe tells us very little about the structural power of transnational media, however, for this we have to look at both ‘new media’ and content (Bondebjerg, 2001; Cohen and Kennedy, 2000). The ‘new media’ of non-terrestrial communication places an emphasis on cable, satellite and Internet distribution, as demonstrated in the power of four corporations. The world’s biggest merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2000, together with the 2006 purchase of Myspace.com by News Corp, illustrate the way in which the old media giants have come to dominate new media space on the Internet. In terms of cable distribution, the markets of Ireland, the Netherlands, Central and Eastern Europe are dominated by US-owned Liberty Global Europe (Liberty Media have holdings in SBS, News Corp, Time Warner, Vivendi, and Viacom). Similarly, the satellite distribution market in Europe has been largely dominated by just two corporations – News Corp (through the Sky group) and Vivendi (through the Canal+ group until 2003). In terms of content, the European media market is dominated by satellite news from CNN (Time Warner), BBC World, and Fox News (News Corp); infotainment such as the Discovery channels (Liberty Media), National Geographic (News Corp); and the History Channel (Disney, Hearst, NBC Universal); children’s programmes from Disney, Nickelodeon (Viacom), Fox Kids (News Corp), Cartoon Network (Time Warner); and music channels such as MTV and VH1 (both Viacom).

It becomes clear that European social, economic, and knowledge-based relations are increasingly predetermined by the dominance of a very small number of transnational media corporations who shape what and how we come to know about Europe. As Christopher Marsden argued, when discussing the power of transnational media we need to look beyond the media to ownership: ‘Interdependence and the structural power of capital generally is a more holistic explanation of the story than the structural power of the media owner per se’ (Marsden, 2000: 12).

It seems clear that attempts to regulate European markets, in particular media markets and rules of cross-media ownership, as part of the ‘third way’ agenda of 1998–2002 were on a collision course with the fourth estate of transnational media corporations. The liberalizations of 1996 in the US, the UK, and Germany had already started the concentration of media into the hands of corporations that were resistant to reregulation and unlikely to have programming representing the third way agenda in any fair way. An example might be found in the role of one of the now dominant new media corporations, News Corp, which attempted
to overcome European resistance by using sport programming as a ‘battering ram’ against regulatory and cross-media ownership rules (Robertson, 2004: 293, 298). The case of BSkyB’s attempted purchase of Manchester United football club, and merger of News Corp with Canal+, in 1998–1999 illustrated how politics and media ownership mix in News Corp’s ‘anti-European Union views’ (Robertson, 2004: 298). If the relative power of elected governments is constantly weakened by the structural power of transnational capital and its negative effects on democratic pluralism (Council of Europe, 2004: 4–6), we are left with the question of how ideas of the common good might be articulated in a globalized Europe. Here we should turn to the idea of normative power for an understanding of the power of ideas in post-Cold War Europe.

**Normative power**

We rely on moral persuasion, the power of argument, and the power of shaming … Other factors in these circumstances of voluntary compliance are also important, such as the domestic salience of the norm, its legitimacy and coherence, and the extent to which it fits with other prevailing and well-established standards; but norms are expressed through language and the process of argumentation and debate can shape what is said subsequently in both domestic and international venues (Foot, 2000: 9).

If relational power is concerted action and structural power is environment shaping, then normative power presents a third form of power – the power of ideas themselves. As Rosemary Foot suggests, normative power relies on persuasion, argument and shaming rather than action or structure to shape change. In contrast to the action and determination orientations of relational and structural power, normative power is a discursive formation that relies on legitimacy, coherence, and voluntarism for its influence. Although sceptical, Strange had also noted the existence of normative power, suggesting it was ‘moral authority, power derived from the proclamation of powerful ideas that have wide appeal, are accepted as valid and give legitimacy to the proclaimers, whether politicians, religious leaders or philosophers’ (Strange, 1988: 23). Similarly, in his study of ‘Europe in the making’ Johan Galtung argued that normative power was one of the ‘three classical types of power’ and was to be found in ‘bad and good conscience’ (Galtung, 1989: 14–15, 162 n. 13). In transdisciplinary European studies, normative power is to be found wherever powerful ideas and argumentation are encountered, for example in the constitutionalization of human rights norms in Europe in the post-Cold War era.

