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Publication date:
2009

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Citation for published version (APA):

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An African Security Regime in Progress?
The African Union, the EU - and the US

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Paper prepared for the panel
‘The EU and Security Regimes’,
5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, 10-12 September 2009
Abstract

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, Africa has become an important region within the global security architecture. The paper raises the question if an African security regime is developing. It is analysed if the security problems of Africa are on the international agenda. The interests and norms of three important actors, the African Union, the European Union and the United States are scrutinized. Also, negotiations on and implementation of security agreements are looked into. The paper concludes, it is possible to identify an African security regime with the AU and the EU as the participants whereas, the unilateral American approach to Africa makes it difficult to argue that the US is participation in the regime. The recent developments of the American understanding of the close link between development and security in Africa may imply that, in the near future, the US becomes a participant in the African security regime.


Introduction

In the current decade, Africa has become an important region within the global security architecture. The position is very different from the one which characterised Africa’s international relations during the cold war as well as during the years following the fall of the Berlin wall. No doubt, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States were very important in changing the general perception of Africa’s position in the ‘new’ post 9/11 global system. The terrorist attacks lead to a radical shift in the American strategic perception of Africa as it is clearly stated by J.P. Pham: ‘It took the shock of the 9/11 attacks to shift the focus of American policymakers and analysts back to Africa in a concerted manner’ (Pham 2007: 41). The priority given to fighting international terrorism has increasingly been mixed with another traditional US national security concern namely access to oil supplies from Africa (Klare & Volman 2006).

Historically, the European Community has had close relations with Africa. Until the end of the cold war, the involvement was restricted to the European Union delivering development assistance under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions (Grilli 1994; Holland 2002: 25-51; 85ff). During the 1990s, the concern for promoting economic and social development was supplemented by an explicit EU interest in managing and if possible preventing conflicts. The European Union’s concern of the increasing number of civil wars, regular inter-state wars and general instability throughout sub-Saharan Africa was stated in numerous public declarations (Landgraf 1998).

It was not only the European Union and the United States which worried about the security situation in sub-Saharan Africa. Ordinary Africans as well as African decision-makers were for obvious reason even more worried. These concerns led in 2002 to the establishment of the African Union (AU) as the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was no coincidence that an African
Security Council, modelled after the UN Security Council, was established as one of the crucial institutions of the AU.

Thus, in the current decade security and stability in sub-Saharan Africa have become core concerns of several international actors. It raises a number of questions. First, are we witnessing the development of an African security regime? And secondly if it is the case, how can we explain the development towards more regional and international cooperation on security issues in Africa south of the Sahara? It is the argument of the paper that, with some reservations, an African security regime is in progress. Moreover, it is the argument that this conspicuous development has to be explained by the increasing interdependency between Africa and the outside world. Specifically, the growth of an African security regime has to be explained with the mutual recognition building up among the European Union, the African Union - and possibly also the United States - that security and development are closely interconnected.

Before embarking on the analysis, the next section gives a brief presentation of the theoretical framework applied in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis focuses on the question if security in Africa is on the international agenda. It is followed by a scrutiny of the potential actors participating in the international discourse on security on the continent. Having identified these actors, it is pertinent to analyse the interests of the actors involved in promoting security and stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Regime theory points out negotiations as well as policy implementation are defining characteristics of the existence of an international regime, therefore the paper needs to address these issues too. The closing part of the empirical analysis focuses on the question if a convergence of expectations among the actors can be observed.
The theoretical framework

The debate on international regimes has not only lasted for several decades, it has taken many twists and turns over the years. Numerous definitions of international regimes have been promoted (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 8-22; Haggard & Simmons 1987; Mayer et al. 1995; Levy et al. 1995). The original definition was launched by Stephen Krasner who suggested it to be “principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1983:2). Other definitions have stressed regularity in behaviour and that some kind of principles and norms must exist to account for the existence of a regime (Haggard & Simmons 1987: 493).

Yet another definition treats regimes as multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-area (Haggard & Simmons: 1987 495). In their article on “the study of international regimes”, Marc Levy, Oran Young and Michael Zürn are fairly firm on the definition of an international regime as far as they state “we do not think it makes sense to use the term ‘regime’ in the absence of both a minimum of formalization and a minimum degree of convergence of expectations” (Levy et al. 1995: 272). The three authors agree to define international regimes as social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas” (Levy et al. 1995: 274).

