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in Cultural Encounters

written by
Merlin Christophersen

supervised by
Lotte Bøggild Mortensen

Roskilde University
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

THIS IS ZANZIBARI

- Identity Constructions, Narratives and Memories in Contemporary Zanzibar

This thesis contains
263.920 characters
corresponding to
110 pages

Notes to this thesis's cover: The title "This is Zanzibari" is a quote from one of my informants (Kheri 2011: 18:20). The original map is found at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/zanzibar_77.jpg (accessed January 10. 2013). It has been modified in Photoshop.

Acknowledgments

Knowledge is not produced by individuals alone, and it would have been impossible for me to write this thesis without my informants' benevolent participation. Although your names remain anonymous I thank you for sharing with me your perspectives on your history.

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Merlin Christophersen, February 2013

Table of content

"*Stories inform in the sense of providing information, but more significantly, stories give form- temporal and spatial orientation, coherence, meaning, intention, and especially boundaries – to lives that inherently lack form. How stories inform lives can be a gift or a danger*"

- Arthur W. Frank in *Letting Stories Breathe – a socio-narratology* (Frank 2010: 2)[1]

1 All quotes in this thesis are italicized, while italics in the original are non-italicized. Brackets around periods – '[...]' – denote that something is left out of the quotation.

Introduction

By a fortunate coincidence I was given the opportunity to visit Zanzibar – an archipelago about 35 kilometers off the coast of mainland Tanzania – between mid August and mid December 2011, and again in May 2012. In these months I stayed in Unguja, the larger of Zanzibar's two main islands, where I decided to conduct fieldwork for my thesis. Inspired by listening to various accounts on the past, which gave me critical insights into Zanzibari history and the struggles that accompany it, my focus became a discussion of the archipelago's history, memory, and identity. This discussion is the topic of this thesis. My empirical data is based on accounts produced in interviews, supplemented by observations and academic texts about Zanzibar's social, political, economic and cultural history.

The introduction of this thesis accounts for my motivation and presents the field of study and the research question, including a number of subsequent questions that guided the work-in-progress. Furthermore, it narrows the scope of the investigation and introduces the different parts of the thesis.

Motivation

Prior to my stay in Zanzibar I had little knowledge about the archipelago, which besides Unguja, consists of the island of Pemba and some small surrounding isles.[2] I began to read about Zanzibar in a wide range of different texts of roughly three genres: Academic literature, novels, and travel guides for tourists. I realized that there are various discrepancies between the images of Zanzibar rendered in these texts, especially between travel guides and academic texts. The former tends to leave out the historical struggles that the latter emphasizes. I will briefly describe this dichotomy, as it triggered my initial interest to learn more about current images of Zanzibar.

Most travel guides have in common that they depict Zanzibar as an exotic, harmonious and peaceful place; a paradise for tourists characterized by bountiful islands, with white beaches, spice plantations, and multifarious flora and fauna. The historic capital, Stone Town, is often pictured as a center for commerce that for centuries summoned traders from the African continent and the Indian Ocean seascape. It is a place where traces of the Omani sultans who reigned in Zanzibar are still detectable for the historically interested

2 See appendix 6 for a map of Zanzibar.

tourist (cf. Sherwood 2006; Lonely Planet 2010).

Contrary to these images, novels (Gurnah 2001; 2005), and especially academic texts (Glassman 2000; 2011; Loimeier 2006a; 2011; 2012; Sheriff 1994; 2000), emphasize the historical struggles that have accompanied such violent historic events as Arab slave trade, Omani and British domination and the revolution of 1964, where thousands were killed and exiled. Moreover, they account for the problematic relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland in The United Republic of Tanzania, describe adversities of party politics, and accentuate limitations of freedom of expression under the regime of the revolutionary government. This regime has ruled Zanzibar since the revolution, although there have been political openings in the recent past.[3]

Coming to Zanzibar I got a chance to investigate various images of Zanzibar in a contemporary perspective. I came to live in the village of Paje on Unguja's east coast. Here and in Stone Town, I conducted my fieldwork to get acquainted with images of Zanzibar. I listened to stories that indicate difficulties in identity constructions on the islands, often with reference to intertwined historical narratives enacting notions of ethnic, racial, national, and religious differences. Simultaneously I read academic texts that question simplistic concepts of Zanzibari identity. Such questioning motivated me further to engage with the stories I heard, investigating the capacities of memories in identity constructions in contemporary Zanzibar.

These considerations motivated me to formulate the research question and the working questions presented below.

Research field, research question and working questions

During my readings I began wondering what influence the recent political openings seem to have on the mere possibility of remembering in a society whose approach to history for decades has been characterized by official hegemonic interpretations. I wondered how "contested memories" (Loimeier 2006a: 189) are played out in a contemporary perspective in Zanzibar; how memories are shaped in accounts of ordinary Zanzibaris and become entangled in stories and discourses about the past.

