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Chapter 1, Introduction

The Danish electorate has historically been sceptical towards the cooperation with the European Community (EC) and later the European Union (EU) (Buch & Hansen 2002). In 1992, the Danish electorate rejected the Maastricht Treaty and again in 2000 the third phase of the EMU. Due to these rejections, Denmark currently has four opt-outs from the EU on: citizenship of the Union¹, defence policy, the common currency (the Euro) and in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)

To get rid of the opt-out on JHA, former Danish Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt from The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne), announced on October 7 2014 that the SR-government² had an interest in changing the Danish opt-out on JHA into a 'flexible' opt-in model³, to ensure future participation in the European Union's law enforcement agency, Europol. Helle Thorning-Schmidt described a scenario, where Denmark had to leave Europol as a *"(...) serious problem for the safety and comfort of the Danes"* (Thorning-Schmidt 2014).

The legal basis for the referendum lies within the Danish Constitution sect. 20, stating that powers vested in the authorities of the Realm under the Constitutional Act may be delegated to international authorities (such as the EU) if decided by a majority of five-sixths of the members of the Parliament or by a majority of the entitled Danish voters in a referendum (The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5 1953). However, on December 3 2015 53.1 per cent of the entitled Danish voters rejected the proposal to change the opt-out on JHA (Danmarks Statistik 2015A).

The referendum on JHA was the 7th time the Danish electorate had to decide on whether to engage further with the European Union, since Denmark's accession into the cooperation in 1973. Evaluating the referendum, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen from The Liberal Party (Venstre) stated *"My impression is that the result was not so much related to what we voted on (...). This is about fear of losing control. I don't see that this is a 'no' to Danish police cooperating with other EU police forces. This is about a general Euroscepticism (...)"* (Jacobsen 2015).

¹ In accordance with Article 8(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty (1998) it is established that: "Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship." Thus, Denmark has de facto only three opt-outs from the European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam 1998).

² SR is an acronym for the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) and the Danish Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)

³ For an explanation of the 'flexible' opt-in model see section 11.1

Similar to the statement of Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the historical Danish EC/EU referenda illustrate the reoccurring patterns revolving around pragmatic arguments versus arguments concerning loss of Danish sovereignty, agitated by the proponents of a 'yes' or 'no' respectively (Kelstrup in Miles & Wivel 2014). On this background, these patterns seem to take precedence over the substantive content of the referenda. Looking for instance at the electoral campaigns prior to the referenda on the EC package in 1986 and The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993, the Eurosceptic seemed to use a similar vocabulary concerning the establishment of a political union. This finding seems remarkable as the EU was not established as a union until 1992 per se.

1.1 Research question

To this point, several authors have analysed the Danish EC/EU referenda from different focal points – as will be shown in the literature review in the following chapter. However, the emphasis has mostly been on the political outcome of referenda or voter behaviour and campaigning. In this respect, a discourse analysis can contribute to the existing literature by offering alternative explanations, insights and perspectives, while attempting to describe how voters react and behave in different referenda scenarios. Therefore, the following research question will be investigated:

“By which dominant discourses are truth value claimed in an electoral campaign prior to a Danish EC/EU referendum and how is this ‘a collective activity of thinking’?”

1.2 Elaboration of the research question

From a post structural perspective, human action is conducted by statements, which claim *truth value*; these statements are deemed discourses. An example of such could be to claim that the EU is incompatible with the Danish constitution. On this background, *dominant* refers to the fact that a discourse can gain a footing in society and potentially lead a group of people, such as the Danish electorate, to vote 'yes' or 'no', respectively when voting in Danish EC/EU referenda. Moreover, this worldview presumes that it possible to regulate and control human behaviour rationally. Thus, *thinking* becomes a *collective activity* given that those who exercise government, for instance leading politicians and interest organisations, and those who are *governed*, the entitled Danish voters (in the scope of this investigation), are both having *thoughts* as to their actions and behaviour in relations to the Danish EC/EU referenda. To analyse the constructions of these discourse, this thesis will use the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault's concept of Governmentality, which in later interpretations, e.g. by Mitchell Dean, provides a strong framework when breaking down discourses.

1.3 Reader's guide

Overview of the chapters and a brief description of their content:

- Chapter 2 conducts a literature review with a view to describe where this thesis is placed within the academic literature and argues why the approach taken by the thesis is a relevant contribution to the existing works.
- Chapter 3 outlines the thesis' theoretical and methodological framework, which is based upon the work of the Michel Foucault and Mitchell Dean who elaborates on Foucault's concept of Governmentality.
- Chapter 4 presents the knowledge base and outlines the analytical structure. Furthermore, the chapter includes the qualitative methodology and considerations used to conduct the interviews used by this thesis.
- Chapter 5-11 comprise the actual analyses of the respective Danish EC/EU referenda. Each analysis is structured in accordance with the four dimensions of government as presented in chapter three and elaborated on in chapter four.
- Chapter 12 presents the conclusions and discuss the possibility for future research, as well as implications of this thesis.
- Chapter 13 contains an epilogue, where the authors discuss why this thesis is an important contribution to the existing literature.
- Chapter 14 contains the bibliography, list of pictures and a reader's guide for the appendix.

1.4 List of abbreviations

The list is presented in alphabetical order.

- Ber, reference to appendix from Berlingske Tidende
- Berlingske, Berlingske Tidende,
- CFSP, Common Foreign and Security Policy
- EC, The European Communities
- EEC, The European Economic Communities
- EMU, The Economic Monetary Union
- EU, The European Union
- JHA, Justice and Home Affairs
- MEP, Member of the European Parliament
- MP, Member of Parliament
- No-parties, refers to actors from the regime of practice arguing for a 'no'
- Nordek, a plan for Nordic economic cooperation and common market
- Pol, reference to appendix from Politiken
- SR, The Social Democratic and Social-Liberal government
- UK, The United Kingdom
- Yes-parties, refers to actors from the regime of practice arguing for a 'yes'

Chapter 2, Literature review

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, this thesis will present and review an extract of literature primarily concerning the field of Danish EC/EU referenda. It will briefly outline the different approaches in the literature and describe the value of each approach. Furthermore, it will attempt to describe where this thesis places itself within the literature and argue why the approach taken is a relevant contribution to the existing literature. This will primarily be done by reviewing a selection of articles and books from the literature to describe what has already been presented and to highlight areas that need further research and hence indicate why the subject of this thesis falls within the category of the latter.

The review will commence by highlighting the two most commonly found approaches within the literature: behavioural research and electoral science with elements of communication theory. Afterwards, each work will be reviewed. The review will start by describing the content of each work and then briefly explain the methodological approach taken by the author. This is done in order to identify the position within the most common approaches within the literature. Finally, the conclusion of each article or book will be presented and the relevance and usefulness explained. The literature will be categorised under different themes.

Common approaches within the literature

Newer literature within the field of EC/EU referenda mainly follows two different theoretical points of departure. First we have the classic EU studies that are based upon integrational theories such as: Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism; primarily attempting to describe referenda in an integrational context of either 'for' or 'against' a certain form of EU integration. These studies usually present the reader with a broader picture of the topic. An example is Claes H. Vreese and Hajo G. Boomgaarden 2005 who give an integrationist perspective and analysis of the outcome of future EU referenda in the light of the recent issues, which the EU faces in relations to immigration and refugees (Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005). This approach allows the literature to describe the subject in a broader political context, though it seldom includes in depth voter surveys etc. to complement the analysis, as this is not the focus of the integration approach. The focus of this approach in the literature is often concerned with *why* a certain outcome of a referendum is achieved. There is also a tendency in this branch of the literature to construct models or arguments for the prediction of the outcome of referenda, relying on the basis of a political context or climate.

The other prominent theoretical approach in the literature is found within electoral science and communication theory. The literature using these methodologies typically deals with a single referendum at a time and uses in-depth voter information to analyse the referendum. The emphasis in this part of the literature is on the *process* and *how* the outcome is achieved. The literature is usually more descriptive in its writings and the conclusions are mostly based upon statistical findings and model calculations, such as the book by Sara Binzer Hobolt from 2009, where she applies statistical information, popularity etc. to develop a model that accounts for other issues than sentiments on the EU (Hobolt 2009). This branch of the literature provides knowledgeable insights in voter behaviour, media exposure and internalisation of communication in general. An example is Roger Buch and Kasper M. Hansens article from 2002 the “The Danes and Europe”; a description of voter behaviour and tendencies connected to partisan views, educational and societal status etc. in the Danish EU referenda from 1973 to 2000 (Buch & Hansen 2002).

2.2 Review

EU integration

Claes H. De Vreese and Hajo H. Boomgaarden analyse the hypothesis which states, that anti-immigration sentiment is negatively correlated with support for further EU integration and, eventually, the possibility for an EU positive outcome of a referendum (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005). They test the hypothesis, using a method of compiling factors, affecting the opinion towards the EU. Furthermore, they are supplementing this approach with behavioural research to propose an alternative explanation. On this background, they can be placed in the category of political research, because they use the behavioural science to analyse the political opinions and to predict the outcome of referenda. They conclude that there is a correlation between a negative sentiment towards foreigners and opposition towards further EU integration. Their methodological approach is a reminiscent of how others have approached the topic. Nonetheless, they use an alternative set of variables to explain how voter opinion towards the EU can be influenced (ibid). Their approach is very different from the one taken by this thesis, yet it can provide insights into topics that may be subjected to a discourse analysis.

William M. Downs investigates the national and international political implications of the Danish EMU referendum in 2000 (Downs 2007). He analyses the topic using an analysis of three key factors, to explain the outcome of the referendum. His article is mainly a discussion of the consequences from of ‘no’, which take precedence over the methodology. His emphasis on the outcome and consequences places him within the field of political research. He concludes that the Danish referendum have had implications for other countries such as Sweden and the UK (ibid). His article provides a good foundation for further research in the Danish

referendum of 2000 as he discusses many of the factors leading to the rejection of the proposal to join the EMU, but does not go in depth with an analysis of each factor. On this background, his article should be seen as a “status update” on the political situation following the referendum.

Sara Binzer Hobolt is the author of the book *Europe in Question*, where she investigates voter behaviour in a context of European referenda (Hobolt 2009). She applies model calculations to determine that voter behaviour is not only motivated by attitudes towards the EU or the current government, but other factors exert influence. These factors include: the amount of information provided and by whom the information is given (ibid). She uses behavioural theory to calculate models, which she applies on empirical cases in order to investigate her initial hypotheses. She concludes that voters are capable of processing available information and making informed choices. However, she also concludes that political elites have a wide range of possibilities to frame the issue and that this will affect the outcome of the respective referendum (ibid). The book provides this thesis with empirically tested evidence, stating that issue framing is relevant for the outcome of a referendum. Further, it highlights the importance of how political elites talk about an issue. Also, it provides this thesis with the knowledge that voters are capable of processing the information and making an informed decision in a referendum context.

Predictive and pattern searching

Sara Binzer Hobolt is also the author of an article from 2005, where she employs findings from a sample of authors within the field of election research to generate a model explaining the impact of political information (Hobolt 2005). Her methodological approach is different from other authors in that she draws on a wide range of other surveys made within the area to generate an explanatory model. She belongs in the category of behavioural researchers, as her main focus is on identifying patterns of voter behaviour. She starts by describing how other studies have shown the importance of information in different ways, while all consider voters as a uniform mass (ibid). Instead, she suggests that voters respond differently according to the factors surrounding the information they receive. She concludes that electorates respond differently to the same information depending on who is presenting it, how the issue is framed and how much information that is presented (ibid). Thus, her article touches upon some of the elements of discourses, such as the importance of who is delivering the information. Her article provides this thesis with an argument for the relevance of a discourse analysis; mainly, because her methodological approach samples several authors and schools of electoral science in order to present a coherent argument and conclusion.

Martin Marcussen and Mette Zølner 2001, approach the Danish EMU referendum of 2000 by investigating how positions of national identity and historical ways of behaving influenced the outcome (Marcussen & Zølner 2001). Their methodological approach is more akin to a political analysis due to their emphasis on the political outcome and events of the referendum. Furthermore, they use behavioural science to analyse the respective political situations. Their article starts by describing the so called “foundational myths”, by which they establish how some elements of the EU are perceived historically in Denmark (ibid). Secondly, they describe the electoral campaign and place it into context. They conclude that due to a series of political and campaigning errors, the referendum of 2000 ended with a ‘no’. The article touches upon discourses and its analysis resembles parts of a discourse analysis. The analysis of the political actors in the EMU referendum and their initial analysis of “myths” provides insights into how previous perceptions of the EU may affect a referendum campaign.

John Garry uses surveys about emotions and likability to explain voter behaviour in EU referenda in the article “Emotions and voting in EU referendums” from 2014. His methodological approach draws from psychological theory and research to present an alternative explanation to voter behaviour (Garry 2014). His article can be defined as behavioural research, but approaches the issue from an alternative perspective by incorporating emotions in the analysis. Due to his alternative approach, the article explains in great detail how emotions can be used as an analytical tool when researching the outcome of a referenda. He uses Ireland’s referendum on the fiscal compact to conduct his analysis/experiments and concludes that emotions and emotionally focused campaigns play a significant role in voting (ibid). Garry’s conclusion alludes to the importance of how things are talked about and thus presents an important argument for the relevance of a discourse analysis.

De Vreese is also the co. author with Andreas R. T. Schuck on an article dealing with the impact of positive news framing on voters who are against a topic in a referendum. They research how positive framing of a topic may be considered negative by voters with opposing views to that topic (Schuck & De Vreese 2012). Their usage of communication theory and analysis of voter reaction to information place them within the group of researchers dealing with behavioural science. The political outcome is secondary to the analysis of the voter behaviour (ibid). They conclude that positive news framing in certain conditions will mobilise voters opposing the content of a referendum (ibid). Their conclusion presents an argument for an analysis of *how* issues are talked about during an electoral campaign and which discourses might exist; this provides the thesis with evidence that issue framing can affect voter mobilisation.

The Danish EU relationship

In the article “The Danes and Europe”, Buch and Hansen use statistical calculations and surveys to describe the Danish referenda and attitudes towards Europe, spanning from the accession in 1973 to the EMU referendum in 2000 (Buch & Hansen 2002). Their methodological approach adheres to the part of the literature within the field of behavioural research, because their main focus is on the importance of attitudes and voter behaviour (ibid). They incorporate historical data from national and international sources to present a picture of the development in attitudes towards the EU in Denmark. They conclude that the Danes have had a “polarised” relationship with high voter turnout to referenda and low turnout to EU parliamentary elections (ibid). The approach taken by Buch and Hansen is very systematic and descriptive, relying on statistical evidence or survey responses to draw their conclusions. Their work presents a sufficient overview of the historical sentiments towards the EU, which can be used as a knowledge base for this thesis.

Discursive and methodological discussions in the literature

Piotr Cap and Urzula Okulska have compiled a series of chapters by various authors in their book “Analyzing Genres in Political Communication” of 2013. In the book, it is investigated how a discursive approach to political communication can be applied in different settings. Two chapters have been of interest for this thesis. In chapter 2, Anita Fetzer and Peter Bull analyse and discuss how discourses can be used in the genre of political interviews (Fetzer & Bull in Cap & Okulska 2013). They discuss discourse analysis in the context of other alternative methodological approaches. Their contribution is not an empirical study of a specific referendum or case. Therefore, it is more akin to a methodological clarification of concepts in the genre of political interviews (ibid). Thus, they do not belong within the field of election studies or science, but are nevertheless relevant to this thesis. Their relevance stems from their conclusion that discourse analysis is a viable way of conducting and analysing political interviews and communication.

Another important chapter (chapter 8) is written by Thorsten Malkmus, who conducts a comparative study to highlight explaining factors regarding the way an election night speech is held in Germany and Britain (Malkmus in Cap & Okulska 2013). During his study, he discusses the importance of discourses. The work draws on communication and discourse theory. He concludes that contrary to the popular belief, political culture is not the only explaining factor constituting how an election night speech is held in Germany and Britain, discourses also play a role. His usage to this thesis lies in his conclusion that discourses affect the action and way politicians present an issue. His findings strengthen the argument that a discourse analysis is a viable way of analysing EU referenda.

2.3 Summary and conclusion

The literature in the field of EU referenda concerns two main issues: voter behaviour and political consequences. However, the methodological and theoretical approaches in the literature vary. Authors like Garry use emotions as an explanatory factor (Garry 2014), while others like De Vreese and Schuck use news framing (De Vreese & Schuck 2012). Thus, as can be seen in the review, explanations differ from author to author. Nevertheless, while the approaches are different, none of the authors exclude other explanatory factors, but underline the importance of their own particular explanation. Having demonstrated how these different themes are of relevance to the outcome of a Danish referendum, this thesis finds that a discourse analysis will have its relevance, as it entails an analysis of the before mentioned themes, such as: the importance of how things are talked about, the relevance of how information is framed and by whom, as well as evidence of the voter's capability of making informed decisions (Garry 2014, Schuck & De Vreese 2012, Hobolt 2006 & 2009). However, this thesis seeks to step away from the sometimes normative explanations and analyse the importance of discourses in Danish EC/EU referenda.

Chapter 3, Theory, concepts and methods

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the thesis' theoretical and methodological framework, which is based upon the work of the Michel Foucault and the concept of Governmentality. The chapter will begin by briefly describing the philosophy of science of the thesis, as well as explaining the basic concepts of post structuralism in a Foucauldian perspective. Next, the concept of Governmentality and regimes of practice will be introduced; using authors who have redefined Foucault's work i.e. Mitchell Dean, Thomas Lemke, Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller.

3.2 Philosophy of science

Foucault adheres to the school of post structuralists, who presumes that social relations are constructed through language. Thus, their *task* becomes to determine structures i.e. the relations between the separate parts of the language (Hansen in Juul & Pedersen 2012: 238). In the post structuralist view, the epistemology takes precedence over ontology, as everything appears to be a linguistic construction and hence, their assumptions of the world become limited. In the post structuralist perspective, these constructions are termed discourses. As stated in the introduction, a discourse is something that is ascribed "truth value" for certain actors at a given time and place in society. Accordingly, the proposition of discursive science is not to produce an objective recognition of truth, rather it is to problematize knowledge that claims to, or appears to be, objective truth (ibid: 233). In accordance with this approach, a discourse prescribes meaning, which can change over time. The social relations in society are determined by their discursive context in which they are interacting. What is paramount, is that society is not to be understood as preferences of the individuals, instead, it should be perceived through the discourses that has been internalised and have become dominant (ibid: 235, Rose & Miller 2013: 7).

3.3 Governmentality

To understand long-term regularities in modern statehood, Foucault, invented late in his authorship the concept of Governmentality. He initiated, but never finished, this quest in the two lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979: "Security, territory, population" and "The Birth of Biopolitics" (Lemke 2012: 12-13). Foucault's stance was that the field of political thought had not yet "cut of the king's head" (Rose & Miller 1992: 174). By this metaphor he argues that power is no longer vested in a single ruler, but is ever present; as modern society is a combination of individualisation techniques and totalisation (Dean 1999: 98-99). Thus, power in modern statehood is no longer *repressional* but *relational*. This distinction marks the shift in

Foucault's authorship. Whereas, the 'early Foucault' was concerned with sovereignty and the inherent punishment of 'complaisant' bodies (i.e. the population in liberal states), the 'late Foucault' looks at power and government as a complex strategic situation (Dag Heede 1992: 37; Bang & Dyrberg 2011). This perception is perhaps best understood from the following explanation offered by Dean:

"Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes" (Dean 1999: 11).

These observations on modern rule are conceptualised by the term "conduct of the conduct" – leading someone to lead themselves (ibid: 11-12, Lemke 2012: 85-87, Rose & Miller 2013: 14). In this line of reasoning, the prerequisite for government is that individuals are free to think and act in a variety of ways, sometimes unpredictable to authorities. Therefore, *"Government is an activity that shapes the field of action and thus, in this sense, attempt to shape freedom"* (Dean 1999: 13). In this respect, government also becomes a moral activity because the governing bodies i.e. the Danish government, parliament and authorities presume to know what constitute good behaviour for those who are governed i.e. the entitled Danish voters. However, as stated earlier, power is not vested in a single individual, group or object. Therefore, an analysis of Governmentality does not limit itself to the analysis of politicians or authorities. A study of Governmentality is the study of the multiplicity of actors and components that constitute the things we take for granted in our everyday life. Still, these things are not granted, they are the product of underlying structures, thoughts and rationalities (Rose & Miller 1992: 174). These structures are called "regimes of practice" by Foucault. The way we greet others, act in an everyday scenario or vote is constituted by these regimes of practice. It is all the things that are institutionalised, formally, and to a large extent, informally. Thus, a regime of practice should be interpreted as a more or less organised way that, at any given time or place, constitutes any thought and/or action taken by an individual (Dean 1999: 20-21).

