The Political Economy of Global Arms Trade: Small Arms Proliferation in the Ethiopian Political Marketplace

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Abstract

The proliferation of small arms has been a major concern over the years in areas of both conflict and peace alike. Around the world, availability and access to small arms instigates violent conflicts while extending existing ones. It is also the leading cause of violent deaths in zones of relative peace. The Horn of Africa, which is one of the most conflict ridden areas of the world is flooded with small arms. Ethiopia, being the largest and the most populated country in the region is at the core of proceedings and also suffers from massive proliferation of small arms. Many of the weapons in the country are a product of massive influx of military equipment that took place during the cold war and beyond - much of the trade of weapons has been driven by global power rivalry. These arms come into play when socio-political tensions boil over between states and non-state actors leading to loss of many lives in and around the country.

This thesis attempts to answer the burgeoning question of why is there such a proliferation of small arms in Ethiopia. It looks at the issue of proliferation of small arms in the country as a small part of global arms trade driven by great power rivalry. In particular, it uses Alex De Waal's conceptual framework of the political marketplace to analyze both the supply and demand for small arms in the country. The paper applies the four socio-economic-political conditions for a functional political marketplace as outlined by De Waal for two distinct periods in recent Ethiopian history - the Derg Regime (1974-1991) and the subsequent EPRDF regime (1991 onwards) - to see how these conditions manifest themselves during the two regions and contribute to the proliferation of small arms in the country.

Keywords: small arms proliferation, Ethiopia, political marketplace, arms trade, Horn of Africa, great power rivalry

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1. Introduction

Over the decades, the Horn of Africa has consistently been one of the most conflict ridden regions of the world. Endowed with abundant diverse forms of resources and a key strategic position along the Red Sea, the region is a part of multiple security complexes which are both shaped by rapidly evolving global dynamics and have an impact on the same. The scramble for foreign soft/sharp power influence has been characteristic of the region and will continue to be so. Moreover, endogenous factors within Ethiopia and other horn countries where sub-state actors have interests and agencies transcending modern nation state boundaries, adds to the spaghetti bowl of complexities in the region. These combinations have resulted in a vicious circle of prolonged conflicts leading to the horn becoming one of the most deprived regions of the world.

The puzzle that this thesis will attempt to delve into is that of the weapons that in part fuel the conflicts in Ethiopia and surrounding areas. In particular, it will look into the proliferation of small arms in Ethiopia. Anyone who has been to Ethiopia shall notice that small arms seem to be ubiquitously available in the country. Apart from some parts in urban centers, it is very likely that one will run into many people carrying arms as they go about their daily livelihood. These weapons come into play when socio-economic-political tensions boil over - leading to armed conflict between and amongst various state and non-state actors. The small arms used in the many conflicts in the country's turbulent history have changed hands constantly and the bullets continue to rip through lives years after their induction. The weapons are one of the protagonists which enable the vicious circle of conflicts in Ethiopia and the region.

This thesis will try to answer the question of *Why is there such a massive proliferation of small arms in Ethiopia?* It shall delve into both the supply side and demand side of small arms in the coutnry. To trace the influx of weapons in the country, two distinct periods in Ethiopia's recent history - the communist DERG rule (1975 - 1991) and the EPRDF regime which followed right after - will be analyzed. A descriptive analysis of small arms imported into the country during these significantly different political reigns will be conducted. Zooming out, this influx of weapons will then be looked at as part of the larger political economy of global arms trade - driven by great power rivalry. These would constitute what I consider the 'supply' side of the

story of small arms proliferation in Ethiopia. In addition to this, craft production of weapons in the country along with the illicit flow of small arms also add to the humongous number of weapons available in the country. For practical purposes and limitations of this Master's thesis, craft weapons and illicit flow of weapons will not be in the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is important to constantly be aware that these have been ever present in recent Ethiopian history and act as a multiplier in creating the enabling environment for small arms to proliferate.

Once the influx and massive presence of small arms in the country has been established, the thesis will attempt to dig into the reasons for its proliferation. The analysis will be anchored in Alex De Waal's conceptual framework of the political marketplace where politics is conducted as the exchange of political services or loyalty for payment using money, weapons and violence. Specific traits of the Ethiopian political marketplace which has nurtured proliferation of small arms shall be explored. It shall also further delve into the regional and global manifestation of the political marketplace - which has further contributed to the proliferation of small arms in the country. These would constitute what I consider the 'demand' side of the story.

Organization of the paper

The paper shall be organized as follows - It begins by introducing the problem of small arms proliferation and its global nature. Focus will be on how despite being 'small arms', these weapons are actually a big problem and considered by many as the real weapon of mass destruction due to the number of lives they take consistently. The next section will introduce the Horn of Africa where Ethiopia is located and briefly describe the security complexes that are a part of it. Given the porous borders within the Horn and the transnational nature of many of the actors and conflicts in the region, it is crucial to have an understanding of the socio-political dynamics of the Horn as a whole. Then, the thesis will focus on Ethiopia as the central part of the Horn and why this country with its unique history in the African context is at the core of this study. The section will brush over Ethiopia's modern history - including details of the two political periods which fall under the scope of this thesis - in an attempt to put into context its recent conflicts (both internal/external) and subsequent security implications. Next, will be an elaboration of the theoretical framework - Alex De Waal's idea of the Political Marketplace. Thereafter, focus will shift to the global arms trade with small arms trade as a marginal part of it while also delving on great power rivalry which has been the driving force behind it. The next

section will focus on small arms proliferation in the Ethiopian context. It includes a brief history of small arms in the country before delving into the aforementioned supply side of the story via a descriptive analysis of the trade data to establish the influx of small arms into the country over the periods concerned. Then the penultimate section will use the theoretical basis provided to look at the salient features of the Ethiopian political marketplace which contributes to creating and nurturing an environment for small arms to prolifearte. It concludes with an overall reflection on the findings of the paper.

Disclaimer

Given the scale of the issues in question and limitations of the study, the aim of this thesis is not to conclusively answer the burgeoning questions surrounding it. Rather, it is an attempt to connect the dots in order to make a critical and informative contribution to the discussion.

2. Small arms proliferation - A large global problem

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are a subcategory of conventional arms that can be operated and carried by one person or a small crew. Small arms is classified by the UN as "revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub machine-guns and light machine-guns. Light weapons are classified as heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti aircraft missile systems and mortars of less than 100 mm caliber." (United Nations 1997 ; Schroder 143). For the purpose of the UN International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)[1] are defined as - any man portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas (United Nations 2). SALW have become ubiquitous around the world - both in zones of war and peace. The international center for counter terrorism at the Hague in its 2020 report attributes the increase in small arms holding and its devastating impact to the the evolving global security landscape marked by the multiplication of intra-state conflicts, the rise of transnational organized crime, and the spread of violent extremism (Demuynck 2).

Small arms are both a commodity and a medium of exchange. They have both direct and indirect use as they provide terrorist and other armed groups with the necessary firepower to carry out attacks while acting as a tool to establish control over populations and territories. Their movement and illicit trade enables profits for various actors along the supply chain while allowing weapon carriers to facilitate a wide range of other illegal income generating activities such as racketeering, extortion, taxation, kidnapping etc (Demuynck 2). As a medium of exchange, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for example, is reported to have institutionalized the bartering of small arms with drugs with a de facto exchange rate established at one kilo of cocaine sulfate per AK-47 (Schroder 13). In addition to the surplus value including direct and indirect benefits that small arms provides, these weapons are easy to conceal and can be transported quickly. Damien Spleeters, Deputy Director of Operations at

[1] The International Tracing Instrument (ITI) was adopted in December 2005 to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons.

Conflict Armament Research emphasizes that weapons diversion[2] also has real consequences. He recalls that in 2016, a team in Iraq traced a weapon that had been diverted to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) less than two months after its manufacture in Europe (Spread of 1 Billion Arms..). This is just one example of how small arms can change hands rapidly. As the weapons age, they might rot and become inefficient but they continue to be a valuable commodity which is highly mobile and can continue inflicting damage wherever they go. Their plentifullness, ease to operate, steady supply and high demand makes this sub-category of weapons "a smuggler's dream and a law-enforcer's nightmare (Schroder VII)."

In 2002, the Small Arms Survey - an associated program of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, which provides expertise on all aspects of small arms and armed violence - estimated that some 638.9 million small arms and light weapons were in circulation globally, including approximately 241.6 million military firearms, 22 million shoulder fired rocket launchers and about 781,000 mortars. Approximately 378 million of that total was believed to be in civilian hands at that time (Schroder 12). In 2020, a report to the Security Council by the Secretary General - as part of the biennial reports on small arms requested by the council since 2007 due to increased concerns on proliferation of small arms - states that the number of small arms in circulation has almost doubled since 2002 to reach over one billion in 2020. During the presentation of the report, Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, further added that these weapons contributed to some 200,000 deaths every year on average from 2010 to 2015 - nearly 50 percent of all violent deaths during that period. She stressed that small arms continue to represent a challenge that cuts across peace and security, human rights, gender, sustainable development and beyond (Spread of 1 Billion Arms..). Furthermore, the report details that in 2020, five civilians per 100,000 people were killed in armed conflict, and one in seven of those was a woman or a child. Most of these deaths were caused by small arms and light weapons - around 27 per cent - followed by weapons and explosive munitions - 24 per cent. Outside conflict areas, the impact of small arms is even greater with globally, more than half the victims of homicide killed by a firearm. (Report of the .. 2021 1). These numbers speak volumes of the devastating impact of what former

[2] Weapons Diversion is a situation where weapons and ammunitions are taken/intercepted from their originally intended recipients

Secretary-General Kofi Annan called "the weapons of choice for the killers of our time (Small Arms in Africa).”

The gravity of the damage that SALW inflict in terms of direct lives taken and livelihoods destroyed, makes these ‘small’ arms the true weapons of mass destruction (Stohl 1). While loose nukes normally grab the headlines, it is the movement of assault rifles, firearms and hand held air defense rockets which has historically played an integral role in driving and extending conflicts. These small arms are one of the main protagonists for instigating issues such as terrorism, armed conflicts, genocide and so on which has haunted humanity for decades and continues to do so.

2.1. Small arms proliferation in Africa

Moses Eromedoghene Ukpenumewu Tedheke, a Professor at the Department of Political Science and Defense Studies, Nigerian Defense Academy traces the proliferation of small arms in the country back to the colonial periods. In his essay, he states that “Wars cannot happen without arms flowing in society, as such Africa was awash with arms of various degrees that were used to conquer the continent. ” These various wars for slave captures were the beginnings of SALW proliferations in the continent (Tedheke 70).

He further adds that today’s Western narrative of SALW proliferation in Africa is a part of politics of imposing group amnesia on Africans in an attempt to cover up that SALW proliferation has been an agenda of the racialised world capitalist system (Tedheke 71). Today, the continent is flooded with small arms with estimates from a Small arms survey report suggesting that African civilian actors, which include private individuals, registered businesses such as private security companies, and non-state armed groups, hold more than 40 million (almost 80 percent) of all small arms on the continent. In contrast, the continent’s armed forces and law enforcement agencies hold less than 11 million small arms. Among the 40 million civilian-held firearms in Africa, 5,841,200 are recorded as being officially registered, while 16,043,800 are unregistered, with the status of the remainder remaining unclear (Small Arms Survey 2018).

As per an International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT situation report from 2020, though on smaller scale than in West Africa, the trade in SALW remains an important concern in East Africa, which is reportedly awash in 7.8 million of licit and illicit civilian held firearms. The report highlights that illicit SALW circulating across the Horn of Africa, which include AK-pattern and other types of assault rifles, machine guns, RPGs, and ammunition, originate from both internal and external sources (Demuynck, Meryl 11)

2.2. Multilateral Global and African responses to smalls arms proliferation

The massive proliferation and damage caused by small arms has prompted several initiatives on the global and regional scale in an attempt to mitigate its disastrous impacts. In 1999, the UN Security Council first addressed the issue of small arms as a standalone agenda. A couple of years later, in 2001, The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) was globally agreed as a framework for activities to counter the illicit trade in SALW and control the negative consequences of its proliferation. Subsequently, within the framework, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) in 2005, the firearm protocol in 2001, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, were also introduced to bolster the activities outlined in the PoA. Starting in 2008, the Secretary-General has reported regularly to the Security Council on this issue in the form of a substantive report (Small arms and Light Weapons - UNDO). Action on small arms is also an integral and cross-cutting part of achieving the UN's Sustainable development goals (SDGs) - with specific indicators targeting illicit flows enshrined under SDG 16: Peace, Justice & Strong Institutions. Under SDG Target 16.4, UN member states committed to 'significantly reduce illicit arms flows' by 2030 (Martin: Peace & Justice..). Additionally, different regional bodies have also taken initiatives to address the issue. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted the document on small arms and light weapons in 2000 and subsequently produced a solution oriented guide to marking, record keeping and traceability of small weapons (Cooperation instruments & initiatives).

African governments, with external support have initiated various inter-state arms control processes. As Ambassador Smaïl Chergu, Commissioner for Peace and Security at African Union Commission asserted, controlling the illicit proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of

small arms and light weapons is at the heart of the African Union's efforts to prevent conflicts, mitigate their adverse impact, and consolidate peace (Weapons Compass). The development of an Africa-wide small arms and light weapons control agreement predates the premier international SALW control framework - the PoA. The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons was adopted on 1 December 2000 (Lamb 70)

Since then, African governments have successfully negotiated continental and regional arms control agreements and established inter-governmental implementation agencies. A number of countries have also initiated bilateral arms collection and destruction operations, and certain governments have updated or are in the process of reforming their arms control policy and legislation. These agreements are multipronged with the following objectives: make the illicit production and possession of small arms and light weapons a criminal offense, promote the destruction of stocks of surplus weapons and, introduce tighter control measures over weapon stockpiles. Overall, these developments have contributed to greater confidence building and continental integration (Lamb and Dominque 70, 75). These efforts have been further bolstered and complemented by the AU's and other African regional initiatives for arms control.

The AU for its part, adopted the 'Silencing the Guns' initiative as a flagship project under its Agenda 2063[3] (Silencing the Guns in Africa). In East Africa, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa is a legally binding agreement that entered into force in May 2006. Moreover, a regional organization has been established - Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) - to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the protocol (Lamb and Dominque 76). Elsewhere in the continent, West African governments are working with the United Nations to assess the regional implications of light weapons diffusion and to craft a regional moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of such arms. In Central Africa, the United Nations has established a trust fund with which to remove small arms and light weapons from the region. (Small arms and light weapons: Controlling the real instruments). The initiatives outlined above put transparency at the core. Transparency on data of legal arms trade and other

[3] the AU master plan for achieving inclusive and sustainable socioeconomic development over a 50-year period

facets of arms proliferation fosters trust amongst the partner nation states and institutions to collectively work towards resolutions.

Despite the increased number of the global and regional initiatives to tackle the issues of SALW proliferation, Suzette R. Grillot, Professor of International Studies at the University of Oklahoma and co-author of *The International Arms Trade*, argues that there is a lack of harmony among these coalitions, which promote conflicting norms and ideas. Additionally, she states that the prevailing consensus among major powers against stricter arms control norms weakens the global framework, allowing various actors benefiting from arms proliferation to exploit its vulnerabilities (Suzette 529). Further details on the role of major powers in enabling small arms proliferation with analysis of the Ethiopian context shall be explored later in the thesis[4].