Such contemplation has guided the formulation of the following research question.

3 See appendix 1 for a time line illustrating these events.

Research question

What role do constructions of ethnic, racial, national and religious identities play in contemporary stories that interpret Zanzibar's recent past?

This research question was formulated and re-formulated parallel to my stay in Zanzibar. It must thus be understood that it developed in a dialogical process mutually influenced by both my fieldwork and theoretical considerations. It is as much influenced by the accounts produced in the interviews as it guided my approach to the fieldwork.

Moreover, the empirical data suggest various, and often contested, perspectives on answers to the research question. In order to structure the diverging perspectives, the empirical data is reflected on two working questions relevant to different aspects of the study. The interpretive aim here is not to find 'true' answers to any of these questions, which would lead to analytical closure, but instead to bring differences into play and thus open the stories to further interpretations.[4]

Working questions

a) What stories are employed in Zanzibaris' contemporary interpretations of Zanzibar's recent past?

b) How are images of Zanzibar and Zanzibari identity rendered in these stories?

With these questions in mind I will now reflect on factors narrowing the study.

Scope of investigation

It seems impossible to give all-encompassing answers to the research question or any of the working questions. Both the field of study and the questions demand an investigation that far exceeds the possible extent of this thesis. Therefore this study's investigational ambition will here be narrowed in regard to spatial, social and temporal factors.

The study is spatially limited to the island of Unguja, to the village of Paje and to Stone

4 This is similar to Arthur W. Frank, who in 2010 states that the aim of narrative analysis is not to resolve contests between stories rendering different imaginations of pasts, presents and futures, "*but rather to enhance the dialogue*" (Frank 2010: 111).

Town, and its surroundings. The informants are eight Zanzibari men living there, of whom most were born in different parts of the islands. Two were born in Pemba, and one migrated from mainland Tanzania at a young age. Given the limited scope of the study – I only interviewed eight men out of a population of almost one million – I do not claim that it is representative of the entire population. The thesis is to be read as an exemplary study of traces of stories and discourses in my informant's accounts only. It probably solely presents some perspectives among others, but it is, as will be argued, still producing valuable knowledge about these perspectives.

Besides gender, other social factors that limit the study's scope are education, occupation, as well as social and economic status. Due to my limited Swahili proficiency I had access to English speaking Zanzibaris only.

In regard to the temporal factor of the research question, this study focuses primarily on Zanzibari history including and succeeding the revolution of 1964. However, as Roman Loimeier argues, the discourse of revolution is entangled with a pre-revolutionary discourse (Loimeier 2006a: 189), and the impact of history of revolution can therefore only be understood in the context of history preceding the revolution (Loimeier 2012: 21). Hence, the study does not completely exclude pre-revolutionary stories, but instead lets them unfold to such degree as they shed light on memories of post-revolutionary developments.

The following section presents the structure of the thesis.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of three parts. Here their focuses, the structure of their arguments, and their interrelation will be described.

Part One comprises the first three chapters, developing the *design* of the study. The design includes discussions of the study's theoretical perspective, methods and objects. The study's methods are contingent on its theoretical perspective, its analytical focus on narratives and discourses, and its understanding of knowledge production. Chapter 1 therefore situates the study's approach in relation to practice theoretical and social constructivist perspectives. It clarifies the study's understanding of terms like knowledge, meaning, reality, and truth, while relating these to narratives and discourses as analytical concepts. Subsequently Chapter 2 introduces the empirical data and its limitations in

greater detail than above. Chapter 3 finally describes, and argues for, the interview methods chosen to produce knowledge about the social fields of investigation.

Part Two consists of two chapters, presenting both a theoretical and a historical *frame* relevant for the analysis. While already touching on questions of subjectivity and social identity in Part One, Chapter 4 conceptualizes the identity parameters employed in the analysis – i.e. ethnic, racial, national and religious identities –, while subsequently situating the study's conception of history and collective memory in relation to relevant theories. Finally, Chapter 5 presents an historical account of Zanzibar's recent past, contextualizing the analysis.

The two chapters in Part Three concern the *argument* of this study, answering and discussing the research question and working questions. Chapter 6 analyzes the empirical data produced in the fieldwork. Drawing on the theoretical vocabulary presented in Part One and Part Two, it analyzes what roles different modes of identification play in the narrative traces of the interviews. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the localized narratives and discourses in a global perspective.

Theories, methods and academic sources

This study draws on a wide range of different, but mutually supportive, theories, methods and academic texts.

However, I differentiate between method and theory for descriptive purposes only. In practice the perspectives on knowledge production, methodology and theory intertwine; the study's methodology is based on theories about meaning production and social identities, while its theoretical frame influences my perspective on knowledge production in the field. Hence, I find it important to present the study's theoretical perspective on knowledge production before discussing its methodology. Moreover, the distinction is blurry between the employed theories and the academic text that are the basis for my account on Zanzibari history. The authors of the latter also develop theoretical frames for their historical analyses. Therefore this study understands all employed perspectives as theoretical. It solely utilizes them for different purposes.

