

Frictions on both sides of the counter?

A study of red tape among street-level bureaucrats and administrative burden among their clients

Madsen, Jonas Krogh

Published in:
Administration & Society

DOI:
[10.1177/00953997241244694](https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997241244694)

Publication date:
2024

Document Version
Peer reviewed version

Citation for published version (APA):

Madsen, J. K. (2024). Frictions on both sides of the counter? A study of red tape among street-level bureaucrats and administrative burden among their clients. *Administration & Society*, 56(6), 738-762.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997241244694>

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@kb.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

This is a peer reviewed Author Accepted version of the article: Madsen JK. 2024. Frictions on both sides of the counter? A study of red tape among street-level bureaucrats and administrative burden among their clients. *Administration & Society*. 56(6):738-762. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997241244694>. It is licensed under the Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND

Frictions on both sides of the counter? A study of red tape among street-level bureaucrats and administrative burden among their clients

Abstract

Administrative burden research shows that onerous and dysfunctional policy design can have detrimental outcomes among policy recipients. But less is known about the intermediary role played by the street-level bureaucrats who enforce these policies in practice. Using two separate surveys of 775 unemployment benefit recipients and 107 counsellors in the Danish unemployment benefit system, I find that recipients report higher levels of administrative burden when served by counsellors who themselves experience red tape from the rules and procedures they have to implement. The findings have important policy implications by showing that experiences of frictions among those assigned to convert onerous policies into practice can exacerbate administrative burden among their clients.

Introduction

Recent years has seen a massive surge in research about the detrimental impact of administrative burden on policy take-up and – more generally - program success (Bell and Smith 2022; Christensen et al. 2020; Gilad and Assouline 2022). Multiple studies have shown how citizens' experiences of learning, compliance, and psychological costs tend to increase with onerous policy design, such as time-consuming application tasks, demanding eligibility requirements, or complicated rules (Bækgaard et al. 2021; Peeters and Campos 2020; Moynihan et al. 2016; Fox et al. 2020; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2021).

In administrative burden parlance, however, state actions encompass both a policy's design *and* how this policy is implemented by street-level bureaucrats (Christensen et al. 2020; Aarøe et al. 2021; Herd and Moynihan 2018). While the former has received much attention, only few administrative burden studies focus on the latter (Jilke et al. 2018; Porter and Rogowski 2018; Olsen, Kyhse-Andersen, and Moynihan 2021) and even less so on the empirical link between street-level bureaucrats perceptions and the administrative burden experiences of their clients (Nisar and Masood 2021; Bell and Smith 2022; Bækgaard and Tankink 2022; Mikkelsen, Madsen, and Bækgaard 2023). This novel line of research is important as administrative burden are not only products of policy design, but also relate to how the street-level bureaucrats perceive and implement policies in practice.

It is well-established in street-level bureaucracy research that multiple different factors affect frontline discretionary decision-making, such as the street-level bureaucrats' role perceptions (Bell and Smith 2019), their view of clients (Nisar 2018), and administrative capacity (Ali and Altaf 2021). Here, a particularly long-standing theme has been the red tape encountered by street-level bureaucrats when rules and procedures that apply to the daily work of the street-level bureaucrat lack functionality, a legitimate purpose, or impose compliance burdens (Bozeman 2000, 2012; Kaufmann

and Tummers 2017). However, while red tape has been shown to hamper organisational performance and employee outcomes across a wide range of policy contexts (Campbell et al. 2022; George et al. 2021; Pandey 2020), no studies investigate whether street-level bureaucrats' red tape perceptions relate to administrative burden experiences among the clients they encounter. Addressing this gap is highly important for the understanding and evaluation of policies – such as conditional unemployment benefits – where street-level bureaucrats are obligated to disseminate, implement, and, ultimately, enforce highly demanding policies onto clients with often complex needs. During such citizen-state interactions, red tape from rules and procedures that lack functionality, clear purposes, or are simply overly rigid are likely to be highly salient to the street-level bureaucrats and consequently also matter to their behavior towards clients.

In this paper, I study how perceived job-centered red tape among street-level bureaucrats relates to their clients' administrative burden experiences. Merging insights from literatures on street-level bureaucracy, red tape, and administrative burden, I argue that red tape can drain street-level bureaucrats' resources and autonomous work motivation to the detriment of their behaviour towards clients. I test the propositions using data from two separate surveys among 107 counsellors and 775 unemployment insurance recipients across 40 departments in a large Danish unemployment insurance fund. In the counsellor survey, I measure the counsellors' perceived red tape along two dimensions: the compliance burdens and the lack of functionality of rules and procedures that apply for their counselling of clients. In the client survey, I measure clients' experiences of administrative burden along two dimensions: the compliance costs and the learning costs from rules and demands in the unemployment benefit system. As the data does not allow me to match counsellors and clients directly, I aggregate red tape perceptions to department averages and test their correlation with administrative burden experiences among clients in the same departments in a series of ordinary least squares regressions. The results show that recipients experience

significantly more compliance costs when served by departments with higher perceptions of red tape among counsellors. The associations between red tape and learning costs are less consistent across robustness checks, but nevertheless point in a similar direction. Taken together, the results suggest that when street-level bureaucrats themselves encounter red tape during client interactions, clients are also more likely to experience administrative burdens.

Moving from objective to subjective measures

In recent years, it has become increasingly popular to use the administrative burden framework to study the learning, compliance, and psychological costs that arise when citizens ‘experience a policy’s implementation as onerous’ (Burden et al. 2012; Peeters 2019). By definition, the concept of administrative burden puts citizens’ experiences at the centre of analysis and thereby distinguishes these experiences from the state actions causing them (Christensen et al. 2020). State actions, on the other hand, designate the rules and demands encompassing a policy’s design and the policy’s implementation by street-level bureaucrats.