[4] See chapter 6

3. The Horn of Africa

"For the students of war, the Horn of Africa offers a cornucopia of violence and destruction. It has interstate wars and civil wars; conventional wars fought in trenches with air-to-air combat overhead and irregular wars fought by jihadists and followers of a messianic cult; international military interventions and maritime piracy; genocidal massacres and non-violent popular uprisings. It has had three major territorial wars and three secessions. There are no purely internal wars: the neighbors are entangled in all (De Vaal 51)"

Alex De Waal in the Introduction to his book - The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power

Strictly geographically speaking, Beirut Mesfin - an Ethiopian political, military and international affairs scholar - considers the Horn of Africa as that north-eastern part of the African continent which faces the Red Sea to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south-east and the Nile Basin to the west (Mesfin 3). According to De Waal, the horn basically consists of three countries which have de facto become six: Ethiopia plus Eritrea; Sudan plus South Sudan; Somalia plus Somaliland and Djibouti (De Waal 44). But due to centuries old interrelationships and other socio-economic linkages, Mesfin considers neighboring countries including Kenya, Libya, Egypt, Uganda, and Yemen (across the Red Sea) as an integral part of the Horn complex - to which many scholars refer to as the 'greater horn'. He further asserts that the political fates of all these countries have never been decided in isolation and have always been intertwined with the fates of one or the other with no one state being insulated from the others' problems (Mesfin 3). Hence, for analysis of conflict, security and small arms in Ethiopia, it is crucial to understand the Horn of Africa as a region.

Mesin sees the Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex (RSC). RSC was first coined by Barry Buzan - an Emeritus Professor at the London School of Economics - in 1991. He defined a RSC as ''a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.'' It is a distinct subsystem of security relations that exists among states who are locked into geographical

proximity. In a RSC, states are held together not by the positive influences of shared interest, but by shared rivalries. He adds that military and political threats are more significant within an RSC due to the proximity between the states (Mesfin 2). Add the presence and proliferation of large numbers of small arms to the picture, RSCs become vulnerable flammable blocks, susceptible to uncontrolled huge fires with onset of minimum socio-economic-political friction.

3.1. A plethora of conflicts

Over the past decades, Africa has consistently been one of the most conflict ridden regions of the world. Currently, the Geneva Academy's Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Online Portal (RULAC) - which classifies all situations of armed violence that amount to an armed conflict under international humanitarian law - reports over 40 active non - international armed conflicts in Africa (Today's Armed Conflicts..). The horn is one of the major hotspots in the continent.

Today, in the horn, per capita income, life expectancy and literacy are among the lowest in the world, and adult and infant mortality are among the highest (Mesfin 3). It is currently experiencing high levels of political violence and instability, from the conflict in Ethiopia and the al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia to militia and Islamist militant activity in Kenya and continued fall-out from the coup in Sudan. In 2019, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda were listed among the thirty-five most fragile[5] countries in the World (IV. Armed Conflict.. 202). Subsequently, the region has one of the highest proportions of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the world with around 13 million in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia alone - as per data from the International Displacement Monitoring center (IDMC). The center further reports that in Ethiopia, conflict and violence triggered more than two million internal displacements in 2022, a 60 per cent decrease from the 5.1 million recorded in 2021 when escalating conflicts in northern regions, and particularly Tigray, pushed the figure to an all-time high. In the period between 2008 - 2022, a total of around 14.5 million Ethiopians were internally displaced (Ethiopia - IDMC).

[5] The state fragility is derived from a complex mix of limited or uneven access to natural resources, intergroup tensions (on regional, religious and ethnic lines), poverty and economic inequalities, and weak state institutions.

Conflicts in the horn have been exacerbated by external interference and accompanied by widespread human rights violations. They are simultaneously intra and interstate which are prone to spillover across boundaries. In the horn, availability and access to small arms is ubiquitous and has further contributed to the violence inflicted upon populations. Conflicts have hampered the horn states' capacities to ensure stability and livelihood for millions of people in the region while severely damaging the social fabric between communities. The fragility combined with rising food/energy prices and the climate crisis has started a vicious circle where conflicts exacerbate and spill over to neighboring communities/countries. This includes armed clashes and militarization of pastoralist communities whose livelihoods are impacted by drastic climate conditions & state infringement in many parts of the region. As the availability of small arms and access to them increased over the years, the consequences became more severe, as violence could be more easily inflicted (Wepundi 1).

3.2. Geographical fate and colonial legacies

Professor Chirstopher Clapham - head of Center for African Studies at University of Cambridge - in his book *The Horn of Africa: State formation & Decay states* "that the horn, in its brutal simplification, can be described as constituting 'non-colonial' Africa". He attributes this to the fact that the core of the region consists of the only indigenous sub-saharan African state, the Ethiopian Empire. He argues that as many territories within the horn were contested by the internal sources of power - in contrast to the clear colonial demarcation in other parts of the continent - the boundaries in the horn are still heavily contested, leading to frictions and fueling subsequent conflicts (Clapham 5). Additionally, he emphasizes the significance of tensions originating from the geological formations of the region which are characterized by dramatic differences of landforms - namely, the highland core, highland periphery, and the lowland periphery - adjacent to each other. He argues that this diversity in landforms meant evolution of different forms of livelihood and subsequently social structures underpinned by different understandings of political power. These discreet societies eventually came into contact with each other and hence conflict arose and continues to do (Clapham 9).

The horn, in many ways, does constitute a 'non-colonial' Africa. But it would be naive to overlook the implications of colonial legacies in the region. Mesfin attributes the seeds of the

conflicts in their current form in the horn to the colonial era - despite many of them existing pre colonialism. He argues that colonialism disrupted pre-existing social, political and economic systems which were largely based on pastoral societies. It forced pastoralist communities to colonial forms of governance and taxation which disrupted their migration patterns and limited their access to natural resources - further fueling intra-ethnic tensions. Furthermore, the classic colonial tactic of 'divide and rule' was also employed in the region which triggered ethno-centrism as certain groups were favored by the colonial rulers at the cost of others. This inflicted deep seated societal wounds which would manifest in elongated tensions over the years and contribute to the vicious circle of conflicts (Mesfin 12). Given that these countries make up part of one (or multiple) RSC (s), path dependencies from colonial impacts in one country are bound to significantly impact another. The debate here is if not but to what extent has colonialism fueled the circle of seemingly endless conflicts in the horn. There is no one specific reason why the conflicts in the horn are as vicious and seemingly never ending. Rather, it is an amalgamation of factors such as history, colonialism, availability of arms, global power games and geography amongst others which has resulted in the present dynamics. One core element which has also contributed to the seemingly never-ending series of conflicts in the region is the nature of leaders and politics that has developed over the decades.

3.3. Egoistic 'Strong Men' characters rampantly undertaking tactics of subversion

A prominent trait which plagues the horn and exacerbates conflicts in the region is the logic of subversion. According to Mesfin, the principle of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' is at the core of horn states' regional policies. Countries in the horn have taken (and continue to take) advantage of every local tension to sponsor subversive activities and use it as a tool to destabilize and endanger the security in another state. This may include supporting rebel movements or pursuing regional foreign policy through any other proxy (Mesfin 16). According to De Waal, the prime period for these mutual wars of destabilization was in the early 1980s - which shall be explored further in a later section[6]. These mutual destabilization attempts by proxy intensified throughout the decade, until all three governments were at the point of military collapse. Somalia and Ethiopia eventually succumbed. In the midst of it all, Ethiopia also suffered one of its worst famines with people dying in very large numbers as they did not have enough to eat - an image

[6] See Chapter 8, section on The DERG Regime

that unfortunately brought the country to front pages around the world. De Waal labels this as “a collective near-death experience” that the region went through from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, at the foundation of which were tactics of subversion driven by ‘Strong Men’ characters (De vaal 51).

Conflicts of the horn are characterized by a highly personalized milieu in which politics operates in the region. Mesfin refers to these individuals as ‘strong-man benevolent leader[s]’ who were/are able to shape the political destiny of a state almost single-handedly and enter into either warm or conflictual relations with other states. These men are also highly skilled in inducing civilian populations to join in and converting them into military and paramilitary groups (Mesfin 12). A case in point is the Ethiopia - Eritrea ‘border war’ of 1998 which haunted the region for more than two decades. Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi and Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki once led the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) respectively to join forces against the Derg Communist military rule. They had taken power in Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively in the early 90’s. Despite harmony in the following years, a war started around a series of ‘trivial’ disputes, at the forefront of which was a border issue. De Waal asserts that it was actually a war fought between two men to establish their hierarchy which led to the death of over 100,000 people and contributed to stagnation of the region (De Waal 45).

Today, almost 30 years on from the famine and series of crises in the mid-80’s and, 20 plus years from the initiation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, the region is still plagued by numerous conflicts of various natures fueled and exacerbated in part by rapid proliferation of small arms. Ethiopia, being the largest, most populous and now the fastest developing country in the horn, is as usual, at the core of proceedings.

4. Ethiopia as a Central Figure - From the Abyssinian Empire to a Federal Democratic Republic

For the rest of the world, the grueling images from the fallout of the famine from the mid-1980's, unfortunately, became an image defining Ethiopia. But since the 90's, Ethiopia has transformed from a state on the verge of collapse into a regional power house and one of the world's fastest growing economies (Gebrerulel 1127). The journey has been and continues to be tumultuous to say the least. From escaping the wrath of European colonialism (twice) to regional expansion pursuits by its imperial leaders, followed by bloody revolutions coupled with intra-state wars and other internal struggles, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has gone through it all in the past century or so.

4.1. Italian invasions, independence and internal expansions

In 1986, when Abysnnian Emperor Menelik the II's forces pushed back Italian invaders in the battle of Adwa - a town in the Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia, the Ethiopian empire was set to be the only indigenous sub-Saharan African state to retain its independence moving into the 19th century. Adwa was widely believed by Abysnnians to be a signal from God. Signals of a 'separate destiny' for the Empire than the rest of Africa. The victory itself was a remarkable feat given that the country was in the midst of a famine and massive economic turmoil. It had significant consequences on the state formation of present day Ethiopia and hence also shaped the region (Gebrerulel 1131) .

Post victory in Adwa, pre-empting further European colonial aspirations, Menelik decided to expand his territory. He wrote in a circular to European governments "If powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator". Soon enough, the highlanders - where the Emperor came from - imposed their lordship and incorporated territories and populations from the low-land areas into their Empire. Estimates suggest that this expansion quintupled the area under Ethiopian control while tripling its population as the Empire also imposed its presence in its neighboring colonized states. (Clapham 32). Menelik's internal colonial pursuits sowed the seeds for long-lasting frictions between highlanders and low-landers in the country which has been decisive and sparks conflicts to date.

In 1935, the Italians invaded again, this time from their colonial base of Eritrea as a launchpad. The Ethiopian resistance was in vain as the Italians marched into Addis Ababa declaring an Italian East African Empire and occupying territory in the region. But global developments during the second world war meant that the Italians were defeated and Ethiopia was restored as an independent state as it had joined the league of Nations under that same status in 1923. Additionally, astute diplomacy combined with alliance with the US meant that Ethiopia could leverage the American's diplomatic muscle for the UN to approve Eritrea as a federation under the Ethiopian state (Clapham 35). From then on, with Haile Selassie I - the King of Kings believed to be chosen by God himself - at the helm, Ethiopia set out to make its mark in the region and the world.

4.2. Emperor Haile Selassie's reign - A mixed legacy

With an apparent legitimacy derived from the divine right of Kings, Haile Selassie I led Ethiopia into the modern era. It would be marked by both a complex domestic political situation and a changed world in which Ethiopia had to operate. He built strong ties with the US in an attempt to reduce Ethiopia's dependence on the British - who he highly mistrusted. A progressive advocate of non-racial multilateralism abroad and a traditional autocrat at home, Selassie used the Crown in both his political and economic pursuits (De Waal 151).

At home, he focused on revolutionizing education - including establishment of the first University in the country in 1951- to produce a lineage of highly skilled technocrats to staff government institutions. This created an elite who would also go on to manage successful enterprises such as the Ethiopian Airlines, Imperial Highway Authority, National banks etc . On the foreign policy front, due to effective diplomatic skills, Ethiopia was able to establish itself as a leader in a continent where its experiences were unlike any other. Indeed, the Emperor was able to leverage the fact that Ethiopia was not one of the newly independent post-colonial African countries. Its standing, which was apart from the Francophone/Anglophone identity, while being well positioned to act as a bridge between the Arab north and sub-saharan Africa meant that it could avoid premature commitment to any groupings. Moreover, it could also draw prestige and empathy as an empire with its own source of anti-colonial resistance. This placed the country as

a leader in a group of independent African states and culminated in Ethiopia hosting the conference that led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) - the precursor to today's African Union (AU) - with Haile Selassie I as its first chairman and Addis Ababa as its permanent headquarters (Clapham 40)

But Selassie's efforts to modernize the country while elevating its international status were not without strengthening his grip over state and society. According to De Waal, his "modernization and bureaucratic advances at home came with a 'rhizome state' that sprouted everywhere - landlords, armed settlers, even priests, were representative of the Crown." The Emperor combined temporal and spiritual authority to sit at the hub of a patronage system, in which he commanded an elite by dispensing rewards and used force to disperse armed settlers deep into lowland peripheries to plunder them. A high proportion of the Crown's top-down representation around the country came from the Shoa region around Addis Ababa and there was virtually no representation from either of the Southern or Western groups. This was in continuation of the previous Imperial attempts to impose Amhara highlander status on other population groups - especially in the lowland (De Waal 152). It further reinforced the idea of a strong, legitimate political authority in the central and northern highlands while marginalizing other groups.[7] Resentments grew and Selassie responded by slightly opening the political space which included the introduction of a revised constitution in 1955. The constitution introduced provisions for a lower house of Parliament elected by universal suffrage - but the upper house was still nominated by the crown, and there would still be no space for political parties to operate (Clapham 41).

Frustrations grew. The regime's 'nation building' project could offer nothing more than the possibility of assimilation into the language, culture and political values of the highland core - which was not well received by the rest of the population. Deep-seated problems deriving from control over land added to the grievances. This led to an attempted coup supported by student movements at the royal palace in 1960, which was swiftly overturned. Clapham states that the rhetoric of the coup leaders pointed toward 'backwardness' of Ethiopia in comparison with the developments taking place elsewhere in the continent. Amidst brewing domestic grievances and

[7] These traits were very characteristics of De Waal's concept of the 'political marketplace' which shall be analyzed -with reference to more recent Ethiopian history - later in the thesis.

increasing political pressure, the Emperor in 1962, attempted to incorporate Eritrea by pushing the Eritrean Parliament to disband itself in what was officially hailed as the final step in the full reunion of Eritrea with the 'motherland'. The seeds of armed resistance against the regime had already been planted and this event further nurtured it. During the 60s, the class of educated elites, who were created as a result of previous reforms, were discontent with their technocratic status and wanted a political voice (Clapham 42). A multitude of factors including the Eritrean insurgency, internal reform failures, discontent among army noncommissioned officers and scandal of another devastating famine contributed to a series of strikes and demonstrations in Addis Ababa in 1974 (De Waal 48). The military stepped in and Selassie was dethroned. The divine right to rule for God's chosen people had come to an end.

4.3. The revolutionary Derg

Violent start, Red Terror and the war with Somalia

The Government of Emperor Haile Sellasie was replaced by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) - also known under its Amharic name of *Derg*. The transition was not bloodless and it was a few years before power was truly consolidated and another 'Big man ruler' emerged in the form of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Derg adopted socialism, embarked on radical social changes, and retained power for over two decades.

Stefano Belluci, from the University of Leiden argues that the Derg had in fact hijacked what was supposed to be a revolution by the aspirations of the Ethiopian intellectuals and students. He asserts that the military junta misappropriated their radical discourse (Belluci 3). In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the first acts undertaken by the Derg would set the tone for the remainder of their rule. Conspiracy, plotting, and brutal acts of violence would characterize the new course of the Ethiopian revolution. After coming to power, the Derg immediately incarcerated all the highest-ranking members of the imperial government. (Belluci 4). This led to a split in the revolutionary factions, with one group - the MEISON - favoring collaboration with the military while the other - the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) - renouncing their rule (Clapham 44). The result - bloodshed. The Derg asserted a total clampdown in which violent and systemic assassination of any enemy of the regime or their sympathizers took place. In the later months of 1976, tens of thousands of people including

innocent civilians and students were murdered on the streets of Addis Ababa and other major cities under operation ‘Red Terror’. The leader of MEISON was also captured and murdered. A whole generation of intellects and students wiped out or driven away (Belluci 8). In the aftermath, factional conflicts within the regime invariably resulted in the killing of the losers and Mengitsu Haile-Mariam came out on top. Another round of Ethiopian autocratic rule was established.