The study's primary theories, methods and academic sources will be briefly sketched here, while they will be presented in greater detail in the introductions to the respective chapters they are employed in.

Choosing theories, methods and academic sources is also a deselection of alternate perspectives. The theories employed in this thesis are all constructivist in the sense that they understand meaning as socially constructed through human agency; meaning is seen as specific to its historic and spatial context, and thus as alterable. This understanding also accounts for the study's own knowledge production.

The study's perspective on knowledge production is primarily inspired by the following theoretical perspectives: First, practice theory (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992; Rubow 2003), which relates discursive macro structures to human practices, second, social constructivism and theories of discourse (Hall 1997), being occupied with general questions of constructivist meaning production and the relation of knowledge and power, and third, narratology (Frank 2010; Horsdal 2012), conceptualizing the capacities of narratives to produce meaningful interrelations between people across time. Narratives are, in combination with discourses, the analytical focus of this study. The methods employed share the constructivist perspective on meaning, understanding its informants as participants in the co-production of meaning rather than as objects of investigation. As a method the study primarily utilizes qualitative interviews (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009).

The employed theories conceptualizing different aspects of identities also understand these as socially constructed phenomena. Besides identity (Hall 1996a) the study here draws on theoretical conceptions of ethnicity (Eriksen 1991), race (Hall 1996b), nations (Anderson 2006; Eriksen 1994), as well as religion (de Vries 2008). Moreover, the theories on history and collective memory employed understand the interpretation of history as a means of power (Assmann 1992; Connerton 1989). Finally, the study draws on a number of academic texts that account for different aspects of the contested Zanzibari history (Glassman 2000; 2011; Loimeier 2006a; 2011; 2012; Sheriff 1994; 2000).

Keeping the research question, the structure of the thesis and the briefly sketched theories in mind, in the following Part One develops the design of the study.

Part One: Design

When conducting qualitative fieldwork, Cecilie Rubow states the researcher must adapt the research object, theory and method to one another, as they are interdependent in determining the study's meaning production. In the research process he/she should thus reflect on how the combination of theories and methods produce meaning about the object of study, while reciprocally checking the meaning production of theory and method on the background of the reality of the object (Rubow 2003: 228). This adaptation of object, theory and method to one another is what in this thesis is understood as the *design* of the study. This design includes epistemological considerations, as well as reflections on the study's analytical perspectives, its empirical data and methods.

This part thus presents the design of the study, its theoretical perspective, object and methods. Chapter 1 will argue how the analytical focus is inspired by practice theory and how the understandings of both the focus, and the object of study, depend upon a moderate social constructivist understanding of knowledge production. The chapter will furthermore conceptualize narratives and discourses, traces of which this study seeks to investigate. While Chapter 2 presents the study's empirical data, Chapter 3 discusses the methods and the practical approach employed in producing this data.

1. Perspectives on knowledge production

1.1 Presentation of theories

This section introduces the theories employed in this chapter, describing how, and for what purposes, they are applied.

The study's analytical focus is inspired by practice theoretical perspectives brought forward by ethnologists Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, and anthropologist Cecilie Rubow. In their constructivist understandings of meaning these authors acknowledge the existence of discursive macro structures governing human lives, but they realize these structures as tangible in human practice. In *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (1992) Comaroff & Comaroff relate investigations of macro structures – e.g. discourses and global flows of thought, knowledge, and commodities – to the local study of everyday practices of human life. In "Samtalen: Interviewet som deltagerobservation" (2003) Rubow argues for the use of interviews in a practice theoretical perspective. She reflects on the researcher's approach to the research field and suggests analytically to distinguish between different orders of interpretation. These authors' perspectives inspire the analytical focus of this study, which operates with narratives and discourses as social macro structures and the practice of telling stories as localized practices.

The perspective on knowledge production presented in this chapter is inspired by cultural theorist Stuart Hall's work. His interdisciplinary perspective combines constructivist conceptions of meaning, symbolic violence, and social structures of discourses with an analysis of material inequalities. A particular inspiration is Hall's perspective on meaning production as representations formed in human practices, which he bases on post-structuralist reasoning and develops in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (1997). His perspective shows the way for a moderate social constructivism that does not disregard the influences the material world we inhabit has on our lives. Furthermore, Hall's discussion of the relation between knowledge and practices supplements the practice oriented approach with theoretical depth. Hall's perspective will also be employed to conceptualize discourses.

