


The Syrian-Lebanese Crisis: Conflict Sensitive NGOs in Lebanon

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines how the Lebanese host-community has shifted from hospitality to hostility towards the Syrian refugee guests and how non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) can act conflict sensitive when intervening in a guest-host conflictual context. Based on two and half week of fieldwork in Lebanon, observations and interviewed NGOs has allowed for a comprehensive understanding of prevalent tensions among Lebanese and Syrian refugees. The tensions emanate from the Syrian-Lebanese crisis where a fear of prolonged presence of Syrian refugees has activated the past. The Palestinian permanency since 1949 and memory of the sectarian Civil war has created an ontological insecurity related to a Lebanese fear of sectarian uprisings to repeat. This has led to othering of Syrian refugees perceived as culturally different and incompatible in the Lebanese host-community, which is reflected in false narratives and stigmas of Syrian refugees on both a civil and structural level. Tensions and stigma of Syrian refugees reveal conflicted guest-host relations calling upon the importance of NGOs acting conflict sensitive. This paper allows for a comprehensive understanding of the complex historical and political context NGOs are intervening in in Lebanon. It provides NGOs with knowledge that can inspire them to conduct a context-specific conflict sensitivity analysis in the region they are operating in. This not only ensures that NGOs are not contributing to conflict by reproducing stigmas but also ensures that staff, program and aid is given in a conflict sensitive manner. Finally, it leaves NGOs with tools to manage conflict with positive effects on security and safety.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Field

With an estimated population of 6 million, Lebanon has hosted 1.5 million Syrian refugees since 2011, which is the largest number of refugees per capita (UNHCR Lebanon Operational Environment 07.03.19). Tensions between Lebanese and Syrian refugees are on the rise and the Lebanese government has recently started coercing Syrian refugees to leave (Vohra 31.07.19). The massive population increase has complicated Lebanese hospitality towards Syrians more than ever. In the first three years after the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Lebanese government opened its borders to allow in refugees from Syria (Amnesty International 2013:4). The refugees were at first welcomed by Lebanese nationals and asked nothing in return – an open border policy that was praised by human rights groups (Frelick 24.03.13). Nonetheless, this left a massive burden on the Lebanese system, including security, shelter, education and economics. In 2014 the human rights groups' tribute to Lebanon evaporated, when the government in April, chose to shut down 18 unofficial borders between Lebanon and Syria (Nayel 17.04.2014). Hospitality was challenged and was only exacerbated by the government of Lebanon's long-standing decision not to sign the UN 1951 Convention, which is the basic legal document defining refugees, their rights and the legal obligations of states. Lebanon is also neither signatory to the 1967 Protocol, which was an expansion of the Convention granting refugee rights, not only in Europe but universally (Guterres 2011:4). By rejecting the conventions, Lebanon insists that it is not a country of asylum nor a state for refugees (Janmyr 2017:440; Cherri et al 2016:1). This also means that Lebanon does not contain any formal camps, which would have centralized and segregated the Syrian refugees from the local community. Instead, the decision not to sign the Convention and Protocol has fostered a widespread displacement of Syrian refugees into informal settlements around the country.

In 2016 the intergovernmental organization (IGO) UNHCR estimated that at least one million Syrian refugees were spread out in the local communities between 3760 informal settlements characterized by tented shelters and poor living conditions (UNHCR Shelter 09.08.19: UNHCR Informal Settlement 2016). These poor conditions have led Syrian refugees to enter the Lebanese job market and have daily interaction with the Lebanese host community. This leaves a potential for positive interactions between Lebanese and Syrian refugees, but it does also risk to create tensions and conflict. The potential for tension and conflict especially arises when there is a strain on resources

¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

and increased pressure on infrastructure and job competition within Lebanon (UNHCR Lebanon Operational Environment 07.03.19). Tensions between the Lebanese host-community and the Syrian refugee guests indicate that hospitality is replaced by hostility due to concerns of Syrian permanency. The problems that arise from overcrowded shelters, the dire situation most refugees are placed in, compiled with the extreme poverty of the refugee groups in Lebanon, adds fuel to tensions between refugee and host groups. Ramifications of overpopulation and impoverished conditions have created unsafe infrastructure and unsanitary living conditions, as well as overcrowded the primary education system (Sharif 2018:11). The Syrian-Lebanese struggle for resources and pressure on infrastructure can be seen as a crisis situation. Back in 2014, the former Lebanese president Michael Suleiman described Lebanon as being in an existential crisis due to insecurity and instability of the country, which threatens to lead to a political and economic collapse due to the massive influx of refugees (Nebehay:14.07.14). This crisis is also reflected when walking down the streets of Beirut today, where it is evident that poverty has led Syrian refugees to live on the streets, increasing feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. One may not have to hold many conversations with the locals in Beirut, until it is realized how frustrated Lebanese are with the Syrian refugee presence. Often Syrian refugees are blamed for the dire economic situation in Lebanon. This was the case at Rabbit Hole pub in Hamra, Beirut, where a Lebanese man, around the age of 25, stated that *“The Syrian refugees destroyed our country!”* (App. 8.3.7 Informal Interviews). In another conversation with a waiter at a restaurant in the same neighborhood, he replied: *“Oh the Syrian refugees, for sure are our biggest headache”* (App. 8.3.2 Informal Interviews) when he heard about the research purpose. The anger and frustration being placed on the Syrian refugees can be seen as a reaction to the existential crisis and the insecurity felt by the Lebanese. It is a crisis defined as the Syrian-Lebanese crisis which is closely related to Lebanon's history of hosting Palestinian refugees since 1948, who still have not been able to return to their homeland. The crisis is also linked to lessons from the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) that in addition left the infrastructure shattered, making Lebanon already vulnerable towards further strains on infrastructure.

The Lebanese Civil War was a conflict that involved regional and international actors, as well as an internal conflict between its citizens as a result of Lebanon being a religious melting pot of Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shi'a Muslims and Druze. A bloody multi-sectarian past and a sudden influx of Syrian refugees, who are primarily Sunni Muslims, it has left Lebanon in a constant crisis situation, where fears of civil strife have returned to Lebanon (Alsharq-Team 09.11.17). Unfolding the Syrian-Lebanese crisis it allows for a comprehensive understanding of how a crisis mode triggers

conflicts between the Lebanese host-community and its Syrian refugee guests. As long as the Lebanese government is not recognizing its Syrian refugees and formalizing camps, the Syrian refugees are dependent on the host-community or international and non-governmental development and humanitarian actors in the informal settlements. However, these actors are facing severe challenges due to an environment of fear, distrust and reluctance of socialization between the local Lebanese and Syrian refugees (Boustani et al. 2016:37). With the widespread nature of informal settlements UNHCR is now dependent on cooperation with non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) as widespread as the Syrian refugee camps. Thus, 6,000 NGOs now operate in Lebanon (Chaaban & Seyfert 2012:1). Most interactions between the Lebanese host-community and the Syrian refugees happen at sites and events organized by NGOs (Care 2018: 9;11).

All humanitarian interventions made by NGOs impact dynamics in a society, however, when assistance is given in areas where there are two parties, such as the Lebanese host-community and Syrian refugee guests marked by intergroup tensions. Most NGOs are humanitarians with positive intentions to support the development and to overcome human suffering. Nevertheless, NGOs risk contributing to tensions, through their intervention and inadvertently cause harm and unintended effects. This stems from lessons among aid actors from the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that led to the realization that humanitarian and development actors contributed to increasing tensions and exacerbation of the conflict. When actors, such as NGOs, intervene in conflict by providing aid and assistance, they do risk becoming part of a conflict between guest and host. If NGOs are simply not aware of the complex context they are intervening or if their interventions are focused on a particular group in a conflict setting, then it might unintentionally add to the existing tensions (Do-no-harm info 21.07.19). Thus, it is key for NGOs to act conflict sensitive, which is a concept that can make NGOs aware of the unintended consequences of their aid, assistance and programs as a way to minimize harm (Haider 2014:1). For NGOs to act conflict sensitive, when intervening in areas where both Lebanese and Syrian refugees interact, it first calls for a contextual understanding of how guest-host relations have unfolded in Lebanon. Knowledge of the Syrian-Lebanese crisis is an important starting point as it allows for a nuanced understanding of Lebanese feelings towards Syrians and the tensions between guest and host.

Tensions are underlying root causes that if triggered cause conflict and hostility. When NGOs are aware of the root causes of hostility they can ensure that they are not contributing to conflict in guest-host relations by unintentionally fueling conflict. It leaves them with a potential for positive effects on safety and security. When NGOs do not take the time to properly understand the

environment they are working in they can inadvertently function as the trigger. By unfolding these complex guest-host relations between the Syrian refugees and the Lebanese, this thesis provides an insight into the Syrian-Lebanese relations, which can assist NGOs to act conflict sensitive and to maximize their impact without harming. This leads to the research question of this paper:

How has the Lebanese host-community shifted from hospitality to hostility towards the Syrian refugee guest and how can NGOs act conflict sensitive when intervening in a guest-host conflictual context?

1.1 Concept Clarification

Syrian-Lebanese crisis: It is a crisis felt by Lebanese related to their Syrian refugee guests. It implies a Lebanese fear and ontological insecurity of a permanent presence of Syrian refugees and thus refers to a state of permanency, where the crisis has become a new normality. The prolonged crisis triggers an orientation towards the past, such as the permanent presence of Palestinian refugees and memory of war from the Civil war 1975-1990.

Syrian refugee guests: This is a generic term for all Syrian refugees living in Lebanon in both informal settlements, on the streets and in private housing. In all cases the refugees are due to the informal settlements widespread in the Lebanese host-community: An estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees are in Lebanon, but the number might be even higher. The term 'refugee' is in contrast to their official categorization as 'International Displaced Persons (IDPs)'. Syrian refugees differ from Syrian migrants and immigrants.

Lebanese host-community: This is a generic term for both vulnerable and non-vulnerable Lebanese citizens, who are estimated to be just over 4 million.

Vulnerability: Vulnerability is defined as the risk of exposure of households to harm, primarily concerning protection threats, inability to meet basic needs, limited access to basic services, and food insecurity, and the ability of the population to cope with the consequences of this harm (UNHCR 2017:4). Both Syrian refugees and some Lebanese can be considered vulnerable.

Conflict: Conflict is a confrontation between one or two parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means. Thus, conflict is used as a generic term for triggered tensions and negative rhetoric such as scapegoating and stigma, which will be further clarified in the literature review. Conflict refers to violent as well as non-violent confrontations (Cf. Moore 2005:56).

Narrative: A narrative is closely linked to rhetoric and is how one represents the reality indicating that a narrative does not reflect the truth, but is an imitative representation with selected plots (Hayden White 1987 & 1973 in Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2010:244). When narratives are false myths, stigma and scapegoating they can reveal conflicts.

Tensions: Tensions are underlying root causes that if triggered cause conflict and hostility. Contrary narratives, tensions are based more on observable and measurable evidence in society rather than rhetoric, even though they are interlinked.

Sectarian imbalance: Sectarianism stems from the consociational democracy based on religious confessions. The sectarian imbalance refers to the influx of Syrian refugees, where the majority (60 %) are Sunni Muslims, which threatens to tip the sectarian political environment.

Informal settlement: This refers to an informal settlement established in an unplanned and unmanaged manner, which means they are generally unrecognized. There may or may not be an informal or formal agreement between landlords and residents of the settlement. Often it is temporary comprising of plastic-sheeting and timber structures and can be of any size from one to several hundred tents. Informal settlements may have some informal community-led management (Reliefweb 20.01.18). Informal settlements are also known as informal encampment.

Non-refoulement: Under international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status (OHCR 2018:1).

Structural level: The structural level represents the Lebanese government, its policies and the public institutions in general.

Civil level: This refers to the level where Lebanese, Syrian refugees and NGOs act. The media can be seen in between the structural and civil level since most channels and papers are supported by political parties.

1.2 Historical & Political Background

Walking down the streets in Beirut one will glance both mosques and churches reminding one that Lebanon is a religious mosaic of religions of various Christian and Muslims tribes. To be accurate 36% Christians, 29% Sunni Muslims, 29% Shi'a Muslims, 5% Druze and 1% Alawites and Ismailis (CIA: The World Factbook 2017). The confessions, or religious affiliation, is a cornerstone of confessionalism. A political embodiment of a fractured social system that tries to form a government with guaranteed group representation of all confessions, it is a system that stems from the French mandate. This historical background allows for an overview of the most important events from the French mandate that gave birth to sectarian confessionalism in Lebanon. From the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Civil war in 1975-1990 to the end of the Syrian occupation in 2005.

1.2.1 From French Mandate to Independence 1920-1943

After the First World War, the victorious Allies redrew the map of the world in 1920. Organized from the League of Nations mandates, overseas colonies were divided between Britain and France. Modern Lebanon was officially born as a French protectorate on the 1st of September 1920, when Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in Beirut, proclaimed the birth of the State of Greater Lebanon with Beirut as its capital (Salibi 1993:26). Lebanon was now a French mandated territory with the provision to prepare for possible independence (ibid.19). The French also established four Syrian states; the State of Aleppo, the State of Damascus, the State of Alouties and the State of Jebel Druze. Aleppo and Damascus got merged into one, while the latter two were annexed. All states together constituted the Syrian Republic. Hence, Lebanon and Syria were created as sister countries, both under a French mandate.

With a League of Nation-assigned mandate, the French mandate in Lebanon was also an attempt to segregate a territory within a Christian Maronite majority. The French supported the Maronites, who were wealthy Christians with a long tradition of union with the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. They were the vast majority in Mount Lebanon and parts of the old Vilayet of Beirut. However, in Greater Lebanon, the Muslim population outnumbered the Maronites, but still, the French support of the Maronites was considered as an easier Arabic minority to lean on for power administration in the region (Rigby 2000). Confessionalism, which is a system where a government that is a de jure mix of religion and politics, was formally institutionalized under the French mandate due to privileges that were mainly granted to the Maronite Christians (Jamali 2001: 284). However, for the French, it was easier to create a country than a nationality. The French had put together a state

but failed to create a unifying nationality among Christians, Muslims and Druze. Foreign imperial powers had artificially formed the countries out of the Arab territories, which had formerly been Ottoman, but none of them had a true concept of nationality to go with it (Salibi 1993:31f).

In 1926 Lebanon's constitution consolidated the confessionalist sectarian arrangements from the Ottoman millet system and established the consociational democracy – a sectarian-based democracy in its modern form (Assaf 2004:211). In 1932 a census identified that the ratio of Christians to Muslims in the parliament was set at six to five, which led to intense wrangling among the Muslims. The discontent led to a compromise in the National Pact that was born in the summer of 1943 – the same year of the declaration of independence from France. It was an unwritten agreement that exalted the confessionalist system that shapes the country to this day (Nelson 2013:353). From this day, the president and Commander of the army are mandated to be a Maronite Catholic, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a Muslim. With the signing of the National Pact: *“these sectarian elites naturally took up the mantle of national leadership. Political bosses bargained intensely for resources and positions for their communities”* (ibid. 2013:353). The idea was to represent the various religious groups in Lebanon, avoiding one group ruling over the other. In practice, it meant that equality between Christians and Muslims was, and still is, exercised in a long-standing power-sharing agreement, where both Muslims and Christians are represented in a system of checks and balances in different spheres – such as the Parliament, Council of Ministers and other military and civilian positions (Obeid 2010: 105).

1.2.2 The First Arab-Israeli War 1947-1949

To understand the relationship between Lebanese and Syrians today, it is also important to understand how the presence of Palestinian refugees has affected Lebanese perceptions of refugees. From November 1947 to March 1949 the first Arab-Israeli war raged. Lebanon only participated symbolically in the Arab–Israeli war through minor missions (Traboulsi 2012:114). During the war, in May 1948 Israel declared its Independence Day terminating the British mandate from 1920. For the Palestinians this is known as *Nakba* (the catastrophe), not only because of the Arab defeat but because it led to the official creation of the state Israel, which increased the Israeli territory by 68%. This caused 700,000 Palestinians to flee from their homes to neighbor countries. The war led to some 120,000 Palestinians fleeing into Lebanon. The Lebanese government did attempt to dump the fleeing Palestinians over the borders into Syria, but Syrian authorities rebuffed the refugees. This caused the Palestinian refugees to ultimately settle in Lebanon, creating an economic burden on the country to

this day (ibid.). Politically, the influx of Palestinian refugees, which has continued since 1948, created new dimensions to issues of Lebanon's security and protection by shifting the demographic balance between Christians and Muslims in favor of the Muslim population. Most Palestinians are Sunni, which is why they were perceived as a threat to the fragile sectarian balance (Obeid 2010:107).

1.2.3 The Civil War 1975-1990

The Arab-Israeli war ended with a ceasefire, but that did not mean that the conflict ended. The sectarian nature of confessionalism laid the groundwork for the bloody Civil war that politicized religion and plagued the country from 1975 until 1990. 150,000 lives were lost during this period. The Civil war still haunts Lebanon today affecting guest-host relations between Syrian refugees and Lebanese. When standing at the street that separates east from west Beirut, the hotel Holiday Inn is to this day still standing like a ghost, stripped to its concrete skeleton. The hotel was a battleground from the beginning of the civil war, today it almost seems like the bullet-riddled empty ruin is looming over the city. The cityscape is generally wounded by bullets as a constant reminder of the atrocities that occurred during the war.

The Civil war started with the 'Two Years War,' which is also referred to as the 'Christian-Palestinian War' in 1975-76. It was a duel between two populist forces, the Phalange Party and its allies in the Lebanese Front (LF) on the one hand and the Lebanese National Movement (LMN) and the PLO on the other. LMN was mainly dominated by Muslims and in August 1975 LMN launched a reform program to eliminate the sectarian quotas in the political and administrative system. It was a response to the fact that Maronite Christians were favored in the parliamentary structure, which provoked the large Muslim population who opposed the pro-western government. LMN wanted to reform the political system that had existed since the National Pact and wanted to change the power balance and improve the Lebanese state. On the other hand, the Phalange Party and LF wanted to keep the system as it was and insisted that the domination of Maronites was the only guarantee of minority protection (Traboulsi 2012:193;195). Another precondition for the war was the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. The PLO was based in Lebanon from the 1960s-1982 with the aim of expanding as an organization to support their struggle against Israel and their dedication to restoring a Palestinian homeland. In 1969 PLO was allowed to strike attacks towards Israel from Lebanon. This was mainly criticized by the Maronite Phalange Party, who

² The Lebanese Christian Democratic political party

responded by attacking a bus of Palestinians in 1975. The outburst of the Civil war began in Beirut between the 13th and 16th of April in 1975 when 4 members of the Phalange were killed, with the attempt to kill their Political leader Pierre Jumayyil's life (Global Security 13.03.19). Members of the Phalange replied, assuming the attack was led by Palestinians, by killing Palestinian civilians in a bus (ibid.). Thus, the Palestinian militants struck back, aiming to eradicate Christian members of the Phalange. These events sparked the early tensions between groups of people living in Beirut, seeding the beginnings of the Civil war (ibid.). During the Civil war, the confessionalist state barely functioned and the rising Muslim population demanded more political power which saw sectarian rifts explode.

1.2.4 Syrian Occupation 1976

Even though the Civil war started as a war between Christians and Muslims, both Syria and Israel also played a vital role. Already on the 22nd of January 1976, Syria intervened through the occupation of Lebanon. They moved Syrian troops into Lebanon under the guise of bringing the PLO back under Syrian influence and prevent the disintegration of Lebanon. The Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh approved this and on the 1st of June 1976, 12,000 Syrian troops started planning operations against Palestinian and leftist militias. However, Syria's interest was mainly its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon (Khalili 2006:58).

1.2.5 Israel Invasion & The Sabre/Shatila Massacre 1982

Foreign actors contributed to the instability and sectarian tensions in Lebanon by putting pressure on the confessionalist structure. Often sectarian societies invite influence from outside countries through the sectarian communities of which those outside actors often hold sway (Yahya 30.06.17). For example, Israel collaborated with the Christians in 1982 trying to empower them by invading the country, while the Arab world backed the Sunnis (Obeid 2010:107). On the 16-18th of September 1982, the conflicts between Palestinian and the Lebanese Maronites culminated with the massacres in Sabra and Shatila at the hands of the Maronite Lebanese Phalangists Forces that were allied with the Israeli Defense Force. The aim was to clear out PLO fighters, but the reality was that up to 3,500 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians in the Shatila and Sabre Refugee Camps were killed (Khalili 2006:58). In 1981 and 1982 the PLO further participated in fighting with Shi'a Amal militia and other Lebanese organizations, which led to bombings of Shi'a villages, sowing the seeds of future conflicts (Khalidi 2014:18-20). During the 1970s and early 1980s, Israel directed their attacks at civilians with

“the objective of alienating them from the PLO and exacerbating Palestinian-Lebanese tensions” (ibid.20). Eventually, this made Lebanese, especially Christians, to blame the PLO and Palestinians for the problems in Lebanon (Khalili 2006:58f).

1.2.6 The War in the Camps in the 1980s

In 1984-85 the Palestinian camps were besieged by Shi'a Amal militants, worsening the sectarian conflict. The war in the camps was another sub-conflict in the Civil war, mainly between the Amal militia, supported by Syria and the PLO and Hezbollah. Amal was originally trained and armed by the PLO but separated due to internal conflicts (Khalili 2006:58). In the 1980s the Shi'a Amal militia consolidated its power in Southern Lebanon challenging the established Palestinian militants. As a way to seek power, the Amal laid siege to the Palestinian refugee camps causing the deaths of thousands of refugees due to a lack of water, food and medicine. Nabih Berri, the head of Amal, predicted that in 1982 the Shi'a population of Lebanon would become radicalized if Israel remained in Lebanon. In a way, Hezbollah became the realization of his prediction. Hezbollah found their way to replace Amal by showing solidarity with Palestinians. Hezbollah earned the affection and loyalty of many Palestinians during the war of the camps when Hezbollah's fighters risked their lives to break the Amal siege to deliver food and medicine to the Palestinians in the Burj aj-Barajna, Rashidiyya camps and Shatila Refugee camp. Hence, the Civil war brought the Shi'a community closer than ever to Palestinian refugees. This has left a scar on Lebanese opinion about refugee camps being militant and radicalized (ibid.59).

1.2.7 The Ending of the War in 1989 and Syrian Occupation 2005

With the Ta'if Accord in 1989, a committee appointed by the Arab League began formulating the solutions to the conflict, taking the first step in ending the war. The agreement created new rules for Lebanese democracy, but it did not devise a safe mechanism of avoiding social tensions. A part of the agreement was to yield increased power to Muslim Arabs hence recognizing the more direct representation of Muslims (Knio 2005:227f) which diminished Christian relative power by partially stripping executive authority (Obeid 2010:105). Even though the agreement was widely accepted, due to it being vital in ending the war, it failed in its goal of eliminating sectarianism. The Ta'if agreement reproduced the sectarian system by adjusting the shares of representation in favor of Sunnis. However, Shi'a Muslims felt disenfranchised and Christians considered the agreement in favor of Syrian influence and that it would support Hezbollah's operations in the country (ibid.106).