In the midst of all the violence at home, Ethiopia would be fighting a war with neighboring Somalia - The Ogaden War. The disintegration of Ethiopia was too tempting for Siyad Barre, the then Somali president, who invaded the country in 1977. This was a mistake as a resurgent sense of Ethiopian nationalism amongst the Derg supplemented by an alliance with the Soviet Union meant that Ethiopia would push the Somalis back. This alliance was a remarkable turn-around in the greater Cold War scenario as Ethiopia was mostly backed by the West pre revolution. (De Waal 49). The Soviet - Ethiopia alliance which saw extensive military support flowing into Ethiopia to fight the Ogaden war, including hardware and weapons, was consequential in opening the gates for a huge number of small arms to enter the country. The import of weapons, combined with its usage by the Derg under the conditions of the Ethiopian Political marketplace caused massive proliferation of small arms in the country. These imports and the specific conditions shall be explored further in later sections of this paper.

Authoritarian Reforms, Resentment and Downfall

With an uncompromising sense of Ethiopian nationalism at the core, the regime set out to incorporate all Ethiopians on an equal basis into a revolutionary state free of inequalities and exploitations of the past. At the base of this reformist movement, was land. Belluci terms land as the ‘mother of all reforms’ undertaken by the Derg regime. According to him, it was not only about productivity and management but also about control. The land, which had for centuries been controlled by feudal power, was declared the property of the people collectively. This was not only the dismantling of power over land but also the breaking down of a deeply entrenched socio-political system. Under the reform, land collectivization was accelerated and it was assigned to farmers who were living and working on it. This won the peasant’s sympathy for the regime. Property was replaced by ‘possession rights’ as the most radical reform of its kind on the

continent took place (Belluci 6). Additionally, a state socialist mode of economic management was pursued as large scale enterprises previously controlled by the British and the Dutch were nationalized (Clapham 45).

The Derg also launched a large-scale rural operation - *'Zemecha'* - to reach the peripheral population in hopes to establish a link between the peasants and the center, which historically was fractured (Belluci 7). This was initially well received. But Clapham argues that what was supposed to be a mechanism to provide services and draw in the peasants, evolved to be a mechanism for centralized control (Clapham 45). As the Derg further morphed itself into soviet style marxism, elections and democracy were seen as risky as it could potentially allow conservative forces back into power. The regime further consolidated its power at the center as it developed into a full fledged military dictatorship.

Top-down economic control would eventually fail and resentments would grow. This combined with the international economic crisis and austerity measures from financial institutions in the late 70s//early 80s would mean severe financial woes. The regime would be cornered and respond with further consolidation of power by usage of violence. A key moment was when a famine struck the country in the mid-80s. The event would go on to expose the revolutionary regime's failures (De Waal 51). The regime turned to the West for food aid as its Soviet allies were not in a position to help. But then, it used the famine and controlled food aid to target opponents - mostly Tigrayans who had fled to the north of the country in the wake of the 'Red Terror' and were regrouping under the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) - while maintaining a political stronghold (Clapham 51). The Derg's reaction would further mobilize anti-regime sentiments also in the other parts of the country. The forces of the southern and eastern peripheries, the Oromo, Somali, Sidama and Afar resistance fronts and other insurgencies on the western borderlands, among the people of Gambella and Beni Shangul, were considered a lesser threat than the EPLF or TPLF, but were still active (De Waal 152). At the same time, the EPLF would also gain further grounds in their struggle for independence. When Soviet support started winding down towards the end of the decade due to their own struggles, the downfall of the Derg was imminent as it would be unable to withstand pressures from all sides. The liberation fronts, combined, wore down the Ethiopian army. By May 1991, EPLF had marched

into their capital Asmara to declare an independent state and the TPLF had consolidated full power in Tigray. The TPLF now pushed into the capital Addis Ababa without much resistance. It was able to build a coalition with other allied regional political movements and form the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) - under which name it seized power in Addis. Mengitsu fled to Zimbabwe - the Derg regime had fallen (Clapham 52).

4.4. The EPRDF Regime

The EPRDF had marched into the capitol pretty much uncontested. Members of the once formidable Derg army were seen selling their kalashnikovs on the streets of Addis Ababa to raise money to get buses back home. This was another instance where small arms changed hands and the proliferation increased. The defeated army was disarmed, most of its members demobilized, and others absorbed into the EPRDF army which would evolve to become the national army. Meles Zenawi, chairman of the TPLF and subsequently EPRDF, was in charge of the transitional government which was in power. The civil servants switched allegiances to the new regime and remained in their posts. This whole transition in Ethiopia was quite different and unique in comparison to what was happening in the rest of the region where revolutionaries had to build any sort of resemblance of a state from scratch. The guerillas once in power inherited a functional state - in which there were deep rooted problems, but one that was administratively functional nevertheless (Clapham 65).

As seen with many revolutionary regimes around the world, governance is a different ball-game then Guerrilla warfare. Meles was aware of this and devoted great thought to the politics of armed struggle to ensure the TPLF's political capabilities did not fall behind their military prowess. Infact, in 1989, despite the leadership's assessment that the Derg's military defeat was certain, the assault was held back as the front was not yet in a position to take political control of the country (De Vaal 153).

State (Re)Building under the EPRDF

The first major decision taken by the regime was the unconditional recognition of Eritrean independence. Despite some friction over the years, the TPLF & EPLF had fought side by side after all. The Eritrean struggle against the Ethiopian state had taken too many lives on each side

and had been a huge burden for all parties involved. Next on the agenda for the new regime was state rebuilding. To embark on that, Meles and co. would have to widen their political base - which was mostly legitimized only amongst the Tigrayans. The formation of the EPRDF contributed to expanding their legitimacy as other rebel movements turned political parties were incorporated as part of a border coalition - with the TPLF still commanding majority of power. The model of the new Ethiopian nation building project was inspired by Marxist Intelligentsia, which called for the recognition and right to self-determination of all the 'nations, nationalities and peoples' within the boundaries of the state. Clapham highlights that this was starkly in contrast to the rest of the continent which adopted the territorial structure imposed during colonialism. Paradoxically, the continent's only non externally colonized country would now seek to build up from its indigenous ethnicities as the base for the state. The fundamental marxist belief underlying the concept of ethnic federalism was understanding of ethnicity in which "ethnic attachments were viewed as nothing more than suppressed ideologies of class struggle, derived from relationships of exploitation that took on a fortuitously ethnic coloring." (Clapham 68).

This new structure was then entrenched in the new Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) which was promulgated in 1995. Ethiopia would now be a federal state, in which the constituent units would be the country's ethnic groups, each of which would have a right to self-determination, and be represented by its own indigenous leadership. Once the ethnic group is conceived as a unit of government, it must be provided with a specific territory which is governed by that group, and within which its members have at least an implicit status that is denied to those who do not belong to it (Clapham 74).

William Davidson, the Horn of Africa specialist and senior analyst at the CRISIS group, frames the system as "formalized power sharing along ethnic lines." He further adds that under this model, the political space was opened up as more independent media and political parties were allowed to operate - but still strictly regulated. According to him, the structure meant that political parties would be ethnically exclusive as the party structure would require alignment with the state structure. All the changes driven by the new constitution were considered to be radical on paper, but TPLF would still be at the heart of it - they would still dominate power

circles (Davidson np). This would continue to be the pattern for quite a while and when tensions simmer between the center and the federations, the ruling party would not hesitate to push back - strongly if need be.

The Developmental State

Meles believed that the neoliberal paradigm is a dead end. In his 2011 article, *States and Markets: Neoliberal Limitations and the Case for a Developmental State*, he argues that a fundamental shift in paradigm is required to bring about the African Renaissance and for that African states need to move away from that paradigm and towards becoming developmental (Zenawi 1). The constitutional restructuring of Ethiopia from a unitary nation into a multinational federation was the first of the ideological pillars of the EPRDF project. The second would be the pursuit of an east Asian-inspired developmental state economic model (Gebrerulel 1131). In the early years, the regime pursued an Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI), a policy which sought to build on the country's agricultural base to create an industrial economy which would add economic value to indigenous raw materials. This would theoretically also seek to cater to the peasantry on whose welfare the guerilla warfare was based. But ADLI did not work as Ethiopian peasants who were subsistence farmers could simply not produce enough to drive the necessary change (Clapham 93).

In 2002, EPRDF formulated a white paper outlining a developmental state grand strategy to accompany the economic model. This was also a clear statement in the favor of capitalism, thereby resolving abiding tension and confusion within the EPRDF's ideological movement (Gebrerulel 1131). Meles explained that "Ethiopia must pursue accelerated economic growth as its absolute and overriding priority. Development should be a matter of national survival; the ideology should be that growth is survival (Gebrerulel 1133)." This would be pursued via an export-led industrialization programme to achieve middle-income status. The political rationale behind adopting the new economic ideology was the belief that Ethiopia was so fragile it risked imminent collapse and would only be saved through a fast-paced economic transformation. For Meles, it was a question of developing the country's political economy to establish the class basis for development and democracy. He argued, "let's be public about building a capitalist society." He believed that a developmental state should monopolize rents and allocate them

strategically for value creation and state-building over the long term (De Waal 157). The new ideological turn faced the strongest opposition from within Meles's (TPLF) and was mostly embraced by other factions in the EPRDF. But Meles would stand his ground. He would push limits, securitize his agenda and eventually also go on the offensive - during the 2005 elections as an example - to ensure he could execute his vision[8]. Under Meles' intellectual leadership, the model would remain dominant in the ruling coalition even after his death in 2012. (Gebrerulel 1133).

On the economic front, the results were good, on paper at least. Ethiopia met astounding levels of growth in the first two decades of the 2000's. In 2017, it recorded annual average GDP growth of about ten percent in the decade prior, driven by public investments in agriculture and infrastructure. For 2015, Ethiopia's GDP growth rate of 9.6% was the highest in Africa and second highest in the world. The poverty rate fell from 44 percent in 2000 to 23.5 percent in 2015/16. The growth was underpinned by expansion of industrial activity and continued investments in infrastructure and manufacturing (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia..). Unlike other African countries - Equatorial Guinea & Angola, whose high levels of growth around the same period can be attributed to hydrocarbons, Ethiopia had very little to do with any kind of minerals. Moreover, this growth was not only city-centered as numerous towns and tiny settlements sprung outside the capital. This was due to increase in access to basic infrastructures and a major change in attitude of people around the country (Clapham 2018 1151). But despite these improved numbers, Aditya Sarkar & De Waal in their paper *Thinking Politically About Money: The Changing Role of Political Finance in The Political (Un-)Settlements in Ethiopia and Sudan,* argue there were major caveats. According to them, much of the rapid growth, especially after 2011, is attributable to large, debt-financed public capital investments, which have had very little impact on increasing productivity (De Waal & Sarkar 28). Additionally, a 2022 World Bank report suggests that growth (as measured by consumption data) in rural areas effectively stagnated between 2011-16 and rural households at the bottom of the distribution did not experience any consumption growth at all (World Bank 2022).

[8] The securitization of the developmental state agenda along with the regime's approach to the 2005 elections are further examples of the conditions of the political marketplace which manifests itself in the country. These shall be further explored in a later section.

In many ways the seeds of the aforementioned progress were sowed in Meles' push for institutionalizing the development state. But it was also not all rosy on the political front. The developmental state was built, in Meles's own words, at 'any cost'. This meant astute political management on part of the EPRDF. The resentments culminated in mass protests which led to Hailemariam Desalegn's - Meles' successor - stepping down. During the EPRDF's two decades plus rule, political management from the top-down combined with ostracization of certain groups in the Ethiopian Political marketplace meant that conditions were again created for further proliferation of small arms in the country.

5. Theoretical Framework - Alex De Waal's political marketplace

In his book 'The Real Politics of Horn of Africa - Money, Power & Business of War', Alex De Waal theorizes his idea of the political marketplace. He uses his personal dealings, field experiences and observations over the decades to lay out a theory of what real politics looks like in the horn. In a world where statebuilding becomes increasingly turbulent, De Waal visualizes the political marketplace as an alternate system of governance in which politics is conducted as the exchange of political services for loyalty (De Waal 28).

De Waal acknowledges that the political marketplace is ever present across all political systems - with varying levels of centrality to political functioning and governance. According to him, in robust democracies, where everyday politics consists of transactions that involve allegiance, license, and coercion - some of these transactions are labeled 'corruption' and others are permissible horse-trading. In advanced political marketplaces, where the marketplace principles are deeply prevaded in governance systems, the conduct of political business as an exchange is the central feature, and the prices of the commodities of cooperation and allegiance are determined by supply and demand. In these systems, real politics is the bargaining and coercion that constitutes these transactions. De Waal emphasizes that turbulence is at the core of advanced political marketplaces where "it is unpredictable and chaotic from one moment to the next, lacking discernible patterns, but still maintains a recognizable structure over a longer period of time." Furthermore, elements or isolated examples of this kind of politics may also be found at the sub-state level. For example, a big country with a well-governed core may have remote peripheries or urban enclaves in which governance is conducted in a political marketplace (De Waal 29).

De Waal asserts that this system of governance exists where the following four conditions apply:

(a) political finance is in the hands of individuals with political, military or business interests;
(b) control over the instruments of violence is dispersed or contested and;
(c) political disputes are not resolved by institutional rules and procedures (law is subordinate to political contingency) and;

(d) these countries are integrated into the global political and economic order in a subordinate position. (De Waal 28)

In this nexus of political finance, insecurity and uncertainty, political bargaining is at the center which reduces people to commodities while using dollars and the Kalashnikov (weapons) as common currencies. The protagonists in this marketplace are men who represent militarized and masculine social values and norms. (De Waal 42 & 187). Violence is embedded in this system, but De Waal states (counterintuitively perhaps) that very large-scale violence is rare. According to him, pervasive violence is used as a tool to increase bargaining powers and/or rent while political businessmen only resort to mass violence only when the system malfunctions (De Waal 47).

This thesis will be rooted in De Waal's idea of the political marketplace. In particular, the four conditions for functionality of the political marketplace and how it manifests itself in the Ethiopian case - for the two distinct periods in question - creating the breeding ground for small arms proliferation will be explored. In other words, the manifestation of the political marketplace in Ethiopia over the years has contributed to the demand for small arms across many spheres of Ethiopian society and led to its massive proliferation. But before delving into that analysis, it is key to better understand the theoretical concept, its core elements, similarities with business management and its internationalization.

5.1. Key concepts in Alex De Waal's political marketplace

The following are some of the key concepts and ideas in Alex De Waal's theory of the political marketplace:

Political Entrepreneurs / Business Managers

They are De Waal's perception of politicians from a business lens. The modern day equivalent of ambitious political leaders who act in ways akin to the heads of criminal cartels. They are the chief executives and sometimes even the owners of political businesses, including criminal ones. A political entrepreneur is marked up if he knows a lot of people and can judge their capacities well, and down if he lacks those qualities, or is timid or capricious. (De Waal 31)

Political Finance

This is the money available for a politician to spend on whatever purposes he may choose – especially for renting the loyalty or cooperation of other politicians. The political budget is not the same as government revenue: it is money for which no accounting is required. But parts of government revenue can be converted into a political budget by funneling it as 'arrears' and using it to advance one's position in the political marketplace (De Waal 34).