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, together with two protocols. These five accords, together with the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; and the four optional protocols, constitute the core international human rights instruments of the United Nations (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). Although most Western European states had taken steps towards enshrinining these core human rights in law, prior to 1990 the ratification and application of these core instruments was incomplete.

From 1990 onwards the normative power of human rights in Europe illustrates the way in which core rights came to be seen as constitutive of the very idea of the common good across Europe. The end of the Cold War in Europe was marked by the November 1990 Paris Charter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which recognized a ‘steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and
fundamental freedoms’ (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990: 3).

The signing of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and membership of the Council of Europe (CoE) brought nine central European states into the realm of European human rights protection between 1991 and 1993. The June 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for membership of the EU made clear that human rights protection (as well as protection of minorities) was a pre-requisite for accession. It is within this institutional context that 15 European post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states acceded to most of the seven core international human rights instruments of the UN (the major exception being the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers). More specifically, 13 Central and Eastern European states, 17 Western European states, and three Mediterranean states (Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey) acceded to the 1989 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (abolition of the death penalty) after pressure from the CoE, the EU, and international human rights groups.

This emphasis on the role of the three European institutions of the CSCE/OSCE, CoE, and EU in spreading human rights law overlooks the extent to which it is grassroots human rights movements and advocacy which has led the development of human rights in Europe. Human rights movements for the abolition of slavery, torture, political imprisonment, and the death penalty, are all primarily movements of people rather than states, as the work of Anti-Slavery International (founded in 1839 as the Anti-Slavery Society), Amnesty International (founded as the ‘Appeal for Amnesty, 1961’), and the Association for the Prevention of Torture (founded in 1977) have illustrated. Chris Brown comments that:

> It is precisely the role of AI [Amnesty International] and similar bodies to ‘carp’ and ‘denounce’ without taking on board all the reasons, often quite compelling in nature, for failings in the area of human rights … bodies such as AI, which do not possess direct coercive [relational] power, can attempt to promote human rights in a way that is less tied up with Western interests, and are less liable to charges of hypocrisy (Brown, 2001: 29).

It is here that we find the normative power of European civil society activism engaged in persuasion, argumentation and shaming in public, the press, the courts, state institutions, and international organizations ‘like water on stone’ (Power, 2002) in order to promote ideas of the common good.

**EUROPE**

Having considered both the reasons why groups act, and means through which groups act on differing ideas of the common good, we can now turn to the question of what are the effects on our understanding of contemporary Europe. This third section involves asking what the consequences are of examining European studies from contrasting analytical perspectives. What we will see is that ideas of the common good are related to the different analytical methods of European studies. The question of what Europe is and how we examine it is the only common analytical focus that European studies shares, and is central to any transdisciplinary study. To illustrate the interrelationship between ideas of the common good, method of analysis and the definition of Europe I will differentiate between three means of understanding Europe – civilizational Europe, categorical Europe, and cultural Europe (see Manners, 2003).

**Civilization**

There are those who have argued that 11th September initiated a clash between civilizations. Here I disagree, a clash between civilizations requires that there are two civilizations, which there are not. There is only one civilization, and that is ours (Kjaersgaard, 2001).
The opening quote from Pia Kjærsgaard, the leader of the Danish People's Party, suggests a post-11th September understanding of civilizational Europe (Rydgren, 2004; Hervik, 2006; Andersen, 2008). In the post-Cold War era ideas of the common good based on the idea of ‘civilization’ became popularized by Samuel Huntington (1993). Huntington’s argument was that religion became a means of differentiating between groups, and that conflict between these groups was inevitable (Batur-Vanderlippe, 1999; Loomba, 2003; Marfleet, 2003).

