Company sponsored egg freezing, an offer you can’t refuse?

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ABSTRACT:

The aim of this article is to argue that one of the central arguments against company sponsored non-medical egg freezing, namely that this practice is contrary to the reproductive autonomy of women, can be difficult to sustain under certain conditions. More specifically, we argue that company sponsored egg freezing is not necessarily in conflict with the three most common requirements for autonomous choice. That is, there is no reason to assume that employees cannot be adequately informed about what is scientifically known about the practice beforehand, or that they lack the required capacity to understand and process this information. Although they may feel a certain pressure to comply with the wishes of their employer, this concern can plausibly be alleviated through privacy regulations. In any event, such pressure is arguably not stronger or relevantly different from other types of pressure that most people readily accept on the labour market. Finally, we argue that company sponsored non-medical egg freezing may mitigate certain types of oppressive socialization, yet it may well perpetuate others, and should in any case arguably be dealt with through guidelines and counselling which will ensure that women make autonomous choices when companies offer egg freezing.

Keywords: assisted reproduction, autonomy, company sponsored, egg-freezing, oppression, relational autonomy
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1. INTRODUCTION:

In 2014, the two Silicon Valley tech giants Apple and Facebook made headlines when they announced that they would start offering their female US employees fertility cryopreservation as an employee benefit.¹ Since then, many other companies, like Google, LinkedIn, Netflix, Spotify, eBay, Snapchat, and Time Warner have followed in the footsteps of Apple and Facebook.² What all these companies have in common, when it comes to cryopreservation, is that they all offer what we can call company sponsored ‘social egg freezing’ or ‘non-medical egg freezing’ (NMEF). This practice is called NMEF, as the offer to freeze eggs has nothing directly to do with medical issues. Some companies, like Facebook do also offer to pay for so-called ‘medical egg freezing’ which is used in order to help, for example, women undergoing cancer treatment that may damage their oocytes³. Moreover, the distinction between medical and non-medical egg freezing is far from razor-sharp. For example, a woman 25 years of age may freeze her eggs for non-medical reasons; however, when she is 30 years old and, say, has

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unfortunately been diagnosed with cancer, her frozen eggs may now be used for medical reasons as a way to preserve her fertility.

In the wake of this new practice, there has been a heated public and scholarly debate about the ethics of companies making these kinds of offers to their employees, usually from a critical standpoint. Apple, however, has argued in favour of this practice on the grounds that they want to attract and retain young female employees by giving perks that benefit women. They claim that the offer of NMEF increases women’s reproductive autonomy by giving their employees “more freedom to pursue family planning according to their own timeline.” Along the same lines, bioethicists, such as Heidi Mertes, have argued that when companies offer NMEF to women, depending on their financial situation, this can “…expand their reproductive autonomy as it [the company] offers them an additional option which some women will not need, but which others might.”

However, the aim of this article is to present and critically discuss a central argument against companies offering NMEF; namely that this practice, contrary to the above-mentioned quotations, is detrimental to women’s reproductive autonomy. Feminist bioethicists, such as Karvey Harwood have, for example, observed that “…the option of egg freezing creates a pressure to use it…” and argues that “…the option to freeze eggs might quickly become an obligation to freeze eggs, a way to demonstrate one’s seriousness about one’s career-making.” Furthermore, another feminist bioethicist, Francoise Baylis, has said that “…the option of

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oocyte cryopreservation does not meaningfully enhance women’s reproductive decision-making...”⁸ and “…it actually disempowers them by overtly entrenching the otherwise subtle message that women who have babies are not serious about their careers.”⁹ Although it is not clear from these quotes, if read in a literal way, it is obvious from the context that these bioethicists believe that such pressure, obligations, or subtle messages are morally problematic.

As far as we can tell, however, this autonomy-based objection against company sponsored egg freezing has not yet been subject to critical discussion. In this article, we aim to remedy this situation.