Profit in the political marketplace

Profit in the political marketplace can either be in the form of power or money. It is normally reinvested into political and security budgets or sometimes for public goods or vanity projects with the larger goal of consolidating power or gaining political capital (De Waal 36)

Rent Seeking

Rent seeking is an economic concept in which an individual or an entity seeks to increase their own wealth without adding any value to the economy. Gordon Tullock, an economist who first put forward the theoretical basis of the concept argued that social cost arises because the resources used in this non-value adding creation of wealth for an individual or entity have opportunity cost somewhere else in the economy. In addition to seeking rent at high social costs, individuals also use real resources to protect their rents from encroachment by other seekers - known as rent protection (Tolisson 74 & 76). The expression usually refers to 'incomes which are above normal' – where 'normal' incomes are those which would have been earned by an individual or a firm in a competitive market. (Khan 2000p. 5). De Waal uses the concept for when political entrepreneurs/managers exploit public and/or state resources to enhance their political budget. A rentier system is at the core of the functionality of the political marketplace.

Dispersed control over instruments of violence

This is a condition which political business managers aim to achieve by creating divided and rivalrous security institutions in an attempt to 'coup proof' their regimes. The underlying principle is 'divide and rent' to ensure other political entrepreneurs/managers do not have enough control over instruments of violence to change the status quo. The principle allows these

others to have enough leverage over violence to ensure their services can be rented if and when needed (De Waal 35)

Poorly institutionalized states

Consists of states where institutions are not robust and their independence is constantly tested. In these states, more often than not, institutions succumb to the power of political entrepreneurs and/or business managers. In poorly institutionalized states, political disputes are not resolved by institutional rules and procedures but rather political contingency.

Double Bargain

Double Bargain is when a political entrepreneur has to act as a link while negotiating between entrepreneurs in both the national and international political marketplace. This usually occurs when domestic political finance is intrinsically tied with International political finance.

Public Sphere and Political Circuitry

De Waal's idea of the public sphere is the arena where politics of ideas and democratic debate take place. Members of the public sphere are isolated from where the actual political business is transacted in the political marketplace - namely, the political circuitry (De Waal 187).

5.2. Similarities between business management and politicians in a political marketplace

De Waal's approach is grounded in the belief that politicians will operate according to business principles. Thus, he uses business management models as a guide to understanding these governance systems. According to him, some of the key concepts from business management transfer remarkably well to politicians in the political marketplace. He draws parallels between the marketplace and Michael Porter's 5 forces of Business (See Appendix 1).

Like any entrepreneur in the world of business, political business people seek to increase revenue and limit costs. With this in mind, they finance their operations through debt, equity, revenue from operations, or rent. Like business managers, politicians try to control as much information flow as they can, and prefer their foreign sponsors to be diverse and not in contact with one another. Political business people also face risk of forward integration by new entrants taking

over their market share. They seek to limit the entry of competitors into the market and discourage rival or replacement products. They try to develop customer loyalty through branding, typically by using identity labels, or by demonstrating their own long-term commitment by closing exit options, for example, by committing conspicuous atrocities (De Waal 32). A political entrepreneur can increase his market share at the expense of his rivals. He can become so effective at renting the services of those lower down the chain and adding value to their activities, that he can challenge and displace his erstwhile patrons. As a larger-scale operator, especially if he takes a controlling stake in a recognized government, he can expand his reach across borders, even rendering sovereign rulers into his clients. Finally, a political entrepreneur can innovate to expand his trade to new sectors - taking on counter-terrorism contracts is a current trend. In doing so he can repackage his business and try to rebrand his reputation (De Waal 33).

5.3. Internationalization and Dollarization of the Political Marketplace

De waal divides the story of the political marketplace in the horn in three acts - during the cold war; the inter-imperium period of the 1900s; and the 21st century - a period he labels as the beginning of an era of ‘new rentierism’ (p48). All three periods were plagued with numerous conflicts further exacerbated by vested interests of regional/global powers.

According to De Waal, full scale integration of the horn’s political marketplace and its subsequent dollarization took place and accelerated at the turn of the century as new forms of rentierisms evolved. The first was the commodity boom in the region, largely fueled by exportation of oil (Sudan 1999 followed by Chad in 20023 as examples). As oil is a strategic commodity it attracted security and foreign-policy interests opening gateways for political business. Post 9/11 and the evolution of the notion of counter-terrorism, forms of security rents sprung. This was further integrated into the marketplace by the evolution of the African Peace & Security Architecture (APSA) and evolved ideas of peacekeeping - opening the gateway for states to maintain military strength on the security payroll using funds from international peacekeeping missions or from direct donor support.

5.4. Limitations

Harry Verhoeven, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in Qatar gives plaudits to De Waal for coming up with the framework and considers it to be of 'audacious design' but with severe limitations (Verhoeven 1022). De Waal himself, in an article with Aditya Sarkar, concedes that just like any political economy framework there are some limitations of this framework and it does not seek to explain everything - within the horn or elsewhere. Instead, they argue that it contains a set of explanations and assumptions for the operation of transactional politics against which the empirics of different cases can be tested. They do not highlight what these limitations exactly are (Sarkar & De Waal 7). Tobias Hagmaan, senior program officer at Swiss Peace, in his review of De Waal's book states that the book, despite inspiring via the marketplace framework, is also disappointing. According to him, the framework is reductionist, as the idea reduces politics in the region to "financial transactions, cost-benefit of violence and, devoid of any ideology." He argues that devoid of ideological considerations is a major shortcoming, given the history of Marksist-Leninist ideas and political practice in the region - especially Ethiopia & Eritrea - which shall briefly be touched upon in later sections of this paper. (Hagmann; Verhoeven 1021,1022)

Another critique of the book - perhaps a glaring one - is De Waal's obvious overlooking of some of the political consequences of decisions made by the Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. His description of his character and his thought processes are rich via personal engagement experiences and anecdotes but perhaps this close association clouds the author's judgment. In many instances, De Waal brushes over Meles' potential atrocious actions and rides along his idea of a developmental state at 'any cost'. This has direct consequences on analysis for this paper as De Waal's narrative on Meles sometimes fails to explicitly align with his marketplace conditions during the regime. I try to rectify this to a certain extent by unraveling the extended impacts of his actions on small arms proliferation in the country.

6. Global Arms Trade

In April 2022, a Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report highlighted that the world military expenditure passed $2 Trillion for the first time ever. This was despite the aftermath of widespread economic downturn following the COVID-19 pandemic. It further added that the five largest spenders in 2021 were the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom and Russia, together accounting for 62 per cent of expenditure (World Military..). SIPRI defines military expenditure as inclusive of all current and capital expenditure on: the armed forces, including peace keeping forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects, paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations, and space military activities (SIPRI ..).

The Global Arms trade makes up only a small subset of global military expenditure. SIPRI suggests that the only way to estimate the global financial value of arms trade is to rely on official data provided by governments and industry bodies. But it highlights that due to lack of an internationally agreed definition of what constitutes ‘arms’ and opaqueness on government reportings, there are significant limitations on using available data (Financial value..). Andrew Feinstein, author of *The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade,* argues that arms deals are always shrouded in secrecy. In many instances, governments enter into contracts directly with commercial suppliers and with other third parties, some of whom are not even legal entities. The sale and supply of arms often involves murky middlemen or agents, referred to as arms brokers or dealers and they mostly operate outside the legal parameters. He refers to this world of trade as the ‘shadow world’ which is also known as the trade done in the gray and black markets. The gray markets are areas where the deals are conducted through legal channels, but undertaken covertly out of public knowledge (Feinstein xxiv). Much of the arms trade, movement, manufacture and proliferation in question within the thesis is conducted in this gray zone. Hence, it is pivotal to assess the figures presented with an understanding that there are gaps in data and the numbers are most likely a gross underestimate of ground realities.

SIPRI further sheds light on the covert nature of these deals by giving examples of countries such as the UK & US who do not release on the export itself but only on the license and agreements. While others, like China, do not release any financial data on total arms exports, export licenses or orders. But despite the limitations, SIPRI calculated the rough estimate for the

total financial value of global arms trade for 2020 to be around $112 billion. Given the murky world of arms trade, they stress on how this figure is likely to be higher (Financial Value..).

De Waal further considers the arms trade as a particularly notorious source of illicit finance. According to him, It has been informally estimated that 40 percent of all bribery in international trade is associated with arms deals. Much of this money comes directly out of taxpayers' pockets as companies in most cases are contracted by the state. Additionally, the business side of the trade has a curious and morally tainted economic logic as European countries want to maintain their production capacity but their domestic requirements are too small to make their products competitive, so they must export (De Waal 171). This means that continuous demand is integral to the survival of manufacturers and other actors in the supply chain. One way to ensure demand is to make sure conflicts exacerbate while volatility continues in hotspots around the world - including in the Horn.

6.1. Small arms trade as part of global arms trade

The Small Arms Survey (SAS) is the primary resource for data and expertise on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. The SAS's latest trade update from 2020 highlights the complexities in gathering data related to small arms. The report summary starts with the line "The lack of transparency among small arms exporters restrains our understanding of the scope of and trends in international small arms transfers. (Trade Update 2020 10)." The total value of international small arms and light weapons trade was worth at least $6.5 billion in 2017. While this is a slight decrease of USD 88 million (or 1.35 per cent) compared to 2016, the value of global small arms exports has nonetheless doubled since the institute started monitoring in 2001. Furthermore, the report states that ammunition remains the largest category, with exports worth USD 2.7 billion in 2017, with the United States being both the main exporter and the main importer for the year. The report uses data from the UN Comtrade - a source for detailed imports and exports statistics in goods and services reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries/areas since 1962. The Comtrade is a database that relies on reporting by states and therefore does not fully capture arms-trading activities. Moreover, the survey highlights that transfers of some light weapons, light weapons ammunition, and accessories for small arms and light weapons are not discernible from transfers of other items recorded in the same categories,

and therefore are not covered in their analysis. This points towards the numbers being a gross underestimation (Trade data 2020 12).

Nevertheless, according to Comtrade data, for 2017, 38 states were major exporters - i.e. they exported at least USD 10 million worth of small arms and light weapons, including their parts, accessories, and ammunition. Among them, 17 were top exporters - with small arms exports equal to or above USD 100 million. For the same year, the most notable increases in exports came from Norway (a 269 % increase) and China (a 89 % increase) (Trade Update 2020 19).

6.2. Transparency issues in small arms trade - Especially in Africa

The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer presents an annual assessment of countries' reporting on their small arms trade activities in reports of various kinds[9]. The 2020 Barometer identifies, in descending order, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Serbia, and the United Kingdom as the most transparent small arms exporters in 2017. The least transparent exporters in that year were, in ascending order, Iran, North Korea (both with scores of zero), Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the UAE. China and Ukraine ranked as the ninth and eighth least transparent states in this year's Barometer respectively, while the Russian Federation ranked 14th (Trade Update 2020 19).

The report highlights that in the African context, like the rest of the world, ammunition represents a significant part of the reported trade, totalling USD 97.7 million in 2017. Furthermore, it adds that the risks of diversion of ammunition is high across many conflict prone countries in the continent due to their limited security and stockpile management system (Trade Update 2020 52). The gaps in data from Comtrade has further discrepancies when it comes to the trade between the least transparent countries and countries in Africa. For instance, the value of ammunition exports to Africa from China and Ukraine reported to UN Comtrade between 2008 and 2017 represents only 3 per cent and 0 per cent, respectively, of the amounts declared as imports by their African trading partners (Trade Update 2020 19).

[9]These include the national arms exports reports, including submissions to regional reports; submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register), including those to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); national reports on countries' implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA); UN Comtrade submissions; and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) initial and annual reports.

For the year, 2017, Chinese transfers represented 10 percent of all small arms ammunition imports reported by African countries in 2017. Taken at face value, UN Comtrade figures would therefore suggest that China is a limited source of small arms ammunition for the continent. But the report suggests otherwise as it points to other data sources claiming China has a broader range of ammunition importers in the continent. Additionally, Chinese ammunitions have been documented among stockpiles of illicit small arms recovered in many parts of the continent. As there is lack of reporting on part of China on their exports, it is difficult to discern if these seized ammunitions were diverted from stockpiles of armed forces in the continent or form a part of unauthorized re-exports from countries that are not directly involved in trade with China (Trade Update 2020 56,57).

In this convoluted scenario, where significant gaps remain with respect to public knowledge of the trade between less transparent states and their dealings in Africa, Ethiopia features as the 5th highest importer of ammunition in the continent for the year 2016 with reported imports worth USD 4.2 million and the top three exporters as Slovakia, UAE, and the United States (Trade Update 2020 53).

6.3. Great power rivalry driving arms flows and proliferation - A global phenomenon

In many civil wars and conflicts around the world - whether in Afghanistan, Yemen, Myanmar, Syria, Palestine, Iraq or Ethiopia, the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, namely the US, UK, France, China and Russia (P5), are sharply divided and protective of their allies - and their prolific arms markets (Deen). According to Tar, today the P5 together account for 88 percent of the world's conventional arms exports. These exports contribute regularly to gross abuses of human rights in Africa and elsewhere (Tar 18). Schroder argues that arms sales are used to build long-term relationships between national defense establishments. According to him, when a country purchases a major weapons system they're also signing up for the years of training and the steady stream of spare parts, ammunition and upgrades needed to integrate the new weapons into their armed forces and keep them running. Policymakers often argue that this interaction translates into influence – both within the recipient's defense establishment and over their defense and foreign policies (Schroder 78).

Throughout the Cold War, countries engaged in proxy battles on behalf of global superpowers (USSR & USA) who were keen to either spread their ideological beliefs or counter the other's. Such battles were played out using free flow of arms and ammunition supplied overtly and in huge numbers clandestinely by the superpowers. But these weapons outlast the battles they were intended for. They left a legacy in which battles were prolonged and realities were dramatically altered for instability to thrive for decades afterwards. For instance, weapons left over from Cold War battles have ravaged the countries of South Asia for decades, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the 1970s and 80s, the United States and the Soviet Union sent millions of small arms and light weapons to their allies in the region. The American motivation for arming the Mujahedeen (the armed resistance against communist Afghanistan) was both visceral – pay-back for Vietnam, and pragmatic – damaging the Soviet war machine. It was based on the CIA's calculations that every dollar spent on the Mujahedeen costs the Soviets eight to ten which was considered an excellent return on a relatively modest investment. It would also mean that every single unit the Soviet's redirected to fight CIA backed rebels in Afghanistan would mean one fewer on the main Cold War battlefield – the European front. These weapons not only fueled the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s and again in 2001, but they also changed the security landscape of neighboring Pakistan. The decision to arm the Mujahedeen continues to contribute to violence and conflict in the region. Proliferation of arms markets and its consequences remain in towns along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where enormous quantities and varieties of weapons are readily available. The pipeline's networks and routes also help the flow of both drugs and weapons – an illicit and continuing trade which plagues the communities in the areas (Schroder 27).

Schroder further highlights the case of Central America where the 1970s and 1980s saw a huge influx of small arms, including AK-47s from the superpowers. While the United States and the Soviet Union had a hand in these transfers, they tried to conceal their involvement, using proxy sources and dealers. Ironically, the United States routinely purchased Soviet bloc weapons for insurgent groups because of their efficiencies. Between 1996 and 1999, the US government sent $376,000 worth of small arms to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama. This might seem like a small sum but the administration also authorized private industry sales totaling over $66 million - eventually, flooding the region with weapons. Years later, the weapons continue to

flow and massive proliferation haunts the region. In the countries involved, the number of deaths and the culture of violence has increased since the conflicts' ends. According to a UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report from 2010, 77% of all murders in the region are committed with a firearm. The threat of firearm violence is also undermining governance in the region. It further adds that most of these were provided by Cold War allies to both states and rebel groups. As the technology for many of these weapons have not been significantly updated since, they are still effective and can cause lethal damage (UNODC 49). Although murder rates in El Salvador have decreased since the end of the war in 1992, the proportion of murders committed with firearms rose from fifty-five per cent in 1990–95 to seventy-five per cent in 1999. In 2001 in Honduras, firearms caused eighty-two per cent of deaths in young adults. Thirty-six per cent of the deaths involved AK-47s, assumed to have been supplied during the above mentioned periods (Schroder 11)

Steps have been taken by local governments and the international community to disarm regimes and rebels alike in the region. But, despite these efforts, there were many weapons unaccounted for when the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua ended. In El Salvador, it is estimated that about 360,000 military-style weapons were not handed over at the end of the war and it is alleged that arms caches were moved to neighboring countries. Similarly, in Guatemala, only 1,824 firearms were handed over at the end of the conflict. In Nicaragua, only 17,000 firearms were surrendered, despite the fact that some 91,000 combatants were demobilized. The discrepancy highlights the huge gap between weapons supplied and the ones eventually surrendered. Although the exact number of unaccounted assault rifles remains unknown, estimates have been in the millions (UNODC 60). These unaccounted weapons come back into play when tensions flare up in the country and the region, leading to escalation of violence and death.