When analysing regimes of practice, Dean suggests that one distinguish between at least four independent varying but related dimensions, who build on each other in sequential order. These are *the forms of visibility, the distinctive ways of thinking, specific ways of acting and the characteristic ways of forming subjects* (ibid: 23). These dimensions will be unfolded thoroughly in the next section. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that in a Foucauldian perspective, the different constellations, actors and stakeholders (i.e. the yes-

parties, no-parties) presented at the Danish EU referenda can be considered regimes of practice. Thus, they will be analysed from the different dimensions to show the specific forms of knowledge and expertise they give rise to. In their respective interpretations Lemke (2012) and Rose and Miller (1992) also elaborate on regimes of government. Accordingly, these are partly⁴ categorised as programmes of government and it is important to notice that breaks and gaps can occur in these programmes. This is not synonymous with failure but quite reverse, an integral part of its existence. An example of such a gap can be seen in the electoral campaign prior to the election on JHA 2015, when the no-parties started questioning the validity of political agreements, thus questioning the existing knowledge in the Danish parliament. Thus, from a Governmentality perspective this example illustrates how gaps in a distinct programme of government can occur (Lemke 2012: 92-94).

This thesis finds that Dean has the most structured approach to the formal processes of government. Therefore, the thesis will structure its Governmentality analysis in accordance with Dean's four dimensions of analysing regimes of government. Nonetheless, some concepts are explained differently and more in-depth by the other authors used in this theoretical section. Therefore, the following section will include a conceptual clarification.

1. *The examination of the fields of visibility of government.* According to Dean, an analysis of Governmentality should include the forms of visibility necessary to the retention of particular regimes of practice. This concerns how a regime of practice sheds light on some things, while attempting to hide others (Dean 1999: 30-31). When looking at the fields of visibility, it will be unfolded how different actors and stakeholders have focused on different perspectives in the EU referenda, historically. From the theoretical framework, these perspectives are 'objects', considered as sub-components of a field of visibility. In other words, each Danish EC/EU referendum has appertaining fields of visibility, where several objects are either illuminated or shadowed by the competing regimes of practice.
2. *The concern for the technical aspect of government.* Here one must ask, by which means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies, authority and rule are constituted. It is presumed that government is not only a matter of ideology, as the technical means often pre-determines successful ruling (Ibid: 31). Rose and Miller (1992) place a

⁴ In their interpretation of the formal dimension of Governmentality Rose and Miller roughly distinguish between programmes of government, technologies of government and expertise of government.

great emphasis on the techniques of government and describe these as a way in which government can constitute individuals as owning allegiance to a particular locus of identity and authority. When looking at the vocabularies that constitute a political discourse, Rose and Miller make a direct link between language and rationality (from Dean's point of reference there is a more implicit connection between the second and third dimension of government). The vocabularies should be viewed as an apparatus/intellectual machinery for making reality "thinkable" and thus constitute political deliberations (Rose and Miller 1992). When concerned with the technical aspects, this thesis will among other things look for patterns in the vocabularies used by the different actors in relations to the Danish EU referenda i.e. the form of appeal and the specific focus on certain aspects/objects (Dean 1999). Also, Rose and Miller emphasise the use of experts as a technique. Experts can be used by the regimes of practice to incorporate truth value to their political campaigns either through their support or the utilisation of their knowledge in the campaign material. According to Rose and Miller, experts can incorporate some degree of truth-value to their statements, solely through their trust and recognition as experts within a given *enclosure*⁵ (Rose & Miller 1992: 188). The practical use of experts is based upon an underlying rationale, which will be analysed in the third dimension.

3. *The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity.* This dimension is also referred to as the "episteme" of government because it tries to identify what forms of knowledge, expertise, strategies, rationality etc. are employed in regimes of practice. Whereas the second dimension approaches government as something depending on technical means, and look for patterns within these. The third dimension concerns *how* these aforementioned patterns are vested in deliberate strategies and calculated administration (of conduct) to create forms of truths, encouragement, motivation, incitements etc. with the intention of influencing the outcome of the respective Danish EC/EU referenda (Dean, 1999: 31-32, Rose & Miller 1992: 175).

4. *The attention to the formation of identities.* This dimension is concerned with the characteristic ways of forming subjects or the forming of "identities". It entails a study of the forms of identity that are presupposed by different practices of government and what sort of alterations the practices strive to make as well as which statuses, capacities attributes and orientations are assumed of those who govern and those who are governed. It is important to remember that regimes of practices are not

⁵ "(...) relatively bounded locales or types of judgement within which their power and authority is concentrated, intensified and defended" Other scholars within the Foucauldian literature identifies enclosures as domains (Rose & Miller 1992: 188).

able to create real subjectivity; instead they attempt to elicit capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents (Dean, 1999: 30-33). Rose and Miller describe this process as a way in which government install calculative technologies in the heart of the private sphere and thus produce new ways of influencing private decisions (Rose & Miller 1992: 187). When looking at the respective Danish EU referenda, the assumed identities of the governors, leading politicians and interest organisations etc., will be investigated alongside with the identities they elicit from the Entitled Danish voters.

3.4 Reflections on the theoretical framework

Interpretations and redefinitions of Foucault's work are characterised by the need of prior knowledge to be properly understood. This finding is also valid in the literature on Governmentality, as can be seen in Dean's book "Governmentality – Power and Rule in Modern Society" (Dean 1999). Furthermore, it is recognised that Governmentality is an analytic concept to investigate modern contemporary states. While, other types of studies of government focus on ideal types and normative explanations, Lemke argues that studies of Governmentality: "(...) have examined governmental programs as empirical facts insofar as they shape and transform the real by providing specific forms of representing and intervening in it" (ibid: 91). Thus, the use concerns the investigation of the practices and inherently rationalities of modern government (Lemke 2012: 91).

Chapter 4, Knowledge base, analytical structure and interviews

4.1 Introduction

This section will outline the knowledge base for this thesis and the background for the selection of sources used, alongside with providing a summary of the findings from spot checks, which have been made to strengthen the pattern, envisioned in the analysis. Finally, an overview of the analysis will be provided.

4.2 Knowledge base

As described in section 3.2, power is relational and constructed through language (Bang & Dyrberg 2011). Thus, to analyse regimes of practice within the respective Danish EC/EU referenda, it is necessary to investigate the linguistic constructions, appearing from actual statements. Therefore, this thesis will look at articles from two major Danish newspapers, Berlingske and Politiken; both nationwide and hailing from a centre-right and centre-left opinion, respectively. Each newspaper has been studied within a timeframe of week prior to each referendum to identify articles with active statements by actors within the regimes of practice, in either interviews, references, adverts or the like. On this background, some political articles have been excluded, alongside with background stories and general news articles with no active statements. The complete knowledge base amounts to 1004 articles not including spot checks. In addition to the articles, this thesis has conducted four interviews in order to gain new knowledge on the referendum on JHA as will be elaborated on in section 4.5-4.6.

4.3 Analytical structure

Foucault used the method of genealogy, however passed away without providing a methodology for its use when conducting a Governmentality analysis. Thus, Mitchell Dean was among the first to provide the conceptual tools to perform a study of Government (Lait 2010: 169). The theoretical framework provided by Dean is a thorough guide through the four dimensions of government and therefore concurrently, serves as a method. Each of the four dimensions of government provides a series of questions that must be asked in order to conduct a Governmentality analysis. For example, when analysing the second dimension, one must ask the question: by which means, mechanisms procedures etc. is government constituted. On this background, all four dimensions of government will be analysed chronologically for each referendum. Furthermore, the analytical findings of each dimension will be presented according to their prevalence in the respective electoral campaign. Finally, each chapter will be concluded with a brief summary.

Neither Dean, nor Foucault presents a comprehensive methodology on how to use sources in the conduct of an analysis of government. Therefore, this thesis finds it necessary to specify the application of the knowledge base. The analysis of a regime of practice consists of examining the multiple sources from which it is constituted (Dean 1999: 21). Thus, the thesis will only use articles that are part of a pattern or routine that constitutes a specific regime of practice. However, if an article in itself indicates a pattern or routine it will also be included. Examples of such articles are longer debates with multiple actors etc. Furthermore, articles used as examples during the analyses are chosen by evaluating their ability to exemplify the analytical points obtained from analysing all articles of a specific referendum.

4.4 Spot checks

This thesis has conducted spot checks for each newspaper at each referendum. These have been conducted to investigate whether expanding the timeframe would have altered the envisioned patterns. Two spot checks have been made for each referendum and newspaper; one taken fourteen days and one taken one month prior to the referendum⁶. The spot checks have shown that a month prior to each referendum only an average of only two articles were present in Politiken and even fewer in Berlingske (Appendix spot check). Fourteen days prior to the respective referenda there appears to be only a sparse amount of articles in comparison to one week before. Furthermore, the present articles seldom contain active statements. An example is Berlingske 14 days prior to the 2000 referendum. The newspaper contains two articles regarding the referendum, whereof one is a news article and one is a background article stating that ship-owner Mærsk McKinney Møller intended to vote 'yes' (Appendix spot check). It should be noted that the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty (1992) is different as it contains almost as many articles as some newspapers from one week prior to a referendum (Appendix spot check). On this background, it seems that the selection of articles has provided the authors with a foundation to conduct a Governmentality analysis and that little would have been gained from expanding the scope of the investigation to a larger time span.

⁶ Some editions were unavailable in the archives of Politiken and Berlingske. In those instances, the editions from the following or previous day have been used in the spot check.

4.5 Interviews and qualitative method

Introduction

The following section will explain the background for the use of qualitative interviews in this thesis. The section will draw upon the work of the leading scientists in this area, Svend Brinkmann and the late Steinar Kvale (1938-2008). Also, the work of Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman will be included because their work is specifically targeted interviews with elites, such as the leading politicians and recognised experts. In this line of reasoning, the interviewees of this thesis are considered to be part of the elite (see appendix 2 for additional theoretical perspectives and specific comments and summary of the output of the respective interviews).

Why interviews?

Because the referendum of JHA is still topical, little academic work has yet been produced. On this background, this thesis will conduct four qualitative interviews; intended to give rise to new knowledge, which seems unattainable elsewhere momentarily. The purpose is to gain an in-depth knowledge of how regimes of practice operate and thus *what* their forms of visibility, ways of thinking, ways of intervening and characteristic ways of forming subjects and selves etc. are.

However, according to Brinkmann and Kvale the starting point, when conducting an interview, should always be to consider whether a qualitative interview is the best way of answering the research question. In the literature review, chapter 2, this thesis accounts for the analysis and methods of several authors who are likewise concerned with the Danish EU referenda and whereof many use quantitative instruments to foresee and describe the climate surrounding the respective referenda. Still, as this thesis has a post-structural approach it becomes essential to investigate not so much *if*, but *how* subjects⁷ are subjected to government (i.e. discourses), which eventually constitute their experiences, feelings and attitudes and thus how they place themselves in relations to the EC/EU. In this quest, the qualitative method is usually relevant as it problematizes an already observed phenomenon (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 27, 125ff, Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673).

⁷ Subjects should here be understood as 'the governed' in Foucauldian terms.

4.6 Conducting an interview

Designing the questions

When designing an interview, one should strive to obtain the intended knowledge. On this background, the interview portfolio will consist of politicians, experts and journalists, which are:

1. Morten Løkkegaard, a Danish journalist who has recently been appointed member of the European Parliament (ALDE)⁸ after a government reshuffle in Denmark, February 29 2016. Until this date Løkkegaard was the political spokesman of EU-affairs for the Liberal Party in Denmark.
2. Rina Ronja Kari, a member of the European Parliament since the Danish election held on the May 25 2015. Rina Ronja Kari is a member of the EU-sceptical group GUE/NGL, which advocates for the preservation of European diversity and sovereignty (guengl.eu).
3. Erik Høgh-Sørensen, co-chairman for the newly established think tank “The Analytical Unit 4V”. Before this Erik Høgh-Sørensen was an EU-correspondent for the Danish news agency Ritzau and in 2015 he ran for member of the Danish Parliament (Danish People’s Party).
4. Poul Madsen, editor in chief of the Danish newspaper Ekstra Bladet, has a past at the Danish broadcasting channel TV2. He is over-all communications expert and in relations to the EU Poul Madsen is active in the public debate.

The life world Interview and specific questions

The notion of life world is best understood from the phenomenological approach, which was developed by Edmund Husserl around 1900 and later refined by especially post structuralists. In short terms, phenomenology takes a point of interest in understanding social phenomena from the actors’ own perspectives. (Ibid: 27-35). Thus, the world is a construction of what people consider it to be. From this notion this thesis will attempt to understand the different themes regarding the Danish EU referenda from the life world (everyday life) of the different interviewees. In the thesis, this approach will adherently add a layer to the post structural methodology, as the main objective is to investigate not only why some discourses can

⁸ ALDE refers to The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Besides Løkkegaard ALDE has two Danish members from the Danish Social-Liberal party, Jens Rohde and Morten Helveg-Petersen

claim truth value, but also how these discourses are perceived by the respective actors. In the following section the questions to the interviewees and the reasoning behind will be unfolded.

1. *Can you explain to us how you have worked with the European Union throughout your career?* This question is not directly related to the themes of the investigation. However, Aberbach and Rockman 2002 stress that the elite generally find it fascinating to talk about themselves. Thus, this question is intended to kick start the interview (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). According to Catharina Juul Kristensen, an interviewer should always have two plans for an interview (Kristensen in Fuglsang et al 2007: 285). In accordance with this rationality, this question (question 1) and question 3 will only be put forward if the circumstances, such as time, allow it.

2. *What is your general impression of the electoral campaign on JHA?* From the phenomenological standpoint this question is qualitative because it addresses the interviewee in a normal language. The purpose is to narrow down the focus of the interview and elicit specific situations i.e. crucial situations in the electoral campaign on JHA 2015, which can be elaborated on by using the semi-structured approach. Because the question is so broad, it does not aim at any later quantitative analysis and it is expected that the interviewees will place a their own emphasize on the components of the Danish referendum on JHA. As already mentioned, the authors of this thesis have a prior understanding of the referendum on JHA. Nonetheless, this questionnaire is constructed with dileberaté naiveté, hence the interview is potentially open to new and unexpected interpretations of the aforementioned referendum. Also, it is recognised that elites do not like being put in a straight-jacket and thus, an open-ended question can potentially elevate the quality of the interviews (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 30-35 & Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).

3. *Thus, why do you think the electorate turned down the proposal?* When asking this question, it is expected that the interview has arrived at a concrete level i.e. the interviewee has touched upon several aspects of the referendum on JHA and now the interviewee will have a chance of clarifying and categorising the prior statements. These statements will supposedly focus on the specific aspects that he or she finds important. Accordingly, the interviewees focus will determine the direction of the interview. Because the question is of summative character it can also present the authors with the opportunity of clarifying any potential ambiguity in the prior statements (ibid).

4. *How do you see the referendum on JHA compared to past referenda?* Like the previous questions it is the intention of this thesis to obtain descriptions that are inclusive and presuppositionless, also leaving room for the interviewees to unfold their knowledge. Thus, this question will supposedly yield several and diverse perspectives of the historical context within which the referendum on JHA can be placed within (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 30-35 & Aberbach and Rockmann 2002: 674).

5. *Did you collaborate with other stakeholders in the electoral campaign and, if so, what do you think of the cooperation?* As stated, the level of academic research is sparse momentarily. Also, information on the specific network and their cohesion is difficult to interpret from newspaper articles, which is the primary source of empirical knowledge in this thesis. Thus, it seems prudent to make this question slightly more specific than the previous ones.

6. *How do you think the outcome will be in case of a future Danish EU referendum?* Because the interview situation is an interpersonal situation and should be an enriching experience for both parties the final question should be considered as an extra twist, were both parties can speak more freely.

Chapter 5, The Danish referendum on membership of the European Communities, October 2 1972

5.1 Introduction

In the early sixties (1961-1967), Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Norway applied for membership of the European Communities. Still, negotiations broke down as France i.e. Charles de Gaulle had a strong aversion against the participation of the United Kingdom, which he feared would weaken France's position and pave the way for American influence (Kelstrup et. al. 2012: 63 and (EU-Norway.org). Looking back to the past, the Danish society was then still to some extent weighed down by the recent world wars. Nonetheless, this era gave birth to a new level of political thinking; whereas, many areas of the private sphere, such as the living conditions of the population, welfare and the bringing up of the children, became the object of political regulation (Danmarkshistorien.dk). Regarding the EC, the public debate in the 1960s was characterised by a very large proportion of the entitled Danish voters not knowing what to vote in case of a referendum on membership of the EC. However, this confusion quickly changed in the early 1970s, when a potential Danish EC membership became a major political issue once again and thus, the people people began to take an interest in the conditions of a potential membership. The proliferation of the political debate gave rise to significant decline of the 'yes-majority', correspondingly increasing the 'no-minority' and almost exclusively eliminating the 'not knowing' (Buch and Hansen 2002: 1-3). From the Danish debate on the EC, roughly two distinct approaches seem present. Whereas, the pro Europeans took a pragmatic stance by quantifying the economic yield from European cooperation, the Danish euro-sceptics kept challenging the EC membership with reference to the legal wording of the Danish constitution (and institutions (Esmark 2002: 212-215). When looking at the respective actors arguing in terms of a 'yes', it is apparent that this constellation involved a great variety of actors with different groups such as economic advisors, performers, former Danish Prime Ministers like Erik Eriksen, Viggo Kampmann, Hilmar Baunsgaard and Jens Otto Krag, accompanied by several other Danish opinion formers with an all-round background, such as professor, dr. phil. Søren Sørensen and actor Ulf Pilgaard (Pol 300972F). When looking at the constellation of actors in the competing regime of practice (the no-parties), it seems smaller and more scattered – further illustrated by the volume of advertisements, which is substantially smaller than the one of the yes-parties. This regime of practice was represented by a public figure, such as executive Steen Danø who supposedly had an influential voice in the public debate; whereas, others, such as the Youth Christians (Ber 011072A), The Danish Social-Liberal Youth Party and the Danish Communist Party, allegedly had a smaller amount of expertise and public voice. On this

background, the following section will provide a thorough analysis of the 1972 referendum by looking at the different dimensions of government outlined in chapter 3.

5.2 The examination of the fields of visibility of government

In the first dimension of government, a Governmentality analysis investigates how a regime of practice can be characterised from the light it places on different objects and similarly, by the shadows it obscures other.

Nordek and Peace

When looking at the electoral campaign leading up to the referendum of 1972, it is apparent that both the yes and no-parties greatly emphasised the Scandinavian economic cooperation, Nordek, and thus, from a Governmentality perspective, place the object in the field of visibility with a bright light. According to The Committee Supporting Danish Accession to the EC, European cooperation will always take precedence over Nordic cooperation. In one of their advertisements they quote former Prime Minister of Norway Trygve Bratelli for saying: *“(...) no well-oriented person can believe that a Nordic constellation can solve the problems that the respective countries have negotiated with the European Community”* (Pol 280972E & Ber 280972F). On a later occasion, Bratelli himself states: *“The Danes can be assured that they are not doing the Nordic a favour by keeping Denmark out of the European Community”* (Ber 011072J1). Also, then, Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag expresses the viewpoint that the Nordek cooperation is best *governed* through European Cooperation: *“No matter the outcome, the Nordic cooperation are to be expanded. But to provide the people with the illusion of a proliferation of the Nordek is condemnable”* (Ber 011072J3). Conversely, the no-parties enlighten the Nordek positively and shadow the EC as something of smaller importance: *“Denmark is a far bigger customer at the EC, than reversely* (Ber 011072S). In the same advertisement, made by The People’s Movement against the EC, the Danish Prime Minister is encouraged to: *“move against Stockholm and not Brussels”* (Pol 011072P & Ber 011072S). According to this regime of practice the Norwegian ‘no’ is an open invitation for the Danish government. The latter argument is also addressed by journalist, Hans Egebjerg, who enlighten that a potential Danish ‘no’ is substantially more expensive for Denmark than the Norwegian ‘no’ was for Norway, because Denmark is potentially jeopardising its primary area of export (Ber 270972J). He is further backed by the former Minister of Finance, Erik Ninn-Hansen, who claims that a Nordic alliance will always be weighed down by the peripheral presence of Russia (Ber 270972M1).

In continuation of the latter argument, the yes-parties illuminate peace as a component of the EC. For example, on the September 29 1972, The Danish Freedom Fighters (frihedskæmperne) brought the following statement in Politiken: *“Solely accession to the European Community will provide Denmark with the*

opportunity of cooperation with our former allies and the new Germany” (Pol 290972H). This argument is also backed by the chairman of the Danish Parliament, Karl Skytte, and a large number of MPs from The Danish Social-Liberal Party (Ber 290972L, 290972P, 260972C). As opposed to this argument, the Communist Party enlightens the EC as something that equals military build-up (Pol 270972H). Moreover, the illustration from the People’s Movement against the EC shows how Germany is lighted up as something frightening (Pol 260972B).

Social conditions

Another area which is greatly illuminated by especially the yes-parties is how the EC will potentially influence the social conditions of the Danish population. On October 1 1972, Former Danish Prime Minister, Hilmer Baunsgaard and the then Minister of Justice, Knud Axel Nielsen, alongside with other from a charmed circle, shed a light on the Danish health insurance, state pension and the unemployment benefits, which according to the last-mentioned are best preserved and even improved by Denmark’s prospective accession to the EC (Pol 011072M, 011072G).⁹ Similarly, the Danish author, Leif Panduro, writes: *“I Fear that the socially marginalised people will be hit hard if Denmark is kept out of the EC”* (Pol 011072Q). Conversely, on September 27 1972, the Danish Social-Liberal Youth Party also illuminates how the EC will affect the social conditions. In their advertisement they claim that the EC will widen the gap between the social classes and hamper the struggle for equal rights between men and women (Pol 270972C). Thus, the no-parties’ enlightenment of the social conditions is diametrically opposed to that of the yes-parties. From a Governmentality standpoint, this is an example of how two competing regimes of practice can render visible two diverse objects to be governed by casting different lights on the same object.