The 1980s saw the biological racism of the colonial era adapted to cultural racism for the postcolonial era with ‘colour’ exchanged for ‘religion’ (Balibar, 1991: 21; Loomba, 2003: 13). Etienne Balibar argued that current racism . . . fits into a framework of ‘racism without races’ . . . It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions (Balibar, 1991: 21).

It is within this context that other religions rather than other races were increasingly identified as the causes of European problems in the post-Cold War era (Zaslove, 2004: 75).

As cultural racism (neoracism) became popular in Europe during the 1990s, far-right political leaders such as Le Pen (France), Bossi (Italy), Haider (Austria), and Fortuyn (Netherlands) became enthusiasts for a civilizational reading of Europe as predominantly Christian, white and closed to others (Batur-Vanderlippe, 1999: 472; Marfleet, 2003: 84; Quraishy, 2003: 72; Wren, 2004: 153).

The 1990s also saw the growth of neonianalist movements under the banner of ‘anti-European’ sentiment, including parties such as the French National Front, Italian Northern League (after 1998), Austrian Freedom Party, Danish People’s Party, and Swedish Democrats (Chari et al., 2004; Gingrich, 2006: 214–5; Rydgren, 2002: 52; Simonsen, 2004: 361). Andre Gingrich defines neonianalism as ‘nationalism in a globalized period of aggressive postcolonial and post-Cold War readjustment’ (Gingrich, 2006: 200). In this respect neonianalists seek to ‘enhance negative images of the European Union’ and ‘oppose the centralized and elite nature of the European Union in the name of the authentic silent majority and the common person’ (Gingrich, 2006: 214; Zaslove, 2004: 70).

We should be unsurprised that neonianalist groups dislike the European Union after the Austrian sanctions crisis previously discussed under virtue ethics (above). However, less well known is the resistance to Article 13 of the Treaty of Rome which provides the basis for EU action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. Neonianalist opposition to the Constitution for Europe was undoubtedly guaranteed by the new Article II-81 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union which went further in contending that ‘any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’. The movement from ‘action’ to ‘prohibition’ and wider-ranging reference to ‘any discrimination’ would clearly have been unacceptable to both neonianalists and neoracists.

In this civilizational Europe, some neoracist and neo-nationalist parties have seized the opportunity to invoke the need for ‘crusades’ of white Christian Europe against the Islamic world, using the war on terror as a pretext – ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while’ (Bush, 2001a; see also Carroll, 2004; Zaslove, 2004: 75). From this perspective a Europe based on such a civilization would be a very reduced and barren one indeed, excluding almost 60 years of immigration as well as most Eastern European states; of course Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Turkey,
Bosnia, Serbia, and Albania would also be excluded.

**Category**

‘Europe’ and ‘the European’ are also symbolic categories ... As such, these symbolic categories are mutually imbricated and craft a field of cultural meanings that produces its own emergent logic. This logic in turn defines the discursive limits of civilization and the relation of differentiated human groupings to that civilization (Lewis, 2006: 88).

As the discussion of civilizational Europe makes clear, our understandings of Europe are symbolic categories created by differing groups to serve political purposes (see Leontidou, 2004; Liotta, 2005). The second perspective looks at Europe as a category in order to escape the ethnic primordialism of the ‘civilization’. However, as Gail Lewis illustrates in her discussion of ‘imaginaries of Europe’, any categories discussed here are themselves the product of cultural meanings, often in opposition to others such as ‘the immigrant women’ (see also Lutz, 1997). While Lila Leontidou has found that regional narratives of Europe have historically focused on geophysical features such as seas, rivers, and mountains, in the post-Second World War period it is institutional narratives that have dominated (Leontidou, 2004). Similarly, in the post-Cold War world the category of Europe can be found through examining the institutional memberships of those organizations representing and defining what it means to be European – the OSCE, the CoE, and the EU.