6.4. Small arms trade as part of big power games in Ethiopia/The Horn

Weapons trade has been an integral part of big power games in Africa for much of the 20th century and beyond. Millions of light arms – lightweight, highly portable, and devastatingly effective - were shipped to Africa during the Cold War to equip anti-colonial fighters, newly independent states and superpower proxy forces alike. They ended up in the hands of many

young or poorly trained users. The result - the pool of SALW in Africa today remains dominated by old, often cold war era models and makes (Tar 30). The situation is so severe that despite Governments keeping track of deaths by SALW, in reality, the continent has lost count of death, destruction of property and crimes associated with SALW (Tar 18). The horn of Africa has also not been immune from great power proxy games over the years.

Ethiopia, the only non-colonized and the biggest powerhouse in the region naturally has caught the eyes of various foreign powers as they have seeked to pursue their interests in the region. In the case of Ethiopia, as Roy love mentions in his article, already before the advent of the Second World War, various European colonial powers who were then well entrenched along the country's borders gave their own interests priority in considering how many arms they would sell to Ethiopia (Love 732). JP Ananad in his article *Horn of Africa: Superpower Maneuvers* highlights the example of how superpowers were willing to switch allegiances and provide arms to whoever they deemed fit as per their larger geopolitical interests at a specific period of time. He argues that there would always be 'the other' in case supplies stop from one of the superpowers (Anand 1537). Michael Clough and Michael Schuman who wrote a review of Jefery A. Lefevre's 1991 book *Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1955-1991*, argue that the ebbs and flow of the US policy towards the two principal countries of the Horn, Ethiopia and Somalia, is the history of the cold war in microcosm. They further assert that American interest in the region fluttered with larger geopolitical tides, with increased interest from Washington and subsequent seeking of favor from the Horn's leader when events there could have larger geopolitical bearings. Lefevre offered three bargaining models to explain fluctuations in the US willingness to offer arms assistance to Ethiopia and Somalia - "a state's perception of internal/external threats; the value of political, strategic and economic assets offered by its partners and; the vested interests of domestic actors in maintaining a stable partnership (Clough, Michael et al. 219)". These models have been apparent in superpower engagement with Ethiopia during various periods in its recent history.

During Haile Selassie's reign, the US was selling arms to Ethiopia in exchange for communication facilities in the country. This included the Kagnew communication station in Asmara, and the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Addis Ababa amongst others.

This continued for almost two years after the fall of the regime as Washington under then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger rationalized aid to the brutal new regime in strictly geopolitical terms. By supplying arms to the Derg, he argued, the United States would demonstrate its credibility as an ally and prevent the new regime from defecting to the Soviet bloc. It was only the subsequent administration of Jimmy Carter that broke the trend citing gross human rights violations on part of the Derg (Clough, Michael et al. 221). This was when the Soviets - a long time supporter of the Somalis, who were Ethiopia's arch enemy at that time - stepped in and agreed to fill the gap (Anand 1537). This was one of the direct consequences of the Somali President Siad Barre's decision to invade the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. Post the break in relations with Ethiopia, the US now started to align with the Somalis, with hopes of finding allies and an eventual foothold in the region. A drastic switch in allegiances was complete.

According to the two Michaels, as the proxy games intensified, both the regimes became increasingly dependent on their superpower patrons. This pattern of shifting allegiances had little to do with the region or ideology. On numerous occasions Megistu and Barre (and also Selassie before them), suggested that they would change their erstwhile ideological stripes if the price was right and their demands for weapons met (Clough, Michael et al. 221). The authors suggest that this was a trend during the cold war where small dependent recipients were not always at a disadvantage in bargaining with great powers as they could exploit their own weakness, to extract from their patrons by vaguely threatening to defect to the other side (Clough, Michael et al. 220). This exploitation of one's own weakness would take a new form at the turn of the century when regimes in the region would expose their apparent vulnerability to terrorism to acquire security rents from donors and international organizations. This shall be discussed in detail in a later section.[10]

6.5. Continued influx of small arms post Cold War

Tar highlights how the collapse of the Soviet bloc saw further flooding of small arms into Africa as manufacturers put additional millions of surplus Cold War-era weapons on the international

[10] See manifestation of 'new rentierism' under *The Ethiopian Political Marketplace & Small arms proliferation under the the EPRDF Regime* in chapter 8 of this thesis

arms market at cut-rate prices. This meant that in some parts of Africa, a Soviet-designed AK-47 assault rifle could be purchased for as little as $6, or traded for a chicken or sack of grain. As a result, hotspots in the horn were full of arms. In 1999, the Red Cross estimated that in the Somali capital of Mogadishu alone, the city's 1.3 million residents possessed over a million guns – among an estimated 550 million small arms in circulation worldwide at that point in time (Tar 30)

In his article for news portal allafrica, Thalif Deen states that the end of cold war dynamics also meant that Ethiopia would diversify its source of arms. "Long gone are the days when the Ethiopian National Defence Force almost solely relied on aging Soviet armament, mixed in with some of their more modern Russian weaponry. " he adds. According to him, in addition to Russia, Ethiopia has in the recent decades imported arms from a number of nations including China, Germany, Ukraine and Belarus (Deen).

The following sections shall put in context the problem of proliferation of small arms in Ethiopia. First, the import of small arms into the country which was highly driven by great power dynamics shall be explored. This combined with more diverse sources of imports in recent years has contributed to the massive presence of small arms in the country. This is one significant bit of the supply side of the story of small arms in Ethiopia.

7. Small Arms Proliferation in Ethiopia

While addressing a rally in Addis Ababa on 23 June 2018, a hand grenade was thrown at Prime Minister Abiy Ahmend. A couple of months later, a petrol tanker and truck stopped by police in an outer suburb of the capital were found to be carrying numerous small arms. On 28 October the same year, an overturned oil tanker on a rural road from Sudan had also been carrying a load of small arms (Love 735). Reuters reports that in April 2019, the Ethiopian government seized 21 machine guns, more than 33,000 handguns, 275 rifles and 300,000 bullets in different parts of the country. A few months later, security forces confiscated a further 2,221 handguns and 71 Kalashnikov assault rifles in Gonder in the Amhara region, one of the areas particularly affected by ethnic strife. They are because of a series of reforms implemented by the new government as they have identified "The proliferation of illegal arms risks fuelling further turmoil" as a major challenge. These incidents and captures provide a tiny window into the number of SALW proliferated across the country. According to William Davidson, small arms proliferation has been exacerbated by the fact that more Ethiopians have resorted to arming themselves as perception of weakened governance around the country grows (Ethiopia Passes ..). But given that much of the weapons proliferated around the country is unaccounted for by the government and only a small portion of them are intercepted, these numbers provide only a glimpse of the extent of the problem.

7.1. A legacy of small arms in Ethiopia

By the fifteenth century, firearms were being sought by most Abyssinian monarchs, in part for internal purposes and in part to combat the growth of Turkish and Arab influence. Additionally, the growing influence of France and Britain along the coastal regions heightened their need to acquire weapons and securitize themselves. Prior to the battle of Adwa in 1896, Emperor Menelik was estimated to have acquired between 60,000 and 100,000 rifles. During 1899–1900, a further 65,000 rifles and five million rounds of ammunition were brought in, mainly from France and Russia. During the era of Haile Selassie, large swaths of arms were also into the country to help consolidate his power. European colonial powers gave their own interests priority in considering how many arms they would sell to Ethiopia. For instance, before the monarchy's downfall in 1974, arms worth almost half a billion dollars were imported into the country from the USA alone. This pattern of major powers choosing to equip Ethiopia and other horn countries

based on their interests in the region would be a sustained one moving into the cold war and beyond (Love 724).

7.2. Estimating number of small arms - a complicated process with evident gaps

The SAS reports that data on both licit and illicit held weapons is hard to come by both globally and – notably so – in Africa. This is due to many state's lack of willingness to report on their stockpile and the number of illicit weapons intercepted. Of the 21 states that responded to a SAS – AU questionnaire in 2021, only 9 provided an official count of registered firearms, while 4 offered estimates of registrations. Eight countries provided estimates of illicitly held firearms elaborated by national authorities, subregional organizations, or research institutions. This means that among the responding states, fewer than half were able to provide any figures or estimates on the licit and illicit firearms held by civilian actors in their countries (Tar 33). The case for estimating the number of small arms is similar, if not worse, in Ethiopia.

SAS in 2017 placed Ethiopia amongst the lowest of 178 countries as measured by guns per 100 population with estimates of 377,000 small arms in the presence of civilians - against an 69,000 estimate with law enforcement agencies. The report further states that in the same year, the number of military firearms in the country was at around 525,000 (Karp 2018 Appendix). Despite rigorous scientific methods in estimating these numbers, the survey states that "Yet there is still reason to believe that the estimates presented here is an underestimate (Karp 2018 p.4)." Love further reiterates the point by stating that it is notoriously difficult to measure the prevalence of small arms with any degree of accuracy in Ethiopia and other Horn countries likewise. He further adds that the above numbers would overlook guns per household and the regional variations within the country (Love 722).

Bisetagnie Nega in his 2021 Masters Thesis on *' Small Arms Proliferation and Its Impact on Human Security & Sustainable Peace: The Case of Fogera Woreda, Woreta City Administration"* from Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia claims that according to the Amhara public militia office's report from 2020, there were more than 508,991 legally certified weapons or small arms in the region. Of those; 84,755 (16.7%,) are government-owned weapons in the hands of public militia and government officials while 424,236 (83.3%) are in the hands of the public or civilians held

privately in the Amhara region (Nega 32). Given that these are the figures only for the Amhara region of the country, which is only one of Ethiopia's 11 national regional states, it reinforces the complexity that Love emphasizes. It highlights the discrepancy in available data with regards to the existing number of small arms in Ethiopia when internationally recognized databases are compared with data from local authorities. Additionally, Nega states that due to the deep-rooted tradition of ownership of firearms, more illegal arms are expected to be available in the region which would far exceed the legal one. Either way, there are a lot of small arms in Ethiopia, to say the least.

The following sections shall delve into two distincts political phases in Ethiopia after 1974 - the Derg Regime (1974-1991) and the subsequent EPRDF regime (until 2015), to look at the import of small arms in the country. It will attempt to draw from import data to see to which extent these purchases were characterized by great power rivalry during the cold war and beyond. For this purpose, primary data will be sourced from the publicly available database of The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT). NISAT was formed in December 1997, and is a coalition of Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid. Its ultimate aim is to contribute to preventing and reducing armed violence (NISAT). The search parameters for the results displayed in the following sections include small arms related numbers from both reported Import by Ethiopia and reported Export by other countries into Ethiopia. This process -called reverse querying- allows the database to attempt to fill in the gaps by comparing reports of both imports and exports. Another important component from the database results include the question of if the bulk of goods reported was 'SALW Only or Not'. As discussed earlier, components which fall under the SALW definition are in many cases regrouped as a different good for trade purposes - The 'SALW Only or Not' filter clarifies if the reported amounts only include SALW or could also potentially include other goods. It also must be highlighted that apart from the data reflected in the Appendices, there were numerous minute small arms transactions worth US$ 5000 or less that have not been included. Finally, the data extracted also shows the source from which NISAT pulls its data. The tables provided in the Appendices reflect the details above and others.

In addition to the import numbers from NISAT, other secondary sources will also be referred to fill the gaps and attempt to provide a clearer picture of import of small arms into Ethiopia and/or exports to Ethiopia from various countries during these periods. It is important to consider that the trade data only represents a partial picture of the prevalence of small arms in the country today. Production of small arms within the country also adds to the number. This includes production both by the state and illegal craft production by various individuals and groups. In addition, illicit flow of small arms into the country also contributes to the proliferation. As per the limited scope of the thesis only the trade data will be looked into.

7.3. Small arms import into Ethiopia during the DERG Regime (1974-91)

The Derg regime, in many ways, was characterized by its military prowess. The start of the so-called new era was bloody and marred with violence against anyone who stood in the military's way - including compatriots who differed in their visions. According to a US directorate of Intelligence report from 1983 (released in 1999), since 1975, the Soviets provided more military aid to Ethiopia than any other sub-saharan country. It further adds that Mengitsu regarded the USSR as the only reliable source of large scale military aid to ensure his consolidation of power (Ethiopia: The Impact.. 1).

A report by the Washington Post in 1977 confirms that "huge amounts of weaponry was airlifted into the country in the advent of the Ogaden war against Somalia." This was supplemented by technical support from Cuba (Doder). Moreover, reports from the Wilson center's cold war history bulletin suggest that the governments of Ethiopia and the USSR signed an agreement on arms transfers and military cooperation in Dec. 1976. However, this agreement covered only a limited volume of small arms. Ethiopia requested additional Soviet arms and military assistance in Mar. 1977. Having observed increased military activity along the border with Somalia, it also approached the USA for assistance. As the USA did not approve exports of spare parts for certain equipment and later that year Ethiopia abrogated the bilateral agreement with the USA on the preservation of mutual security (Bulletin No.8/9 55-57, 61-62)

The CIA paper estimates that by 1983, the Soviets had delivered US$ 2.6 Billion worth of military assistance out of the US$ 4 billion promised to the country in exchange for strategic

influence in the area. While keeping the figures on the exact amount owed by Ethiopia to the USSR confidential, the report suggests that Ethiopia by the mid 1980s would be highly in debt to the Soviets. This in turn would provide leverage for the Soviet's to assert pressure for political and military concessions (Ethiopia: The Impact.. 2). Paul Watson, the author of *Arms and Aggression in the Horn Of Africa* suggests that in 1982, 16.8 percent of the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government's expenditures went to the military. That total of $381 million represented about twelve dollars for each of Ethiopia's 30.6 million people for that year (Watson 159). For a country reeling with the devastating effects of an impending famine, much was being spent on acquiring weapons to prop its regime.

Trade Reported on the NISAT Database

1974-1980

From the years between 1974 and 1980, total reported small arms into the country was worth approximately US$ 2 million. This included various military weapons, sidearms and relevant parts. It is interesting to note that in line with earlier discussions, the flow of small arms into the country from the US and its western allies continued until the breaking down of relations in 1977. This did not come to an absolute stop as Western allies - including Spain, UK, Germany, Belgium and Italy amongst others continued their exports. Post 1977, there is a major gap in data for the years 1978 and 1979 - apart from minute amounts of imports from Belgium and USA. The next significant number props up in the year 1980 where the USSR supplied around US$ 1.8 million worth of small arms to Ethiopia (NISAT - Appendix 2). Given the consensus in literature on the increased military assistance between Ethiopia and the USSR starting 1976/77, it can be argued that there were much more small arms entering the country than reported on NISAT.

1980-1991

Despite earlier suggestions that Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia continued in the 1980s, there are no records of either import into Ethiopia from the USSR or export from the USSR to Ethiopia for the decade. There are significant gaps in data for the decade with only a small amount of exports recorded from Western countries such as Italy, France, Germany, Spain, UK and Denmark amongst others, which totals to a value little over US$ 100,000 (NISAT -

Appendix 3). In addition to the above imports worth smaller amounts from unspecified sources also took place during this period.