The economic consequences

Looking at the campaign, it is evident that both the yes and no-parties shed a strong light on the economic impact of Denmark’s potential accession to the EC. For the yes-parties, the field to be governed is the competitiveness and growth of Denmark and Danish industry. The Committee Supporting Danish Accession to the EC states: *“A ‘no’ the 2nd of October might have big severe economic consequences for Denmark – for the everyday economy of the Danish families. Experts claim that a devaluation will be inevitable”* (Pol 011072E).¹⁰ In contrast, Svend Auken, from the Social Democrats, who at the time were at loggerheads over the issue of Denmark’s participation in the EC, put forward that an accession to the EC could result in a “salary

⁹ See also Advertisements and letters to the editor from The Danish Social Democrats and Minister for Social Affairs Eva Gredal (Pol 290972K1, Ber 300972D)

¹⁰ See also Ber 011072K, Ber 270972F where the former Prime Minister, Hilmer, Baunsgaard, illuminates how Denmark will be forced to devalue

party” and thus hamper the politics of economics (Ber 250972B). From a Governmentality perspective, the yes-parties also present several calculations, by which the field of the governed can be visualised: for example, the major Danish company Superfoss put forward an advertisement stating that 5000 jobs will be preserved by entering the EC (Pol 290972B, Ber 011072M). The same tendency can be found among The Corn and Fodder Industry, Dan-Contractors and packing industry that enlighten similar pitfalls in case of a ‘no’ to the EC (Ber 300972F, 280972, 280972I, 270972E1, 270972).

5.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

As opposed to several other studies, claiming that government is solely a manifestation of values and ideologies, the Governmentality research recognises that successful ruling must rely on technical means i.e. instruments, techniques and vocabularies. These will be unfolded in the following section.

The volume of advertisements

The analysis shows that the two regimes of practice have followed a different procedure as to the newspaper advertisements. For example, on the September 28 1972 the yes-parties bring six (sponsored) advertisements in Politiken. By comparison, the no-parties have only one letter to the editor by the businessman Steen Danø (Pol 280972H). The same tendency can be found in Berlingske on October 1 1972, one day prior to the referendum. Here the yes-parties bring 11 sponsored advertisements and the no-parties three. In theoretical terms, this finding illustrates that the yes-parties have used newspaper-volume as a tactic to constitute authority.¹¹ Also, several advertisements are brought repeatedly in Berlingske and Politiken within the time frame of the analysis. An example of this repetitive tactic can be found on September 29 1972 where both Berlingske and Politiken include the same sponsored advert containing a statement from Grethe Philip from the Danish Social-Liberal Party (Pol 290972A & Ber 290972E).¹²

The vocabularies – simple math or a complex political union?

From the advertisements it can also be seen how the yes-parties use a quantitative technique to capture the eye and inherently constitute rule. In several of the adverts, numbers are placed in the headline, such as the aforementioned advertisement from Superfoss (Pol 290972B, Ber 011072M) or The Committee Supporting Danish Accession to the EC, stating that “*Frederikshavn is looking forward to 3100 new jobs from Norway and Sweden*” (Ber, 300972A). Apart from the discussion on the costs of a potential devaluation, the vocabularies constituted by the no-parties consist of figurative language (e.g. Pol 011072P, Pol 270972H). For example:

¹¹ Supposedly also that yes-parties were, at the time, better organised and possessed greater resources.

¹² For additional examples see Pol 290972B, Ber 011072M, Pol 300972G, Ber 300972A

*"We do not need to stand in Brussels with the hat in our hand (...)." (Pol 011072P), "Denmark as a bridgehead to the Internal market does not favour the North" (Ber 011072D) or "JA WOHL - VOTE NO THANKS" (Pol 260972B). These statements are consistent with the field of visibility, where authority is constituted by a strong light on Denmark and the Nordek; while obscuring the value of the EC cooperation (Dean 1999). As stated, the yes-parties use numbers as a mean to illuminate the economic benefits of the EC. Furthermore, many of their advertisements are characterised by short and catchy messages: "You desire a happy family life. Yes. The internal market will create a happy family life (...)." (Pol 011072R), "if we are not to cooperate with the Western democracies, who are we to cooperate with?" (Pol 260972C), "The EC hinders European disputes" (Pol 260972E) and so on. In contrast to the yes-parties' enlightenment of the economic benefits, the no- parties use a choice of words that seems to hold a different meaning; for example, the word "political union" is repeatedly used as an instrument to make the governed *think with eyes and hands*, as figuratively illustrated by Bruno Latour (Dean 1999: 33).*

Picturing the field to be governed

In several of the adverts there is likewise an inclusion of drawings. In the Governmentality approach, both the yes and no-parties use this platform as an instrument to constitute their respective authority. Similar to the vocabularies, the emphasis of the drawings is very different. As mentioned, The Danish Freedom Fighters brought an advert, which shed light on the advantages for Denmark from cooperating with Germany through the EC (Pol 290972H). This statement is accompanied by a drawing of a large dove holding an olive branch, which is a universally recognized peace symbol. Conversely, The Danish Movement



Picture 1, advert from Politiken October 1 1972 (Pol 011072U)

against the EC bring two drawings, see picture 1, of an eagle tearing itself away from four additional eagles and a little girl, respectively (Pol 011072U). As opposed to the dove, the eagle is a symbol of power, thus, according to the Governmentality literature, the drawing can be considered a *diagram of power*, because it illuminates the tension field between five equally powerful eagles, where the one, being Denmark, decides to break away from the flock (of the EC) and inherently go it alone. In continuation hereof, the little girl is used as a technical mean to illustrate that the Danishness should be safeguarded from the EC, which is feared to evolve into a superpower (Pol 270972C)

5.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

According to Mitchell Dean, the fields of visibility and technical aspects of government give rise to specific forms of truth. Consequently, the third dimension of government investigates the knowledge, strategies and rationalities embedded in regimes of practice.

The rationalities, strategies and means of calculation

From the fields of visibility and technical aspects of government, it has, till now, been demonstrated how the yes and no-parties have constituted their ruling by illuminating and shadowing several aspects of the Danish referendum on Denmark's accession to the EC in 1972. By looking at the campaign of the yes-parties there seems to be a distinct strategy to enlighten the economic advantages for Denmark. Hence, the employed rationality is that the Danes will vote 'yes' if there is an overall promise of economic growth for the Danish industry and enhanced social conditions for the population.

In Berlingske on October 1 1972, The Committee Supporting Danish Accession to the EC bring an advertisement illustrating the costs of a 'no' (Ber 011072E). The advert includes six pictures on every day commodities. There are two prices; a 'yes price' and a 'no price', where the latter is 25 per cent higher than the first mentioned. On this behalf, the advert asks: "*can you afford a no?*". This approach is consistent with the yes-parties using a quantitative technique, which include numbers and catchy messages; thus, from a Governmentality perspective the mean of calculation is that a visual illustration, i.e. economic incitements, will be 'bought' by the Danish electorate and conduct them into voting 'yes'. Furthermore, the advert put forward that these calculations are the words of economic experts and not of politicians. This strategy to use expertise is a general tendency from yes-parties (see also Ber 280972 and Pol 250972). Thus, in agreement with the conceptual framework of Rose and Miller (1992), using experts can add truth value to statements, solely due to their recognition as experts. The fields of visibility and vocabularies further illustrate that the yes-parties had a strategy to include the means of scaring the Danish electorate on several on several occasions by illuminating the consequences of a potential 'no'. This is evident in a letter to the editor, where then Minister of Economic Affairs, Per Hækkerup states: "*Should the outcome be a no, the government will summon the labour market and industry to a crisis meeting*" (Ber 300972) or, as stated by the former Danish ambassador, Finn Gundelach: "*There is no guaranty that Denmark will be granted a free-trade agreement with the EC in case of a no*" (Pol 300972I). The same *means of calculation* can be observed when looking at the respective adverts made by the Danish industry supporting a 'yes' (e.g. Ber 280972I, 270972E1, 280972, 300972F).

As opposed to the yes-parties, the regime of the no-parties is constituted by a tactic of shadowing the EC; placing a strong light on Denmark and the Nordic cooperation. An instrument in this quest has been continuously to use words and synonyms for 'political union'. An example can be found in Politiken on October 1 1972, where former Minister Karl Hjortnæs made the following statement:

"Should we choose the binding cooperation in the EC with the intrinsic consequences for our freedom of action in the area of foreign policy on the Danish legislative framework, which, today belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Budgetary Affairs" (Pol 011072H).

From the quotation it is apparent that the no-parties had a strategy to put forward possible negative consequences for as many areas of the Danish administration as possible. The same tendency can be seen in the advert from the Social-Liberal Youth Party who put on that the EC will "(...) evolve into a superpower with a joint foreign and defence policy" (Pol 270972C). This procedure seems to prove evidence of a rationality relying on the Danish electorate as *protectors* of Denmark. Thus, if the light is strong enough on the loss of Danish sovereignty and the EC as a supra-national and frightening constellation, this will manifest itself from a 'no' (see also Pol 280972H & Ber 011072D). As mentioned, the two regimes of practice also picture the social conditions as the field to be governed. Yet, the no-parties seem to use a strategy, which makes the two regimes of practice incompatible. In his letter to the editor, Karl Hjortnæs concludes that every prosaic assessment will claim the EC is unable to solve most social issues. This strategy to shadow the social dimensions of the cooperation is also consistent with the approach of the Social-Liberal Youth Party and the Communist Party who equate the EC with 'The Capital' (Pol 270972C, 011072H, 270972H).

5.5 The attention to the formation of identities

The final dimension of government, investigates the collective and individual identities, through which government operates and seek to transform. It is the examination of the duties and rights of the governed and correspondingly the capacities and statuses presupposed by those who exercise government.

In continuation of the latter argument, it is apparent that the regime of practice of the no-parties operates through a collective identity, which seeks to transform the Danish electorate into protectors of Denmark and Danish sovereignty. Yet, this strategy would probably have little punch without some initial orientation towards national self-esteem; at least this is what seems to be presupposed by the no-parties. On this

background, the Danish electorate is given the status as protectors of Denmark from an exogenous superpower. Also, it has been illustrated that rule is constituted from a technique (and inherently a strategy) to make the EC disassociated with the improvement of the social conditions of the population. Thus, the regime of practice elicits the Danish electorate with the capacities and appertaining duties to help improve the social conditions in Denmark by voting 'no' to the EC. The governors have the attributes and the orientations towards preservation of Denmark, Danish autonomy and Danishness (Pol 270972C).

When analysing the competing regime of practice, a very different sets of identities are fostered. By stating the obvious advantages of the EC, in a, to some extent, vulgarised way, it is presupposed that the Danish electorate is motivated by financial incitements and inherently rational decision-making, and, as stated, a great deal of the advertisements include means, supposedly intended to scare the Danish electorate. Therefore, the regime of practice elicits a capacity among the entitled Danish voters, which make them responsible for their own fortune, alongside with the one of the Danish industry. Furthermore, there is a direct linkage between the EC and the social conditions of the population. Thus, the entitled Danish voters are transformed into having the responsibility of ensuring the social conditions for themselves and the Danish population in general. The governors, being the spearheads of the Danish society, are assumed to use their statuses and capacities as leading politicians, executives and experts, to conduct the Danish electorate into an understanding of the paramount advantages following from cooperation within the EC. They are the ones with the attributes of knowing Denmark's future challenges – best solved through cooperation with the EC.

5.6 Summary

From the analysis it is apparent that there has been a substantial difference in the level of expertise (and resources), which have been at the disposal of the two regimes of practice. The yes-parties have used a *strategy to illuminate* the EC as voucher for economic and social prosperity. Conversely, *the means of calculation* of the no-parties have been to *enlighten* the Nordek cooperation and *shed a strong glare* on the EC as political union.

Chapter 6, The Danish referendum on the Single European Act, February 27 1986.

6.1 Introduction

In general, the referendum of 1972 made clear that Denmark joined the EC with a highly selective identification of EC goals i.e. the economic advantages for Denmark and the Danish industry, alongside with enhanced social opportunities for expression within the population. From the early 70s to the election on the Single European Act in 1986 (also referred to as the “EC package”), Denmark had a reserved approach to the EC, made possible by a number of endogenous problems stemming from diverse interests among the member states (Kelstrup in Miles & Wivel 2014: 14-16). Domestically, most Danish political parties were getting increasingly fond of the EC cooperation. Yet, the public opinion was that a line had to be drawn somewhere (Sørensen 2004: 17 & Buch and Hansen 2002: 5).

Looking at the actors supporting a ‘no’; The Danish People’s Movement against the EC/EU had gained position since their first election in 1979 (Buch and Hansen 2002). Furthermore, several strong actors i.e. The Federation of Semiskilled Workers in Denmark (Specialarbejderforbundet), The Danish Union of Electricians (Dansk El-Forbund), University of Copenhagen, Economists Against the EC and several smaller organisations such as The Danish Freedom Fighters, the environmental organisation NOAH, were participating in the electoral campaign pleading for a ‘no’ in 1986. In comparison to the 1972 referendum, this illustrates a more organised constellation of actors with a greater space for action, as will be illustrated throughout the analysis. Conversely, the yes-parties still had a strong representation of prominent politicians and important figures, for instance former head of the OECD, Thorkil Kristensen, then CEO of Novo Nordisk, Mads Øvlisen, former head of LO-Denmark, Thomas Nielsen and many more.

The background for the referendum in 1986 was that the government, led by then Prime Minister Poul Schlüter was unable to obtain a majority in Parliament in favour of the EC Package. Therefore, an advisory referendum was held on February 27 1986 and the result, eventually, made The Social Democrats change their stance and accept the EC Package (Kelstrup et. al. 2012: 67).

Taking a step back, Europe was losing terrain to Japan and the United States in the international competition. To counteract this development, the European leaders decided to speed-up the final steps of the Internal Market, first enacted with the Treaty of Rome in 1958 (EEC and Euratom) (Kelstrup et. al 2012: 60, 66-67).

Consequently, The European Commission launched a white paper with 279 bills. Also, it was decided to replace the current decision-making procedure of unanimity within the Council (veto) to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), alongside with strengthening the European Parliament's powers in certain legislative areas, involving the cooperation procedure in relations to the future accession and association treaties (Euparl.europe.eu A, Eur-lex A).

Because the EC Package increased the community powers, the main themes in the electoral debate revolved much around economic advantages and trade as opposed to loss of Danish sovereignty and national and cultural identity (Buch and Hansen 2002: 14), advocated by the yes and no-parties respectively.

6.2 The examination of fields of visibility of government

An emerging political union?

As stated in the introduction, the referendum on the Single European Act partly concerned a transfer of powers within the Council and the European Parliament. On this background, the power of veto is one of the objects, which the no-parties casted a decisive light on. An advertisement made by The Federation of Semiskilled Workers in Denmark states: *"If we are to say yes to the EC-package, the power of veto will disappear. Decisions can be made with QMV in the EC institutions. Denmark will only play a very small part"* (Pol 210286D). Also by enlightening the object of a political union, it becomes visual that it is Danish sovereignty and Danishness that are to be governed. On February 26 1986, Freddy Andersen, the chairman of The Danish Union of Electricians writes: *"the EC package prunes our freedom and can be considered the beginning of the end – the creation of a de facto Western European Union"* (Pol 260286R). The intense glow on the political implications can be further perceived in an advertisement, by The Unions Against the EC Union (Fagforeninger mod EF-Unionen) with the headline: *"The word you were not allowed to see"*. In the advert, it is illuminated that there is a problem in the Danish translation of the word "Union"¹³, as used in the EC Package (Pol 210286A). The same field of vision is current in an advertisement issued by The Danish People's Movement against the EC, which, in addition, shed a light on the Danish Constitution and the claimed incompatibleness with the direction of the European Community (Pol 250286B). Another object in this line of reasoning is "sovereignty". An example can be found in an ad from February 26 1986, where the Council of Police, among many others, states that *"Giving up Danish sovereignty will not be recognised"* (Pol 260286L).

¹³ The Danish translation the word "Union" is sammenslutning "sammenslutning", which refers to a cooperation with fewer obligations.

In their respective advertisements, the yes-parties also illuminate the issue of sovereignty as something unproblematic. Thus, in terms of Governmentality, the object is obscured. In a telephone interview, transcribed in Berlingske, Poul Schlüter says *“The Union will not succeed in my lifetime”* (Ber 230286G). Correspondingly, the former German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, put forward that the change of the decision-making process should primarily be a concern of the bigger EC countries, as their freedom to act will be lowered in accordance with the wording of the EC package (Ber 230286). He is further backed by the former secretary-general of the OECD, Thorkild Kristensen: *“There are those who fear that the EC will become a union. This is connected with thoughts from the first years of the post-war era (...) it appears to be completely unrealistic. The 12 countries have long traditions as independent states (...)”* (Ber 250286E).

The Environmental aspect of the EC Package – Suppression or empowerment?

When the European leaders discussed the completion of the Internal Market in the mid-80s, one of the Danish main demands was securing a strong environmental protection. This demand was eventually enacted by the EC (Kelstrup et. al. 2012: 67). Nevertheless, environmental concern was a distinct object within the field to be governed. When looking at an advertisements made by former head of the Social Democrats, Svend Auken, who at the time was still an Eurosceptic, the illumination is clear: *“The package will per se mean that the new decision-making procedures on environment and health can prevent Denmark from pursuing the desired politics”* (Pol 260286F). The same enlightenment is seen two articles comprising of statements from biologist, Finn Bjerre, (Pol 260286D), the environmental interest organisation NOAH (Pol 260286C) and in an advertisement brought by The Federation of Semiskilled Workers in Denmark (Pol 200286B).

The yes-parties seem to cast an equal decisive light on the environment. On February 24 1986, the then Minister for the Environment, Chr. Christensen, enlightens that the EC Package will: *“strengthen the safeguarding of the environment, both within the national and EC framework”* (Ber 240286J). Also, ads and letters to the editor brought by the Danish Social-Liberal Party (Pol 230286F and Ber 230286I), The Committee for a better YES to the EC (Komiteen for JA til et bedre EF) (Pol 250286E), Hans Engell¹⁴ (Ber 260286I) and Poul Schlüter (Ber 230286G) shed a light on the new environmental policies as minimum standards and thus *“(...) every country can decide to implement its own – sternest – legislation”* (Ber 230286G).

¹⁴ Hans Engell was Minister of Defence at the time.

Trade barriers

In a letter to the editor from February 22 1986, former MP Annelise Gottfredsen from the Conservative People's Party describes the environmental object with another light, claiming that a 'no' will lead to a loss of Danish competitiveness and thus Denmark will, in the long run, be forced to lower its environmental standards (Ber 220286A). The ad is rather cryptic, (the vocabularies will be analysed later on) however, it illustrates an overall pragmatic stance, which involve the abolishment of trade barriers. An example of this approach can be seen in the following statement by MP, Per Stig Møller, also from the Conservative People's Party: *"It is a significant advantage for, not only Denmark, but Europe as a whole, if the trade barriers are removed. Today they raise the costs by 100 billion kroner and strain the Danish society with extra costs of 5.5 billion kroner"* (Pol 260286Q). This quote bear resemblance to the illumination on the economic consequences from a 'no' in 1972, where former Prime Minister Hilmer Baunsgaard states: *"a no the 2nd of October means unpleasant, radical changes. Through the past 14-15 years we have witnessed a strong prosperity due to the inter-state trade with the Western European countries"* (Ber 011072K, 270972F).

Also, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, put on that a 'no' will have significant costs in the longer run (Ber 260286E). He is backed by Erik Hoffmeyer, then head of the Danish Central Bank, stating that the abolishment of the trade barriers will favour the Danish economy considerably (Ber 230286D). When looking at the strong illumination of the economic benefits, it becomes apparent that the no-parties, in terms of Governmentality, shadow this object, which is not directly addressed in the advertisements.

6.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

Until now, the analysis has shown that each of the two regimes of practice have followed a distinct procedure to constitute rule, by illuminating and obscuring trade barriers and dimensions of sovereignty respectively. Now, the main concern is to analyse the applied technical aspects, which, according to Dean (1999), is a condition of governing.

Can I scare you to vote in accordance with my desires?

In the electoral campaign, prior to the referendum on Denmark's accession to the EC in 1972, it was demonstrated that many of the advertisements advocating a 'yes', included means funded in a rationality that the Danish electorate could be conducted into voting 'yes' if a strong light was placed on economic yields and pitfalls. On this background, the regime of practice elicited a capacity making the Danish electorate responsible for the prosperity of Denmark and themselves. When looking at the electoral campaign prior to the referendum on the Single European Act, the same pattern can be seen when looking at the vocabularies.

For example, on February 26 1986, The Liberal Party bring an ad, where the entitled Danish voter is asked to sign 15 pointers on the future of Denmark e.g.: *"I Understand and accept that solely in the area of agriculture*

Ja til Europa - nej til union!

