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Kaarsholm, Preben; Frederiksen, Bodil Folke

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Amaoti and Pumwani: Studying urban informality in South Africa and Kenya

Preben Kaarsholm* and Bodil Folke Frederiksen**

Roskilde University

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Abstract: Based on the authors’ parallel projects of research and fieldwork in urban informal settlements in Durban and Nairobi, the article uses comparison to bring out similarities and differences in the dynamics of informality in a South African and Kenyan setting. The article examines three dimensions of informality – the informal economy, informal housing and informal politics – as they play into the lives of youth, popular culture, moral debate, and local political contestations. The two historical trajectories of settler colonial state-building and urban influx control and segregation in South Africa and Kenya are contrasted, together with the struggles that accompanied decolonisation and the transitions to democracy. The article discusses the ways in which informal entrepreneurship has different weight and possibilities in the South African and the Kenyan case, and shows the impact of different expectations of state delivery in the two environments. In conclusion, the authors try to assess comparatively whether developments in the two cases of urban informal settlement in Durban and Nairobi are converging, or whether they exhibit different patterns of urban integration.

Keywords: Durban; Nairobi; informality; urban history; local politics

In this article, we reflect on the parallel trajectories of fieldwork carried out by Preben Kaarsholm in Amaoti on the outskirts of Durban in South Africa and by Bodil Folke Frederiksen in the Nairobi township of Pumwani from the mid-1990s onwards. Both research efforts have been directed at issues of local politics, the dynamics of violence, moral debates, and popular culture with a special focus on the self-understandings and activities of youth living in situations of high unemployment, extensive poverty, and risk. We use comparison to highlight both commonalities and major differences in the contexts and strivings we have been studying, and try to explain why the interplay of aspiration, exclusion and belonging within a context of informality has worked out in the ways it has within the two cultural and political worlds of Amaoti and Pumwani.

Three dimensions of urban informality

* Email: preben@ruc.dk
** Email: bodilff@ruc.dk
Notions of ‘informality’ are central to our comparison, and we use the concept both in our discussion of the economies of the two urban settlements, in terms of their physical situation, and housing, and to characterise political strategies and activities within them. We find in the South African and Kenyan environments of Amaoti and Pumwani similar forms of poverty and deprivation, but very different forms of informal economic entrepreneurship and hopes of success as well as different expectations of state delivery of welfare and a unified economic framework. As far as informal housing is concerned, we see this persisting within both the South African and the Kenyan setting, but within very different scenarios of urban planning and governance and with different constellations of economic interests involved. Finally, we show that informal politics is thriving in both Amaoti and Pumwani, in both cases to make up for exclusion from more institutionalised channels of articulation, but we also see – in particular as regards young people – that different registers and degrees of radicalisation of popular culture and religion come to the fore as informal politics of aspiration.

We thus enter into important ongoing discussions about the appropriateness and relevance of notions of ‘actually existing’ informality, but even more importantly perhaps into discussions of how informality is perceived by – in particular young – people living and inhabiting what they perceive as urban informality. In terms of housing, they may refer to this as ‘slums’ – as is done for example by the Slums Information, Development, and Resource Centres (SIDAREC) project in Pumwani. Or they may prefer to call it ‘shacks’ or ‘shack settlements’ – as is the term most commonly used by for example Abahlali baseMjondolo, a very active social movement in the Greater Durban area.

As far as economic informality is concerned, this would be most commonly identified with unemployment or the absence of opportunities for self-employment, and this is where local perceptions of whether or not permanent full-time employment can be regarded as a realistic and standard expectation relate very directly to ongoing debates of theory and policy. Thus, in a recent article Fred Cooper has argued that the idea of ‘an urban informal sector’ as introduced famously by Keith Hart in 1973 is misleading:

‘Urban informal sector’ was an evocative but sloppy concept: the urban informal sector was not specifically urban; it was not informal, since relations among producers was quite complex and often highly organised; and it was not a sector, for economic activities of different kinds overlapped each other. (Cooper 2017: 139)

Other social theorists have argued in a different vein that ‘informality’ is an inadequate concept, since unemployment or ‘wagelessness’ should be seen not as a
temporary aberration but instead as ‘a normal an unavoidable aspect of industrial society’ in conditions of capitalism (Denning 2010: 83). More elaborately, Jan Breman and Marcel van der Linden have argued that ‘the regime of informality/precarity has come to stay’, and has developed with globalisation from something that used to be characteristic of life in ‘the South’ as this became subjected to capitalist ‘primitive accumulation’ to become increasingly a global condition (2014: 936).

Similar debates related to policy-making have been carried on with particular intensity in South Africa in the period of transition from apartheid after 1994, as for example in the discussions in 2006 around the launch of the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). Here political ambitions were prominent that a ‘dual economy’ of segregation should be replaced by a unified one of equal opportunities for all. As argued and demonstrated in analyses by Kate Philip (2010), Franco Barchiesi (2011), Imraan Valodia (2012 & 2014), Richard Devey (2012), David Neves & Andries du Toit (2012, and others, such an idea of a ‘dualism’ between formality and informality is misleading. Both have developed historically in close interaction, and ‘informality’ can neither be extinguished nor replaced by formality, nor can it be developed independently on its own to represent an alternative economy. The combined effects of ‘structural inequality’, the ‘spatial legacies’ of segregation, and ‘deep inequalities in the development of human resources’ make inclusion and exclusion parts of the same picture – ‘it isn’t really possible to understand the nature of economic marginalisation in South Africa without understanding this history’ (Philip 2010: 109). ‘Separate development’ under apartheid meant the underdevelopment of the ‘second economy’ was a precondition for the development of the ‘first economy’. Consequently, ‘Black townships … were designed as places with no internal social or economic logic, as dormitory towns … and as places where business activity was largely disallowed’, and on whose market demand for consumer goods businesses in the ‘first economy’ would be dependent, thus squeezing out possibilities for local ‘small businesses’ to take root. The low level of informal sector business apart from retail re-selling thus:

[f]ar from being a symptom of lack of entrepreneurship … actually reflects a sober entrepreneurial assessment of where opportunities really lie; and to large extent they lie in the distribution of branded goods from the core economy to the margins, in ways that complement and extend existing retail networks: through street trading, spaza shops and shebeens. (Philip 2010: 117)
A development of different, more wide-ranging and prosperous varieties of informal-sector entrepreneurship would require structural changes of the basic historical preconditions for capital accumulation. In South Africa the Land Act of 1913 marked the beginning of an exceptionally brutal process of primitive accumulation, dispossession of a potential workforce from the land, and the consolidation of structures of migrant labour supply which reached its peak with ‘high’ apartheid and the establishment of bantustans from the 1960s (see the discussion of work by Martin Legassick & Harold Wolpe on this in Philip 2010: 209ff.). In Kenya, a similar process of separation of labour from the land through colonisation took place from the 1930s, but did not reach the same levels of dispossession. Thus different histories of primitive accumulation through settler colonialism have led to different preconditions for informal sector entrepreneurship and different expectations and aspirations in contemporary poor urban environments in South Africa and Kenya.