The Ta'if agreement reinforced the sectarian boundaries, supporting groups in using the idea of a unified state, just as a strategy to solidify their own political legitimacy and interests (Alagha 2007:231). In 1991 the parliament passed the Amnesty Law, which pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment and the militias were slowly dissolved. Religious tensions between Sunnis and Shi'a remained after the war and the Maronite population was now politically disadvantaged, due to most of their leadership being driven to exile or assassinated (Traboulsi 2012:246). In 2005 there was an assassination of the previous Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. This sparked uprisings that are known as the Cedar revolution, where people protested and demonstrated against the Syrian presence. This resulted in the end of the Syrian occupation in Lebanon (Thorleifsson 2016:1072).

1.2.8 The Status on Confessionalism Today

The confessionalist system stems from the Muslim under-representation during the French mandate where Maronite Christians were favored. Since then, the Civil war has been a consequence of the confessional approach to breeding sectarianism, turning religious groups towards each other. Today, Lebanese are not citizens in a representative democracy, but are believers of a certain faith, preventing citizenship to replace confessional identities (Calfa 2018). Nevertheless, Lebanon has, despite confessionalism, managed to maintain a pluralist political environment with some civil liberties (Makdisi et al. 2011:129). The confessionalist model has offered some opportunities for different religious communities to share power and exercise their right to freedom of expression (ibid.132). It is also important to stress that the system originally established to promote peaceful coexistence among disparate communities, however, *“The problem is that confessionalism has bred perverse incentives that undermine the very possibility of harmonious coexistence”* (Obeid 2010:106). Rather than promoting peaceful coexistence, it does just the opposite by deepening the sectarian differences and promoting the primacy of religious identity. The system of confessionalism enforces religious groups to interact among themselves and weakens the state by encouraging one to follow a confessional group over the nation. Indirectly, this controls jobs, housing and education, which is mainly obtained by appealing to one's confessional political leaders. This leads to a weak national identity with a weak integration across its communities. It is a delicate confessional balance that makes the country sensitive to any internal and external stressors as seen in the Civil war (ibid.104;106).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review allows for a theoretical foundation for the analysis in this paper, capturing literature that can unfold guest-host relations. Applying the concept of hospitality, it allows for an understanding of the power relation between guest and host. Hospitality will be conceptualized by combining conditional hospitality, cultural intimacy and network theory. However, these concepts do not cover how hospitality can lead to hostility when the guest becomes a permanent visitor. By including crisis theory, it is possible to explain how the permanent presence of a guest leads to ‘othering’ processes by the host community. It can be seen as a transition phase towards hostility, grasped through the concepts of scapegoating and stigma. When guest-host relations shift from hospitality towards hostility, it risks creating conflict. This calls for humanitarian intervention, of which do-no-harm principles and conflict-sensitive approaches will be presented to stress the importance that third-party facilitators, who intervene in guest-host relations, are not responsible for worsening conditions by contributing to conflict.

2.1 Hospitality

The concept of hospitality can be used to unfold the initial guest-host relations that, together with cultural intimacy and network theory, explain why a guest prefers one host-community over another. Hospitality highlights the hierarchical structure embedded in the guest-host relationship, which is that the guest needs to abide by the host’s rules. This allows for an analytical framework when attempting to grasp why Lebanon initially welcomed Syrian refugees.

2.1.1 Unconditional & Conditional Hospitality

Hospitality is conceptualized by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s perception of hospitality stems from the former German philosopher Immanuel Kant and his vision of hospitality, who perceived it as a cosmopolitan universal right. Kant was engaged with the idea of linking hospitality to universal human rights and cosmopolitan governance that goes beyond state borders (Meckstroth 2017:237). In Kant’s vision, the stranger has the right not to be treated as a hostile or enemy, when he or she arrives into foreign countries’ territories (Ramadan 2008:663).

Kant’s idea limited the expansion of hospitality, as it only comprehends the idea of granting people of a sovereign state the right to visit momentarily. This questions whether groups as refugees fall out of this category, as they are not a temporary visitor when they cannot return to the country they fled

from (ibid.). This challenge relates to the view of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who views the character of the refugee as a “*disquieting element to the very foundations of nation-state sovereignty*” (ibid.). For Agamben, when a human being is born, it is automatically a citizen of the nation and never appears as a ‘pure man’ or a ‘bare life.’ In his opinion, the refugees interrupt the tangled bonds between man, citizen, birth and nationality, as such a refugee only possesses his ‘bare life’ because a refugee has no citizenship and can never achieve the universal rights for hospitality, as Kant perceived. This is exemplified through international institutions that exist to provide a separate system of rights for refugees. There is an international tendency towards nation-states pulling back their commitments to international obligations towards refugees in recent years, where policies prioritize state security over human security. However, Derrida built his theoretical idea of hospitality as something that goes beyond “(…) *state authority and state legislation* (ibid.)” and beyond Kant’s view of hospitality. For Derrida, hospitality needs to be understood as either conditional or unconditional. When hospitality is an unconditional treatment and reception of the other, hospitality becomes defined by welcoming each other, no matter the conditions or restrictions of the host (Kakoliris 2015:146). The host opens their space, home, language, nation and themselves to the other unconditionally. The ethics of unconditional hospitality is that the host-community does not decide beforehand, who receives hospitality. Instead, the core ethic is to accept the other, whomever they might be, without questioning the guest’s intentions (Ramadan 2008:664).

However, Derrida argues that hospitality cannot be unconditional, because when a host-community offers hospitality, the host is bound to the fact of identification of the guest, which automatically will make the hospitality conditional. Conditional hospitality is created through laws, rights, conventions and borders (ibid.). The notion of identification can be used to discuss the Lebanese governmental policy towards the categorization of the Syrian refugees as internationally displaced people (IDPs) and ramifications stemming from this. It can also be used to discuss the morally and ethical obligations that hospitality carries, which has put Lebanon in a dilemma of being hospitable to refugees at the expense of the Lebanese quality of life or prioritizing the Lebanese people at the expense of refugees. For Derrida, conditional hospitality is further illustrated through practical examples of foreigners, which in this sense, can also be perceived as refugees: “*The right to hospitality subsumes the reception, the welcome that is given to the foreigner under a strict and a restrictive jurisdiction*” (Kakoliris 2015:146). Guests do not only have a right to visit unconditionally, but they would also have to mutually fulfill obligations, such as behaving accordingly to the local norms and values.

If hospitality implied an absolute openness of a host state, it then would be impossible to retain laws or policies toward the other. This would destroy the host's mastery of the home, which enabled hospitality in the first place. Instead, the host would be left with an indeterminate space, leaving the host's ability with no domain to provide hospitality (Carpi 27.10.16). According to Derrida, any real-world example of hospitality requires that the host upholds some level of sovereignty of his or her home. To be able to be hospitable, the host needs to carry out a degree of control over the guest to retain its position as the host, otherwise the guest, immigrant or refugee can take over the community, which will reverse who is the host and who is being hosted (Ramadan 2008:664).

When guest-host relations are initiated, cultural comfortability and familiarity are factors that can influence initial hospitality shown towards an outgroup. This is further elaborated through the concept of cultural intimacy and network migration theory. These concepts can support understanding as to why the Lebanese government and civil society held an open-door policy at the beginning of the Syrian refugee influx. Cultural intimacy is defined by the characteristics of a certain culture's identity that are externally criticized and considered as something one may feel embarrassed or ashamed of, but that provides the members inside the culture a reassuring commonality (Herzfeld 2016:7; Kaya 2016:3f; Subotic & Zarakol 2012:917). This can be useful in determining, why the Syrian refugee majority has tended to stay in neighboring countries rather than migrate to Europe or the west, due to fear of being ostracized and condemned for one's cultural beliefs (Kaya 2016:17). However, cultural intimacy is not just the simple familiarity one has with a culture (Herzfeld 2013:491; Kaya 2016:4). Cultural intimacy can explain one side of the migration coin, as it highlights influential factors as to why people seek comfort in a similar culture and space as to their own home. However, cultural intimacy does not consider familiarity when applied in a migration context. The network theory of migration can explain the other side of the migration coin by expressing the importance of familial and cultural ties with people and other cultures. Migration, under this theory, can be initiated by many different push- and pull factors such as war, economics, cultural similarity, language, familiar ties and geographic proximity (Castles et al. 2013:40). The network is made up of interpersonal ties that connect various groups by familiar connections and cultural similarities (ibid.). Refugees tend to migrate to areas where they already have an established network, even if that initial relation is weak, it will increasingly become stronger due to cultural familiarity (Kaya 2016:16). This can be used as a framework to dig into the cultural ties and migration history between Lebanon and Syria. Cultural intimacy and network migration theory allows one to explain positive guest-host relations and the initial hospitality in Lebanon towards Syrian refugees.

2.2 Hostility

Hospitality will always be conditional, otherwise, there would be no hierarchy between host and guest, revealing an implicit power hierarchy between host and guest. The host needs to carry a degree of control over the guest. However, hospitality does not explain what occurs when control of the home is lost due to the permanent presence of the guest. It neither explains how hospitality can lead to hostility. Thus, hostility will be grasped through a wide range of concepts such as crisis, othering, stereotyping, scapegoating and stigma. The theoretical conceptualization of hostility can be used as an analytical framework to explain the shift from hospitality to hostility in Lebanon, as well as explain the root causes of potential conflicts.

2.2.1 Othering as a Response to a Permanent Crisis

Hospitality can be viewed as a share of resources between host and guest. Nevertheless, this share of resources between host and guest has the potential of being the root cause of hostility, if the resources are scarce to begin with (Thorleifsson 2016:1078). When the guest's role becomes perpetual rather than temporary in the host-community, the share of resources creates a conflictual situation, where the competition for resources between host and guest can cause instability and anxiety about economic and physical safety. Kinnvall argues that this is ontological insecurity, which is defined by existential anxiety over a perceived safety and comfort in the host-community that comes under threat from outgroup members (Kinnvall 2004:476).

The permanent presence of the guest, activating ontological insecurity, can be associated with a situation of crisis. A crisis is conceptualized through Reinhart Koselleck and Henrik Vigh. It is derived from the Greek word *krisis* meaning selection, decision or discrimination and implies “*a turning point*” or “*movement of decisive change*” (Redfield 2005 in Vigh 2008:9). Thus, it can be understood as a departure between different ‘states of normality’ from one another (ibid.). Koselleck explains this rupture in relation to the critical moment where a patient is hovering between life and death, a temporary abnormality, a place in between two poles, leaving one to decide which side to be on – life or death (Koselleck in Witoszek & Trägårdh 2002:13). In this crisis context, there is an alarming urgency that compiles one to act now and take the right decision to ensure progression and a better future (Koselleck 2007:33). It can be seen as the context between the moment of chaos and collapse and life after the crisis (Koselleck in Witoszek & Trägårdh 2002:8;16). However, it assumes that crisis is temporary and not when ‘states of normality’ become permanent. Vigh supplements Koselleck’s notion of crisis as temporary, by arguing that the notion of rupture can be stretched into

a relative constant when people find themselves caught in a prolonged crisis. Vigh argues that instead of seeing a crisis “in *context*,” crisis should be seen “as *context*” (Vigh 2008:8f). A crisis can then be viewed as a prolonged condition rather than a turning point in time. This is related to ‘chronicity,’ which is when the crisis is experienced as an ongoing perpetual dysfunction and crisis becomes the norm (ibid.10). Just because a crisis becomes a constant context and a ‘new normal,’ it does not mean that people get used to the feeling of existential anxiety or the feeling of loss of stability, security or clarity. The situation people stand in will still become mirrored in what they have lost (ibid.16). Crisis theory can be used to explain how a feeling of crisis can be seen as a response to the guest overstaying their welcome. This sheds light on how Syrian refugees staying long term triggers ontological security within Lebanese. This reinforces the need for the host to gain control over the mastery of the home and resources.

Nevertheless, the experience of feeling unable to change the forces in the prolonged crisis can “*be associated with a feeling of powerlessness*” (Habermas 1982 in Vigh 2008:14). When stuck in a crisis, one feels unable to control the external forces that influence one’s possibilities and choices (Jackson 1998 in Vigh 2008:13). In a crisis, people try to gain some degree of control of their life through reflection and comparison with others (ibid.18). One example of reflection is activating the past to address the root causes prior to the crisis. This is what Koselleck calls a “*Geschehen*,” which is an expression of history as something that always takes place. Thus, a crisis can in one way trigger nostalgia as a way to gain a footing in something that was once stable, as well as trigger memory of war, where suffering is reactivated as a way to understand what went wrong before the crisis. The past becomes explanatory and related to guilt as a way to explain the present insecurity and instability in the contextual crisis. This as an urgent reaction as an attempt to act in the present as a way to ensure a better future (Jordheim 2012:158). The past further serves to reinforce a shared identity by defining who ‘we’ are, by defining who ‘we’ are not (Jensen 2006:69). This indicates that when crisis becomes a constant in situations of ‘disorder and ruin,’ it also encompasses a loss of cohesion (Vigh 2008:10). In other words, when the guest becomes a permanent visitor in the host-community, the guest is not only a perceived threat to the loss of resources but also a threat to the loss of cultural cohesion within the host group. This leads to ‘othering,’ which Vertovec argues is not uncommon when there is a massive influx of guests. In this situation, ‘the other’ is perceived to be a threat, not only because of the share of resources but because it can be perceived as a threat to the national identity. In turn, a foreign population will inherently create diversity within a nation-state, which threatens the homogenization of the national culture (Vertovec 2011:244). This takes a structural-functionalist

view in that the total sum of a “*nation's values, cultural practices and social institutions*” are units of a “*cohesive system based on necessary interdependence and equilibrium of its parts*” (Vertovec 2011:245). Regarding this conception of the foreign other, the guest can be viewed as a threat to the cultural cohesion and thus be used to discuss the Lebanese host community's hostility towards its refugee guests in Lebanon. The influx and flow of people have the potential to deterritorialize the cultural boundaries that set one culture apart from another, which threatens the established power structure. Superior are the members on the inside of the group and inferior are the ones excluded, causing an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality (Kinnvall 2004:754f). However, increasing ontological security for one group will, in turn, decrease the security for the excluded parties, which Kinwall refers to as “*subjectivity of securitization*” (ibid.763f). Perception of the self and the other is but one transformative catalyst that can turn hospitality into hostility. Hence, to understand hostility, one has to understand how a permanent crisis can lead to othering as a way to gain control in the situation of crisis. Othering is thus a stepping stone to hostility, as it constructs the foundation of stereotyping, scapegoating and stigma, as a place to project guilt and free oneself from bearing the burdens of ontological insecurity.

2.2.2 The Scapegoat

When othering occurs as a response to a permanent crisis, it can lead to scapegoating, due to a human desire to place guilt away from yourself. The American psychologist Gordon Allport explains it through “*complementary projection.*” Allport describes scapegoating as internal aggression or frustration that is projected towards an ‘other,’ justified by attributing undesirable traits to this other. It is a way for one to direct project an attribute that lies within oneself but gets attributed to another. It is an ego defense that places uncomfortable feelings such as anger, frustration, instability or insecurity at a person or group. This fosters a sense of affirmation and self-righteous indignation. It is incorrectly attributing the cause of one’s internal state to another person's’ behavior. It often happens without conscious awareness, since the individuals repress the awareness of hostility toward the true source of frustration and do not realize the rationalizations behind scapegoating. If the individual did understand the true source it would defeat the whole purpose of scapegoating (Allport 1954:352). Scapegoating can easily lead to prejudice, which Allport defines as:

(...) an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is, therefore, presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to that group.

- *ibid.*7

The internal aggression one feels must be placed onto a target that can safely be aggressed without consequences, which means that it is often vulnerable who are targeted (*ibid.*350).

In the guest-host relation, the host will always be superior to the guest (Cf. Kinnvall 2004:754f). Hence, scapegoating the permanent guest ties together how hospitality suddenly can lead to hostility towards the guest, a group that shares cultural ties with its host, but due to the guest's permanency become blamed for the crisis as a psychological response. However, Allport argues that scapegoating is counter-productive – displacing aggression into a scapegoat does not relieve the frustrations (Allport 1954:351). It can be argued that scapegoating does not solve the crisis, it just places guilt onto someone else thus freeing oneself from responsibly. Scapegoating sheds light on the internal frustration within Lebanese as a response to the crisis and explains the psychological response of placing guilt towards Syrian refugees.

2.2.3 The Stigma

The concept of scapegoating is arguably rooted in the othering process of an 'us' vs. 'them' mentality and the vehicle that allows one group to scapegoat the other is through prejudicial stereotypes, in which the cumulation is stigmatization of a group on a civil and structural level. A stereotype is when a particular group of persons tends to become categorized and generalized through collective reflections, which does not always reflect the truth (Foucault in Hannem 2012:21). The stereotype reinforces the group's own identities while ignoring the individuality of the out-group to highlight differences (Dervin 2012:90f). Stereotypes do arise out of the conflict over perceived resources and the conflict itself highlights the perception of the two distinct groups (Fiske & Taylor 2013:282f), which support the arguments presented so far. Naturally, with intergroup conflict, the desire for power is one way in which to ensure that the desired party's needs are met. Hence, stereotyping can be manifested and addressed through collective narratives about the other to serve the needs of power and can become instruments to achieve these goals (Herzfeld 2016:181).

A narrative can be defined through the principle of *mimesis*, which is that a narrative is not a reflection of the mere reality, but is an imitative representation of reality organized and structured by excluding and including selected plots (events or characteristics) depending on how one wishes to represent the reality. Hence, a narrative is dynamic, changes accordingly to the context and intentions and can always be ascribed new meanings (Hayden White 1987 & 1973 in Brinkmann & Tanggaard 2010:244). However, stereotyping narratives about the other does not always have to imply negative connotations about the perceived other, which is why stigma is more accurate as a way to address hostility. When the stereotyping narratives are used to highlight undesirable negative attributes of the out-group members it becomes a stigma (Herzfeld 2016:180f; Dervin 2012:189; Fiske & Taylor 2013:282).

Erving Goffman explains that stereotyping is the process or tool which allow one group to discredit the other by giving them “*an attribute that is deeply discrediting (...) [and a] relationship between attribute and stereotype*” (Goffman 1963:3)”, which in the mind of others reduces a person “*from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one*” (ibid.). Hence, stigma carries shame, dishonor, disgrace and humiliation, because the stereotype now reached an extent, where it reduces and discredits a person. In Goffman’s concept of stigma, he focuses on the person, who possesses a particular attribute, such as the marks of criminality or racial ‘otherness’ (Hannem 2012:15), which is perceived as an undesirable or negative characteristic or deviant behavior. One way to observe the effects of stigma is through discriminatory behavior towards the stigmatized, which is observed in the interaction between the stigmatized and non-stigmatized – such as through eye contact, physical contact, conversation or the lack of interaction by being ignored or avoided. A consequence of Stigma is that the stigmatized become socially rejected from society due to a fear that leads to social distance, isolation and loneliness. Furthermore, the stigma can lead to a self-stigmatization, where the stigmatized internalize this stigma, believing that it is the truth. This not alone legitimizes the stigma, but also demoralizes one’s self-worth to fight against the stigma – only exacerbated by the fact that often stigmatized are vulnerable, already in a weak position to resist (Friedman 13.05.14).

However, Goffman’s narrow focus on interaction in everyday life ignores the structures of power and knowledge that also create the possibility of stigma shaping people’s interactions. Furthermore, stigma on a structural level can be used to explain how governmental policies can be seen as a stigma of certain groups. Thus, Stacy Hannem supplements Goffman by combining Goffman's notion of stigma, through interactions on an individual level, with Michel Foucault’s notion of knowledge and power. This provides a holistic picture of stigma on both civil and structural

level (Hannem 2012:11f). Foucault complements Goffman through his broader perspective on structures by pointing towards the importance of institutional knowledge rather than individual knowledge by stating that individual experiences often reflect larger structures. Hence, Hannem conceptualizes how stigma is constructed on a structural level by examining the origin of policies and practices, discriminatory institutions and the notion of power and knowledge that is used to create a structural stigma towards a group (ibid.11; 25; 27). Structural stigma is when the state or other institutions are perceiving a particular population as a risk or morally bereft to the country. It is when carefully calculated decisions, at an institutional level, are trying to manage this group based on the stigmatic attribute that they are aware of (ibid.24f). Even if the goal of policymakers is to help or improve a situation, the need for assistance often justifies creating a stigma solely by defining the target groups as 'different', 'risky' or 'tainted' (ibid.25). Stigma can be used to explain how negative stereotypes of Syrian refugees has led to a stigma on both a civil and structural level.

The conceptualization of hostility through crisis, othering, scapegoating and stigma fills the gap for grasping how guest-host relations can change from hospitality towards hostility. It reveals that the structural hierarchy of guest-host relations can be manifested and escalated to an extent that it leads to hostility. It stresses that guest-host relations are not a constant, but a dynamic relationship that is exposed when the guest becomes permanent evolving a crisis of chronicity. When the host and guests share of resources becomes permanent it leads to a crisis. The permanent insecurity within the host-community prepares for othering processes as a way to gain control. One way is by orienting towards the past as a way to diagnose, what went wrong before the crisis or as a way to gain a footing in a stable period in the past. Another way of gaining control is through scapegoating and stigma, which polarized groups, leading to a high risk of conflict. When NGOs are intervening in conflicted relations, the above knowledge of the crisis, othering, scapegoating and stigma does provide an important context that can be useful in conducting and implementing conflict-sensitive approaches.

2.3 Conflict Sensitivity

NGOs interacting in conflictive guest-host relations risk of intervening in conflict by providing aid and assistance. Conflict sensitivity is something NGOs must apply in all programs in order to do no harm, especially in conflict affected societies Conflict sensitivity helps to address the root causes of tensions and conflicts and ease the stigmas of the guest with a potential for the aim of improving safety and security. Before defining conflict sensitivity 'conflict' will be defined and related to guest-host relations. Conflict sensitivity is based on do-no-harm principles and can be seen as an important

framework in how NGOs can ensure that they are not doing harm and increasing conflict through their interventions. To inspire NGOs to conduct conflict sensitivity analysis, concrete conflict sensitivity tools will be presented.