More specifically, we will argue (1) that companies offering employees NMEF do not put more pressure on employees than other offers most people would readily accept, such as offering an employee a promotion that requires relocating to a city far away. Moreover, (2) the offer of NMEF is no less legitimate than other offers a company might make that most people would readily accept, such as a company offering contraception or courses on family planning. Finally, (3) company sponsored NMEF arguably does not condition women into postponing pregnancy more so than other practices, which do not elicit the same opposition (e.g. financial support for assisted reproduction).

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we outline the standard view on autonomy and informed consent. We show that there are three relevant ways the offer of company sponsored NMEF could be said to violate the (reproductive) autonomy of employees. The first is through excessive pressure, the second is through undue pressure, and the third is through social conditioning. In Section 2, we argue that company sponsored NMEF does not put more pressure on employees than other offers, which do not elicit the same

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⁸ Baylis, op. cit. Note 5, p. 66.
opposition. In Section 3 we argue that company sponsored NMEF does not need to influence the reproductive choices of employees through undue pressure - more so than other practices that most people would not object to. In Section 4 we argue that company sponsored NMEF does not, given certain circumstances, condition women into postponing pregnancy to a greater extent than other practices, which do not appear intuitively troubling. In Section 5 we argue that company sponsored NMEF does not necessarily violate or mitigate against reproductive autonomy due to opportunity costs, as for example, Mertes has claimed. Finally, in Section 6, we sum up and conclude.

2. WHAT IS REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY?

Autonomy is usually understood as self-determination or self-governance. That is, to act autonomously is to act in accordance with one’s own values, reasons, and motives. Thus, reproductive autonomy is the capacity to act in accordance with one’s own reasons and values when it comes to one’s reproductive choices. Whether understood as an intrinsic or instrumental value, respect for reproductive autonomy is clearly an important value. It matters a great deal to people how much influence and control they have over their own lives in this regard.

However, in order to know whether it increases or decreases the reproductive autonomy or reproductive decision-making of women when companies offer NMEF to its female employees, we need to specify what is meant by ‘reproductive autonomy’ in the case of NMEF. Arguably, reproductive autonomy entails three conditions that all must be fulfilled before it can

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be claimed that women (or trans men) make an autonomous choice when they consider whether to accept an offer for company paid NMEF.

In what follows, it is presumed that autonomous choice requires the agent to have at least: (a) access to information about available options and the expected risks and benefits of these options, and (b) the ability to understand this information, to form preferences about the options, and to make a choice based on this information and any relevant related preferences of the agent, and finally (c) the procedure under which the choice is made must be free of undue influence such as coercion, manipulation, pressure, and social conditioning12. These three requirements are what many moral philosophers would accept as the minimum necessary conditions for autonomy13. That is, if any of these requirements are not satisfied, autonomous choice is impossible. We will refer to them as respectively the knowledge, capacity, and freedom requirement.

We take it as our point of departure that employees who are offered NMEF satisfy both the knowledge and the capacity requirement. That is, we suppose, along with the American Society for Reproductive medicine (ASRM), that the medical staff at the cryopreservation clinic, at which they will have their eggs retrieved and banked, are able to properly inform them about the procedure14. We further take it as given that the employees in question are rational adults who are able to understand this information. To claim that such employees are, on average, not competent decision-makers seems wrong. We believe that the information handed over to the employees should be the latest scientific knowledge about:

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• The procedure of egg retrieval and banking of eggs
• The possible risks and benefits of these procedures
• The prevalence and success rates of having a child with the use of cryopreserved eggs
• That postponing childbearing will usually reduce the chance of becoming parents
• That having a child with cryopreserved eggs involves In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)

And by the HR staff of the company, they should be informed about:

• To what extent the company will pay for egg freezing
• To what extent the company will pay for IVF treatment
• What will happen to the cryopreserved eggs when one leaves the company
• Whether the company has any expectations about postponing childbearing after having paid for egg freezing.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that due to the novelty of egg freezing technology, data e.g. concerning success rates are hard to come by. Especially in relation to individual clinics. We believe, however, that the knowledge requirement can still be satisfied, as long as the relevant uncertainties are properly communicated. In any event, if this apparent lack of information rules out informed consent when it comes to egg freezing, it does not matter who is paying the bill and thus does not specifically concern the practice of company sponsored egg freezing.