With this distinction, the concept offers a framework to investigate why citizens sometimes respond to policies irrespective of – and occasionally directly against – the policy’s intended design and purpose (Herd and Moynihan 2018; Baekgaard and Tankink 2020; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2020). However, the role played by street-level bureaucrats has so far received little empirical scrutiny. This gap is striking as citizens rarely face a faceless bureaucracy; taxpayers call tax officers for tax filing assistance, patients get health checks from doctors at the hospital, and benefit recipients have meetings with caseworkers at the job centre. In each example, the street-level bureaucrats are themselves mediators of the policy to the client which makes it important to understand how their discretionary decision-making hinges on their personal and situational

characteristics, such as their skills, attitudes, and organisational context (Lipsky 1980; Pandey and Kingsley 2000; Kaufmann and Haans 2020; Baviskar and Winter 2017). Particularly when client interactions are bound by rules and procedures, street-level bureaucrats might, for instance, experience that rule compliance consumes resources that otherwise be spent on meeting preparation, struggle to understand how rules are to be applied in practice, or even question the purposefulness of the rules for the clients they encounter (Pandey 2020; Guul et al. 2020). These experiences shape street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape in the policies they enforce on clients. And the type and degree of such red tape can – intendedly or not – affect how they behave towards clients and thereby also whether clients experience policy implementation to be onerous (Herd and Moynihan 2018; George et al. 2021).

To investigate the relation between street-level bureaucrats' red tape perceptions and their clients' administrative burden experiences, I employ the 'job-centered' red tape definition developed by van Loon et al. (2016). Unlike classic definitions that focus on how objective rules increase red tape (George et al. 2021; Madsen et al. 2020; Bozeman and Feeney 2011), the job-centered definition explicitly captures the street-level bureaucrats' own subjective perceptions of red tape from the rules and procedures surrounding their core job functions (van Loon et al. 2016; van Loon 2017; for an additional subjective red tape measure, see Borry 2016). Here, red tape is measured on two dimensions: the degree to which time and effort go into complying with the rule (*compliance burden*) and the degree to which the rule serves its intended purpose (*lack of functionality*) (van Loon 2017: 62). As an example, a rule causes compliance burdens when a street-level bureaucrat spends time on registering client activities rather than providing actual client counselling, and a lack of functionality when having to enforce demands that are irrelevant to the client's situation.

Focusing exclusively on job-centered red tape as perceived by street-level bureaucrats in the front-line – as opposed to other individuals at higher management levels – improves

measurement validity as employees assess red tape in relation to their own job function and not on behalf of the *whole* organisation or across those with different responsibilities (van Loon 2017; Kaufman 1977). Moreover, it allows for the study of red tape among employees at the street level, where frustrations over, for instance, outdated or dysfunctional rules are most salient and thus potentially also more consequential to citizen-related behaviours (Brewer and Walker 2010; van Loon et al. 2016). And third, it helps explain whether and how specific dimensions of red tape matter to the outcomes of interest. This follows the argument by Migchelbrink and Van de Walle, who perceive red tape as a multidimensional concept with potentially also has multifaceted effects (2020).

How is red tape linked to street-level bureaucrats' behavior?

How might perceptions of red tape among street-level bureaucrats be associated with their clients' experiences of administrative burden? In the following, I draw on the original intentions behind the measure (van Loon et al. 2016; van Loon 2017) along with recent empirical studies of red tape (George et al. 2021), administrative burden (Herd and Moynihan 2018), and street-level bureaucracy (Tummers et al. 2015) to highlight three relevant mechanisms potentially linking red tape to administrative burdens.

The perhaps most traditional approach to red tape is perceiving it as an obstacle to street-level bureaucrats' available resources: When street-level bureaucrats spend their already limited time and energy on understanding and fulfilling rules and procedures, they simply have fewer resources to invest in core job activities (Blom et al. 2020; Jacobsen and Jakobsen 2018; van Loon 2017; Kaufmann, Taggart, and Bozeman 2018). Here, red tape hinders them from performing extra-role behaviors, such as preparing for meetings, engage in actual interactions with clients, or other ways of moving towards clients (Tummers et al. 2015), and instead makes them ration their available

resources and routinize services towards clients (Huang et al. 2022). With Maynard-Moody and Musheno's classic notion, street-level bureaucrats cope with red tape by resorting to the role of a state-agent, who focus more on complying with rules and procedures of the job, than a citizen-agent, who first and foremost seeks to meet the needs of their clients (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). A series of recent studies support this mechanism by showing how red tape – as an obstacle hindering or slowing down achievement of such citizen-oriented job goals – reduces job satisfaction, work engagement, and ultimately employee performance (Brunetto et al. 2017; Borst et al. 2019; Steijn and van der Voet 2019; Cooke et al. 2019; Sharma, Gautam, and Chaudhary 2019; Heinrich 2016; Henderson and Borry 2023). Although both subdimensions of red tape will potentially affect the street-level bureaucrats' behaviour towards clients, it is most likely to stem from compliance burdens which directly captures the degree to which street-level bureaucrats experience an inherent resource loss from complying with excess rules and procedures.

However, red tape can also be a question of how well rules and procedures serve job purposes (van Loon 2017; Jacobsen et al. 2014; Mikkelsen et al. 2015). For instance, when street-level bureaucrats are preoccupied with the fulfilment of detailed procedures that do not advance policy goals, their professional discretion is compromised. This can lead to a loss of co-participation and induce feelings of meaninglessness (Hattke, Hensel, and Kalucza 2020; George et al. 2021; Borst 2018). As a result, their behaviour towards clients can turn increasingly machinelike (DeHart-Davis and Pandey 2005: 135; George et al. 2021). Here, a study by Jacobsen and Jakobsen suggest that perceived red tape does indeed threaten the basic psychological need for autonomy, and thereby compromise the performance-enhancing autonomous work motivation (Jacobsen and Jakobsen 2017; Vansteenkiste et al. 2020; Deci and Ryan 2000; DeHart-Davis et al. 2015). This demotivational impact of red tape occurs when rules and procedures are detached from clients' needs and is, therefore, more likely to be related to red tape as lack of functionality.

Finally, red tape can potentially also work in more complex ways by increasing street-level bureaucrats' rule-bending behaviours (Potipiroon 2022; van Loon 2017; Tummers et al. 2015; Lipsky 1980). In this view, the street-level bureaucrat are so used to navigate work situations in which formalised rules and procedures are less applicable to their clients' situations that red tape will not reduce their role as citizen-agents. Rather, they will bend – or even ignore – existing these rules and procedures to keep addressing clients' specific needs (Potipiroon 2022). Rule-bending thus becomes a way of proactively coping with rules that stand in the way of addressing clients' needs (DeHart-Davis 2007; Tummers et al. 2015). Indeed, a series of recent studies even find that red tape is in fact positively associated with both prosocial rule-bending (Borry and Henderson 2020), innovative search for new solutions (Sharma, Gautam, and Chaudhary 2019), and even attitudes towards public participation (Migchelbrink and Van de Walle 2022). Unlike the other two mechanisms described above, the rule-bending mechanism is likely to stem from both red tape as a compliance burden and red tape as lack of functionality, although evidence suggests that proactive rule-bending behavior is most strongly related to the latter (Sharma, Gautam, and Chaudhary 2019; Migchelbrink and Van de Walle 2022).