7.4. Small arms import into Ethiopia during post EPRDF regime (1991 - 2015)

The cessation of Cold War confronted Africa with increase in trade and circulation of SALW from the stockpile of arms at the disposal of weak states (Tar 18). In the Horn, sources of supply have often come from the collapse or defeat of one of the region's armed forces, an effect that tends to be highest in the immediate aftermath of the end of conflict. The collapse of Siad Barre's government in 1991, for instance, left many soldiers with only their weapons to sell or trade in exchange for safe passage through militia or warlord-controlled territory. Similar was the case for Ethiopia as the fall of the Derg in the same year saw weapons traded for cash by defeated government forces. In each case the initial origins of many of the weapons lay with earlier support from the Soviet Union and the USA to the armed forces of governments in the region (Feyissa 2010). But slowly towards the turn of the century, it can be noted that the number of players involved in the small arms trade with Ethiopia increased. With changing dynamics in the global power order and increased capacity of states beyond the traditional powers to produce and sell weapons, a diverse range of partners emerged.

Trade Reported on the NISAT Database

1991/92 - 2000

In the period between 1992 and 2000, there are major gaps in NISAT data available on flow of small arms into Ethiopia. Under the parameters used, the database only reveals small arms worth US$ 170,000 traded into the country. Despite the total value reported being low, it is crucial to note that there were imports into Ethiopia from various unspecified sources. Additionally, new players in the arms business such as Taiwan and Czech republic also reported trade small arms worth small values with Ethiopia (NISAT - Appendix 4)

2000-2005

Moving into the 21st century, the NISAT database appears to be much more comprehensive with fewer gaps in data. The first few years highlight the entry of significant new players in the small arms trade with Ethiopia including South Korea, China, Israel and Ukraine amongst others. The traditional Western powers continue to sell small arms to Ethiopia, be it at a smaller scale. Additionally, countries such as Bulgaria and Uganda also sold small arms to Ethiopia. A total of

US$ 8.5 million plus worth of small arms were reportedly traded into Ethiopia during this five period (NISAT - Appendix 5). This included a mix of different kinds of SALW including Sports rifle, military rifle, hunting rifle and anti aircraft guns amongst others. The rising prominence of China in small arms trade with the country can also be seen as a watershed moment as the numbers continue to increase while China strengthens engagement with the country in the following decade. It is also interesting to note a total of US$ 1.7 million worth small arms were imported to Ethiopia in the year 2005 - the year where turbulent elections took place in the country which was followed by reports of armed violence against civilians. This event will be further delved into in a later section.[11]

2006 -2010

The period between 2006 and 2010 saw the highest value of reported small arms traded into Ethiopia for the time periods explored within the thesis. A staggering number of small arms worth at least US $ 75 million was traded into Ethiopia during this period of time. China led the way with almost US$ 55 million worth of reported small arms traded in 2006 and 2007 alone. It is important to note that during this five year period, only a small shipment worth US$ 30,000 was reported from the US - another sign of dwindling US relations with the country. Prominent new players include Bulgaria who sold SALW worth almost US$ 11 million during this period. Countries like Israel and Turkey also joined in while the EU, New Zealand, Denmark and UAE also engaged in exports of weapons (NISAT - Appendix 6).

2011-2015

Though not as huge as the sum in the previous five years, this period totalled to around US$ 29.5 million. Despite China's prominence in the previous 5 year period, only around US$ 60,000 worth of SALW import from the country was reported by Ethiopia for the year 2011. In addition, there was another 15 dollars worth of reported import of pistols for the same year from China. This sharp decrease in 2011 in China-Ethiopia small arms flow could be a result of gross underreporting for this period. Bulgaria continued to be a significant SALW partner with reported US$ 11.7 million worth of exports. Additionally, countries such as Poland and Slovakia increase their prominence in sales of SALW to Ethiopia while the US maintains its presence as a partner (NISAT Appendices 7&8)

[11] See Chapter 8 - Section on EPRDF

Since the EPRDF came to power in 1991, total imports of SALW into Ethiopia as reported by NISAT was around the US$ 1 billion mark. There are plenty of gaps in the data and reasons to believe that the real figures are way higher. In addition to these, there has also been a significant increase in industrial and craft SALW productions within the country itself. Moreover, Ethiopia is the hub and a major transit point in the illicit flow of weapons in the region and beyond. These factors significantly contribute to the increasing number of SALW present within the country and aid in its proliferation.

8. The political marketplace & Small arms proliferation

Alex De Waal theorizes that the Political marketplace exists where the following four conditions apply:

- political finance is in the hands of individuals with political, military or business interests;
- control over the instruments of violence is dispersed or contested and;
- political disputes are not resolved by institutional rules and procedures (law is subordinate to political contingency) and;
- These countries are integrated into the global political and economic order in a subordinate position. (De Waal 28)

This chapter will delve into if and how these conditions manifested themselves in the Ethiopian context - both during the Derg regime and subsequent EPRDF regime. Furthermore, it shall look into how the respective regime's policies under these conditions contributed to small arms proliferation across the country - directly or indirectly.

8.1. The Ethiopian Political Marketplace and Small Arms Proliferation Under the Derg Regime

The Derg regime, despite its initial popularity, quickly transformed into a full fledged military dictatorship. The revolution remained relatively calm until late 1974 as expectations of a peaceful transition to a more open political system remained high. But as the Derg failed to consolidate and channel the diverse energies of various groups seeking greater influence in the political space, it began clamping down. It was followed by suppression of civilian groups, indiscriminate killings and extrajudicial executions (Sarkar & De Waal 15).

This included the attempted arrest and eventual killing of a distinguished Ethiopian General Aman Andom. Aman, who was considered to be moderate within the Derg ranks and was against a hardline approach to Eritrea, posed threats to Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam's strive for power. After public disagreements, on November 23 1974, Mengistu sent troops to Aman's house to arrest him where a firefight ensued and Aman was killed. That night, 59 former imperial

regime officials who had surrendered and were being held for investigation and possible trial were also summarily shot (Henze 44). These were tell-tale signs of the level of violence that would follow.

8.1.1. Funneling of Political finance to the center by subordinating laws & institutions

As the arrests, exiles and murder of dissidents to the regime continued, it culminated in the horrendous Red Terror massacre. Mass killings took place on the streets of Addis Ababa and other major areas starting in 1976. This pattern of resorting to violence immediately after assuming power was the first step in which laws and institutions would be subordinated to marketplace transactions in the formative stages of an imperfect marketplace under the regime[12]. Moreover, it was also indicative of the regime's intentions to not wield political finance to competitors at any condition and eventually consolidate them.

Derg's attempts to centralize political finance was also reflective in their overall economic policy and its manifestations. A few months after they assumed power, the regime declared *Hibrettesebawinet* (Ethiopian Socialism) under the banner Ethiopia *Tikdem* (Ethiopia First). The same declaration paved the roadmap for economic policies under the Derg where resources crucial to development would be brought under state control and those considered peripheral would be delegated to the 'private' sector but would still be subject to stringent public monitoring (Ageba 53). Many scholars - Ethiopians and otherwise - argue that this would turn out to be disastrous in the medium/long run (Ageba 52; Clapham 36; Sarkar & De Waal 7). A 1986 RAND Corporation report states that "The sweeping reforms decreed during 1975 had the effect of stirring up society from above at a time when it might otherwise have settled down. (Henze 40)." Ageba further argues that this was the cornerstone of serious forms of financial repression which was outright prohibitive and was driven by ideology. It would be the foundation on which political finance would be centralized and control would be exerted.

According to Clapham, the project of state building, which was borrowed from a Soviet model, placed an overwhelming emphasis on state power. De Waal & Sarkar further state that to replace

[12] The political conditions in Ethiopia under the Derg regime is framed as an 'imperfect' (or incomplete) marketplace as it does not fully meet the four conditions under De Waal's framework - as elaborated subsequently

the old order, the Derg constructed a political economy centered on a massive military-party apparatus, funded and supported by the Communist bloc (Sarkar & De Waal 16). State power - which in practice was conducive to the power of the colonel, was further consolidated through the formation of peasant's associations in the countryside and urban dweller's associations in the towns known as *kebeles.* Kebeles grew in prominence and became a crucial element of local-level governance which was controlled by the hierarchy at the center (Clapham 2019 37). Despite being formed to serve the interest of the locals, the kebeles became mechanisms to ensure that political finance - in the form of exerting control and influence - was funneled to the center through localized units. In addition, De Waal states that the single party – the Workers Party of Ethiopia – became the mechanism for state patronage and the only ladder for individuals to gain career advancement (De Waal 152).

Furthermore, the politics of famine and food production/distribution was also used to exert control and redirect political finance to the center. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) - which was setup in the aftermath of the 1973 famine to coordinate famine relief but came to prominence a decade later during the famine of 1984-85, rapidly became one of the primary instruments through which control was exercised by denying food aid to populations belonging to resistance groups (Clapham 2019 40). Moreover, state control of agricultural marketing further served as a vital mechanism for transferring resources from the countryside to the center. It was also used for sustaining the army - whose size was constantly growing with ongoing wars against the TPLF and EPLF (Clapham 2019 39). In addition, massive military support from the Soviet bloc meant the creation of the largest conventional army in sub-Saharan Africa during a period of deepening economic crisis - which was deployed to exert control and centralize political finance.

8.1.2. Soviet patronage as the major link to the global economic order

A point of inflection for the Soviet patronage to kick in was the 1977 Somali invasion of Ethiopia which saw a massive airlift of Soviet weaponry, Cuban soldiers and estimated cash injection of around US$ 2 billion to help Ethiopia come out victorious (Sarkar & De Waal 15). De Waal and Sarkar argue that during this period, in Ethiopia, with its low tax base and weak commercial class, external patronage consolidated a centralized security sector and

administrative apparatus which directly enforced social engineering projects (Sarkar & De Waal 16). This external patronage was the major link which integrated the domestic marketplace into the global political and economic order in a subordinate position. This link would go on to last until the fall of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous fall of the Derg regime.

8.1.3. Centralized, monolithic instruments of violence which were eventually dispersed?

In regards to the political marketplace condition outlined by De Waal which "states that the control of instruments of violence are dispersed or contested", Ethiopia under the Derg regime does not completely retain the character. Scholars argue that the Derg used centralized, monolithic instruments of coercion as its principal instruments of control (Clapham 2002, 22; Hagmann 2005, 531 Sarkar & De Waal 16). However, the 1980's was a period where different forms of ideological and armed resistance groups [13] sprung up against the regime across the country (Henze 64-75). Mengitsu responded with various degrees of force but was unable to truly overpower many of them despite the regime's superior military balance. The continuous and elongated military engagement of the regime with these various groups could have led to a situation where the control of instruments of violence were inadvertently dispersed around the country.

Additionally, it has been documented that the regime supported various Somali rebel movements such as the Western Somali Liberation Front and Somali Abo Liberation front - which were thought to be more of a potential threat to Mogadishu than Addis - in its pursuit of dismantling the incumbent Somali state (Henze 64). According to De Waal, in return these Somali insurgent groups devoted part of their military effort to defeating insurgents inside Ethiopia, repaying their debt to Mengistu and also clearing the way to take the war inside their respective countries. But given the porous nature of the Somalia-Ethiopia border and the factionalized nature of these groups - with lingering frictions against Addis and the regime due to their treatment of Somalis in Ethiopia - the Derg's military support to these groups and the weapons involved could have easily catapulted back into Ethiopia Thereby, dispersing the control over instruments of violence. In the case of engagement and

[13] The TPLF, EPLF, Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Alliance (EPDA), The Afar Movement, Wollega Oromo Movement, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Sidama Liberation Front to name a few. Henze, in his report, gives succinct details of the identity of these fronts (and others) and their perceived threat to the regime in 1985 in his RAND report.

willingness to push for regime change in Somalia, Mengitsu, in De Waal's term, can be seen as a political CEO willing to operate at a larger cross-border scale. Dismantling the then regime in Somalia and subsequently helping prop up a new one would enable him to reach across borders and render sovereign rulers into his clients as part of operations in the marketplace.

8.1.4. Disorder in the marketplace meant increased demand for arms

The Derg regime, despite starting off relatively without struggle and with high hopes for integration of all Ethiopians in the political process, spiraled quickly. Marred by clamping down of dissidents and violence, the conditions quickly evolved into a sort of a political marketplace - with slightly differing characters than defined by De Waal. Domestically, famine reinforced the cleavage between the northern areas of the country where it took place, and the southern regions, leading to a government programme for the resettlement of northerners into indigenous lands in the South. This was a replication of a southward shift in population that had been taking place over a long period, but in a form that could only exacerbate tensions between the indigenous groups and the newcomers (Clapham 40). This form of resettlement meant that communities with distinguished ways of life and cultural history would compete in the same space. As tensions would simmer to many times take a violent form, demand for small arms increased, creating an environment for small arms to proliferate.

The changing dynamics of violence and increased use of firearms in the Karamoja cluster in the South Western part of the country is a case which sheds light on this phenomenon. The Karamoja Cluster refers to the border regions of south-western Ethiopia, north-western Kenya, south-eastern South Sudan, and north-eastern Uganda. (Wepundi 13). Manasseh Wepundi in his 2014 Small Arms Survey Report titled *Evolving Traditional Practices: Managing Small Arms in the Horn of Africa and Karamoja Cluster*, explores how the prevalence and use of firearms increased amongst the pastoralists communities based in the area starting from the 1980's and onwards. He recounts how in January 2000 for instance, firearms were used in a single attack that claimed 60 lives, including those of women and children (Wepundi 2). He further adds that pastoralist communities have more firearms and feel less safe than non-pastoralist populations. Despite generally agreeing that firearms are dangerous, members of these communities feel the need to own firearms for their

protection. Some observers further attribute the increasing culture of gun ownership for these communities to a history of social and political marginalization (Wepundi 5). These forms of marginalization were further exacerbated by the resettlement and other related policies of the Derg as discussed above. Moreover, Wepundi's report adds that civil and regional armed conflicts have accelerated the rate of arms acquisitions. As a result, Karamoja experienced a widespread proliferation of arms in the 1990s and into the following decade (Wepundi 7).

Pastoralists in Ethiopia and the surrounding regions have always engaged in various degrees of conflict for resources throughout their history. But the widespread availability of firearms has increased the stakes and gravity of the violence (Wepundi 1). It has heightened the risk of misuse, leading to severe injuries and more deaths. Karamoja is just one isolated example where communities feel the need to wield arms to protect their livelihoods. Similar is the case in different parts of the country and the greater Horn of Africa. Moreover, weapons trade and socio-political marginalization of various groups has been characteristic of Ethiopia's modern history. For instance, Mburu states that firearms have been circulating in the pastoralist regions of the Karamoja Cluster and the Horn of Africa since the 1800s, when arms were actively traded out of south-western Ethiopia (Mburu 5).

The policies of the Derg regime are not the sole responsible factor for the increase in demand for weapons in communities such as Karamoja and around Ethiopia - but they have had extended effects which act as multipliers for weapons demand and proliferation as the policies adopted by the Derg in alignment to the conditions of the marketplace would further exacerbate disparities and marginalization. This would result in increased grievances for the various groups involved and subsequently increased propensity to wield weapons. These frustrations combined with resistance against the regime from pretty much all sides meant that the country was a boiling point of resentments against the regime. Seeds for conflicts which had been sewed already during the previous eras were further nourished by the Derg's governing approach and policies. This spaghetti bowl of tensions created a huge wave of demand for small arms - be it for the regime itself, for armed resistance against the state or for indigenous people and previously un-governed communities defending themselves. The domestic situation combined with the extensive

militarization of the country throughout the Derg rule, which included significant import of small arms - meant that conditions were ripe for weapons proliferation in the country.