Analytically the study focuses primarily on narratives of the past. Therefore it employs theories of narratives, presented by philosopher and narratologist Marianne Horsdal and sociologist Arthur W. Frank. In *Telling Lives: Exploring Dimensions of Narratives* (2012)

Horsdal presents her perspective on autobiographical research. Frank develops what he calls a socio-narratology in his book *Letting Stories Breathe: a socio-narratology* (2010). Both Horsdal and Frank give detailed descriptions of the social capacities of narratives and the manner in which narratives influence identity constructions. Their perspectives form the basis on which the study conceptualizes narratives as structures of social knowledge at play in and across discourses. Horsdal and Frank also both provide a terminology valuable to narrative analysis, which will be presented as an introduction to the analysis in Part Three.

1.2 Practice theoretical perspectives

Rubow's and Comaroff & Comaroff's practice theoretical perspectives allow me to bridge a gap found in the fieldwork between local practices – the telling of stories – and complex discursive macro structures of social knowledge, which the stories draw on as a reservoir of narrative themes, plots and strategies. This section introduces these practice theoretical perspectives and argues how they influence the analytical focus of the study.

Practice theoretical investigations are to a considerable extent based on qualitative fieldwork investigating human practices. As Rubow argues, qualitative fieldwork is by definition exclusionary as it emphasizes in-depth analysis of certain aspects of a certain reality while neglecting other aspects. The researcher does not necessarily know all relations between the persons, actions and contexts that are the objects of study. In the fieldwork it is therefore the researcher who combines fragmented fields of meaning and to a great extend constructs the research field (Rubow 2003: 231). Rubow's argument stresses the importance of the researcher's analytical perspective. It is he/she who decides what fields of meaning – including relations and references – to focus on, and this focus is always contingent to his/her theoretical perspective.

This study is inspired by a practice theoretical understanding of exclusionary fieldwork, as described by Rubow. Therefore it dissociates itself from the anthropological research tradition that, according to Rubow, has had a preference for inclusive fieldwork, which imagines the researchers to be capable of accounting for all aspects of a certain reality. The object of study is here demarcated and localized, as for instance a specific cultural practice in a spatially bound community. The inclusive research tradition, Rubow argues, renders an imagined ideal impossible to fulfill (Rubow 2003: 228).

In accordance with the exclusionary focus Comaroff & Comaroff argue how the demarcation of the object of study – the construction of the research field – is more complicated in a practice theoretical perspective than in the inclusive anthropological tradition. As "*anthropology shift its concentration away from simple structures and local systems*", it "*deprives us of our conventional, all-too-easy means of bounding analytic fields, forcing us to enter rarified realms of floating texts and macro-structures*" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992: 31). However, such macro structures are always tangible in human practices. Comaroff & Comaroff argue that even "*macro-historical processes – the building of states, the making of revolution, the extension of global capitalism – have their feet on the ground*", and thus are "*rooted in the meaningful practices of people great and small*" (Ibid. 32f).

Paradoxically the combination of exclusionary fieldwork and a practice theoretical perspective thus simultaneously limits and broadens the scope of anthropological research. On the one hand it narrows and deepens the thematic focus of analysis, while it on the other hand broadens the analytical frame of connective references to complex structures, or fragmented fields, of meaning that reciprocally govern, and are shaped by, human practices.[5]

Rubow suggests that the researcher differentiates between diverse orders of interpretation when conducting qualitative fieldwork. A first order is a certain ritual practice that he/she investigates. An informant's account on that practice is a second order, while yet other orders could be the researcher's different analyses of both the practices and interpretations. While traditional anthropological fieldwork analytically focused on the first order of interpretation, the other orders are as important in exclusionary fieldwork (Rubow 2003: 230).

This thesis has a different focus than Rubow's study. While she is interested in rituals and focuses on first and second orders of interpretation, I primarily focus on second and following orders. In investigating contested memories on Zanzibari history, I study "*the annals of a cultural imagination*" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992: 34). This means, I cannot go back to analyze the practices of the actual events that are interpreted by the informants in the interviews. The study's focus is therefore on the oral practices enacted in the informants' interpretations of Zanzibari history and identity. These are narrative practices that interact with broader discursive structures.

5 To be able to produce meaning among such fragmented fields of meaning I find it important to reflect on how I understand and combines the study's fields of meaning which are entangled in narratives and discourses. These reflections are linked to the discussion of the theoretical understanding of knowledge production in the following sections.

In focusing the analysis of historical interpretations on contemporary texts, the study aligns with Comaroff & Comaroff's attempt to "do *an ethnography of the historical imagination*" (Ibid. 31). In this the analysis encounters "*the general problem of reading social processes from exemplary representations*". In order to make such readings meaningful, Comaroff & Comaroff state, the analyzed texts must "*be anchored in the processes of their production, in the orbits of connection and influence that give them life and force*" (Ibid. 34). According to this I understand the study's empirical interview data as texts that are anchored in the situational practice of the interview that produced them, while these texts simultaneously refer to narrative and discursive macro structures rendering history and identity constructions in Zanzibar.

With this outline of the study's practice theoretical approach in mind the following section describes how the study's perspective on knowledge production is based on social constructivism, and how this influences both the understanding of its social fields of investigation and its own meaning production.