Danmark skal regeres fra Christiansborg. Vi vil selv vælge dem, der skal regere. Hvis EF-pakken vedtages, kan andre lande - med flertals-afgørelser i EF-institutioner - stemme Danmark ned. Hidtil har vi haft vor fulde selvbestemmelsesret. Den mister vi. Det såkaldte "indre marked" i Europa får nu - eller som virkning på længere sigt - vidtgående konsekvenser for arbejdsmiljø, ydre miljø, varekvaliteter, afgifts-politik, lønpolitik, penge- og finanspolitik. Vi vil på flere og flere områder miste vor selvbestemmelsesret.

Kravl ikke op på rutschebanen
Et ja til EF-pakken er et ja til den rutschebane, der fører os ind i den politiske union. Andre EF-lande vil forcere denne udvikling. De vil mase på med nye pakker. Hver gang vil deres ja-sigere i Danmark true med, at et nej til pakken betyder fare for EF. *Tro dem ikke!*
Et ja til EF-pakken er første ghidning på den rutschebane, der fører til en politisk union, hvor vores politiske selvbestemmelsesret er væk.

Stem dansk - stem nej!

SPECIALARBEJDERFORBUNDET

Picture 2, advert from Politiken February 25 (Pol 250286C)

and related industries 40.000 workplaces will vanish" (Pol, 260286B). Also the area of the international competition is used as an instrument to conduct a scare campaign: *"I am not nervous about the fact that Denmark alone will have to negotiate export to 800 million people in the United States of America, Japan and Eastern Europe"* (Pol, 260286B). The same vocabulary is used in an advertisement made by The Committee for a better YES to the EC: *"If we say 'no', Denmark will be isolated. There are many political expressions from other EC-countries that confirm this. It will entail irreversible damage to the Danish economy, production and employment"* (Ber, 250286E). As opposed to the means applied by the yes-parties, the no-parties also seem to use a tactic of scaring the

Danish electorate, in accordance with the respective field to be governed i.e. the Danish sovereignty and the avoidance of a political union and the appertaining power of veto. An example can be found when looking at the vocabulary used by the People's Movement against the EC: *"If the package is adopted the EC will for example decide on the number of drugs we are allowed to have in Denmark"* or as delivered by the Social Democrats: *"The wage earners in the other EC countries are obliged to take out insurance in order to get social comfort. It will be the same in Denmark if the EC package enacted"* (Pol 200286E).

The technologies

The analysis of the 1972 referendum showed that there was an unequal amount of sponsored advertisements in the respective newspapers, where the numbers clearly favour the yes-parties. Yet, the amount of ads in the electoral campaign prior to the referendum on the Single European Act was close to equal with 52 advocating a 'yes' and 45 supporting a 'no'. This could, on the one hand, illustrate that the no-parties changed their tactic and wanted to constitute rule by using newspaper advertisement. On the other hand, as touched upon in the introduction, the mobilisation of the no-parties was getting increasingly stronger (Buch and Hansen 2002). This is for example reflected in that the no-parties had a strong use of pictures and drawings in 1986, where many were full-pagers and thus cost-intensive. Similarly, the use of pictures and drawings can be interpreted as an instrument to vulgarise the complex content of the referendum (this point will be further elaborated on in the next dimension).

On February 26 1986, the Danish People's Movement against the EC bring an ad of a Dane on a slide with a headline saying: *"Stop the slippery slope towards the Union"* (Pol 260286J). The same tendency can be seen in Politiken on the February 21, 25 and 26 respectively (Pol 210286C, 250286C, 260286J). In three ads, The Federation of Semiskilled Workers in Denmark bring drawings of big packages, where one is about to be dropped on top of a handful Danes holding a book with the text *"the power of veto"* (Pol 210586C). Perhaps most controversial, is picture 2 (Pol 250286C). In the ad, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is discouraging a family from take a slide after the EC package into the oven of the political union (from where there is no return).

When looking at the technologies of the yes-parties, the message seems more pragmatic. On February 26 1986, the Conservative People's Party bring an ad in Berlingske and Politiken (Pol 260286N and Ber 260286D) containing two young people smiling from ear to ear. The picture is accompanied by several claims to the proliferation of employment the environment and prosperity. Also, the statement *"How can anybody believe that we will become less Danish by cooperating with other countries"* (Pol 260286N) bear witness of a pragmatic stance. The same vocabulary is found in an advertisement placed by the Danish Industry and Agriculture: *"In writing it is evidenced how many Danish workplaces created by the export to every country of the EC"* (Pol 260286K).

6.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

The rationalities and strategies of government

The previous sections show a great variation between the two regimes of practice. Yet, government should be perceived, not only from its fields of visibility and technologies; government is a rational and thoughtful

activity, depending on the 'complaisant' bodies of the population i.e. the entitled Danish voters (Dag Heede 1992). Thus, it is paramount to investigate the next layer of government, which is the inherent rationalities.

The techniques and vocabularies applied by the yes-parties testified to an overall pragmatic rationality, which seems very much in line with the one of the 1972 referendum. On numerous occasions the trade barriers are illuminated as hampering the potential of social, environmental and economic growth and prosperity (e.g. Pol 260286Q, 260286N, 260286K, 230286I and Ber 250286E). Plus, the vocabularies testify to a degree of "common sense", such as the aforementioned statement by the Conservative People's Party: *"How can anybody believe that we will become less Danish by cooperating with other countries"* (Pol 260286N). Thus, the means of calculation are that the Danish electorate will, once again, vote 'yes' if confronted with the above-all economic opportunities, combined with the illumination of the potential disorder from a 'no', such as: *"I understand and accept that 2/3 of the Danish fishery will be gone in a few years"* (Ber 260286C). In this line of reasoning, there is also a great deal of expertise involved and according to the theory, hence a better chance of incorporating truth value in the campaign, for example, the Director of the Danish Central Bank (Ber 230286D), the former head of LO (Ber 260286K), the Danish Industry and Agriculture (Pol 260286K) and so on. Furthermore, there seem to be a rationality employed in this practice to use the surroundings as a strategy to advocate the 'yes'. While, the electoral campaign prior to the referendum in 1972 shed a strong light on not only the economic advantages for Denmark but also the Nordek cooperation and peace, the field of visibility in the 1986 referendum is characterised by the surroundings and public opinion. In almost every advertisement, there is a linkage between the trade barriers and the environmental concern (e.g. Ber 230286I and Ber 260286I).

Contrary to the pragmatic strategy of the yes-parties, the no-parties seem to have a distinct strategy to strongly illuminate the loss of Danish sovereignty and shadow the economic object/aspects of the referendum. Thus, the inherent rationality is that the population will reject the EC if confronted with the judicial and supranational elements of the EC Package. To do so, the no-parties used drawings and pictures as an instrument. As earlier stated, this approach witnesses of, among other things, a tactic to simplify the content of the referendum. Moreover, The Unions against the EC Union placed three advertisements in Politiken on February 21, 25, and 26, 1986. In these ads, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is associated with the creation of a European Union. He is dressed in a suit and in all three pictures he is holding a smoking cigar (Pol 250286G, 210286A, 260286I). Perhaps, most illustrative is the picture where (supposedly Uffe Ellemann-Jensen's) two fat hands are scaling of the word "Union" from the official document of the EC Package (Pol 210286A). The example illustrate that the means of calculation is that the Danish electorate will associate

the EC with bossism and thus reject the package. Furthermore, in Politiken February 15 1986, Poul Schlüter is pictured whispering and is requested to “give a straight answer” by the Danish People’s Movement against the EC (Pol 250286B). Similarly, The Unions Against the EC Union bring an ad where Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is standing behind a half-opened door with a big smile, impersonated as a door-to-door salesman (Pol 250286G). These two advertisements give rise to a specific form of truth, making the EC surrounded by secrecy.

6.5 The attention to the formation of identities

So far, it has been displayed that the fields of visibility and technologies of government is grounded in an inherent rationality seeking to render the issue of the Danish EC cooperation governable. On this background, it can further be addressed how government presupposes and elicits collective and individual identities among the governors and the governed i.e. the stakeholders advocating for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ respectively and the entitled Danish voters.

The previous section shows that the no-parties impersonated Poul Schlüter and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen as being secretive in relations to the content of the EC Package. Bearing resemblance to the referendum of 1972, where for example, The Danish Social-Liberal Youth Party claimed that the EC will transform into a superpower (Pol 270972C). These findings illustrate that the governed, the Danish electorate, should have a cautious orientation towards the EC. Also that they have the duty of preventing Denmark from becoming part of the “so-called” Union and then, eventually, crushed under the weight of the EC Package (as graphically illustrated on several occasions (Pol 250286C, 200286B, 210286D)). By continuously illuminating the EC as a Union, (see for example Ber 2502861 and 240286D) and using the means of scaring the Danish electorate into believing that two constellations are incompatible, a national capacity is elicited furthermore; the entitled Danish voters should have a national orientation and not a European one. Thus, it is expected that they vote ‘no’ in accordance with this stance.

Unlike the 1972 referendum, the governors in this regime of practice have a great deal of authority. An example is the public figure Hardy Hansen, Chairman of The Federation of Semiskilled Workers in Denmark (Pol 200286B), who had a good grasp on the Danish working class. Furthermore, prominent Social-Democrats such as Anker Jørgensen and Svend Auken¹⁵ are advocators of a ‘no’ and had the capacities, attributes and expertise of skilled politicians.

¹⁵ Anker Jørgensen and Svend Auken were, at the time, critical towards the EC cooperation.

Whereas, the no-parties try to form a collective Danish identity, the yes-parties try to elicit the opposite. On February 23 1986, the Liberal Party bring an ad in Berlingske and Politiken, which greatly illuminate the European perspective: *“A convincing YES can be ensured Thursday by all who continuously wishes to see Denmark placed in a community with European democracies”* (Pol 230286E, 260286B). The same pattern appears from two letters to the editor by Mads Øvlisen, former group managing director of Novo Nordisk (Ber 260286L) and then Minister of Transport, Arne Melchior, where the states: *“a ‘no’ to the EC Package is pure isolation”*. Moreover, The Danish Wholesale Trade, brings an advertisement with the headline: *“Danes who want something [figurative] are not afraid of the other Europeans”* (Pol 200286C). From the quotations it is apparent that the senders wish to foster a capacity among the Danish electorate, which involves a European orientation and not solely a Danish one. By placing the world ahead of Denmark and continuously illuminating the advantages from inter-state trade, alongside with the dramatic consequences of a ‘no’, the entitled Danish voters are furthermore given the duty of deciding between prosperity and ruin for Denmark. When looking at the governors, i.e. leading politicians and spearheads of Danish industry and international organisations, they too are expected to have an orientation beyond the Danish perspective – as put forward by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on February 23 1986:

“We live on inter-state trade with the other Western European countries. This is the prerequisite and foundation for our prosperity. If we remove this, we jeopardise not only the economic progress but force a significant decrease of the standard of living, which have been build up through the past 40 years (Ber 230286L).

From the statement(s),¹⁶ it is apparent that the regime of government fosters a capacity among the governors to be visionary and exercise government through pragmatic and undisputable arguments.

6.6 Summary

Throughout the analysis, it has been demonstrated that the yes-parties placed a decisive light on the economic advantages stemming from the removal of trade barriers. Also, the environmental concern has been an associated object within the fields of visibility. Similar to the referendum of 1972, this regime of practice has also conducted a scare campaign by continuously casting a decisive light on the costs of a ‘no’. On this background, the overall rationality has been to use a pragmatic vocabulary to conduct the Danish

¹⁶ See also Ber 260286I

electorate into voting 'yes'. The analysis has further proved a significant increase from 1972-1986 in the resources available for the no-parties, manifesting itself in the amount of advertisements and expertise. The no-campaign seemed to be well organised, by comparison to the 1972 electoral campaign, and had a pivotal focus on sovereignty, the power of veto – all stemming from the increase of community powers within the EC. From an overall perspective, the two regimes of government had similar firm stances.

Chapter 7, The Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, June 2 1992 and the referendum on the Edinburgh Agreement, May 18 1993.

7.1 Introduction

In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall (1989), followed a series of integrational initiatives across Europe. One among those was the enlargement of the European Community (Kelstrup et. al 2012). In December 1991, the Council agreed on the establishment of a political Union (the Maastricht treaty), consisting of three pillars: The European Communities, The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters/JHA (EUR-Lex B). From a Danish perspective, the détente in the late 1980s and the acceptance of the EC Package (1986) had created a favourable international context (Kelstrup in Miles & Wivel 2014).

Among the bigger political parties (The Social Democrats, The Conservative People's Party, The Liberal Party, The Danish Social-Liberal Party), a positive attitude towards the progress of the EC reigned, and several former EU/EC-sceptics such as Anker Jørgensen and Svend Auken both spoke for a 'yes' in the respective electoral campaigns prior to the referenda of 1992-93 (Pol 270592E, Ber 310592H). Still, on June 2 1992 50.7 per cent of the entitled Danish voters rejected the Treaty of Maastricht, sending shock waves throughout the major political parties and the Danish industry. Though the outcome indicated an insufficient popular backing towards Denmark's admittance into the European Union, it was evident that a vast majority of the population still wanted to remain part of the EC/EU (Kelstrup in Miles & Wivel 2014). Therefore, a 'national compromise' was settled on October 1992¹⁷. Apart from the EC/EU positive Danish parties the lynchpin of the settlement was The Socialist People's Party, who had until then, been against EC/EU cooperation. The compromise was a de facto acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty, yet with four Danish reservations on 1) the third stage of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) 2) cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs 3) the defence policy dimension 4) the citizenship of the Union (EUR-Lex C). On December 12 1992, the European Council adopted a declaration granting Denmark four opt-outs in the aforementioned areas (EUR-Lex C). On the background of the Edinburgh Agreement, a second Danish referendum was held on May 18 1993 and the political union was approved by 56.7 per cent of the entitled Danish voters.

¹⁷ The National Compromise was initiated by The Social Democrats, The Danish Social-Liberal Party and The Socialist People's Party and later acknowledged by The Liberal Party, The Conservative People's Party, The Christian People's Party and the Centre Democrats

The transitional period between the two referenda also marked the upshot of the Schlüter Government (1982-1993, I-IV), where, then Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter, was forced to step down after allegations of misconduct, generally referred to as The Tamil Case (Tamilsagen). On this background, the Social Democrat Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, was elected Prime Minister of Denmark January 25 1993.

Similar to the referenda on Denmark's accession to the EC in 1972 and the EC Package in 1986, the yes-parties were represented by a number of prominent politicians, civil servants, experts and executives, such as then¹⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Ber 130593H), Danish Economic Advisors (Pol 270592L), Vice President of the European Commission, Henning Christophersen (Pol 270592E), Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller (Pol 270592E) and so on. Though, paling in comparison, the constellation of the no-parties also consisted of powerful actors, for instance professor dr. polit, Sven Danø, professor, Gunnar Thorlund Jepsen (Pol 010692A), executive, Asger Aamund (Pol 310592C), alongside with several British actors, being for example Peter Shore, MP for Labour (see Pol 150593, 290592G)

In general terms, the electoral campaign prior to the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, bear resemblance to the prior referenda of 1972 and 1986 as the major themes in the public debate were economic, social and environmental advantages as opposed to the loss of Danish sovereignty in the form of a political union, put forward by the yes and no-parties respectively (Buch and Hansen 2002).

7.2 The examination of fields of visibility of government

The Maastricht Treaty – A mere formality, a global necessity or a transition to bureaucracy and oppression?

In the previous sections, it was illustrated that the question of Danish sovereignty has been a major political issue in the electoral campaigns prior to the respective Danish EC/EU referenda. When looking at the field of visibility, which characterised the no-parties in 1986, it contains the object/aspect of QMV (i.e. the power of veto) and the rise of a political union. In a similar way, the referenda of 1992 and 1993 bear witness of the same enlightenment by the equivalent regime of practice (the no-parties). On May 31 1992, Asger Aamund, made the following statement: *“The referendum on the Union is solely a political question as to whether we should give up Danish sovereignty in favour of a European superstate”* (Pol 310592C, see also Ber 290592A and Pol 290592G for corresponding statements). Furthermore, defence attorney, Bent Nielsen, shed a light on Treaty of Maastricht as a step towards *“The United States of Europe”*. Also, in an advertisement from Berlingske on May 16 1993, executive Steen Danø, and actor, Sonia Dahlgaard, describe the future Union as

¹⁸ Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was Minister of Foreign Affairs 10.09-82-25.01.93 (Schlüter I-IV). On the 25th of January 1993 he was replaced by Niels Helveg Petersen (The Danish Social-Liberal Party).

a constellation of bureaucrats undermining democracy (Ber 160593C). The statements bear the resemblance of many other statements made in the electoral campaigns of the 1992-1993 referenda (e.g. Ber 290592A and Ber 280592) and is supposedly inspired by an announcement that Jacques Delors¹⁹ made on April 7 1992. An example can be found on May 30 1992, where the Socialist People's Party bring a sponsored advertisement under the heading "did he really say so", followed by the words of Delors: *"The community that we are building is not democratic enough. It appears to me that we are moving towards something way to elitist and technocratic, leaving no room for the people"* (Pol 300592J). Illuminating the same objects as Delors (i.e. the Socialist People's Party), the writer and vicar in the church of Denmark Søren Krarup and former editor in chief from "Ekstra Bladet", Victor Andreasen, describe the EU as an ideological fantasy constellation which according to Søren Krarup will suppress the citizens: *"(...) a yes-vote is betrayal towards Denmark, who will be reduced to a small county depending on others"* (Pol 280592C). Moreover, associate professor Steen Steensen put politics and bureaucracy on the same footing, as he considers the institutions of the EU to be unpredictable and thus endangering democracy (Pol 280592C).

From the analysis of the 1986-referendum, it is apparent that the yes-parties only partly placed the 'political union' within the field to be governed. On several occasions prominent politicians, such as Poul Schlüter, obscure the argument of a political union by e.g. illuminating the differences between the member states of the EC/EU (see Ber 310592M, 300592I, 230286G). When looking at the referenda of 1992 and 1993, the same enlightenment on the Union seems present. On May 30 1992, Poul Schlüter once again argues *"that the forces who wish to see the EC evolve into a federal state are becoming increasingly weaker"* (Pol 310592D, 300592N). He is backed by former Minister of Finance, Henry Grünbaum who perceives the Maastricht Treaty as a direct contrast to the dreams of Jacques Delors' European superstate (Ber 010692A). Furthermore, Mogens Camre, then MP for the Social Democrats, claimed that the decisions, which "we are to harmonise with the additional member states," concern an area in which Denmark already has no autonomy today (Pol 280592G). Thus, from a Governmentality angle both regimes of practice shed a light on the object of sovereignty. Yet, they are placing it differently in the field to be governed. For the no-parties, sovereignty is placed in the middle of the field, where the light is strongest, while conversely the yes-parties seem to place the transfer of powers in a corner, where there is only a small glow.

¹⁹ Jacques Delors was head of the EC/EU Commission from 1985-1995 (Kilde: Gyldendal)

An economic persuasion?

According to the Liberal Party, part of the Schlüter-IV coalition government with the Conservative People's Party, Denmark's accession to the Maastricht Treaty (i.e. the European Union), will lead to: *"An increase in the employment, greater investments, bigger export, confidence in the Danish Krone, lower interest rates and inflation and enhanced influence"* (Pol 300592A). In continuation hereof, then Minister of Economic Affairs,



Picture 3, advert from Politiken May 30 1992 (Pol 300592A)

Anders Fogh Rasmussen from The Liberal Party, projects that a 'no' could lead to the loss of 150.000 jobs (Ber 260592J). Also, then Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, shed a light on the economic consequences of a 'no', where: *"(...) the business community will invest less in Denmark and thus the economic growth will decrease. On this background, the tax income will be lower and it will become harder to maintain the Danish welfare model"* (Pol 260592A). The same illumination on the economic consequences can be seen in letters to the editor by prominent Social Democrats such as then Minister of Industry and Energy, Anne Birgitte Lundholt (Ber 260592H) and Mogens Camre who state that *"a yes the 2nd of June means a raise in the employment, higher growth and thus the foundation of welfare"* (Pol 280592G). Furthermore on May 14 1993, the chairman of the Business Council in Southern Jutland²⁰ states: *"(...) a no will lessen the employment by 1500 in Southern Jutland, whereas a yes will lead to 1000 new jobs in the*

region" (Ber 140593F). In a similar way, the CEO of SAS Denmark delivers the argument *"The present standard of living and welfare can only be maintained through continued participation in the European cooperation"* (Pol 120593E).

Whereas, the economic projections in 1972 and 1986 were greatly shadowed by the no-parties, the 1992 and 1993 testify to a new level of visibility on the economic aspects on Denmark's cooperation with the EU (and the inherently rationality, as will be analysed later on). In Berlingske and Politiken respectively, a number of economists bring an advertisement under the heading *"economists do also vote no the 2nd of July (1992)"*.