When such knowledge is not handed over to the employees, or not understood by the employees, however, we have a moral problem. But as we believe that these potential problems can be solved by the proper communication, we want to focus on the third requirement, which
best captures the worry concerning autonomy in the above-mentioned quotations\textsuperscript{15}. Thus, in the present context, we are solely interested in the freedom requirement. In this regard, there are three key different ways that the reproductive autonomy of employees could potentially be violated by the offer of company sponsored egg freezing. The first is through excessive pressure. We add the qualifier because decisions are nearly always undertaken under some form of pressure. The idea here, however, is that pressure can sometimes be so excessive that it violates or transgresses autonomous decision-making. For instance, mental illness can be a source of great internal pressure, and threats of physical harm can be a source of great external pressure that can diminish autonomous choice.

The second way reproductive autonomy could be violated in the present context is through undue pressure. Sometimes it is not the strength of the pressure that matters in terms of autonomy but rather whether the source or type of pressure is in itself undue. That is, the offer of company sponsored egg freezing may violate the reproductive autonomy of women not because the pressure to undertake freezing is too strong to refuse, but rather because companies should not interfere with people's reproductive choices at all.

The third, and final, relevant way autonomy can be compromised is through social conditioning. As many feminist scholars of relational autonomy have argued, choices are always made within a particular social context, and on the basis of particular social conditionings\textsuperscript{16}. Consider for instance the case of an obedient wife, who has internalized societal norms about women being inferior to men. Satisfied with her position in life, she dedicates all her energy and efforts to her husband. Although she acts out of her own volition, this woman does not seem to act


\textsuperscript{16} Stoljar, op. cit. Note 11,
particularly autonomously. After all, to act autonomously is to act in accordance with one’s own reasons and values. To act in accordance with values that have been instilled in one by others seems to be the opposite of acting autonomously\(^\text{17}\).

In the following sections we discuss whether company sponsored NMEF violates or mitigates against reproductive autonomy as outlined above.

3. EXCESSIVE PRESSURE

One obvious way company sponsored NMEF could be said to violate the reproductive autonomy of employees is through excessive pressure to undertake freezing. For instance, if women feel that they have to undertake egg freezing in order to advance their careers, that could potentially put a great deal of pressure on their decision making. For instance, Harwood seemingly has concerns that the offer of NMEF will “create a pressure to use it”. In this way, she worries that the offer of company sponsored NMEF quickly becomes “an obligation to freeze eggs, a way to demonstrate one’s seriousness about one’s career-making.”\(^\text{18}\) And when Baylis in the aforementioned quotation says that companies offering NMEF sends a “subtle message that women who have babies are not serious about their careers”\(^\text{19}\), this is easily read as a form of pressure to make women freeze their eggs and postpone childrearing. Moreover, studies have shown that one motivation for choosing egg freezing is fear of future regret\(^\text{20}\).

Thus, the offer of company sponsored egg freezing may pressure women into freezing their


\(^{18}\) Stoljar, op. cit. Note 16.

\(^{19}\) Baylis, op. cit. Note 8.

eggs due to anticipated decision regret of not having done everything possible in case of future involuntary childlessness.