1.3 Moderate social constructivism

The following introduces Hall's perspective on social constructivism, including conceptualizations of culture, identity and discourses.

1.3.1 Meaning as cultural representations

Hall argues that the world – what we perceive as reality – is socially constructed and re-constructed through cultural representations. These representations are forms of human practices that not solely reflect, but actively produce reality. He states that it "*is by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them – how we represent them – that we* give them a meaning" (Hall 1997: 3). Things, subjects, and phenomena thus do not have essential cores of true meanings. On the contrary, all meaning is produced in human interactions in specific places at specific times. Meaning is thus ambiguous and fluent, as it is potentially constantly argued about in language, which is here understood in a broad sense, including "*sounds, written words, electronically produced images, music notes, even objects*" (Ibid. 1), but also human practices (Ibid. 44). However, meaning is

temporarily fixed in structures of social knowledge, e.g. in discourses, but also in culture (Ibid. 15ff).

1.3.2 Subjectivity and identities

Like all meanings, identities are realized in social constructivism as being in a constant mode of becoming. An identity is not something people have, it is rather to be understood as a constant process of identification that is partly based on a performance of the self – including the telling of stories about oneself –, is partly contingent on social structures of knowledge and is related to the (unconscious) spheres of feelings and drives (cf. section 4.2). Hall describes social constructivism as abandoning the duality between mind and body as subjectivity is shaped by productive power in social structures of knowledge that are both socially and mentally representations. Both mind and body are produced as part of the human subject (Hall 1997: 54ff). One cannot be detached from the other, as the body is crucial for a person's self-understanding, but also for others' understanding of a given person. Bodies are thus produced within structures of social knowledge; having a specific body will in many ways determine one's social identity. Skin color and other physical characteristics, for instance, are often represented as determining peoples' identities as belonging to certain ethnic or racial groups (Ibid. 225ff). As Hall writes elsewhere, identities – collective or individual – are "*the product of the marking of difference and exclusion*" (Hall 1996a: 4).[6]

1.3.3 Culture as a social structure of knowledge

Hall conceptualizes culture as a basic structure of social knowledge. It is "*a set of* practices" with "*shared meanings*" (Hall 1997: 1f). To share a culture is to share cultural codes that "*fix the relationships between concepts and signs*" in mental "*conceptual maps*", which are "*unconsciously internalized*" and "*the result of social conventions*" (Ibid. 21f). Cultural codes make us able to "*interpret the world in roughly similar ways*". Therefore "*we are able to build up a shared culture of meanings and thus construct a social world which we inhabit together*" (Ibid. 18). Culture is accordingly defined as a social yet mental structure of shared meanings that takes form in human practices.

6 This is a vital point for this study's understanding of race, ethnicity, national and religious identities, which will be elaborated in Chapter 4.

Moreover, practices reciprocally shape the shared meanings of culture. This duality between subjects acting on, and simultaneously being determined by, social structures of knowledge is a vital point that links subjectivity to productive modes of power. As we will see in the following section, this also applies to narratives and discourses.

1.4 Narratives and discourses

As already argued, the concepts of narratives and discourses as social structures of knowledge allows this study to bridge an analytical gap between the localized rooted practices of human agencies and social macro structures of shared meanings. The study focuses on traces of narratives that are referred to in the practice of interviews while the concept of discourses allows a linking of these narrative traces to discursive formations rendering identity parameters in Zanzibar. The following presents the study's understanding of narratives and discourses, and discusses how they shape social identities.

1.4.1 Narratives: Telling stories of who we are

Similar to Hall, both Horsdal and Frank understand reality and identities as constructions that – in a constant process of becoming – are the results of human performativity. Different from Hall their foci are on narrative means of meaning and identity construction.

Describing human dependency on stories, Horsdal argues that we "*are in a state of becoming, continuously in a process in which we try to make sense of and create meaning from what happens. Telling stories and exchanging stories is the primary human means of accomplishing this.*" In sharing stories our "*individuality is founded on, and intertwined with, personal relationships*" (Horsdal 2012: 3).

According to this argument identity must always be realized as a social phenomenon, which means that it is never fully individual; identity is simultaneously produced by individual agency and social dependency. We tell stories to make sense of the world and ourselves because we have a "*need for meaning*" (Ibid. 17). Simultaneously we interpret our own and others' stories. Never being alone in the sense making, we draw on social reservoirs of culturally embedded knowledge about storytelling. Horsdal states that many narratives "*reproduce old, familiar "truths" (cultural assumptions) about the state of the*

art of the world". But she also emphasizes that "*each single narrative is a situated, contextual expression*" (Ibid. 19). We thus "*become culturally embedded through participation in "common" or "cultural spaces" and acquire social and cultural meanings in communication*", while we "*are continuously surrounded by cultural narratives that influence our interpretations of self and existence*" (Ibid. 101). This indicates the already mentioned duality of human agency being determined by, and simultaneously acting on, social structures of meaning.