The decades of debate on how to define international regimes have resulted in the development of three schools of thought distinguished from each other by the degree of ‘institutionalisation’ they tend to espouse (Hasenclever et al. 1997:2ff). Institutionalisation refers to how much international institutions matter. It is possible to talk about interest-based theories, power-based theories and finally
knowledge-based theories. Power-based theories find that institutionalism is weak whereas the interest-based theories argue for a medium degree of institutionalism and the knowledge-based theories claim a strong degree of institutionalism.

The theories not only differ from each other as to their ideas on institutionalisation. They also differ on what they find are the most convincing explanations to why international regimes develop. The explanations may either be power, interests or knowledge (Hasenclever et al. 1997). The paper has chosen interests as its core explanatory variable. Based on two different research projects, it seems as if interest-based variables produce the most promising explanations in comparison to power-based hypotheses (Mayer et al. 1995: 408ff). Moreover, Stephen Krasner’s analysis of the human rights regime confirms that regime properties can be explained in terms of the preferences and values, i.e. interests of the most powerful states involved (Krasner, 1995).

The paper defines an international regime as “multilateral agreements among actors aimed at regulating actions within a given issue-area. The agreements are based on a growing convergence of interests and norms and on an agreement concerning procedures and rules for future interactions within – in this case – the security field in sub-Saharan Africa”. The traditional aim of a security regime is to reduce conflicts between sovereign states by decreasing the uncertainty and distrust characteristic of the well-known ‘security dilemma’ (Crawford 1994 348; cf. Müller 1995: 361ff). A security regime in an African context has the same aim but also, it is expected to contribute to reducing tensions and violations of basic human rights within the individual African states. The core instrument to fulfil both aims is conflict management defined as activities explicitly geared towards addressing the causes and the consequences of likely conflict. However, the paper narrows its focus down to conflict management with military means meaning, it only looks into conflicts where conflict management is carried out by means of armed forces which may be either African or non-African.
The research on regimes has focused on several topics (Levy, et al, 1995: 268ff; Young 2005). One focus has been on the formation of regimes, i.e. on the question under what conditions and through what mechanisms do international regimes come into existence. Another focus has dealt with the consequences of regimes for state behaviour and for solving the problems they have been established to address, i.e. on how effective is the regime in question (Levy et al. 1995: 269).

The paper concentrates on regime formation and therefore, it concentrates on analysing the indicators which may, or may not, point towards the formation of an African security regime. Oran Young argues, it is useful to divide the process of regime formation into a number of distinct stages (Young, 2005: 95ff). The first of these stages is agenda setting referring to the process through which an issue emerges as a policy concern and how it is framed for consideration in the relevant policy arenas. Thus, ‘discourses’ on a specific policy issue serve to structure the ways in which we conceptualize problems and the cognitive constructs that guide the search for solutions to these problems. An issue may achieve so much international attention that it justifies the initiation of negotiations.

Negotiations are exactly the second stage of regime formation. Negotiations and bargaining involve actors and thereby, the issue of which forces are driving regime formation as well as the interests of these actors are brought into the focus. The third and final stage involves operationalization and implementation of agreements and thereby it refers to the process where agreements may make the transition from paper into practice (Young 2005: 95ff, 100; Levy et al. 1995: 282ff).

Summing up, if it is to be possible to talk about the development of an African security regime, a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. First of all, it is required it is possible to identify an international discourse on security and on the need to establish international cooperation in order to manage conflicts sub-Saharan Africa. Closely related to this, it is it is required that it is possible to
identify the actors involved in the negotiations and their interests and norms related to conflict management. Next, it is necessary that international agreements on security and conflict management are negotiated and bargained. Finally, is it possible to identify implementation of agreements? If these three conditions are met, it is the argument of the paper that an Africa security regime relying on conflict management by military means is in progress.