The OSCE is primarily a product of the Cold War era, created by the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 countries, including the US, the Soviet Union, and Canada, thus creating an East–West understanding of Europe ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’. By the 1994 Budapest conference meeting the CSCE had grown to 52 states who agreed to further institutionalization and a name change to the OSCE. As the world’s largest regional security organization, its 56 members must represent the largest understanding of Europe as an institutional category, including the US, Canada, Russia, five central Asian republics, five micro-states, and 43 European countries.

The Council of Europe (CoE) is Europe’s oldest political organization, created in the aftermath of the Second World War by the 1949 Treaty of London. The Treaty was signed by ten West European parliamentary democracies with the aim of achieving ‘a greater unity between its members’ (Article 1). The CoE was thus a Western European organization which initially excluded the dictatorships of southern and eastern Europe because of their absence of individual freedom, political liberty, rule of law, and ‘genuine democracy’ (preamble to Treaty of London). Fifty years later, by the end of 1989, the CoE had grown to 20 members, including the new democracies of southern Europe. However, the next decade was to be the ‘decade which made history’ as the Council played a crucial role in guarding democratic security and assisting the transition of Central and Eastern European states to democracy (Huber, 1999). Thus, by 2003 the CoE included 46 European countries, the only major exception being authoritarian Belarus.

The EU is Europe’s main integration organization, with its beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community created by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. As the Treaty was signed by the six Western European states who had been most affected by the Second World War, it was effectively a peace treaty, prompted by the 1950 Schuman Declaration (Fontaine, 2000: 20). After the 1957 Treaty of Rome significantly expanded the integration activities to include economic production and trade, the focus of the newly created European Communities was on the ‘pooling of resources’ in order to strengthen peace and liberty, including the free movement of persons, services, and capital. By 1989 the EC had enlarged three times and...
included 12 relatively wealthy Western European parliamentary democracies. The end of the Cold War brought a deluge of applications for membership of the newly restructured EU, resulting in three more rounds of enlargement and a total of 27 members by 2007. Thus membership of the EU currently includes 27 of the 46 CoE member states, excluding Norway and Switzerland in Western Europe.

This brief comparison of institutional categorization illustrates the extent to which ‘Europe’ is an open category. Whether focused on security (OSCE), democracy (CoE), or integration (EU), Europe as a category can include between 46 and 27 states, stretching from Lisbon to Bucharest, Ankara, or Moscow. But under any categorical definition of Europe a wide range of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity is always included, ensuring that there are no discursive limits to civilization in a neoracist sense.

Culture

In spite of all the difficulties, we are on our way towards building a European Community that cannot be ignored. In this often chaotic European assembly, the voice of France, which sometimes has difficulty making itself heard when it calls for the construction of a ‘social Europe’, still finds allies in other governments and in the public opinion of various countries. Whilst all of them are deeply attached to their particular cultural traditions, they all implicitly or explicitly share our notion of freedom (Kristeva, 2004: 31).

Moving beyond discussions of civilizational or categorical Europe, it might be more valuable to look at Europe from the perspective of culture where differing cultural traditions across Europe share some common notions such as freedom and a more social Europe. From this third perspective we can acknowledge that geographic, ethnographic, and linguistic categories are primarily cultural constructions. Thus, a better understanding of the power of ideas of the common good will be looked at through culture as a means of comprehending contemporary Europe. As Maria Todorova suggests, ‘It is not symbolic geography that creates politics, but rather the reverse … “Europe” ends where politicians want it to end’ (Todorova, 1997: 160; and Liotta, 2005: 67). But we should remind ourselves that politicians and governments are themselves constructed through their particular cultural traditions.