Frank is also interested in the social productive power of stories. He focuses his socio-narratological perspective on the work of stories and humans creating the social "*in symbiotic dependency [...] that comprises all human relationships, collectivities, mutual dependencies, and exclusions*" (Frank 2010: 15). Stories, Frank states, "act *in human consciousness*". Although the individual is sometimes not aware of this acting, "*stories and narratives are resources for people, and they conduct people, as a conductor conducts an orchestra*" (Ibid. 14). By arguing that stories can break free of their tellers (Ibid. 23), Frank further describes the symbiotic relations between humans and stories similar to how Hall describes culture; narratives can become social structures of knowledge that people draw and act on in making sense of the world, others and themselves.

Besides being important in the construction of individuals' identities, Frank stresses that stories also create groups, and thus form collective identities. Stories, he states, "*call individuals into groups, and they call on groups to assert common identities*" (Ibid. 60). Similar to individuals, in groups also we tell stories about who 'we' are, and reciprocally we define other groups who we demarcate ourselves from. Hence, narratives produce collectives, which in their inclusion are always also exclusionary.

What then is a narrative? A narrative is always told in one way or another, as it is "*a symbolic representation in language*" (Horsdal 2012: 26). A narrative is a rooted practice expressed in human agency. Frank works with a conception of a narrative as "one thing happens in consequence of another" (Frank 2010: 25). Horsdal elaborates on this concept stating that a "*narrative can be defined as a course of events with a beginning and an end, as a bounded temporal sequence*" that *"unfolds in a time span from its beginning to the end"* (Horsdal 2012: 11).

Time is not solely an important aspect of the duration of narratives, but also on how they orchestrate lives. We make past events meaningful by telling stories about them. In this we interpret history in ways that shape our present and future. As Frank argues, "*stories do not simply report past events. Stories project possible futures, and those*

projections affect what comes to be, although this will rarely be the future projected by the story. Stories do not just have plots. Stories work to emplot *lives: they offer a plot that makes some particular future not only plausible but also compelling"* (Frank 2010: 9f).

In the sequence of a narrative plot, past, present and future are interrelated. Hence, in order to project a compelling future, the past must be integrated in a likewise compelling plot. This emplotting of history, and the capability of stories to break free from their tellers, are important points for this study's understanding of social memory, and for conceptualizing history as a mode of identification with a past, a present and an anticipated future. Stories in this sense let us "*share our experience across time and space*", as they "*can lift us above the perspective of here and now and make a cultural transmission possible, and bring about identification with experiences from other places in other times*" (Horsdal 2012: 26).

Hence, history acts on the future, while stories have the ability to materialize in human practice, as they "*coordinate actions among people who share the expectation that life will unfold according to certain plots*" (Frank 2010: 15). As stories are often embedded in each other, their plots must be understood as intertwined in matrixes of social meanings (Ibid. 26).

In the telling of narratives, Horsdal states, there is an aspect of power that concerns "*the right (and the possibility and capability) to tell*". When conflicting with "*canonical narratives*" – and we could add official narratives – certain voices and "*interpretations can be suppressed*" (Horsdal 2012: 31). Furthermore silence can be enforced as a "*cultural instrument*" that restricts "*narrative rights of some people and, in certain cases, cuts people off from a meaningful integration of experience*" (Ibid. 32). Chapter 5 describes how some voices historically have been restricted in Zanzibar.

In accordance with the above discussion this study understands narratives as being individual expressions that draw on social structures of narrative knowledge. Thus, certain plots and characters make the individual stories meaningful (Ibid. 30f). The understanding of a symbiotic dependency between human agency and social meanings in narratives seem similar to Hall's concept of culture. While the concept of culture focuses on shared meanings in an imagined timeless existence, the concept of narratives emphasizes the interrelation of past present and future.[7] Although socially constructed, stories furthermore

7 The concept of culture does not rule out the past. It solely focuses on historical representations that render consistency of meaning over time. In Chapter 4 we shall see this in the discussion of national culture that is

have the power to make themselves true, an ability that also applies to discourses, and thus relates the two concepts to each other.

Narratives are important for the analysis since they, as social structures of knowledge, can break free from their tellers. In telling stories, people draw on cultural reservoirs of narrative knowledge that for instance guides their plots. Such reservoirs are embedded in culture and in discursive formations. They are contingent to alteration through human agency, while they simultaneously determine peoples' actions. Narratives are closely linked to identity, as they render selves, groups and others, combining fragments of social identities in temporal perspectives. The combination of all these functions makes narratives relevant for the focus on Zanzibari identity in relation to the archipelago's recent past.