An international discourse on security in Africa

The core question addressed in this section is if there has been and still is an international debate on security and conflict management in Africa. For decades, the international debate on Africa was focussed on development and on poverty eradication in Africa (Grilli 1994; Holland 2002) and it was not until after the end of the cold war, a debate on security developed. During the 1990s, Africa was the continent most tormented by violent conflicts and grave violations of human rights. In 1999, it led to a “paradigm shift in peace and security” among African political leaders who agreed to replace the OAU and to establish it with the African Union (Murithi, 2008). The African Union was founded in Durban in July 2002 (Miki 2007: 113ff). At the summit, the establishment was accepted of the AU Peace and Security Council and its 15 members were mandated to conduct peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building. Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act affirms the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in crisis situations (ibid.). Tim Murithi’s conclusion as of 2008 is that “it goes without saying that the AU’s peace and security architecture will be a vital component of Africa’s strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent” (ibid).
During the 1990s, the EU and the European Commission in particular became the promoters of a debate on security and conflict management in Africa and on the need to do something about it (Olsen 2009). It was no coincidence that conflict management and the promotion of peace and stability in Africa became crucial elements of the CFSP/ESDP which developed significantly in the wake of the St. Malo summit in 1998 (Howorth, 2007). Africa together with the Balkans became the two geographical regions where the EU became most active with a number of military conflict management operations. At the first EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000 in a joint communiqué, it was established that security in Africa was a core priority of the both the EU and the African countries (Olsen 2006). The second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon of 8-9 December 2007 made it clear that making peace and security is a key dimension of the new EU-Africa joint strategy which described the relationship between the two regions as a ‘Strategic Partnership’ (EU-Africa, 2007). In the wake of the summit, the security interests have been specified to comprise related priorities such as preventing migration, fighting drug trafficking and terrorism (Interviews with officials, Council Secretariat, Brussels Oct. 2008).

The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 changed both the American strategic perceptions as well as the American discourse on Africa (Cohen 2005; Schraeder 2005; Pham 2005). First of all, Africa was suddenly considered an important region where the US was to meet its new enemy, international terrorism. The goal of fighting terrorism was strongly emphasized in the US national ‘Security Strategy’ launched in September 2002 (White House 2002). The White House ‘National Security Strategy’, issued in 2006, went further identifying Africa as ‘a high priority of this Administration’ and ‘recognizing that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under control of effective democracies’ (White House 2006 n.p.).
Summing up, there is no doubt that the 1990s and the current decade have been characterised by a high profiled and from time to time also an intensive international debate on security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. Two elements are worth noting in this context. First, the Africans mainly the African Union have involved themselves in the debates and the AU has even agreed on a number of far-reaching steps such as the possibility to intervene in sovereign states’ internal affairs. Secondly, it is important to stress that the international discourse on security issues in Africa is not restricted to the AU, the EU and the US alone. As Patricia Daley argues “peace and security is high on the agenda of many international development agencies and Western governments….” (Daley 2006: 310).

**Actors, interests and norms**

Having established there is and has been an international debate on security issues in Africa, the next step is to identify the actors involved in potential negotiations on the establishment of a security regime on the continent. Closely linked to the identification, it is important to discuss the interests and the norms of these actors. The most important actors involved in the development of an African security regime are supposed to be the African Union, the European Union and the United States. The pointing out of these three actors means that the United Nations, China and individual European states are left out of the analysis.

The Durban summit accepted that the African Union has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the continent. Since its creation, keeping peace and security has been a major concern of the AU and in recent years, the organisation has played a central role preventing conflicts and violence on the continent. In addition to the African PSC, the AU
established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA consists of different kinds of mechanisms such as a Continental Early Warning System, a Panel of the Wise, an African Stand-by Force and a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework. From the outset, the most conspicuous instrument has been the African Standby Force which is expected to become operational by 2010. Until now, AU military missions have been deployed in Burundi, Darfur/Sudan, Somalia, The Central African Republic and in the Comoros (Cilliers 2008; Siradag, 2009: 2ff, 28ff).