2.3.1 Conflict as a Response to a Crisis

‘Conflict’ is derived from Latin ‘to clash or engage in a fight.’ This indicates a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means. Conflict can be perceived as tensions representing an inherent conflict which is a challenge to coexist peacefully. If conflicts are controlled or managed constructively, they do not necessarily lead to violence. Before introducing conflict sensitivity it is relevant to introduce which types of conflicts tensions can be seen. Christopher Moore (2005) defines conflict definitions in combination with psychological explanations for motivations for conflicts. The first relevant conflict definition is *Conflicts related to relationships*, which refers to the nature of interactions between and within communities. These conflicts are related to a negative history, mutual mistrust, emotions and negative feelings, no communication or difficult communication, perceptions about each other, lack of respect and fear or difficult behaviors (Moore 2005:56). This is closely linked to the ontological insecurity that triggers the activation of the past as well of negative perceptions that can lead to stigmas of the other as a way to deal with the perceived insecurity. Other potential conflicts are *Conflicts related to needs, motivations and interests*,” which refers to how needs are prioritized and what hope and expectations are prevalent for the future. This can be related to a struggle for resources and fear of lacking basic needs, as well as security needs, which are all closely linked to ontological insecurity. Finally, there are *Conflicts related to values* such as identity, beliefs, standards, morals, customs, tradition or personal ethics (ibid.). If values are considered contradictory or different from each other, it will also decrease cultural intimacy. All conflicts can be prevalent at the same time and can mutually escalate each other. The main motivations that generate conflicts are identified by the psychologist Abraham Maslow and can be aspirations, hopes, expectations, interests, fears, perceptions, beliefs and values (Maslow 1943), which all can be perceived as a response to a crisis (Cf. Koselleck 2007; Vigh 2008). More universal and invisible deep-rooted motivations could be a physiological need, the security need, the need for belonging and love, the need for self-esteem and the need for fulfillment as being the source of our motivations (Maslow 1943). Vern Neufel Redekop, a professor at Saint Paul University Canada, talks about identity needs such as the need for meaning, belonging, security and recognition (Redekop 2002). This is closely linked to othering, which is an effect of a crisis since

othering can give one group a feeling of belonging and identity in a situation of crisis. Thus, to understand and manage conflict, it is important to understand the motivations of individuals and to discover the deepest motivations that are hidden (Danish Red Cross 2018:17). In conflict management it is strongly stressed that it is not the third party facilitator who changes the stakeholders' behavior, settle their conflict or resolve their problems. Instead, it is the role of the facilitator to assist the stakeholders to help them find a solution themselves.

2.3.2 Third Party Facilitator

There is a distinction between a mediator and third party facilitator. Mediation refers to a ten step mediation process meaning that one cannot be called a mediator unless all ten steps are followed (Danish Red Cross 2018:23). Due to limitations and lack of empirical data this paper does not go into depth with the implementation of the mediation process, but mainly focuses on the conflict-sensitive analysis and providing safe spaces. A conflict-sensitive analysis is in the preparation phase, seen in the first step of the mediation process. Nevertheless, NGOs need to act as an impartial and neutral facilitator when intervening in guest host-relations. Inspired by Humanitarian Mediation, a third party facilitator is then defined as:

(...) third party neutral and impartial humanitarian actors facilitate communication and collaboration between stakeholders involved in or affected by conflicts, to assist them to find, by themselves, a mutually fair and acceptable solution.

- Danish Red Cross 2018:1

Third party facilitators manage conflict through do no harm principles and conflict analytical tools. Regarding the neutral and impartial actors, which can be both an insider and an outsider, can be defined as either: 1) A trusted insider from the community who is still perceived as neutral and impartial by all the stakeholders, 2) A national staff who is not from the locality where the conflict arose, 3) An international staff from a different country or 4) A colleague from another organization that has gained trust and credibility (ibid.19). Depending on the context insiders and outsiders can both be relevant because they bring different qualities. Where insiders:

(...) provide the depth of knowledge about the context and connections to the communities affected, their culture, attitudes, and world-view. Outsiders provide a breadth of knowledge and connections to external constituencies, ideas, and models.

- Anderson & Olsen 2003:37

Impartiality of the facilitator is considered as the optimal way to conduct conflict management, contrary to arbitration or conciliation of conflict, rather impartiality focuses on the resolution of conflict through the conflictual parties themselves. This allows for a consensual and mutually acceptable solution for all stakeholders. Not only does it strengthen the commitment and sustainability of the agreements, but it also restores or builds trust between participants (Danish Red Cross 2018:20). When the conflict sensitive process begins, a safe space is created for the stakeholders to come together and express themselves where violence, harassment and hate speech is not tolerated. The conflict sensitive process can be implemented in training, programs or workshops.

2.3.3 The Do No Harm Approach

The conflict-sensitive analysis is based on the do-no-harm approach, which will be introduced before elaborating on the specific conduction of the analysis. Do-no-harm principles were originally developed by Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) in a project from 1993 and presented as an approach in 1999 that could be used in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. It was built on the following key lessons:

Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance initiatives are never neutral, but rather can become a part of the conflict context:

- 1) There are always two realities in a conflict - dividers and connectors, which can be characterized by two driving forces of social dynamics: Dividers are factors that increase tensions between groups and may lead to destructive competition. Connectors are factors that connect people and serve as local capacities for peace.

- 2) Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance have an impact on both dividers and connectors. Conflict insensitive initiatives can increase tensions while conflict-sensitive initiatives can support local capacities for peace.
- 3) An intervention consists of both actions and behaviors. Actions reflect the resources being brought into a context, while behaviors reflect the conduct of the actor bringing the resources
- 4) The details (what, why, who, by whom, when, where, and how) of cooperation strategies and programs matter
- 5) There are always options. Redirecting a strategy or a program can help to mitigate negative impacts (increased tensions) and increase the opportunity to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

- Sida 2017:3

The do-no-harm approach can be seen as a principle that NGOs need to consider as an attempt to minimize the harm that could be inadvertently caused by providing aid to only one group (Danish Red Cross:9). This paper is based on a commitment to do-no-harm principles in all means of NGO intervention because this is seen as the optimal way of securing that NGOs do not play a part in escalating the conflict.

2.3.4 Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

One way for NGOs to understand the context they are intervening in is by doing a conflict-sensitive analysis. This is based on the do-no-harm principles but is a more concrete tool implementable by NGOs. Conflict sensitivity refers to:


(...) the practice of understanding how aid interacts with conflict in a particular context, to mitigate unintended negative effects, and to influence conflict positively wherever possible, through humanitarian, development and/or peacebuilding interventions.

- CDA 24.07.19

Interventions applying a conflict sensitive approach could help improve safety and security at a civil level and is a way for NGOs to do what they are best at through their aid and assistance, but at the same time ensure that this provision does not feed the tensions and worsen the conflict. The conflict-sensitive analysis can be conducted by following four steps: 1) The conflict cycle and conflict timeline, 2) The conflict tree with pillars, 3) The actor mapping and 4) The ‘connectors’ and ‘dividers’ (Danish Red Cross 2018:26), which will now be introduced.

The Conflict Cycle and Conflict Timeline


The conflict cycle is a way for the mediator to understand the conflict in a timeframe and point towards where exactly one is in the cycle. If the conflict has not yet escalated, it can be used as an act to prevent the conflict. When the conflict has reached its peak, it points towards focusing on mitigating the effects. After the conflict, it points towards a matter of stabilizing and rebuilding the social dynamics in the hope of a possible reconciliation. In most conflicting contexts, communities are at different stages of the conflict, which is why it is important to look at each local situation and avoid generalizations (ibid.27). The conflict cycle can be applied by addressing how a crisis has led to tensions accelerated by scapegoating, stereotyping and stigma threatening to escalate the conflict.




The conflict timeline is another way to look at the conflict stages through a series of events that led to the current situation. By revealing how guest-host relations are unfolding in terms of the conflict, important events can be addressed in the timeline. The timeline can help NGOs to understand the chain of cause and effect that have led or are threatening to lead to a conflict or to identify the warning signs of rising conflict (ibid.28).

The Conflict Tree with Pillars & Fishbone


The conflict tree can help NGOs to address the deep sources of conflict as well as civil and structural pillars feeding the conflict (ibid.28). Where the roots illustrate the causes of the conflict, the pillars address factors that maintain, nurture and feed the conflict. The effects are the results of both root causes and pillars (ibid.29). The conflict tree with pillars can be put in a simplified version called the fishbone only addressing root causes to the problem. This can be perceived as a useful tool to use in a conflict sensitive process with stakeholders, whereas the conflict tree is for the internal conflict sensitivity analysis conducted by the NGO.





Mapping the Involved Stakeholders

Another vital part of the conflict analysis is mapping the involved actors as a way to be sure to include all stakeholders. Actors are not only fueling the conflict but are also those who are impacted by the conflict or can contribute to reducing it. These are actors and relations that determining the conflict dynamics enabling a targeted intervention in the conflict (ibid.30).



The Connectors and Dividers

Finally, the connectors and the dividers need to be addressed. The connectors are what unite or maintain links between these groups, whereas the dividers are what differentiate groups from each other.

	CONNECTORS & DIVIDERS
SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS	How people organize themselves for action and how they organize service provision. It relates to what structures people belong to such as militias, police departments or legal systems or to where they get services such as energy and water supplies (Wallace 2016:39; Red Cross 2018:31f).
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS	How people talk about and treat each other. This could be either by addressing tolerance, acceptance and even love and appreciation for the people of the 'other side' or negative attitudes of 'the other' such as discrimination, insult, racism and intolerance (ibid.).
VALUES AND INTERESTS	How people think of themselves and the other in terms of values, culture and religion and how does this affect positively or negatively their use of resources to meet their basic needs (ibid.).
EXPERIENCES	How people interpret and select history and culture due to their own experiences. This could be experiences of war and suffering that are either different or the same on all sides (ibid.).
SYMBOLS AND OCCASIONS	How people demonstrate what group they belong through the use of symbols and occasions such as national symbols, flags, monuments, or holidays that can bring people together as well as divide people (ibid.).

Following these four steps, NGOs will experience important aspects of the conflict ensuring knowledge about the context they are intervening in. The conflict sensitivity analysis is not to be shared with the stakeholders but serves for internal use of NGOs as a pre-understanding for acting conflict-sensitive in all aspects.

2.3.5 Conclusion

The literary review set out to examine the relevant literature about the guest-host relations in Lebanon. The conceptualization of hospitality through conditional hospitality, together with cultural intimacy and network migration theory, provides an analytical framework for grasping initial hospitality. However, there is a research gap in the transition from hospitality towards hostility. One way of addressing what can trigger hospitality towards hostility is through the concept of a prolonged crisis that allows us to see a crisis as a constant persistence of dysfunction. A crisis triggers orientation towards the past, which calls for an in-depth understanding of the historical context. In this prolonged crisis, there is a high risk of conflict, which can be addressed through tensions between guest and host. This paper seeks to contribute with a comprehensive understanding of hostility as a response to a crisis that leads to othering, scapegoating and stigma of the guest. This serves as the pre-understanding of the conflictual context of guest-host relations, which can be useful for all actors involved. It also calls for a third-party neutral facilitator, which NGOs have the potential for. Third party facilitation encompasses a conflict-sensitive way for NGOs to apply when they are intervening in guest-host communities experiencing tensions and potential conflict. Third party facilitation of a conflict involves do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity. It is strongly suggested that they do act as conflict-sensitive impartial and neutral actors, when they operate and intervene in a conflict situation by giving aid or assistance. By conducting a conflict sensitivity analysis NGOs become equipped to understand the context they are intervening in without doing harm.

3. METHODOLOGY

The inductive approach is derived from a bottom-up perspective, that the data begins with the observation of the outside world, reflecting upon this knowledge and then moving towards theoretical concepts. An inductive approach allows for the researcher to have the starting point of a general concept or problem area and move towards a more elaborative conceptualization of the problem field (Neuman 2006:70f). Without any theoretical concepts beforehand, the preparation prior to the fieldwork was mainly to gain knowledge about the historical and political context related to guest-host relations. This led us to gain knowledge about the importance of NGOs in Lebanon and that in order to gain specific expert knowledge about guest-host relations, it would be relevant to talk to the actors who interact with both groups. The expert interviews were conducted with informants from the following NGOs operating in Lebanon: Salam, Women Now, Sawa, Danish Refugee Council, GAME and House of Peace. Furthermore, an interview with the IGO UNHCR was conducted. These interviews were not planned before going to Lebanon, as access to the empirical data was first achievable by being physically present. Furthermore, nine informal interviews were conducted spontaneously allowing for anecdotal stories about guest-host relations.

What was planned before fieldwork in Lebanon was a stay in the Syrian-Palestinian refugee camp Shatila. However, an inductive approach was still implemented during the fieldwork by doing participant observations and having informal interviews with the residents in Shatila based on curiosity rather than questionnaires. The inductive approach to expert and informal interviews and participant observations created an opportunity to let the empirical data determine the research goal and point towards which theoretical concepts that seem relevant to apply. The qualitative empirical data will be supported by secondhand quantitative statistical data derived from LCRP, ARK Survey and Fafo Poll. Finally, selected photos, all taken by us, from the fieldwork will be presented and more photos can be found in Appx. 9.

3.1 Semi-Structured Expert Interviews

The primary method applied in this paper is conducted through semi-structured expert interviews. Surveying Lebanese perceptions of Syrian refugees in only two and a half weeks would provide knowledge about what tensions are prevalent, yet it would not provide in-depth data as to why these tensions have risen. NGOs facilitating meetings between several Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese give them an insight into where the tensions stem from and provide more context-specific

expert knowledge. Considering the exploration phase of the research of this paper, by talking to experts, it helps to increase the breadth of data that can be possibly generated in a shorter period.

The seven expert-interviews cannot be generalized on behalf of all NGOs in Lebanon working with both host-community and Syrian refugees. It can be questioned if we to some degree, should have been more critical towards our informants' perceptions. However, our data provided some tendencies shared among the NGOs. The insights from the interviews are strongly supported by our secondary data as well and questioned and criticized if they contradict each other as a way to grant transparency and nuances. In general, there is a strong consensus between interviews, survey and statistics. Regions of Lebanon where the expert interviews took place were in Beirut and Bar Elias in the Bekaa Valley. Conducting the interviews in different areas of Lebanon gave an insight into regional differences between these two areas. Limitation to this paper regarding locations and regionality pertains to data gathered only in one informal camp within Lebanon and interview data was only taken from two regions in Lebanon, Beirut and Bekaa. Secondary data taken from the three surveys helped to counterbalance the regional focus of the data collected in this study.

What characterizes an expert is not only in terms of power and social status but is also related to their knowledge and personal experience in the specific research area (Alexander et al. 2009:26). Expert interview informants in this study consist of a sample size of 6 NGOs and one interview with the UNHCR. All of the seven interviews with NGOs and UNHCR are considered experts, not only because of their position within the NGOs and their ability to talk on behalf of the whole NGO but in their respective fields of strong experience working with target groups that consist of Syrian refugees and local Lebanese. The informants have through activities and programs acquired specialized knowledge, which categorizes them as experts within their field (ibid.7). The informants, viewed as experts, give insider knowledge, as they can be portrayed as representatives of a wider circle of informants (ibid.2). Informants consisted of varied demographic backgrounds, male and female and various religious affiliations. Women Now and the UNHCR interview was conducted with two interviewees, while the other interviews consisted of only one interviewee. All informants, except Sawa, was conducted in English allowing for ease in transcription. One limitation was the language barrier in the interview with Sawa, which did mean that some meanings were lost in translation, due to the translator's interpretation. However, the translator did work for Sawa and he can be seen as a representative for the NGO. All interviews were semi-structured with the purpose to let the informants contribute with descriptions of how they view the guest-host relations, for one to interpret their meaning (Brinkmann & Kvale 2015:6). After conducting the interviews, the data provided

knowledge regarding how NGOs ensure not to contribute to the conflict between the Syrian and the Lebanese. However, this was not realized during the interview process with the informants. The empirical data, when conducted, gave new insights of direction for the paper.

Setting the interview stage with experts we gave the option to all of the informants of providing access to the questionnaire beforehand by email. This allowed for insight into the research before setting up the interview to allow them to engage and talk more freely about their own experiences of our research topic and to feel comfortable talking with strangers (ibid.342). The questionnaire allowed us to get key information we want to get, however with an inductive approach the semi-structured interviews allowed for an increased breadth of data that we were unaware of beforehand. Two main questions were related to what tensions the NGO had experienced between Lebanese and Syrian refugees and if the NGO saw them self-mitigating these tensions and if so how. These two main concerns allowed us, to some extent, to systematize and structure the data allowing for some limitations. Applying an inductive approach, we ensured that the questions should be open leaving room for other relevant questions to arise through the interviews. All expert interviews were recorded to ensure accuracy in recalling the interviews. After the fieldwork, the transcriptions were systemized and condensed into a data-driven coding schedule letting the data speak for itself and to find patterns among the expert interviews (Cf. Gibbs 2007:47f). Five categories were derived from the collected data, whereof tensions and mediation were two ideas predetermining the coding, whereas narratives, government and regional differences were purely data-driven. Mediation in the schedule refers to a third party facilitator, rather than mediation in a broader scope. We sought out to collect data on mediation and discovered that the NGOs interviewed are not active in the mediation process, whereas the conflict sensitive approach is seen as a more applicable concept. The coding categories inspired what theoretical concepts were relevant for the literature review determining the analytical structure. The categorization of the coding schedule can be seen below and is found in full length in Appx. 1-7.

Category	Quote	Meaning
1.Tensions	1.' <i>Example of quote</i> '	
2.Mediation		
3.Narratives		
4.Government		
5.Regional Differences		

The reference structure to the interview coding is as such 'Appendix' refers to the specific interview conducted and numbers that follows refer to the category and number of the quote within that column. For example, (Appx. 1.1.1) refers to the first interview appendix, first category (tensions) and the first quote within the tension category.

All the expert interviews conducted will now be presented in terms of whom we interviewed and the NGO's main mission and vision. Salam supports vulnerable populations in Lebanon by providing direct aid and facilitating the efforts and initiatives of independent volunteers and organizations. UNHCR provides basic assistance, education, protection, public health, shelter and support to host communities under the UN charter. Sawa supports refugees' rights to freedom and dignity in Lebanon and secures better socially and environmentally conditions for both vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees. Women Now train and educate Syrian women and children and vulnerable Lebanese in Lebanon who have fled from the war, as well as training women employment opportunities, financial independence and entrepreneurship. House of Peace creates social peace within local communities in Lebanon, with the aim to bridge both refugee populations and host communities in Lebanon together through conflict sensitivity and memory of war training. GAME in Lebanon is an NGO that aims to create social change through street sports at these so-called GAME zones. GAME in Lebanon works with children from all areas in Lebanon, including Syrian refugee children and local Lebanese. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) addresses the needs of both refugee and host populations through rights-based programming. DRC's response in Lebanon has focused on delivering critical multi-sector support to displacement-affected individuals and communities to deal with the effects of protracted displacement while maintaining emergency response capacity to ensure flexibility in a volatile environment. For a more thorough description of each NGO and the interviewed representants read Appx.1-7.

3.2 Participant Observation & Informal Interviews

While conducting fieldwork in Lebanon one method applied was participant observation. Participant observations are when the observer or researcher is in a participatory role that allows insight into group situations with the main focus being that of data collection. In this role, the researcher is not considered a member of the group, but participating for means of collecting a greater breadth of data. In this role, however, the participants control the type and level of data that is given but allows for close interaction without full participation in group activities (Kawulich 2005:9). One example of participant observation was conducted with the NGO GAME. Through our informant from GAME,

we were invited to be part of their GAME zone in a poor area of Beirut, where vulnerable children in Lebanon were doing sports activities together. By observing the children's interaction in the sports field and participate in their sports programs, it provided insight into one of the NGOs programs and implementation.

Another example of participant observation was when staying in the refugee camp Shatila for six days. The stay was organized through the NGO Children and Youth Center (CYC) that provides a guest house in the Shatila refugee camp. Shatila is viewed here to be in a very interesting situation as it was originally built as a refugee camp for Palestinians in 1949 for around 3,000 inhabitants but is now to be estimated to be around 40,000 after the Syrian influx hosting more Syrians than Palestinians (Sharif 2018:1). Instead of visiting Shatila for a day and leave after the data is collected, staying in the camp and interacting with its residents provided insight into how Lebanese policy towards refugees has had a real impact on people's lives. It allowed us to get close to the Syrian refugees decreasing the distance between us as researchers and the research subjects. Furthermore, informal conversations with shop owners created a familiarity between the residents and researchers that allowed for further access to interviewees. The purpose of conducting research in this camp was to provide insight into the functionalities of an informal settlement. Moreover, Shatila was chosen to observe Syrian refugees' conditions in an informal settlement as well as gain access to Syrian refugees, who can give anecdotal stories about their daily experiences such as being ignored outside the camp and motivations for not leaving the camp. The camp posed as an opportunity to gather further informal interview data from the camp's inhabitants, which was not possible for us to gather while at informal Syrian refugee settlements in the Bekaa valley, due to security issues. The Shatila refugee camp was further chosen for more practical terms due to the guest house accommodation that CYC provides and transportation to and from the camp and access to a gatekeeper, allowing for increased safety within the camp. During the fieldwork period, a logbook was done to document observations, general notes and notes on informal and expert interviews that were conducted.

Informal interviews refer to all the spontaneous conversations with informants such as local Lebanese being a bartender, bar patron, waiter, taxi driver and a Palestinian school teacher and Syrian and Lebanese shop owners in Shatila. These were all unstructured interviews conducted from curiosity on how the informants perceive guest-host relations. Participants were randomly selected through interactions during our fieldwork in Beirut and Shatila refugee camp. Participants in the interviews consisted of various demographics, males and females and various religious backgrounds and age ranges. In Shatila refugee camp a translator and gatekeeper were used when conducting

interviews. The informal interviews were not recorded, but notes were taken in the logbook during the interviews. Informal interviews were placed in the same meaning-making schedule as the expert interviews and can be found in appendix 8. The only difference is that each informal interview does not have an appendix for each specific category, but all informal interviews are compiled into one meaning-making schedule. However, the informal interviews applied in the paper do not encompass all of the informal interviews conducted while in Lebanon. Some of the informal interviews were not useful in the context of this paper.

3.3 Ethical Concerns

The ethical concerns while researching in Lebanon revolved around the researcher's role in observation, informant's rights and transparency about the research being conducted. Prior to expert interviews, we made the informant aware of our identity and research purpose. All informants were granted the right to anonymity, to decide not to answer the questions and quit the interview at any time. Further, all informants were asked permission of recording and transcription and given the option of a copy of the transcription and the final paper (Cf. Creswell 2009:89-91). The informal interviews that are addressed by name in the paper gave consent to the use of their names. The informal interviews not given names such as taxi-driver, Manakish guy and waiter were granted anonymity to protect their identities.

Some of the participants who took part in the study were considered a vulnerable population, such as residents in Shatila. The research conducted strives not to leave a negative impact and to be cognizant of the researcher's presence causing more harm than it does good. One step taken in the research to mitigate harmful interactions with participants was to refrain from interviewing children even though we had the opportunity at a GAME zone. The concern is that questions regarding tensions and intergroup differences may make the child aware that there are differences between them and other children, to begin with. Another step was to become familiar with the history, politics, demographics and geography of Lebanon to be aware of cultural norms and to not damage any relation due to ignorance on the researcher's behalf. In the first interview with Women Now, we asked for local recommendations of how to conduct ourselves in interviews and in the Shatila Refugee Camp (Cf. Kawulich 2005:12).

Over research of Shatila and its effects on residents has become a concern. Residents of Shatila have become oversaturated with researchers, but nothing much occurs in terms of a difference in their everyday lives (Sukarieh & Tannock 2012:499-502). The over-researched nature has led to many

researchers coming into the camp misrepresenting the residents without prior cultural knowledge and knowledge of previous research done within the camp. By staying in the camp for several days, it allowed us to challenge the apprehensiveness towards the researcher and instead gain more trust with the informants. For example, we participated in an annual commemoration of Nahkba 1948 and a Children's marathon in the mountains outside of Beirut as a way to gain trust and ease conversations. Another example of gaining trust in Shatila was by speaking to many different shopkeepers and residents within Shatila. William our flat mate volunteered as a teacher in Shatila and was used as an Arabic-English translator and gatekeeper because he already was trusted among the residents. Further, daily contact with the manager from CYC, Abu Moujahed gave not only credible permission to stay in Shatila but allowed for access for interviews with staff.