We believe, however, that this worry of excessive pressure, which is also mentioned by e.g. Bricknell 2006) is overstated for the following reasons. Firstly, concerns about perceived pressure can at least to some extent be dealt with through privacy regulations. As long as employers do not know whether a given employee has accepted the offer of fertility cryopreservation, there is presumably little risk of employees feeling pressured into accepting the offer. In principle at least, this should be no different from other types of sensitive health information that are inaccessible to employers. Of course, if the offer of NMEF sends the message that women who have babies are not serious about their careers, then there could be an implied pressure on women not to become pregnant – no matter whether they have accepted the offer of NMEF or not. However, it is not entirely convincing that the offer of NMEF necessarily sends this message. Rather, it could just as well send the (perhaps equally problematic) message that women who do not freeze their eggs are not serious about motherhood. Or the message that it is better to be safe than sorry when it comes to reproduction.

We emphasize that we do not advocate for any of these potential alternative interpretations. The point here is merely that concerns about company sponsored egg freezing sending out subtle messages are highly speculative. So, it is therefore difficult to assess such statements, without any supporting evidence. It is entirely possible that this practice communicates a range of different and conflicting messages, but it is not evident that that they, overall, put pressure on the reproductive autonomy of female employees.

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21 Datta, op. cit. Note 14.
Secondly, and most importantly, even if there is no way around such pressure, there are seemingly many different ways companies put pressure on employees that most people would nevertheless readily accept. Consider for instance the following case:

**Relocation**: Ann is offered a promotion in a different and far away city C, that will increase some minor risk to her health because of increased pollution and an increased crime rate for C.

Clearly, the promise of a promotion puts a great deal of pressure on Ann’s decision making. There is value in a promotion, but also a cost to relocating. Besides the increased risks of harm, which, for the sake of the argument, is comparable to the health risks of egg retrieval, relocating to another city may also make it more difficult for Ann to have children with her current partner. For instance, her partner may not be able to move along with Ann and moving may also make it more difficult for Ann to have a child due to a lack of social network and support in a new city. Similarly, there is a good chance that Ann will feel pressure from anticipated decision regret. If she doesn't take the promotion, she may regret it down the line; if she does, and ends up childless as a result, she may also come to regret her decision. Nevertheless, it does not seem right to hold that the offer of the promotion violates her autonomy because the offer puts too much pressure on her decision-making. We believe the same thing holds for offering employees company sponsored egg freezing.

**UNDUE INTERFERENCE**

As we have seen, it is difficult to sustain the view that the offer of company sponsored NMEF violates reproductive autonomy because it puts too much pressure on employees. However, another way to understand the autonomy objection against company sponsored NMEF is that
the offer of NMEF violates reproductive autonomy because companies should not interfere with
the reproductive choices of employees. According to this line of thought, the reproductive
domain is off limits for employers, so to speak. In this section, we discuss this variant of the
autonomy objection against NMEF.

At first glance, there is doubtlessly something appealing about the idea that
companies should not interfere with the reproductive choices of employees. This idea seems to
complement the common view that employers should not be allowed to ask potential employees
about their reproductive plans or withhold promotions from employees who decide to have children.

On closer inspection, however, we believe this variant of the objection fails for
the following reason. It seems that there are many ways companies can interfere with the
reproductive choices of their employees, which do not appear morally problematic. Consider
for instance an offer of contraception to employees as part of a health package, offering
employees courses in family planning, or arranging company parties or events that can affect
the reproductive choices of the employees. Even paying for assisted reproduction would be off
limits if companies were morally obliged not to interfere at all in the reproductive choices of
employees. If the offer of company sponsored NMEF is undue because the reproductive domain
is off limits to employers, the same would seem to apply to offering contraception, assisted
reproduction, and so on. This would arguably be a difficult implication to accept, and therefore
it is also not convincing to claim that offering NMEF amounts to undue involvement in
reproductive choices.
SOCIAL CONDITIONING

A third way to understand the criticisms of Harwood and Baylis, however, is not so much about the potential of women feeling pressured into postponing pregnancy or suffering pressure from an undue source. Rather, it is that women would come to choose company sponsored NMEF due to internalized norms owing to oppressive socialization or social conditioning. Consider again the example of a woman who does everything to please her husband and believes that this is her duty as a wife. Could the offer of NMEF similarly instil in women the belief that female employees ought to postpone pregnancy for the sake of their employers?