1.4.2 Discourses: The interdependency of power and knowledge

Differing from the perspectives on culture and narratives, the concept of discourses presented here focuses exclusively on the relationship of knowledge and power. Although rooted in human practices discourses are not themselves practices, which also differentiates them from the concepts of culture and narratives. To analyze discourses we must analyze the modes of their rootedness in practices, which corresponds to the practice theoretical focus discussed above. As we shall see, there is an interdependency between human agency and the discursive structures of knowledge that are governing the very practices that (re)produce them.

Discourses can be defined as social and historical structures that govern the relationship between power and knowledge in the world. As Hall argues, they determine not only what can be said at a certain place in a certain moment – what can be claimed as truth – they also define how subjects may possibly perceive their surrounding worlds, themselves and others (Hall 1997: 41ff). Hall writes that a discourse is "*a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment*" (Ibid. 44).[8] A discourse is historically contingent, as it is produced by what formerly has been said about a specific topic. Furthermore a discourse "*defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about.*" As it also

imagined as existing in what Benedict Anderson calls "*homogeneous, empty time*" (Anderson 2006: 26; cf. section 4.3.3).

8 Hall here quotes his own article "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" (1992).

governs human thoughts and conduct, there is nothing meaningful outside discourse (Ibid.).

Thus, objects of our knowledge – e.g. what we know about the physical world, human practices, subjectivity, bodies, phenomena, etc. – are objects of discourse, and as such linked to power. Hall defines the power here at play as a socially constructed and re-constructed productive force that shapes the perceivable world and subjectivity itself. It is not obtainable by a person or collective, neither is it a force enacted downwards in a hierarchical structure (Ibid. 41ff). The knowledge of the discourse, Hall writes, "*not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to* make itself true." Because, all "*knowledge, once applied in the real world, has real effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true'*". This is what Hall terms the "effectiveness *of* ***power/knowledge***" (Ibid. 49, bold in original). Hence, the discourse is making itself true through the governing of human practices, and is therefore not detachable from the physical world that these practices act on.

In the process of making itself true a discourse enacts power that excludes other perspectives. Power is here, however, not standardized, but a multiplicity of contradictory and intertwined forces of knowledge production. It is so, because discourse must be thought in plural, as discourses that in formations govern different perspectives on any object of knowledge. Discursive formations, Hall states, knit discourses together that refer to the same object and render knowledge through the same strategies (Ibid. 44).

Furthermore, in discourses, and in discursive formations, struggles about meaning take place. This is obvious when looking at discourse analysis, revealing how struggles about meaning often produce changes of certain knowledge over time. When knowledge changes this must happen through the influence of other forms of power/knowledge. 'Truth' then becomes a struggle on the effectiveness of discursive knowledge production. When one discursive formation dominates this struggle, and other perspectives are so deprived of truth that they become unthinkable, the object of this formation becomes objectified as truth. Hall describes this as regimes of truth (Ibid. 49).

Now, the object of a discourse can theoretically be defined on a simple everyday level – as for instance the discourse of preparing food – or on an abstract level, as complex structures of power/knowledge. What a discourse analyst focuses on is primarily influenced by the interest of analysis. Focusing on an everyday level of discourse might reflect interest in the references people make to discourses in interaction, while a focus on an abstract level could be on the development of discursive formations, and thus the

alteration of certain knowledge over time.[9] This study's analytical focus will be on everyday utilizations of discourses, though without excluding references to abstract discourses.

Before presenting the informants and discussing the study's methodology, the following section reflects on truth and knowledge production.

1.5 Reflections on truth

In its social constructivist perspectives this study operates with structures of social knowledge that order perceptions of the world, govern human practices, and attempt to fix the flow of meaning. These structures thus render 'truth' different from the notion of a duality between human cognition and an outside world of objects perceivable in terms of objectivity. Yet, in shaping reality, social structures of knowledge enact material influences on human lives. Furthermore they are historically constructed and often considerably resistant to alteration.

This section underlines the following points: First, reality might be theoretically questioned, but it is still *real* to those persons living (in) it, e.g. for the informants, but also for myself. Secondly, social structures of knowledge are able to fix meaning in such a degree that they – as in a regime of truth – potentially become true, at least temporarily. Besides, social structures of meaning are not contingent to humans' interaction alone, but also to their environments. This point is crucial to an understanding of a moderate social constructivist perspective.

1.5.1 The informants' realities

In engaging in the first point we return to the distinction between different interpretational orders, described by Rubow. What helps to frame this argument is the distinction between my own theoretical interpretation of a conceptualized reality, truth, and identities, and the informants' conception of their realities, truths, and identities. In extensively representing objectified meanings, the latter is substantially different from the former.

How the informants primarily employ essentialist understandings of meaning, truth,

9 For an overview of different discourse analytical perspectives see Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 30f.

and identities, can be exemplified by two of the informants', Kigoma's and Naasir's, statements about identity. Kigoma states that he can tell who is Zanzibari by "*their look*", with which he means physical characteristics (Kigoma 2011: 42:38). Similar to this Naasir tells that his grandfather came from Oman: "*he married Shirazi woman […] so my father is mixture […] half is Arabic and half is Swahili, because his color is brown dark*" (Naasir 2011: 3:55). Both statements represent essentialized understandings of identifications that draw on racial logics, as will be described in section 4.3.2.