3.3 Secondary Data

The core secondary statistical data referenced in this paper revolves around three surveys. They consist of the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2017-2020, produced by the Government of Lebanon and United Nations collaboration, together with the Fafo Poll, which is a national opinion poll from 2013, of which addresses the Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees implemented. The Fafo poll is from 2013 and can thus be considered dated, why it is supported through a more recent survey report from 2017 that addresses the social tensions throughout Lebanon. This is produced by the ARK group which is a stabilization and development company on behalf of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) with funding from the Dutch government.

The LCRP statistical numbers are generated from Lebanese governmental census and estimates, UN interagency census and assessment figures and World Bank statistics (LCRP 2019:8;32f). The Fafo Poll consisted of 900 respondents, of which 44% were female and 56% were male. The survey was conducted between the six regions in Lebanon: Beirut, Bekaa, El Nabatieh, Mount Lebanon, North and South Lebanon and done over three rounds of sampling. The sample size from each region was proportionate to each area's number of registered voters and stratified between the different municipalities within each region, which totaled 26. Only participants at the age of 18 and over could participate in the study (Christophersen et al. 2013:5). The ARK group data contains a sample size of 5,000 respondents. The survey data collected were randomly sampled over four periods and geographically spread over six regions in Lebanon: Beirut, Bekaa, El Nabatieh, Mount Lebanon, North and South Lebanon. Interview data in this sample was weighted through the allocation of interviews by population size and then adjusted to over-sample vulnerable areas (ARK 2017:5f).



Photo 1. From the Rooftop at Shatila Refugee Camp. 2019.



Photo 2. From the Rooftop at Shatila Refugee Camp. 2019.



Photo 3. The Rooftop at Shatila Refugee Camp. 2019.



Photo 4. The Rooftop at Shatila Refugee Camp. 2019.



Photo 5. Palestinian and Syrian children in Shatila Refugee Camp. 2019.



Photo 6. Resident of Shatila Refugee Camp (left) and William our translator and gatekeeper (right). 2019.



Photo 7. Nine girls from a GAME zone in Beirut. 2019.



Photo 8. In the break between games at a GAME zone in Beirut. 2019.



Photo 9. Nine boys from a GAME zone in Beirut. 2019.

4. ANALYSIS

Guest-host relations will be unfolded with a departure in *4.1 The Syrian-Lebanese Crisis* which explains the preconditions conflict related to ontological insecurity. The crisis supports and explains what triggers the shift *4.2 From Hospitality Towards Hostility* towards Syrian refugees at a structural level by addressing the Lebanese government's policies related to Syrian refugees. However, the shift from hospitality to hostility is not only reflected in structural conditions but will also be investigated through *4.3 Tensions Between Lebanese Host-Community & Syrian Refugee Guests* at a civil level. How tensions can lead to negative stereotyping, scapegoating and stigma will be explored in *4.4 The Stigmas of Syrian Refugees* which can be seen as examples of potential conflicts in guest-host relations. This is the conflictual context NGOs in Lebanon need to be aware of when intervening in guest-host relations preparing the ground for the last analysis dealing with *4.5 Conflict Sensitive NGOs* allowing for concrete tools in how NGOs can ensure that they are not doing harm.

4.1 The Syrian-Lebanese Crisis

The prolonged presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon can be seen as a crisis because it is a rupture of normality. The Syrian-Lebanese crisis will be unfolded reflecting upon ontological insecurity stemming from the fear of permanency and activation of the past related to the existence of autonomous Palestinian camps and the memory of Syrian occupation from 1982-2005. This is the first step in understanding how a crisis can trigger othering processes that can lead to hostility from which conflicts between guest and host arise. NGOs intervene in complex historical relations, where the memory of war can be activated and lead to conflict. Thus, by understanding how a crisis is intermingled with the past, NGOs can make sure that they are not triggering memory of war, contributing to conflict.

4.1.1 The Permanent Guest

In a survey by ARK, 63.1% of Lebanese respondents have been concerned over the prolonged presence of Syrian refugees in the country (ARK 2017:18). 59.4% of Lebanese did not believe that Lebanese and Syrians in this community are able to work together to solve problems (ibid.). This indicates that the Lebanese host-community is feeling disillusioned about creating a positive future together due to the despair that the prolonged crisis has caused. The prolonged presence of Syrian refugees has generated fear, which is triggering an orientation towards the past, as a way to diagnose

the present crisis to find the proper treatment to ensure a better future (Cf. Koselleck in Jordheim 2012:158). Palestinian refugees have lived within Lebanese borders since the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, where Palestinians fled from Palestine to Lebanon. Today official numbers estimate 450,000 Palestinians, of which more than 220,000 live in informal refugee camps (UNHCR Lebanon Operational Environment 07.03.19; Cherri et al 2016:166). The permanent Palestinian presence triggers memories of the complex history between Lebanese and Palestinians leading to ontological insecurity and fear amongst Lebanese of Syrian refugee permanency (Appx. 5.1.2 DRC; UNHCR 3.4.1). The long-term Palestinian presence has turned into a constant of dysfunction, where their presence has become an unwelcoming departure from how things previously were before 1948 (Cf. Vigh 2008:10). However, just because the long-term permanency has become a ‘new normal,’ it does not mean that people get used to abnormality, because people will still become mirrored in what they have lost (ibid.16). Just as the chronically ill patient will not give up on finding his treatment, Lebanese will still seek to solve the crisis by gaining a stable foothold. Even though very few remember Lebanon before 1948, the past is yet still alive as a *Geschehen* (Cf. Koselleck in Jordheim 2012:158). Elia, who is from a Lebanese Christian and French-speaking family, find that there is an orientation towards the better past:

There is a nostalgia towards Lebanon before 1948. Everything was better and Lebanon was considered Switzerland of the Middle East – it was a playground for the rich. Muslims, Druze and Christians were living in peace. There was no trouble and everyone minded his own business. Lebanese miss the good days.

- Appx. 8.3.6.1 Informal Interviews

The statement from Elia reflects a nostalgic attitude towards Lebanon prior to 1948. This nostalgic attitude showed highlights the transformative event of Palestinians entering Lebanon and how this has shaped a negative impact on Lebanese memory. The fear of the permanent presence of the Syrian refugees today is also deeply rooted in ontological insecurity that is associated with the refugee camps.

4.1.2 Fear of Radicalization and Militarization in Autonomous Camps

The fear of Syrian refugees staying permanent, like the Palestinians, triggers ontological insecurity mainly because the camps are perceived as a security threat and that some refugees are presumed to be agents of insecurity (Jaji 2012:227). Syrians posing a security threat in Lebanon is a widespread opinion among Lebanese. According to the ARK survey, 84.3% of the Lebanese respondents believe that the large number of Syrian refugees has contributed to more incidents of crime and violence (ARK 2017:30), which only highlights the fear of radicalization. It is based on a fear that in the long term it creates an enabling environment for the radicalization of refugees that is, in turn, is increasing terrorism and organized crime rates (International Alert 2015:1). Thus, Lebanese might fear that refugee camps provide shelter for the recruiting of radicalized ‘refugee warriors’ (Salehyan 2007). The Palestinian refugee camps, such as Shatila, run almost self-sufficiently (Khalili 2006:37). Before entering Shatila during the fieldwork, informal interviews of taxi drivers, waiters and the hotel staff were asked about staying in Shatila. None of the Lebanese interviewed had ever set foot in Shatila, even though the camp is only 4 km away from the city center. The concern they expressed about visiting Shatila, indicated a fear of the radicalization and autonomous structure of the camp. In the camp, it was experienced that there is no official police force or operating managerial body maintaining law and order in the camp. Instead, Shatila has created their own unofficial peacekeeping force, however, it is not quite clear if this force is affiliated to the mafia in Shatila. The lack of an official police force creates an image of the camp not being a safe place to enter. Even though the experience in Shatila was defined by peaceful interactions meeting many friendly people, there were stories from informants in Shatila regarding a mafia, drugs and criminality, which is an issue in the camp. One of the informants interviewed works in a shop on the main street of Shatila. He is a Syrian refugee who used to study psychology and geography at the university in Damascus but now lives in Shatila with his pregnant wife (Appx. 8.5.4 Informal Interviews). He stated that he has been assaulted by the mafia in Shatila several times:

I have been kidnapped 6 times getting beaten up because they [*the mafia*] want money from me. They know I have money because I work in this shop. One time I said to them “You need money? I have a child on the way. He needs the money more than you”, but they still took my money.

- Appx. 8.5.3 Informal Interviews

According to this informant, the mafia is made up of Palestinian and Shi'a Muslims. The mafia within the camp apparently does not target foreigners because they know the camp is dependent on foreign support, instead *"They try to get Syrian because they know they have money and no one will help them"* (ibid.). It is stories like these that create an ontological insecurity among Lebanese because the camps are perceived as a threat to their safety. The office manager of the Children and Youth Center (CYC) in Shatila is not explicit about the mafia but confirms that there is a huge drug problem in Shatila that even seduces children into crime. He poses a question on the negative perceptions of child labor:

This is why child labor is not always a bad thing, because it keeps them away from the streets. (...) The same with the schools – even though they might not get a proper education - when they are not in school they are not in the street.

- Appx. 8.5.10 Informal Interviews

The fear of children being seduced to committing crimes supports the potential of radicalization in autonomous camps. The fear of radicalization is also connected to the fear of militarization that can trigger memory of war-related to the sectarian Civil war, where Sunni, Shia, Druze and Christians were fighting each other. This makes Lebanon vulnerable to sectarian interests, which the camps can become a breeding ground for, which is stressed by Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah; *"any camp for Syrians in Lebanon will turn into a military pocket that will be used as a launchpad against Syria and then against Lebanon"* (Daily Star 10.03.12). Hezbollah is considered an ally of the Syrian al-Assad regime and the government of Lebanon does not wish to risk damaging al-Assad's regime, which they fear will create instability within Lebanon. Hence, the essence of the opposition towards Syrian permanency is based on the same fear of Palestinians upsetting the dynamics within Lebanese politics (Dionigi 2016: 22; Ibrahim 2008:83-88). This is exemplified by the International Crisis Group (ICS) in Lebanon³:

³ ICS is working to prevent wars and shape politics towards a more peaceful world. It was founded in 1995 as a response to Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia.

Lebanon, today as in the past, is vulnerable to the regional tug of war. Rebel infiltration and an influx of refugees from Syria echo the pre-civil war context when conflicting Lebanese stances toward Palestinian refugees and fighters paralyzed the political machinery and fueled grievances and polarization.

- International Crisis Group 2015:5

The Lebanese Civil War has led to an existential fear of history repeating itself and fear fostered of refugee camps becoming the breeding ground for radicalization. This radicalization threatens to tip the sectarian balance and lead to militarization.

4.1.3 The Fault of Others

When the crisis becomes a permanent context, the feeling of powerlessness does not necessarily lead to passivity. Activating memories from the Civil war can provide a feeling of control over the present crisis. When people live face-to-face with the people they once fought silence about the past can be preferred as a way to deal with the present (Shaw 2010:257). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the past is forgotten. On the other hand, the Civil war “*continues to haunt the Lebanese because it has not been dealt with*” (Haugbølle 2010:228). Strong and painful memories from people, who experienced or knew someone affected by Civil war is activated. For example, this could be memories that deal with the events of “*Muslims or Christians [whom] were randomly stopped and executed solely on the grounds of their religious identification*” (ibid.125). In memories of the Civil war, there is a dominant Lebanese narrative that it was a war fought by ‘others’ (ibid.13f). It was a complex civil conflict with both regional and international ramifications compelling foreign powers, such as Syria, Israel and Iran, to sponsor Lebanese actors, fund Lebanese militias and intervene directly (ibid.15). Due to the PLO’s involvement in the 1980’s internal conflicts between Palestinians and Lebanese Christian Maronites, along with PLO conflicts with Lebanese Shi’a Amal militia in 1981-1982 and the war in the camps from 1984-85 (Khalili 2006:58;18-20), there was “*an implicit consensus that the Palestinians bore a substantial responsibility for the war*” (Haugbølle 2010:19) and a stereotypical idea that during the Civil war the Palestinians destroyed the country (Omvärlden 04.03.19). Syrians also shared the responsibility of the blame due to the Syrian occupation in Lebanon from 1982-2005.

According to the ARK survey, 81% of the Lebanese respondents agreed that memories of the Syrian army occupation impaired relations between Lebanese and Syrians today (ARK 2017:40). This public sentiment was highest amongst Christian and Druze respondents, with actually 87% of respondents agreeing (ibid.). During the Syrian occupation in Lebanon, human rights violations made by the Syrian military, such as Lebanese experiencing harassment and violence from Syrian soldiers, have resulted in many Lebanese carrying old prejudices against Syrians. This is based on an idea that Syrians destroyed the country, both by their military presence in the streets and their part in the Civil war, as well as the Syrian political influence on Lebanese politics as addressed by the NGO Salam: *“the Syrian decided everything in our government here, they decided who was the president and everything. People, they have this bad image of the Syrians, because it was an occupation.”* (Appx. 2.3.5 Salam). The restaurant, that the interview with Salam was conducted at, was together with most other shops in the neighborhood owned by Syrians because this area in Beirut used to be controlled by the Syrian army for 100 days in the Civil war. During this war, Syrian military forces destroyed the area with missiles. Some Lebanese women remember harassment by Syrian soldiers and some parents are blaming the Syrians for losing their children: *“(…) they see the refugee as the enemy, because of the history. If they look at Syrian refugee children, they don’t see a refugee child, but an enemy because of history (….) most people remember what happened here.”* (Appx. 2.3.2). UNHCR supports this by mentioning that;

(…) there are still Lebanese who are still in Syrian prisons, kidnapped during the war or when the Syrian army was present. The fate of a few hundreds of people is still unknown today and it is believed that they are still living in Syria. So yes, the history is still very much present in all this debate about refugees.

- Appx. 3.3.3.2 UNHCR

However, not all Lebanese see the Syrian presence as an occupation stressing the regional differences, *“Even those who were against the Syrian presence and fought it militarily, they do not call it an occupation they call it a mandate.”* (Appx. 3.3.3.1 UNHCR). UNHCR continues by stating that each community will have its version of history (Appx. 3.3.4 UNHCR). Thus, there are different responses to the present crisis even internally among Lebanese, who *“don’t have a common vision on how to deal with the Syrian crisis. They don’t even have a common understanding of their own history.”*

(Appx. 4.5.4 Women Now). This also explains why no one learns about history after the French left in 1943 in schools (Appx. 1.2.10 House of Peace). The modern history of Lebanon is simply still an open wound. The activating of the past differs from region to region depending on whether it is a Christian, Sunni Muslim or Shi'a area and whether it is a pro-Syrian area or not (Appx. 1.5.1 House of Peace).

4.1.4 Sectarian Imbalance

The sectarian differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims were only further amplified in 2005, where the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated, assumedly by forces from Syria. This triggered the Cedar Revolution, which was highlighted by protests and demonstrations against the Syrian presence that finally led Syria to withdraw their forces from Lebanon in 2005, marking the end of the Syrian occupation in Lebanon (Thorleifsson 2016:1072). The Civil war and occupation might be over, but the fear and anxiety of a sectarian conflict are still reflected in the minds of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees. In the Fafo poll from 2013, 67% of the population expressed a fear of the spillover effect from the Syrian war. This fear has led to Syrian refugees being settled according to their confessional background (ibid.1073). Segregating people in groups of confessions might give an immediate feeling of increasing ontological security, but the truth is that it is only feeding the sectarian tensions and increasing the risk for conflict. A crisis polarizes and leads to 'us' and 'them' mentalities preparing the ground for conflict. This happens when Syrian refugees are perceived to be a threat to the Lebanese 'cultural' cohesion within Lebanon (Cf. Vertovec 2011:244f). Although one can strongly question whether there is cultural cohesion in Lebanon, due to its sectarian and confessionalist system, the Syrian refugees do pose a threat to the status quo.

During the uprisings in the Arab Spring 2010-11, Lebanon was largely sidelined. Nevertheless, a few hundred demonstrators did gather in Sanaya, Beirut at the beginning of 2011 carrying banners with the following message: "*the people want the downfall of the sectarian system (In Arabic: As-Sha'ab yurid isqat an-nizam at-ta'ifi)*" (Leenders 2012:243). However, a survey from 2012, made by the Lebanese Opinion Advisory Committee, found that half of the Lebanese population agree that political confessionalism is rooted in Lebanese culture and cannot be removed (Obeid 2012:108). This indicates that the Lebanese population is highly divided when it comes to proclaiming or disclaiming the consociational democracy. Nevertheless, one thing is clear, as long as the confessionalist system is in power, fear related to sectarian interests will exist. Increased nationalism is to be expected, as it allows for the reformation of identity as a way to gain a feeling of control and

superiority, trying to decrease the existential anxieties (Cf. Kinnvall 2004:763). However, the question is if these othering processes necessary leads to increased security, or if it is exactly these othering processes that lead to conflict.

4.1.5 Conclusion

Crisis triggers polarization due to the urgent state of affairs that people are left in and Lebanon is no exception. The prolonged presence of Syrian refugees has increased ontological insecurity among Lebanese due to fears of permanency. This has caused an activating of the past as a psychological response to gain control in the crisis. With a nostalgic attitude towards the stable period before 1948, this becomes the past in which Lebanese try to gain footing. In contrast, the Palestinian camps become addressed as a root cause of the insecurity and instability due to fear of radicalization and militarization triggering a new Civil war Lebanese fear that the presence of the Syrian refugees can exacerbate this threat. This fear is only aggravated with negative memories of the Syrian occupation and a fear of Syrian refugees tipping the sectarian balance, which polarized memories of war is only feeding. As a result, othering processes of Syrian refugees has occurred as an attempt to gain control and superiority over the situation and reformate identity among Lebanese host-community.

4.2 From Hospitality Towards Hostility

At the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Lebanon initially opens its doors to fleeing Syrians. This begs the question as to why was it that at the beginning of the Syrian conflict Lebanon was open to receiving the Syrians with a relatively open response. However, policies closing borders to Syrians paint a picture of Lebanon's hospitality decreasing. This section allows for a pre-conditional understanding of how the shift can be reflected on a structural level. These are structural conditions useful for NGOs to be aware of when intervening in guest-host relations.

4.2.1 Welcoming the Syrian Refugees

The initial hospitality can be explained by looking at the cultural network relations between the Lebanese and Syrians. It is important to examine the historical context, in which both countries are situated. Lebanon and Syria share a complex and tumultuous history, from its Ottoman roots through the Lebanese Civil War until the Syrian conflict today. In 2006, an Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon saw 250,000 Lebanese flee into Syria, of which 180,000 remained (UNHCR Global Report 2006:332f). One of the informal interviews conducted was with a shop owner in the Shatila refugee camp that sold a type of manakish. He referred to when the Syrians opened their country to the Lebanese that during this period the Syrians welcomed the Lebanese into their country (Appx. 8.5.9 Informal Interviews). The situation today is a reversal of the roles of host and guest between Lebanese and Syrians. The open hospitality towards each other was reflected especially in the Bekaa valley. The cultural ties between the two societies are undeniable in this area, “*you know the Lebanese who are from Bekaa are more similar to the Syrians than to the Lebanese in Beirut.*” (Appx. 4.5.6 Women Now). During the Lebanese Civil War, the Syrian government forces occupied Lebanon from 1982 until 2005 intending to influence Lebanese politics. Even though the Syrian presence in Beirut had been minimized in 1978, Syrian occupied territory remained in areas of the Bekaa valley (Slomich 1998:625; Traboulsi: 2012:245). Another contributing factor is that the majority of people living in Bekaa are Sunni, which explains the immediate hospitality towards Syrian refugees as stated by Salam:

(...) all the Sunni villages, they opened their doors for the Syrians. (...) All the people around this area [*Anjar, Bekaa*] are Sunni, and they support the Syrians revolution. So, when the Syrian refugees came, they opened their doors and welcomed the Syrians.

- Appx. 2.5.1 Salam

This is supported by Sawa, who emphasizes the cultural ties: “(...) *the people in Bekaa have the same traditions as the Syrian people. Same traditions same language, same religions.*” (Appx. 7.5.14 Sawa). The Lebanese region of Bekaa has hosted a long history of migrant workers coming from Syria far before the Civil war. Estimates in the mid-1990s have been debated, ranging from 253,000 to around 1.4 million Syrian migrant workers (Gambill 2001; Chalcraft 2006:1;14f) and according to Sawa, just before the Syrian war there were around 400-900 thousand Syrian migrant workers in Lebanon (Appx. 7.3.6 Sawa). Also, Women Now stresses the special relation between Lebanese and Syrians in Bekaa:

(...) the Syrian people created shops, social dynamics and economy in this area. Because the people there they build houses to rent out to the Syrians, so they like Syrians there because they create infrastructure. You don't find this dynamic in Beirut, because here you have a different relation between Syrians and Lebanese host-community.

- Appx. 4.5.6 Women Now

The history of seasonal migrant workers through the decades and Lebanese refugees in Syria in 2006 have all played a historical role in creating familiar bonds between the two societies. It is through historical events and temporal space that the two cultures have become increasingly similar as well as creating familiar and economic networks between the two countries.

Intermarriage between Syrians and Lebanese have historically been common, further strengthening social and familiar networks between the two communities (Care 2018:9). One can see that the Syrians fleeing into Lebanon have settled into the geographic areas that historically have seen the most traffic of Syrians. Furthermore, the importance that familiar ties is considered one of the strongest factors of the network migration theory determining where refugees migrate to. Familiar networks help to alleviate the anxieties that forced migration places on refugee groups (Kaya 2016:16) but also can be argued to provide the comfort of the familiar that cultural intimacy provides.

The interview data collected from NGOs in Lebanon such as Game, Salam, Sawa and UNHCR supports the notion of historical and cultural ties that have led to hospitable entry for Syrians into areas of Lebanon that share these ties “*Even though to a certain degree the host-community was highly welcoming of the refugees, but with many reasons like historical ties, religious, whether they*

are on the border, so they had a previous relation in that sense.” (UNHCR 3.5.1). Other NGOs interviewed hold similar viewpoints as the UNHCR on the matter (Appx. Salam 2.5.1; GAME 6.1.7 Sawa 7.3.6). It is through these cultural familiarities, the comfortability in shared cultural practices without the fear of being ostracized for these practices by the host-community, along with the economic and familiar network ties through history that has paved the way for Syrian refugees to seek refuge in Lebanon and a hospitable transition. Further supporting that Lebanese have shown hospitable tendencies towards Syrian refugees is the ARK survey showing that 92.9% of Lebanese respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that Lebanese have been good hosts to the Syrians (ARK 2017:30).

4.2.2 Conditional Hospitality

The economic and familiar network ties, in particular, has allowed for the blending of the two groups culturally, but can also be seen as creating a sort of co-dependence economically on one another. It is through these networks that allowed for the initial hospitality of the Syrian refugees:

(...) because they [*Lebanese farm owners*] don’t have Lebanese who work in this sector. They need seasonal workers in agriculture. But these people working here are not refugees because they came before the crisis to work there.