The security interests of the African Union are clearly formulated in the article 4 (e, f, d) of the AU’s Constitutive Act. For the discussion here, it is important to establish that one of the basic principles related to the AU’s peacekeeping policy is to strengthen the cooperation internationally as well as with the sub-regional organisations for sustaining peace and security (Siradag 2009: 28f; Cilliers 2008). According to the AU PSC, political and economic stability is an essential prerequisite for preserving peace, security and stability in Africa. This particular conception is closely linked to the establishment of the NEPAD-program in 2001. NEPAD is considered as an instrument to strengthen political and economic stability and regional cooperation and integration on the continent. Moreover, the AU set up the African Peer Review Mechanism in 2002 within the framework of NEPAD to promote democracy, human rights and good governance (Melber, 2006: 5-6). Based on these developments, it is possible to argue that the AU has a comprehensive understanding of the close link between security and stability on the one hand and economic and social progress on the other.

As the European Union is not a unitary actor in international affairs, a number of actors are involved in EU policy-making on Africa. Decisions on general foreign policy initiatives as well as decisions on deployment of armed forces have to follow strict intergovernmental procedures and therefore, the EU member states in principle have a significant impact on these decisions. Not only do they participate directly in policy-making on Africa, the member states also have the direct
responsibility for initiating and implementing EU crisis management operations (Gourley 2004: 404-421). Moreover, institutional actors in particular the Council Secretariat and European Commission, with their individual interests influence European Union decisions. Indeed, a “case study of the EU security policy in Africa shows that (it) .....relies for a large part on institutional dynamics. The EU security policies in Africa are at least as much determined by bureaucratic affiliations of the concerned EU actors as they are by African realities” (Bagoyoko & Gibert 2009: 790). Moreover, a recent analysis shows that the Commission exerts considerable influence on the European African policies which is attributed to ‘the EU institutional system (which) has provided the Commission with several unofficial channels of influence…. (thus) the Commission appears able to exploit the gaps in the EU pillar structure in order to affirm its competence on security matters’ (Sicurelli 2008: 231).

The identification of the European interests towards Africa is difficult because of the Union’s principle of intergovernmentalism in decision-making and because of the bureaucratic actors involved in the policy-making on Africa (Bagoyoko & Gibert 2009: 806). Nevertheless, it is assumed possible to talk about ‘European interests’. Often, it is emphasised that the European Union’s foreign policy is influenced by ethical and moral concerns and it is suggested that this type of priorities play an important role in foreign policy-making (Hyde-Price 2008: 108). The influence from ethics is mixed up with at least three other types of interests which finally crystallize into the Africa policy of the Union. First a ‘new’ Africa policy with emphasis on security may provide new legitimacy for the development policy of the Union which is the responsibility of the Commission. Secondly, the Council secretariat finds that Africa security is a field of experimentation for implementation of the CFSP and therefore important. Thirdly, some member states in particular France have an interest in Europeanization of their bilateral Africa policies and the EU is seen as an adequate means for this interest (Bagoyoko & Gibert 2009: 790-91).
The official recognition of a close connexion between development on the one hand and peace and stability on the other is an obvious example of the influence of European soft values. But it is also a reflection of the influence of the three types of interests mentioned by Niagalé Bagoyoko and Mary Gibert. The recognition of a close link between stability and development was clearly stated in the European Africa Strategy adopted in late 2005 which stated ‘without peace, there can be no lasting development…. it is now universally recognised that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. Peace and security are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development’ (European Communities: 2005: 10, 26).

Historically, the United States has had limited interests in sub-Saharan Africa which explains why American Africa policy has been characterised by bureaucratic policy-making described as ‘bureaucratic incrementalism’ (Schraeder 1995: 23-25). At least 5 different bureaucracies in Washington are involved in decision-making on Africa and in order to understand the US policy towards Africa, it is absolutely necessary to look at the interactions of the bureaucratic decision-makers. Peter Schraeder maintains that the ‘unique nature of the US policy making system ensures that specific policy initiatives often emerge from and are coordinated by the national security bureaucracies with little input from the White House’ (Schraeder 2006: 6). Specifically, it is argued that the Pentagon has been the primary driving force in the creation and expansion of the current regional security initiatives (Schraeder 2006: 12).

There are two main concerns of the United States towards Africa in the post 9/11 period and it is the global war on terrorism and it is the increasing dependency on oil imports from the continent. In 2004, an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors that have shaped American interests in Africa in the past decade: oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror and HIV/AIDS. In 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,
Walter H. Kansteiner III declared ‘African oil is of national strategic interest to us’ (Wall 2009). The question of access to oil has become even more important in the face of the fast growing Chinese presence in Africa which is strongly focussed on oil (Chong 2008: 19).