Drawing on the previous discussion of institutional categorization and inspired by Todorova’s symbolic geography of the ‘Balkans’, we can observe how European geography is a cultural production (Paasi, 2001). Because Europe sits at the western end of the Eurasian tectonic plate, any geographical definition of Europe must be topographic rather than geological. Hence geographical discussions of ‘continental’ Europe are somewhat misplaced, often replaced by discussions of Europe from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU). It is worth remarking that while CoE membership may include states from the ATTU, their landmasses stretch from Baffin Bay (Greenland) to the Bering Straits (Russia). Also of interest is the way in which the EU also involves 28 non-European territories around the world, involving the seven ‘non-continental and overseas territories of member states’ (including French Guiana) and the 21 ‘overseas countries and territories’ listed in the treaties (including Bermuda).

Similar to geography, European ethnography is also a cultural production, consisting of over 100 ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ (Fernández-Armesto, 1994; Pedersen, 1992). But any such study of nations or peoples in Europe is highly problematic because of the contested nature of ‘ethnicity’. Definitions of ethnicity range from Max Weber’s suggestion of ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonization or migration’ (Weber, 1968, in Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 2), to Paul Spoonley’s idea of ethnicity representing ‘the positive
feelings of belonging to a cultural group’ (Spoonley, 1993, in Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 1). The difficult question arises of who, exactly, are the peoples of Europe? – Filipe Fernández-Armesto’s 1994 *Times Guide to the Peoples of Europe* allows space for Ruthenians, Jews and the Roma, but none for the millions of non-indigenous citizens from around the world who are naturalized in Europe.

European linguistics may provide us with a better insight into cultural Europe, but given the Indo-European language roots of much of Europe, we are again presented with the issue of no clear separation within Eurasia. The ten main linguistic subfamilies of the Indo-European language family, together with non-Indo-European Uralic (Finno-Ugric and Samoyedic), Turkic, Basque and Maltese, ensure that languages spoken in Europe are shared with much of the world. The daily presence of semitic Maltese and Finno-Urgic (Finnish, Estonian, and Hungarian) languages in the EU illustrates the extent to which Indo-European languages are not a sufficient identifier of cultural Europe. Similarly, European languages such as English (5.5 per cent of global population), Spanish (4.6 per cent of global population), and Portuguese (2.9 per cent of global population) are widely used as first languages around the world, to the extent that cultural production outside of Europe in these languages has become more dominant within Europe – think of the US or India, Mexico and Brazil for example (Buckley, 1998: 4–5).

Returning to Julia Kristeva’s opening quote, it is increasingly the case that, in spite of all the difficulties and resistances, cultural traditions tell us much about social Europe and any European community that might follow. Here it might be more insightful to define cultural Europe by those cultural productions which are widely shared across Europe, for example Europop in the form of the Eurovision song contest and Euro sport in the shape of the UEFA European Football Championship.

The interplay between the EU, television, and entertainment/sporting bodies have produced cultural reconfigurations of Europe. For example, EU media policies such as the 1989 ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directive and the three MEDIA programmes since 1990 have intertwined with the role of the European Broadcast Union (EBU) to encourage co-productions such as the Eurovision Song Contest. Participation in Eurovision is limited to active members of the EBU, including recent winners from Ukraine, Turkey and Israel, as well as participants from Morocco, Russia and Armenia. Similarly, the combination of EU politics, including the European Court of Justice’s 1995 Bosman ruling, and the pro-activity of sporting organizations has broadened definitions of Europe to include Russia, Turkey and Israel, as seen in the Euro 2008 (UEFA European Football Championship) competition. Ahead of the 2008 championships co-hosted by Austria and Switzerland, teams such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in group A; and England, Russia and Israel in group B had to play each other in order to qualify.

**APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF A EUROPEAN COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE**

Throughout this chapter I have argued in favour of a transdisciplinary approach to the study of contemporary Europe that asks a series of questions about the power of ideas of the common good, and their diffusion in a European context. In each part I examined one of these questions: normative, power, and Europe, from three different perspectives. In each response I tried to give an example from contemporary European studies that illustrate the transdisciplinary nature of such an approach. Hence we briefly considered the Austrian sanctions, GMO and Kosovo ethical crises; then the power of the ‘third way’, transnational media, and human
that that’s [11th September] a crime against humanity and that it’s right and indeed necessary for the whole global community to bring the perpetrators to justice’ (Robinson, 2002).

A deontological ethics approach might place greater emphasis on the need for reasoned, legal actions against international terrorism, and would most likely sanction an international ‘just war’ as was seen in Afghanistan in 2002. A large number of politicians, academics, and commentators around the world supported the US-led war in Afghanistan from 7 October 2001 onwards, with apparent UN Security Council backing in ‘supporting international efforts to root out terrorism’ (UN Security Council Resolution 1378; see also UN Security Council Resolution 1368). The extent to which the US appeared to work through international law and organizations in order to pursue a ‘just war’ through operations ‘Infinite Justice’ and ‘Enduring Freedom’ seemed a reasoned, legal approach to international justice which could be articulated across the globe (see Elshtain, 2003; Falk, 2001; Holliday 2002; contrast with Chomsky, 2003). Support for a European deontological ethics approach to counter-terrorism was removed when the US began preparing for the invasion of Iraq from October 2002 onwards, despite the lack of UN Security Council support and the largest anti-war protest in history on the 15 February 2003 when millions of demonstrators took to the streets of Rome, London, Madrid, Berlin, and beyond.

A consequentialist ethics approach would seem more likely to place the emphasis on outcomes in terms of defeating terrorists by any means possible, perhaps including a total war on terror. From 11 September 2001 onwards the doctrine of ‘total war on terror’ was increasingly at the heart of US consequentialist logic which focused on defeating not only terrorists but all enemies, as US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld noted on 11 September: ‘Go massive … Sweep it all up. Things related and not’ (Martin, 2002). Within a year this results-oriented strategy was
clarified by the chair of the US Defence Policy Board Advisory Committee, Richard Pearle:

This is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There are lots of them out there. All this talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq ... this is entirely the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don't try to piece together clever diplomacy, but just wage a total war ... our children will sing great songs about us years from now (Pilger, 2002: 13; 2003: 10).

The US invasion of Iraq from the 20 March 2003 onwards divided Europeans between those following a consequentialist ethic (primarily pro-Bush governments in the UK, Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Netherlands, and Spain) and those following a more deontological ethic (e.g. Germany and France). As the disastrous consequences of the invasion became clearer after 2003, European governments in Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary, Norway, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Italy withdrew their military forces from Iraq. In 2006 it was also revealed that the total war on terror’s consequentialist ethic involves the illegal extradition and torture of terrorist suspects from Europe (see Amnesty International, 2006; Fava, 2006; Marty, 2006; Mayer, 2005; Priest, 2005). European consequentialist ethics as seen in counter-terrorist activities such as Iraq, extraordinary rendition and other contraventions of civil and human rights thus make it very difficult for virtue ethics and/or deontological ethics to be pursued as well. In their place the counter-terrorist discourses of war on terror and violations of human rights, rather than crimes against humanity and pursuit of international law, ensure that addressing the complex causes of terrorism becomes virtually impossible (Chibli, 2002; von Schorlemer, 2003).

**Power in counter-terrorism**

The second question to ask is how best to respond to such attacks? Using relational power would tend to involve direct action with an obvious preference for those resources most ready for action, in particular the armed forces. The use of relational power in counter-terrorism has become the defining feature of the total war on terror with the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan also declaring ‘total war on terror’ (Alexander, 2003; Burns, 2005; Faraj et al., 2004). The US sanctioning of relational power encouraged Russia and China to join the war against their own ‘terrorists’ in Chechnya and Xinjiang (Hamilton, 2004; Manners, 2007). As Jonathan Stevenson observes:

[A] full-scale Western mobilisation against transnational Islamist terrorism – a total war on terror ... [in which] the West’s intelligence, law-enforcement and military assets would be brought to bear against any actual or potential terrorist strongholds or supporters ... would amount ... to furnishing bin Laden with precisely the violent ‘clash of civilisations’ that is integral to his apocalyptic eschatology (Stevenson, 2006: 96).