²⁰ Sønderjyllands Erhvervsråd

Here Søren Kjeldsen-Kragh illuminates the economic consequences from Denmark's approval of the Maastricht Treaty: *"We will not lose jobs by voting no. Quite the contrary, the Union is a political experiment, by which we can easily jeopardise our economy"* (Pol 290592D, Ber 290592G). Furthermore, professor in macroeconomics Gunnar Thorlund Jepsen from the same coalition enlightens on July 1 1992 that *"a monetary union will lead to rise in unemployment"* and that *"Danish commodities will not be affected by the outcome of the referendum"* (Ber 010692L). The presence of economists, is in terms of the Governmentality literature, an example of how expertise is used within a specific enclosure to incorporate truth value and thus conduct the Danish electorate into voting 'no'. Also in 1992, Victor Andreasen put forward that the convergence criteria²¹ will eventually lead to significant unemployment rates in Southern Europe and thus social tensions in the Union (Ber 280592B). When looking at the electoral campaign prior to the referendum of the Edinburgh Agreement 1993, Søren Kjeldsen-Kragh appears again with Hanne Reintoft the then head of "Mødrehjælpen", and according to the two *"another No is the recipe for economic stability – and to solving the unemployment troubles"* (Ber 140593). In addition, a chief economist in Citibank London, Neil MacKinnon, argues that *"it is likely that the value of [Danish] Kroner will rise from a no, the foreign exchange market will reward the Danish coin for making the rational choice"* (Pol 150593).

By looking at the economic objects of the referenda, it seems that both sides place the economic consequences and arguments within the field to be governed. Still, the enlightenment bear witness of two diametrically opposed rationalities (as will be unfolded later on). Whereas, the yes-parties illuminate the possible gains from entering the EU greatly, the no-parties place a strong light on the uncertainties, untrustworthiness and political implications from the EU/EC cooperation, such as the convergence criteria.

7.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

Denmark, in the centre of the European Union or vice versa?

So far, it has been demonstrated how the two competing regimes of practice have constituted their rule by casting different lights on the objects of the two referenda. From this point on, the main focus is to investigate how truth is produced within the two regimes of practice. Thus, by which means, procedures, tactics etc. is authority constituted. The technical aspect of government should be considered the practical dimension of the underlying rationalities, which will be analysed in the following section.

²¹ The convergence criteria concerns: price stability, government finances, exchange rates and long-term interest rates. Each Member State must meet all of the criteria in order to participate in the third stage of the EMU (EUR-Lex G).

When analysing the means applied by the yes-parties, there is an almost exclusive enlightenment or linkage to either a global or a European perspective. On May 30 1992, the community “Yes to Europe”, bring an advertisement in *Berlingske* and *Politiken*, picturing Mayors Per Kaalund, John Winther and Jens Kramer Mikkelsen stating that *“Now is our chance to place the capital within the centre of Europe”* (Pol 300592S, Ber 300592M). Correspondingly, picture 3, published by the Danish Agriculture, captures the surroundings of the European Championship 1992, to illuminate the consequences of being kept on the outside.²² On the picture – a technical mean of government – the Danish national team is impersonated with sad and angry faces, as a consequence of their lack of participation in the European Championship (European Union) (Pol 300592Q, Ber 300592A). In a similar way, Mimi Jacobsen, from the Centre Democrats, put forward that true *“(…) powerlessness comes from being on the outside!”* (Pol 290592E). The same mechanism seems present in an ad placed by the Employers’ Association for Trade, Transport and Service, where Chief Economist from Louisiana says *“unilateralism will lead nowhere in an ever-changing world”* (Pol 310592N). Apart from distinct light on the global/European perspective, the yes-parties seem to further constitute rule by interconnecting the global perspective to the additional objects within the field to be governed. For example, in an ad placed by The Social-Liberal Party on July 1 1992, it is initially made clear that the complex nature of society gives rise to interdependency among the countries; thus a small country like Denmark cannot proceed in isolation. Afterwards, there is an illumination on the environment, and international safety issues. The same tactic can be seen in *Politiken* May 16 1993, where Heidi Simonis then Minister of Finance, in the federal state of Slesvig-Holsten states that *“(…) many political and economic problems are no longer possible of solving on a national level, just think of the environmental area”* (Pol 160593I).

Similar to the prior Danish EC/EU referenda, the governors within this regime of practice seem to use a pragmatic vocabulary. This is, according to the theoretical anchoring, an example of a procedure for the production of truth (the rationality hereof will be analysed in the next dimension). On May 29 1992, Klaus Bustrup, Director of Council of Agriculture put on that he finds it difficult to explain to foreigners why the Danes do not find it self-evident to participate in the European cooperation (Ber 290592C). In the same way, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen stated *“I am surprised that highly educated people, even professors [with reference to Niels Ivan Meyer of The June Movement], unashamedly and without quavering can say so”* (Ber 110593A). The same production of truth can also be seen in letters to the editor by two former Danish ambassadors, Peter Dyvig (Pol 010692F) and Jens Christensen (Pol 310592Q), where for example the latter, expresses

²² Denmark did initially fail to qualify for the European Championship in 1992, but was granted access after the disqualification of Yugoslavia – a result of warfare and breakup in the country. Source: uefa.com

emotions “having a hard time understanding” why the Danish distrust in the national politicians should lead to euro-scepticism, while he finds an upside-down development more logical (Pol 310592Q).

Within the field of visibility, constituted by the no-parties there seems to be a distinct light on the disadvantages from entering the EU, which they enlighten as a political union. Having just proved how the yes-parties used a tactic of unifying Denmark and namely Europe. The no-parties seem to do quite the opposite. The strong light on the political implications is backed by a distinct vocabulary. On May 16 1993, professor and spokesman for The June Movement Niels Ivan Meyer makes a comment on the changes from the National Compromise, which he describes as “some footnotes”. Also, he uses the phrase “behind closed doors in Brussels” to describe the future decision-making process if a ‘yes’ is granted by the Danish electorate (Pol 160593F). This statement has a striking likeness to several of the 1986 electoral campaign, being for example, The Unions against the EC Union, who use the phrase “*The word you were not allowed to see*” (Pol 210286A). Corresponding, Sonia Dahlgaard put forward that “distant bureaucrats” will decide in the future and that the Danes should put their feet down against the Euro-politician’s “lust for power” (Ber 160593C). With regards to the technical aspects of government, this approach bear witness of a procedure/tactic to conduct a scare campaign based on vocabularies, designed to alienate the EC/EU. Moreover, there seems to be a deliberate attempt to mystify the content of the referenda. An example can be found in an advertisement placed by the June Movement on May 11 1993: “*Prior the referendum on the Union, we Danes would rather not hear what they are going to do with the power*” (Ber 110593D). In addition, a list of stakeholders pleading for a no, put on that “*We should say no to an opaque system*” (Pol 310592M), which, according to Asger Aamund, “*The politicians are unwilling to talk about*” (Pol 310592C).

Moreover, it should be noted that the use of expertise testifies to a new procedure within this regime of practice. Hence, in a Governmentality terminology, the no-parties seem to use a tactic which involves the inclusion of economic experts to produce statements with a high level of truth value within the given enclosure (i.e. the economic fields of the referenda) (Rose & Miller 1999: 188). This finding marks a shift from previous referenda, where the network of the no-parties did not include the same level of economic expertise.

7.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

As suggested by the term “Governmentality”; a contraction of the two nouns “government” and “mentality”, government is considered a “thoughtful activity” and, as will be unfolded in the next section, not just of individual minds of representations – thinking is a collective activity, which involves both the ones conducting and the ones who are conducted by the latter i.e. leading politicians, experts and the Danish electorate

respectively (Dean 1999). On this background, it is highly desirable to identify the rationalities employed in regimes of practice.

The end of the latter section, testified to a procedure among the no-parties to continuously illuminate the uncertainties from a 'no' and question the legitimacy of the actors in favour of and associated with the EU (e.g. Ber 110593D & Pol 310592M). Thus, this regime of practice gives rise to knowledge based upon an incompatibility between the Danish model and the EU. This rationality can for example be perceived in an ad from May 31 1992, where actor Niels Hausgaard states that: *"The most precious possessed by the Danes is our greatly evolved democracy, which we are now to dilute without reason"* (Pol 310592I). Moreover, the distinct vocabularies, elaborated on in the technical aspects of government, illustrate the same thoughts on governments. By increasingly impersonating the EU as something decided "behind closed doors in Brussels", similar to the referendum of 1986 (Pol 160593F), the means of calculation is that the Danish electorate will be frightened by the lack of transparency and on this background vote 'no'. What distinguishes the referenda of 1992 and 1993 from the previous ones is the use of economic expertise by *both* regimes of practice, for example Søren Kjeldsen-Kragh who puts the economic consequences of the referendum in perspective (Pol 290592D). In this respect, the no-parties, like the competing regime of practice, appear to give rise to a more pragmatic rationality. Thus, not solely using "emotional", "nationalistic" means of calculation, but correspondingly using a strategy to include the words of economic experts to create statements.

Similar to previous referenda, a different rationality seems to be employed in the competing regime of practice, the yes-parties. By looking at the respective field of visibility, the economic benefits from participating in the EU is in the middle where the light is strong. Thus, the rationality is that the Danish electorate will once again be conducted into voting 'yes', if they are presented with a number of economic projections, as put forward by for example Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Ber 260592J) and the economic advisers (Ber 270592D), where the latter, in terms of Governmentality, can deploy a noteworthy degree of truth-value to their statements, as a result of their trust and general recognition as economic experts (Rose & Miller 1993: 188). Equivalent to the referendum of 1986, the yes-parties seem to use a mechanism, which involve sweeping aside the critique of the political implications of the Maastricht Treaty, for example claiming the Union dead, as done by Poul Schlüter on several occasions: *"I was right back then and I am even more right now"* (Pol 280592E). This argumentation seems to be funded in the knowledge of a bigger perspective and inherently field to be governed. By continuously linking the objects of the referenda to an either global or European perspective (e.g. Pol 310592N, 160593I), the, according to the no-parties, de facto transferral of powers becomes shadowed or placed behind the concern for the joint problems, which according to this

regime of practice, demands collective action through the EU. To transform these thoughts about the value of the cooperation, the vocabularies are used to create a pragmatic form of truth, for example by using words such as “self-evident” or “undisputable”, when describing the “immense” advantages of the EU (Ber 290592C, 300592E, 280592D). Thus, the means of calculation is to make the choices of either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ “self-evident”.

7.5 The attention to the formation of identities

Until now, the forms of visibility placed on the different objects of the referenda have been analysed. From the distinct enlightenment the inherent rationalities have been uncovered alongside with the technical aspects of government i.e. the vocabularies, procedures and tactics. In this final dimension, the Governmentality theory investigates how different forms of identity are presupposed and even elicited by the yes and no-parties (Dean 1999).

In continuation of the 1972 and 1986 analyses, the no-parties seem to follow the same pattern, which involves shedding an untrustworthy light on the EU, as done by Preben Wilhjelm, former MP from The Left Socialist Party (Venstresocialisterne), who states on May 16 1993: *“The institutions of the EC can take advantage of the treaties to a degree no one had imagined”* (Ber 160593H, see also Ber 110593D, Pol 310592M). The statement resembles an announcement made by Freddy Andersen in 1986: *“A Union [the EC] will make Denmark lack legal capacity and strip the Danish population of democratic rights”* (Pol 240286). From the wording of the first statement, it seems that the no-parties, once again, try to foster a cautious orientation towards the EC among the entitled Danish voters. This is supposedly done with a level of realisation from previous referenda, where the result indicated a significant scepticism towards the cooperation of the EC, even though a majority of the Danish electorate were still in favour of membership. Thus, in a Governmentality terminology, they possess the attribute as protectors of the Danish autonomy. In 1992-93, it is evident that the Danish electorate once again have the duty of protecting Danishness from the “distant bureaucrats in Brussels” (Pol 160593F). These duties are further elicited by a vocabulary, which clearly separates Denmark from the EU, for example by using the words “us” and “us Danes”, as done by The June Movement on the 11th of May 1993 (Ber 110593D). Whereas, the leading actors advocating in favour of a ‘no’ were greatly shattered in 1972, the referenda of 1986 and 1992-93 testify to a network with a larger degree of authority and expertise (Pol 150593-1, Ber 140593). When looking at the constellation, “Economists do also vote no the 2nd of July”, consisting of more than 30 economists, they clearly have statuses as experts. On this background, they are expected to use their economic capacities to challenge the economic arguments of the yes-parties, being for example that a ‘yes’ will lead to greater employment rates, as for

example contested by Søren Kjeldsen-Kragh on several occasions (Ber 140593, Pol 290592D). This is important in a post structuralist perspective, as it is not about creating an objective truth, but questioning the knowledge that claims to be true (Hansen in Juul & Pedersen 2012: 233).

By looking at the field of visibility, which characterises the competing regime of practice i.e. the yes-parties, there is also a connection to the previous referenda of 1972 and 1986. On numerous occasions the economic projections are put forward, for example by the Liberal Party who claims that a 'yes' will lead to an increase in employment, investments and export (Pol 300592B). Poul Nyrup takes it one step further, by arguing that a 'no' could endanger the Danish welfare model (Pol 260592B). Thus, the entitled Danish voters are given the duty of protecting the functionality of the Danish society. This type of conduct relies on the governed as having a logical and to some extent utilitarian capacity. This finding is also consistent with the illumination on the global and European perspective. As already stated, this distinct enlightenment of the greater perspective is used to place the object of sovereignty in the corner of the field of visibility. On this background the entitled Danish voters are also elicited to have an orientation, which goes beyond the Danish perspective. In this line of reasoning, the governors, being leading politicians and international recognised personalities, are expected to exercise authority through pragmatic arguments, as seen by then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Niels Helveg-Petersen, who express himself with fear for the future of Denmark if the Edinburgh Agreement was to be rejected. In the advertisement, Niels Helveg-Petersen uses his high level of authority and status as Minister of Foreign Affairs to enforce the aforementioned pragmatic capacity among the Danish electorate (Ber 140593A).

7.6 Summary

Similar to the previous analysis of 1972 and 1986, the yes-parties have shed a decisive light on the economic advantages from the European cooperation. Also, the European and global perspective have been used as a tactic to avoid the discussion of Danish sovereignty. Like the yes-parties, the strategies of the no-parties bear witness of a somewhat congruent rationality towards the conduct of the Danish electorate. On most occasions the EU is impersonated as an untrustworthy, bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, the level of expertise relating to the 1992-93 referenda seems significantly higher compared to the former referenda.

Chapter 8, The Danish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, May 28 1998

8.1 Introduction

In accordance with the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria²³, the EU was in the late 1990s preparing for an enlargement of the EU, incorporating some of the former eastern-bloc countries into the Union (plus Cyprus and Malta). To accommodate the new countries, it was believed that the treaties needed to be updated, to suit a larger and more diverse EU. The Leader of this revision was Jaques Santer, who had replaced Jacques Delors as head of the Commission. As opposed to Delors, Santer was believed to be much more cautious. On this background, Morten Kelstrup et al 2012 refers to the Amsterdam Treaty as the *“Toothless treaty of Amsterdam”* (Kelstrup et al 2012: 73-74).

With regards to Denmark, the treaty did not constitute any radical changes. The Danish negotiations had largely been successful, based on the strategy to iron out any issues that could give problems during a possible Danish referendum (Petersen 1998: 16-23). After the negotiations, came the issue of getting the treaty ratified. As the treaty did not achieve a 5/6 majority in parliament, it was put to a referendum. The referendum was decided to take place on May 28 1998, leaving little more than two months for campaigning. However, due to large scale striking called by the LO²⁴ taking up much of the political and media attention, the electoral campaign lasted approximately two and a half weeks (ibid: 25).

Especially for Denmark, the Amsterdam treaty did not constitute major change in the cooperation with the EU. The treaty sought to change some of the nuances of the previous agreements and provide a general update of the EU legislation. One such update was the Schengen Cooperation, which was moved to pillar 1 of the Union and thus became part of the supranational cooperation. As Denmark had an opt-out on matters falling under pillar 1, a solution had to be made. That solution was to renew the Danish opt-out, effectively meaning that Denmark (like the UK and Ireland) was not obliged to commit to any new legislation within the areas of asylum, border control and visa and neither having a say in future legislation within this area (EU representation in Denmark, 2001: 20, 23-24). In other words, Denmark *was* part of the Schengen Cooperation in 1998 and to this extent nothing changed with regards to the status for Denmark.

²³ The Copenhagen criteria are a set of requirements that must be met in order to be accepted into the EU. They were established in 1993 and further enforced in 1995. The criteria are: Firstly, *stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities*. Secondly, *a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU*. Lastly, *ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Eur-Lex D)*.

²⁴ LO is the central organisation for 17 minor labour unions, primarily representing unskilled and semiskilled workers.

Another circumstantial difference from previous referenda was the lack of major involvement from interest organisations and non-political groups. The main actors in the constellation of the yes-parties were The Social Democrats, The Liberal Party and The Conservative People's Party. By comparison, the most prevalent actors amongst the no-parties, were The Socialist People's Party and The Danish People's Party, although The Progress Party also posted a series of smaller adverts (Appendix 1998). In addition, The Nations Europe²⁵, who would later play a significant role in the 2000 referendum, was active for the first time in 1998.

8.2 The investigation of the fields of visibility of government

Supposedly, as a result of the relatively short electoral campaign and a non-extensive treaty, many of the objects within the respective fields of visibility were recurrent from former elections, being for example questions on loss of sovereignty and further establishment of a political union, which will be elaborated on throughout the analyses.

The EU as keeper of peace

One of the resurgent objects was the EU as a keeper of peace in Europe, primarily enlightened by the yes-parties. This bears resemblance to a tactic used by the former Danish freedom-fighters in 1972 (Pol 290972H). In Berlingske, May 23 1998, then Minister for Culture, Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen from the Danish Social-Liberal party, stated with reference to the Balkan conflicts: *"Who shall show the rest of the world—away from the heartlessness of jungle-liberalism and the warmongering of nationalism? (...) Who shall secure the peace – in the Balkans, in Cyprus. In Central Europe?"* (Ber 230598E). Furthermore, this object was enlightened by The Liberal Party, who in Politiken May 23 wrote: *"I vote YES, because we, with the Amsterdam Treaty, have a historic opportunity to recreate a whole and undivided Europe."* (Pol 230598E).

By comparison, Henning Gottleib, former top civil servant, said in an interview on May 24 1998 that: *"To put it on the edge, it is a matter of war or civil war. The EU lacks the principle prerequisites that are needed, namely that the countries have a common culture, history, mentality and so forth (...)"* (Ber 240598B). To put it in terms of Governmentality, this conflict illustrates that the yes-parties was partly constituted by ensuring peace in Europe. Conversely, the no-parties can be identified from their enlightenment of the cultural misfit between the European countries.

²⁵ The Nations Europe (Nationernes Europa) is a group of primarily economists, lawyers and social science experts against supranational cooperation in the EU. They favour the intergovernmental cooperation in the former EC (hold-fast.dk).

The United States of Europe, conferral of sovereignty and the amount of influence

From a Governmentality perspective, the regime of the no-parties can best be characterised from their enlightenment of how the Amsterdam treaty could lead to increased unionisation, harmonisation and even a federal state. Niels Ivan Meyer exemplifies this in a letter to the editor on May 21 1998: *“The EU-elite’s goal is to create a new economic superpower in the form of a new federal state that can match the USA and Japan. In the longer run the United States of Europe shall also have their own military defence as it is more than hinted in both the Maastricht- and Amsterdam- treaty”* (Ber 210598C). This quote is very much in line with the following statement made by the Social-Liberal Youth Party in 1972: *“The EC will evolve into a superpower with a joint foreign and defence policy”* (Pol 270972C). Also, the Socialist People’s Party posted a series of adverts where party leader Holger Kirkholm Nielsen says *“Choose the safe NO to more union”* (Pol 220598E). Furthermore, the leader of the newly formed Danish People’s Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, stated in a Q&A that *“The [Treaty of Amsterdam] treaty’s loyalty commitment will prevent Denmark from carrying out its own sovereign foreign policy”* (Pol 230598D). This enlightenment is consistent with the statement Svend Auken made in 1986; imposing that Denmark would be prevented from carrying out its own policies (Pol 260286F).

This object was put in a different light by the yes-parties, who constituted their rule by emphasising the smaller and larger successes of the EC/EU cooperation. The chairman of the Craftsmen’s Council, Poul Ulsøe, wrote in a chronicle that:

“The EU has a series of sub-purposes that are all realised or on the way to becoming it (...). It is amongst others, questions of how goods (...), machines and construction materials – shall be produced, treated, shaped etc. under compliance with a high level for health and safety.” (Ber 240598O).

By shedding light on the positive outcome of the EC/EU and its impact on the everyday lives of Danes, he attempts to place the successes closer to the centre of the field of visibility. This is similar to the 1986 referendum, where the yes-parties argued that the environment was best preserved through common European policies, within the framework of the EC (Ber 240286J). Similar to the referenda of 1986 and 1992/93, the yes-parties obscure the argument of the EC/EU as a political union, by stating that the development of the EU will slow down. In two articles from May 23 1998 the leader of The Liberal Party, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, states his conception of how the EU will evolve *“The expansion of the EU will take far the most effort in the coming years. It will affect the depth in the cooperation and I hold nothing against the EU slowing down”* (Pol 230598). This statement is consistent with the one made by Poul Schlüter on

several occasions: “The Union is stonedead” (Pol 280592E). Thus, in terms of Governmentality we can visualise the field to be governed from this *diagram of power* (Dean 1999: 30). The field in question is the future cooperation in the EU. Contrary, the no-parties did not define the future of the EU as the field to be governed, but shed light on previous agreements, such as the Schengen and Police cooperation. For example, The Nations Europe Posted an advert picturing a police officer at the Danish border, see picture 4.

