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Critical theory and the future of humanity

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Published in:
Philosophy and Social Criticism

DOI:
[10.1177/01914537211061549](https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537211061549)

Publication date:
2022

Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
Jepsen, P. (2022). Critical theory and the future of humanity: A reply to Asger Sørensen. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 48(2), 164-173. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537211061549>

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Per Jepsen

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY A REPLY TO ASGER SØRENSEN

I

In his recently published book, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique: Studies in Economy and Dialectics*, Asger Sørensen apparently makes the case for a continuation of Classical Critical Theory, that is, the theoretical approach of the early Frankfurt School, in particular Max Horkheimer (though, as we will return to, only the Horkheimer of the 1930ies) and Herbert Marcuse. There is, Sørensen claims, still today, in the face of modern, globalized capitalism, “a lot to do for Classical Critical Theory”.¹ The question is, however, exactly wherein the duties for Classical Critical Theory today consists. The answer to this question evidently will vary according to how one defines Critical Theory – or Classical Critical Theory – in the first place. At both points Sørensen is clearly at odds with the development of one of his two intellectual heroes, namely Horkheimer, who after his and Adorno’s publication of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in 1944/1947 and his own *Eclipse of Reason* from 1947 turned in a much more pessimistic and, to some of his critics, more classical philosophical direction than the originary position of Critical Theory in the 1930ies. It is clear from Sørensen’s exposition of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that he, like most of Horkheimer and Adorno’s successors as leading figures of The Frankfurt School, is not happy with this development. According to Sørensen, Horkheimer and Adorno in the 1940ies replaced the critique of capitalism with a critique of civilization, and Critical Theory accordingly “ended up as a totalizing critique of modernity and civilization”.² Horkheimer became “prone to despair and pessimism” and finally turned from the Marxism of his early days as leader of The Institute of Social Research to the Schopenhauer of his pre-critical youth.³ At the end of the day, this meant in Sørensen’s view the decline of Classical Critical Theory, and a continuation of the latter thus has to seek other ways than Horkheimer and Adorno’s after the 1940ies: Horkheimer after this point “did not write anything of importance anymore”.⁴ Sørensen consequently wants to go back to what to him constitutes the ‘classical’ version of Critical Theory, namely to Marcuse and the early Horkheimer’s idea of Critical Theory as a “programme for philosophy of social science”⁵ according

to which the role of the social sciences is “to change both science and society, realizing the true social reality characterized by justice and non-alienation”.⁶ Ultimately the goal for this emancipation of society is, as becomes evident from the introduction to the book, the “full realization” of humanity.⁷

To Horkheimer, however, there was no radical break between his ideas about Critical Theory before and after *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Eclipse of Reason*. Rather the shift in his views was an expression of what he and Adorno in the 1969 preface to the new edition of the former calls the “temporal core” of truth.⁸ As Sørensen himself observes, “Critical Theory does not ignore time,” but on the contrary “take[s] into account the continued change of its theoretical assessment of society”.⁹ In other words, the theory must reflect the historical development of the societal totality it seeks to ‘grasp in concepts’ (Hegel) and thus necessarily cannot remain identical over time. In order to get hold of the changes of society, for better or for worse, Critical Theory itself must change. Horkheimer’s revision of his views on the possibility of social emancipation as well as his increasing disbelief in the emancipatory role of science and technology reflects exactly such a change. For Horkheimer after the outbreak of the Second World War there is little evidence that humanity through conscious and solidary effort will take control over its own destiny and finally turn its back on the injustice and exploitation of previous history. Rather it seems to him probable, if not even inevitable, that late capitalist society is moving towards a total societal administration of nature and human beings – what he together with Adorno terms “the administered world” (die verwaltete Welt) – with a vast loss of freedom and individuality as consequence.¹⁰ Capitalism in this way, against what Marx was prophesying, seems able to integrate its own antagonisms and to make the exploited human beings identify themselves with the system that exploits them. When Sørensen in his argument for a continuation of Classical Critical Theory wants to go directly back to the version of it set forth by Horkheimer and Marcuse in the 1930ies, the question must be raised whether he in this step does not, by ignoring the possible insights of the later Horkheimer’s revision of Critical Theory, at the same time ignore the temporality of truth that he elsewhere states as an indispensable condition. In the following remarks, I will try to elaborate this suspicion, thereby contributing to a more thoroughgoing dialogue with the late Horkheimer and Adorno that will, in my opinion, undoubtedly strengthen the argument of Sørensen’s book.