However, there are several reasons why a negative impact of red tape on administrative burden is a more likely scenario than a positive. First, not all street-level bureaucrats are professionally socialised to such rule-bending behaviours, let alone have the work discretion to bend – or even break – the rules and procedures that apply to their job (DeHart-Davis 2017; Dudau, Kominis, and Brunetto 2020; Borry and Henderson 2020). Second, if street-level bureaucrats experience rules and procedures as a compliance burden or dysfunctional, they might express their own frustrations to their clients or – if clients voice experiences of administrative burden – acknowledge and emphasize with their clients' frustrations. While the latter could potentially make clients feel emphasized with and perhaps more at the centre of their counselling, both will likely

solidify clients' perceptions of administration burden. Finally, and most importantly, a positive average impact of red tape on administrative burden would presuppose that the rule-bending would effectively outplay the purported negative effects of drained resources and reduced motivation on the street-level bureaucrats' behavior. As these latter effects generally receive more support in the literature of red tape – and are particularly prevalent in emotionally draining social service contexts (Henderson and Borry 2023; Moesby-Jensen and Nielsen 2015) – , it seems most likely that rule-bending could moderate – but not necessarily overshadow – the negative impact of red tape on resources and motivation.

How is administrative burdens linked to street-level bureaucrats behaviour?

Why would street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape then relate to clients' experiences of administrative burden? First, if red tape saps the resources or motivation of the street-level bureaucrat, they will spend less time preparing and processing the client's case, be less flexible with regards to the scheduling of client meetings, less prone to offer personalised guidance about where clients can get information that proves their standing, all of which would make street-level bureaucrats more likely to impose compliance demands unsuited to their clients' skillset, interests, and general situation (Moynihan et al. 2014; Soss et al. 2011). As a consequence, clients have to make more effort to provide and register the information necessary for document eligibility, have overwhelming compliance demands imposed upon them, such as extensive work requirements, irrelevant activation courses, or – in the most extreme cases – financial sanctions. Hence, red tape is likely to increase compliance costs.ⁱ

H1: Street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape as compliance burdens are positively associated with their clients' experiences of compliance costs.

H2: Street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape as lack of functionality are positively associated with their clients' experiences of compliance costs.

Second, when street-level bureaucrats have limited time and motivation to prepare for meetings or answer specific informational questions related to their clients' situations, the clients will receive less help to comprehend the nature of their benefits, which conditions need to be satisfied, or which services they are entitled to (Herd and Moynihan 2018). In short, this will result in clients feeling less equipped at understanding the rules and procedures that apply to their benefit and the options available to them for navigating the benefit system. As a result, I expect that red tape will be positively associated with experiences of learning costs among clients.

H3: Street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape as compliance burdens are positively associated with their clients' experiences of learning costs.

H4: Street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape as lack of functionality are positively associated with their clients' experiences of learning costs.

In sum, I expect that both dimensions of perceived red tape among street-level bureaucrats is positively associated with both dimensions of administrative burden experiences among citizens. It is less clear whether compliance burdens and lack of functionality will be stronger related to either compliance costs or learning costs. Moreover, the research design does not allow me to effectively

distinguish empirically between these mechanisms. In the analysis and discussion, I do however provide a series of additional explorative tests to add more depth to the findings.

Data and method

To test the relationship between perceptions of red tape and experiences of administrative burden, I focus on counsellors and clients in the unemployment insurance system in Denmark. I choose this case for several reasons. First, unemployment insurance funds have a special role in the Danish unemployment benefit system as private non-profit actors that take part in both the development of unemployment policies, as members of labour market policy boards at the national level, while simultaneously responsible for implementing these policies locally (Bredgaard and Larsen 2005). Second, larger unemployment insurance funds are often decentralised which potentially make the implementation of national policies vary across departments and counsellors. Third, although recipients of unemployment insurance receive comparatively generous benefits compared to other OECD countries (Knotz 2020), benefit eligibility requires active compliance with several different demands (Faglig Fælles A-Kasse 2021). Most importantly, they have to exhibit ‘availability for the labour market’ by actively seeking jobs each week, registering job-search related activities online, maintaining an updated CV online, attend activation courses on ‘a day’s notice’, self-book meetings with both the municipal job centre as well as their local unemployment insurance fund if requested, and accept any job offers within 90 minutes public transport from their home. At the same time, recipients face various different financial sanctions if they do not e.g. show up for meetings, attend activation courses they are assigned to, or in other ways do not exhibit an ‘availability for the labour market’. In such cases, their benefit payments can be put on hold until they return with a valid reason for their absence. They are automatically imposed a reduction in their monthly benefit allowance

(equivalent to a full day's rate of benefit payments) if they do not work at least 148 hours across a four month-period. A range of specific rules also apply to how benefits are reduced if recipient have additional income from part-time contracts, if they receive a pension, or have remaining annual leave from their previous occupation. Finally, the unemployment insurance system is a relevant case as the recipients are interacting with – often several different – counsellors over their unemployment period. During meetings, mail or phone communication, these counsellors have to assist the recipients in finding their way (back) into employment, but at the same time granted discretion to sanction those who do not show availability for the labor market. Counsellors thus have to actively assess whether recipients live up to the extensive and complex eligibility requirements based on information registered by other counsellors at previous meetings, information registered by the recipient in their online portfolio, information provided by the recipient during meetings, and information from the fund's own administrative data on the recipient. Hence, not only the recipients of unemployment insurance policies but also the policy providers have to navigate bureaucratic rules and procedures on a daily basis.ⁱⁱ It is thus a suitable case to investigate whether recipients of unemployment insurance benefits experience more administrative burden when they interact with counsellors who themselves face red tape from the policies they implement.