Fieldwork and participatory research in historical perspective

In what follows we discuss the configurations of economic, housing and political informality in urban settings of Kenya and South Africa in such a historical perspective and in the light of the conceptual debates referred to. But our primary focus has been on local perceptions, understandings, and articulations of experience – on the ways in which the residents of Amaoti and Pumwani with whom we interacted, and who participated actively in our research, have been thinking and taking action regarding the restrictions and possibilities in their lives. Also, the reflections we present do not follow from one single project of research, but from a series of consecutive, parallel studies, whose results have been published separately (Frederiksen 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2007 & 2010; Frederiksen & Munive 2010; Kaarsholm 2005, 2006 & 2009).

A core element in our research methodology has been long-term periods of fieldwork and participatory research in Amaoti and Pumwani, which have involved re-visiting the two settlements and interacting with informants, assistants, and collaborators over more than a decade. Through this fieldwork information and quantitative data were collected through workshops and questionnaire surveys – material that was then investigated further through qualitative methods, including individual and focus group interviews. In both Amaoti and Pumwani, we worked with members of local youth groups as assistants and interpreters, who over the years became participant researcher colleagues, who carried out significant portions of the survey, interview and workshop research. The information collected through fieldwork was supplemented by insights gathered from archival work and reviews of the existing
As far as our method of presentation is concerned, we proceed by presenting first in more detail the two urban contexts, which we have been studying, and the ways in which our trajectories of research have unfolded. We then give an outline of the historical processes through which urban informal settlements came into existence in both parallel and different ways in Amaoti and Pumwani. On the basis of this we offer a comparative discussion of the outcomes from our primary research in the two settings, and end by reflecting on the main points of similarity and difference we have identified, and on the merits of comparison as a methodological approach. We do not think the findings from our case studies are necessarily representative of or can be generalised to cover South Africa and Kenya as a whole, but hope they can provide inspiration and help with the formulation of research questions for further study.

Getting to know Amaoti and Pumwani

Let us begin by briefly introducing our two urban environments. Amaoti – ward 53 – is situated in Inanda at the northern end of the eThekwini Municipality – Greater Durban – area, and in 2011 had a population of 30,608, with 29 per cent of households living in shacks, and with an average annual income per household of R14,600. Pumwani ward is part of Kamukunji constituency in Nairobi’s Eastlands, and at the time of the 2009 – the most recent – Kenyan Population and Housing Census had a population of 23,052. Of these 12,638 were men, 10,414 women, the number of households was 7,539, and population density was 44,009 per square kilometre (KNBS 2010: 36).

The development of the two urban settlements are the outcome of dynamics between formality and informality, which have unfolded in different ways in Amaoti and Pumwani. Whereas in Amaoti ongoing efforts of formalisation are taking place against the background of decades of informal residence going back to the late 19th century, informality in Pumwani developed from within a context of planned African township establishment from the 1930s. Also, whereas Amaoti grew as an urban settlement on the outskirts of Durban in Inanda – more than 30 kilometres from the city’s central business district, Pumwani was set up and has been growing in close proximity to the city centre of Nairobi.

The beginnings of Amaoti were a part of a peri-urban fringe, which developed in and around a mission reserve in Inanda from the late 19th century. In 1936, the land was legally declared a ‘released area’, whose usage would be determined by subsequent planning. Within
this, over the next decades, a sprawling area of informal settlements developed, where many people came to settle as an alternative to the more highly formalised apartheid township set-up from the 1950s in KwaMashu. In terms of claims to the land, they would be tenants of African or Indian landowners who had turned from sugar or vegetables to shack farming, or became the wards of authorities of varying degrees of formality, who set themselves up as the allocators of land rights and the gatekeepers of urban entry (Hughes 1985). As immigration from the Zululand countryside – as well as from Pondoland and the ‘homeland’ of Transkei – accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, the role of KwaZulu authorities – and of Qadi indunas like the Ngcobos affiliated to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) – in issuing KwaZulu ‘homeland’ registration papers became crucial, and struggles around endeavours to be recognised as Zulu became increasingly violent (see Hindson & McCarthy 1994). This included violence against Indians – as in 1985, when the Gandhi Phoenix Settlement at Bhambayi, next door to Amaoti, was burnt – but also in the late 1980s and early 1990s increasingly violent contestations between supporters of the IFP and of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and African National Congress (ANC) (Kaarsholm 2005: 138 & 2006: 145). Plans for the formalisation and development of Amaoti as a township got under way in the early 1990s as part of peace-making efforts, in which civil society organisations like the Inanda Development Forum (IDF) were prominent, and have since become a lead project of the post-apartheid Durban – now eThekwini – municipal government. Structures of informality persist, however, within both economy, housing, and politics due to poverty, interests of property, and political contestations.

By contrast, Pumwani started as a planned and regulated space of housing for Africans. The rapid increase of the urban population and its everyday economic practices, pushed by rural poverty and Nairobi’s growing needs of labour, has meant that like other Nairobi neighbourhoods for the poor it has become increasingly characterised by informalisation. Throughout Nairobi’s history there have been crises over housing the urban poor. In the 1960s, the government tried to solve the crisis by demolishing illegal and ramshackle housing. The outcome was an explosion of illegal structures, initially self-help housing, later a commercialisation of the housing market, which had been the province of government (Mitullah 1992: 33; Amis 1996: 274). The inroads of informality in housing and other social and economic spheres was recognised and approved by the government in the 1980s, following the interventions by international organisations like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the 1970s (ILO 1972; Mitullah 1992: 16; King 1996; Amis 1996: 274). Deregulation and some service provision have encouraged not only ‘subaltern informality’,
but also by ‘elite informalities’ in Pumwani and neighbouring Eastleigh (Hansen & Vaa 2005; Roy 2011: 224 & 233). Housing, malls and finance institutions that started out as illegal, backed by local or international capital, have gradually been formalised.

Though both Amaoti and Pumwani have been in recent times ‘shack’ or ‘slum’ settlements on the borderline between informality and formality, they have also both been historically important intellectual hubs for debates on culture and politics with much wider repercussions. Our research aimed to capture some of these energies, and to trace their development into the post-democratic transition worlds of Kenya and South Africa. In Amaoti – situated in the heart of Inanda, where John Dube, Mohandas Gandhi and Isaiah Shembe had their headquarters – two of the female protagonists of Kaarsholm’s research in Amaoti in the 1990s have emerged as significant public contestants within contemporary South African politics: Zandile Gumede as mayor of eThekwini (Durban) and Hlengiwe Mkhaliphi as member of parliament (MP) for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). In Kenya, nationalist leaders like Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga found a haven in African neighbourhoods of Nairobi like Pumwani, where they organised resistance and addressed rallies in the 1940s and 1950s, and in 1961 Tom Mboya stood as the first African parliamentary candidate for Kamukunji, the constituency that includes Pumwani. In today’s Kenya, the neighbourhood has stood out as a microcosm of broader national and regional tensions. It has been a major field for contestation between the state and new youth movements (like Mungiki), between ‘locals’ and ‘immigrants’, and between new mobilisations of identity and religious politics, including Al-Shabaab.