II

Let me begin by concretizing my suspicion that Sørensen has more to learn from the late Horkheimer than he himself is willing to admit through an example: It is in Sørensen's view a necessary condition for establishing true democracy and in this way emancipating society from injustice and alienation that "civic education and formation become central political issues".¹¹ In the process of social liberation a political education becomes necessary that makes the upcoming human beings aware of their potentials as citizens in a free and just society and at the same time makes them able to "cope with alienation".¹² Already in the introductory presentation of the book, however, Sørensen mentions a serious obstacle to the realization of such an education, namely the "current regime of neo-liberal New Public Management", under which "public universities are no longer able to uphold the ideals of academic freedom and freedom of research".¹³ Exactly this tendency to reduce academic or intellectual freedom that is today represented by the regime of New Public Management can be seen as a main topic in the work of the late Horkheimer. What is commonly referred to as the critique of instrumental reason, a critique that, as is well known, has given name to the German edition of Horkheimer's *Eclipse of reason*¹⁴ and occupies a great part of his work after this book, is not at least a critique of a change in the intellectual culture of Western Europe that leads to a dethronement of autonomous thinking in favour of mathematical and technical computation. As Horkheimer writes in the first chapter of *Eclipse*, "it is as if thinking itself had been reduced to the level of industrial process, subjected to a closed schedule".¹⁵ The more speculative dimensions of this critique such as the moral neutrality of instrumental reason that is the topic of the second Excursus of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* have been frequently discussed in the literature. But at a very concrete level the critique of instrumental reason is also a critique of the role that is attributed to science and knowledge in late capitalist society. Like everything else, science and knowledge in this society have been reduced to means, that is, they have to prove themselves useful for whichever ends there happen to be, since the question of the rationality of the ends cannot be posed in terms of instrumental reason. This situation favours the technical aspects of science and on the other hand makes such things as reflection and self-reflection appear unscientific or even irrational. In his essay *The Concept of Education* (Der Begriff der Bildung) from 1952 that was originally a speech given to the newly matriculated students at The University of Frankfurt where he was at that time the rector, Horkheimer seems to sum up the consequences of this view on reason and knowledge for the educational system: While it was previously the purpose of the

university not only to qualify the students to the execution of a certain job or occupation but at the same time to contribute to the unfolding of their “human potentials”, this idea of the university has today (in 1952) become obsolete.¹⁶ The concept of “Bildung” that in the classical intellectual tradition in Germany captured the idea that a university study should help the student to develop his or her full humanity, has now been replaced by the demand for the usefulness of knowledge.¹⁷ Instrumental reason, that is, the fact that everything else becomes a means for human beings, in the end makes humanity itself to a travesty, since it systematically undermines the inner freedom of the individual, the ability of autonomous thinking and the willingness to commit oneself to something without knowing beforehand what the outcome will be.¹⁸

If Horkheimer was right in his analysis – and if I am right in the assumption that this analysis by and large can account for the pressure on academic and intellectual freedom today – the obstacles to Sørensen’s project of a civic education are considerable. Since the topic of civic education is not treated in details in the present book, but instead put aside for a later volume, the reader can only guess as to what Sørensen’s explanation of New Public Management as well as his strategies against it will consist. Horkheimer on several occasions expressed his doubt about whether the faculty of autonomous thinking would survive the prevalence of instrumental reason in late capitalist society.¹⁹ Therefore, for him as well as for Adorno, the preservation and protection of critical thinking became more important than the practical commitment to a social liberation that anyway seemed to be indefinitely postponed. Uncompromising theoretical thinking and the fight for autonomy and resistance as educational goals became for them, in Adorno’s famous words, “stand-in(s) for freedom”.²⁰