Data sources

The final data set used in the study is composed by merging survey and administrative data. First, two separate surveys were collected among counsellors and unemployment insurance recipients in the unemployment insurance fund, Faglig Fælles A-Kasse (3FA). By December 2019, 3FA was the largest unemployment fund in Denmark, with approximately 13,500 'full-time' unemployment

insurance recipients across 65 local departments nationwide (Jobindsats 2021). The fund's recipients primarily seek both skilled and unskilled work in blue-collar industries.

In liaison with the fund's head office, the counsellor survey was sent to a list of 382 employees across all departments, whom representatives at the head office believed were doing job counselling as part of their daily work routine. Respondents were invited for the survey on 18 December 2019, and answers were collected until 21 January 2020. At the beginning of the survey, each respondent was asked to actively confirm whether they conducted counselling on a daily basis. In total, 132 respondents answered the survey, resulting in a 35 per cent response rate. Here, 25 respondents were filtered out of the final sample as they either they did not conduct counselling (12 respondents) or failed to answer the study's main variables of interest (13 respondents). The final survey thus contains 107 respondents across 40 departments.

The client survey was sent to 5,000 respondents randomly drawn from a list of all unemployment insurance recipients in the fund by the time of data collection. Data for the survey was collected between 2 December and 18 December 2019.ⁱⁱⁱ Here, 1,021 recipients partially or fully answered the survey, resulting in a 20.4 per cent response rate. However, the final models only includes 729 full responses at the client level as departments are dropped if counsellors did not also reply to the survey.^{iv} As shown in Appendix A, the included departments are largely balanced with the excluded departments. However, the excluded departments on average have less counsellors and younger clients. These aspects are discussed in greater detail below. Moreover, the final member sample approximates the target population with an underrepresentation of young clients (sample: 49.1 years, population: 44.3 years) and men (sample: 60.1 per cent men, population: 65 per cent men).^v

Measures

Each response variable used in the analysis consists of the predicted scores from separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) using full information maximum likelihood. For an overview of the full item wordings and corresponding factor loadings, see Table 1.

Independent variable: Job-centred red tape

To capture the perception of red tape among counsellors, I rely on an existing two-dimensional job-centred measure of red tape developed by van Loon et al. (2016). The dimensions measure the extent to which counsellors experience compliance burdens and lack of functionality from the rules and procedures that apply to the counselling of unemployed clients. Each dimension was measured with four items and rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘completely disagree’ (0) to ‘completely agree’ (4). All items for lack of functionality were phrased positively, which is why each item response is reversely coded. Items include: ‘When I counsel members, I work with procedures and rules that cause much delay’ (*compliance burdens*) and ‘When I counsel members, I work with procedures and rules that have a clear function for my counselling’ (*lack of functionality*).^{vi} The dual-factor measurement model shows a good fit^{vii}: ($\chi^2 = 22.795$ [df = 19, $p < 0.247$], CFI = 0.987, RMSEA = 0.043, SRMR = 0.042). McDonald’s Omega is 0.84 for lack of functionality and 0.72 for compliance burdens.

Dependent variable: Administrative burden

The measure of learning and compliance costs is based on the scale used by Madsen and Mikkelsen (2021). Here, respondents are presented with a list of items about their experiences in the unemployment insurance system. Each dimension was based on responses to three items that were rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘completely disagree’ (0) to ‘completely agree’ (4). Item

examples include: ‘I spend too much time documenting things (e.g. registering how many jobs I apply for)’ (*compliance costs*) and ‘It takes too long to learn about the rules that apply to me as an unemployment insurance recipient’ (*learning costs*). The dual-factor measurement model shows a good fit: ($\chi^2 = 32.663$ [df = 8, $p < 0.000$], CFI = 0.985, RMSEA = 0.064, SRMR = 0.024). McDonald’s Omega is 0.80 for learning costs and 0.76 for compliance costs.

[Insert table 1 here]

Control variables

To minimise the risk of confounding, each model includes a series of control variables that could potentially influence the main variables of interest. To account for variation in working conditions across departments, I use administrative data provided by the fund to control for the number of counsellors and unemployed clients registered in each department (Blom et al. 2020; George et al. 2021; Tummers et al. 2015; Pandey 2020). At the client level, I include controls for factors that could potentially drive subjective experiences of administrative burdens and the unemployment situation more generally, such as administrative data on the client’s age as well as their educational level, number of children living at home, and length of unemployment as reported in the surveys (Christensen et al. 2020; Kim, Kim, and Lee 2019).

Taken together, the final dataset thus consists of five data sources: survey data from two surveys of counsellors and clients, respectively, merged with administrative data about counsellors,

the clients, and the departments. For a descriptive overview of the key variables used in the analysis, see Table 2 below.

[Insert table 2 here]

Analytical strategy

For the main analysis, I use ordinary least squares regression to test how clients' experiences of administrative burden are associated with average perceptions of red tape among counsellors in their respective departments. I opt for this strategy as clients often face different counsellors during their unemployment spell and because matches between counsellors and clients are not registered in the fund's registries. However, aggregating red tape perceptions to the department level entails a loss of information and thus potentially dampens any estimates of red tape and administrative burden. Moreover, empty models including only learning or compliance costs and department show intraclass correlation coefficients below 0.02 for both learning and compliance costs across all 65 departments, and below 0.01 for the final data set. This is less surprising considering that the final data set contains only 40 departments with a low number of observations per department (Huang 2016). Moreover, as mentioned above, unemployment insurance recipients only have a certain share of interactions with counsellors in their departments as a share of their meetings during the unemployment spell are held at the municipal job centre. More importantly, it suggests that experiences of administrative burden are likely also driven by other factors, such as level of education, age, or number of children at home, effectively suppressing the impact of the department in the empty intraclass correlation models.

Despite these reservations, there are good reasons to believe that administrative burden is indeed associated with the aggregated level of perceived red tape across departments. As the data

is clustered, it still contains potential risks of markedly inflated Type I error rates, which is why each regression model reports cluster robust standard errors to account for any homogeneity within departments (Huang 2016). For robustness, Appendix C contains the results of random intercept models estimated with restricted maximum likelihood.^{viii}

Analysis

Table 3 shows the results of separate ordinary least squares regressions testing the association between both red tape dimensions and both dimensions of administrative burden.