Doing fieldwork and participatory research in Pumwani

When Frederiksen began fieldwork in Pumwani in 1995, the area was crisscrossed by a multitude of organisations and institutions. Christian missions – especially Catholic and Anglican – had expanded their influence steadily over the decades. Responding to the new pressure from Pentecostal churches the mainstream churches had added ‘charismatic’ wings, like the very popular all-night prayer meetings. Relations between Christians and the 20 per cent of the population who were Muslims were peaceful, Salafist organisation and finance of mosques came later. The relationship with the adjacent Eastleigh and its predominantly Somali population was one of co-existence and commercial opportunity more than of competition, something that would change radically with Somali capital and enterprise moving into Pumwani in the next decade.

Frederiksen’s research project was on young men and women, their livelihood
opportunities and the use they made of local and global popular culture. In tune with a growing awareness of youth as central agents in both crises and reconstructions of African postcolonial societies, her interest was to study how young men and women made their own livelihoods and how they navigated political, economic and social structures whose informal character presented both brakes and opportunities (Honwana & De Boeck 2005: 1–3; Frederiksen 2010: 252–3). A group of local young research assistants administered questionnaires on work, leisure and media-use to representative groups of young men and women – between the ages of 18 & 26. The results were a baseline for a number of focus group interviews on moral concerns, gender dynamics, political participation, belonging and aspirations. In addition, she conducted life history interviews with selected informants, and researched in depth the family history of a particularly important family. In order to get a historical perspective on Pumwani’s development, she used archival material and oral history approaches. In subsequent research periods and visits in Pumwani in 1998, 2000, 2005, 2012 & 2014, she followed the life courses of the group of young people who were her informants, and surveyed key institutions, particularly video parlours and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The young men she met and who became her research assistants were nearly all ‘looking for work’, which meant getting by on their varied informal economy activities. Some tried to make a living out of being activists, organising discussions and other activities for local NGOs, many earned money from the profitable trade in miraa, which has its Nairobi centre in Pumwani and Eastleigh, and a large group moved between petty crime and entrepreneurship. Many of the young women had small businesses, selling vegetables, tea and foodstuffs to those frequenting the popular Gikomba market. Beauty and hair saloons jostled with bars, eating houses and video parlours, competing for custom. The colonial beer hall was still in function, somewhat desultory, though, and outcompeted by smart bars with pool tables, jukeboxes and very little regulation. One area, Digo, had housed prostitution since the colonial days, and still did. Wood carvers rented land from the city council, worked in the burning sun (jua kali), and their goods sold well. A small group of people worked in salaried jobs in the centre of town, only two and a half kilometres away, and enjoyed cheap housing. Many sublet their houses, and made a good living as landlords.

With all this activity there was a certain level of wealth. What was striking was that the densely situated and profitable activities coexisted with an almost total neglect of infrastructure. Roads were muddy, public transport was available in the form of ramshackle matatus, but dangerous and irregular, garbage was everywhere and there were no functioning
streetlights. The old and newer housing seemed to be in various stages of neglect, but at a
closer look what appeared dilapidated were often new structures in the process of being built,
adding a workshop, rental rooms or a barber saloon to the living quarters. Respectability was
a priority value, and a large part of the inhabitants led orderly lives, pursuing work and
earnings endlessly, dressing smartly, and looking after their health and that of their children
in so far as their resources would let them – sending them to school in uniforms and with
school bags. Realising that Pumwani was an unhealthy and dangerous neighbourhood –
particularly at night – many parents spent a good deal of their earnings on the enrolment of
their teenage sons and daughters in boarding schools outside the neighbourhood.

Doing fieldwork and participatory research in Amaoti
Kaarsholm’s research on political and cultural diversity in Amaoti began in 1998, and was
inspired by Frederiksen’s in Pumwani. Like her, after workshopping, he trained a group of
local youth to carry out a questionnaire survey on ‘The social situation, self-understandings
and cultural activities of youth in Amaoti’, and followed up on this through individual and
focus-group interviews, and more workshopping, discussing the outcomes of the interviews
survey. This process led to important insights into how distinctions were perceived within the
setting (which was more of an arena or a field than a community). It demonstrated that
respectability was not simply a matter of income, education and social class, but was
something that could be built from scratch or from very scarce material resources. Many
groups, families and individuals kept themselves respectable with a minimal household
income provided by a pensioner or receiver of social benefits. Within a context of high
unemployment, education in itself – including secondary and even tertiary education for
many unemployed youth – would give respectability, but a lot of respectability seemed to be
‘constructionist’ and based simply on the capacity to lead organised and regular lives. This
involved daily schedules of routine, staying out of crime, and building organisations of
multiple types including NGOs, churches, fellowships, gospel and is’cathamiya choirs,
gangsta rap, R&B, and beauty contest clubs, community policing forums, and garbage
removal enterprises. It also involved the creation of regulations and by-laws, business plans,
agendas for meetings, the calling of and taking minutes from meetings, etc – the whole
panoply and more of organisational life that came together within the IDF, as it was
flourishing in the initial stages of the democratic transition up to 1996 (Kaarsholm 2005: 139
Moral debate in Amaoti in the late 1990s was centred on two post-apartheid concerns – the HIV/AIDS epidemic and crime inside the locality. What people found hard to understand and come to terms with was, why – at the height of democratic transition from apartheid and the victory of liberation movements – they should be afflicted with these two scourges that both seemed to involve moral depravation of a very grave nature (compare Ashforth 2002). The HIV/AIDS epidemic because it indicated promiscuity resulting from poverty and young people’s families’ incapacity to bring together the necessary material resources for respectable marriages, and thus a collapse of respectability. Crime within the locality was an indication of similar demoralisation – it was one thing for gangsters and trompies (frustrated groups of unemployed youngsters, some of whom were involved in crime) to venture into the wealthier white suburbs and Indian townships of Durban to appropriate means for redistribution. It was quite a different thing to steal your neighbour’s bicycle or transistor radio, or to rape a neighbour’s daughter. Amaoti was a dangerous place, there were a lot of guns around, and people would complain that ‘you can simply not progress, because every sign of improvement will be stolen’ (Kaarsholm 2005: 142).