In addition to these hard core interests, new interests seem to have developed in recent years. Thus, in 2007, a radical shift took place in the American Africa policy with the decision to establish a special US Africa Command, Africom. Africom is a military command responsible for all US military activity in Africa meaning that all African countries except Egypt are brought under a single unified combat command. The decision to establish this special command for Africa implied a radical shift in policy from giving priority to combat operations to focusing on conflict prevention. The Africa Command clearly reflects the evolution in American policy makers’ perceptions of US strategic interests in Africa (McFate 2007: 114; McFate 2008: 115ff). Africom was born out of a number of security lessons one of which is that military force may not be the best instrument in security policy whereas ‘soft power capacities’ aimed at preventing conflict may be better (Henk 2009: 40). Finally, the presence of State Department representatives in Africom can increase the responsiveness of the US effort to local conditions” (Davis 2009:135; 131; Patrick 2008: 138).

The recognition that security and development are closely linked and mutually reinforcing is part of the new strategic paradigm which stresses that only by the addressing the challenges of development can security be achieved and maintained. Thus, it is difficult to argue in favour of a convergence of expectations between on the one hand the AU and the EU and on the other the US. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the strategic focus of the Africom implies official American recognition that development and security are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

In conclusion, these recent changes in the perceptions may result in a change in the American behaviour towards their African partners. Also, it may lead to a convergence of expectations between
the African Union and the US and possibly also between the US and the European Union. In the latter relationship, France is a very important actor when it comes to influence and to carry out EU military mission in Africa. Therefore, it is worth noting that French army officers apparently take a positive look at the prospects for closer cooperation with the Americans in the Africom. “On two separate occasions I accompanied senior US Defence Dept. officials to the French Ministry of Defence and provided briefings on Africom. They were uniformly supportive and intended to provide French officers to the Africom staff. The French told us they are trying to internationalise their assistance in Africa – they simply don’t have the resources to impact the problems sufficiently. The idea of the US focussing on African security issues through this new command is welcomed by the senior French officers we talked to” (Marchal, 2007)

**Negotiations**

The existence of negotiations is the second crucial element in the process identifying if an African security regimes is under development. There appears to have been numerous rounds of negotiations on security issues in Africa. “Regional states acting unilaterally, the European Union, the USA, Canada, European countries, religious organisations such as the Catholic Church and international and regional NGO’s are all active in the negotiations” (on peace and security in Africa), Patricia Daley points out (Daley 2006: 310). On a number of occasions, African heads of state and heads of government have met with European Union heads of state and government. The two EU-Africa summits in 2000 and again in 2007 are the most highly profiled in this context. In between these meeting, officials from both
sides have met on a regular basis to discuss security issues including conflict prevention measures under the headline of the EU-Africa dialogue (Siradag 2009: 35; Cilliers 2008).

At the July 2002 summit in Durban establishing the African Union, the European Commission and the AU decided to develop cooperation between the two regions with respect to promoting peace and security (Siradag, 2009: 38). Since then, the EU and the AU have cooperated to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa. The handsome financial EU for support of the African Peace and Security Architecture is one of the significant results from these close contacts. The main instrument has been the ‘African Peace Facility’ which is intended to finance African Union troops to carry out conflict management operations on the continent.

The general approach of the US towards Africa and towards conflict management on the continent appears to be influenced by great power thinking combined with strong bureaucratic influence. Laura Nathan argues that the US has been so preoccupied with its own concerns that it has forgotten the African partner (Nathan 2009: 60). This situation has had a strong impact on the American approach to negotiations with the African counterparts implying a less attentive attitude towards the African partners. Often, it leads to a less than harmonious relationship to the African partner depending on which bureaucracy is taking the lead in policy-making on a particular country (Schraeder, 2006: 12). The regional programs are to a very large extent bureaucratically inspired responses to what is considered as core American priorities. The African Crisis Response Initiative of the 1990s may be illustrative of such a programme which “had more to do with what the US felt it could provide than what the African countries necessarily needed” (Bah & Aning 2008: 121). The unilateral establishment in 2007 of Africcom and the prior lack of consultation of African leaders is a repetition of the American announcement of the African Crisis Response Force in 1996 which lead a similarly painful learning with negative African responses as the consequence (Burgess 2009: 79-99).
It was a “failure by the US administration not to consult the African Union about Africom” and it is not to be seen as “a communications lapse but as indicative of the superpower’s arrogance, ignorance of African politics and disregard for the efforts of Africans to enhance their own security” (Nathan, 2009: 60). Eric Berman is basically in agreement with this evaluation pointing towards the American tradition for launching major diplomatic initiatives in Africa without prior consulting their African ‘partners’ (Berman 2009). Stephen Burgess finds that Africom was created in an ‘authoritarian manner’ by not consulting the African partners. Because the African political leaders were not consulted before the announcement, they were upset and some African leaders felt the formation of Africom without prior consultation and input from African states as a sign of arrogance and condescension. The African resistance culminated in a January 2008 African Union summit where Africom was a matter of heated discussion.