- Appx. 4.5.4 Women Now

The economic network built through the years of migrant workers coming across the border from Syria to agricultural areas of Lebanon have been built structurally through conditional hospitality between the Syrian workforce and the landowning Lebanese. Conditional hospitality, as derived from Derrida, created through this identification process of borders, laws and regulations also hinges on the fact that the host must be able to hold onto sovereignty of their conceptual ‘home’ to provide hospitality in the first place. Without the host-guest hierarchical structure, hospitality would not be possible and the guest then could take over the ‘home’ (Ramadan 2008:664).

The conditionality is that the migrants are part of the workforce with the hosts bearing the title and power of the landowners providing the economic opportunities for the Syrians. This is a clear distinction between the host-guest conditional structure, the migrant Syrians are guests, labeled and categorized as seasonal workers, allowed to cross the border on the condition that they abide by the

host's rules that they work in the agricultural sector. In this established power structure, the guests are situated in a position, where they are culturally and structurally abiding by the host communities' regulations. Remnants of this conditionality of the Syrian migrant and Lebanese landowner, as well as cultural and network ties between the two groups, during the beginning of the refugee crisis, exemplify the indicators of hospitality towards the Syrians. However, the idea of hospitality is being challenged by accusations that Syrian refugees have overstayed their welcome (Carpi 27.10.16).

4.2.3 The Open Border Policy as Initial Hospitality

To elaborate on how the hospitality has developed in Lebanon towards Syrian refugees, it is key to look at several factors such as conventions and policies. For one, Lebanon did not sign the 1951 Geneva Convention for refugees or the 1967 protocol, leading the Lebanese Government to neglect any domestic legislation, when it comes to the status of refugees (LCRP 2019:1). Thus, the Lebanese government perceives persons who fled from Syria after 2011, not as 'refugees' but as 'temporality displaced individuals' (TDI) (ibid.20;4). By defining the refugees with this term it allows the Lebanese government to maintain its sovereignty, so it can determine the refugee's status according to their own laws and regulations.

Furthermore, Syrian refugees are only limited to work within three sectors: construction, agriculture and environment – which entails garbage collection and cleaning services (Care 2018:15). Taken from a governmental perspective, the categorical policy implemented towards Syrian refugees questions the moral and ethical obligations of hospitality, as it can be argued in this case that the Syrian guests are granted limited access to jobs, hence rendering a more vulnerable status of life. This indicates from a structural perspective that the Lebanese Government, as a host-community, hinders the refugees' chances of feeling welcomed by denying legal access to certain job opportunities to engage with the host community.

It can be tempting to criticize the Lebanese Government's view on humanitarian rights for refugees claiming that they did not at all show hospitality. However, according to UNHCR, just because the Lebanese Government is not signatories to the refugee convention does not mean they are not accountable for upholding human rights.

No, they [*the government*] are abiding by principles, they are abiding by law.
Again, with minor exceptions that happened in the early years of the crisis.

Lebanon is not party to the conventions, but it is party to other human rights convention.

- Appx. 3.4.3.3 UNHCR

Regarding the UNHCR being a party to advocate for other human rights and being supportive, shows that the Lebanese government does respond to international humanitarian principles. It is rather the Lebanese recognition of Syrian refugee status that can be questioned. Following Janmyr's perspective, avoiding the term 'refugee' is a way for the Lebanese government to prevent refugee's permanent residency, thus the lack of legal framework in Lebanon situates the Syrian refugees vulnerable to indecisive policy (Janmyr 2018). This means, the Syrian refugees are in a weak position in Lebanon and their future is strongly affected by national Lebanese policies. UNHCR elaborate on why the Lebanese government did not choose to provide legal documents that will secure refugees' rights, "*they [the government] do not want to be bound by any document that will give refugees, by large, any rights in Lebanon, including forced nationality.*" (Appx. 3.4.4 UNHCR). This statement supports Janmyr's notion that the Lebanese government wants to maintain its sovereignty as well as explains why they would not give the refugee status in fear of permanent residency. It seems that UNHCR's argument of why the Lebanese took Syrians into their country stems from the composition of the country and political reasons:

(...) I'm not saying they have done so willingly, they have done so because of the composition of the country. It's for political reasons Lebanon has given a lot to the Syrian refugees, much more than other countries who are signatories of the convention.

- Appx. 3.4.4 UNHCR

Taking the sectarian confessionalist system into account, some politicians with Sunni Muslim background might have a political interest to support Syrian refugees, who are Sunni, as a means to secure more governmental power. Other political parties in Lebanon, such as the Maronite Christian parties, support the return of the Syrian refugees in fear of political balance being tipped (Appx 3.1.3 UNHCR). UNHCR's statement on political reasons, tied together with the Lebanese sectarian model, reveals the dynamic patterns of hospitality in its conditional form. The very nature of the

confessionalism fuels the different viewpoints of hospitality. It fragments the state's view of hospitality towards Syrian refugees. However, it is important to understand the complexity of the refugee situation that the Lebanese government is in. UNHCR puts this into perspective by saying that one cannot justify saying that the Lebanese government did not do anything in the process of welcoming the Syrian in comparison to other nations:

(...) if you compare the situation in Lebanon and compare it to others that are signatories of the convention, Lebanon has been giving to refugees, regardless of the reasons (...) Access to education, access to healthcare, freedom of movement, although many have been suffering for lack of legal status, but still the hurdles are not so substantive. If you just imagine yourself in a country, any country and suddenly you receive between one and one point five million.

- Appx. 3.4.4 UNHCR

As UNHCR highlights it is key to compare Lebanon's lack of international response with other European countries, who have signed the refugee convention. DRC backs up this view:

Lebanon has taken the burden of the Palestinian refugees and essentially dealing with a massive burden from Syria without any financial support from the international community (...) given the context. I think the Lebanese government should be rewarded and praised for the response they have been given to Syrian refugees. Clearly the picture is not 100 % perfect for the Syrians here, but certainly from my perspective the Lebanese government should be applauded.

- Appx. 5.4.1 DRC

Given the insights from DRC and UNHCR, they both agree on the lack of international support to the Syrian crisis, leaving Lebanon vulnerable to maintain the huge influx of refugees. It can be argued that both UNHCR and the DRC view Lebanon at the beginning of the Syrian influx as welcoming to the Syrian refugees. This can also be reflected in the open border policy at the beginning of 2011, even though the government is not signatory to the convention "*the government maintains an 'open border' policy whereby registered Syrian refugees can live and work in Lebanon.*" (ILO 2014:8).

The open border policy in 2011 allowed the Syrian refugees to flee into Lebanon and at that time it portrayed the Lebanese view of the Syrians as, “*victims, who were forced to flee across the border*” (Care 2018:4). Lebanon's host-community and NGOs assisted refugees with shelter, services and in general a more generous welcome, even though their own needs of resources was increasing (Cherri et al. 2016). The lack of host community resources and the willingness to host, stresses that Lebanese hospitality cannot simply be seen as solely a generous act of offering shelter to Syrian refugees (Carpi 27.10.16). Hospitality also reflects the former mental image and attitude towards the refugees.

4.2.4 The Refugees ‘Overstayed Their Welcome’

Eight years have passed since the war in Syria started and the Lebanese hospitality towards Syrian refugees seems to have changed reflected in national policy. The border that used to be open is now closed. Policy change leading to border restrictions happened in 2014. Before this, half of the Lebanese respondents in the Fafo poll stated that Syrians should not be allowed to enter the country indicating that there were strong limits to Lebanese hospitality (Thorleifsson 2016:1078). The October Policy in 2014 implemented tighter restrictions regarding Syrian refugees. The October policy aimed to enforce a restrictive border policy ensuring a decrease in the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to its territories. The Cabinet decided that Lebanon should only open its border to refugees in ‘exceptional’ or ‘urgent’ humanitarian cases. The government enforced that all Syrians entering the country should have a costly visa that only gave them a temporary stay (UNHCR 2015). The policy was carried out by the General Security Office who set new requirements towards Syrian refugees, thus making it more difficult to enter the country (Janmyr 2018). The October Policy can be seen as a response to the public sentiment, which is reflected in the fact that over half of the Lebanese were reluctant to let any more Syrians into the country as stressed in the Fafo poll in 2013. With the closing border policy, the government legitimized this public sentiment. Furthermore, the Lebanese government set up a seven-tier categorical schedule to regulate the amount of Syrians coming into Lebanon. This schedule places Syrians with different economic backgrounds and reasons for immigrating to Lebanon into different categories. The impact of the October policy resulted in an estimated 74% of Syrian refugees with no legal status. This impacts many aspects of the Syrian refugee's life, for instance, their opportunity to move freely (Janmyr 2016:66f).

The October policy was followed by the government's decision on stopping UNHCR from registering refugees in 2015. Even though this did not stop the exodus of people fleeing from Syria, it does mean that with no registration they can get no work permit unless they pay a high fee (Vohra

31.07.19). One can arguably say that the October policy and decision to stop registration exemplifies the decreasing hospitality, stemming from a political response to the public sentiment, as they use political intervention to limit the access of Syrians. The policy created a hierarchical structure to place Syrians in, one is either considered a Syrian of low economic means (refugee) or a Syrian of means. This categorical structure has granted different conditions of hospitality from the host community based on where one is placed in the structure (Cf. Janmyr 2016:66f).

On one hand, Lebanese hospitality has created close Lebanese and Syrian refugee relations. Thus, it requires a sustainable hospitable host-community in order to maintain that relationship. On the other hand, the host communities have reached its critical point regarding social and economic resources as an impact of the Syrian influx (Cherri et al. 2016) and the lack of resources can be viewed as the primary drivers for the October policy. The October Policy challenges hospitality and leads to increased hostility towards Syrian refugees. According to Thorleifsson, the hospitality towards the Syrian refugees is a two-sided case, because Lebanese show compassion and sympathy for Syrian refugees, which is exemplified through Lebanese families hosting Syrian refugees and share their homes and resources. On the other hand, there is a cumulative view held by the Lebanese that is fostering public and local discourses of Syrian refugees as scapegoats (Thorleifsson 2016:1078). This unfolds the complexity of hospitality because as Thorleifsson argues, hospitality is also a share of resources (ibid.). Hospitality is changing towards increased hostility when looking at the structural and civil level of hospitality between Lebanese and Syrian refugees. The increasing hostility is in contrast to the more hospitable view of refugees that occurred at the beginning of the Syrian influx. Syrian refugees primarily rely on hospitable local communities in order to get access to housing, services and jobs by developing social relations with the host community (Care 2018:5). This is challenged when the state and host-community's attitude towards the refugees are changing, putting the Syrian refugees in a more precarious situation.

4.2.5 Conclusion

The immediate generosity and openness that defined the governmental welcoming of Syrian refugees, before the October policy in 2014, has been challenged and points towards hostility due to the massive pressure on Lebanon. Even though the Lebanese government is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, they have been taking a huge burden in their effort to host Syrian refugees in need. The remnants of the conditionality of Lebanese farm owners and Syrian migrant workers has allowed for initial hospitable conditions between the two groups, where now the conditionality has shifted. As such, there has been a shift from this hospitable climate towards the Syrians in Lebanon. The conditionality of the hierarchical structure between guest and host has deteriorated blurring the distinction between host and guest, the guest is now conceptually being perceived as 'taking over the home.' The shift from hospitality towards hostility can be seen as a response to the Syrian-Lebanese crisis. It is within the space of this ambivalence of hospitality that prepares the ground for tensions.

4.3 Tensions Between Lebanese Host-Community & Syrian Refugee Guests

The shift towards hostility is not only reflected on a political-structural level, but can also be addressed at a civil level. Tensions on a civil level can first of all be seen as an immediate response to the Syrian-Lebanese crisis that has caused an ontological insecurity leading to othering. The permanent presence of Syrian refugees has reached a stage that there are prevalent tensions between guest and host. These tensions can be perceived as conflicts or as potential conflict. NGOs are indeed providing aid and assistance in communities, where Syrian refugees live among its Lebanese host and thus intervening in guest-host relations. In order for NGOs not to do harm and contribute to the conflict, the first step is to comprehend these prevalent tensions.

4.3.1 The Struggle for Resources, Infrastructure & Services

Hospitality can be viewed as a share of land and resources, the longer the guest will stay, the more resources the host will need to share with its guest, which lay the foundation for the risk of tensions to arise. The presence of 1.5 million Syrian refugees has increased pressure on the infrastructure and social services lack the capacity to meet increased needs (LCRP 2019:11). According to Salam, tensions first began when people saw: *“the street filled with refugees and everything is dirty”* (Appx. 2.1.4 Salam). In 2014, the Ministry of Environment stated that waste disposal was increased by 40% particularly in Akkar and Bekaa and that 92% of the sewage was running into fresh water supplies due to an increased need for land, water, electricity and waste disposal. According to the ARK survey conducted in 2017, the data depicts that 93.9% of Lebanese respondents are certain that the Syrians are straining the resources, such as water and electricity (ARK 2017:30). From 2011-2015 the waste water pollution increased with 33% (UN 2014). One of the consequences of pollution is that it has reduced access to clean water for both local Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees (LCRP 2019:45). This is a clear example of how the share of land and resources has lead to a severe pressure on the sanitary conditions that the Lebanese government is not equipped to deal with. It is exactly the struggle for resources and pressure on infrastructure that led to initial tensions between local Lebanese and Syrian refugees, indicating an ontological insecurity related to the fear over the acquisition of basic needs.

According to the UNHCR hospitality has today decreased, *“(…) even in the most welcoming region to the refugee, you would start hearing about tensions in these regions, just due to the already existing problems in the country.”* (Appx. 3.1.2 UNHCR). The statement exemplifies that not only hospitality in Lebanon is decreasing, but that it is evident that tensions are increasing as well. This

can be seen in the light that Lebanon was a fragile country even prior to the Syrian crisis: *“It’s also important to flag that the country even pre-crisis, it’s a fragile country with a very poor infrastructure and with the number of refugees coming into the country.”* (Appx. 1.1.1 UNHCR). Ability to afford food and access to affordable healthcare and education leaves vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees in a situation where it is increasingly difficult to meet their basic needs (LCRP 2019:12). The pressure on health care services is yet another source of tension. In the extended LCRP report it is elaborated that there has been a difference in out-of-pocket expenses for primary healthcare between vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians. Some places provided money to support facilities and allowed subsidies to only Syrian refugees (ibid.105). This is backed up by the ARK survey which shows that competition for services and utilities is a tension trigger (ARK 2017:14).

The struggle for resources, infrastructure and service is only becoming exacerbated with high poverty rates. 28.5% of Lebanese and 68% of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line, living on less than \$2.50/day. Lebanese households are sinking deeper in debt. More than half of the Lebanese households have incurred debts in the last 24 months (LCRP 2019:12). When the Lebanese households run out of money, the host-community loses its ability to provide hospitality. The debt and housing issues have consequences for the vulnerable regions, *“(…) the majority of the influx of the refugees is inside the most farming and poor regions around the country. They are scattered around the country and in the most vulnerable regions.”* (Appx. 3.5.1 UNHCR). There is a particular ground for tensions in the areas with vulnerable people. It is especially in the areas of the Bekaa Valley (38%) and in the North of Lebanon (36%) that have the highest percentage of poverty across Lebanon. Further, the ARK survey found that the respondents in Bekaa and Akkar found this as the most cited tension with 94.6% of all respondents in the Bekaa area and 81.4% of respondents in Akkar (ARK 2017:14). Ever since the Syrian crisis, Lebanon has experienced a gradual shrinking of space for both livelihoods and income-generation. This has led to an inability of poor and displaced families to secure their basic needs and access social services (LCRP 2019:12). When the vulnerable Lebanese became the host for Syrian refugees, it increased the risk of social tensions, due to the fact that they both are struggling in social and economic terms. It is in these areas where poverty has increased the social tensions between the different communities and deepened the country’s socio-economic disparities (ibid.).

4.3.2 The Struggle for Jobs & Housing

At one hand, legal access to the labour market is an important step to make Syrian refugees self-reliant and reduce feelings of a loss of dignity, but on the other hand it is the competition over jobs that causes the main tensions between Syrian refugees and the Lebanese host communities. There is a widespread social anxiety about the potential of Syrian refugees to undercut the socio-economic position of host communities (AKTIS 2016). In the ARK survey both Syrian and Lebanese respondents reported 'competition for lower-skilled jobs as a primary source of tension with 61.6% of Lebanese and 52.1% of Syrians. Tensions at the job market thus needs to be seen in relation to poverty. According to a World Bank report from 2013, 170,000 Lebanese have been pushed into poverty solely as a result of the increased competition with Syrian refugees for jobs (World Bank 2013:4). When Syrian refugees are only allowed to work in three sectors; construction, agriculture and environment, the competition between vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees are particular prevalent (ARK 2017:20). Within these three sectors refugees tend to work at lower wages, which together with the job competition, creates tensions in the job market (Thorleifson 2016:1077; Care 2018:7).

Visiting the NGO Sawa in Bekaa, Sawa could only confirm that they did experience tensions due to job competition in the Bekaa area (Appx. 7.5.3; 7.5.4 Sawa). However, Sawa contradicts this by also stating that the tensions are very limited between Lebanese and Syrian refugees in the Bekaa valley, because even though there is a high amount of vulnerable Lebanese 38%, it is also an area that is highly pro-Syrian. Both Sawa and Women Now, who work in the Bekaa area, state that there is overall a good relation between Lebanese and Syrians (Appx. 7.5.11 Sawa; Appx. 4.5.6 Women Now). In other words, it is interesting and almost paradoxical that Bekaa, which contain the most vulnerable communities and experience increased tensions on the job market, possess a more welcoming mentality due to their cultural ties. This highlights how cultural ties and a history of migration network can ease tensions in areas where it would be expected.

To grasp the tensions due to job competition on a civil level it is first relevant to look into why this is so widespread in the first place. A main argument is that it is a result of the Lebanese policies of non-encampment of Syrian refugees. The non-encampment policies have in fact led to informal settlements, which has led to poor conditions within the settlements. This entices the Syrian refugees to enter the labor market in the country, because they are forced to merge into the job market to survive (Turner 2015:388). Thus, Turner argues that it is the non-encampment in Lebanon that has caused inter-communal tensions on the job market between locals and refugees (ibid.). If the

government on the other hand signed the Convention and Protocol, as well as formalized camps, it would lead to the centralization of the refugee camps, which would then segregate the refugees from the host-community, thus, not having to compete over scarce resources as well as jobs. This would relieve the economic pressure put on these local communities and in theory provide a safer environment for refugees (ibid.99; Thorleifsson 2016:1074).

Another tension is related to the housing and accommodation. 60% of Syrian refugees live in private housing (ReliefWeb 2016). This is mainly a result of the informal settlements that create poor conditions forcing the refugees to interact in society and find private housing. The demand for accommodation has been on the rise proportionally with the influx of refugees, which is increasing rental prices. Refugees are obliged to pay high prices for small shelters, or shared apartments with other families, because the alternative is to move to other informal camps, abandoned buildings or tented settlements (ILO 2014:16). Many Syrian refugees have reported that Lebanese landlords are exploiting the increased demand for housing by raising the rent. The refugees have thus lived in constant fear that their inability to pay rent would result in their eviction (Thorleifsson 2016:1075). Lebanese landlords are taking advantage of this desperate situation that refugees are in according to House of Peace:

The landlord takes advantage of the Syrian, because they are not covered – they don't have a residency. So they take advantage of the Syrians, steal their money, make them repair the house and then they kick them out. (...) Its affecting everyone, because of the numbers of refugees. We don't have a law that protects us as renters, so the houses are inflating. For example, my room is 500\$ and it used to be 300\$.

- Appx. 1.1.13 House of Peace

In fact, when Lebanese landlords take advantage of the Syrian refugees it is hostility in disguise. On one hand, the landlords are providing a home for the Syrian refugees by choosing to rent to Syrian refugees over Lebanese, which at the surface can be perceived as hospitality. However, because landlords are taking advantage of the fact that Syrian refugees have no insurance or rental right, renting out to Syrian refugees is more due to economic motivations than hospitality- hospitality is becoming commoditized. Humanitarian agencies are paying local families to host Syrian refugees for a limited period of time, usually for a year (Carpi & Senoguz 2018:130). The refugee becomes a

commodity that Lebanese can benefit financially from instead of being a guest. The competition for housing between Lebanese and Syrian refugees and the rising housing prices, also helps to explain why over half of the Lebanese do not wish to welcome more Syrians into the country (Fafo Poll 2013 in Thorleifsson 2016:1078)). Over two-thirds Lebanese believe it is the UN agencies responsibility to establish refugee camps for Syrians instead of accommodating them and hence blame the international community for not carrying out the economic cost of housing the Syrian refugees (ibid.).

4.3.3 The Sectarian Imbalance

Beirut is one of the areas where Muslims and Christians live side by side. However, more than two decades after the Civil war East Beirut is still dominated by mostly Christians and West Beirut primarily Muslims. In most other neighborhoods villages also remain largely segregated divided by different confessions. According to the ARK survey 60.1% of all vulnerable Lebanese and 59.1% of all non-vulnerable Lebanese find political and sectarian conflicts as one of the most important issues that exacerbates tensions in Lebanon (ARK 2017:20). The influx of Syrian refugees has triggered fears about the presence of a large number of Sunni Syrian refugees that could tip the sectarian balance. This needs to be seen in the light of the sectarian nature of Lebanon of where the confessionalist political system is vulnerable towards sectarian interests. With a Maronite Catholic as the president and Commander of the army, the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Parliament, a Shi'a Muslim, sectarian elites are bargaining intensely for resources and positions for their own communities (Nelson 2013:353). Hence, the amount of Syrian Sunni refugees threatens to tip the sectarian balance in favor of Sunni political parties in Lebanon, which challenges the demographic balance against the interests of Christian and Shi'a political groups (Care 2018:5). This is shifting the power dynamic for Shi'a and Christian parties that could potentially lead to another Civil war (Thorleifsson 2016:1074). The influx of Sunni Muslims, compounded with Christians that have moved abroad, have begun to erode the Christian political power (Al Jazeera 06.05.17). The UNHCR addresses that the refugee crisis has become highly politicized, expressing how fragile sectarian balance is:

(...) they [*Christians and the Shiite*] see the refugees as a threat to this balance, because they are Sunnis and they think that they could become in addition to the already existing Sunnis in Lebanon and therefore the Sunni-community will

become a very important majority and that they would lose political influence as a result.

- Appx. 3.1.3 UNHCR

The permanency and lengthened presence of Syrian refugees has only increased the ontological insecurity. 52% of the Lebanese perceive Syrian refugees as a threat to the national stability and security (Fafo Poll 2013 in Christophersen et al 2013), exemplifies the fear amongst Lebanese of a tipping of the sectarian balance. Sami Nader, a renowned Lebanese analyst, criticized this fear mongering but also stressed that in such a small country like Lebanon, numbers do matter because Lebanon cannot absorb all the Sunnis saying *“Already we have 300,000 Sunni Palestinian refugees. We have to maintain an equilibrium between the different sectarian groups, and absorbing the Sunni Syrians would call for a reconsideration of the Lebanese formula and at the cost of the form of the state as it is now.”* (Vohra 31.07.19). This cannot be isolated from the fear of another civil war that lies within Lebanese causing an existential ontological insecurity.