Much of the moral debate in Amaoti was given voice through religion, and the setting had (and has) an amazing riches of church activity and spiritual organisations – most of this Christian in one form or another, but including also traditionalist and Muslim positions. Among the Christian institutions were the old mission churches – Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, Baptist – but also very active Zionist churches and other forms of African Initiated Churches (AICs) like the Shembe Nazareth Baptism Church or the Apostolic St John’s Church – a prosperous water healing church with a huge compound next to the police station in Amaoti. In terms of generational styles, the AICs would be on the ‘localist’ side and controlled by patriarchal elders, and they would be challenged energetically by more ‘cosmopolitan’ and youthful charismatic and Pentecostal churches of the ‘born-agains’ (Ferguson 1999: 102; on stylistics, see further below). Where Zionists and Shembe people would argue that Zulu and African tradition was perfectly reconcilable with correct understandings of Christianity, born-agains would be radical modernisers, for whom correct religion would require a total break with superstition and the backwardness of tradition. A similar divide existed between mosques and schools of Muslims, who would also argue either that Islam and African culture were basically identical, or that they could not be reconciled. Even among the practitioners of custom – like the organisers of virginity testing rituals to control youth and counter HIV/AIDS – there would be differentiations between types of discourses, with some understandings of tradition being close to IFP codifications and
alternatives representing other imaginings of what Zulu culture was really like, while still other varieties would be more ‘cosmopolitan’ and express themselves rather in phrases of health and hygiene (Kaarsholm 2005, 2006 & 2009).

*Moral debates, local politics, and democratic aspiration*
Central concerns of our research in Amaoti and Pumwani have been the relations and interactions between popular culture and democratic aspirations, and between moral debates and local politics – often involving patterns of violent opposition and struggle. We have explored cultural genres and debates as alternative fora for political articulation within frameworks of oppression (see Barber 1987; Kaarsholm & James 2000; Frederiksen 2000), and we have tried to understand the social contexts within which different moral positions have emerged, and how such positions have informed and driven forms of political organisation and struggle (see Cohen 1973; Couzens 1982; Lonsdale 1992; Kaarsholm 2005). The moralisation of leisure has been a recurrent theme, as have the moral politics of contestation between different understandings of generation and gender. In what follows, we attempt to pinpoint what we see as important similarities and differences between the ways in which local culture and politics have unfolded in a South African and Kenyan context. We compare forms of economic informality, middle-class aspirations, the interaction between moral debates and local politics, and prospects for urban integration or continued marginalisation.

For such a comparative study to make sense, it is important to look first into the ways in which the histories of South Africa and Kenya, of Durban and Nairobi, and of Amaoti and Pumwani have converged and differed over the last century and a half.

**Histories of settler colonialism, land governance and urbanisation**
Settler colonial governance in both South Africa and Kenya was directed at two main concerns – the distribution of land ownership and at the provision of labour. In both cases the colonial state was embedded within a larger system of British government regulation and based on a distinction between the political rights of settler citizens and the entitlements of African subjects, with different institutions of direct or indirect rule being designed for the two ‘pyramids’ of government. This involved segregation in terms of rights of residence and urbanisation – in both South Africa and Kenya cities and towns were regarded as centres of colonial administration and of settler economic activity and political interaction, while
African subjects were seen as essentially rural subjects with tribal homes and traditional belongings in the countryside (Berman & Lonsdale 1992; Guy 2013).

The regulation of African urban residence under colonialism

Urban residence for Africans was controlled through pass laws, was supposed to be short-term, and was conditional on having a labour contract. Provisions of housing were made at first reluctantly in hostels and compounds for single male African workers, and the first locations for Africans were situated at a safe and ‘sanitary’ distance from white residential suburbs (on ‘the sanitation syndrome’, see Maynard Swanson 1977). While finance for African housing was provided in the context of Nairobi by the government, the Nairobi municipality and the railways authorities from the 1940s, the financing of African housing in Durban was seen to be the responsibility of employers or of the African workers themselves (Torr 1996: 245). The so-called Durban system – which subsidised the provision of housing urban amenities from municipal African beer-hall profits – became a model for early 20th-century township administrators widely in East and southern Africa (Maylam 1996; La Hausse 1996: 47).

Only after the Second World War did township development come to include family housing, and South African architects became pioneers in the design of segregated townships, drawing inspiration from arts and crafts and the British ‘garden city’ movement – as in the Nairobi master plan developed by Cape Town architects in 1948 (White, Silberman & Anderson 1948). For many Africans in both South Africa and Kenya, the encounter with urban modernity took place within frameworks of illegality and in urban slums and informal settlements, where ‘influx control’ could be by-passed, and where the allocation of shack residence was controlled by systems of informal authority.

In South Africa’s Natal, access to urban residence was regulated within a framework of land ownership that developed from the 1840s, which separated white-owned farms from native reserves, and created different rights and structures of governance for them, including the codification of tribal authorities to be in charge of the African reserves (Guy 2013: 97–101 & 499–504). The Land Act of 1913 consolidated such arrangements, and formally prohibited African purchase in white rural areas, while the 1923 Urban Areas Act made African freehold in urban townships illegal.

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 extended the land areas designated for African reserves from 7.13 to 13.6 per cent, and in 1937, under the Native Laws Amendment Act, Africans were then prevented in general ‘from buying landed property in urban areas
outside the reserves’ (Maylam 1996: 9). With National Party rule from 1948, the segregation of land rights and urban influx control became even more rigid – apartheid legislation included the Group Areas Act of 1950 and the transformation of African reserves into ‘homelands’ under the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and the Black Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970. In Durban, this led to the creation of the two big African townships of KwaMashu in 1957 and Umlazi in 1967 on the perimeter of Durban, and meant to be excised from South African territory and incorporated into the homeland of KwaZulu. Even after the creation of the apartheid townships, a considerable proportion of Durban’s African labour force continued to live on the outskirts of town, in informal settlements, or as tenants of Indian and African landowners in areas such as Cato Manor or Inanda (Hughes 1985: 7–9). Durban’s peri-urban fringe provided a hinterland of agricultural supply and became home to a first generation of African and Indian nationalists and cultural and political entrepreneurs like John Dube, Mohandas Gandhi and Isaiah Shembe. From here, aspiring African urbanites could both travel to Durban for ‘short-term labour migration’ and find homes for their families (Hughes 1996: 303, 2011: 107–13 & 250–2). The Second World War gave a major stimulus to manufacture and urbanisation, and Durban’s African population developed from 43,750 in 1932 to 150,000 in 1949, and more than two million in the late 1980s (Maylam 1996: 16 & 25).