During January 2003 the total war on terror through the invasion of Iraq was promoted by US envoy Bruce Jackson (Judis, 2003). This led to the ‘Letter of Eight’ (signed by eight pro-Bush European leaders) and the ‘Vilnus Letter’ (signed by ten pro-Bush central European leaders) apparently supporting relational power through the invasion of Iraq (Macmillan, 2003). The division of Europe into ‘old Europe’ opposing the invasion of Iraq (the popular response across the whole of Europe) and ‘new Europe’ (the 18 leaders who signed the Jackson letters) was openly encouraged by US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld as a means of weakening the EU and the UN in order to pursue relational power (Levy et al., 2005).

Exercising structural power would be more longer term and entail addressing the socioeconomic and political conditions in which terrorism thrives, in particular through economic and political aid, trade and sanctions (both positive and negative). By the end of 2003, the division of the EU earlier in the year was beginning to be addressed through agreement on the European Security Strategy (ESS).
In particular, the ESS clarified the extent to which a common EU counter-terrorism strategy would need to use structural power to address its ‘complex causes’:

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society (Council of EU, 2003: 4).

Within a year the European Commission had clarified the extent to which structural power would involve taking action to address the root causes of terrorism:

Action must also be taken to address the root causes of insecurity and the factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Steps aimed at enhancing security must be taken without prejudice to individual rights and freedoms and the openness and tolerance of our societies must be maintained. At the same time EU actions aim to strengthen governance, including the rule of law, and to encourage the development of sound institutions both within the Union and in third countries (European Commission, 2004: 1).

The exercise of structural power by European states has accelerated since the terrorist attacks on civilians in Madrid and London based on a more holistic approach including both domestic and international policies. There emerged a European consensus on the four pillars of an EU counter-terrorism strategy, firstly ‘to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally’ (Council of EU, 2005: 3). Internationally, structural power is being applied through EU Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, including the Cotonou agreement, to ‘help address the root causes of insecurity which may contribute to the emergence of terrorism’ as well as ‘better sequencing of governance, peace and security, linking relief, rehabilitation and development interventions on the basis of a holistic approach to … the prevention of terrorism’ (European Commission, 2004: 10, 15).

In contrast to relational or structural power, employing normative power would rely on a much broader approach to transforming the complex causes, radicalization process, and active symptoms of terrorism by engaging with the despair, alienation, grievances, and pressures created by economic, social, cultural, and political change and injustice. This more holistic approach has its origins in the European counter-terrorist strategy discussed above, but the ongoing military failures of the total war on terror in Iraq, together with the rising public awareness and outrage at prisoner abuse, illegal extradition and torture by the US and its European allies is leading to calls for the exercise of normative power to address ‘the pressures of modernization, cultural, social, and political crises’ (Council of EU, 2003: 4). It is here that the division of Europe created by the invasion of Iraq and accompanying human rights abuses is starting to be healed by a fragile consensus heeding the words of Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General:

The notion of larger freedom also encapsulates the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand ... This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and dramatic geopolitical change. While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to ‘cause’ civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence ... Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed (Annan, 2005: 5–6).

Such a consensus increasingly includes an acceptance of using normative power to promote human security as the core of a more holistic counter-terrorist strategy (Liotta and Owen, 2006). For the European Commission, human security means a concern for individuals, not states, and encompasses both freedom from fear (e.g. conflict and human rights abuses) and freedom from want (e.g. poverty and disease) (European Commission, 2005: 2; Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 103–7). The April 2006 ‘European Consensus on Development’ is an obvious example of
this commitment to normative power with its references to promoting human security in order to address the root-causes of violent conflict (European Consensus on Development, 2006: 3, 14) with an emphasis on common normative values:

EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity, and justice. The EU is strongly committed to effective multilateralism whereby all the world’s nations share responsibility for development (European Consensus on Development, 2006: 3).