[Insert table 3 here]

As demonstrated in Table 3, clients report significantly higher compliance costs when being served by departments in which counsellors face compliance burdens from rules and procedures (Est = 0.154, SE = 0.043, $p = 0.011$), thereby finding support for H1. I also find significant positive, albeit smaller, associations between red tape as lack of functionality and compliance costs (Est = 0.084, SE = 0.036, $p = 0.048$), thereby supporting H2. However, the results do not support H3, as the estimated association between compliance burdens and learning costs is only significant at the 90% level (Est = 0.102, SE = 0.052, $p = 0.096$). Finally, I do not find support for H4 as the association between red tape as lack of functionality and learning costs is only significant at the 90% level (Est = 0.0560, SE = 0.028, $p = 0.071$).

Taken together, the results show that aggregated red tape perceptions of rules and procedures among counsellors in the department are positively associated with experiences of

compliance costs among clients in the same departments. The results on learning costs are less convincing and only significant at the 90% level. A potential explanation for the stronger and more consistent results on compliance costs could be that the main interaction between counsellors and clients happens during meetings, phone, and emails where the counsellors have assist clients' way back to employment and assess whether clients are sufficiently 'available' for the job market. At these meetings, clients are encouraged to bring previously sent job applications, update their online job-search portfolio before the meeting, and even make a list of potential employers they have contacted. However, facing a counsellor who is resource-deprived or demotivated from red tape can increase clients' experiences of compliance costs if the counsellor is less prepared for job counselling and more concerned with, for instance, checking whether the client lives up to eligibility criteria. The additional analysis of single compliance cost items reported in Appendix B supports this interpretation. Here, estimates are strongest for items measuring onerousness from participating in meetings, counselling, and courses that do not advance employment chances and from living up to 'too many demands' than onerousness from registration of work-related activities.

It is also worth considering the low effect sizes reported in Table 3 above ($\hat{\beta} = 0.09$ for the association between compliance burdens and compliance costs and $\hat{\beta} = 0.08$ for the association between lack of functionality and compliance costs). As further discussed below, this is less surprising given the attenuated variation of the aggregated red tape variable. However, to ensure the robustness of the results, I test the associations in a linear mixed effect model using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. As reported in Appendix C, the model replicates the significant associations between both red tape dimensions and experiences of compliance costs. Moreover, the high correlations between the subdimensions of red tape (Pearson's $R = 0.9$) raise the concern that both dimensions essentially reflect the same underlying factor. Although the two-factor model of red tape shows a high fit, I make two additional robustness checks to address this concern. First, I create mean

indexes for each red tape dimension and use these as my independent variables. As shown in Appendix D, I find significant associations between red tape as compliance burdens and experiences of compliance costs (Est = 0.119, SE = 0.038, $p = 0.023$), but not between lack of functionality and experiences of compliance costs (Est = 0.063, SE = 0.036, $p = 0.123$). Second, I estimate a one-factor model of red tape in a CFA and use the predicted scores as my independent variables. As shown in Appendix E, I find a significant relationship between red tape and compliance costs (Est = 0.104, SE = 0.041, $p = 0.038$), while the association between red tape and learning costs is only significant at the 90% level (Est = 0.073, SE = 0.035, $p = 0.077$).

In sum, the robustness checks show that the association between counsellors' perceptions of red tape as compliance burdens and clients' experiences of compliance costs among clients is consistent across the different specifications. However, the association between red tape as lack of functionality and compliance costs is less consistent. It is worth considering that the analysis is based on clustered data with few department-level observations, which reduces statistical power and increases the risk of not detecting true relationships (Huang 2018). The fact that the main results replicate across model specifications suggests strong evidence that perceived compliance burdens among street-level bureaucrats – despite only meeting with clients a handful of times on average – do indeed play a role in the perceptions of administrative burden among clients.

Discussion and conclusion

In this study, I have argued that street-level bureaucrats' perceptions of red tape are linked to their clients' experiences of administrative burden. I hypothesised that these associations are likely driven by two different mechanisms: red tape can drain street-level bureaucrats' available resources and compromise their autonomous work motivation. My results show that street-level bureaucrats'

perceptions of red tape as compliance burdens are positively associated with their clients' experiences of compliance costs. This suggests that red tape negatively affects street-level bureaucrats' behaviour towards their clients to the detriment of the clients' navigation of the rules and demands imposed on them.

Despite these results, however, certain potential methodological caveats should be taken into account. First, although the associations between red tape as compliance burdens and experiences of compliance costs are consistent across model specifications, I am unable to effectively separate the different purported mechanisms underpinning the hypotheses. While the results suggest that red tape most strongly affects street-level bureaucrats' behaviour by draining their available resources, future research should investigate these claims in more detail (Tummers et al. 2015; DeHart-Davis 2007).

Second, as counsellors in certain departments did not respond to the survey, I was forced to drop a share of the responses at the client level. Here, one might for instance imagine that departments with higher caseloads would be less likely to have counsellors answer the survey. As shown in the balance checks in Appendix A, this is not the case. The included departments do however tend to be larger and have slightly older clients. The former does not come as a surprise when considering that it only requires one counsellor to respond for a department to be included. I therefore encourage future studies to replicate the findings with more representative samples.^{ix}

Third, the small effect sizes and the low explanatory power of the models are most likely explained by the fact that counsellors and clients are not perfectly matched and only have a limited number of meetings. Given these conditions, the fact that the models yield significant results does on the contrary testify to the relevance of studying the intermediary role of street-level bureaucrats to the administrative burden experiences of their clients. However, future research should ideally assess

the impact of caseworkers in settings where clients are assigned fixed counsellors and their interactions are more frequent. Moreover, if using longitudinal studies that contains multiple observations for each individual, these studies will be better able to account for time-varying sources of both red tape and administrative burden that will help to provide more precise – and most likely stronger – effect size estimates.