In Kenya – until the early 1920s – European settlers aimed to have exclusive rights of ownership to the most fertile areas of land in the central Kenyan highlands, as sanctioned with the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915. Recognising that the African population would have to be provided with means of existence, the principle of ‘tribal reserves’ on Crown Land was introduced, but it was not until 1926 that the boundaries of such reserves were gazetted: ‘An agrarian color bar was rigidly drawn around the heartland of the country’ (Rosberg & Nottingham 1966: 154–7). Land alienation, taxation, and forced labour, led to the transformation of African peasants in the Highlands from independent cultivators to tenants and squatters on white-owned farms, and waves of migration to Nairobi (Werlin 1974: 45; Berman & Lonsdale 1992: 90; Rosberg & Nottingham 1966: 21; Atieno-Odhiambo 1995: 28ff).

Urban segregation was less formalised in Nairobi than in Durban, but at the same time ‘Nairobi was the perfect apartheid city without trying’ (Lonsdale 2002: 220). From the mid-1920s urban space was segregated according to race – European, Asian, African – through ordinances, economic differentiation, and by sheer compulsion. Segregation was not official policy, but was experienced as an everyday reality by the Indian and African population. In
Nairobi, Pumwani Location, which was opened in 1921, was the first serious exercise in planning for permanent African urban residence with sites laid out on municipal land close to the city centre. This was the beginning of Nairobi’s Eastlands, a mixture of informal and formal planned neighbourhoods that became the core area for the city’s African population and for the poorer sections of Asians.

The government recognised African presence in Nairobi by creating Native Village Councils in Pangani and Pumwani in 1923, and the consultative Nairobi African Advisory Council a few years later. Government and settler interests dominated the municipal council, which controlled resources and had executive powers. African interests were looked after by a representative of the Anglican Church; Nairobi’s Indian population had a few members but little influence. Only after the Second World War did the city council come to include two appointed African members (Werlin 1974: 82–3 & 84).

Only Europeans had full rights to the city, settling in the high-lying areas north and west of the commercial and administrative centre. The African population’s access to the town was regulated by the need for labour power. From 1915 passes were introduced for Africans, and a series of ordinances on health, trade, and wages bolstered the racial division of urban space (Werlin 1974: 45). The rapid spread of African informal housing in the locations meant, however, that the municipality increasingly lost control of influx into town. Nairobi could not be preserved as a white man’s city (Kanogo 2005: 38). The African population of Nairobi almost doubled to more than a hundred thousand between 1948 and 1957 (Collier & Lal 1986: 58). Urban social unrest and African anti-colonial action brought about government initiatives of welfare and control. Housing was built for African public employees, railway workers, and others with permanent employment in town, resulting in a regular building boom between 1942 and 1955. The houses were simple, square, brick structures with small gardens and became icons of the stabilisation of a much needed, skilled urban African workforce (Anderson 2002: 143–5). At Independence in 1964, such structures at the core of Nairobi African urban settlements like Pumwani had become dilapidated and were renovated through ‘site-and-service’ projects by government and development donors. Such projects often led to a pushing out of poorer residents into informal housing (Rodriguez-Torres 2010: 68). All in all, the population of Nairobi grew from 266,743 in 1962 to 834,500 in 1979 (Maxon 1995: 124), and in 2009 Nairobi had become a mega-city with a population of more than three million (KNBS 2010).

Urban informality, resistance and political struggles
In Durban, the Group Areas Act and the establishment of the new African townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi (together with the establishment of Indian townships at Phoenix and Chatsworth) had been intended to regulate urban influx and clean up the segregated map of residence within the Durban ‘functional zone’. But implementation could not keep up speed with the ambitions of planning, the KwaZulu homeland never fully materialised as an administrative framework for African urban residence, and as apartheid structures of governance disintegrated and were challenged by resistance and boycotts from 1984 onwards, peri-urban areas like Amaoti continued to provide opportunities for informal refuge and residence. For an extended period up to the first democratic local elections in 1996, Amaoti – and other parts of Inanda – were governed by civic associations and ‘social compacts’ like the IDF, within which youth activists would have considerable power. This included the informal authority to issue PTOs – ‘permissions to occupy’ – and thus to control access to land and shack housing, until more formal institutions of government came into place. It took place within the context of a breakdown of state legitimacy and implementation of Group Areas Act provisions, and of drastically increased movement into town from violence-torn rural areas, and in the period of the unravelling of apartheid Amaoti became a particularly popular home for Xhosa-speaking people from Pondoland (Hindson & McCarthy 1994: 94–5).

In Kenya – as part of its efforts to create African urban ‘stability’ – the Nairobi municipality tried to pre-empt political unrest by providing spaces for meetings, education and leisure activities, and built community halls for African activities – the first one, Pumwani Memorial Hall, was opened in 1923. With the growth in nationalist politics in the late 1940s and 1950s these became favourite spaces for political mass meetings. For the Kikuyu population, Pumwani was a hotbed of covert and open resistance, which as civil association meetings and ‘tea parties’ were important in the build-up to Mau Mau emergency (Rosberg & Nottingham 1966: 212; Frederiksen 2006: 289). In 1954, members of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic constituencies were removed during Operation Anvil from Pumwani, and neighbouring locations in order to cut off the lines of provision to forest fighters, and to suppress urban violent protest. Locations were renamed ‘estates’ and enclosed in barbed wire. When – in the late 1950s and early 1960s – the removed groups began drifting back to their Pumwani homes, they found them occupied by Luos and other ‘strangers’, and enduring ethnic division and conflict was the outcome.

Post-independence housing policies in Pumwani were a mixture of demolition of squatter neighbourhoods, of slum upgrading, the construction of new middle-income estates,
reliance on self-help, and the commercialisation of the housing market (Amis 1996: 274). A survey of informal settlements in Nairobi in 1990 estimated the population growth of informal settlements to be between four and six per cent per annum – in Pumwani it was way above average at 12.9 per cent (NACHU 1990: iii & 39). In 1979 around 40 per cent of Nairobi’s population was housed in informal settlements, and in 1993 the proportion had risen to 55 per cent (Amis 1996: 273–4).

We now move to the more contemporary development of urban culture and politics in Amaoti and Pumwani.

**Urban citizens, youth, and politics in the contexts of post-1990s democratic transition**

*Ethnicity, gender, and generational conflict in Amaoti*

In Kaarsholm’s research in Amaoti from 1998, the violent conflicts that had divided the settlement in the period when apartheid was disintegrating were still looming large. After the first democratic local elections in KwaZulu-Natal in 1996, informal authorities in Amaoti continued to co-exist with newly elected government institutions. Traditional ‘courts’ of elders, community policing forums, the IDF, and religious leaders had considerable powers of arbitration. The political violence preceding the transition continued in the conflict in Amaoti in the late 1990s between two elected ANC councillors, which ended in one of them being killed, and supporters of the other camp accused of being behind the murder (described in more detail in Kaarsholm 2005). While the elections had given the ANC a massive majority in the two Amaoti wards, turning it into a de facto local one-party state – this conflict revealed a lot about the dynamics of local politics and violence, and their overlapping dimensions.