The last object that was illuminated, primarily by the yes-parties, was the level of influence Denmark had in the EU. As mentioned in the introduction, the negotiations of the Amsterdam treaty had been successful from a Danish perspective. This was used by the chairman of The Danish Farmers Association, Peter Gæmelke, to enlighten why Denmark *has* influence in the EU: “*There will be listened a lot to us in the EU. We have learned to prepare ourselves well for the negotiations and we often achieve good results. This is part of the reason why Denmark had such great influence on the shaping of the Amsterdam-treaty.*” (Ber 240598P). Furthermore, an advertisement brought by The Liberal Party states: “*(...) because a yes will be evidence that we have, at long last, understood that like Europe have a need for us, we have a need for Europe.*” (Pol 230598G). The Conservative People’s Party even goes so far as to claim that the EU is the only solution to guarantee peace, freedom and prosperity (Ber 210598). This is consistent with the approach used by the yes-parties in the 1992/93 referenda, where the global and European perspective was placed central in the field of visibility. The no-parties had no articles on the mutual benefits, even though organisations such as the Nations Europe stated they were for the EC cooperation (Ber 240598R). Thus, this object must be considered shadowed by the no-parties.

8.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

From the analysis of the fields of visibility, it appears that the electoral campaign has many reoccurring themes from previous referenda. Both regimes of practice used different techniques in their campaign. For example, the yes-parties used a larger volume of advertising in their campaign with a 107 articles, adverts etc. compared to 39 representing the no-parties (Appendix 1998). This difference in the volume of advertising has been evident in prior referenda; See for example the 1972 analysis in chapter 5.

The vocabularies

The yes-parties used a distinct vocabulary as a tactic to illuminate the benefits and achievements of the EU as well as underlining how Danish influence in the EU has become “a matter of course”. For example, Minister of Economic Affairs and Nordic Cooperation, Marianne Jelved writes: “*The treaty [of Amsterdam] will make it possible for Denmark to continue influencing the EU-cooperation in a Nordic direction*” (Ber 220598C). The

Conservative People's Party used the same vocabulary in their adverts picturing famous cyclist Jesper Skibby stating *"EU or cycling... It is the cooperation that provides the results"* (Pol 230598J) as well as businessman Knud Overø who puts forward *"Let us keep influencing the EU-rules by which we under all circumstances will be affected"* (Pol 230598J). This sports analogy is similar to the procedure of the yes-parties in 1992, where The Danish National Team was depicted on the side-line, with the text *"How can we win if we are not playing"* (Pol 300592A).

As opposed to this approach, the no-parties used a vocabulary similar to the ones of previous referenda i.e. questioning the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the EC/EU. Examples can be seen in the headlines of adverts from different no-parties stating *"No more union"* (Ber 210598C), *"More union? NO THANKS"* (Ber 270598J) and *"No to more Union. Yes to sovereignty"* (Ber 270598H). Moreover, this vocabulary was used by Holger Kirkholm Nielsen to address Per Stig Møller: *"You still claim that there is no more union in the new treaty and argue that with the new flexibility decisions. But in the Amsterdam-treaty they are present, allowing the union-eager countries to move as they wish. (...) there is given the opportunity for the strongest of the field to ride away from the others"* (Ber 240598F). While this pertains itself to the actual contents of the treaty, other actors amongst the no-parties used a tactic of illuminating objects that were not directly related to the actual content of the treaty. One example is an advert from the Danish People's Party with the headline *"What has the Schengen-cooperation to do with the Amsterdam-treaty? Everything (...) Vote no to Schengen Tomorrow"* (Ber 270598K). By doing so, the no-parties use the Schengen Cooperation as an instrument to question the content on the treaty and thus, as a mechanism to accomplish their rule i.e. to conduct the Danish electorate to vote 'no'.

Furthermore, the no-parties also used the Schengen Cooperation as an instrument to frighten the entitled Danish voters. In the picture 4 the Danish electorate is met by a police officer at the Danish Border. In the

“VI FÅR STORE PROBLEMER, HVIS GRÆNSEKONTROLLEN AFSKAFES”

“Efter mere end 80 år ved grænsepolitiet i Padborg kan jeg ikke lade være med at reagere over for en ophævelse af grænsekontrollen, som vil gøre vores arbejde mindre effektivt.

Vi bremser mange kriminelle ved grænsen. Men endnu flere holder sig væk, fordi de ved, vi er her, og ikke vil løbe den ekstra risiko, det er at kunne tages ved grænsen.

Vi giver også værdifulde oplysninger om mistænkelige til baglands-patruljerne, så de kan tjekke dem en ekstra gang. Det fører ofte til anholdelse af narkohandlere og andre kriminelle, som vi ikke selv har kunnet afsløre.

Hver anden narko-fangst hos den såkaldte Politi- og Told-gruppe og hver tredje sag om menneskesmugling er startet med et tip fra os i grænsekontrollen.


Hertil kommer checket af lastbiler, der f. eks. kommer fra områder med svinepest, og som sendes til rengøring på karantænestationen.

Hvis grænsekontrollen nedlægges, må også danske borgere finde sig i at skulle legitimere sig over for politiet. Det vil skade vores gode forhold til befolkningen, som i dag giver os mange tips. Og selv ved en sådan skærpet kontrol med flere ansatte er jeg sikker på, at der vil komme mere narko og flere kriminelle ind i landet.

Kan det virkelig være meningen?”

John Rasmussen

John Rasmussen er tilfidsmand for Padborg politi. Først i 1951, miller ommander og har siden 1974 arbejdet i dansk politi, de sidste 20 år i Padborg. Her er der 125 politifolk ansat, som ved en turmæssing alle har erfaring med grænsearbejde.



De fleste danskere ønsker, at Danmark er med i et europæisk fællesskab, men er - lige som vi - belysede over, at det dansk-tyske samarbejde mellem selvstændige nationer udvikler sig til en stærkt mere omfattende politisk Union. Gennem et utal af forhandlinger, direktiver og retsregler griber EU direkte ind i hverdagen for os alle. Det er allerede givet en for valg.

Holdt har det først og fremmest været de politiske yderlige, som har været imod denne udvikling. Moderat skeptikere på

NATIONERNES EUROPA
EF-tilhængere imod mere Union

Initiativtagere til "Nationernes Europa, EF-tilhængere imod mere Union" er bl.a. forlagsmand Mette Koefoed Rasmussen, Frank Dahlgaard, MF-forde kom-

interview he states “We stop a lot of criminals at the border. But, even more stay away because we are here, and they are not willing to run the extra risk (...). And he continues: “If the border control is abolished, also Danes will have to identify themselves to the police. This will hurt our good relationship with the population, which today pays off with many tips. And even with such a control with more employed [at the border], I am certain that there will be more drugs and more criminals coming into the country”. This advert shows how the no-parties use a figure of authority and expertise, the police officer, as a tactic to constitute rule. According to Rose and Miller, experts can incorporate truth value to statements within their specific domain. Therefore, when the police officer states that there will be in increase in crime and drugs, his statements are used by the no-parties as an instrument to accomplish their rule by frighten the Danish electorate into voting no.

Picture 4, advert from Berlingske May 24 1998 (Ber 240598R)

8.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

From the analysis of the two previous dimensions, it is apparent that different rationalities were employed in the two regimes of practice. On this background, this dimension will analyse these underlying rationalities and thoughts that seek to make the Danish electorate governable (Dean, 1999: 13; Rose & Miller 1992: 174).

The non-extensiveness of the Amsterdam Treaty is used by Anders Fogh Rasmussen amongst others, to obscure the object of a political union (Pol 230598, 260598O). Thus, the means of calculation is that the entitled Danish voters can be conducted into voting ‘yes’ if they can picture the EU slowing down. By comparison, the no-parties illuminated general concerns of the EU, as well as objects outside the scope of

the Amsterdam treaty, to make them governable. By doing so, they attempt to give rise to a different form of truth. For example, the Schengen Cooperation is used as a mechanism to accomplish this. In this line of reasoning, the mean of calculation seems to be that the Danish electorate can be conducted into voting 'no' if confronted with a general discussion of the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the EU.

As stated, The Amsterdam Treaty was meant to lay the foundation for the EU eastwards expansion. Arguing in favour of the enlargement, the yes-parties enlightened the conflict in the Balkans and the peacekeeping capabilities of the EU. For the example, The Liberal Party uses statements with references to the conflict in their adverts in Politiken May 23 saying *"I vote YES, because we with the Amsterdam Treaty have a historic opportunity to create a whole and undivided Europe."* (Pol 230598E) and *"I vote YES, because a yes enables the EU to react faster and more efficiently. Many ethnical and religious crises will be avoidable if the EU can react quick and united"* (Pol 230598I). The last statement directly refers to the Balkans and possibly the Second World War. Hence, the employed rationality is that the Danish electorate can be conducted into voting 'yes' if they perceive the EU as the only solution to the problem. This strategy seems similar to the one used by The Danish Freedom Fighters in the 1972 referendum.

8.5 The attention to the formation of identities

So far, the analysis has proven that both regimes of practice sought to accomplish rule through the illumination of additional objects than those directly related to the content of the referendum. In this final dimension of government, the formation of identities presupposed and elicited by the yes and no-parties will be outlined.

The yes-parties operate through a collective identity that desires to transform the Danish electorate into keepers of peace and in favour of a united Europe. By doing so, they also presupposed that the Danish electorate would be able to look at the larger picture and listen to arguments of unification and peace. This is in stark contrast to previous referenda, where the yes-parties in particular put great emphasis on pragmatic economic arguments. This indicates a shift in the means of calculation of the governors, who no longer perceive it possible to conduct the voters and accomplish their rule through enlightening the actual content of the treaty. The no-parties sought to transform the Danish electorate into the protectors of Danish Sovereignty. This is explicitly evident in their strategy to use the Schengen Cooperation and border police in their campaign. By the no-parties, the entitled Danish voters are given the duty (and latent capacity) to protect Denmark through a 'no'. Hence, when looking at the campaign it is presupposed by the no-parties that the EU does not have the capacity to protect the Danish border. By emphasising the political aspect and

through the heavy use of politicians in the campaign, from both parties, the regimes of practice try to take the responsibility for Denmark's future. In the light of the successful negotiation result, the politicians from the yes-parties tried to promote themselves as the ones with the attributes to best decide on the future.

8.6 Summary

The referendum of 1998, illustrates a shift in the latent rationality of the respective regimes of practice. Whereas, the yes-parties previously relied on pragmatic arguments, the illumination on EU as a peacekeeper marks a shift towards a more general emphasise. Similarly, the no-parties use the Schengen cooperation to accomplish rule.

Chapter 9, The Danish referendum on the third phase of the EMU, September 28 2000

9.1 Introduction

In 1998, the Council decided to establish a common currency (the Euro) with effect from January 1 1999. Therefore, following in the wake of his success in dealing with Denmark's ratification of the Amsterdam treaty, the then Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen issued a referendum to abolish the Danish opt-out on the third phase of the EMU, upheld in the Edinburgh Agreement (Qvortrup, 2000: 493).

In the months prior to the introduction of the common currency, the Danish Krone had suffered from currency speculations that was deemed to be a result of the Danish Euro opt-out (Friis, 2002: 3-4, Downs 200: 223, Kelstrup et al, 2012: 70). Furthermore, the role of the EU as the keeper of peace crumbled during the crisis in Yugoslavia, where peace agreements were made by the NATO, UN and United States and no participation from the EU (Kelstrup et al, 2012: 69). During the electoral campaign, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen relied on the support from other actors advocating a 'yes', since he personally was unpopular as a result of the case on early retirement benefits (Information 27/11-1998, Qvortrup 2000: 493-494). The actors included both representatives from the political parties and the industry, similar to the referenda of 1972, 1986 and 1992/93, but absent in 1998. The no-parties were comprised of several political parties from the Socialist People's party to the Danish People's Party, as well as the interest organisation The Nations Europe, who were particularly active during this referendum.

9.2 The examination of the fields of visibility of government

The Welfare state and public pensions

In order to picture the field to be governed, the no-parties placed the Danish welfare model and social conditions in a bright light. Furthermore, they shed a light on the national economy and what they deemed to be 'the dismantling of the Danish welfare state' (Pol, 270900P). In a chronicle from September 27 2000, the leader of the Socialist People's party, Holger Kirkholm Nielsen writes that for fiscal policies to work effectively it requires harmonisation of the welfare states in the EU (ibid). By placing other elements than the Euro in the field of visibility, the no-parties are obscuring the object of the Euro. This is further done by The Nations Europe, who states that "*Harmonisation will destroy our welfare model*" (Pol 220900J). The prevailing argument is that in order to preserve the Danish welfare state the fiscal policies must be governed from Denmark (Ber, 270900). During the campaign, the yes-parties are characterised by their illumination of the

economic consequences, amongst these were the loss of jobs, economic growth opportunities and safeguards against currency speculations (Ber 210900E). The coalition government states at a press conference that a no would cost approximately 20.000 jobs over a two-year period if the Euro was rejected (Pol 210900). The quote is consistent with a statement made by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 1992, where he projects that a 'no' would lead to the loss of 150.000 jobs (Ber 260592J)

Influence versus sovereignty

Similar to the referenda of 1992 and 1998, the yes-parties illuminate the benefits that Denmark gains from being part of the Euro zone (Pol 300592A, 230598J). This is evident in the campaign where both The Liberal Party and The Social Democrats, respectively, state that *"We will sit at the table where decisions are made (...)"* (Pol 270900A) and *"Because it is way better to be: inside than outside (...) [to be] present were the decisions are made (...) [better] to decide than obey (...)"* (Pol270900J). Not only the political parties, but also interest organisations attempt to enlighten the object fiscal governance, for example the organisation European Youth quoted a song by Ella Fitzgerald saying *"baby, it's cold outside"* (Pol 270900H). However, the object which the yes-parties places closest to the centre of the field to be governed is how the opt-out acts as a constraint for the opportunities of the Danish economy. Furthermore, they enlighten how economics are best governed in collaboration with the EU in order to avoid currency speculations (Ber210900E, 220900, 270900J).

Another characteristic form of visibility is the issue of sovereignty, which is illuminated in 34 of the 54 adverts advocating a 'no'. Especially the interest organisation The Nations Europe, enlightens this point in all their articles from statements such as: *"But us, who wants to hold firm to Danish independence, must vote no"* (Ber 220900A). The People's Movement against the EU made a comparison between currency and economic policy with the statement: *"A common currency must, logically, also lead to common economic policy..."* (Ber 240900A). In Governmentality terms, this is an attempt to constitute their authority of rule, by drawing a *roadmap* of where they perceive the EU to be heading. In contrast, this object was shadowed by the yes-parties who did not mention the word 'sovereignty' at all (Appendix 2000).

9.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

When looking at the fields of visibility, it seems that the regimes of practice perceived the field to be governed differently. The no-parties illuminated sovereignty in terms of economy and social conditions, whereas the yes-parties instead shed a light on the influence and opportunities from governing the economy in cooperation with the EU. The following section will analyse the technical means, which is a prerequisite for successful government.

Vocabularies and catch phrase usage

In the week prior to the 2000 referendum, Berlingske and Politiken bring 171 articles containing active statements by the regimes of practice. Of those, 54 articles agitate in terms of a 'no' and 117 in terms of a 'yes'. From a Governmentality viewpoint, this shows that the two regimes of practice use different procedures of government in their campaigns. Whereas, the yes-parties use a high volume of advertisements, letters to editor etc., the no-parties constitute rule from longer contributions.

The vocabularies of the two regimes of practice differ in their campaigns. The yes-parties use statements regarding the perceived economic and inherently societal consequences of a 'no'. An example is a press conference held during the campaign, where the Minister for Finance from the Social Democrats, Mogens Lykketoft, states that: *"(...) a no to the Euro will cost 20.000 jobs"* (Pol 210900) – a sentence, which caught headlines in the newspapers. He continues the press conference, referenced in Politiken on the 21 and 22 of September, by describing how a 'no' would cost at least 20 billion in the 20 years to come (Pol 220900F). The numbers and quantitative arguments were left out in the advertisement campaigns, in favour of a technique relying on shorter catch phrases and statements, for example *"Yes to the Euro – its best for the Danish economy"* (Ber 260900F). The Social Democrats' campaign included the slogan *"A yes is best for Denmark"* (Pol 270900J). followed by a series of short catch phrases: *"We say yes because... Denmark has a lot to offer. Outside the common currency we can only follow the lead. Inside we can contribute to creating a better Europe. Denmark needs to be present, when decisions are made (...)"* (Pol 260900C). The use of short catch phrases is similar to the technical means of government used by the yes-parties in 1972, such as *"You desire a happy family life. Yes. The internal market will create a happy family life (...)"* (Pol 011072R).

In the same respect, particularly the Nations Europe, use the opposite technique and include explanations and examples in their advertisements (Ber 270900I, Pol 220900J). Nevertheless, the no-parties also use shorter catch phrases in some advertisements e.g. in an ad brought by the Socialist People's under the slogan *"NO – for the sake of democracy"* (Pol 210900J). The aforementioned ads also consist of both a question and

an argument against the Euro. By comparison, the advert brought by The Social Democrats takes up an entire page. This finding illustrates that the no-parties relied more on knowledge and expertise as an instrument to obtain truth value in their statements, whereas the yes-parties relied on their own authority and majority position in Parliament. This is evident in their method of arguing in adverts without using sources or reference, instead relying on simple catch phrases as seen in Politiken 270900J and Politiken 260900C. In a Foucauldian terminology, the question is not to produce an objective truth, rather to problematize knowledge that is perceived to be true (Hansen in Juul & Pedersen 2012: 233-38). Thus, presenting sources and fleshed out arguments in their adverts, is a tactic used by the no-parties to ascribe truth value to their statement. In this line of reasoning, it is important to remember that there is no objective truth from a post structuralist worldview; something is only true insofar as the actors perceive it to be so (ibid: 235, Rose & Miller 2013: 7).

9.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

From the technical aspects of government, both regimes of practice supposedly relied on very different strategies. The regime of practice agitating a 'yes' used a tactic of presenting their messages in large quantities, with simple catch phrases. The regime of practice arguing for a 'no' did the opposite and presented their messages with elaborate arguments and often with sources. The yes-parties did also use their authority and status as governors i.e. leading politicians, whereas the no-parties used experts to a large extent.

In regards to the placing of objects in the field of visibility, it has been demonstrated that the no-parties did not attempt to hide or shadow any object illuminated by the yes-parties. Hence, their means of calculation is that they can conduct the entitled Danish voters to vote 'no', by using experts and expertise to question the knowledge presented by the yes-parties. In an advertisement brought by The Nations Europe, under the headline "*The purpose of the Euro is political integration and more union*" (Ber 220900A), there is a reference to the economic advisors (alongside with a picture of professor in economics Hans Aage) and a question to the voters, challenging the exchange of sovereignty versus governing "Denmark from Denmark" (Ber 220900A, see also Ber 270900I, Pol 220900J, 230900J). According to Rose and Miller, an expert can add truth value to a statement within a given enclosure. Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, questioning the existing knowledge is how new knowledge and latently truth is produced (Rose & Miller 1993: 188, Hansen in Juul & Pedersen 2012: 233-38).



Picture 5, advert from Politiken September 26 2000 (Pol 260900)

From the field of visibility of government, it can be seen that the yes-parties use a technique of short catch phrases and clear messages. The employed rationality is opposite to the one of the no-parties, as they primarily use their own authority to constitute rule. Through the use of pictures of politicians, the yes-parties give the impression that the corresponding text is statements from the politicians themselves, see for example Picture 5. The rationality of the yes-parties seems to be that they can conduct the entitled Danish voters by making statements without the need of reference to a source, instead relying on their own personality and authority. In the same line of reasoning, the yes-parties combine the aforementioned use of their own political authority with pragmatic economic arguments, such as “A yes will ensure the Danish welfare. A yes will secure continued economic prosperity for the Danes. (...) A no

is not free. A no cost influence, progress and economic opportunities. Therefore, we hope for your YES the 28. September- it is best for your future and your family” (Ber 2709000). In this respect, their means of calculation seem consistent with previous referenda, imposing that the entitled Danish voters can be conducted if presented by economic incentives.

In addition to the pragmatic approach, the yes-parties question the authority of the opposition. The advert brought by The Danish European Movement, Picture 5, shows a famous actor, Lise Nørgaard, saying “Consider who is saying no” (Pol 260900D). In the ad, the heads of the political parties and movements agitating a ‘no’ are displayed with altered contrast and straight faces. Below them, the leaders of the political parties agitating a ‘yes’ is shown in bright light and smiling faces.

The yes-parties also use a strategy of fear in an attempt to conduct the Danish electorate; through the use of a position (of authority) held by specific individuals. For example, on September 24 where heads of industry state: “We, who work in the companies, are afraid of a no” (Pol 240900G). In a Governmentality viewpoint, this illustrate part of how thought seeks to transform the rationalities. In a similar way, the no-

parties also use a strategy, which could be considered a scare campaign. However, this seems funded in a rationality of creating new knowledge. This finding is supported by their use of sources in the respective advertisements. For example, in the chronicle by Holger Kirkholm Nielsen, who argues that Denmark would not be able to make comprehensive welfare reforms if the euro was accepted. Moreover, the chronicle problematizes decisions made by the Euro X group and the economic constraints of the EU (Pol 270900P).