In conclusion, for some years there have been negotiations on security in Africa involving the African Union and the EU. However, the American unilateral approach makes it difficult to argue that the Americans have been involved in multilateral negotiations on security in Africa. Based on the scrutiny of the negotiations it can be argued that it is possible to identify an African security regime consisting of the AU and the EU whereas, based only on the issues of negotiations, it does not appear reasonable to maintain that the regime includes the United States.

Operationalization – implementation of policies

The section aims very briefly to give an overview of the military conflict management initiatives launched in the post 2001 period. Obviously, it is the aim to scrutinize if the third precondition for the
development of an international regime is fulfilled. The analysis is divided into three subsections. First, the initiatives of the African Union are looked into. Second, the military conflict management of the European Union in Africa are briefly presented and finally, the actions and policies of the United States are scrutinised.

Since 2002, the African Union has carried out a number of conflict management missions. The biggest, most comprehensive but also the most difficult operation is the one in Darfur, Sudan. The Peace and Security Council of the AU has stressed that the African Union should play a more active role in resolving the Darfur crisis and also to work closely with, among others, the EU maintaining peace and stability in the region. Therefore, the AU has deployed troops under the AMIS I and AMIS II operations in Darfur in order to protect the civilians. Moreover, the AU troops have involved themselves in peacekeeping activities. By means of the African Peace Facility, the European Union has handsomely supported the AU with financial and human resources etc. (Murithi, 2008: 76-78; Siradag 2009: 43-59; Williams 2006).

The AU has been involved in activities related to promoting peace, security and stability since the DRC conflicts began. The EU has supplied economic resources via the APF and advice and technical advice including support of disarmament and of the general elections (Siradag, 2009: 59-66). Between 1993 and 2005, Burundi was ravaged by a civil war between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-dominated army. Since 2003, the AU has been engaged in maintaining peace and security in Burundi since 2003 as it decided to deploy troops in the country. The AU mission consisted of more than 3.000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide security. Once again, the EU has played an active role in promoting peace in the Central African country. (Murithi, 2008: 74-76; Siradag, 2009: 66-73; Daley, 2006). “In fact, without the Africa Peace Facility it is unlikely that the AU would have been able to undertake any of these missions. Since the
implementation of the Africa Peace Facility, the relationship between the AU and the EU as developed quite strongly, resulting in the EU strategy for Africa and recently the extension of the joint EU-Africa strategy in December 2007”, Jakkie Cilliers concludes (Cilliers 2008: 12)

In the current decade, the European Union has launched no less than three military operations aimed at managing African violent conflict. Operation ‘Artemis’ was launched in June 2003 and took place in the North Eastern Ituri province of the DRC. The aim of the operation was to stabilize the security situation in the crisis-ridden Ituri province in the DRC and to improve the humanitarian situation in and around the main town of Bunia (Faria 2004; Ulriksen et al. 2004).

During the election campaign in the DRC in the spring of 2006, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council decided, temporarily, to support the UN mission (MONUC) already in the country. The EUFOR DRC was conducted within the framework of the ESDP and was assigned to support MONUC to stabilize the situation during the election process, protect civilians and protect the airport in Kinshasa. The military deployment with the operational headquarter provided by Germany included an advance element of almost 1,000 soldiers in and around Kinshasa (Council 2006; Olsen 2009: 253-254).