Fourth and related, although I use several control variables on both levels of analysis, the correlational nature of the data makes it difficult to fully rule out the common caveats of analysis cross-sectional data. As also shown in recent studies, experiences of administrative burdens is potentially be driven by several other factors at the client level that could potentially occupy cognitive resources and lower their ability to navigate the unemployment insurance system, such as financial scarcity (Madsen et al. 2022; Wanberg, Ali, Csillag 2020), mental and physical health (Bell et al. 2022), and the stress of being unemployed more generally (Pultz et al. 2019). More importantly, reverse causality can arise if counsellors report higher levels of compliance burdens and lack of functionality *because* they deal with clients who have a harder time navigating the unemployment insurance system. Although the results should be interpreted in light of this limitation, I do not believe that it invalidates the results as several studies suggest that red tape is closely related to organisational structures and policy design (Hong 2020; Kaufmann et al. 2018) and has elsewhere been shown to matter to street-level bureaucrats' behaviours towards clients (George et al. 2021; Pandey 2020). To add more certainty about the estimates, however, future research should employ field experiments that randomly allocate counsellors to clients and thereby more effectively rule out these potential confounding factors. Doing so would also enable one to assess whether counsellors' work identity or role perceptions matter to how they cope with such red tape in relation to their clients (Bell and Smith, 2022).

Finally, confounding may arise from the fact that the counsellor survey was collected as an extension of the client survey and was extended over the Christmas holiday in 2019 and into January 2020. Although this would ideally have been conducted in a reversed order and at a different time, I am less concerned that these issues affect the findings as red tape perceptions are unlikely to change drastically over such a short time frame.

Despite these potential methodological caveats, the highly policy-relevant findings suggest that clients' experiences of administrative burden are not simply products of the policies themselves but also associated with the street-level bureaucrats assigned to implement these policies. This point is far from trivial.

First, it shows that policy recipients suffer more when those assigned to carry out these policies in practice themselves are burdened by rules and procedures of their job. The findings thereby supplement existing literature on street-level bureaucracy and citizen-state interactions by identifying new ways in which the former has downstream impact on the latter. Despite the small effect sizes, it warrants attention from both researchers and policymakers alike as both red tape and administrative burden are – to some extent – products of policy design and implementation and therefore also malleable that matter together and in their own right.

Second, it raises an important point for the widely stated call to 'shift burdens back onto the state' (Herd et al. 2013; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Christensen et al. 2020; Peeters and Widlak 2018). Doing so might indeed lessen the impact of administrative burdens experienced by policy recipients, but this should come with careful consideration of *where* those burdens are placed and how street-level bureaucrats perceive them. As the findings suggest, it matters whenever street-level bureaucrats themselves already face substantial red tape from complying with time-consuming rules and procedures when documenting clients' eligibility. Adding additional administrative or

verification tasks onto street-level bureaucrats can therefore further impact their behaviour towards clients and effectively reduce the advantages of removing burdens from the clients. Instead, a way forward may be to simply remove the burden of proof from both clients and street-level bureaucrats through, for instance, automated registration systems or allow street-level bureaucrats to have a more client-centered, and a less rule- and procedure bound, approach to clients during interactions.

ⁱ One might also imagine that red tape among street-level bureaucrats will matter to clients' experiences of psychological costs, but this lies outside the scope of the paper.

ⁱⁱ As shown by reports, both counsellors and recipients in the unemployment insurance system generally consider the system to be based on highly complicated rules (Deloitte 2018; Faglig Fælles A-Kasse 2019).

ⁱⁱⁱ As shown, the counselor survey was gathered directly after the member survey. The potential consequences of this are outlined in the Discussion section.

^{iv} Moreover, certain departments of the fund have gathered their counselling services in a single department. The three departments in Odense and the two departments in Copenhagen are thus collapsed into two separate departments: One for all three Odense departments and one for both Copenhagen departments.

^v The population data for 3FA's clients age and gender is drawn from jobindsats.dk for December 2019 (Jobindsats 2021)

^{vi} The choice to include the mention of 'members' – which is what 3FA labels their clients – at the beginning of each item is to ensure that the measure captures red tape in relation to client-related tasks.

^{vii} Despite the good fit of the two-factor model, further inspection of the red tape measure shows high correlations between the two dimensions (Pearson's $R = .9$). As the scale is previously validated (van Loon 2016; 2017), I opt to use the two-factor model as it is. As a robustness check, however, I run each analysis with additive indexes and a single-factor model as well.

^{viii} With few clusters, restricted maximum likelihood is generally recommended over full maximum likelihood estimation (Huang 2016).

^{ix} As shown in Appendix E, including caseload as a control variable in the main models does not change the main results with the exception of red tape as lack of functionality and learning costs now being marginally significant at the 95%-level (p-values change from 0.071 to 0.041).

References

- Aarøe, Lene, Martin Bækgaard, Julian Christensen, and Donald Moynihan. 2021. "Personality and Public Administration: Policymaker Tolerance of Administrative Burdens in Welfare Services." *Public Administration Review*, 81, 652–663.
- Ali, Sameen, and Samia W. Altaf. 2021. "Citizen trust, administrative capacity and administrative burden in Pakistan's immunization program." *Journal of Behavioral Public Administration*, 4(1), 1–17.
- Baviskar, Siddhartha, and Søren C. Winter. 2017. "Street-Level Bureaucrats as Individual Policymakers: The Relationship between Attitudes and Coping Behavior toward Vulnerable Children and Youth." *International Public Management Journal*, 20(2), 316–353.
- Bell, Elizabeth and Kylie Smith. 2019. "Perspectives from the Front-line: Street-level Bureaucrats, Administrative Burden and Student Access to Oklahoma's Promise." Paper presented at *Public Management Research Association*. Chapel Hill, NC. June 11-14th, 83(2), 385-400.
- Bell, Elizabeth, Julian Christensen, Pamela Herd, and Donald Moynihan. 2022. Health in citizen-state interactions: How physical and mental health problems shape experiences of administrative burden and reduce take-up. *Public Administration Review*.
- Bhargava, Saurab, and Dayanand Manoli. 2015. "Psychological frictions and the incomplete take-up of social benefits: Evidence from an IRS field experiment." *American Economic Review*, 105(11), 1–41.
- Blom, Rutger, Rick T. Borst, and Bart Voorn. 2020. "Pathology or Inconvenience? A Meta- Analysis of the Impact of Red Tape on People and Organizations", *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 41(4), 623–650.