4.3.4 Conclusion

The pressure on resources, infrastructure and services has triggered an ontological insecurity in the Lebanese host-community, concerning the ability to obtain basic needs. The Syrian refugees being restricted to work within three sectors has increased the job competition between vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees decreasing wages as a result. The informal encampment has led Syrian refugees to be spread out in the local communities of Lebanon increasing competition for housing. Lastly, the confessionalist system has led Lebanon to remain largely segregated, divided by different confessions, supported by a confessional democracy favoring sectarian groups. This has created the conditions in which leaves the Lebanese host-community vulnerable toward a massive influx of Syrian Sunni Muslims in fear of tipping the sectarian balance. The tensions are conflicts that increase hostility on a civil level exacerbating othering processes, where scapegoating, stereotyping and stigma can occur.

4.4 The Stigmas of Syrian Refugees

One way of capturing how othering processes has led to hostility towards Syrian refugees is by investigating the stereotyping narratives that surround Syrian refugees on a civil and structural level. When Syrian refugees are stigmatized and scapegoated it adds to the growing distance between the host and guest communities, in turn, increases conflict. Stigma is related to misconceptions and stereotypes regarding Syrian refugees and differs from tensions, because stigma is reflecting a perceived truth by the Lebanese. For NGOs to intervene without doing harm, it is important for them to know the context of exactly how hostility towards Syrian refugees is manifested through scapegoating and stigma. Where scapegoating relates to placing guilt and responsibility towards Syrian refugees, to free host-community from guilt, stigma is used to reveal which deviant behavior, or unwanted attribute, the Syrian refugees carry that is not perceived in accordance to Lebanese values and norms of living.

4.4.1 ‘Syrian Refugees are a Security Threat’

In 2017 84.3% of the Lebanese respondents believed that Syrian refugees pose a security threat (ARK 2017:30). This might stem from the fear of radicalized autonomous Palestinian camps, however, it is when criminality is linked to ‘being Syrian’ that it becomes a stigma. House of Peace argues that the Syrian tradition of gathering in large numbers is now associated with security concerns:

(...) As Lebanese we maybe gather with the family for tea or coffee, but for Syrians they are used to gather in a big number. 20-25 people just to have a coffee, and for us it is a security issue, because we are not used to seeing 25 men having a coffee together unless there is a problem.

- Appx. 1.1.4 House of Peace

This quote represents a view that some Lebanese view large gatherings of men as a negative social-cultural practice, becomes the discrediting and undesirable attribute. (Cf. Foucault in Hannem 2012:21; Goffman 1963:3). The Lebanese are not used to this behavior, which triggers a fear and discomfort, an ontological insecurity, linking the deviant behavior to security issues.

However, fear does not always match reality, this is reflected in a survey conducted by International Alert in 2014. 75% of the Lebanese respondents felt less secure than they did before the

Syrian crisis, but only 15% of these respondents had personally experienced security incidents with Syrian refugees. In another survey conducted in 2015, 54% of the Lebanese do not feel safe compared to the 26% of the Syrian respondents, even though Syrians have experienced more assaults than the Lebanese (Alsharabati, & Nammour 2015:3). This difference between fear and reality indicates that the perceptions “*seem to be the product of inaccurate word of mouth*” (International Alert 2015:4). Regardless if the presence of Syrian refugees has increased crime, it is when the deviant behaviour of ‘criminality’ attributed to ‘Syrian culture’ that the narrative becomes violent and risks doing harm, as the social isolation (Cf. Friedman 13.05.14) can lead to tensions and conflict between the host-community and the Syrian refugee guest.

4.4.2 ‘Syrians have other Values & Lifestyles’

Another main narrative about Syrian refugees is that they are perceived as having a ‘different culture and mentality’ (Carpi 27.10.16). According to the ARK survey only 41.4% of the Lebanese respondents found that Lebanese and Syrians share many values and have compatible lifestyles, compared to 60.2% of the Syrian respondents (ARK 2017:30). More Lebanese respondents view the Syrians as culturally different than compared to Syrian respondents in the survey. However, it is interesting that some Syrian refugees do consider their own values and lifestyle different compared to Lebanese, which dilutes their cultural ties. In the Fafo Poll survey, it further shows that it is especially the younger Lebanese respondents who believe that Syrians have another culture and mentality (Thorleifsson 2016:1079). This can be explained due to the younger generation of Lebanese feeling less connected to Syrians through historical and cultural ties.

One example of Syrian refugees being an ‘incompatible part’ in Lebanese culture is the Syrian tradition for kinship. Syrians mainly use their elderly to interfere in problem resolution for family disputes. The nature of refugees fleeing their country of origin (ibid.1075) has, in many cases separated families from one another. The Lebanese landlords have now become the defacto elder in Syrian households. House of Peace addresses that using a landlord as resolute figure is very different from Lebanese way of living, who solve their own problems or let the police intervene (Appx. 1.1.5-1.1.7 House of Peace). This indicates that Lebanese perceive Syrians as dependent on others, which can lead to a stigma relating Syrian refugees to a helpless, dependent person unable to resolve issues.

4.4.3 ‘Syrians are Conservative’

In general there is an underlying belief that Syrian refugees are conservative Sunni Muslims in comparison to open-minded Lebanese and that *“most of the Syrian refugees are Sunni Muslim, and their conservatism is seen as culturally insular and religiously backward by many Lebanese, particularly Christian Lebanese (Vohra 31.07.19).* This idea of Syrians being conservative and ‘backward’ is also reflected in the Shatila Refugee Camp, where a Palestinian teacher commented on Syrian women: *“Syrian women are more conservative. They work more in housekeeping, cooking and taking care of the children and nothing more. Palestinian women are more free and more active”* (Appx. 8.3.13 Informal Interviews). This can be seen as scapegoating because she projects the internal frustration to console a sense of affirmation and self-righteous indignation of aspects in her own situation in Shatila, towards the Syrians, whom she can safely aggress without consequences because they are in an even more vulnerable situation than Palestinians (Cf. Allport 1954:350). The Palestinian teacher did not recognize that most Syrian women actually have adapted to Lebanese culture, due to the fact that the Syrian women now live close to strangers – including men who are not their relatives. Hence, their new situation has forged new social networks, as well as a new reversal of traditional gendered roles (Thorleifson 2016:1075f). The teacher from CYC further believed that Syrian kids were different from Palestinian kids: *“they [Syrian] are having harder time to learn for instance math, because they memorize only, rather than using analytical skills, which Palestinian kids are better at.”* (Appx. 8.3.15 Teacher CYC). This quote can be seen as an implicit stigma. She did not try to address that mental illness, trauma and fleeing a country, due to the Syrian war and refugee situation, could be a factor that disrupted their education. Instead what is reflected is the differentiation between Syrian and Palestinian children's learning abilities being attributed to a nationality rather than displacement. This reflects a hidden stigma, where Syrian children are ostracized educationally simply because of being ‘Syrian.’ In general stigmas of Syrian women and their children are prevalent inside the camp.

4.4.4 ‘Syrians have a Large Number of Children’

The idea of Syrians being culturally different is further reflected in the idea that Syrians have a ‘large number of children’ (Carpi 27.10.16). The NGO Salam supported this narrative, stating that Syrian women are more inclined to high birth rates compared to Palestinians, whom he perceives more similar to Lebanese than with Syrians:

The Syrians are different you know. The Palestinian family is very similar to Lebanese family. One woman three or four children. But when you look in a Syrian settlement, there are so many people. Three or four women and twenty children.

- Appx. 2.1.10 Salam

Nonetheless, the idea of Syrian women getting six to seven children is a false stereotype, since Syrian women have only 2,92 children on average, which is only 1,23 children more than Lebanese women (Verdensbanken 2016). It is an example of prejudice – an aversive or hostile attitude towards a group, simply because one belongs to the group (Cf. Allport 1954:7). It also stresses how Salam is reproducing false stereotypes, which can be considered as doing harm, if this is reflected in interactions with Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

4.4.5 ‘Syrian Refugees are Different from Other Syrians’

In order to grasp the stigma of the Syrian refugees, it is interesting to dig into the differentiation between being ‘Syrian’ and a ‘Syrian refugee.’ For example a local Lebanese man at a bar said: “*Yes of course I have Syrian and Palestinian friends, but they are different than the refugees*” (Appx. 8.3.8 Informal Interviews). The translator from Sawa supports this by stating that his Syrian boss, Mr. Marshall, also experienced this differentiation in interactions with his Lebanese friends:

Every time they talk about the problems that Syrian refugees are accused of, they say to Mr. Marshal that he is different. But he is Syrian, how is he different from the rest? This is not flattery. (...) They [*Lebanese*] see a difference, everyone says that my [*Syrian*] friends are good. They are not generalizing, but specifying their friends that “my friends are different from the refugees”.

- Appx. 7.3.11; 7.3.17 Sawa

In these examples, it is the label of being a ‘refugee’ that is something that is inferior and deviant, not solely because one is Syrian. The idea of ‘Syrian refugees’ being different than ‘Syrians’ can be explained by the lack of meaningful interactions between Lebanese and Syrian refugee which leads to the othering that is exemplified in the quotes. This is supported in the statistic that shows that

41.8% of the Lebanese interact with ‘Syrian refugees’ on a daily basis but that the level of meaningful interactions remains very low (Thorleifsson 2016:1079). When the guest host relationship lacks meaningful interaction and becomes superficial, one can then see how the othering of the Syrian refugee here can take place. Thus, providing a safe space for host and guest to meet is a way of improving meaningful interactions as a way to improve empathy and solidarity between one another (Care 2018:10).

On the other hand, Syrians who have immigrated before the Syrian crisis are perceived differently. Another local Lebanese called Elia tries to explain this: “(...) *So immigrants have money, this is why they don't have a problem with them, on the contrary they become their friends*” (Appx. 8.3.6 Informal Interviews). Thus, a guest that contributes to the economy and the Lebanese society are perceived different than those who only come to draw from limited resources without contributing in return. Furthermore, the Syrian immigrants that have been in Lebanon for generations might have assimilated to the host-community and thus are perceived more as hosts than guests, whereas the refugees are still perceived as new temporary guests, who take rather than contribute (Cf. pressure on infrastructure, services and job competition).

4.4.6 ‘Syrians are in Favor of Child Labour & Child Marriages’

A narrative that reflects the idea that Syrians are different is that they are in favor of child labour, “*For Lebanese they think that Syrians are used to child labour that it is a part of their culture and that they promote child labour.*” (Appx. 1.1.9 House of Peace). Being ‘promoters’ of child labour insinuates that Syrians are morally corrupted by not only letting their own children work but also promoting it to others. From walking down the narrow streets in Shatila Refugee Camp one could observe many Syrian kids working in vegetable markets or small manakish shops. Also observed in the streets of Beirut were children selling gum for \$1, polishing shoes, as well as many young children begging on the streets. These observations of children working, to some extent identify the foundation of the prejudicial narrative of child labor. However, what can be questioned is if this is something that lies within the Syrian culture or if it is a mere result of desperation. House of Peace stresses that the reason behind this is that Syrian children have previously worked in Syria, because this was a necessity for survival:

[In Syria] Men can't work, because if they go out all the time they will be captured by the police, that is why they always send woman and children to go

work because they can more easily move, and that is why child labour in the Syrian community is large. They will not stop a woman or a child on the street.

- Appx. 1.1.9 House of Peace

Child labour still occurs in the Syrian refugee community in Lebanon due to economic pressures of being a refugee. It is not enough with just the income generated by the parents, which is forcing children to work in order to sustain the family's needs (Appx. 4.4.3 Women Now). In Shatila, it was evident that children work due to lack of proper education and future prospects. This at least give the children skills so they can survive and keep them away from the streets (Appx. 8.3.10 Informal Interviews).

According to an UN interagency coordination document, child labor has tripled in Lebanon from 2009 till 2016. Furthermore, it is stated that 6.7% of Syrian children from ages 5-17 are engaged in child labor, compared to Lebanese children at 6% (UN interagency coordination 2018:1f). This shows that child labour is not particular only for Syrians, but is a general problem in Lebanon as to why it cannot be seen as a part of Syrian culture. An example of the false stereotype is an experience with a female Lebanese taxi driver who closed the window and avoided all eye contact with a 7-8 year old Syrian girl approaching the car, *"This is a Syrian girl, a Lebanese girl would never beg for others money"* (Appx. 8.3.1 Informal Interviews). This is a clear example of how 'begging' is perceived as a deviant behavior attributed to Syrian children, not Lebanese, even though Lebanese children work almost just as much as Syrians. The taxi driver's avoidance of eye contact, and clear differentiation and othering of Syrian girls, can be seen as the observable evidence of stigma.

Another narrative of Syrians being stigmatized as morally corrupt is the Syrian practice of child marriage. Child marriage is considered a violation of human rights (UNHCR 22.07.19), supporting that it is normative seen as morally wrong among Lebanese. Rates of Syrian child marriage has dramatically increased during and after the Syrian crisis (Saja et al 2018:3). During a workshop for Syrian refugees, Salam experienced that, *"Most of them [Syrian refugee girls] were married when they were between 12-14 years old."* (Appx. 2.1.11 Salam). Salam states that child marriage is related to being 'Syrian,' *"This is how it is with people from Syria. Here in Lebanon there are no women married in that early age"* (Appx. 2.1.11 Salam). Instead of addressing *why* Syrian women marry at an early age, this representative from Salam assumes that it is a cultural thing and thus implicitly are stigmatizing Syrian contributing to potential conflict. In general, when Lebanese are differentiating

themselves from Syrians on cultural differences that are perceived as morally corrupt, it is decreasing the cultural intimacy between Syria and Lebanon, because Lebanese are now externally criticizing Syrian culture, of what the Syrians are to feel embarrassed or ashamed of (Cf. Herzfeld 2016:7). However, one can question if the increasing rates of Syrian child marriage is attached to Syrian culture or something that occurs:

When resources become limited, some Syrian families find themselves forced to marry away their adolescent girls earlier than they would have otherwise, believing that a good husband will offer their daughter protection, better than what her father or male guardian could provide.

- Saja et al. 2018:3

Even though rates of child marriage dramatically increased during the Syrian Crisis it is not something related to culture, but to insecurity, since armed conflict, natural disasters or displacement and vulnerability are the reasons that child marriage becomes more prevalent in the society (ibid.).

4.4.7 ‘Syrian Women are Stealing Lebanese Husbands’

There also exists a common narrative about Syrian women stealing Lebanese husbands and that the husband would choose a Syrian woman as his second wife (Appx. 1.1.11 House of Peace; Thorleifsson 2016:1079). The figurative choice of the word ‘steal’ again implies that Syrian women have a lack of moral as an undesirable characteristic, which becomes the stigma. Another example of Syrian women being in lack of morality and self-control is shown in the Fafo Poll, where several Lebanese male informants described how Syrian women had literally ‘thrown themselves on them.’ This is supported by prejudices about Syrian women being ‘cheaper’ than the Lebanese women (Mahzooni 2018:15). These prejudices are not only putting them at a higher risk of being exposed to harassment and assaults, it is also a way to stigmatize the Syrian women as being ‘cheap’.

Without intermarriage statistics it is not possible to deduct if the polygamous intermarriage between Lebanese men and Syrian women is actually based in reality. Nevertheless, the claim of Syrian women marrying Lebanese men seems contradictory considering that 82% of the Lebanese population feel uncomfortable marrying a Syrian (Fafo Poll 2013 in Thorleifsson 2016:1079) and that 73.1% of Lebanese do not want their family members to marry a Syrian (ARK 2017:21). This

indicates that the idea of Syrian women stealing Lebanese husbands reflects prejudices and hence is a false stereotype. However, House of Peace does confirm that when there exist intermarriages, the Syrian is often the second wife. Nevertheless, when a Syrian woman end up marrying a Lebanese man, it is not due to her culture as elaborated by House of Peace:

[The Syrian] refugee will think that at least she can live, not with dignity, but at least she can eat before she sleeps. (...) We have a lot of marriages between Lebanese men and Syrian women and usually Syrian women is the second wife. Why? Because for the Lebanese man, he doesn't need to pay a lot (...) and Syrian women will accept anything because she is very poor and a refugee.

- Appx. 1.1.11 House of Peace

4.4.8 'Syrians are Stealing our Jobs'

Syrian men do not escape the stigma of thievery either, as they are accused of stealing Lebanese jobs (Care 2018: 7; Appx. 5.3.1 DRC; Appx. 2.3.4 Salam; Appx. 4.1.3 Women Now). According to the Fafo Poll, 98% of the Lebanese believe that the Syrian refugees are taking their jobs and reducing wages (Fafo Poll 2013 in Thorleifsson 2016:1078). The general accusation of Syrians stealing also implies that they have a lack of morality, as if it was their intention to 'take' something that does not belong to them, attributing them as being 'thieves.' However, this stigma is strongly questioned by Salam, Women Now and DRC. Salam stressed that it is very rare that Lebanese are unemployed (Appx. 2.3.4 Salam). An unemployment rate on 5% is considered "normal" and since the Lebanese unemployment rate is 6.2%, it cannot be deducted that Lebanon has a particularly high unemployment rate (Trading Economics; Economic Research). The myth about high unemployment rates, is not accurate, but still we ran into the myth in a conversation with Karim, a Lebanese bartender, who is employed, but yet seems to be drained from hope for the future: *"I want to move to Germany to study computer engineering, because it is so difficult to get a job here. The unemployment is so high and there is no future"* (Appx. 8.1.1 Informal Interviews).

DRC and Women Now further deconstructs the myth, stating that it is not based on evidence, but rather on people's own ideas, since the Syrians mostly are employed in the three sectors that Lebanese people do not want to work in to begin with (Appx. 5.3.1 DRC; Appx. 4.1.3 Women Now). DRC refers to the non-vulnerable Lebanese, because it is mainly the vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian

refugees who compete for jobs in the three sectors, covering jobs considered as ‘Dirty, Dangerous and Difficult’ and therefore undesired by non-vulnerable Lebanese citizens (Cf. ARK 2017:20; Care 2018:16). It is interesting that DRC states that it is the non-vulnerable Lebanese who reproduce myths about the refugees – those Lebanese who are not affected by the Syrians taking their jobs. It exemplifies how people can have a strong opinion about the other, even though they are not directly affected by them in their own life. On the other hand, in Bekaa, that has most vulnerable Lebanese and are actually competing with Syrian refugees over the same jobs, are more hospitable towards Syrian refugees. Even though this is related to the cultural ties to Syria, it can also be seen as an expression that because they are more exposed to Syrian refugees by working with them in the same sectors, hence they have more and deeper interactions with Syrians, which reduces prejudice and increases empathy (Cf. Care 2018:10).

Syrians are not only accused of stealing jobs, but are also blamed for driving down wages. However, Elia, a local Lebanese stressed it is not the Syrian but the business owners, who “(...) *exploit and use Syrian refugees because they work more hours for cheaper*” (Appx. 8.3.5 Informal Interviews). In addition, Salam addresses that there are no rules and protections for Syrian refugees compared to Lebanese, which means that Syrians will get the cheaper jobs because they have no contract and no rights and cannot go to the police if they get exploited by the business owners (Appx. 2.1.5 Salam). This is supported by Care, who argues that the refugees are willing to work for lower wages, which makes them more attractive for business owners, outcompeting Lebanese workers. This is because only 0.5% of refugees of working age in Lebanon have work permits (Care 2018:7;15), which puts the Syrian refugees in a desperate situation, having no other choice than to take what they are offered. For Syrian refugees to be allowed to work in Lebanon, the refugee must first be registered with UNHCR and have legal residency, which 74% respondents from The 2017 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees surveyed do not have (ibid.15). When Syrian refugees get legal residency they must find a ‘Kafeel’ (sponsor) in order to work (ibid.). Further, Syrian refugees are not allowed to be self-employed but must find a Lebanese business partner, who will be the legal owner on paper (ibid.18). In other words, the Lebanese business owner can take advantage of the lack of rights and contracts as an excuse to negotiate lower wages (ibid.16). Instead of blaming the Lebanese business owners for the internal frustration that unemployment can cause, the Syrian refugees becomes the scapegoat – the ones being responsible for the insecure economic situation in Lebanon (Thorleifsson 2016:1072).

4.4.9 ‘Syrian Refugees are Polluting our Country’

Lebanese also accuse Syrians of polluting Lebanon, addressed by UNHCR and Women Now (Appx. 3.3.2 UNHCR; 4.1.3 Women Now). Again it implies that Syrian refugees are in lack of moral and ethics as if they intentionally pollute the country, insinuating that they do not care about their host-community. Salam agrees that there is a problem with Syrian polluting:

They [*Syrian refugees*] can’t just be built [*informal settlements*] in the middle of the village or beside the river, because they put all the rice water in the river and make it dirty. You need to organize the room for people.

- Appx. 2.3.3 Salam

However, whether Syrian refugees are actually polluting the country is strongly questioned by UNHCR and Sawa. UNHCR says that the number of informal settlements, that Salam refers to is very small, “*I mean the number was so small. I can’t even tell you, but it is a very minimal number. Maybe less than 30 or around this.*” (Appx. 3.3.2 UNHCR). It has not been possible to back this up by statistics, but Sawa argues that the percentage of pollution directly linked to Syrian refugees is only about 10% (Appx. 7.3.10 Sawa). It is further supported by a report stating that, “*The miscellany of land uses in the river basin, notably the agricultural, makes it vulnerable to many pollution aspects* (Moussa et al.:2014:280). Following this report, agriculture in Lebanon seems to be one of the core factors to polluting water, not informal settlements with Syrian refugees. Of course increased agricultural pollution can be seen as a response to refugee influx increasing the demand for food, but it is not directly the Syrian refugees who are polluting. If Syrian refugees are being connected to environmental issues in Lebanon, it can help to explain how they are perceived by the host-community of Lebanese, “*(...) they [Lebanese] see the street filled with refugees and everything is dirty.*” (Appx. 2.1.4 Salam). The connection between being a ‘Syrian refugee’ and being ‘dirty’ or ‘pollutant’, is further confirmed by a teacher in Shatila, who states that “*There are sanitation problems with Syrian kids – their parents do not shower them. They are more dirty than Palestinians.*” (Appx. 8.3.16 Informal Interviews). Her idea of Syrian being dirty only fuels the idea that Syrians are polluting Lebanon.