At first sight, the war of the councillors appeared to be an ethnic one between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, with one councillor – Bethwell Khumalo – having a Zulu background, and the other – Mboniseni Phewa – representing Xhosa-speaking Pondos as well as a substantial group of residents with links to Malawi. This, however, was misleading, as councillor Khumalo had backing from groups of elders from Pondoland, and relied on their courts and ‘regiments’ (*insizwas*) to govern. On the other side, councillor Phewa had the support of youth groups, including both UDF comrades with education, respectability, and a modernist, anti-ethnic outlook, as well as *trompies* – who were being violently policed or harassed as they saw it – by councillor Khumalo’s traditionalist forces. Kaarsholm’s group of research assistants and participant researchers were all directly affected by this – one part of them as ANC youth members and former UDF activists, another part as former gang
members, *trompies*, who had been punished by Khumalo’s informal courts of traditional justice, and had organised themselves as a local organisation, they called the ‘Amaoti Save the Youth Project’.

Oppositions of generation and of notions of tradition versus modernity seemed to over-ride ethnic distinctions, but ‘generation’ was not simply a matter of age or of being for or against patriarchal ideas of ‘respect’ (*hlonipha*). Old and young men and women were involved in the struggle on both sides, and the generational divide was rather one between what James Ferguson identified on the Zambian Copperbelt as ‘cultural styles’, setting ‘localists’ against ‘cosmopolitans’ (Ferguson 1999: 82–122; Kaarsholm 2006: 155). Women protagonists were important in the war of the councillors in the late 1990s. Councillor Khumalo’s most important supporter was his wife, Hlengiwe, and on the side of councillor Phewa, a prominent woman UDF and civic association activist, Zandile Gumede, was a powerful ally. After the killing of Bethwell Khumalo, his widow mobilised locally against Zandile Gumede for having hired the hit-men, who shot Khumalo. This led to a court case that went all the way to the High Court in Durban, before charges were dropped. Subsequently, Hlengiwe Hlophe (now Mkhapliphi) pursued her own political career, was herself elected councillor in Amaoti’s ward 53 for the ANC between 2000 and 2006. Her successor as councillor in Amaoti was no other than Zandile Gumede, and today both women take up prominent positions in the South African political landscape.

As these two female political figureheads have been moving to the top level of national and municipal politics, local politics of aspiration in Amaoti have also changed. What used to be striking, when doing research there in the late 1990s, was the high level of expectations, which both old and young would have for the post-apartheid government to deliver political rights, material welfare and employment. There would be poverty and desperation, and there would be *gangstas* and *trompies* dropping out and acting destructively, but in spite of violence and unemployment there was little rebellious politics. When politics became violent, it involved control of crucial avenues of access to the political resources of government and the dominant party.

Amaoti’s shacks were typical examples of the urban informality of the transition period as regards both the economy, housing, and uses of popular culture as local political organisation. While some NGOs – like Isibani Soluntu – made efforts of providing skills training for small-scale businesses. But – compared to Kenya – there were very limited expectations of informal sector entrepreneurship being capable of developing a predominant basis for the sustaining of livelihoods.
Matriarchy, identity politics, and expectations of modernity in Pumwani

Different strategies and expectations were giving voice by members of Pumwani’s informal sector, where from early on women stood out as traders, owners of rental housing, and in services (see Bujra 1975; White 1990; Frederiksen 2002a). The prominence of women entrepreneurs and female-headed households encouraged matriarchy. From the 1980s onwards sexual morality was under rapid transformation among young people. Because of easy access to popular culture by films, TV and radio, young people were very aware of modern living in South Africa, the United States, and Europe. Among middle-class women in Nairobi many preferred to stay single and concentrate on a professional career – a tendency that was also important in Pumwani (Frederiksen 2000; Spronk 2014).

From early on, the dominance of values rooted in ethnicity was challenged by the diversity of urban life. Unlike many parents and grandparents, young people did not identify strongly with an ethnic group – tribalism was seen as rural and unsophisticated, and guidance was sought more in religious institutions than in tribal traditions. Anglicans and Catholics competed with Pentecostals and Methodists, and both Christians and Muslims organised local crusades. A wealth of NGOs, mostly foreign funded, supported informal schooling for street children and were active in debating HIV/AIDS, individual rights and the importance of education. These activities for ‘respectable youths’ competed with recruitment by Mungiki, the radical youth grouping based on class and ethnicity – in their case Kikuyu values and religion (Frederiksen 2010; Rasmussen 2010). Its emergence brought a partial revival of ethnic rivalry among youth groupings and gangs – particularly Kikuyu versus Luo. This political development echoed the deep splits in national politics – Kikuyu/Kalenjin against the oppositional Luo.

Islam has been important in Pumwani since the location’s beginnings, and mosques have offered Koran schools, assistance to the destitute, and moral guidelines. From the 1990s, wahaabi and Salafist versions of Islam have challenged Swahili practices of tolerance on which the absence of religious conflict in Pumwani has historically been based. Detailed teachings on how to lead pure and respectable lives offered by Al-Shabaab and Mungiki were attractive to some young men and women, searching for certainties and distinctions from older generations. The morals of elders were regarded as loose, they had invited HIV/AIDS into the community, and they had not managed to escape from poverty.

With democratic elections in the 1990s, the importance of being formally acknowledged by the state became more obvious. Only a few of the young men and women
Frederiksen met in the mid-1990s had the identity papers necessary to vote and seek formal employment. The process of obtaining them was expensive and demanding, and by contrast to South Africa, recognition did not entail financial advantages in the form of welfare services.

When Frederiksen returned to Pumwani in 2012 and 2014, the neighbourhood still shared its defining structural characteristics with thousands of poor urban spaces in sub-Saharan Africa: lack of infrastructure, poverty, crime, unemployment, unhealthy housing, high population density, insecurity. However, some changes had occurred: primary schooling was more affordable than under the KANU regime of the 1980s and 1990s. Matatus and buses were fewer, but safer. Roads were better, and at night security lights cast their glare from strategically placed masts over the surroundings, a response to rising crime rates and increased violence.

More spectacularly, new multi-storey housing had sprung up, the old mosque had been torn down, and a new mosque – financed from Saudi Arabia – was under construction. In its shadow, a shopping arcade had been built by Somali business people in the section of Pumwani that has traditionally been inhabited by Muslims – something hitherto unknown in an environment where shopping had been conducted with hawkers along the streets and in the Gikomba market.