- Borry, Erin L. 2016 “A New Measure of Red Tape: Introducing the Three-Item Red Tape (TIRT) Scale”, *International Public Management Journal*, 19(4), 573-593
- Bozeman, Barry, and Mary K. Feeney. 2011. *Rules and red tape: a prism for public administration theory and research*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Bredgaard, Thomas and Flemming Larsen. 2005. *Employment policy from different angles*. Copenhagen: DJØF-Forlaget.
- Brewer, Gene A. and Richard Walker. 2010. “Explaining variation in perceptions of red tape: a professionalism-marketization model.” *Public Administration*, 88, 418–438.
- Brunetto Yvonne, Stephen T. T. Teo, Rodney Farr-Wharton, Kate Shacklock, and Art Shriberg. 2017. “Individual and organizational support does it affect red tape, stress and work outcomes of police officers in the USA?” *Personnel Review*, 46, 750–766
- Burden, Barry C., David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Donald P. Moynihan. 2012. “The effect of administrative burden on bureaucratic perception of policies: Evidence from election administration.” *Public Administration Review*, 72(5), 741–51.
- Bækgaard, Martin, Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Jonas Krogh Madsen, and Julian Christensen. 2021. “Reducing Compliance Demands in Government Benefit Programs Improves the Psychological Well-Being of Target Group Members.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 31(4), 806–821.
- Campbell, Jesse W., Pandey, Sanjay K., and Arnesen, Lars. 2023. “The Ontology, Origin, and Impact of Divisive Public Sector Rules: A meta-Narrative Review of the Red Tape and Administrative Burden Literatures.” *Public Administration Review*, 83(2), 296–315.

- Chudnovsky, Mariana, and Rik Peeters. 2020. "The unequal distribution of administrative burden: A framework and an illustrative case study for understanding variation in people's experience of burdens." *Social Policy and Administration*, 55(4), 527–542.
- Christensen, Julian, Lene Aarøe, Martin Bækgaard, Pamela Herd, and Donald Moynihan. 2020. "Human capital and administrative burden: the role of cognitive resources in citizen-state interactions." *Public Administration Review*, 80(1), 127–136.
- Donna K. Cooke, Katarina K. Brant, and Juanita M. Woods. 2019. "The Role of Public Service Motivation in Employee Work Engagement: A Test of the Job Demands-Resources Model", *International Journal of Public Administration*, 42(9), 765-775
- Deci, Edward L., and Richard M. Ryan. 2000. "The 'What' and 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior", *Psychological Inquiry*, 11(4), 227–268
- DeHart-Davis, Leisha, Randall S. Davis and Zachary Mohr. 2015. "Green Tape and Job Satisfaction: Can Organizational Rules Make Employees Happy?", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25(3), 849–876.
- DeHart-Davis, Leisha, and Sanjay K. Pandey. 2005. "Red Tape and Public Employees: Does Perceived Rule Dysfunction Alienate Managers?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 15(1), 133–48.
- DeHart-Davis, Leisha. 2007. "The Unbureaucratic Personality", *Public Administration Review*, 67(5), 892–903.
- DeHart-Davis, Leisha. 2017. *Creating Effective Rules in Public Sector Organizations*. Georgetown University Press.

- Deloitte. 2018. “Foranalyse vedr. gennemskrivning og forenkling af lovgivning på dagpengeområdet.” STAR: <https://star.dk/media/9573/bruttokatalog.pdf> [last accessed 26/11/2021].
- Faglig Fælles A-Kasse. 2019. “Medlemsundersøgelse,” April 2019. København: Faglig Fælles A-Kasse.
- Faglig Fælles A-Kasse, 2021. “Hvornår har jeg ret til dagpenge?” Faglig Fælles A-Kasse: <https://www.3f.dk/faa-hjaelp/dagpenge/hvornaar-har-jeg-ret-til-dagpenge#du-skal-staa-til-raadighed-for-arbejdsmarkedet> [last accessed 26/11/2021].
- Fox, Ashley M, Edmund C. Stazyk, and Wenhui Feng. 2020. “Administrative easing: rule reduction and Medicaid enrollment.” *Public Administration Review*, 80(1), 104–117.
- George, Bert, Sanjay K. Pandey, Bram Steijn, Adeliën Decramer, and Mieke Audenaert. 2021. “Red Tape, Organizational Performance, and Employee Outcomes: Meta-analysis, Meta-regression, and Research Agenda.” *Public Administration Review*, 81, 638–651.
- Guul, Thorbjørn Sejr, Mogens Jin Pedersen, and Niels Bjørn Grund Petersen. 2020. “Creaming among Caseworkers: Effects of Client Competence and Client Motivation on Caseworkers’ Willingness to Help.” *Public Administration Review*, 81, 12–22.
- Hattke, Fabian, David Hensel, and Janne Kalucza. 2020. “Emotional Responses to Bureaucratic Red Tape.” *Public Administration Review*, 80(1), 53–63.
- Heinrich, Carolyn. 2016. “The Bite of Administrative Burden: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 26(3), 403–20.
- Henderson, Alexander C., and Erin L. Borry. 2023. “The emotional burdens of public service: rules, trust, and emotional labour in emergency medical services”, *Public Money and Management*, 43(5), 405-414.

- Herd, Pamela and Donald Moynihan. 2018. *Administrative burden: policymaking by other means*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Herd, Pamela, Thomas DeLeire, Hope Harvey, and Donald Moynihan. 2013. "Shifting administrative burden to the state: the case of Medicaid take-up." *Public Administration Review*, 73(1), 69–81.
- Hong, Souman. 2020. "Performance management meets red tape: bounded rationality, negativity bias, and resource dependence." *Public Administration Review*, 80, 932–945.
- Huang, Quifeng, Kaili Zhang, Ali A. Bodla, and Yanqun Wang. 2022. "The Influence of Perceived Red Tape on Public Employees' Procrastination: The Conservation of Resource Theory Perspective." *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 19(7), 4368.
- Huang, Francis L. 2016. "Alternatives to multilevel modeling for the analysis of clustered data." *Journal of Experimental Education*, 84, 175–196.
- Huang, Francis L. 2018. "Multilevel modeling myths." *School Psychology Quarterly*, 33(3), 492–499.
- Jacobsen, Christian Bøtcher, and Mads Leth Jakobsen. 2018. "Perceived Organizational Red Tape and Organizational Performance in Public Services." *Public Administration Review*, 78(1), 24–36.
- Jacobsen, Christian Bøtcher, Johan Hvitved, and Lotte Bøgh Andersen. 2014. "Command and Motivation: How the Perception of External Interventions Relates to Intrinsic Motivation and Public Service Motivation", *Public Administration*, 92(4), 790–806.
- Jilke, Sebastian, Wouter Van Dooren, and Sabine Rys. 2018. "Discrimination and administrative burden in public service markets: does a public–private difference exist?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 28(3), 423–439.