4.4.10 The Consequences of Stigma

When Syrian refugees are stigmatized by its host-community, it has the consequence of increasing the distance between host and guest and increasing hostility. This can partly be reflected in the ARK survey, where 54% of Lebanese said that they do not want to share a workplace with a Syrian. 48.6% of Lebanese do not want to live next door to a Syrian family, compared to only 4.9% of Syrians who would find living next door to Lebanese disagreeable. 57.8% of Lebanese do not want to find their children attending school with Syrian children, compared to only 7.3% of Syrians (ARK 2017:22). The statistics highlight that there is a tendency for Lebanese to prefer physical and social segregation from Syrian refugees and their children. On the other hand, the majority of Syrian respondents do not want to be segregated from the Lebanese community. This indicates that it is the host's perception of the guest that is hostile and not the other way around. When the Lebanese host-community are distancing themselves from the Syrian refugees, it reflects the above stigmas presented that Syrians are carrying (Cf. Friedman 13.05.14), which risks isolation of Syrian refugees from the greater society and can exacerbate tensions due to prejudicial increases and empathy becomes reduced by decreasing interactions. When Syrian refugees are being scapegoated for the increased insecurity related to economic, social and security failures in Lebanon (Thorleifsson 2016:1071), it is important to mention that scapegoating is actually counter-productive. The displacing of aggression into a scapegoat might provide a feeling of relieving frustrations, but it does not defeat the root causes to the frustration. On the other hand, it increases tensions and polarizes the society, which prepares the ground for conflicts. The existing stigmas and scapegoating is reminding us that there are severe challenges, which NGOs need to be aware of, in order to not do harm in a conflictual context. However, the NGOs should not only to be aware of stigma and scapegoating on a civil level, but it is also worth considering that the stigmas occur at a structural level seen in governmental rhetoric, policies and acts.

4.4.11 The Government Accuses Syrian Refugees for Causing Cancer

The idea of Syrians polluting the country is not only evident among Lebanese host-communities, it is also supported by the government. Sawa stresses that the government is inventing stories about rubbish in Beirut related to refugees (Appx. 7.3.8 Sawa). The government associates rubbish and trash with 'cancer' and in a public speech they "(...) *accused Syrians of spreading cancer.*" (Appx. 7.3.10 Sawa). The government's narrative about Syrian refugees is a strong example of the Lebanese government using the Syrian refugees as a scapegoat for the governmental short-comings. A compost

project in North Lebanon has been attributed to polluting fresh water supplies causing high levels of toxicity. The pollution of the fresh water has also been linked to an increase in cancer fatalities in the area. It is through governmental corruption that has kept this compost project operational and by exploiting the Syrian stigma held by Lebanese, the government has scapegoated the Syrian refugees by shifting the blame from their failure to safely run a compost project to attributing it to the refugee who is causing the pollution and cancer (Jay 11.05.19). Other examples are Syrians being portrayed like 'parasites' because they are accused of using up health care, education and other resources, as well as having a negative environmental impact (Vohra 31.07.19). When the Lebanese Government is using rhetoric such as linking cancer, parasites and trash to the fact that people are from Syria it becomes a structural stigma, because it suggests they are a disease to a healthy environment. However, the governmental narrative of Syrians polluting is not accurate, as the pollution issue already existed before the Syrian crisis (Appx. 3.1.2 UNHCR). House of Peace further argues that as a response to the pollution problem:

The Lebanese government protects themselves by accusing the refugees. That the refugees from the camps are throwing the trash in the river and they also accused NGOs that they are the reason behind this.

- Appx. 1.1.2 House of Peace

This is an example of the governmental scapegoating of the Syrian refugees. Instead of addressing the agriculture as the main reason for pollution (Cf. Moussa et al.2014:280), they blame the refugees for being responsible for the pollution. They can draw upon the negative rhetoric about refugees being dirty and unsanitary people associated to 'cancer' as a way to easily convince the public that it is the fault of the Syrian refugees. This has allowed the Lebanese government to use the refugees as a political scapegoat for their own pitfalls, when it comes to sanitarian infrastructure degradation. Negative rhetoric around Syrian refugees are not just words as it can lead to and legitimize action. According to the Arabian television station Aljazeera, there has recently been a case in Lebanon alongside the Litany river, where the government approved LRA to demolish Syrian informal settlements. Using bulldozers they drove out 1,500 Syrian refugees out from an informal settlement with the argument that the refugees are polluting the water (Vohra 27.04.19). Sami Alawieh, the current director of the Litani River Authority (LRA) claimed that, "*If the refugees erect tents on our*

agricultural land and their waste seeps into the ground and the river, then, of course, we need to move them." (ibid.). This narrative framed in the media of refugees sounds plausible due to the concern of environment as a way to secure sanitary conditions. However, as previously stressed, the pollution in the Litani River it is not proved to be related to the informal settlements, but is due to the agriculture in this area where "*(...) agricultural pollutants are tremendous, with a special emphasis on fertilizer*" (Moussa et al.:2014:280). Thus, this action can be seen as a consequence of a structural stigma.

4.4.12 'The Government Blames the Syrians for Taking Lebanese Jobs'

The idea of Syrians stealing jobs is also reflected within the Lebanese government. According to Salam: "*(...) the government of Lebanese people blames the Syrians for taking their jobs.*" (Appx. 1.4.1 Salam). Supported by the public sentiment, where Lebanese believe Syrian refugees are stealing their jobs, it justifies the governmental decision to close down Syrian businesses. For example recently the government has "*(...) imposed crackdowns on some of Beirut's hippest cafes, bars, and restaurants, threatening employers with hefty fines unless they either fire their Syrian staff or ensure they have long-term residence and work permits.*" (Vohra 31.07.19). By closing Syrian businesses and denying legal protection in the labour market, it leaves the Syrian refugees in a position where they can do little in creating a sustainable livelihood. This is an example of how the stigma that Syrian refugees carry as being morally corrupt by stealing jobs and Lebanese governments restriction of labour rights are mutually justifying each other.

Another example is the Ministry of Labour's decision to close all Syrian Business in the agricultural area Akkar, leaving the Syrian refugees not even allowed to have a bank account, thus preventing them from the option to get any legal loan (Care 2018:19). According to Care this act can be viewed as an arbitrary decision which is obstructing the Syrian refugee's ability to make a living (ibid.). This can also be reflected in our interview with House of Peace: "*(...) It is because the government is not giving them a work permit.*" (Appx. 1.2.8 House of Peace). This is related to the governmental decision in 2015 to stop UNHCR registration which means that they cannot gain a work permit unless they pay a residency fee, which many cannot afford. In general the lack of paperwork poses a risk of deportation back to Syria (Vohra 31.07.19).

4.4.13 ‘Hallas We Are Done, People Should Go Back’

The negative perceptions of Syrian refugees are also exploited by the Lebanese authorities in their insistence that Syrian refugees should not stay in Lebanon for much longer (Care 2018:5). One of the main goals in the 2014 October policy was to encourage Syrian refugees to go back to Syria by closing borders and reducing access to Lebanese territories (Janmyr 2016:59). This policy shows how political instruments are increasing difficulty for Syrians entering the country, but it is only one step. The October policy has supported the public debate and rhetoric, being increasingly in favor of compelling the return of refugees (Care 2018:4). This political narrative is strengthening the Lebanese view that Syrians Refugees should go back, which is stated by Women Now “*there is a narrative that is getting very violent against the Syrian refugees. Now the political narrative is that Syrians should go back. ‘Hallas we are done, people should go back’.*” (Appx. 4.3.1 Women Now). House of Peace addresses that right now the main problem that most parties want to raise is “*the forced return of the refugees. Is it time to go back? Is it safe to go back? So soon you will see magic in the media* (Appx. 1.3.3 House of Peace). The media in Lebanon is not independent, the Lebanese media system has a wide spectrum of TV stations, radio and newspapers. TV stations in Lebanon cannot sustain themselves in the Lebanese market making them dependent on political donors, “*who use the outlets as their mouthpieces rendering the media system not only very pluralistic, but also highly politicized.*” (Alsharq-Team 09.11.17). This is not only a problem in relation to political incentives towards refoulement of Syrian refugees, but has a risk of exacerbating conflict in terms of all tensions and stigmas identified. Sawa did also support that governmental speech and Lebanese media is a forum for negative narratives around Syrian refugees (Appx. 7.3.1 Sawa). The UNHCR stresses how “*One speech on the media can backfire and bring you back to previous conditions.*” (Appx. 3.3.5 UNHCR). This has convinced Sawa that “*Changing the media, changing the narratives or stories that are portrayed in the media.*” (Appx. 7.3.14 Sawa), viewed as an important step in preventing conflicts.

Nevertheless, forcing Syrian refugees to go back is a direct violation of international humanitarian rights, because non-refoulement means that if the government is forcing refugees back without any guarantee of safety, regardless of whether they have signed the refugee convention or not, is a clear breaking of an international norm (OHCHR 22.07.19:1; Appx. 5.4.2 DRC). Even though the government is not allowed to return Syrian refugees, they can legally tiptoe around the non-refoulement through indirect push factors, as addressed by House of Peace:

(...) when UNHCR stops registration by complying with Lebanese governmental policy, in turn creates a push factor towards Syrian refugees. When you don't give them residency it is a push factor and when you stop aid it is a push factor. Security and anything is a push factor. So this is kind of forced return.

- Appx. 1.4. 5 House of Peace

Another way of circumventing the non-refoulement is when 'The Free Patriotic Movement,' the political party of President Michel Aoun and Foreign Minister Bassil, are distributing flyers stating that Syria is safe for return and urging citizens to report Syrians working illegally (US News 16.06.19). The government has officially maintained that Syria is safe for return, ignoring reports stating that Syria is not yet a safe country with unabated arrests, torture, and conscription under Bashar al-Assad's regime (Vohra 31.07.19; UN Security Council 2019:1). House of Peace supports this by stating that "*the media and the Lebanese and Syrian government are trying to promote that returns are safe – which is bullshit.*" (Appx. 1.4.4 House of Peace). DRC states that is *quite hard to get concrete evidence* that the government is deporting Syrian refugees against their will but stressed that "*We are hearing that people who are returning back to Syria are finding the conditions so bad in Syria that they are paying the Lebanese government to smuggle them back in to Lebanon*". (Appx. 5.4.9 DRC). Officially, the Lebanese authorities have promised not to deport Syrians involuntarily.

However, there are small numbers of forced returns violating the non-refoulement and the country's international obligations. In May 2019 "*in just one month, 301 Syrians were summarily deported as Lebanese security agencies implemented an official decision to send back anyone who entered the country illegally after April 24.*" (Vohra 31.07.19). Other accusations are that the government is tricking refugees into signing forms, simply posing the question of whether they "wish" to return to Syria and offering the choice of answering "yes" or "no." (ibid.).

UNHCR furthermore emphasizes that rhetoric of fear surrounding Syrian refugees from the Lebanese government is a political tool (Appx. 3.3.1 UNHCR). Thus, media and political party's can use fear and ontological insecurity, caused by the Syrian-Lebanese crisis, as a tool to get viewership and votes. Consequences of the overall stigma placed on the Syrian refugee is that it legitimizes a government push for refoulement and can further be used as a scapegoating tool as a way to blame the Syrian refugees:

Syrian refugees frequently take the blame for everything wrong within Lebanon, from economic hardship to failing basic services and growing insecurity - a trump card the political class plays at every opportunity instead of agreeing on a policy to address the challenge.

- International Crisis Group 2015:10

When the government also blames the Syrian refugees for the insecurity in Lebanon, it makes it easier to implement policies without Lebanese objections. By scapegoating the Syrian refugees, the government can move responsibly away from themselves. Instead of solving the different tensions through policies, they are tempted to scapegoat the stigmatized Syrian refugees, who are in no position to respond to this. It is also a way for the government to emphasize that the Syrians have overstayed their welcome to maintain the guest-host relation and thus a manifestation of the hierarchy between host and guest. It is a way of re-materializing the borders reminding the Syrian refugees that they are only guests, who are in no way entitled to stay. This negative rhetoric of Syrian refugees allows for policies such as the implementation of a curfew that prevents Syrian refugees from leaving home in certain areas after 6 P.M. (Appx. 7.4.4 Sawa). BBC news report states that the government is imposing curfews in multiple areas in Lebanon (BBC World News 03.10.14). Reports of conflict between Lebanese security forces and militants had been the reason behind the recent curfew enactments. The curfew placed on Syrians is directly tied to ontological insecurity of Lebanese, the threat of violent clashes that disrupt the perceived safety of the community. Another policy is the Lebanese authority's decision to order Syrians to demolish their homes in the border town of Aarsal. They have been barging into refugee camps detaining Syrians on the charge of unofficially entering the country (Vohra 31.07.19).

4.4.14 Conclusion

The stigmas on a civil and a structural level are mutually reinforced by one another. The main stigmas on the civil level are related to Syrian refugees being perceived as culturally different and morally corrupt as they are accused of stealing jobs, husbands, polluting the country, supporting child labour and child marriage as well as being a threat to national security. On a structural level the Lebanese government is using negative rhetoric, such as framing them as causing cancer, being parasites and responsible for pollution in the country. This legitimized acts such as distributing flyers stating that

Syria is safe, closing down businesses and enforcing curfews. It also legitimizes deportations and indirect push factors towards refoulement, violating or circumventing international obligations. The stigma and scapegoating are counter-productive and only adds to the conflict between guest and host. Stigmas and scapegoating can be seen as a crisis strategy of self-determination – an improvised way of personally dealing with the Syrian-Lebanese crisis, trying to mark Lebanon's territory as a home to be managed and controlled by the Lebanese host. It is a way to project economic, social and security failures in Lebanon from within the Lebanese host-community, and the government, towards it Syrian refugees.

4.5 Conflict Sensitive NGOs

The Syrian-Lebanese crisis has caused prevalent tensions that has led to a civil and structural stigma of refugees, which serve as a pre-understanding, of which, NGOs can consider when intervening in a conflictive guest-host relation. Before analyzing how NGOs can act conflict sensitive, it is relevant to look at how NGOs are perceived by the state as an enemy, highlighting the challenged environment NGOs are acting within when intervening in the guest-host community. This calls for a need for NGOs to provide aid and assistance in a conflict sensitive manner following do-no-harm principles. This can be done through providing safe spaces, managing conflict as a neutral impartial third party facilitator and conducting conflict sensitivity analysis processes. Finally, this leads to suggestions on how to use conflict sensitivity as a framework for staff and programs, together with interagency coordination between NGOs.

4.5.1 NGOs Potential & Challenges

Comprehending NGOs role as conflict sensitive actors in guest-host relations, it is first relevant to look into the situation NGOs navigate in today. The Lebanese government has not been able to respond and solve the Syrian-Lebanese crisis that has led to tensions. Instead they have been acting as a weak host state (Cherri et al 2016:171), only feeding the negative perceptions of Syrian refugees, leading to the effect of structural stigma. There has been a decentralization of the Lebanese authorities and a lack of public services with the Lebanese state having some of the highest levels of debt in the world (Janmyr 2017:456-58). Lebanon has approximately 6,000 NGOs operating in Lebanon and are considered the country counting the highest number of NGOs compared to other Arab countries (Chaaban & Seyfert 2012:1; Safa 2007:3). The vast number of NGOs stresses the Lebanese government's failures in providing public services for its Syrian refugees and highlights why the

NGOs have to collaborate with the civil society. The close relationship between civil society organizations and the Lebanese host-community, leaves UNHCR and NGOs to become essential in supporting the situation of the Syrian refugees. It is essential to understand the increased role of NGOs to emphasize the importance and potential they carry, as it pertains to the implementation of programs. The lack of services provided to the civil society at the structural level has opened the door for NGOs to take some of the responsibility from the state.

However, NGOs reputation is getting tainted in Lebanon. In the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011, the government willingly delegated the responsibility of taking the lead to the UNHCR “(...) *the lead in response to the Syrian displacement within Lebanon.*” (Boustani et al.,2016:130). Nevertheless, UNHCR and NGOs are increasingly being perceived as an enemy of the Lebanese government. This is partly due to UNHCR acting like a surrogate state (Slaughter 2009:1). This threatens the sovereignty of the government, but is mainly due to the fact that UNHCR and NGOs are being seen as a threat to the governmental decision not to give the refugees permanency. The UNHCR stresses that the fear of permanency is rooted in a fear of granting refugees nationality, which partly explains why the government is not signing the convention:

Lebanon [*the government*] thinks it would have an obligation to integrate any refugee that would be recognized under such convention, which is not the case, as you may know the convention and protocol does not impose on signatory countries to give the refugees nationality. But still there is a phobia at some point and this is why they do not want their hands to be forced in one way or another to have additional legal obligations.

- Appx. 3.7.1 UNHCR

The governmental phobia stresses ontological insecurity, which makes it difficult for UNHCR to convince the Lebanese government that refugee status does not grant direct access for Syrian refugees to gain permanency. Where the government is trying to create push factors for refoulement of Syrian refugees, NGOs are being blamed for opposing the returning of refugees by creating good conditions for the refugees through aid, safety and registration. UNHCR addresses that there is a negative perception of NGO presence because they are accused of encouraging the refugees to stay: “*They [the government] are accusing us of that through our assistant schemes, we are encouraging the refugees to stay because we are very generous*” (Appx. 3.3.8.1 UNHCR). This fear of encouraging the

refugees to stay is further supported by UNHCR's fear of changing the history curriculum to be less sectarian: *"No, we don't dare to go there, because we are accused [by the government] of wanting to get the Syrians integrated as Lebanese nationals."* (Appx. 3.4.8 UNHCR). Also Women Now states that the government perceives the NGOs as a threat: *"There is a violent narrative, which is dangerous. And for these people [the government] we as NGOs are the enemy. We are keeping the refugees here and are creating conditions of which Syrians can stay."* (Appx. 4.3.2 Women Now). It is dangerous because it is a way for the government to encourage the refoulement of refugees. The perception of NGOs as a threat puts NGOs in a difficult position, where they need to be careful not to be seen as an enemy to the state and at the same time be able to offer aid and assistance for Syrian refugees. Managing relations with the government is one complex relation, however, what NGOs can offer in terms of guest-host relations to act conflict sensitive requires following of do no harm principles and creating a safe space.

4.5.2 Neutral Impartial Third Party Facilitator in a Safe Space

Refugees being stigmatized as a response to tensions is increasing the risk of conflict. NGOs seen as a threat only adds to this hostile environment NGOs have to act within. This calls for urgency of NGOs to ensure that they are not contributing to this hostile environment. In this paper tensions and stigma surrounding the Syrian-Lebanese crisis has been presented as a pre-understanding useful for NGOs, which can now be implemented in a conflict sensitive process. In order to complete this, NGOs need to be an impartial neutral third party and create a safe space in a country with a history of a civil war, a confessionalist political system and sectarian interests. NGOs being non-governmental does bare a special potential for this. The third party facilitator can be either a trusted insider, from the local community, as well as an international outsider, as long as they have gained trust and credibility (Cf. Danish Red Cross 2018:19). When a trusted neutral and impartial insider or outsider is found there is a need for a safe space, so conflict management can begin. A safe space is created for the stakeholders to come together and express themselves, where violence, harassment and hate speech is not tolerated. It is important that NGOs provide a safe space in order to ensure to do no harm. Most of the NGOs interviewed creates safe spaces, as an attempt to bridge host and guest communities together (Appx. 3.2.4; 3.2.1.1 UNHCR; 1.2.13;15 House of Peace; 2.2.3 Salam; 4.2.4 Women Now; 7.2.7;8 SAWA 6.0 GAME). The coherency between NGOs is important, because it eases the potential for further developing conflict sensitive approaches to conflict. NGOs create safe spaces in various ways – Salam creates safe spaces through providing an area where dialogue between

various groups of people can occur (Appx. 2.2.2-4 Salam). Sawa runs programs, such as a communal Ramadan kitchen, bringing Syrian refugees and local Lebanese together to cook (Appx. 7.2.7 Sawa). GAME, who are dealing exclusively with children, creates safe spaces through sports. The safe space they created in a sense is the arena in which children learn to play various sports and compete, here is where they stress that they attempt to teach the children about equality (Appx. 6.2.3.4 GAME). GAME has created a safe space by explicitly having a no-tolerance-policy for racism and discrimination “*If any of the kids hear something like racism they will come and tell us. And then we tell the coach and they take responsibility, so no kid is allowed to talk in that way to another.*” (Appx. 8.2.8 GAME). At a GAME zone nine girls in the age of 8-12 from various nationalities (Syria, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia) were seen playing together without differentiating each other. GAME also mentioned an example of a Syrian mother contacting GAME to tell them ‘*Thank you GAME for giving my daughters friends.*’ (Appx. 6.1.4 GAME). These are all prime examples of how creating a safe space can be a preventative measure to conflict.

UNHCR in collaboration with NGOs creates a safe space through their basic strategy of bringing both Lebanese and Syrians refugees together to evaluate needs and problems between both groups through implementation of projects that target both of these communities (Appx. 3.2.4; 3.2.1.1 UNHCR). One concrete example they have of safe space is through their solidarity initiatives that bring the two communities to sit together and “*(...) identify key common problems between both, identifying three to four priorities, selecting one priority to be implemented and should decrease the tension.*” (Appx. 3.2.5 UNHCR). They also encourage youth groups and activities in social centers where the local community can also interact (ibid.).

4.5.3 Do-No-Harm through Inclusive Non-sectarian Aid

Even though safe spaces are important for NGOs to provide, it is not enough for NGOs to ensure that they are not participating and contributing to the conflict by their intervention. This can be reflected in the widespread opinion among Lebanese, who perceive NGOs as unfair towards Lebanese indicating that not all NGOs have been acting as impartial and neutral facilitators. In a survey from UNDP ⁴from 2018, 85% of the Lebanese feel that vulnerable Lebanese have been overlooked for international assistance (Care 2018:7f). This is supported by House of Peace that states that:

⁴ United Nations Development Program

(...) because of transparency they [*Lebanese*] think that Syrians are living an easy life, because they get paid from UNHCR, food and rent from the NGOs, free education, free health care plus they come to work in the country. (...) “They are having everything and we as Lebanese – no one is taking care of us.”

- Appx. 1.1.14 House of Peace

However, this is strongly questioned by UNHCR because the aid for Syrian refugees is actually very limited and “*only a very small percentage of the most vulnerable receive cash (...) and very few actually receive assistance.*” (Appx. 3.3.6; 3.3.8.1 UNHCR). Nevertheless, NGOs need to also incorporate do-no-harm principles, adopting a conflict sensitive approach in all aspects. This however has not always been the case:

What happened with the crises and the war was that a lot of money was put to respond to the needs of the Syrian refugees and this approach was not conflict sensitive, because all the money was targeted and Syrian refugees, so the vulnerable Lebanese communities did not receive any support. So because the vulnerable Lebanese didn't receive any money in the beginning, it created tensions inside the communities.

- Appx. 4.1.1 Women Now

This stresses how important it is to support assistance in areas with a high number of vulnerable Lebanese in order to reduce the vulnerability and potential for conflict. According to Care, humanitarian agencies in general have attempted not to do harm by correcting this oversight in providing aid by offering services to both Lebanese communities and refugees (Care 2018:7f). The increased debt that half of the Lebanese households are experiencing (LCRP 2019:12) stresses the need for NGOs not only to support Syrian refugees, but to support vulnerable Lebanese households to ease their debt as a way to show they support both guest and host. This is further exemplified in the Basic Assistance approach that many NGOs have used, where a cash assistance system gives direct assistance to Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. However, due to resource limitations, NGOs often support those who are most in need, while not all eligible households receive assistance, which might breed social tensions between the recipients and non-recipients (LCRP 2019:45). Thus,

NGOs need be pragmatic and consider in what way they can do the least harm and still provide aid and assistance for those who need it the most.

It is not only necessary to provide aid in an impartial manner by targeting both vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees. It is also crucial that aid is not given for selected confessions such as Christians, Muslims and Druze as highlighted by Salam:

Most of the associations of NGOs in Lebanon are based on traditions, and when it is based on traditions and religion, then it means it is politics. For example, the big NGOs in Lebanon (...) they are based on the church. Other NGOs as 'Asrad' and 'the Shaiff' are the same, but everyone has a political and religious agenda. (...) it is good to have an NGO without any of this.

- Appx. Salam 2.2.7

NGOs that implement programs that are sectarian based, excluding other groups from participation, is a direct violation of do-no-harm principles and run the risk of reinforcing conflict through aid allocation to one group rather than another. This can have a destabilizing effect on a state with such a volatile sectarian balance such as Lebanon. Neither of the interviewed NGOs were sectarian but an example is another NGO called Labora, who reacts towards the fear of Christians moving away from areas in Lebanon due to a fear of tipping the sectarian balance in the region. This has led to efforts in planning housing projects reserved exclusively for Christians to prevent them from selling their land to Muslims. Due to this concern Labora work on finding jobs for Maronite Christians as a strategy to prevent them from leaving the country (Al Jazeera 06.05.17). Sectarian based NGOs also pose a risk by allowing Lebanese politicians to push private sectarian agendas through these NGOs. For example, governmental officials donating money into Christian NGOs has the potential to influence how they provide aid in the civil society, which can be at the detriment to other marginalized groups, such as the Syrian refugees. In 2006 for example, the Lebanese government provided 98.65 million U.S. to non-profit organizations (Chaaban & Seyfert 2012:7), this creates a loophole for exploitation by the majority party in Lebanon, giving a vast majority of the money to NGOs that will further push their political agendas, while other organizations miss out (Altan-Olcay & Icduygu 2012:177f). By targeting only certain NGOs with donations and undercutting NGOs that provide support to Syrian refugees, further dwindles down the limited resources already available to this population.


Nevertheless, the NGOs interviewed all practiced the notion of providing support to not just their target population, but to the host-community, including all confessions as well (Appx. Salam 2.3.2; House of Peace 1.2.6; Sawa 7.2.9; GAME 6.0; Women Now 4.2.2). Along with the coherency of the interviewed NGOs creating safe space, NGOs agreeing on providing aid in a conflict sensitive manner is vital showing a shared recognition of do-no-harm principles. However, the majority of the NGOs interviewed did not explicitly address conflict sensitivity in the interviews. Thus, it is through an indirect manner that their do-no-harm approach has been addressed. House of Peace and Women Now were the only NGOs that explicitly stressed the importance of do-no-harm principles and conflict sensitivity in their interventions. Yet, there have been incidents of specific groups being targeted by aid, which stresses the urgent importance of contributing with specific tools in how NGOs can act conflict sensitive. Providing safe spaces and giving aid in following do-no-harm principles is still not enough to ensure conflict sensitivity. For this NGOs need to conduct a conflict sensitivity analysis for the conflicts they experience in their specific geographical area.

4.5.4 The Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

Based on the four analyses in this paper, the conflict sensitivity analysis will be applied as an example for NGOs to follow. It is conducted through the four steps: 1) The conflict cycle and conflict timeline, 2) The conflict tree with pillars, 3) The actor mapping and 4) The ‘connectors’ and ‘dividers’ (Cf. Danish Red Cross 2018:26). Although, it has to be stressed that this is a generalized analysis meant as inspiration for NGOs to follow. NGOs are encouraged to conduct the analysis related to the specific conflict in the community they are operating in, as well as consider the different stages local communities are in (ibid.27).Based on the identified tensions and stigmas, a conflict tree with pillars and actor mapping, will be applied on selected conflicts such as: 1) Job competition and decreased wages, 2) Pressure on resources, infrastructure and services, 3) Housing competition and rising rental prices, 4) Increase of child labour, 5) Increase of child marriages, 6) Intermarriage and 7) Insecurity. As an attempt to give the best overview, the following conflict sensitivity analysis will only be depicting ‘job competition and decreasing wages’ as a conflict. However, the conflict tree with pillars and mapping of actors on the rest 5 conflicts can be found in Appendix 10. The dividers and connectors can however be considered as a general step that are relevant for all the conflicts. It is important to stress that the analysis is not the aim, the aim is that conflict sensitivity is adapted by the NGOs in programs and staff training. All graphic designs are made by Kasper Rebien inspired by models used by Danish Red Cross (2018).

The Conflict Cycle

The conflict cycle allows for an overview of the conflict reflecting upon seven steps of conflict:



- 1) **Calm:** The war in Syria causing 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, leading to the Syrian-Lebanese crisis
- 2) **Trigger:** As a response to informal settlements Syrian refugees are widespread into host-community
- 3) **Agitation:** Syrian refugees entering Lebanese job market, increasing job competition and lowering wages
- 4) **Acceleration:** Negative rhetoric of Syrian refugees by Lebanese, government and media through scapegoating and stigma
- 5) **Peak:** Discrimination, hostility, hatred and decreased empathy
- 6) **De-escalation:** Conflict Sensitive neutral impartial conflict management
- 7) **Recovery:** Follow-up sessions to ensure conflict is not repeating

Timeline

The timeline allows for a quick overview of important events and policies relevant to understand the escalation of conflict on job competition and decreased wages.

2011: War in Syria

2012-2013: Syrian refugee influx reached 1 million


2014: October policy: Closing borders and requiring sponsorship ('Kafeel')

2015: Government prevent UNHCR to register new arrivals from Syria

It was the Syrian war that led to the influx of 1 million refugees prior to the October policy that closed borders and required Syrians be registered within UNHCR and to find a sponsor in order to be able to gain a work permit. When the government stopped allowing UNHCR to register Syrian refugees in 2015, it made it difficult for Syrian refugees to gain a work permit causing the Syrians to mainly seek work in the informal sector, competing with vulnerable Lebanese.

The Conflict Tree with Pillars

The conflict tree with pillars is shown at the next page and can be used to address the root causes for conflict where the pillars explain factors that are feeding and exacerbating the conflict.




The conflict tree first of all addresses the primary root cause to the conflict of job competition and decreased wages. Firstly, it is that 1.5 million Syrian refugees were fleeing from war and due to the government's decision regarding signing the refugee convention and the 1967 protocol, informal settlements have left Syrian refugees to become widespread in Lebanon. Due to poor state services and the basic needs, Syrian refugees must enter the Lebanese job market to generate income. If Syrian refugees are not registered within the UNHCR a work permit cannot be gained, which forces the refugee to work illegally and often in the informal sector. This is often the case when 74% of Syrian refugees do not have a work permit (Cf. Care 2018:15). Syrian refugees who are registered prior to 2015 must find a 'kafeel' to manage their monetary sponsorship, but if Syrian refugees do not succeed they often or not end up working in the informal sector. If Syrian refugees manage to obtain a 'kafeel' they will only be allowed to work within three employment sectors, increasing the pressure of competition within these sectors. In all scenarios the Syrian refugee will risk to compete for jobs, especially with vulnerable Lebanese, who are left to compete over the limited economic opportunities. This competition leaves the Syrian refugees in a dire situation where they are not able to negotiate higher wages and business owners often exploit the refugees predicament by decreasing wages, which affects vulnerable communities as well.

The pillars are addressed as a negative rhetoric, polarizing language, scapegoating by the government, the media and the Lebanese, as these pillars have the effect of escalating the conflict. This is only supported when Syrian refugees and Lebanese host-community are interacting in areas that are not managed through a safe space. The fear of Syrian permanency and fear of sectarian imbalance only adds to conflict legitimizing governmental decisions to enforce curfews for Syrian refugees and closing down their businesses without objections. One effect is a stigma of Syrian refugees as being morally corrupt as they are seen as to 'steal' jobs, which is difficult to be rid of. This decreases cultural intimacy because the Lebanese feel that Syrians are different than them. Supported by other existing conflicts and stigmas, it can lead to hostility, hatred, discrimination and decreased empathy towards Syrian refugees with the effect of isolating and segregating Syrian refugees, pushing them towards refoulement to Syria, which is still unsafe for return.

The Actor Mapping

When root causes, pillars and effects of the conflict is addressed it is now evident who are the main actors in the conflict and who are not directly a part of the conflict. Even though non-vulnerable Lebanese feel that they are a part of the conflict, they are not because it is in most cases only the vulnerable Lebanese' jobs that Syrian can get access to. The arrows help to highlight the relations between the different actors:

Conflict: Job competition and decreased wages



The Connectors & Dividers

The connectors and dividers are a useful tool to address what the conflicted actors have in common and what differ their situation from each other and are general for all guest-host related conflicts. The connectors are what unite or maintain links between Lebanese and Syrian refugees, whereas the dividers are what divide and differentiate the groups from each other. On a broad scope, connectors can be related to cultural ties and cultural intimacy that is linked to unconditional hospitality, whereas dividers can be addressed through hostility such as othering, scapegoating and stigma. Connectors and dividers can be seen as a part of the context which is critical for NGOs to consider when they intervene. Outside interventions will always interact with both dividers and connectors, thus risking


to have a negative impact and exacerbating dividers or have a positive impact that can strengthen connectors and thus serve to reduce dividers (Wallace 2016:16;27; Sida 2017:3). In a more concrete scope, dividers and connectors can be illustrated in the figure below:

	CONNECTORS	DIVIDERS
SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees getting services same places at NGOs • Vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees in the same economic situation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees getting services different places • Lebanese under Lebanese police and military • Syrian refugees living in autonomous camps under private security and military forces • Syrian refugees have less rights than Lebanese
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In areas such as Bekaa valley there exist positive attitudes because they are often pro-Syrian 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In most other areas there exist an increasingly hostile attitude towards Syrian refugees
VALUES AND INTERESTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural ties • Sunni Muslims • Same language 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural differences • Sectarian imbalance due to multiple confessions
EXPERIENCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Memory of war causing suffering on both sides • Economic desperation and insecurity on both sides 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Memory of war triggering bad experiences with the other • Different interpretations of history such as Civil War and Palestinian permanency
SYMBOLS AND OCCASIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ramadan for Muslims and other shared religious holidays 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not all a sharing the same religion having different holidays • Lebanese celebrate other holidays than Syrians • Different flags

The conflict sensitivity analysis can encourage NGOs to realize that work needs to be done in order to de-escalate conflict as and a vital step for all NGOs to conduct as a way to understand the complex guest-host relations that they are intervening in.

4.5.5 Creating an ‘Aha Moment’ with the Fishbone Tool

After conducting a conflict sensitivity analysis NGOs are equipped to engage with conflicted stakeholders through structured dialogue. The conflict-tree can be converted into the fishbone, which excludes the pillars and effects and focus primary on root causes to the conflict. The fishbone allows the participants to visualize the root issues as a way to understand the conflict (Appx. House of Peace 1.2.1;2;7). It needs to be the participants who realize what is the problem, categories and causes through a structured dialogue, where the facilitators job is to ask neutral questions to make the participants realize it themselves. However, a fishbone model has been created to serve as an example. This exemplified fishbone takes a point of departure in the statement from a Lebanese man at a bar, who said: “*The Syrian refugees destroyed our country!*” (Appx. 8.3.7 Informal Interviews) and the different categories are based on the other six selected conflicts introduced in the beginning of the conflict sensitivity analysis elaborated in Appx. 10.1-10.6.



The fishbone allows the participants to realize the root causes to why Syrians presumably ‘destroyed their country’ as what to make them realize that this is no fault of the Syrian refugees. As House of Peace stressed, the aim of the fishbone is to make the participants get an ‘Aha moment’:

When the participants see this in front of them, they realize that it is not the mistake of the refugee. (...) So when the participants work together and see this result, there is this “Aha moment” where they realise what is happening.

- Appx. 1.2.8 House of Peace

An example of such an ‘Aha moment’ was a story, told by House of Peace, which made a special impression. House of Peace did a conflict sensitivity workshop in Tripoli in the North of Lebanon. This is an area where Shi’a and Sunni Muslims used to fight against each other for five years during the civil war. During the opening of the training:

(...) two women discovered that one of the woman's brother was killed two years ago by the other woman’s cousin. They started arguing, crying, raised their voice. I mean her brother was killed, and it was her cousin who killed her brother, so it was a disaster. The trainer had to do an intervention. (...) Today they are best friends. (...) They just needed to talk together and realize that they are both suffering.

- Appx. 1.2.14 House of Peace

House of Peace did not solve it, but facilitated a safe space and training that made the women solve it themselves and “(...) *make it clear to everyone that you are not the reason, he is not the reason and she is not the reason.*” (Appx. 1.2.15 House of Peace). By addressing the root causes it prevents the conflict from escalating with a potential to build peace among stakeholders.

4.5.6 Conflict Sensitivity as a Framework for Staff & Programs

The majority of the NGOs interviewed did not mention do-no-harm and conflict sensitivity revealing that there is a lack of implementation of conflict sensitivity analysis and conflict sensitive training in

NGO programs. House of Peace states that they actively employ conflict sensitivity training of their staff and offer to train other NGOs in actively measuring the impact of their programs, positive or negative (Appx. 1.2.5 House of Peace). Women Now realized that when they started in 2014 the staff was solely Syrian, but slowly they realized that they need to change their strategy in order to include Lebanese as well in order not to contribute to conflict (Appx. 4.2.2 Women Now). This shows that Woman Now intends to follow the do-no-harm principle, even though they did not explicitly mention this. Salam on the other hand stated that they do not want to hire Lebanese men as staff, because they experienced that they want to make advances on European women (Appx. 2.2.15 Salam). This contradicts the vision of Salam to include anyone and is not conflict sensitive. As found in the previous analysis Salam also reproduced the negative stereotype of Syrian *“being different than Lebanese (...) that Syrian gets more children than Lebanese (...) that child marriage is related to being ‘Syrian’ (...) [and] that Syrians are polluting the rivers near their settlements.”* (Appx. 2.1.10; 2.1.10; 2.1.11; 2.3.3 Salam). Reproducing false narratives is only fueling the conflict’ even though it might not be the representative of Salam’s intention to reproduce this prejudice, it is an example of how a profound understanding of the conflictual context between guest and host is vital to ensure not to do harm.

By evaluating programs, with a conflict sensitive approach, it leaves a potential for a realization of the necessity to redesign programs that more appropriately address their target populations. For example, House of Peace, through conflict sensitivity analysis realized that they need to do memory of war training: *“After 2 years we discovered that we need to work more on memories (...) When the war is over, they need to tackle this and not repeat what happened in Lebanon”* (Appx. 1.2.11 House of Peace). To implement this program they asked their partner to facilitate memory of war training and deal with the past in all their projects: *“(...) basically the idea of the training is to go back to the war and to talk more about it and try to deal with our past as Lebanese”* (Appx. 1.2.9 House of Peace). The fact that not all Lebanese view history in the same light due to the sectarian past and present exemplifies the importance of conflict sensitivity training in the specific area they intervene within. Memory of war training can be used as a tool to further understand the conflictual context of where one’s perception of the other is situated. By conducting a conflict sensitive analysis, House of Peace were made aware of the impact memory of war has on shaping one’s perceptions of the ‘other’ and perpetuating the already existing tensions. The NGO can now move forward with this knowledge and redesign and implement new programs, as well as train their staff to acknowledge the impact of memory of war. Following a conflict sensitive approach can also provide the needed framework to

foster coherency between NGOs. The sheer number of NGOs operating in Lebanon and various programs make coordinated communication difficult, but implementing conflict sensitivity can help to tear down some of the obstacles in the way of interagency communication.

4.5.7 Interagency Coordination

The absence of coordination and communication on the inter-organizational level can partially be attributed to the inconsistency among NGOs. According to House of Peace and Woman Now, communication between organizations is very poor (Appx. House of Peace 1.12.15f; 18; Woman Now 4.2.12) and this is worrisome considering the vast amounts of NGOs operating in Lebanon. The concern is that due to the lack of communication and coordination between NGOs, implementation of conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm principles are not being applied properly in the field (Appx. 4.2.12 Women Now; Appx. 1.2.15 House of Peace). In 2018 House of Peace trained nine NGOs in conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm principles of which roughly 90% of the participants were not aware of what this meant (Appx. 1.2.15 House of Peace). Miscommunication can lead to a hindrance of do no harm principles, for example if one NGO is inadvertently adding to a conflict that can potentially dilute the successful programs of other NGOs, a virtual one step forward and two steps back. Poor communication between organizations ultimately can lead to refugees receiving inadequate care and the larger access to support is also hindered by the miscommunication (Al Adem et al. 2018:312). In other words, NGOs suffer from not knowing which NGO is working on what projects, with what target groups and the response. According to Women Now what should be done to combat miscommunication is a way for NGOs to collect and disseminate information (Appx. 4.2.12 Women Now). One way to combat the lack of communication between NGOs would be for the organizations to universally adopt do no harm principles through a conflict sensitive approach. This would help to ensure that even if NGOs are not in direct communication with one another they are at least approaching issues facing their respective target populations in a uniform manner.

However, the UNHCR claims that Lebanon has one of the best implemented inter-organizational structures, in which multiple agencies and NGOs sit down and meet with the UNHCR. They state that ‘the coordination model’ has been applied also elsewhere in the region and is a success (Appx. 3.2.1.1; 3.2.6.1-2 UNHCR). This coordination structure leaves a huge potential for the UNHCR to provide coordination and foster communication amongst NGOs in terms of disseminating training on do no harm and conflict sensitivity, where various NGOs can base communication and coherency.

4.5.8 Conclusion

The lack of the Lebanese government's response to the Syrian-Lebanese crisis has allowed for NGOs taking the responsibility to support both guest and host. This opens the potential for intervening in a conflict sensitive manner. Although NGOs are perceived as an enemy to the state it is important that NGOs do not compromise the do no harm principles and conflict sensitivity to pander to politicians. On the contrary, they need to counteract confessional and sectarian interests by providing aid and assistance in an inclusive manner without underprioritizing groups such as vulnerable Lebanese or selected religious groups. Provided safe spaces can in certain NGOs be efficient, such as seen in GAME. However, it is strongly recommended that this is supplemented through conflict sensitivity analysis, which gives the NGO a potential for acting as impartial and neutral third party facilitators, not only to avoid contributing to the conflict, but with the potential of making the participants solve their conflict and build peace. This can be done through structured dialogue with the fishbone as a tool. conflict sensitivity also brings a potential of realizing if existing programs should be redesigned or staff needs training. By re-evaluating programs after analysis, it might also make NGOs realize what programs or workshop is needed. Finally, conflict sensitivity can be used for interagency coordination, ensuring NGO coherency with a potential of sharing learning experiences.

5. CONCLUSION

The war in Syria and the Syrian crisis has not only led to displacement of 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon but has caused a Syrian-Lebanese crisis due to ontological insecurity related to fear of Syrian permanency. The majority of Syrians are Sunni compounding fear of tipping the sectarian balance in Lebanon's confessional political system. The fear and feeling of insecurity are triggering an activation of the past, regarding the Palestinian refugee permanency since 1949 and memories of the Syrian occupation during the Civil war, as a way to place guilt and explain the current crisis, increasing the othering of Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees have resided in Lebanon since 2011 and are perceived as guests who overstayed their welcome. The governmental decision to not be signatory to the UN 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol has left Syrian refugees to be widespread in host-community creating tensions and confrontations in guest-host relations. As a response to the ontological insecurity felt by Lebanese othering processes of Syrian refugees has replaced hospitality with hostility. Cultural intimacy that has been used to define Syrian and Lebanese relations, today is eroding. Syrian culture is increasingly perceived different than Lebanese culture where Syrian culture is something now to feel embarrassed or ashamed of. Tensions between especially the vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees are on the rise, mainly related to pressure on infrastructure, resources and services along with job and housing competition. These tensions are fueled by the lack of meaningful dialogue in safe spaces combined with fear of sectarian conflicts. Negative rhetoric of Syrian refugees is reflected in stigmas relating to cultural differences accused of conservative values and being polygamous, cheap, thieves, a security threat and pollutants. An idea of Syrian refugees being morally corrupt is only supported by ideas that Syrian parents are forcing children to get married and to work due to being 'Syrian' rather than addressing their dire economic situation as a root cause. These are all false narratives reflecting nothing but one representation of a perceived truth. All narratives pose a risk of leading to conflict. By using the media, which is sectarian, supported by each political party, the government is supporting these narratives by scapegoating Syrian refugees as a way to project economic, social and security failures in Lebanon from within the Lebanese host-community and the government towards its Syrian refugees. This can be seen as a way to free themselves from responsibility and to push for refoulement of Syrian refugees. The stigma and scapegoating are counter-productive and does not solve the Syrian-Lebanese crisis but only adds to the conflict between guest and host. Further, the government is fueling conflict by supporting the idea that Syrians are pollutants and unsanitary by linking Syrians together with causing cancer. Supported in media, some parties have been distributing flyers stating that Syria is safe to go back, turning a

blind eye to reports stating that Syria is not yet safe for return. In 2019 minor incidents of 301 forced deportations of Syrian refugees by Lebanese authorities have occurred but mostly the government's push towards refoulement through indirect means by tricking refugees into signing forms, closing down Syrian businesses, demolishing their settlements or enforcing curfews. Other means is when the government chose to prevent the UNHCR to register refugees in 2015, leaving the refugees unable to gain a work permit unless they can afford an expensive fee. This leaves them to work as illegal employees in the informal sector increasing tensions with the vulnerable-Lebanese. Negative rhetoric and stigma of Syrian refugees, causing segregation and isolation in some cases leaves Syrian refugees with no other option than to go back to a country that is not safe. However, the Syrian refugees that stay in Lebanon are in risk of conflict with their Lebanese host-community due to an increasingly hostile attitude towards Syrian refugees. When hostility is reflected on both a civil and structural level they mutually legitimize and justify each other, leaving the Syrian refugees in a weak position to revolt against the hostility. This leaves NGOs, who are intervening in guest-host relations increasingly important not only to prevent conflict but also leaves a door open for building peace. The more hostile the Lebanese host-community are towards its Syrian refugees the more risk there is for conflict, which not only has devastating consequences for the stakeholders, but also complicates the distribution of aid and assistance, only stressing the importance of conflict sensitive NGOs in Lebanon. NGOs can act conflict sensitive by knowledge of the conflictual context, which tensions and stigma are examples of and by differentiating genuine tensions from false narratives and stigma. All conflicts found in this paper might not be prevalent in each region of Lebanon, this is why NGOs need to conduct a conflict sensitivity analysis in the specific area they operate in. However, if NGOs are aware of the tensions and stigmas found in this paper, they are equipped to react if they experience conflicts related to these. Being conscious about these potential conflicts it further ensures that the NGOs are not reproducing the stigmas contributing to the conflict in their programs, aid or through their staff stressing that conflict sensitivity needs to be applied in all aspects. NGOs need to counteract confessional and sectarian interests by providing aid and assistance for both vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees without differentiating on behalf of religious confessions. Further, NGOs need to provide a safe space and act as an impartial neutral facilitator. In a conflictual environment a conflict sensitive analysis can equip the NGO with tools to manage a conflict through a structured dialogue helping the stakeholders define the problem and identify root causes to the conflicts. Aiding the conflictual stakeholders to resolve intergroup issues between themselves through dialogue can have lasting effects on security and safety.

6. LITERATURE

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