8.2. The Ethiopian Political Marketplace and Small Arms Proliferation Under the EPRDF Regime

After coming to power, via the promulgation of the new constitution in 1995, the EPRDF regime sought a solution to confront structural inequalities within the country. Clapham asserts that the idea was inspired by Joseph Stalin's approach to the 'national question' in the Soviet Union. This involved the "division of the country according to ethnicity or nationality, and establishing an autonomous administration within each of the territories thus defined, whose people were guaranteed a right to self determination, up to and including secession. (Clapham 2019 42)." The constitution would decentralize power by giving sovereign power to all the Nations, Nationalities and People in the country (Constitution of the FDRE 1995). In theory, self-recognition along ethnic lines would allow a base for historical inequalities to be removed and subsequently a sense of national identity to emerge. It would further rally all Ethiopians behind the new regime and help acquire public support for their idea of state building. But the reality was not so simple as centralized control - be it with a different facade - continued to be at the core of Ethiopian politics.

Already during the Derg regime, sub-nationalist sentiments had risen across Ethiopia. These were amplified by the Derg's state policies as discussed in the preceding section. Semir Yusuf, senior researcher in the Horn of Africa programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, *in his monograph Drivers of Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Ethiopia*, argues that after the EPRDF seamlessly came into power in 1991, these sentiments continued to brew and expressed themselves in different forms (Yusuf 5). On paper, the new constitution opened political space for all the different groups and people of Ethiopia. But, it also further widened existing cleavages while creating new ones. Yusuf argues that ethnic federalism both empowered some ethnic groups while disempowering others. He attributes this to two reasons - TPLF's control at the top which generated a sense of Tigrayan dominance across all spheres of the society and; the ownership of each federal unit to a certain ethnic group leading to divisive policies between the natives and newcomers.

Resentments also came from two dominant nationalist movements in the country. The Ethnic Nationalists figured that their cause would never be allowed to bloom because of the heavily centered and Tigray dominated state apparatus. At the same time, the new structure also agitated Ethiopian Nationalists as they believed the Constitution was the start of what would eventually be dismemberment of the country along the ethnic lines. The Ethio - Nationalist's frustrations were further aggravated by EPRDF 'conceding' their right to sovereign land by granting easy independence to Eritrea. In addition, there were already multiple pre-existing liberation movements who were yet to be fully integrated into the vision of the EPRDF's political structure with their own grievances. Hence, during the formative years of the regime's reign, it had already found itself on the receiving end of grievances of multiple ideologies within the country (Yusuf 6). This was nothing new for Ethiopia's rulers but this time, it was brewing under a facade different from the Ethiopian experience of the past. When the EPRDF regime started, there was more of a feeling of the presence of a 'state' for various groups and parts of the country than ever before. But the core-periphery dynamics still existed along with the forces of the political marketplace. According to De Waal, "many Ethiopians experienced the presence of the state and the ruling party in their everyday lives. Yet the forces of the political marketplace are present: they are most visible in the peripheries and in Ethiopian policy towards its neighbors, but also immanent within elite politics (De Waal 150)." Yusuf further reinforces this by stating "Grievances and low-scale conflicts along multiple lines simmered under a façade of overall stability (Yusuf 7)."

Moving into the new century, the EPRDF's reaction to the various movements combined with their top-heavy & centralized idea of state building (or how it eventually turned out to be); pursuits to assert themselves in the region via tactics of subversion and; their approach to regional and international diplomacy meant that the political marketplace would thrive further creating a ripe-er environment for small arms to proliferate across the country.

8.2.1. Centralized political finance & control as the ruling party disintegrated into rent-seeking

Rene Lefort, an independent researcher who has been writing on Ethiopia and the region for decades, in his study of the 2005 Ethiopian elections, describes the concept of *mengist* (power) around the northern highlands of Ethiopia. According to the majority of the respondents from his interviews, power cannot be contested, as it is divine by essence - it can only be gained or lost by arms (Leforte 153). This was reflected in imperial times as myths suggested that the late Emperor Haile Sellassie was officially referred to as 'Elect of God'. De Waal further argues that his successors - including the EPRDF - still perceived their mandate as coming from the heavens. This philosophy and subsequent desire for consolidating control would seemingly creep into the EPRDF's ruling strategy and its elite - both of which were ultimately commanded by Meles Zenawi.

De Waal and Sarkar in their paper argue that political finance played a nominal role in the first decade of the EPRDFs rule. According to them, the leadership in that period coercively decided what forms of political finance were permissible and were not (De Waal and Sarkar 19). But this changed at around the turn of the century as Meles consolidated his powers. De Waal states that Meles believed that custom and fear were two useful instruments of rule - which would only be effective if real and consistent benefits were felt by the populous (De Waal 150). In other words, extreme measures/actions would be justified as long as the people got what they needed. The former Prime Minister considered rent-seeking as one of the biggest plagues in the society which hampered development and concluded that an activist state is needed to clamp down on rent-seeking activity and promote growth. According to him "Development is a political process first and economic and social process later. It is the creation of a political set-up that is conducive to accelerated development that sets the ball of development rolling (De Waal 154)." Meles succeeded in rallying support for his idea of a developmental state. But making it democratic would be a tall order. He stated that democracy was not just a choice, but a necessity. (De Waal 40). But this was in stark contrast with the idea of Mengist, in which power, God-given and indivisible, and some key concepts of democratic government, such as division of power and elections, did not sit well. In retrospect, Meles's idea of democracy was postponing it until Ethiopia had achieved middle-income status.

Key to Meles' vision was the capture and allocation of rent - which he believed could not and should not be eliminated - by an activist state. In other words, the funds available for the ruler's political budget should be invested in development and state-building, not in maintaining or building a political base (De Waal 157). But in practice, things would pan out to be a bit different. The 'capturing rent' bit of his strategy would be executed with efficiency, but with this also came the same diseases which he considered to be a major threat. Centralized control of political and economic power were being utilized for economic development - which was in turn used to consolidate power further. In Meles' own words "But we (The EPRDF/TPLF) began to change to a rent-seeking party. From the peasant to the very top, we were degenerating (De Waal 155)."

Progress was made - be it much to the credit of debt financing - with Ethiopia drastically reducing poverty rates and increasing investment in infrastructure. Ethiopia was becoming an exemplar of centralized rent utilization along with developmental patrimonialism which had the potential of securing sustainable growth. But with it, came further consolidation of power and centralization of political finance. As Meles continued to shrink the political space, implementation of his political ideas became detached from the virtues of collective leadership and " he started running the party and the government as a one man show" - in which both debate and decision was run by himself (De Waal 156).

Politically, power was concentrated through wilful fusing of party and state structures and maintenance of political control over the peripheries through informal networks and coercion. TPLF, under the disguise of the EPRDF, had set foot in all corners of the country. Even the kebeles were militarized to make party membership a prerequisite to obtain local positions (Lefort 2012 692). The result was the creation of a new localized elite who depended on state and party patronage for their power - further opening channels for funneling of political finance to the center.

On the economic front, the EPRDF financed the developmental state by generating rents through control of strategic sectors of the economy such as telecommunications, construction & pharmaceuticals where corruption was also high. In addition, they mobilized external financial

support in the form of development assistance, concessional loans and debts (including increasing Chinese funds towards the turn of the century). Stefan Dercon, in his book *Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Other Countries Lose,* suggests that it is quite impossible to empirically measure the levels of corruption that took place during the period but he argues that it has been established that certain leaders and political-business elites derived financial benefit from their positions at the helm of state-owned companies and their proximity to power. This would also sometimes take the form of favorable legislative and policy measures (Dercon 2022). Hence, consolidation of political - economic power allowed the EPRDF to centralize political finance and use it to pursue their idea of the developmental state. Corruption existed at large, but as long as basic services were provided, it was subordinated to political bargain.

De Waal argues that the developmental state project likewise highlighted the tensions between an economic policy that viewed Ethiopia as a single national unit, and a governmental structure that rested on the high level of autonomy granted to the constituent units in the federation. A mobile labor force was a key part of this process, but risked turning internal immigrants into semi-citizens within the ethnic units created by the federal system. (Clapham 46)
Centralization of political finance and consolidation of power was taking place in an already simmering environment where conflicts and other forms of dissent were extending and increasing. Resentment against the state apparatus and its approach was also growing on all sides. As the pressure increased, the response from the top was to further consolidate power and in many cases also resort to violence - including in the aftermath of the 2005 elections. The promises of the new constitution never materialized, but rather it was used to centralize control and political finance. Thereby, further aggravating existing grievances and creating an increased demand for weapons amongst various groups which ultimately nurtured the environment for small arms to proliferate.

8.2.2. Institutional rules and procedures crumbled as Meles stamped down his authority

As Meles's democratic developmentalism rapidly became more of a personal exercise, laws and institutions continued to become subordinate to his political contingency. This was reflected in the buildup and aftermath of the 2005 National elections.

The 2005 elections were widely considered to be the most open in Ethiopia's history. It fielded genuinely strong candidates and the playing field was leveled to encourage positive and healthy competition. There was ample public coverage followed by rigorous public debates, all leading to a feeling that the voters would have a genuine choice on election day. But in the build up to the elections, signs of electoral mismanagement ensued starting with the hindrance of domestic observation by civil society following a decision from the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to deny some civil society groups the right to observe. The supreme court reversed the decision but it was only on the very eve of the elections - 3 days before - which was considered too late.

According to the Carter Center's report on the observation of the 2005 elections, "In spite of the positive pre-election developments, the electoral process did not fulfill Ethiopia's obligations to ensure political rights and freedoms necessary for genuinely democratic elections. (Election observation Mission 2005). The report highlights how a day of hope was marred by electoral violence, clamping down of opposition, inefficient tabulation & counting of results and also in many cases suppression of protests which led to armed violence and killings. It further adds that while the results of many of the 547 constituencies appeared reasonable, there were many constituencies where credibility of the results were questioned - especially in the August re-elections and elections in the Somali region. In addition, the opposition faced intimidation and harassment in many areas. Combined, these undermined the legitimacy of the voting that took place (Election observation Mission 2005 38).

The NEBE announced the final election results on Sept. 5 2005, with the ruling EPRDF winning 327 seats (60 percent of the total vote), government affiliated parties claiming an additional 45 seats (8 percent of the total vote) and opposition parties winning 174 seats (32 percent of the total vote). Opposition parties rejected the results, citing the various irregularities (Election observation Mission 2005 38). A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report states that official tallies in the weeks following indicated that opposition parties had made enormous gains in Parliament but had fallen well short of obtaining a majority. The largest opposition coalition refused to accept those results, alleging that it had been robbed of outright victory by widespread government

fraud (Human Rights Watch). The oppositions refused to take their seats and proceeded to challenge the outcome through constitutional means and protests. Meles publicly dismissed their claims and further put his foot down (De Waal 37).

As a response to protests in the aftermath of the elections, security officers reportedly killed around 39 protestors while injuring over a 100 more (as per HRW). Subsequently the government adopted excessive security measures which further exacerbated tensions (Election observation Mission 2005 38; Human Rights Watch). Further violence and killings followed in November that year when negotiations between the opposition coalition and the EPRDF leadership brokedown, with around 46 more people killed by security forces in Addis Ababa. An additional 4000 were arrested. These were followed by a series of draconian measures combined with state sponsored violence in the form of political repression, withholding access to facilities, controlling freedom of speech and targeting other ethnic groups (especially in the Oromia region) amongst others (HRW). In a post election period what De Waal called a 'disaster for democracy', law and institutions had completely crumbled. The build-up to the elections also saw an increase in the influx of small arms in the country - as explored in the earlier sections. (Appendix 5). This influx can also be observed in the context of propping up the military apparatus of the regime to clamp down its authority. Resorting to extreme violence in the aftermath of the elections meant that existing tensions flared up, further fueling active armed movements around the country. Thereby, increasing the demand for small arms and supplementing small arms proliferation in the country.

8.2.3. Dispersed control over the instruments of violence

Via state sponsored atrocities

The 2005 election and its aftermath, is only one example where the EPRDF used armed violence to exert control. In 2008, Meles was confident that the EPRDF had consolidated the the domestic political arena sufficiently except in pastoral areas where there is no EPRDF presence and no basis for a democratic developmental state. According to De Waal, in those peripheries, security was the priority, which was pursued using coercion and co option (De Waal 161). Under the regime, there are many instances where the Ethiopian military used armed violence to commit gross abuse of human rights against civilians and members of resistance

groups - much of it with near-total impunity. HRW reports one such incident in December 2003 when military personnel joined civilian mobs to rampage through indigenous Anuak neighborhoods in the Gambella region murdering as many as 424 Anuak civilians. According to HRW, in subsequent months, the Ethiopian military forces subjected members of the community to rape, torture, arbitary imprisonment and indiscriminate murder. Similar was the fate for Oromo and Somali civilians as they were accused of being associated with rebel movements (Human Rights Watch). Infact, a report[14] by Oromo Liberation Front Information and Research Unit from March 2014 - published on the Danish Parliament's (Folketinget) website under the Committee of Foreign Affairs - highlights over 16 different events of targeted abuse and killings of Oromo people by the regime since it came to power in 1991. The report accuses the regime of executing mass murder of the Oromo people via Ethiopian government agents and armed forces in an attempt to exterminate the entire group. It further states that most of the killed were unarmed and innocent civilians (Partial List of … 3). Many of the above incidents and accusations go uninvestigated and are often whitewashed. Furthermore, as the government continuously denies accusations and restricts access of independent journalists/investigators, much of the truth seems to be buried away already.

Under EPRDF, given that the Ethiopian Armed forces were allowed to go rogue on various communities perceived to be enemies of the state - it is not a stretch to believe that these atrocities, to a large extent, were committed using small arms. As many of the violent incidents perpetrated by the regime also took place in remote parts of the country, small arms, which are easy to conceal and transport would naturally be the weapons of choice. Additionally, due to the covert nature of operations, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of weapons used in the process. But given that Ethiopia during this time had continued to import small arms to strengthen its capacities over the years, it is not a stretch to assume that these weapons did come to use. Sending out a plethora of weapons to various parts of the country and subsequently dispersing the control over instruments of violence via the Ethiopian military meant it further added to the already ripe environment for small arms to proliferate across the country. Moreover,

[14] The report highlights different acts of mass targeted execution of Oromos from the years 1992, 1995, 2002, 2003 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2014

it also further increased the demand for weapons on part of these communities who were forced to take up arms to defend themselves against the constantly invading state.

Via the regime's regional policy and tactics of subversion.

The 1990s and 2000s continued to see instability in the Horn of Africa. As usual, Ethiopia was directly or indirectly involved in many of the conflicts during these two decades. With conflicts, further mobilization of the military and weapons took place.

According to De Waal, after a relatively quiet period for the region post collapse of the Soviet Union, the outbreak of a new regional war was heralded in january 1994 when Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki ordered out the Sudanese ambassador and declared there would be a new government in Khartoum soon. Another series of tactics of subversion and proxies would begin as the regional political business CEOs attempted to go international by spreading their patronage across borders. De Waal adds that the Ethiopians, in a more discreet manner initially, started training and arming the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The regime in Addis was so invested in dismantling its neighbors that they also went further to draft a declaration of principles for the Sudanese peace process that espoused national democracy and self-determination for South Sudan. Eventually as things escalated, Ethiopia's role became more public. Their military engagements, which were still covert, expanded to include a mechanized invasion of Sudan and even deployment of generals to direct SPLA operations. (De Waal 52).

Another major war was the Eritrea - Ethiopia 'border' war, which scholars tend to see as a war between egos of two autocratic leaders vying for supremacy in the region under the facade of a border conflict. The fallouts from the war which would continue for over 20 years still haunts the two countries and the region. De Waal labels it as the "bloodiest conventional war of modern African History". Furthermore, as a domino, it ignited a proxy war in Somalia where each of the regimes supported opposite sides in attempts to further expand their political businesses in the region (De Waal 54, Clapham 2019).

Apart from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, the greater horn which includes Uganda, Kenya and the DRC (formerly Zaire) were also engulfed in wars between the liberators and their

armies during this period - which were in most cases backed by foreign powers in the form of proxies. So Ethiopia at this point, somehow found itself surrounded by and/or engaged in either traditional war or proxies or liberation wars or internal armed conflicts on all sides. Given the intertwined history and vague borders between the countries involved, no specific distinction between internal and international wars can be made. It is all happening in one big pot. De Waal argues that what remained in the region once the dust somewhat settled "was the most elementary transnational political order: the marketplace." A marketplace where small arms flourished as militarized political mercantilism triumphed and control over the instrument of violence was further dispersed to various corners of Ethiopia and the region (De Waal 55). All of this was the perfect recipe for small arms to proliferate.

8.2.4. Integration into the global political and economic order in a subordinate position.

The breakdown of the Soviet bloc, which coincided with the transfer of power to the EPRDF in Ethiopia, changed dynamics in the region. According to De Waal, the 1990s was an 'inter-rentier' period where Cold War security rents had gone, and the global War on Terror security rents had yet to begin (De waal 53). Clapham asserts that the breakdown of the bloc allowed the EPRDF regime to easily dissociate itself with Socialist allies and re-establish itself as an ally of the West. This gave the new regime a favored status as a recipient of foreign aid (Clapham 2019 44). According to Feyissa, Ethiopia was the second largest recipient of official development assistance (including concessional loans) amongst least developed countries between 1991 and 2011. This was despite Ethiopia's public disapproval of policy prescriptions from the Washington Consensus (Feyissa 2011). But given that the Soviets had pretty much dissipated from the region and the West was keen on having Ethiopia as its major strategic partner in the region - these were overlooked. Moreover, in the aftermath of the start of 'Global War on terror' post 9/11, this relationship strengthened further. This would give rise to what De Waal terms as the multifaceted and globalized 'new renterism' - of which foreign aid and security cooperation are key sources, amongst others. He adds that these would drive an economic boom, and make mercantile short-term political management strategies very profitable. Through new forms of renterism, the horn would be well integrated as part of the global patronage in which political loyalties were instrumentalized and dollarized in a regional political

marketplace (De Waal 168). The rise of new renterism would be another factor contributing to small arms proliferation in the coutnry. In Ethiopia's case, security cooperation would be a major driving force.

Security cooperation - Counter terrorism & The New Peacekeeping

One of the key sources of rent within De Waal's new renterism is rent accrued from support for security cooperation activities. This would broadly include funds for counter terrorism activities, peacekeeping and policing. After 9/11, the US identified the Horn of Africa - given its proximity and entanglements within regional strategic rivalries of the Greater Middle East- as a core component of its counter-terror strategy. This along with the idea of 'New Peacekeeping', created opportunities for an exceptionally well-financed rentier political - security market which came with intelligence technologies and political space that justified secrecy, strengthening of domestic military apparatus and repression (De Waal 174).

The regime in Ethiopia, like other countries in the region, used the counter terrorism alliance with the US to serve its own needs. Under the counter terrorism umbrella, Ethiopia provided space for US special forces to host themselves on Ethiopian soil in their efforts to push back against Islamists in Somalia. This was despite the EPRDF's understanding that intervention would most likely strengthen jihadism in the region - which it eventually did. But the whole charade enabled Ethiopia to roll back Eritrean influence in Somalia - without having to spend resources on exerting influence on the ground. An additional perk was that Meles could brush off Western backlash on his reaction to the 2005 elections by leveraging Ethiopia's position (De Waal 175).

The other development which opened space for new renterism was the establishment of regional political structures for the purposes of managing conflicts. This set in motion after the AU was conceived in Libya in 1999 and born in Durban in 2002. De Waal argues that AU's actual functioning is highly reflective of the political marketplace principles - especially in its most active Peace & Security department. According to him, it acts as a space for "security-sector rent-seeking" for African leaders. New ideas of peace-keeping took on a central role in political markets, as means for putting militaries on the international payroll, and for pursuing

political-economic interests in contested peripheries. It also provides structure for the powers sitting at the top of the global patronage system - the P5 - to leverage regional institutions for their political gains. For the US, the AU was emerging as a useful intermediary in the 'new peacekeeping', circumventing the UN, while for China and Russia, it was useful to gain African votes (De Waal 178). Ethiopia has fully leveraged these changes in the security sector to expand its military capabilities and put its army on what de Waal terms as the "peace payroll".

In 2014, President Barack Obama at The US - African Leaders Summit, announced the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership ('A-Prep') to build the capacity of six selected African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers at a cost of USD $110 million a year. "The United States will partner with an initial group of six countries—Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—to develop a rapid response capability program, by building improved capacity in areas such as military training, equipment maintenance and repair, institutional support, and interoperability with other Africa-based peacekeeping forces (Fact Sheet..)." This is a case in point where Western countries subsidize regional power's military budgets in hard currency in exchange for space to pursue their interests in the region. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a pertinent example in which the mission was used as a mechanism for Ethiopia to obtain international backing for its political goals. Eventually, around 4,000 Ethiopian troops were integrated into the mission - resulting in Ethiopia having boots on the ground in Somalia (where they have had long vested interests) while the costs were covered by peacekeepers. Another example is The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei[15] (UNISFA) which consists of an Ethiopian brigade and is a unique case of a single country providing all the troops for a mission. Also, The Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) in South Sudan is deployed within the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and includes troops from Ethiopia. This has led to Ethiopia significantly increasing the number of peacekeepers from 1,000 in 2003 to 7,858 in 2015 plus 4,400 serving at AMISOM - allowing for the regime to keep its military expanding while the budget for it shrinks as costs are covered by international organizations and/or donors. (De Waal 180).

[15] The Abeyi region is the contested region between the republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan

Given the EPRDF's documented history of leveraging its military prowess to assert its dominance in the country, strengthening the military apparatus via global patronage gives the regime further power to exert control. Additionally, the continuous influx of small arms and weapon technologies during the first decade and half of the millennia adds to the control apparatus of the regime. Combined, these allowed the regime and Meles to simultaneously centralized political finance, subordinate laws and institutions and disperse the control over instruments of violence to create a breeding ground for small arms to proliferate in the country

9. Conclusion

Small arms are deemed as the 'real weapons of mass destruction' due to the number of lives they take around the world - both in conflicts and zones of peace. Over the past decades, their proliferation has prompted numerous global and regional initiatives to tackle the issue and save lives. But due to its ubiquitous availability, longevity, effectiveness and ease to carry and conceal, there have been significant hurdles in achieving disarmament goals. Moreover, in a world where military prowess still dictates hegemony and forms a core part of the economy for many countries, major global powers have continued to block progress on these initiatives to protect their arms industry as they continuously seek new markets to ensure continued demand for these products. Over the years, trading arms has also been used as a tool to gain strategic leverage for many global powers to pursue their larger geopolitical interests in the recipient country and/or its region. Small arms have become the weapons of choice for the killers of our times. They play a crucial hand in instigating and exacerbating conflicts around the world. The Horn of Africa - because of its key geo strategic location, along with Ethiopia are no exception to this global phenomenon.

Ethiopia, with its unique history of state formation in the continent, is at the heart of everything in the Horn. Over the years, the largest and most populous country of the region has been engaged in numerous conflicts - both internal and external, leading to small arms being proliferated all over the country. Many of the arms in the country are 'legacy weapons' which originate as a result of them being imported into the country during different political eras in the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century. Other sources include craft production of weapons in various parts of the country and the illicit trade of small arms for which Ethiopia is a major transit point.

Throughout Ethiopia's modern history, there has been a consistent supply of small arms into the country. Ethiopian leaders have been keen to import arms from global powers in an attempt to prop up their regime and consolidate power domestically. Be it the Imperial regime of Haile Selassie or the Communist Derg regime or the EPRDF regime in recent history, every ruler at the helm in Ethiopia has looked to import significant arms from pretty much any party willing to supply them - regardless of their ideological alignments. As much of the arms trade is shrouded

in secrecy, it is very difficult to have proper estimates of small arms imported and existent in Ethiopia. Despite major gaps in data, NISAT shows that both during the communist Derg regime (1974-1991) and subsequent EPRDF regime (1991 onwards), significant amounts of small arms have been imported into the country. The USSR during the Derg regime and the US post that have been the usual suspects in terms of leading arms exporters to Ethiopia. But this has also been heavily contingent on their own interests as seen during the US's continued supply of small arms to Ethiopia in the early years of the Derg (1974-77), despite their clear condemnation of the regime's policy. Since the fall of the Soviet Union which coincided with that of the Derg in 1991, the small arms trade partners have diversified for Ethiopia. New significant players including Israel, Bulgaria, China, Ukraine, the EU, Italy, Germany (and the list goes on..) emerged as the EPRDF seeked these weapons to consolidate power.

On the demand side, the various regimes, via their domestic and regional policy, have continued to exacerbate historical grievances and fuel tensions in the country. Alex De Waal theorizes Ethiopia and the region as a political marketplace where politics is conducted as the exchange of political services or loyalty for payment in the form of either cash or weapons. Using his theoretical framework, this paper delved into how political elites during the regimes in consideration have conducted politics in the marketplace to create an enabling environment for small arms to proliferate. In many of their policies, these connections can be directly made while in others, the direct relationship is harder to establish. Nevertheless, their actions did have elongated effects which created brewing environments for small arms to proliferate. Each of the regime and their policies under the political marketplace act as a multiplier in creating and sustaining environments where the vicious cycle of increased supply of and demand for these weapons continue - leading to its massive proliferation.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 - Michael Porter's five forces of Business & De Waal's five forces of Political Business



Fig: Michael Porter's five forces of Business



Fig: De Waal's five forces of Political Business

Appendix 2 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (1974-1980) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
1974	UK	Non Miltiary Firearms	81546	6000	EX	Yes	
	Spain	Revolvers and Pistols	15525	207	EX	Yes	
	Italy	non military Firearms	12444	304	EX	Yes	
1975	Spain	Revolver and Pistols	4515	54	EX	Yes	
	Germany	Revolvers and Pistols	2000				
	Unspecificed	Military Weapons	1018				
	Unspecifiec	Revolvers and Pistols	2114				
	Unspecificed	Sidearms	202				
	USA	Revolvers and Pistols	1347				
	All countries	Military Weapons	1018				
	All countries	Side Arms	202				
	All countries	Revolvers and parts	3461				
1976	xx						
1977							
	USA	Military Firearms	114311		IM	No	Comtrade
1978	xx						
1979							
1980	USSR	Military Weapons	1844829		IM	No	Comtrade

Appendix 3 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (1981-1990) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
1981							
1982							
1983							
1984							
1985							
1986	UK	Side arm and parts	61006	746	IM	Yes	Comtrade
1987							
1988							
1989	Germany	Revolvers, pistols, hunting/shooting rifles, shotguns	26190		EX	Yes	Comtrade
1990	Germany	Revolvers, pistols, hunting/shooting rifles, shotguns	17000		EX	Yes	Comtrade

Appendix 4 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (1991-2000) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
1991	Germany	Revolvers, Pistols, Hunting Rifles	12000		EX	Yes	Comtrade
1992	Germany						
1993	Spain	Pistols and Revolvers of 9mm or greater	12000		EX	Yes	Eurostat
	Spain	Pistols and Revolvers	158533		EX	Yes	Comtrade
1994	xx						
1995							
1996	xx						
1997	Germany						
1998							
1999	USSR	Large Caliber Artilery Systems					UNROCA
2000	Unspecified						Comtrade

Appendix 5 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (2001 - 2005) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
2001	South Korea	Military Weapons	3660916		IM	No	Comtrade
2002	China	Military Weapons	124318		IM	No	Comtrade
	South Korea	Sports and hunting rifle	91920				Comtrade
	Russia	Anit Aircrat missle launcher		100 units			Comtrade
2003	China	Military Weapons	7800		IM	No	Comtrade
	Ukraine	Military Weapons	2912440		IM	No	Comtrade
	Italy	Sports and Hunting rifle	16000		EX	Yes	Comtrade
2004	Uganda	Military Rifles, Machine Guns and Others	108738		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Ukraine	Military Rifles, Machine Guns and Others	8019		IM	Yes	Comtrade
2005							
	China	Cannons and Mortars	15092		IM	No	Comtrade
	Finland	Military Rifles, Machine Guns	72640		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Israel	Military Rifles, Machine Guns	1196486		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Russia	Military Rifles, Machine Gusn and others	250101		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Ukraine	Sports and Hunting Rifles	64173		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	UK	Military Rifles, Machien Guns and Others	71607		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Bulgaria		61696		EX	Yes	National Report

Appendix 6 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (2006-2010) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
2006							
	Burundi	Cannon Mortars and others	1064083		IM	No	Comtrade
	China	Military Rifle, Machine Guns and others	11576967	23930		Yes	Comtrade
	China	Pistols and Revolvers	1573076	1636	IM	Yes	Comtrade
	ISrael	Pistols and Revolvers	28101	50030	IM	yes	Comtrade
	ISrael	Artillery	19985		IM	No	Comtrade
	Israel	Cannons, mortar and others	22413		IM	No	Comtrade
	USA	Cannons, mortar and others	30394		EX	No	Comtrade
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons with < 20mm calibre	242153		EX	Yes	National
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons with > 20mm calibre	147696		EX	No	National
	Sotuh Korea	Sports and Hunting	25704		EX	Yes	National
2007							
	Bulgaria	Military Rifles, Machine Gusn and Others	361698		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	China	Military Rifles, Machine Gusn and Others	42261784	3176	IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Uk	Cannon Mortars and others	242263		IM	No	Comtrade
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	5058532		EX	Mix	Consolidated EU Report
	EU	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	2417846		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU Report
	Eu	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	1377871		EX	No	Consolidated EU Report
2008							
	Turkey	Postols and Revolvers	481158		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	2460421		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU report
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	3221542		EX	No	Consolidated EU report
	Turkey	Pistols and revolvers	440000	2000	EX	Yes	Comtrade
	Turkey	Semi automatic pistols		2000	EX	Yes	UNROCA
2009							
	Bulgaria	Smooth bore weapons of different calbers and accecories	67772		EX	No	Consoldiated EU
	Israel	Cannon and Mortar	294000		EX	yes	
	Israel	Pistol and Revolver	44000	112	EX	No	Comtrade
2010	Denmark	Salon Sako Quad					UNROCA

Appendix 7 - Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (2011 - 2013) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
2011							
	China	Military Rifles, machine Guns and Others	652802		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	China	pistols and revolvers	15		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Sweden	Artillery	63046		IM	No	Comtrade
	UK	Sports and Hunting rifle	42305		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	9088764		EX	No	National Report
	Czech republic	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	1019409		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
2012							
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	9787136		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT/National Report
	Czech republic	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	3043576		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	128136		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
2013							
	Unspecified	Sporting and Hunting rifles	35523		IM	Yes	Comtrade
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	250222		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	1119677		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	21581		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	92073		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Slovakia	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, machine guns and accecories	34148		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Slovakia	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, machine guns and accecories	31475		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	UKRAINE	SUB MACHINE GUNS		10000 UNITS	EX	Yes	UNROCA

Appendix 8- Small arms trade data for Ethiopia (2014 & 2015) - NISAT

Year	Partner Country	Type	Value in USD	Weight	Trade type	Only SALW?	Source
2014							
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	510199		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, projectiles and accecories	487756		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Czech Republic	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, projectiles and accecories	207872		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, projectiles and accecories	170278		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, projectiles and accecories	538593		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
2015	USA	Military Rifles, Machine Guns and others	72000		EX		
	USA	Sporting and Hunting rifles	19500		EX		
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	21946		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Bulgaria	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	234618		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Poland	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	281089		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT
	POLAND	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others and accecories	918227		EX	No	Consolidated EU REPORT
	Slovakia	Smooth Bore weapons of differetn calbires, others, machine guns and accecories	57353		EX	Yes	Consolidated EU REPORT