III

Sørensen in his book warns against that Critical Theory “distance(s) itself too far from the basic approach of the first generation, with all the philosophical and political radicalism this implies”.²¹ Most importantly, it should not give up on its practical commitment to the project of a liberation of society from injustice and alienation. Since capitalism is what produces injustice and alienation, Critical Theory must incessantly criticize and as far as possible itself be a factor in the overcoming of capitalism.²² For the same reason Sørensen declares himself unwilling “to accept the conclusions of the radical critique of civilization” that Critical Theory in his reading turns into with Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.²³ Yet the claim that *Dialectic of Enlightenment* together

with *Eclipse of Reason* represents a “displacement of the critique of capitalism into a critique of civilization” that is afterwards to permanently haunt Horkheimer and Adorno’s versions of Critical Theory does not hold true²⁴. Although they certainly deepen the categories of the critique of capitalism, including the category of capitalism itself, in a way that makes the question of liberation much more intricate than before, Horkheimer and Adorno by no means expel these categories altogether. Nor do they, as Sørensen seems to presume, definitely renounce on the idea of an emancipation from capitalism, though Adorno on this point is actually closer to the position of the 1930ies than Horkheimer.

That *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is still a critique of capitalism is in my opinion evident. As several passages of the book suggest, the analyses of instrumental reason, of culture industry and of the psychopathology of fascism all regard “late capitalism”.²⁵ Even if the two authors, as Wiggershaus rightly points out, for opportunist reasons reduced the occurrence of Marxian terminology from the 1944 to the 1947 edition²⁶, it is simply not true that they “systematically” and in every case changed their vocabulary.²⁷ The word “capitalism” not only still occurs throughout the book, it also almost without exception occurs in passages that leave no doubt that the purpose of the argumentation of the whole book is to criticize capitalism. In Adorno’s work after *Dialectic*, there is no attempt to tone down the commitment to the Marxian Critique of Political Economy, and in a lecture from 1968, he explicitly favours the term “late capitalism” at the expense of the more neutral “industrial society”.²⁸ What might disturb Sørensen concerning the concept of capitalism in the *Dialectic* might on the other hand not only be that it often moves close to other and more intricate categories – like those of ‘enlightenment’ and ‘civilization’ - but also that capitalism according to Horkheimer and Adorno is “subjectless”²⁹. In other words, it is impossible to identify a privileged class or something similar “behind” capitalist dominion. On the contrary, we are all *victims* of it, even those who apparently exercise it though privileged positions in the capitalist system of exploitation.³⁰ As Horkheimer underlines in “The longing for what is completely different”, we should all have an interest in “creating a world in which the life of all human beings would be more beautiful, longer, better” and “as far as possible free from suffering”.³¹ And not only should we all have this interest; bourgeois society has created abundance and wealth to such a degree that it would actually be possible to realize such a world through the solidary association of human beings.³² So why do we not, in accordance with our true interests as human beings, once and for all break with capitalist exploitation and domination and instead bring together all our efforts to organize society in a way that contributes to a full unfolding of our human potentials? Why do we,