We believe that this concern is also overstated. For one thing, it is an open question whether offering NMEF will indeed have this effect, as the above-mentioned authors claim. Companies may socialize their employees in many different ways, or give out many different signals, and some of these may work against the message that women who become pregnant are not sufficiently concerned about their careers. For instance, companies may have other family-friendly policies in place that send out the complete opposite signal. In fact, as Mertes also points out, those companies offering NMEF are for the most part also those companies who have the most generous family-friendly policies. Furthermore, in order to make the offer of NMEF less of a threat to reproductive autonomy, companies could indeed also offer comparable benefits to employees that opt to have children rather that postponing parenthood (benefits like parental leave, childcare, etc.)

Furthermore, when it comes to reproduction, women are arguably subjected to oppressive socialization in both directions. For instance, in most societies around the world, women are also socially conditioned into having children when they are relatively young, e.g.
by their immediate families who want grand-children\textsuperscript{22}. Indeed, one traditional feminist critique of masculine society is how women have historically been relegated to the reproductive arena from the onset of adulthood\textsuperscript{23}. Since NMEF arguably allows women more time to complete other goals in life\textsuperscript{24}, NMEF can perhaps help mitigate some forms of oppressive socialization, even if it may perpetuate others.

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, we believe that this version of the autonomy objection against company sponsored NMEF suffers from the same flaw as the previous versions. That is, this version of the autonomy objection also seems to condemn practices that most people would readily accept. In particular, if offering NMEF violates reproductive autonomy because this practice conditions women into postponing pregnancy, the same seems to apply to offering employees financial support for assisted reproduction. This practice could similarly be said to condition women into postponing pregnancy, as this practice also offers employees better odds of having children at a later age than what they would otherwise have. However, few people would presumably hold that companies supporting assisted reproduction for employees violates or infringes on their reproductive autonomy.

Finally, even if women are subject to oppressive socialization when it comes to choosing company sponsored NMEF, this does not necessarily entail that any choices should be taken out of their hands. As feminist scholars of relational autonomy, such as Kim Atkins, have argued, in the context of informed consent, oppressive socialization is best dealt with by medical professionals helping patients “critically reflect upon and understand their own


\textsuperscript{24} Goold, I., & Savulescu, J. (2009). In favour of freezing eggs for non-medical reasons. Bioethics. 8(1), 67-85.
deliberative processes and self-conceptions that underlie and motivate their choices". By the same token, women who are offered NMEF should at the same time be helped by medical professionals to critically reflect upon the offer and how NMEF fits in with their visions of the good life (as part of the freedom requirement). They should not be denied the possibility of making their own decisions.

Based on the above, we conclude that there is no reason to suppose that company sponsored NMEF will necessarily be in conflict with either the knowledge, capacity, or freedom requirement.

**OPPORTUNITY COSTS**

However, even if the above-mentioned three requirements are satisfied, Mertes has argued that we should not accept companies offering NMEF, as she believes that egg freezing has little value for women in terms of reproductive autonomy. This is because the procedure is relatively expensive, and many women end up not using their frozen eggs anyway, as only a small number of women end up needing fertility treatment later in life. Thus, Mertes argues that egg freezing should not be introduced at the cost of other family-friendly policies, which are better suited to increasing the reproductive autonomy of women overall. Considering that the resources spent on NMEF could always have been used on other family-friendly policies, e.g. increased parental leave and so on, this seems to be a good argument against company sponsored egg freezing.