9.5 The attention to the formation of identities

In the previous three dimensions, it is evidenced how the two regimes of practice use different tactics to transform thought into actual conduct. The yes-parties used a tactic to include a high volume of advertisement relying on shorter catch phrases. Whereas, the no-parties used fewer adverts but included a high level of expertise to incorporate truth value. In accordance with the analytics of government, the next section will analyse the forms of individual and collective identity through which governing operates.

From the no-parties' continuous illumination on the issue of sovereignty, e.g.: *"But us, who wants to hold firm to Danish independence, must vote no"* (Ber 220900A), it is clear that the governors of no-parties are expected to operate through a national orientation. However, as their strategy relies on the use of experts, as opposed to their own authority, it seems presupposed that the governors themselves lack the capacity to conduct the entitled Danish voters. In continuation hereof, the governed are expected to possess the analytical attributes to cope with arguments, such as *"Harmonisation will destroy our [the Danish] welfare model"* (220900J), this indicates that the Danish electorate, similar to the governors, are assumed to have a national orientation and can be conducted through nationalistic arguments²⁶. Finally, it seems presupposed that the entitled Danish voters cannot be conducted through arguments of fear, as exemplified by Holger Kirkholm Nielsen's comments on the Euro X group.

By comparison, the governors of the yes-parties are assumed to operate through a common European identity. Head of The Liberal Party, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, states that *"To see the Danish flag side by side with the other European countries flags and to hear the Danish voice at the table where the decisions are made is an important part of the Danish democracy"* (Pol 250900G). This is similar to previous referenda, where the yes-parties for example, emphasised a common European identity to secure peace. Furthermore,

²⁶ Morten Løkkegaard elaborates on this in his interview from 2015 *"(...) we [the Danish electorate] have a combination of low self-esteem and delusions of grandeur (...) everything we do at home [in Denmark] are, of course, best i.e. nobody from the outside can tell us any better"* (Appendix 2).

it is presupposed that the Danish electorate can identify themselves as being a part of a European community.

In their illumination of the objects in the field of visibility, the yes-parties emphasise the societal consequences of a 'no' i.e. the loss of jobs. Thus, it can be assumed that Danish electorate have the duty to protect Danish employment. Opposite of the no-parties, the use of short catch phrases to condense the economic arguments presuppose that the entitled Danish voters cannot be attributed the capacity to fully comprehend the actual content of the referendum. Furthermore, the strategy of using the authority of the governors, assumes that the entitled Danish voters are virtuous citizens who can be conducted to vote 'yes' by arguing from a position of authority. From the use of Picture 5 as a technical mean, the Danish electorate is elicited to fear the governors of the no-parties; hence identify themselves with the governors of the yes-parties. The strategy of scaring the electorate was also seen in 1992 where Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and Anders Fogh Rasmussen preached doom on the Danish labour market and welfare state in case of a 'no' (Pol 260592A, Ber 260592J).

9.6 Summary

Similar to previous referenda, the yes-parties emphasise the influence that Denmark will gain from participating in the Euro as well as the economic uncertainties in case of a 'no'. Conversely, the no-parties can be characterised by the light they shed on the Danish welfare state and the loss of sovereignty. The rationality of yes-parties seems to be that they could conduct the entitled Danish by arguing from a position of authority. Moreover, they use a strategy of frightening the Danish electorate by making predictions of the societal consequences of a 'no'. The no-parties follow an opposite strategy by including experts and a large degree of knowledge from references and sources.

Chapter 10, The Danish referendum on the European Patent Court, May 24 2014

10.1 Introduction

The concept of a common EU patent was already conceived in 1973, where the European Party Convention decided on the central rules regarding European patents. The agreement was intergovernmental and therefore Denmark could participate (cf. the Danish opt-outs) (EU-oplysningen A). Since then, the agreement has been updated several times, among others in 2012, where the European Parliament agreed on regulation (EU) 1257/2012, which established the foundation for a common EU patent and patent protection (regulation EU 1257/2012). In continuation hereof, the 2013 intergovernmental agreement established the European Patent Court. However, the Danish Ministry of Justice came to the conclusion that adhering to the intergovernmental agreement would confer sovereignty to the EU and thus, trigger the constitution §20, as described in the chapter 1 (EU oplysningen A). A proposal to sign the agreement was put forth in Parliament (L22), where it failed to reach a 5/6 majority, because the Red-Green alliance and the Danish People's Party voted against the proposal (Ber 240515, ØIM A). Consequently, participation in the agreement on the Patent Court was put to a referendum. Furthermore, a referendum on conferral of sovereignty must have participation of more than 30 per cent of the entitled voters to be valid. The government feared that this be difficult to obtain the required participation, due to the nature of the issue and as a result, chose to hold the referendum in conjunction with European parliamentary election (Ber 240515, ØIM A).

10.2 The examination of the fields of visibility of government

Economics of patents and business culture

As described in the introduction, the Government feared that the issue of the Patent Court was too technical to reach popular attention. However, both regimes of practice illuminated the economics behind international patents. On the May 21 2014, Bjarke Møller, director of the Think Tank Europa, states: *"(...) a European patent application cost 240.000 crowns as today, or only approximately 35.000 crowns after the patent reform"* (Pol 210514B). Although, seemingly reluctant to give specific projections, CEO from Danish Industry, Karsten Dybvad put forward: *"We believe that it is an advantage, but it is not only about expenses in a narrow understanding. The new system will remove concurring burdens and leadership effectiveness in patent processes. That kind actually hinders especially the smaller companies (...)"* (Ber 210514A). On the other hand, the no-parties stressed the unknown economic impact of the new patent system and the

possibility of patent trolls²⁷, which they claimed posed an economic risk for small and medium-sized businesses (Pol 230514A). Furthermore, Pernille Skipper, from the The Red-Green Alliance expresses concern about the possible increase in patents and the patents held by large corporations, which she fears could: “(...) *have severe consequences for research and treatment of diseases*” (Pol 220514). Thus, in accordance with Governmentality approach, both regimes of practice can be characterised from their illumination of the economics consequences from a common European patent.

Also, the yes and no-parties placed the Danish industrial and business culture in the field of visibility. The interest organisations, Danish Industry and CO-industry, launched a campaign under the slogan “*The Danes are original*” (Pol 230514). In a letter to the editor, business law director from Danish Industry, Kim Haggren, describes Denmark “as land of ideas and not copies” and enlightens the advantages of patents for small start-ups with original ideas (Ber 231405A). Similar to this approach, a constellation of actors from the yes-parties brought the same advert in Politiken on May 20, 21 and 24, respectively. The advert shows known Danish export products with patents, such as the NOVO insulin pen and GM hearing aids, to exemplify the Danish business culture as one of originality (Pol 200514, 210514D, 240514). Another example is the ad from Danish Industry and CO industry showing a lightbulb coloured as the Danish flag with a corresponding text: “*Take good care of Denmark’s original ideas*” (Pol 230514). From Dean’s interpretation of Governmentality, these graphical illustrations are a visual representation of the field to be governed. This approach bear resemblance to the one made by the yes-parties in 1972, where everyday commodities were used as a tactic to conduct the Danish electorate from economic incitements (Ber 011072E).

The complexity of the Patent Court

Another object illuminated by the yes-parties concerns the complexity of the Patent Court. For example, MP from The Liberal Party Jakob Ellemann-Jensen put forward on May 18 2014 that “*The patent court is very technical matter. I, myself have difficulties with [understanding] it even though I have worked with the area in ten years. Therefore, we [The Liberals] had also hoped to have been able to consider the matter in the Parliament*” (Ber 180514). This concern was further enlightened by the CEO of the Industrial Foundation Mads Lebech. In a letter to the editor he argues that such complex and expensive decisions should not be put to a referendum; instead he argues that the Danish Constitution should be revised (Ber 200514A). The no-parties shadowed the object and did not explicitly mention the arguments (Appendix 2014). Nevertheless, they illuminate the potential increase in patents that would result from a yes to the Patent Court “*If it is a*

²⁷ A patent troll obtains the patents being sold at auctions by bankrupt companies attempting to liquidate their assets, or by doing just enough research to prove they had the idea first. They can then launch lawsuits against infringing companies, or simply hold the patent without planning to practice the idea in an attempt to keep other companies’ productivity at a standstill (Investopedia.com).

yes, it is expected that we, instead of 6.000 international patents will have 60.000 international patents per year” (Pol 230514A). In this respect, they perceive the increase in patents as potentially obstructing the competitiveness of the smaller businesses.

Finally, both regimes of practice identify the object of EU patents as related to a general discussion on EU. On May 23 2014, two members of the Social-Liberal Party, Lave Knud Broch and Sebastian Korsbakke Jensen, state: *“We believe that a yes (...) will reduce the legal rights (...)”* (Pol 230514A). Correspondingly, Ritzau correspondent Erik Høgh-Sørensen put forward that the Danish electorate should “look at the bigger picture” when considering how to vote (Ber 210514). In a similar way, journalist Amalie Kestler put on that in spite of the many undetermined issues relating to the Patent Court, she will vote ‘yes’ based on trust in the EU project (Pol 240514B). Furthermore, The Association for the Danish Road Transport of Goods (ITD) bring two advertisements which exclusively illuminate the advantages being a community within the EU. In the respective advertisements, the Patent Court is not directly mentioned, however quotes by former Danish Prime Minister Poul Hartling and former Minister of Justice Affairs K.K. Steincke are used as a historical points of reference (Pol 200515A, 210515). The use of prominent politicians as references bear resemblance to 1972, where The Committee Supporting Danish Accession to the EC cited former Prime Minister of Norway, Trygve Bratelli, for saying: *“(...) no well-oriented person can believe that a Nordic constellation can solve the problems that the respective countries have negotiated with the European Community”* (Pol 280972E & Ber 280972F).

10.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

From the previous section it is apparent that the competing regimes of practice define the object of the Patent Court differently. Nevertheless, a prerequisite for government to achieve ends is to use technical means such as certain procedures and vocabularies. In the following section these will be unfolded.

Picturing the area of patents

To successfully constitute authority, the yes-parties used letters to the editor, chronicles and sponsored adverts, brought by industrial leaders or organisations; holding some sort of expertise or authority (Appendix 2014). Furthermore, the yes-parties argued from a position of authority. For example, Karsten Dybvad claims: *“It is only a problem if you have a bad case, I think that the no arguments are affected by the fear of not taking action”* (Ber 210514A). Another sample can be found in a letter to the editor on May 20 2014, where Eva Maria Gram from the Think Tank Europa made the following statement: *“This myth [in relations to patent trolls] has no truth value”* (Ber 200514). These statements testify to a pragmatic vocabulary similar to

previous Danish EC/EU referenda. For example, on May 29 1992, Klaus Bustrup, Director of Council of Agriculture, uses phrases such as “self-evident”, when describing why Denmark should participate in the EU (Ber 290592C). Furthermore, the field of visibility characterised the yes-parties by the illumination on solidarity and unity. This finding bear witness of a procedure to constitute government by avoiding the complex issues of the Patent Court and instead emphasise more palatable issues, in which prominent former Danish politicians are used as an instrument to achieve ends.

By comparison, the no-parties sought to accomplish authority through the use of sponsored adverts and letters to the editor brought by politicians and not industrial leaders (Pol 220514). This distinction is also evident when looking at the technical means of government. In the respective advertisement from the Red-Green Alliance, Pernille Skipper is using a vocabulary supposedly intended to picture the content of the referendum. In the advert, she explains how the pharmaceutical industry will be able to take out patents on gene sequences, which is used in cancer treatment. The same tendency can be seen in an interview with the headline “*Doctors fear patent on cancer treatment*”, where medical professor Jens E. Rehfeld states “*It is overall a problem of principles and a private company will want to make money on it*” (Pol 200514B) see also Pol 230514A, 220514, 200514B). Thus, in agreement with the Governmentality way of thinking, these words enable the entitled Danish voters to think about the patents with their eyes and hands. A similar technique seems present when looking at the yes-parties, who consistently brought newspaper advertisements of Danish export products, to condense the content of patents and inherently making the issue governable.

10.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

Until now, it has been demonstrated, how the competing regimes of practice have used technical means to make the entitled Danish voters able to *touch* the complex area of patents. On this background, a successful Governmentality analysis must subsequently analyse how the technical aspects of government is a product of an inherent rationality.

Similar to previous Danish EC/EU referenda, it has been outlined how the yes-parties used a pragmatic vocabulary to constitute authority. Thus, when *thinking* about governing, the overall rationality seems to be that the regime of practice i.e. the governors possess a great deal of expertise, which in terms of Governmentality manifests itself in truth value. On May 23 2014, Kim Haggren began his letter to the editor by stating that two researchers from University of Copenhagen had made misjudgements as to the implications from the Patent Court (Ber 230514A). On this background, his mean of calculation is that he can

conduct the Danish electorate by using his status as a professional. The same strategy is evidenced when looking at the respective contributions from Karsten Dybvad and Eva Maria Gram (Ber 210514A, 240514). In both cases the actors use their knowledge and expertise to sweep the critique of patent trolls by claiming that in comparison with the USA, it is invalid. Also, Bjarke Møller uses his expertise to deem the campaign of the no-parties “tendentious” (210514B). Apart from giving rise to a pragmatic form of truth, several actors in this regime of practice place the value of the EU as the field to be governed. When Amalie Kestler, put forward that she will vote ‘yes’ as a result of trust in the European project, the statement give rise to a specific form of truth, claiming that Denmark is depending on other countries and that this issue should take precedence over issues specifically related to the Patent Court. Albeit more specific, the same line of reasoning seems present when Karsten Dybvad and Kim Haggren impersonates Denmark as a small country of ideas (Ber 230514A, 210514A).

In the latter dimension, it has outlined how the no-parties used several technical means to turn thoughts into action. By picturing the Patent Court as potentially hampering cancer research, the means of calculation is that the Danish electorate will be scared and eventually vote ‘no’. Furthermore, the specific illumination on the pharmaceutical industry seems funded on a general aversion towards these companies, which typically impersonated as being greedy and unscrupulous (Bulik in Fiercepharma.com). Also, the definition of the Danish legal rights – enlightened by Lave Knud Broch and Sebastian Korsbakke Jensen, testifies to an employed rationality of scaring the Danish electorate. In a similar way, Erik Høeg-Sørensen seems to use his knowledge on the European system to transform the practice by illuminating previous incidents. When looking at these findings, the overall rationality seems to follow the same pattern as previous referenda. For example, in 1986, where the no-parties used the aspect of sovereignty to shadow the economic implications of the EC Package (Pol 250286G, 210286A, 260286I).

10.5 The attention to the formation of identities

Having so established the rationalities employed in the respective regimes of practice, the final step of a Governmentality analysis concerns the forms of identity prompted and presupposed by regimes of practice.

According to Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, the Patent Court is a very technical matter, which he himself has difficulties in understanding. From this statement it seems presupposed that the governed i.e. the Danish electorate do not have the capacity to understand the actual content of the referendum – or at least they are given the *right* to be less concerned with the actual content of the referendum. Quite contrary to the collective identity of the governed, the governors are expected to use their statuses as prominent figures in the Danish industry to conduct the entitled Danish voters from an overall pragmatic stance. On this background, the governed are elicited to be rational citizens in favour of helping the Danish industry, which is impersonated as Grundfos, Coloplast, Velux, Novo Nordisk and so on, by voting ‘yes’ to the Patent Court (Pol 240514).

When looking at the no-parties, they seem to operate through a different set of collective identities. Because the governors primarily are politicians, they are expected to use their political attributes; hence deliver political statements, as done by Pernille Skipper when using the pharmaceutical industry as a technical mean of government. On this background, it seems presupposed that the Danish electorate have a negative attitude towards the pharmaceutical industry; which they are given the duty of protecting Denmark against. Furthermore, Lave Knud Broch, Sebastian Korsbakke Jensen’s letter to the editor indicates that the Danish electorate, similar to previous referenda, should have a cautious orientation towards the EU (e.g. Pol 240286). This capacity is elicited by picturing the Patent Court as directly related to the Danish legal rights and thus the entitled Danish voters are given the status as protectors of Denmark.

10.6 Summary

The analysis of the referendum on the European Patent Court illustrates that both regimes of practice have given thoughts to evade the actual content of the referendum. The yes-parties have used their expertise to conduct the entitled Danish voters from a pragmatic vocabulary and the need for unity amongst the European countries. As opposed to this approach, the governors of the no-parties have used their political status to illuminate the legal and societal consequences of a European Patent Court.

Chapter 11, The Danish referendum on the flexible opt-in on justice and home-affairs, December 3 2015

11.1 Introduction

The Danish opt-out on JHA means that within this area Denmark is cooperating with the EU on an intergovernmental basis. Throughout the 1990's and the early 00's, this was possible due to the lack of legal development in the EU (Kelstrup et al, 2012: 73-74). However, the Amsterdam Treaty moved the issue of immigrants and refugees from an intergovernmental to a supranational level. As described in chapter 8, the Amsterdam treaty was considered *toothless*. Therefore, many of the reforms that were supposed to be implemented in the EU in 1998 were instead implemented with the Nice Treaty, ratified in 2003. None of these treaties constituted changes with regards to the Danish opt-out on JHA (ibid).

On June 13 and July 10 2003, the European Convention adopted by consensus a new Constitution for Europe. The constitution was signed October 29 2004. The aim was to replace the founding treaties of the EU (the Treaty on the EC and the Treaty on the EC) with the new constitution. However, the ratification process failed in France May 29 2005 and June 1 2005 in the Netherlands. Afterwards the European Council decided to put the EU on a "think break" (EUR-Lex, E, F).

The break ended with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which effectively moved the entire cooperation on JHA to the supranational level, including Europol (3december.dk). With the Lisbon Treaty Denmark achieved a protocol number 22 to the Lisbon Treaty, allowing Denmark to replace its-opt out with a flexible opt-in model. This protocol allows Denmark to repeal its JHA opt-out entirely or selectively (Protocol no. 22 of The Lisbon Treaty).

On this background, the SR-government reached a political agreement, on December 10 2014, with The Liberal Party, The Conservative People's Party and The Socialist People's Party to hold a referendum to replace the opt-out on JHA with a 'flexible' opt-in model. The 'flexible' opt-in should allow Denmark, on a case-to-case basis, to opt-in to existing JHA-legislation, as well as any future legislation on the area (UM A 2015). The referendum would lead to an immediate participation in 22 legal acts plus Europol, Eurojust and the PNR register²⁸ (3december.dk B). An additional agreement between the political parties ensured that

²⁸ The EU Passenger Name Record is as proposed registry where airlines oblige to provide authorities with travel data from passengers (EUparl.com B)

Denmark would not participate in legal acts concerning the area of refugees or immigration without holding a prior advisory referendum. This agreement became the topic of much controversy the electoral campaign (3december.dk B).

11.2 The examination of the fields of visibility of government

The debate on Europol

Even though the referendum on JHA encompassed 22 legal acts plus Europol, Eurojust and PNR, the yes-parties were characterised by their primary enlightenment of the specific acts involving Europol, such as cross-border crime. In a chronicle on December 2 2015, written by the leaders of the political parties agitating a 'yes', it is stated that: *"Criminals move across borders. Therefore, the police must, of course, also work cross borders"* (Ber 021215E). They further state *"We have been criticised for focusing too much on Europol. And – admittedly – we have spent a lot of time on Europol, because it is so determining for the police's opportunity to fight cross-border crime"* (ibid). The rest of the chronicles mentions the fight against child pornography and the ability of the Danish police to issue restraint orders across borders.

The no-parties were characterised by their illumination of the alternative options for Denmark to participate in Europol on an intergovernmental basis through a parallel agreement. EU-spokesman from the Danish People's Party, Kenneth Kristensen Berth states: *"The yes-parties get more and more shrill, but it will not make us change what we have said all the way though: We will find a solution with regards to Europol in case of a no. One way or the other, it will be solved"* (Berl 011215). This was further enlightened by MEP from the Danish People's party Morten Messerschmidt who proposed a re-negotiation of article 20 of the Lisbon treaty, which authorise enhanced cooperation between member states, as a possible solution (Pol 021215A). In response, the yes-parties shed a strong light on the possible disadvantages of participating in Europol through a parallel agreement. Ulla Tørnæs from the Liberal Party enlightened this on November 11 2015 *"It is correct that Norway, in emergency cases, can get faster assistance from Europol than normally. And if you are satisfied that Denmark only in emergency cases can get quick assistance from Europol, you can easily vote no (...). I do not believe that the everyday comfort is redundant"* (Pol 261115C). By defining the object of a parallel agreement differently, they are obscuring the argument that a parallel agreement is of equal value to a full membership.