Soon after the UN Security Council passed a resolution in September 2007 authorizing the deployment of a military force for one year in Eastern Chad and in the North-Eastern part of the Central African Republic, the EU signalled it was ready to take on the responsibility for implementing the military mission. On 28 January 2008 it was decided to launch a military operation of up to 3,700 troops to support and to protect refugees from Darfur and internally displaced people from the region (Background 2008; Olsen 2009: 254-256). Obviously, the initiative was to be understood as an integral element in the EU’s effort to contribute to solving the crisis in Darfur (Interviews with officials Council Secretariat Oct. 2008).
Immediately after September 11, the US launched a number of regional security initiatives sending the signal that Africa is an important region in the global fight against terrorism. The Pentagon established its ‘Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’ based in Djibouti with the objective to engage in counterterrorist activities (Lobe, 2003; Rothchild & Emmanuel 2005). The focus of the task force is on ‘detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating trans-national terrorist groups operating in the region and provide a forward presence in the region’ (Ploch 2008: 18). The force is also to train the region’s security forces in counter terrorism, to collect intelligence and to serve as advisors to peace operations.

In addition to these training initiatives, the Pentagon has launched a number of programmes focussing on regional security in Africa. Among the major security assistance programmes implemented by the Department of Defence is the ‘Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership’ started under the name PSI in 2002. Another regional programme is the ‘East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative’ which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda launched in 2003. It is considered a pilot project for the State Department and it aims at financing a number of smaller programmes focussing on border control in the wider East African region. The primary aim of these programmes is to build the capacity of the African armies. In line with this, Africom is expected to concentrate its activities on training and on assistance to professionalize local militaries so they can better endure stability and security on the continent. Also, Africom is to oversee all current counter-terrorism programs like the Horn of Africa initiative and the Trans Sahara Initiative (McFate 2007; McFate 2008: 10ff).

Summing up, the implementation of security related activities in sub-Saharan Africa seems to point towards an interesting pattern. On the one hand, there are AU operations funded by the EU and other international actors. The interdependency between the AU and the EU is obvious as it is
established by Tim Murithi “In terms of the 10th European Development Fund, the EU has pledged support for the African Peace and Security Architecture and will provide 300 million Euro towards the facility for an initial three-year period, from 2008 to 2010. The EU seeks to support long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management, to enable Africa’s ability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict” (Murithi, 2008: 81). Also, there are EU operations carried out with the full consent of the AU. Together, these two types of interventions lead to a conclusion that there is an African security regime. On the other hand, American initiatives have been implemented with the consent of individual governments and in some cases of the African Union. Based on the scrutiny in this section, it is nevertheless a question if we are facing one or maybe two African security regimes.

**Concluding reflections**

Based on the analysis made here, it is the conclusion of the paper that it is possible to talk about an African security regime with the African Union and the European Union as the participants. The two actors are in frequent contact and they are in basic agreements about the norms and principles which are to guide future security interventions in Africa. Moreover, they have more or less identical interests in promoting security and stability on the continent. Based on the analysis of the American approach to Africa and the American security interventions on the continent, it does not appear reasonable to argue that the US participates in the African security regime. On the other hand, the development of the American perceptions and the American understanding of the security problems in Africa points towards a conclusion that within few years, we might be witnessing an African security regime comprising not only the AU, the EU but also the United States.
The explanation to these developments is basically the recognition among African, European and American decision-makers who share a common understanding that, what happens on the continent has an impact on the outside world. It means there is a common understanding of an increasing interdependency between Africa and the EU and between Africa and the United States. Formulated differently, the problems of Africa and not least the lack of development have an impact not only on the lives of the Africans. These problems also have an impact in Europe and in North-America. It is argued that among the three actors, there is an increasing convergence of the understanding of how to address the security challenges of Africa as far as they share a common understanding that there is a close link between development and security. The AU and the EU have moved fairly far in this direction whereas the jury is still out in the case of the official American position.

Oran Young argues that regime theory can be considered as an approach to global governance (Young 2005: 97). If this point of view is adopted, it is possible to argue that not only is an African security regime in progress. We might be witnessing the development of elements to a new system of global governance.
List of references


Krasner, S. (1983)


(http://forums.csis.org/aafrica/?p=64; accessed 10-06-2009)