This argument can, however, be challenged in a number of ways. Firstly, even if other family-friendly policies would benefit a larger group of employees, this does not

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26 Mertes, op. cit. Note 5, p. 1209.
necessarily mean that it will be optimal in terms of increasing reproductive autonomy. Egg freezing may be a tremendous benefit for those who end up needing it, as they are the most likely to end up involuntary childless. That is, women who need more time in order to prepare for motherhood, find a suitable partner, and so on; women who would most likely have postponed pregnancy anyway, for reasons more or less beyond their control. Moreover, these particular women would see less benefit from other family-friendly policies, such as increased access to parental leave or childcare facilities at the workplace, in terms of their reproductive autonomy. Considering that this may be a substantial number of women, and that egg freezing may be their best bet against childlessness, it is not entirely clear that other family-friendly policies will necessarily have the most bang for buck when it comes to increasing the reproductive autonomy of women in the workforce.

Secondly, it is worth noting that the women in question may prefer access to egg freezing over other family-friendly policies. It is difficult to see why offering other family-friendly initiatives instead of NMEF would best serve women's reproductive autonomy, if they themselves prefer to have access to fertility preservation over other family-friendly policies, such as better access to childcare, parental leave, and so on.

Thirdly, as Mertes mentions herself, Facebook, for example, treat their female employees very well with more than e.g. average paid parental leave, etc., so it is possible to offer NMEF as well as other family-friendly policies. This is important because as long as there is a proper baseline of other family-friendly policies, introducing company sponsored egg freezing could be the most efficient policy in terms of increasing reproductive autonomy. Of course, companies like Apple and Facebook may not be there yet, but whether offering egg freezing at the expense of other family-friendly policies is sub-optimal in terms of reproductive autonomy surely depends on how good the existing policies are. Obviously, introducing
company sponsored egg freezing in a company with no other family-friendly policies in place would probably not be optimal in terms of increasing the reproductive autonomy of the employees. But it is much less obvious when it comes to companies that already have many family-friendly policies in place. At some point, at least, egg freezing may be the best available alternative for increasing the reproductive autonomy of some women, and should therefore not be ruled out on principle.

CONCLUSION

In this article we have argued that one of the central arguments against company sponsored non-medical egg freezing, namely that this practice violates the reproductive autonomy of women, is difficult to sustain upon closer scrutiny. More specifically, we have argued that company sponsored egg freezing is not necessarily in conflict with the three most common requirements for autonomous choice. That is, there is no reason to suppose that employees cannot be adequately informed about the practice in advance, or that they lack the required capacity to comprehend and process this information. While they may indeed feel a certain pressure to comply with the wishes of their employer, privacy regulations could plausibly alleviate this concern. In any event, it is arguably not stronger or relevantly different from other sources of pressure that most people readily accept. Moreover, we have argued that offering NMEF is no less legitimate coming from a company than offering other types of fertility related treatments, such as sterilization and contraception. Finally, we have argued that company sponsored NMEF may mitigate certain types of oppressive socialization, while it may perpetuate others, and that oppressive socialization in any case is best dealt with through guidance and counselling rather than taking options away from individuals.
We have also argued against Mertes that even if company sponsored egg freezing comes at the expense of other family-friendly policies, this need not interfere with the reproductive autonomy of female employees. This is because egg freezing may be a tremendous benefit for those who end up needing it.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that we do not know in any detail the specific practices of the companies who are currently offering fertility cryopreservation, such as Apple and Facebook. We do not know to what extent they fulfil the three requirements of reproductive autonomy and so on. Our point has merely been that to the extent that these requirements are fulfilled, which we emphasize is by no means impossible in practice; there is seemingly no principled moral reason, based on reproductive autonomy, against companies offering egg freezing as an employee benefit.

Of course, there may be other moral reasons against companies offering fertility cryopreservation as an employee benefit. For instance, some have argued that this practice is an individual solution to a social problem, and therefore morally problematic or that this practice is discriminatory against older female and male employees, who see little benefit from company sponsored egg freezing. These concerns are however a matter for a different discussion.

27 Harwood, op. cit. Note 7
28 For a critical discussion of this view see (self-reference omitted)
REFERENCES:


