The Established and the Delegated
The Division of Labour of Domination among Effective Agents on the Field of Power in Denmark
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Abstract

What is the relationship between the various forms of power held by elites in contemporary society? Using Bourdieu’s notion of the field of power, we address this question by exploring the division of labour of domination among contemporary Danish elites. Via a specific multiple correspondence analysis of 44 variables with 198 categories, we examine the relationship between the volume and distribution of various forms of capital held by 423 individuals at the core of Danish elite networks, arguing that they constitute effective agents in the field of power. We find three major differentiations between: 1) established and newcomers, 2) public and private forms of legitimation and 3) rural or industrial-based, but nonetheless organisationally well-connected, elites and the social elite surrounding Copenhagen state nobility. The legitimising pole of the field of power does not necessarily derive its positions from the cultural field but can also rely on delegated forms of capital.

Keywords: capital, elites, power

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Introduction: The division of the labour of domination

Elites face a double challenge. They must secure the influence of their own form of power, while also seeking recognition from and recognising other elite groups with their particular forms of power that are also vital for the reproduction and legitimisation of the status quo. To maintain power, elites must then be hyper agents (Maclean et al., 2017) and work in between and across fields. Elites become key players in the national power structure only when they occupy positions that provide them with control over or access from forms of capital with transferable value (cf. Khan, 2012). They are not just the capital rich or the best; they hold forms of capital that are valued across fields. In other words, elite fractions have to balance two sometimes conflicting sets strategies, one tied to securing the status quo of a social order in which they are at the top and one tied to their specific position within this elite constellation. That is, while the relative values of specific forms of power underpinning different power bases depend upon the recognition from the holders of other forms of power, they are also subject to challenges. These struggles are constrained by the high degree of mutual interdependence among the dominant, or what Bourdieu (1996: 263) calls ‘the organic solidarity of a genuine division of the labour of domination’.

This ongoing process of defining the exchange rates between different forms of capital, that is of shaping the structure of a given elite constellation, is rarely a partnership of equals, however. Who determines the value and exchange rate of the different forms of power, and what are the mutual relations of dependence between this group? Or, succinctly put, what are the types of power that allow agents to efficiently influence the value of different forms of power? To address these questions, we turn to Bourdieu’s notion of the field of power.

As Wacquant (1996: xv) argues, Bourdieu suggests with this notion, ‘an agenda for a comparative, genetic and structural sociology of national fields of power that would, for each society, catalog [the] efficient forms of capital’. Contrary to the broader tradition of elite sociology, our focus on the structure of the field of power does not centre on the classic question of whether or not a national elite is unified or divided (Aron, 1950; Mills, 1956; Useem, 1984, Mizruchi, 2013). On that question, Larsen and Ellersgaard (2018) has demonstrated the existence of a cohesive power elite in a Danish context. The focus of this paper is the types of capital that are held and thus valued by different fractions of the elite.

Since the value of different forms of capital may differ across societies and over time, identification of the agents with sufficient volumes of the forms of capital held in high regard by others in the field of power has remained a black box. A key challenge to the (re)empirical construction of the field of power – and of any field
in general – is the identification of the agents, who are in fact engaged in the struggles in the particular field of power. We propose a two-step procedure in the empirical construction of the field of power. First, to identify the actual effective agents in the field of power we identify the inner core of an extensive nationwide network of all potentially influential affiliations. We argue that this core, in fact, represents the effective agents because their many field-bridging interconnections give witness to a mutual recognition of the value in the different field-specific types of capital, and because they act as key players and brokers through these connections when the relative value and exchange rates of different forms of capital are fought over and determined. Second, we use this group to construct an empirical model of the structure of the field of power to objectivate the ‘figurations of elite positions and the relations between them’ (Hjellbrekke & Korsnes, 2009: 36) and, in turn, to identify the forms of capital that structure the field.

In the analysis, we turn to the social structure of this field, examining it using prosopographical data – biographical data on all group members collected from secondary sources (Rossier 2019) – on the 423 individuals who make up the aforementioned core of the Danish network of all potentially influential affiliations (Larsen and Ellersgaard, 2017). Using specific multiple correspondence analysis, we explore the relationship between various forms of capital and identify the key oppositions with regard to volume and composition of capital in the field of power. To identify these forms of capital, we use unique data, presented in Appendix, applying results from social network analyses, data from complete career sequences, contemporary and historical data on registered enterprises and board memberships, highly granulated data on media coverage and publication activity, and spatial proximity combined with biographical data on the elite individuals and their families. All in all, 44 variables with a total of 198 modalities – or categories – are then included in the analysis.

The empirical sensitivity of the notion of the field of power in terms of the particular historical struggles within different nation states allows us to explore how these struggles have played out in the particular setting of a Scandinavian welfare state with a strong corporatist tradition. The Danish economy is negotiated by the triumvirate of the state, employer associations and unions that share control over important institutions within the legal system, pension funds, finance, research funding, education and economic policy. Scholars have already supplemented Bourdieu’s (1996) analysis of the field of power in 1970s France by constructing the field of power in Norway (Hjellbrekke et al., 2007) and contemporary France (Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet & Thine, 2018). While all three analyses identify vertical oppositions between the established and the newcomers in the field of power, Bourdieu’s view of a horizontal split between positions holding economic versus cultural capital appears more specific to the historical and national context of his analysis. Interestingly, in both the Norwegian and contemporary French field of power, those who hold economic capital or who hold dominant positions in the economic order do not, to the same extent, appear to be dependent on those with dominant positions in the cultural or academic field. And, as we will argue, the same is true for Denmark.
Building on the lessons from Norway and France, the aim of this study is to describe and understand the relationship between the forms of power in the context of a contemporary welfare state in a negotiated economy. Hence we ask: What is the structure of the Danish field of power? What are the dominant forms of capital and how are they related to one another through the properties of the effective agents on the field of power?

It is important to note that this study differs from previous studies in the sample strategy and the number and content of the variables included. In the Norwegian and the French case the researchers had to rely on either positional samples, in the Norwegian case, or samples derived from the French Who’s Who?, whereas our approach is more inductive, moving from a large network of potentially influential positions to an exclusive core.

Before turning to the analysis of the field of power in contemporary Danish society, let us explain what is implied by using the notion of the field of power.

**From fields to the field of power**

In the overall framework of Bourdieu’s theory, society is construed as a totality of multiple relatively autonomous social fields and subfields that emerge historically when different forms of human activity become increasingly detached from one another (Bourdieu 2016, 1003; 2011, 127). There is, however, more to it. In Bourdieu’s work, the notion of field is intrinsically tied to his reconceptualisation of the notion of capital. Fields are not just specific domains in the social world; they emerge in historical processes of monopolisation of the means of production and reproduction of specific goods, whether material or symbolic in nature (Bourdieu, 2011: 127; 2016: 207f). As specific microcosms within the social order, fields are to be understood as configurations of relations between positions in unequal distributions of different forms of power resources or capital. A field is thus always a pre-given structure determining human agency, i.e. a static field of forces, and simultaneously a dynamic field of struggles to change the distribution of these forces (Bourdieu 2015: 501).

Within the broader sociology of class, Bourdieu (1984) depicts society as a social space of positions in a two-dimensional class structure of capital volume and composition – economic versus cultural capital. A similar structure has been found across various societies in many later studies (for Denmark, see Prieur et al., 2008). This social space, which Bourdieu (2015: 593) sometimes refers to as the field of social classes, field of class relations or class struggles, exhibits a class structure opposing a dominant pole to a dominated pole in terms of capital volume but, equally important, it also introduces the idea of factions within the dominant class, based on ‘the
kind of capital on which their power relies’ (Bourdieu, 2013: 22). This is one of at least two ways in which Bourdieu employs the notion of the field of power – that is, as a more comprehensive, empirically sensitive synonym for the dominant positions in the social space at large.

Viewing the social space as not only a space of social agents but also as a field of social fields, Bourdieu (2016: 28) gives the field of power a broader, more theoretically ambitious meaning, as a meta-field of the objective relations and interactions between fields. In that sense, the field of power is an analytical conceptualisation of the hierarchy and interdependence of different forms of capital, or power, in a society.

Since the relative strength of the different fields and their specific capital is historically contingent, the field of power is also a field of struggle, a locus for struggles to preserve or transform, or even subvert, these relations of power. At stake in these struggles are the very exchange rates of capitals, their relative value and magnitude (Bourdieu, 1996: 264f).

In the French context of Bourdieu’s original work, the field of power reflects a hierarchy of fields ranging from the economic field, at the dominant pole, to the artistic field of cultural production, at the other (Bourdieu 1996: 270). Although the opposition between economic and cultural capital has a national and historical specificity, Bourdieu (2011: 129; 2016: 1039) argues that the structure of fields of power, hence the division of the labour of domination, will tend to organise itself around an executive or commanding pole of bellatores, and a speaking or legitimising pole of oratores.

So far, the notion of the field of power has been discussed here from the perspective of social theory, as a meta-field of fields, that is, equivalent to the social space as such, but seen from a different analytical perspective (for this reading see Schmitz et al., 2017), or, as Vandenberghe puts it (1999: 54), ‘a sort of “metafield” that regulates the struggles for power throughout all fields’.

If we take seriously the statement that the relative strength of capital is fought over and, if we are to move towards an empirical investigation of national fields of power, we must be able to answer the pressing question: Who are the specific individuals doing the struggling or negotiating? Who holds positions allowing them to affect the exchange rates between forms of power and thus alter the configuration of the field of power? And, what are the types and distributions of capital structures in the relationships between these individuals?

Finding the effective agents

Aware of the implied tautology, Bourdieu explains that because a field can be conceived, theoretically, ‘as a space in which a field-effect exerts itself […] the limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of
the field die away’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 76). Given the all-encompassing effects of the field of power on society at large, this definition has little demarcative value for the purpose of specifying the boundaries of the object of inquiry. Bourdieu (2016: 240) does, however, also suggest another, more specific criterion: ‘To be part of a field means producing effects in it’. Studying another field with society-wide influence, i.e. housing policy, Bourdieu (2005: 99) restricts his empirical analysis to what he called effective agents. While everyone is certainly affected by the effects of the field of power, not everyone is effective in the field of power.

In his various attempts at defining the field of power more precisely, Bourdieu (2016: 445) suggests a definition that is highly useful for our purpose:

[I]t is a space in which the principle of structuration is the distribution, not of capital (such a space would be the social space in its entirety), but of power over the various kinds of capital […] a power that comes from a certain type, a certain quantity of capital, or from a certain position of power over the institutions [les instances] giving power over capital.

To find the effective agents in the field of power, we must look for agents that not only possess high volumes of the distinct kinds of capital, but that also hold this kind of second-order power, as Bourdieu coins it (2016: 1009). In other words, a power over capital.

One way forward, in line with the traditional positional approach in elite studies, would be to define the various field elites, sampling the heads of the largest institutions in the most important fields. Which fields, then? And how many institutions from each? This would require knowing in advance the thing that we are in fact asking, that is, the relative strength of the fields vis-à-vis each other on the field of power.

We argue that power over capital is not a resource held by individuals or by institutions; it is bound to the networks of various fora in which agents from different fields meet. In this sense, we tie the idea of power over capital to what Boltanski (1973) calls multi-positionality. To understand the power an individual can mobilise, we must take into account all the positions he or she holds, not only the primary position. It is important to note that this kind of power depends not only on the number of positions, but also equally – and maybe even more importantly – on their dispersion over different fields or sectors. This calls for an inductive identification strategy that includes as many types of sectoral affiliations as possible.

Thus, the effective agents in the field of power, then, are not simply the top players in any social field, but the agents that, via their multi-positionality, bind together various fields and act as brokers in the ongoing negotiation of the relative strength of different forms of power. As Maclean et al. (2017: 130) also suggest, we should understand the field of power as ‘an affiliation of dominant agents transcending individual fields’.
While an interaction network like this is not a field in the Bourdieusian sense of the word, a network of real interactions can nonetheless ‘be the empirically visible channel through which relations that cannot be reduced to these interactions manifest themselves’ (Bourdieu, 2015: 539; see also De Nooy, 2003; Singh, 2016). In the remainder of this study, we therefore argue that the structure of the social space of the Danish individuals at the highly exclusive core of the broad network of potentially influential affiliations is an adequate empirical manifestation of the structure of the field of power in contemporary Denmark.

**Methods: Constructing the field of power**

To identify the effective agents in the Danish field of power, we take an inductive, multi-positional approach. We have gathered membership data on all positions in the Danish network of potentially powerful fora, that is, directorates, boards, commissions, councils, and networks of various kinds. In total, this amounts to 5,079 different affiliations with 56,536 positions held by 37,750 individuals. In a previous study (Larsen and Ellersgaard, 2017) used social network analysis to identify a highly interlinked network core (see Seidman, 1983) of 423 individuals in the Danish power network in 2012. The core is identified by decomposing this large Danish power network through successively removing individuals with low connectivity until the network cannot be reduced further. This identifies a group of 423 individuals in which all were within a network reach of at least 199 of the 422 other core members. This core is akin to Mills’ (1956: 18; see also Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet & Thine, 2018) definition of a power elite as an ‘intricate set of overlapping cliques [that] share[s] decisions having at least national consequences’ and that serves as our empirical approximation of the effective agents on the Danish field of power.

Taking the relative strength of representation of individuals from different sectors as an indicator of the value of the forms of capital possessed by this group, the negotiated economy has left a decisive mark on the formal networks of power. Looking at the main organisational affiliation of the 423 effective agents in the field of power, five fields stand out: 1) the economic field, a dominant group consisting of business (44%), business association (9%), farming association (3%) leaders and top corporate lawyers (2%); 2) the political field (8%); 3) the bureaucratic field, with senior civil servants (7%) the royal family and court (2%); 4) the field of unions (13% union leaders); and 5) the academic field, with leading figures in science and education (12%). Leaders of cultural institutions and charities (1%) comprise the few representatives from the cultural field, with no cultural producers such as artists or journalists, among the effective agents on the field of power. The group is an old boys network. Only 19% are women and the median age was 56 years old with only 2% being younger than 40 and about one in four being under 50 years old.
While the effective agents on the field of power were methodologically identified solely by holding central positions in an affiliation network, their claim to power is directly attributed to their immediate control over and careers in the largest, most powerful organisations in Danish society. An overwhelming majority (86%) of them have held or hold executive positions at top level in large organisations. Those who have not held executive positions are often economists, investors or inheritors of large landed estates. Notably, the affiliation network itself is a register of powerful positions – not just merely a set of social connections. Most affiliations are the governing bodies of a large set of organisations and the 423 effective agents hold almost 4,000 positions within more than 1,000 affiliations.

The geometry of power

To construct the field of power we rely on the methodological tradition of geometrical data analysis; see Appendix A1, which includes methods such as principal component analysis and multiple correspondence analysis. Geometrical data analysis was a key instrument in Bourdieu’s analyses of various social fields, including the field of power in France at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century (Bourdieu 1996; Lebaron 2009). According to Benzecri (1973: 6), the aim of geometrical data analysis is to let ‘the model […] follow the data, not the reverse’. Within this particular framework, a wide range of indicators of different forms of capital can be reduced to a few continuous dimensions. The outcome is a multidimensional space in which the strongest relations between the categories of the different variables are expressed along the main axes or dimensions of the space. Studying the principal dimensions of this space provides a good summary of the main categorical differences and similarities between the effective agents on the field of power. Data was collected from a wide range of publicly available sources, including biographies and public registers, as described in Appendix A2. The 44 active variables are grouped into headings according to the main form of capital that they are indicators of; see Appendix A3. In the analysis, we rely on two kinds of variables: on the one hand, information on general social properties – defined by the relations of power between forms of capital in the overall social space – and, on the other, information on resources and properties more specifically pertinent to the field of power (cf. Lebaron, 2009: 16). The social properties consist of 1) five variables capturing various aspects of social background and inherited forms of capital; 2) six variables describing academic credentials and formal cultural capital; and 3) seven variables dealing with economic capital and commercial dispositions, as well as engagement in various forms of business. The field-specific properties and resources are covered by 1) eight variables measuring aspects of social capital; 2) nine variables characterising career trajectories; and 3) nine indicators of public recognition and prestige (see Table 1).

<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Data has been coded to be compatible with the multiple correspondence analysis. In the analysis, we use a novel form of coding of some of these variables – either profile variables or fuzzy categories using distributions within the variable rather than discrete values (see Appendix A4 for further description) – to better use the variation in the data.

The 44 variables are reduced to three analytically interpretable dimensions. These first three axes explain a total of 51.8% of the adjusted inertia and were selected due to their analytical relevance and relative strength. The dimensions are interpreted and named based on the contribution of the headings, categories, individuals and position of the supplementary categories. For the technical specification of the analysis, see Appendix A5, which contains the inertia rates, the contribution values of all modalities to the principal dimensions and the cloud of individuals.

Analysis: The structure of the field of power

The multiple correspondence analysis reveals three main dimensions: first, an opposition between the established and the newcomers within the already select group of power elite individuals; second, an opposition between public agents with political or academic capital and individuals included in the economic order; and third, an opposition between central agents with political, organisational and regionally based capital around the Danish model of a negotiated economy and the circles of the state nobility in the capital city. In the following, we will examine these oppositions more thoroughly.

The principal opposition: Seniority in the field of power

The principal opposition among the effective agents in the field of power, accounting for 23.8% of the total adjusted inertia, divides individuals according to the symbolic capital associated with being part of the haute bourgeoisie.

While Denmark is often associated with strong levels of social mobility and egalitarianism, the social background of the effective agents in the field of power is very exclusive. Of the 379 with known social background, 118 (or 31%) originate from the upper class (see Appendix A3 for description of class background), and a further 99 (or 26 percent) have an upper middle-class background, while only 39 (or 13%) grew up in working-class families. Since half of all Danes born in the same generation as the effective agents
had working-class parents (see Goul Andersen, 1979: 123), the relative risk of entry into core positions in the
elite network is approximately 177 times larger for individuals with an upper class background, compared to
those with a working-class background. People with a long lineage of belonging to the upper class also very
frequently appear among the elite as well. As Table 2 shows, 90 (or 31 percent) out of the 293 people whose
grandparents we have information on regarding class have at least one pair of grandparents from the upper
class, and 50 (or 17 percent) have upper middle-class grandparents. Apparently, a class-specific habitus (cf.
Hartmann, 2000), acquired through an upbringing in the right families, is required to swim like a fish in the
waters of elite circles. Thus, forms of capital reproduced and accumulated across generations, that is, through
seniority in the field of power, therefore seem to play a pivotal role in access to the field of power.

However, even on the field of power, some agents are more equal than others. An examination of the variables
contributing most to the first axis shown in Figure 1 indicates that 18.1% of the axis variance is due to the
reproduced, or inherited, forms of capital tied to family background. A similar dimension has also been found
in Norway (Hjellbrekke et al., 2007) and France (Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet & Thine, 2018), albeit on the second
and not the first axis. When this opposition is principal in our analysis it is probably due the inclusion of more
comprehensive data, and thus also a higher proportion of modalities, on inherited, symbolic and social forms
of capital.. For positions above the vertical axis in Figure 1, we find indicators of having parents who owned
corporations or land, were mentioned in *Who’s Who*, or of having grandparents from the upper classes. Other
attributes associated with high volumes of economic or symbolic capital are associated with these family
markers, such as the founding of companies or living in expensive estates – often also with more than 25 other
effective agents living within a radius of two kilometres – and receiving royal or foreign decorations. Finally,
affiliations to leadership networks or to networks tied to the armed forces, often associated with a strong
patriotic ethos, highlight how seniority in the field of power is closely tied to the symbolic capital of having
inherited a good name from a good family. The key role played by family background in this primary
differentiation within the field of power is confirmed when looking at variables tied to family background; see
Figure 1. Having parents, grandparents and in-laws with high social standing is strongly associated with being
located atop in the first axis, while newcomers to the elite with ancestors who were workers or farmers are at
the bottom, farthest away from the establishment.

The characteristics of newcomers are opposed to those of the established. At the bottom of Figure 1, lowest
on the first dimension, we find modalities indicating lower volumes of economic or symbolic capital, such as
less expensive houses in areas with few or no other effective agents. At this pole we find no royal or foreign
decorations and less media attention. This is also where individuals with working-class parents are most likely
to be found, which is a strong indicator of a relative lack of forms of capital based on inheritance. The social capital related to this area of the space is strictly tied to positions in the world of corporatism, for example, in union-owned pension funds. In short, this area contains forms of capital associated with being delegated.

The secondary opposition: Public legitimation versus private ownership

The second dimension in the Danish field of power, explaining 16.6% of the total adjusted inertia, is in contrast to the public and the private fractions of the Danish field of power. This axis is closely tied to the division of the labour of domination, in particular the opposition between cultural capital and inclusion in the economic order. Thus, the most important headings of attributes contributing to this dimension consist, on the one hand, of the variables associated with formalised cultural capital (29.8%) and, on the other, of different indicators of social capital (22.3%) (see Table 1).

It would be tempting to interpret this axis *prima facie* as being driven by homologies between the field of elite education and the field of power, as described by Bourdieu (1996) in the French case. However, in terms of educational capital, the second dimension is indeed less a matter of volume than of type. On the left side of the horizontal axis in Figure 1, we find traditional academic disciplines like political science, humanities and economics, while higher degrees in business economics and prestigious MBAs are found to the right. The main driver of the differences along this second dimension is the ability and willingness to engage in debates in the public sphere, which is the labour of legitimising the currently powerful. The inclination to participate in the shaping of the public debate at different levels, writing books or opinion pieces in national newspapers is the most notable characteristic of the left side of this dimension. It is also strongly associated with being covered by the print media, particularly but not only by the centre-left press. The only newspaper tied to the right side is *Børsen*, a Danish business newspaper.

Positioned towards the left pole are thus individuals with delegated forms of capital that rely on public support and justification. In many ways, these are the brokers between the elite and other interest groups, as evidenced by the highest level of betweenness centrality – the number of shortest paths running through an individual, indicating their potential for brokerage – in the entire network. They are also the agents most likely to take part in the state theatre of commissions (cf. Bourdieu, 2014), in the prestigious networks surrounding the state economy and in the corporatist dominated pension and insurance corporations. It is also primarily among these individuals that we find less field-specific career trajectories. The modality of having spent less than 50% of a career in one sector is a good indicator of inter-field mobility, as is the fact that shifting between elite positions at executive level in different fields or sectors also occurs more frequently amongst those positioned here.
Opposite to this group of brokers, we find the private sector on the right side of Figure 1, which contains modalities tied to the formalised cultural capital associated with administration of the economic order, such as degrees in business economy or engineering, MBAs and credentials from white-collar vocational training, often as trainees in banking or shipping, alongside work experience from consultancy firms. The formal network of individuals to the right is more often confined to just one or two sectors – typically business – which also explains why these individuals typically have the lowest level of betweenness centrality in the entire elite network; that is, they do not bridge as many regions of the network. Not only is the economic pole located here, it is also the private fraction of the elite in another sense of the word. They are less likely to enter the public debates themselves, or to be drawn into it by others, and are covered almost exclusively by the business press. Interestingly, this division of the labour of domination is also related to the personal life of power elite members. Having a spouse who works as a nurse is associated with the private fraction, whereas the public fraction is associated with spouses working as primary school teachers. These two highly skilled, yet not academic, occupations thus emphasise two different types of preferences regarding occupations that support spouses and the associated lifestyles they entail.

This secondary opposition thus seemingly resembles the classic opposition between economic and cultural capital. The agents on the left side undoubtedly share strong academic capital, including the ability and experience to produce texts and knowledge for the public. However, they are in no way part of the inner circle of the cultural elite or active in the field of cultural production. Rather, this is an opposition between individuals with a less integrated and more pure form of economic capital, as opposed to individuals with capital based on their ties to the state and the political order. It is a differentiation between those with a position tied to the possession of, or the trust of those who possess, private money, as opposed to those who owe their position to the trust of those elected to serve the public good or to lobby on behalf of those with private money.

In Figure 1, we see that delegated fraction of the field of power is positioned almost exclusively in the lower left quadrant of the plane spanned by the two first dimensions – a quadrant with low elite seniority and high levels of public engagement and attention, as well as academic capital. Elite individuals who are delegated by those farthest from the field of power in the social space – union leaders and left-wing party politicians – are also almost exclusively found in the most extreme positions of the lower left quadrant in Figure 1. This logic of delegation is also gendered. Among the 121 people who are in some way elected or appointed, 32 (or 26%) are women compared to less than one in five of the effective agents as a whole. Taken together, the lower levels of inherited capital found among the delegated and the presence of more women show that those with delegated forms of capital tend to be slightly more like the general population. That is, topologically speaking, the lower left quadrant of the field of power is where we find the entry points for newcomers, primarily through delegated forms of capital.
The third opposition: The regionally negotiated economy

While the first dimension could be interpreted as a hierarchy of domination, and the second as a division of the labour of domination between a pole engaged in public affairs and cultural-academic production and a pure economic pole, we argue that the third dimension – which explains 11.4% of the inertia – comes closer to an axis of conflict and alliances in a negotiated, coordinated market economy. However, this axis is also closely related to the geographical cleavages between productive and administrative areas in Denmark, between the industrial dynasties in the provinces and the elite vortex of Copenhagen.

On the left side in Figure 2, we find those with a weaker connection to the capital city and metropolitan area. They are born in rural areas, live more than two kilometres from other effective agents on the field of power and have larger proportions of their careers outside of Copenhagen. On the right side, we find the Danish equivalent of the state nobility or the Copenhagen establishment. The modalities that contribute most to this side of the axis include being born in Copenhagen, having your entire career near the capital and living within two kilometres of at least 11 other effective agents. At the Copenhagen-based pole, we find the offspring of urban professionals like civil servants, junior and senior managers, as well as academics, while the provincial side is populated with sons (and a few daughters) of farmers and manual workers.

This somewhat geographically isolated fraction is, however, by no means isolated in terms of network ties. The modalities that contribute most on the provincial side of the axis are indicators of high levels of network reach among the elite, and of positions in many sectors, in particular in pensions, insurance and corporatism. A common characteristic here is having held the position of chair multiple times. The side occupied by the state nobility fraction is less well-connected to the rest of the field of power and in the elite network as a whole through formal ties. The third dimension thus also gives witness to a chiasmatic structure involving two kinds of proximity: socio-geographical and network proximity, reflecting whether ties are made at backyard barbecues or are formalised in the boardrooms of corporatist institutions, as illustrated by the modalities with vectors on Figure 2.

<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>

Figure 2 shows the role of networks among those individuals who are best described by plane 1–3. On the right side, we find less connected individuals such as senior civil servants (illustrative individuals are permanent secretaries Peter Loft and Bo Smith) and the personification of the state nobility, the Queen (Margrethe II). On the left side, we find well-connected industrial leaders and unionists (for instance the now former CEO of the rural industrial giant, Danfoss, Niels Bjørn Christiansen, and its owner, Jørgen Mads Clausen, and president of the Danish Union of Metalworkers, Thorkild E. Jensen, all three of whom are among the 10 most central
individuals in the elite network). This opposition not only opposes regional to Copenhagen-based capital, but also establishes a distinction between practices aimed at legitimising either the state or the economic and organisational order.

The three identified dimensions thus show how the field of power is structured by the amount of inherited and symbolic capital of the agents, but also by the distribution of political and academic capital versus purely economic capital and by the capital-state establishment versus the organised corporatist alliances.

Conclusion and discussion: Representation and legitimation in the field of the power

In this article, we have analysed the structure of power in Danish society as a system of relations between different forms of capital possessed by what we call the effective agents on the field of power.

The extensive prosopography of this group sheds light on the fact that its members hold different amounts of various forms of this kind of capital with transferable value. Our analysis of the relational system of positions occupied by the holders of these forms of capital identified a field of power structured by 1) the level of seniority in the field of power, 2) the role in the division of the labour of domination towards either public legitimation and delegation or private financial foundation and 3) the role in either the symbolically dominant, Copenhagen-based establishment or as key cogs in the negotiation of the Danish political economy.

A key difference from Bourdieu’s (1996) field of power in France is the second dimension. Bourdieu famously discovered a chiasmatic structure of economic and cultural capital, lining up the different social fields in a hierarchy from the economic to the artistic field. However, he was also aware that the chiasmatic structure of economic versus cultural capital might be less clear at the end of the twentieth century compared to the middle of the century (Bourdieu, 2015: 596). This is in accordance with our results. Rather than being an opposition between cultural and economic forms of power, the poles in the Danish power structure can be explained as a divide between agents in need of public support, that is, politicians and other delegates or representatives, and agents tied to the economic order. This is perhaps not unexpected in a country with a large welfare state, strong unions and a vital co-op movement. In Denmark a substantial proportion of power elite members rely on some form of democratic legitimacy to achieve and maintain their positions. They are the heads of membership organisations and they are elected by unions, political parties and business associations as representatives of broader interests. Positioned opposite to the delegated newcomers, the strong position of business within the
field of power is seen by the convergence along the primary axis of symbolic, social and economic capital of those with seniority in the *haute bourgeoisie*. Having a large social surface – being in touch with many sectors – being well-connected in the elite and participating in prestigious networks are intricately tied to official recognition and holding the most prestigious positions. The complex, mutually reinforcing relationships between symbolic and social capital – at least in small nation-states like Denmark and Norway (cf. Denord et al. 2011) – suggest that even among the effective agents on the field of power, defined by their access to central affiliations, we see a dominant faction.

The third major opposition is tied to differences between informal and formal forms of social capital and the differences between the state nobility near Copenhagen and the productive alliances of industrialists and union leaders with stronger ties to the provinces, which further adds to the national and temporal specificity of the Danish elite relations. This shows that a cross-class alliance within the productive sector, based on strong formal networks integrated in established and newcomer elite fractions. It appears that within a negotiated market economy, the opposition between cultural and economic capital, at least in the field of power, has been supplanted by oppositions between economic versus political capital. However, this opposition is ameliorated by a well-integrated alliance between key players from the Danish labour market model. Thus, dynamics of delegation, rather than control over the means of cultural production, complement the most established fractions of the field of power in the division of the labour of domination.

The reason cultural capital is partially supplanted by delegated forms of capital could that political organization is more deeply entrenched in Danish society. Strong social movements and political parties have at the same time been challenging one another for power and had to develop ways to coordinate and compromise. Political affiliation has mattered more than educational credentials and aesthetic mastery as also indicated by cultural capital seeming to matter less for careers of top executives (Ellersgaard, Larsen and Munk, 2013) and in the legitimation of political elites in contemporary Denmark than in France. What remains to be explored is whether or not the opposition between delegated and economic forms of capital is homologous to similar types of opposition in the Danish social space as a whole. To explore this, scholars analysing social structures in a Bourdieusian framework should consider applying indicators of the forms of social and political capital, i.e. union membership, political activity and civic engagement, to supplement the classic indicators of economic and cultural capital.

The homology between the social space as a whole and the field of power constructed in this analysis should not, however, be assumed a priori for methodological and theoretical reasons. Methodologically, because our identification strategy of looking at densely interlocked elite groups as the effective agents on the field of power does not include individuals from the cultural elite since they more rarely take part in these networks. The ethos
of disinterestedness associated with cultural capital could be part of the explanation. Ass holders of cultural capital exchange their capital on the field of power, they could undermine their position within the cultural field, in turn rendering less attractive to other effective agents on the field of power. However, the exclusion of cultural producers also speaks volumes about their position as dominated on the field of power. Rather than being the primary challengers to the dominant, economic pole of the field of power as described by Bourdieu (1996; 2011) activity in the cultural field serves primarily to indicate seniority in the field of power, as illustrated by the association of indicators of high levels of cultural capital with positions in the established part of the field of power. In Denmark, rather than being challengers, the cultural elite are perhaps better understood as entertainers. Theoretically, while the field of power can be seen as a meta-field regulating the struggles on other fields, it need not resemble the social space. The social space is structured by the forms of capital that can be possessed and accumulated by – and thus also extracted from – the population at large, while the concentration of capital at the very top, among the effective agents in the field of power, generally includes types of capital, as is the case with delegated mandates, of which regular individuals only hold miniscule amounts.

Nonetheless, our findings here suggest that scholars should explore how the divisions of labour of domination, between the established and the newcomers, public and private forms of power and between productive and administrative fractions of the elite are explored in other elites outside Denmark and in the entire social space.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General social properties</th>
<th>Field-specific properties and resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited forms of capital</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandparents' class</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents' position</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents in Who's Who</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner's position</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural capital</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest degree</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles written</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books written</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media activity profile</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic capital</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate value</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of residence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies founded</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension/insurance board(^7)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment firm board(^8)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership consultancy board(^9)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and tech firm board(^10)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ctr.: Contribution of the variable or variable block to each modality (described further in Appendix A3). Above average variables and variable block contributions are marked in bold.

1 Number of other elite individuals in the analysis living within a two-km radius.
2 Number of other elite individuals in the immediate network
3 Betweenness centrality in the entire elite network
4 Sector shift at top level
5 Been in same organisation as other elite individuals
6 Board positions on firms
7 Prestigious networks
Individuals below the dotted line, marked with an x rather than a dot, hold their formal position based on public mandate from either a political organisation or unions. Sectors, which is a supplementary variable, are in bold.
FIGURE 2. THE DANISH FIELD OF POWER, DIMENSIONS 1-3

Sectors, which is a supplementary variable, are in bold. Positions of illustrative individuals are in bold. Lines with arrows mark formal (network reach and network centrality) and informal social capital (living within a two-km radius of at least 25 other power elite members).