Change brought worries also of increased insecurity, related to the on-going influx of newcomers, intra-Muslim conflicts, rising inequality, easy access to drugs and small weapons – mostly stemming from the conflict in Somalia – and the real and rumoured presence of Al-Shabaab. Nairobi’s dynamism as a major urban hub of innovation and the transformation of neighbouring Eastleigh also made its mark in the neighbourhood. Mobile phones and M-Pesa banking were everywhere and provided opportunities and employment for some of the area’s youth. Fashion consciousness was high, especially among young men – hair salons flourished and bars and video parlours streamed Champions League football and the newest US films.

**Comparisons**

*Bridge City: expectations of state delivery in Amaoti*

As is clear from the above a major difference between Amaoti and Pumwani has been a different level of faith in and expectations from the state – high in Amaoti, low in Pumwani. For Amaoti, one reason for this lies in a structure of social services and pensions, which were already in place under apartheid (see Lund 2012: 478–81). These were basic, and not
everyone knew how to access them, but they provided a baseline, which helped some families
subsist, and also served to legitimise the restrictions placed on informal economic activity,
whose effects are still felt (compare Philip 2010: 125). But most importantly, expectations
were placed with the transition from apartheid, and with the agendas of reconstruction and
development, on which the victorious ANC promised to deliver. Such expectations were
detailed within civic associations and development forums in the years immediately
preceding the 1994–1996 democratic transition. Expectations were placed with investments
in public works and infrastructure upgrading that were foreseen in the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP) from 1994, and then from macroeconomic growth to result
from the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy adopted in 1996.

Some of these expectations have indeed been fulfilled in Amaoti, though with less
momentous employment impacts than had been hoped for. New roads are being constructed,
housing schemes implemented, availability of electricity and water has been improved, and
social benefits have been upgraded. Schemes of accommodation for old-age pensioners,
which used to be for whites only, have been de-segregated, and a huge new primary school –
called ‘Hlonipha’ (‘respect’) – has been built in the Amaoti main road. New inflows of
residents have occurred to take advantage of this, which seem to far exceed census figures.

The extent of informal enterprise in Amaoti remains very much below that of
Pumwani. Another common expectation was that the end of apartheid should result in the
elimination of a dual economy – an expectation shared by policy-makers, who did not realise
that this would be impossible without substantially removing deep structural inequalities
(Philip 2010: 108). Consequently, little was done – neither from above nor from below – to
think of realistic strategies for the informal sector that would make it possible to enter into
competition with large-scale industry and agriculture consumer goods and prices, and would
strengthen linkages between informal and formal occupation that could provide a check on
the rise in unemployment (Valodia 2014: 273; compare Valodia & Devey 2012: 154ff).

Thus apartheid’s restriction and neglect of urban informal economic activity has
continued after the democratic transition. This applies to South Africa as a whole, where
between 2004 and 2010, informal employment came to 33 per cent of all non-agricultural
employment against 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.iii While informal
enterprise remains subdued, the integration of Amaoti into a more unified Greater Durban
through the eThekwini Municipality has moved forward through the Bridge City corridor
project, aimed at building a more unified urban environment. This involves the establishment
of links between the inner city, its central business district and suburbs, and what was
planned during apartheid and the Group Areas Act as a distant periphery of labour-supply townships in KwaMashu and Phoenix, and the informal sprawls of Inanda, of which Amaoti forms part. The Bridge City project builds roads and institutions, including hospitals and new shopping malls, like Dube Village, which has sprung up next to Bhambayi, Amaoti’s twin settlement (ward 57) – bringing the joys of formal mass consumerism closer to home. It also means that consumer goods are now even more available to local residents, and at prices and in attractively branded packaging, with which informal enterprises have only slight chances of competing.

As far as housing is concerned, a new black African middle class is manifesting itself in these transforming areas of informality, while at the same time shacks and poverty persist. Shacks are difficult to get rid of, because their owners have an interest in preserving them and renting them out to new residents, after they have themselves been awarded facilities through a housing scheme. ‘Shack farming’ remains a well-established and prospering line of business in the urban informal economy. But also because poverty and high unemployment persist, and consequently also the market demand for cheap shack dwellings. Many of the new social movement initiatives that have gradually come about to challenge the tardiness and cost of state delivery of services have been directed against the clearing of slums and shacks – like the Abahlali baseMjondolo (the shack-dwellers’ movement). Such mobilisations have increasingly led to confrontations with the ANC authorities and with local ANC politicians, leading to incidents of political violence similar to what was experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In terms of ethnic identifications, ten per cent of Amaoti’s population in the 2011 Census were Indians (whereas they made up 83 per cent in neighbouring Phoenix). Xhosa speakers – with a family background in Pondoland and the Eastern Cape – made up 15 per cent of the population against 62 per cent whose first language is Zulu, and 13 per cent were born in the Eastern Cape, but generation and gender continue to be more important markers of identity than Zulu or Xhosa ethnicity. The substantial number of families of Malawian descent have been fully integrated, and the number of people without South African citizenship is marginal in census statistics – less than three per cent. Although Amaoti is likely to be home to a substantial number of un-registered residents, immigration issues and ‘xenophobic’ violence against recent arrivals have not been prominent on the local political agenda, like it has in many other South African informal settlements. The local balance between different registers of identity is thus very different from what we see in Pumwani and in the context of Kenya.
Ethnicity, Islam and political destabilisation in Pumwani

In Pumwani pride in locality and the legacy of enterprise, independence and resistance have persisted. In the realm of economic activity, the state is seen less as a regulatory instance than as a facilitator that encourages the huge informal sector in Nairobi’s Eastlands, and whose lack of zeal when it comes to regulation and persecution of illegal practices is the general expectation. Formal structures, renting stalls and plots from the municipality and paying taxes, coexist with informality. Petty corruption, paying off police and administrative officials, mingles with grand corruption, particularly concerning urban land and property. As noted, the level of infrastructure and services has improved during the last ten years.

Interaction with Eastleigh with its more than 800 thousand inhabitants has brought inflows of capital, skills, and business. New alliances between Kikuyu and Somali property owners and retailers have emerged, and Eastleigh – with its banks, hotels, and up- and down-market shops – has become a popular trading and shopping area for Nairobi’s middle classes, providing competitive prices for goods and services. Religious and political associations are intertwined with business and welfare activities, involving both young and old. At a by-election in 2011, an Eastleigh-born Muslim Kenyan Somali, Yussuf Hassan, was elected MP for Kamukunji, and he was re-elected in 2013. Hassan has close ties to the business community, and his popularity is commonly seen as an emblem of middle-class encroachment into the former slum area of Pumwani.

The proximity to Eastleigh has also added to insecurity. Mass immigration from Somalia after the 1991 coup, and more recently the rise of militant Islam in the shape of Al-Shabaab, have moved from Eastleigh into Pumwani. Young men are being recruited, and illegal networks of transactions in weapons and finance as well of extremist ideas and activities lead a subterranean life.