contrary to this, accept living in a world that from time to time “sinks into a new form of barbarity” and in which the societal institutions are in control of us instead of us having the control over our own institutions?³³ This was exactly the question to which Horkheimer and Adorno in the *Dialectic* wanted to provide an at least provisional answer. So, when Sørensen in *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique* maintains that “humanity needs to reconsider (...) how we organize our common interaction with ourselves, our fellow human beings and with nature, i. e. how we produce, how we consume and how this “we” is to be constituted”³⁴, he is touching upon the focal point of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and the Critical Theory of both Horkheimer and Adorno after the 1940ies. This of course just makes it all the more puzzling that he does not want to enter into any real dialogue with them but instead chooses to follow the interpretation of them by “mainstream critical theory”, that is by Habermas and Honneth and their successors.³⁵ If Sørensen genuinely wants Critical Theory to be a part of the solution to the current economic and ecological crisis and “to give rise to ideas for alternative ways to organize humankind”³⁶, and if capitalism is, as he himself claims, to a great extent responsible for the crisis, he also has to answer the question why humanity has not yet emancipated itself from capitalism. In other words, he has to face more in depth the *obstructions to emancipation*.

Horkheimer and Adorno in their late work both offer some thoroughgoing reflections on these obstructions and their possible explanation. Though of course there must be differentiated between the two authors³⁷, it is nevertheless possible to trace at least two theoretical strategies that are common to both when it comes to the explanation of the absent emancipation: While the first strategy makes use of the already mentioned theory of an economic stabilization of capitalism, that was inspired by Pollock’s theory of State Capitalism³⁸, the second and more important regards what could be termed *the integration of consciousness* and the annihilation of any conscious need for emancipation that follows from it. While the economical and societal regularities of capitalism are still objectively framing late capitalist society, what has been changed is that the individuals are lacking “not only class solidarity” but also “the full awareness that they are objects of and not agents in the societal process that they nevertheless uphold as agents”.³⁹ On this view the emancipation from capitalism is obstructed by the lacking awareness of the subjective *need for* such emancipation. As Sørensen points out in the introduction to his book, capitalism is upheld by “corrupting and holding down” human possibilities and “appealing to what is less human”.⁴⁰ But what if, as both Horkheimer and Adorno from the late 1940ies and onwards seem to imply, what is threatened is the very awareness that things could be different, that human beings could so to say be

more human than they are under the economic and societal conditions of capitalism? Although this awareness of course still exists as the insight of a marginal intellectual and political group, it has probably never been more remote from being a general public awareness than it is today. To fight for overcoming capitalism one has as a first step to fight for the renewed consciousness of the *contingency* of the way things are and the insight that society as a whole could be otherwise than it is. Here there is in my opinion a lot to learn from the late Horkheimer and Adorno.

IV

Another thing that Sørensen might learn from the late Horkheimer and Adorno is that the humanism of his 1930ies-version of Critical Theory is not so unproblematic as he might think. Although Horkheimer and Adorno, to quote the preface to the 1969-edition of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, “take up the cause of (...) tendencies toward real humanity”⁴¹, they are at the same time increasingly skeptical toward what one with reference to its classical ancient form could call the *homo mensura* humanism: the idea that man is the measure of all things as this idea seems to be implied also in many modern versions of humanism, including the Marxian. The assumption of the superiority of mankind over the rest of nature that lies behind the scientific and technological utilization of the latter, in an important sense continues the blind power of nature itself that humanity through philosophical and scientific enlightenment attempted to escape. Although it may not be reduced to this, it *also* constitutes an unacknowledged domination of inner and outer nature. Exactly for this reason the ideal of a reconciliation between man and nature becomes crucial to the (according to Sørensen ‘paradoxical’) thought that enlightenment can “come to control of itself”.⁴² An important element of the *healing* of the pathologies of enlightenment thus is man’s acknowledgment that he himself is a part of nature and that the human domination of the latter cannot be absolute without fatal consequences for humanity itself. When Horkheimer in his famous 1937 essay “Traditional and critical theory” writes that critical theory is connected to the interest in the “unimpeded development and happy existence of real people”⁴³ he still seems to think within the boundaries of the more classical Marxian humanism that from the *Dialectic* and onwards is criticized by himself and Adorno. Also for this reason, the critical position in the *Dialectic* can be considered a necessary self-critique on behalf of early critical theory.

Although widely unnoticed, the abovementioned strain of thought has been highly influential to the ecological and environmental movements in the late 20th century.⁴⁴ Considering Sørensen’s

ambition through philosophy – or critical theory – to contribute to solving the present crisis of society that he himself rightly acknowledges is also an ecological crisis⁴⁵, it becomes hard to understand why he ignores exactly this aspect of the critical theories of Horkheimer and Adorno after the 1940ies, since the man-nature relation here seems to be much more in focus than in the further development of the theory by Habermas and Honneth. Also, the topic of a “liberation of nature” that occupies an important place in the work of the late Marcuse is not analyzed or discussed in any detail by Sørensen.⁴⁶ Admittedly, in chapter 7 where he defends the current importance of Marcuse’s theory of liberation he incidentally mentions the latter’s idea of a qualitative transformation of technology that includes a change in the way technology relates to nature⁴⁷. Though he seems to claim that this idea is crucial to the overcoming of today’s climate crisis⁴⁸, however, Sørensen nowhere in the book explains this claim more in detail. And all in all, he appears throughout the book to defend the very form of humanism that constitutes an important part of the problem. In other words, it is not at least the reduction of non-human nature to a means to the unfolding of human potentials that have brought humanity of today on the edge of a global environmental disaster.⁴⁹ Sørensen, through his demand for the realization of a society that allows each individual to be “reasonable, free and happy” and through his lack of elaborate reflection on the need for a change in the way society relates to non-human nature, is not able to break radically enough with this trend.⁵⁰ Consequently, his renewal of Classical Critical Theory as a theory aiming at human liberation contains no solution to – and not even an analysis of – the environmental crisis.⁵¹

In the work of the late Horkheimer, on the other hand, there is an increasing awareness of the dependency of human beings on nature. The still more all-encompassing societal domination and utilization of nature becomes fatal because of its denial of this very dependency. Sometimes, Horkheimer’s view on humanity without doubt is hard to discern from regular misanthropy. As when he, reflecting on an 18. Century painting of a crowd of people gaping at a captive Rhinoceros concludes that “nowhere becomes the stupidity of human beings as evident as in this picture. They are the only race that captures specimens of other races(...)only to appear great in their own eyes”.⁵² Nevertheless, Horkheimer does not give up the humanism of early critical theory but, in accordance with the ideal of a reconciliation between man and nature, desperately seeks a humanism *beyond* the *homo mensura* version. In an aphorism from the same period – 1956-1958 - he declares “humanity” (*Humanität*) to be “our practical philosophy”.⁵³ What he has in mind is both the demand “that human beings do not suffer” and that all “creatures are allowed to unfold”⁵⁴. It is

not a humanity that is attained at the expense of nature but only through the intimate care and protection of the latter. In the literal sense of the word, what he strives for is no longer 'humanism' but rather a universal solidarity between creatures capable of suffering.⁵⁵ Still, Horkheimer finds, as he himself concedes, no "better word than humanism, the poor provincial slogan of a half-educated European".⁵⁶

For humanity today, considerations like these seem more important than ever. Neither Marcuse's claim that a liberated society will recognize nature as a subject in itself nor Horkheimer and Adorno's idea of a reconciliation between man and nature can today be rejected as examples of the relapse of Critical Theory into unfruitful philosophical speculation.⁵⁷ Rather they both point at the most crucial challenge that any theory that is concerned with a better future for humanity – or just with the ambition to ensure that humanity has a future at all – has to face.

¹ Asger Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique: Studies in Economy and Dialectics*, p. 82.

² Ibid., s. 54.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., s. 53.

⁵ Ibid., p. 26.

⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

⁸ Horkheimer/Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, in: Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 3, p. 9.

⁹ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 36.

¹⁰ Horkheimer, "Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen", in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, p. 401-402. Cf. Horkheimer, "Verwaltete Welt", in: *ibid.*, p.363-382 and Adorno, "Kultur und Verwaltung", in: Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 8, p. 122-146.

¹¹ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 22.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., p. 22-23.

¹⁴ Cf. *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft* (translation by Alfred Schmidt) in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 6, p. 21-186.

¹⁵ Horkheimer, *Eclipse of reason*, p. 15.

¹⁶ Horkheimer, *Der Begriff der Bildung*, in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 8, p. 409.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 411.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 417.

¹⁹ Cf. Horkheimer, "Himmel, Ewigkeit, Schönheit: Interview zum Tode Theodor W. Adornos", in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, p. 291ff.

²⁰ Adorno, "Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis", in: Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 10.2., p. 763. Compare also Horkheimer, *Eclipse of reason*, p. 58, where "theoretical thinking" is asserted as the "vehicle" of freedom.

²¹ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 7.

²² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 2 and 19ff.

²³ Ibid., p. 7. Cf. p. 53ff.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 53.

²⁵ Cf. e. g. Horkheimer/Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 73, p. 158 and p. 223.

²⁶ Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule: Geschichte · Theoretische Entwicklung · Politische Bedeutung*, Carl Hanser Verlag, München 1988, p. 446-447.

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- ²⁷ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 51.
- ²⁸ Adorno, "Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft?", in: Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 8, p. 354-370.
- ²⁹ Horkheimer/Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 134.
- ³⁰ Cf. Adorno, "Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft", p. 360.
- ³¹ Horkheimer, "Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen", in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, p. 386.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 394.
- ³³ Horkheimer/Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 11.
- ³⁴ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 4.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ³⁷ See for an example Stefan Breuer, "Horkheimer oder Adorno? Differenzen im Paradigmakern der kritischen Theorie", in: Breuer, *Aspekte Totaler Vergesellschaftung*, Ca-Ira Verlag, Freiburg 1985.
- ³⁸ For a more thoroughgoing discussion of Pollock's influence on the critical theories of Horkheimer and (especially) Adorno in the 1940ies and 1950ies see my book *Adornos kritische Theorie der Selbstbestimmung*, Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2012, p. 135ff.
- ³⁹ Adorno, "Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft?", Adorno, GS 8, p. 358.
- ⁴⁰ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 2.
- ⁴¹ Horkheimer/Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, p. 9/12
- ⁴² Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 51.
- ⁴³ Horkheimer, "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie", in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 4, p. 221.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. Brennan, "Environmental ethics", 3.3.
- ⁴⁵ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 4.
- ⁴⁶ Marcuse, for an example in the book *Counterrevolution and revolt* from 1972, explicitly makes clear that a liberation of humanity is impossible without a simultaneous transformation of the relation between man and nature (cf. Marcuse, *Counterrevolution and revolt*, Beacon Press, Boston 1972, p. 59 ff.) and a recognition of non-human nature "as a subject in its own right" (*ibid.*, p. 60).
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 232f.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 234.
- ⁴⁹ Correspondingly, a great part of Environmental ethics since the late 1960ies has been concerned with the critique of "anthropocentrism" in classical western thinking and – not at least – in the ethical traditions that have been dominating in the european history of ideas (cf. for an Example the epoch-making essay "The historical roots of our ecological crisis" by Lynn White from 1967 (in: *Science*, vol. 155, p. 1203-1207) and Holmes Rolston, *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world*, Temple University Press 1987, p. 1-44).
- ⁵⁰ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 39.
- ⁵¹ Sørensen, *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*, p. 19.
- ⁵² Horkheimer, "Mensch und Rhinocerus", in: Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 6, p. 266.
- ⁵³ Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 6., p. 259.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁵ Cf. Jepsen, "Verlassenheit und Solidarität: Die Philosophie Schopenhauers in der kritischen Theorie Max Horkheimers", in: *SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 12, Number 1, p. 118.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 260.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie*, p. 54.