Jobindsats. 2021. "A-dagpenge. Antal personer og fuldtidspersoner." Jobindsats.dk: <https://www.jobindsats.dk/jobindsats/> [last accessed 26/11/2021].

Kaufmann, Wesley, and Richard Haans. 2020. "Understanding the meaning of concepts across domains through collocation analysis." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 31(1), 1–16.

Kaufman, Herbert. 1977. *Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses and Abuses*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Kaufmann, Wesley, Reggy Hooghiemstra, and Mary K. Feeney. 2018. Formal Institutions, Informal Institutions, and Red Tape: A Comparative Study. *Public Administration*, 96, 386–403.

Kim, Ji G., Haram J. Kim, and Ki-Hak Lee. 2019. "Understanding behavioral job search self-efficacy through the social cognitive lens: A meta-analytic review". *Journal of Vocational Behavior*. 112, 17-34.

Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. New York, NY: Russel Sage Foundation.

Madsen, Jonas K., Kim Sass Mikkelsen, and Donald Moynihan. 2021. "Burdens, Sludge, Ordeals, red Tape, Oh My!: A User's Guide to the Study of Frictions." *Public Administration*, Published online ahead of print.

Madsen, Jonas K., and Kim Sass Mikkelsen. 2021. "How salient administrative burden affects job seekers' locus of control and responsibility attribution: Evidence from a survey experiment", *International Public Management Journal*, DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2021.1951905

Masood, Ayesha, and Muhammad Azfar Nisar. 2021. "Administrative Capital and Citizens' Responses to Administrative Burden." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 31(1), 56–72.

Mikkelsen, Maria Falk, Christian Bøtcher Jacobsen, and Lotte Bøgh Andersen. 2015. "Managing Employee Motivation: Exploring the Connections Between Managers' Enforcement Actions, Employee Perceptions, and Employee Intrinsic Motivation." *International Public Management Journal*, 20(2), 1–23.

Mikkelsen, Kim S., Jonas K. Madsen, and Martin Baekgaard. 2023. "Is Stress among Street-Level Bureaucrats Associated with Experiences of Administrative Burden among Clients? A Multilevel Study of the Danish Unemployment Sector." *Public Administration Review*, 1–13.

Moesby-Jensen, Cecilie K., and Helle Schjellerup Nielsen. 2015. "Emotional Labor in Social Workers' Practice." *European Journal of Social Work*, 18(5), 690-702.

Moynihan, Donald, Pamela Herd, and Elizabeth Ribgy. 2016. "Policymaking by other means: do states use administrative barriers to limit access to Medicaid?" *Administration & Society*, 48(4), 497–524.

Moynihan, Donald, Pamela Herd, and Hope Harvey. 2014. "Administrative burden: Learning, psychological, and compliance costs in citizen-state interactions." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25, 43–69.

Nisar, Muhammad Azfar. 2018. "Children of a lesser god: Administrative burden and social equity in citizen–state interactions." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 28(1), 104–119.

- Olsen, Asmus Leth, Jonas Høgh Kyhse-Andersen, and Donald P. Moynihan. 2020. "The Unequal Distribution of Opportunity: A National Audit Study of Bureaucratic Discrimination in Primary School Access." *American Journal of Political Science*, Published online ahead of print.
- Pandey, Sanjay K. and Gordon A. Kingsley. 2000. "Examining red tape in public and private organizations: Alternative explanations from a social psychological model", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10(4), 779–800.
- Pandey, Sanjay K. 2020. "The Psychological Process View of Bureaucratic Red Tape." In *Research Handbook Human Resource Management in the Public Sector*, edited by Eva Knies and Bram Steijn. Edward Elgar.
- Peeters, Rik, and Arjan Widlak. 2018. "The digital cage: administrative exclusion through information architecture—the case of the Dutch civil registry's master data management system." *Government Information Quarterly*, 35(2), 175–183.
- Peeters, Rik. 2019. "The political economy of administrative burdens: A theoretical framework for analyzing the organizational origins of administrative burdens." *Administration & Society*, 52, 566–592.
- Porter, Ethan, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2018. "Partisanship, Bureaucratic Responsiveness, and Election Administration: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 28(4), 602–617.
- Pultz, Sabina, Karl Bang Christensen, and Thomas W. Teasdale. 2019. "Contextualized attribution: How young unemployed people blame themselves and the system and the relationship between blame and subjective well-being." *Nordic Psychology*, 72(2), 146–167.

Angel Sharma, Hemant Gautam, and Richa Chaudhary. 2020. "Red Tape and Ambidexterity in Government Units", *International Journal of Public Administration*, 43(8), 736-743.

Soss, Joe. 1999. "Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action." *American Political Science Review*, 93(2), 363–380.

Soss, Joe, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford F. Schram. 2011. *Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Sunstein, Cass. 2019. "Sludge and ordeals." *Duke Law Journal*, 68, 1843–1883.

Shore, Jennifer. 2020. "How social policy impacts inequalities in political efficacy". *Sociology Compass*, 14(5), e12784

Tummers, Lars L. G., Victor Bekkers, Evelien Vink, and Michael Musheno. 2015. "Coping During Public Service Delivery: A Conceptualization and Systematic Review of the Literature." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25(4), 1099–1126.

Van Loon, Nina, M., Peter L. M. Leisink, Eva Knies, and Gene A. Brewer. 2016. "Red tape: developing and validating a new job-centered measure." *Public Administration Review*, 76(4), 662–673.

Van Loon, Nina, M. 2017. "From red tape to which performance results? Exploring the relationship between red tape and various dimensions of performance in healthcare work units." *Public Administration*, 95(1), 60–77.

Vansteenkiste, Maarten, Richard M. Ryan, and Bart Soenens. 2020. "Basic psychological need theory: Advancements, critical themes, and future directions." *Motivation and Emotion*, 44, 1–31.

Wanberg, Connie R., Abdifatah A. Ali, and Borbala Csillag. 2020. "Job Seeking: The Process and Experience of Looking for a Job." *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, 7, 315–337.