The old forms of informal housing are being pushed by new developments. Processes of formalisation and informalisation coexist, promoted by a number of actors – private and public – with different and conflicting interests. Some constructions are non-regulated extensions of the existing buildings, others are multi-storey malls and housing, often built without permission on land whose status is contested. The 99-year lease of municipal land on which the centre of Pumwani was built is running out. Sub-letting adds to the already high density, and the exceptional growth of Nairobi’s informal settlements is a reality here as elsewhere. In 2006 Nairobi had the highest urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa, and 75 per cent of this growth occurred in the city’s informal settlements (UN-Habitat 2006).
Informal political activities wind their way in and out of electoral and party politics. Increasingly, their roots are the politicisation of ethnicity. Political parties make use of criminal militia in their campaigns. The youth-based ethno-religious-political movement *Mungiki* is one example. The movement started out by protecting their own, young Kikuyu men and women, striving for moral survival and respectability. Later, in the electoral violence of 2007, they carried out extortion and violence at the behest of political parties. The organisation is now proscribed.

The sources of instability and violence are seen to stem on the one hand from poverty, and on the other from politics, and are associated more with a punitive state and leading politicians than with the challenges of immigration and diversity. The connections between poverty and the violence related to politics are experienced as a social and political reality that is unchanging. That does not kill aspirations of social mobility with the majority of Pumwani’s population. Young people aspire to move away from poverty, and often also from the neighbourhood. The provision of education is one area in which expectations of the state are high and families do their utmost to educate their children in good schools, many of them provided by the municipality and the state.

Young well-educated men and women also have high expectations of the rich associational life in the community. Churches, mosques and other faith-based institutions thrive, and respectable organisations like development and human rights NGOs seem to promise routes out of poverty and powerlessness. They provide training, respectability and hope of progress that is not always delivered.

With democratic elections, the politicisation of ethnicity, underway also under the one-party rule of the former president, has crept into all areas of Kenyan life, both rural and urban. During the 2007 elections, the Pumwani went under cover. Police were rumoured to execute suspected *Mungiki* members, and protests against what was seen as a rigged election led to violent confrontations between ethnic groups – particularly Kikuyu versus Kalenjin – as in other parts of Kenya. Shops and markets were closed, and families had to stay inside their houses for long periods in early 2008 because of the fear of violence. Between elections urban life reconstitutes itself, with people reasserting themselves and doggedly pursuing their economic and social goals.

**Conclusions**

In the above, we have compared two different trajectories of informality. One of informal settlements on a peri-urban periphery in Amaoti, which – in the aftermath of apartheid – have
been increasingly formalised in terms of having housing and infrastructure facilities upgraded and being included in urban planning aimed at the dismantling of structures of segregation. Another – in Pumwani – of informalisation taking root and prospering within a formal township area close to the city centre. Our comparison has shown that the two environments have given different hopes for informal entrepreneurship, that different varieties of ‘shack’ and ‘slum’ housing have been characteristic, and that informal politics have taken different forms. In both settlements, comparison has shown that the dynamics of informality have been influenced decisively by ‘deep’ historical legacies of structural inequality, established through settler colonialism. But comparison has also been valuable in showing that this legacy has been more radical and has had more far-reaching consequences in South Africa than in Kenya, and that – because of this – different possibilities exist in Pumwani from those in Amaoti for the establishment of linkages between informality and formality, and for a reduction in inequalities.

Whether these findings from our two case studies, which show the South African case to be different, but not exceptional in comparison with the Kenyan case, are representative also of urban informal settlements in South Africa and Kenya more generally will have to be tested by other research and different methodologies.

To conclude, let us try to summarise what we have seen as three overall trends of development in our comparison of Amaoti and Pumwani.

Firstly, we noted that in both cases religion, religious discourses and religious institution played a major role in framing debates among young people and between generations and genders over the moralisation of everyday life – how to maintain respectability, how to avoid the pitfalls of sin and temptation that deprivation brings with it, how to walk tall in the face of unemployment and blocked opportunities. At the same time, however, the political mobilisation of religion, which Mungiki and Al-Shabaab have represented in Pumwani, has not been a presence in Amaoti, though evangelical church affiliation has been an important register of identification and respectability for local politicians.

Secondly, we observed that faith in and expectations from the state were very different in Amaoti and Pumwani, and that this went along with differences in levels of informal economic activity and entrepreneurship. In this respect, a gradual convergence may well be under way – with the post-apartheid South African state under President Zuma having lost some of both its high moral standing and – with receding growth rates and steadily high unemployment – some of its capacities for delivery also. While differences may therefore be
declining, and South African and Kenya becoming more alike, there is still a considerable
gap between South Africa’s ‘upper middle-income’ society of 55-million people and Kenya’s
‘lower middle-income’ one of 48-million people. At the same time, however, inequality has
been declining in Kenya, which had a GINI co-efficient of 47.68 in 2005, while it has been
increasing in South Africa, where the corresponding figure in 2006 was 67.4. Livelihood
conditions among the poorest of Amaoti and Pumwani may well be becoming increasingly
alike.

Finally, in terms of urban integration, the informal and distant settlement of Amaoti –
situated 35 kilometres from the city centre – is busy being formalised and linked up with its
greater eThekwini municipal environment and the Durban inner city and suburbs through the
Bridge City project. This is built on private-public partnerships in which the municipal
government and planning departments play a major role. While the Amaoti settlement is thus
gradually becoming embedded in the changing landscape of urban formality, new shacks and
informal establishments are likely to spring up on its outskirts. By contrast, Pumwani –
situated next-door to the city centre and to the prospering business environment of Eastleigh
– is being integrated into Nairobi in quite different ways. Here, government and municipal
neglect and absence of regulation have prevailed, and as a result Pumwani is today in the
process of being swallowed up by the greater Nairobi surrounding it through private
investment and steep rises in price of landed properties. The Pumwani we have been
describing above as a lively urban slum with an extended range of informal activity is likely
to have disappeared within the next five or ten years and been replaced with high-rise
accommodation, business and office buildings for a different class of urbanites. Meanwhile,
the poor of Pumwani will have migrated to break new ground for informal slum settlements
on the outer fringes of urbanisation.

Notes
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Notes on Contributors
Bodil Folke Frederiksen is associate professor emerita in International Development Studies at Roskilde
University, specialising in African Studies, particularly the cultural history of Kenya. Her current research
interests are the history of sexuality in Africa; youth cultures; media and political culture.
Preben Kaarsholm is professor of Global and International Development Studies at Roskilde University. Among his research interests are settler state formation and postcolonial development in southern Africa, and transnational Islamic movements and networks of labour migration and control in the Indian Ocean.

References


For a summary of Amaoti geography and demographics based on the 2011 Census, which takes into account ward boundary changes as of 2016, see <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-59500053-ethekweni-ward-53-59500053/> (accessed 24 July 2017).