Europe in counter-terrorism

The third question to ask is what understanding of Europe emerges as part of this counter-terrorist response? A civilizational Europe would be one fully engaged in a ‘clash of civilizations’ as part of a total war on terror. As discussed under civilizational Europe earlier, a larger number of groups around Europe have been keen to join with bin Laden and Bush in such a clash, for example with Ari Fleischer (the White House Press Secretary) and Silvio Berlusconi equating Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism (Berlusconi 2004; Fleischer, 2002). For Arundhati Roy this emphasis on civilization involves an ‘algebra of infinite justice’ where

the equivocating distinction between civilisation and savagery, between the ‘massacre of innocent people’ or, if you like, ‘a clash of civilisations’ and ‘collateral damage’. The sophistry and fastidious algebra of infinite justice. How many dead Iraqis will it take to make the world a better place? How many dead Afghans for every dead American? How many dead women and children for every dead man? How many dead mojahedin for each dead investment banker? (Roy, 2001)

In contrast, a categorical Europe would be one where clear-cut categories of good versus evil would be sought and applied, with the argument that ‘you are either with us or you are against us’ (Bush, 2001b). As discussed earlier, from September 2001 to January 2003, most Europeans were generally with the US in its attempts to counter-terrorism, including the ambiguous sanctioning of torture and extraordinary rendition. However the US invasion of Iraq, as well as the Madrid and London bombings, demonstrated the extent to which there are no such clear-cut categories, with civilians and human rights always being the victims (Guild, 2003). As the EU counter-terrorist strategy from December 2003 onwards makes clear, the phenomena which facilitate terrorist radicalization and recruitment are to be found both within and without Europe, thus blurring any precise distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’.

Finally, a cultural Europe would be one in which all such constructions of civilizations, total war, good versus evil, and ‘with us’ versus ‘against us’ might be understood as gross simplifications of complex cultural processes. From this perspective it seems clear that the intention of bin Laden and al-Qaeda was to provoke a response which would strengthen such gross cultural simplifications. Unfortunately the total war on terror in the pursuit of infinite justice is precisely the cultural response which the Salafi jihadists seek. A culturally aware European counter-terrorist response would be one which understood that ‘terrorism cannot defeat democracy in a straight fight, but democracy can defeat itself’ (Ignatieff, 2004), and that to suspend or abandon human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the name of security ‘would be to give the terrorists a victory they could never achieve by themselves’ (Ranstorp and Wilkinson, 2005: 7).

CONCLUSION: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

Obviously such a brief and cursory reflection on one of the most demanding questions of our time cannot provide anything other than a casual overview of counter-terrorist policy, but it does help to illustrate how a
transdisciplinary approach to almost any issue in contemporary European studies can be opened up for reflection (see Manners 2002 and 2007 for an opening up of human rights and counter-terrorist policies). Similarly, it is worth noting how replies to earlier questions such as ‘normative?’ and ‘power?’ tend to predetermine responses to later questions such as Europe?

As I have illustrated through this example, normative power Europe gives us a transdisciplinary approach to understanding why, how and with what effect differing ideas of the common good constitute, motivate and shape Europe. Such ideas of the common good should not be overlooked in European studies for, as Victor Hugo wrote in 1852, ‘An invasion of armies can be resisted; an invasion of ideas cannot be resisted’ (Hugo, 2004: 441). This transdisciplinary approach also suggests a means of developing a theory of society that goes beyond European integration to understand Europe in a global frame of reference, and perhaps thus giving us a better sense of the notion of the ‘good society’ in contemporary European studies.

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NOTES

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