Democracy and Sovereignty

The no-parties refrained from discussing the specific acts; instead they illuminated the objects of sovereignty and democratic legitimacy (Pol 291115). In an interview conducted by this thesis, MEP from the People's

Movement against the EU, Rina Ronja Kari, says that *“Our main narrative was this question of whether the EU should rule the legal policy too. (...). Namely that the population as a whole is tired of the EU deciding so much, they have a distinct experience that the EU has received too much power without asking them, the population”* (Appendix 2). Furthermore, Kenneth Kristensen Berth states *“(…) one need to remember that when we have given up sovereignty in an area, we cannot have that sovereignty back”* (Pol 291115). This bears a strong resemblance to the 1998 and 2000 electoral campaigns, where the no-parties placed general concerns and objects not directly related to the referenda, in the centre of the field of visibility, by stating *“Vote no to Schengen tomorrow”* (Ber 270598K) in 1998, or *“NO – for the sake of democracy”* (Pol 210900J) in 2000. In the 2015 electoral campaign, the object of democracy was enlightened by Pernille Skipper from the Red-Green Alliance: *“And then we are back where we started. Is it democratic? And how large a super tanker is it to turn around? It is, practically speaking, very difficult to correct mistakes made within the EU”* (Pol 291115D).

Historically, the yes-parties have not shed a direct light on the loss of sovereignty as such, but instead enlightened the advantages of EU cooperation. The 2015 referendum was no exception as only two articles mentions the transferral of sovereignty (Pol 301115C, 281115B). Instead, the yes-parties again illuminated the potential benefits from *“sitting at the table”* similar to the referenda of 1998 and 2000. The main political parties amongst the yes regime made a joint statement: *“If we keep the opt-out on justice and home affairs, it will be up to the other EU-countries to decide what Denmark can be a part of. That decision should instead be placed within Denmark”* (Ber 021215E).

The agreement on the common asylum policies

Despite the agreement between the major political parties stating that an advisory referendum would be held before joining any common asylum policies (3december.dk B) the object that was illuminated by both regimes of practice. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kristian Jensen, defined the characteristics of the agreement in an interview by stating: *“We [the agreeing parties] believe that the political agreement is stronger than a legal. The political agreement gives each of the [political-] parties power to veto on the area, whereas a legal text can be changed by a simple majority in parliament”* (Pol 261115A). However, the no-parties defined the political agreement differently; questioning the lack of legal bindings and the trustworthiness of the yes-parties. Morten Messerschmidt, presented this argument on November 26 2015: *“It changes nothing for us, regardless of how many [persons] are running around issuing guarantees, when they are not willing to incorporate it in the legal text”* (Ber 261115A). By defining the same object differently, the no-parties are questioning the existing knowledge related to that object.

11.3 The concern for the technical aspect of government

The previous section shows that the yes-parties were characterised by their pragmatic illumination of the advantages of police cooperation in the EU. By comparison, it is possible to picture that the no-parties considered the Danish sovereignty as the overall object to be governed. According to political commentator and CEO of Konsentio²⁹, Sinne Backs Conan: *“We [the yes- and no-parties] were tuned in to two different channels”* (Poulsen 2016 Appendix). On this background the following section will analyse the technical means of government.

The politicians are untrustworthy and the EU will govern Denmark

By the enlightenment of the political agreement, it seems the no-parties used a tactic of obscuring the value hereof. As a mean to accomplish authority, they used a vocabulary that emphasised a lack of trust in the politicians. In a letter to the editor, brought on November 26 2015 professor, Ole Hasselbach, states: *“Can we trust politicians of that quality? The answer is no. These [the politicians arguing for a yes] politicians’ insurances with regards to the consequences of a yes, should be judged by the proximity they previously have shown to have with the real world”* (Ber 261115). By the latter argument, he is using the unfulfilled predictions made by the yes-parties during the electoral campaign in 2000, as an instrument to question their authority and expertise.

To illuminate the benefits from sitting at the table, the chairman of the European Movement in Denmark, Stine Bosse, compared the situation to renting an apartment: *“I believe that we should trust the Danish political system and that a yes brings us to the table, where important areas of policing, security, businesses and co-existence in the wider sense is regulated – mind you only what happens in the common areas – inside the apartment we decide for ourselves!”* (Ber 021215C). In terms of Governmentality, the apartment is a diagram of power used by the yes-parties as a mechanism to constitute authority by specifying necessity of joint policies and solutions in areas beyond the reach of the Danish legal capacity. In this line of reasoning, the core of the Danish decision-making process remains intact. This technique was also used in the referenda of 1992/93, where the issue of sovereignty was somewhat obscured by emphasising the global and European nature of the on-going problems (Pol 160593I).

²⁹ Konsentio is Danish-Belgian public affairs bureau.

Picturing the frightening alternative

From the analysis of the fields of visibility, it is apparent that both regimes of practice used a tactic of painting a picture of the alternative. The technique was used to obscure the objects illuminated by the competing regime of practice through questioning the accessibility or content of a parallel agreement. For example, Ulla Tørnæs from the Liberal Party states that a parallel agreement on Europol would lead to a “second grade membership”: “(...) if you are satisfied that Denmark, only in emergency cases, can get quick assistance from Europol, you can easily vote no (...). I do not believe that the everyday comfort is redundant” (Pol 261115C). In the statement she uses Norway’s parallel agreement on the Europol as an instrument to scare the entitled Danish voters.

Conversely, the no-parties pictured the alternative to voting ‘no’, by using a vocabulary which questions the content of the flexible opt-in by calling it a “*kinder egg of surprises*” and “*a way to sneak asylum policies in through the back door*” (Pol 291115B, Ber 261115A). Furthermore, the no-parties used the theme of the agreement as a technique to paint a picture of the intentions of the yes-parties. In an interview on November 16, Kristian Thulesen Dahl from The Danish People’s Party stated: “(...) they [the yes-parties] wish to reserve the right to say that reality has changed and we have to join the common EU asylum and integration policies on a later occasion” (Pol 261115A). In this respect, the statement shows that the no-parties believe they can accomplish rule by using the theme of the agreement on asylum and integration policies as an instrument to scare the Danish electorate.

11.4 The approach to government as rational and thoughtful activity

The analysis of the technical aspects of government has shown reoccurring tactics and techniques from the previous referenda revolving around the alternative to a ‘yes or ‘no’ respectively. Furthermore, both regimes of practice defined objects differently to obscure them. In the following section, the underlying rationalities will be analysed.

One of the actors, who use a procedure to picture the outcome, is Professor Marlene Wind. In a chronicle, she refers to the negotiations of Danish opt-outs in a strategy to problematize them.

“Because of the opt-outs from 1993 we could not participate [in the supranational Europol] and had to beg the other EU-countries to receive the same privileged opt-in solution (...). Now we are in the cringe worthy situation before the referendum, that even after we got a yes from

the other EU-countries to a spoiled special solution, we are reserved and try to be included in as little as possible” (Pol 281115B).

In the statement, she is presenting a picture of an EU that has already made concessions to Denmark and a Denmark that has been spoiled in the process. From a Governmentality perception, her strategy is to question the knowledge of the no-parties regarding the possibility of parallel agreement and thus conduct the Danish electorate.

From the selection of legal acts, which directly or indirectly concerned Europol i.e. sensitive areas, such as paedophilia and trafficking, the employed rationality in this practice of government is that all the entitled Danish voters will be in favour of combatting these issues and thus vote ‘yes’. Editor in Chief at Ekstra Bladet, Poul Madsen, links this finding to the complexity of JHA: *“(…) this is important, but we [the government] can never explain it to the population and we can never get it passed by on its own. Therefore, it will be stuffed in [with the police cooperation]”* (Appendix 2). According to the literature, this quote illustrates that the yes-parties through *thought* sought to render the issue of JHA governable, by illuminating the police cooperation and leaving many of the legal acts in the dark.

From the way specific objects were illuminated and defined, it seems that the employed rationality of both regimes of practice was that the entitled Danish voters could be conducted through fear. For example, by the way Ulla Tørnæs describes how Denmark would become a second grade member of Europol and Kristian Thulesen Dahl who states that the flexible opt-in would, eventually, lead to common asylum policies. Furthermore, the two regimes of practices also seemed to share means of calculations, namely that the Danish electorate could be conducted by providing a different definition of objects, presented by the competing regime of practice. The yes-parties defined the political agreement on asylum and integration policies as binding, whereas the no-parties defined it as legally void. From this definition, as well as the illumination of Europol and the shadowing other legal acts, the employed rationality of yes-parties was that the Danish electorate could be conducted to vote ‘yes’ if they feared that the Danish police force would be weakened. Conversely, the rationality of the no-parties was that no matter how effective the agreement was, the politicians who made it were untrustworthy and thus, eventually, Denmark could be part of the immigration and asylum policies.

The Danish People’s Party also enlightened the loss of sovereignty, similar to previous referenda, such as 1998 and 2000. In the respective interview with Erik Høegh-Sørensen he elaborates on the topic of

sovereignty: *“This dilution of Danish sovereignty, I think basically no one has told the Danes in time, and then we arrive at the referendum where it is gradually dawning on people”* (Appendix 2). He expresses that the strategy of elevating the referendum into something more than “just” a flexible opt-in model presuppose a degree of scepticism among the Danish electorate, who according to Erik Høegh-Sørensen is “fed up” with the arguments of the yes-parties (Appendix 2). In the same respect, the no-parties employed a strategy of including objects not directly related to the referendum, similar to how the Schengen was used in 1998. In a longer interview on December 1 2015, the head of The Danish People’s Party, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, states that he would expect the government to reformulate its EU policies: *“(…) [to] take into account the scepticism that the Danes are expressing”* (Pol 011215A). In the interview, he is giving rise to new knowledge and in accordance with the framework of Governmentality, new forms of truth, by stating that the referendum is on the entirety of EU policies, not just on JHA.

11.5 The attention to the formation of identities

In the previous section, it was unfolded how the two regimes of practice had different strategies to conduct the entitled Danish voters. On this background, the Governmentality literature investigates the various capacities, through which governing operates.

When looking at the respective regime of practice advocating a ‘no’, it seems that those who exercise government, presuppose Euroscepticism as an attribute characterising the entitled Danish voters and supposedly fostered by previous Danish EC/EU referenda. Furthermore, by delivering new knowledge i.e. questioning the value of political agreements, the governors foster a capacity among the governed to be cautious towards the promises of the Government. In this line of reasoning, it is presupposed that previous referenda have entailed a capacity among the Danish electorate to see through the doomsday scenarios, which have been presented on several occasions, for example in the 2000 referendum on the Euro. Thus, the entitled Danish voters are expected to favour Danish sovereignty, albeit confronted with horrifying images of abused women and children. In the interview with Rina Ronja Kari she states *“we used the general discontent with the power of the EU to create common narrative”* (Appendix 2). From the statement it is apparent that the governors are expected to exercise authority from an overall critique of the constellation of the EU. Furthermore, Erik Høegh-Sørensen explains that the word ‘sovereignty’ is incomprehensible for many people, which prompt the need for a high level of concreteness. Thus, in terms of the identities of government, the governors must have the capacity to simplify the content of the referendum and make it identifiable for the Danish electorate (Appendix 2).

When looking at both individual and collective identities fostered and presupposed by the yes-parties, the picture is conflicting. According to Sinne Backs Conan: *“(...) they [the no-parties] were constantly up in the sky, whereas, the full spectre of the yes-parties tried to be concrete when describing the content of the referendum”* (Poulsen 2016 appendix). Also, Poul Madsen put forward that he considers Denmark to be a nation of pedlars and thus it is paramount to impersonate the EU as a “good bargain”. Hence, from the Governmentality frame of reference the governors are expected to have pragmatic orientation and use a concrete vocabulary to describe complex matters. On this background, the Danish electorate are expected to have similar pragmatic attributes and are given the duty of securing the best possible working conditions for the Danish police; the responsibility of preventing the abuse of children etc. Yet, these assumptions rely on a collective identity, which involves the absence of the capacity to engage in the actual content of the respective referenda.

11.6 Summary

Similar to previous referenda on less extensive aspects of the Danish EC/EU cooperation, the no-parties constituted ruling by illuminating objects not directly related to the content of the referendum, such as migration policies. They obscured the arguments of the competing regime of practice by questioning existing knowledge and defining the objects of the referendum differently; assuming a cautious orientation towards the EU among the Danish electorate. Contrary, the yes-parties did not believe the Danish electorate would have the capacity to comprehend the actual legal acts in the referendum. Therefore, they shadowed several parts of the content and shed a strong light on the issue of police cooperation; presupposing that the entitled Danish voters would be virtuous citizens, who could identify with the fight against cross-border crime.

Chapter 12, Conclusions, future research and implications

12.1 Introduction

This thesis has found its relevance in the investigation of: *“By which dominant discourses are truth value claimed in an electoral campaign prior to a Danish EC/EU referendum and how is this ‘a collective activity of thinking’?”* To answer the research question, a Governmentality analysis of the respective Danish EC/EU referenda spanning from 1972-2015 has been conducted. In the following section the conclusions hereof will be outlined.

12.2 Conclusions

From the analyses, this thesis concludes that the regimes of practice have used the societal context to deliver and exemplify their arguments. This is evident in 1972, where both regimes of practice spend a significant amount of resources on illuminating the post war objects such as peace and military build-up (contradistinctions). In 1998, the same rationality seemed employed in the regime practice arguing for a ‘yes’, as they used the Balkan conflict to shed a distinct light on the EU as a facilitator of peace.

Furthermore, it is concluded that the referendum on Denmark’s accession to the EC 1972 bear witness of two dominant discourses agitating a ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. The discourse in favour of a ‘yes’ argued in pragmatic terms and stated the advantages from the EC cooperation, whereas, the competing discourse emphasised the pitfalls from a loss of Danish sovereignty. From 1972 up to and including the referendum on the national compromise in 1993, these were the dominant discourses in the electoral campaigns. For instance, when looking at the electoral campaigns in 1986, 1992 and 1993, the no-parties gave rise to a specific form of truth that illuminated the negative consequences from the introduction of QMV and the implications of a political union. In this respect, the rationality of the no-parties remained relatively unchanged. When looking at the formation of identities, the regime of practice impose that the Danish electorate should have a cautious approach towards the EC and protect Denmark from the “grasp of the union”. Unlike this consistency, there seem to have been a change of thought amongst the yes-parties, manifested in the vocabularies. For example, in 1986, Poul Schlüter deems the union “stonedead” and in 1992-93 the yes-parties place the European or global perspective in the middle of the field of visibility, as a tactic to avoid the discussion of Danish sovereignty.

As can be seen from 1972-1993, the discussion, to a large extent, revolved around the principle nature of the EC/EU cooperation and the consequences hereof. From 1998-2015 the thesis concludes that the fields of

visibility illustrate a shift towards a more specific field to be governed concurrently with the development in the EC/EU cooperation. This pattern starts in 1998 and 2000 where the principle discussion of the EU as a whole is replaced with a discussion of the components of the Union, such as the Schengen cooperation and the third phase of the EMU.

Despite this shift, the employed rationality seems unchanged and pragmatic phrases such as “*It is only a problem if you have a bad case*” (Ber 210514A) and “*Because a yes makes Denmark Stronger and Safer*” (Pol 301115) were still used by the yes-parties in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Similarly, the no-parties have continued to question the legitimacy of the EC/EU through figurative language such as calling the referendum on JHA a “Kinder egg of surprises” (Pol 291115B), which bear resemblance to 1993, where Niels Ivan Meyer used the metaphor “*Behind closed doors in Brussels*” (Pol 160593F), as a technical mean to throw suspicion on the EU.

From an overall perspective, and though with many distinctions, the dominant discourses that have claimed truth value during the electoral campaigns prior to the Danish EC/EU referenda are: a pragmatic discourse versus a sovereignty discourse, agitated by the proponents for and against the EC/EU, respectively.

12.3 Future research and implications

From the substantial amount of articles, this thesis has rendered visible two dominant discourses claiming truth value in the respective electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, there is still room for future research to uncover additional implications, when analysing the Danish EC/EU referenda. Some of these implications will be presented in the following section.

Empirical implications

In chapter 4, the knowledge base of the thesis was unfolded. In this respect, more than 1000 newspaper articles have been processed. Yet, an analysis could include additional platforms of communication, such as TV-debates. Also, social media seems to be increasingly important in political communication. This finding was discussed in the interview with Editor in Chief from Ekstra Bladet, Poul Madsen, who stated: “*The development of social media has been exponential (...) they have been very important this time [The referendum on JHA]*” (Appendix 2). On this background, a future study could investigate, whether the same discourses and patterns be in evidence on social media, and if similar statements can be ascribed truth value on different platforms of social media, e.g. a comparison of statements from Facebook and Twitter. Furthermore, this thesis has investigated newspaper articles with interviews, references or adverts

containing active statements from politicians, experts and so on, who in terms of Governmentality are considered to be conducting the Danish electorate. Yet, the scope of this investigation could be expanded by looking at news articles and political analyses not containing active statements, to uncover the fields of visibility, technical means, rationality and identities of this practice of government.

Still, a Governmentality analysis could go beyond the Danish EC/EU referenda, looking for general European patterns. In this line of reasoning, the recent British referendum, which ended with a 'Brexit', seems to be an obvious case for comparison. In the electoral campaign, strong proponents of the no-campaign, such as the UK Independence Party, advocated in terms British sovereignty and emphasised among other things that Britain should take control over its borders to avoid immigrants. Conversely, the greater part of the British government and industry stressed the importance of inter-state trade (Wheeler & Hunt in BBC.com). Even though this interpretation is greatly simplified, the dominant discourses seem to revolve around the same patterns as identified by this thesis and the work of others

Theoretical and methodological implications

In accordance with the knowledge base of this thesis (chapter 4), Mitchell Dean was among the first to provide the conceptual tools to perform a study of Governmentality; suggesting one to distinguish between at least four independent varying but related dimensions of government who build on each other in sequential order. Yet, Dean leaves the door open for additional perspectives which could be incorporated as additional dimensions of government (Dean 1999: 23). One amongst such is the role of expertise and experts who according to Rose and Miller can claim truth value in their statements within a given enclosure (Rose & Miller 1992: 177-178). This perspective has been unfolded throughout the analysis of the thesis. However, this approach could be expanded more to investigate the experts, not as individual actors within a regime of practice, but as part of larger networks. To accomplish this, Peter Haas introduces the concept of Epistemic Communities where he puts forward a set of analytical tools to examine the effectiveness of a network in applying truth value and exercising government (Haas 1992: 16-18). Haas argues that a network of experts who share causal and principal beliefs, knowledge base and interests will be inherently more effective in their ability to apply truth value and thus, conduct those who are to be governed (ibid: 18). An investigation of networks according to these tools, would require an in-depth investigation of each actor involved in a given constellation.

Chapter 13, Epilogue

In accordance with chapter 2, a literature review has been conducted with the purpose of describing where this thesis places itself within the literature, and, to argue why the approach taken is a relevant contribution to the existing literature. The authors of this contribution find that we have made a thorough analysis of the main discourses (c.f. the latter section) that claim truth value in a Danish EC/EU referendum. Still, we find the urge to, explicitly, express why this contribution is important.

The analysis of the referendum on JHA 2015 showed that Europol was the main subject in the electoral campaign. According to the actors agitating a 'yes', a Danish exit to Europol posed a serious problem for the safety of the Danes. Conversely, the actors agitating a 'no' put forward that a solution to participating in Europol would be made "one way or the other". Looking at the latter statement, recent times have showed that Denmark's future participation in Europol may be a complicated matter if it is through a parallel agreement. Latest, on May 16 2015 president of the European Council Donald Tusk stated: *"So it will not be easy. Maybe impossible"* (The local.com). Furthermore, the recent Brexit have caused more than 1 million Brits to say that they regret having voted 'leave' as "reality is kicking in" and the arguments presented during the Brexit campaign now seems paling in the light of reality³⁰ (Independent.co.uk A, B).

The authors of this thesis find that these examples testify to the importance of how we talk about things prior, during and after referenda on the EU, as the consequences may be grave and even unintended. In line of this reasoning, our prevalence of two dominant discourses in the Danish EC/EU referenda bear evidence of a strategy to somewhat proceed with business as usual and thus a lack of the much needed nuances in the respective electoral campaigns.

³⁰ For example, Nigel Farage who stated that the UK sends 350 million GBP to the EU every week and claimed that the funds could be spend on the NHS, which later proved wrong (Independent C).

Chapter 14, Bibliography, list of pictures and reader's guide for appendix

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14.2 List of pictures

Front page of this thesis is comprised of picture 1 and picture 3, from Politiken October 1 1972 and May 24 1998, respectively.

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14.3 Reader's guide for the appendix

Appendix 1, Knowledge Base

The newspaper articles analysed by this thesis are provided in a separate archive. The articles are organised accordance with their chronology, by: year, date and a letter from A-Z to identify the individual article. The first article of a given date has no letter suffix. If an article spans more than a single page, they can be identified by an additional numeral suffix. The two newspapers Politiken and Berlingske Tidende have been shortened to "Pol" and "Ber" for the sake of convenience. Thus, the reference (Pol 260286H) refers to article "H" in Politiken September 26 1986. The newspapers used for spot checks have been organised in a separate folder with two sub-folders, named Spot check Berlingske and Politiken, respectively.

Appendix 2, Interviews

The second appendix contains methodological considerations regarding the interviews conducted by this thesis. Furthermore, it contains an explanation of the method used for transcribing the interviews, as well as the transcriptions. The appendix is organised with a table of contents for overview.

Appendix 3, Original quotations

According to proper academic practice, all quotations have been presented in order of appearance, in their original language.