In a theoretical order of interpretation focusing on representations this can be analyzed as modes of stereotyping. Hall argues that stereotyping "*reduces people to a few, simple, essential characteristics, which are represented as fixed by Nature*" (Hall 1997: 257). It is this reduction of a complex reality, which Hall is critical of, as he analyzes derogatory racial stereotypes. We shall return to Hall's notion of the negative characteristics of ethnic and racial stereotypes in Chapter 4. For now, we focus on the argument that reduction of meaning seems necessary for humans in order to make sense of the complex realities they inhabit.

Corresponding to the exclusionary character of this qualitative study, also the informants' orders of interpretation are exclusionary, although they mostly lack reflections about this fact. Hence, their perspectives employ notions of objective truth, e.g. in regards to representations of racial, ethnic, national and religious identities, which are the objects of analysis in this study's orders of interpretation.

1.5.2 The study's perspective on social constructivism

As for the second point made here, it is important to remember that meanings of things, phenomena, subjects, and reality may be socially constructed, arbitrary, and alterable through human agency, but these meanings are therefore not less meaningful and true to the people in question. The reality we encounter and inhabit is real to us, and acting upon this reality has consequences for ourselves and others. This is so, because the reality we perceive is contingent to social structures of meaning, which have developed throughout the history of human interaction. Moreover, as Horsdal states, "*our cognitive understanding is based on bodily interaction with the environment*", and "*our imagination is also based on bodily interactions*" (Horsdal 2012: 24). Understanding environment as both a social and physical sphere – with certain physical regularities – the fluidity of meanings seems to have boundaries in both the social and the material world we

inhabit.

In regard to the development of social structures of knowledge in Zanzibar, Roman Loimeier analyzes how conceptions of time – before the introduction of clock time by the British colonial forces – were contingent on the tide, the cycle of the moon and the change of seasons, for example the rain seasons and monsoon winds. These traditional conceptions of time structured, and still structure, many aspects of life on the islands, such as agricultural practices, fishing and trade. Most of these practices are still determined today by physical factors (Loimeier 2012: 43ff). In Paje, for instance, the seaweed cropping and the sailing out of fishing boats are regulated by the alternated tide. Knowing the tide – and the rain seasons – is thus crucial in an agricultural community like Paje, and a society like Zanzibar. This example supports the argument made here that meaning is historically constructed not isolated from, but in relation to the material world that humans inhabit.

The focus on the historical and environmental contingency of meaning production thus implies at least two reasons that make it hard to argue for a completely relativist perspective on social constructivism: First, meaning is contingent to modes of construction that are as old as human consciousness, and therefore certain knowledge that is imbedded in social structures can be extremely resistant to sudden change. And second, meaning cannot be understood as completely arbitrary, as it is formed in relation to a physical world that has certain demands towards human life.

Turning to the fieldwork, the following chapter presents the informants, while Chapter 3 subsequently presents the methodology of this study.

2. Empirical data

This study is based on interviews with eight male Zanzibari informants, conducted in autumn/winter 2011. Three informants were interviewed again in spring 2012, immediately after demonstrators against the union of Tanzania clashed with police forces in Stone Town on May 27.[10] In addition to interviews, I made field notes on observations, and participated in various conversations during my stays in Zanzibar.[11] All interviews were conducted in English language and can be found as audio files in appendix 7.

Their perspectives on being and feeling Zanzibari was the most important factor for my selection of informants. Besides this feeling of belonging the selection was primarily based on accessibility, i.e. who I could possibly get access to interview. The question of accessibility limits the group of potential informants in regard to factors such as education, gender, social and economical status. I understand these factors simultaneously as social and economic capital, *and* as gatekeepers restraining access to the less resourceful Zanzibaris, including women. Compared to a Zanzibari average the informants are all relatively resourceful, both socially and economically. When seeing this in relation to the question of accessibility, it becomes clear that this study is solely able to investigate narratives of relatively resourceful individuals, as access to others is denied.[12] But their social and economic capital might also enhance the informants willingness and ability to formulate accounts on the past towards an English speaking foreigner.

This chapter presents the eight informants in regard to their social and economic status and describes my approach of encountering informants.

10 Chapter 5 elaborates on the riots.

11 For instance, I interviewed Wera and Jade, two non-Zanzibari women living in Zanzibar. Wera is a Canadian anthropologist working in the Zanzibari educational sector for a Canadian development agency. She told me much about Zanzibar's education system. Jade is Australian and married to one of my informants, Marzuku, with whom she manages their two restaurants. She told me about her experiences of how women are excluded from parts of societal life in Zanzibar.

12 Appendix 2 describes the question of accessibility in greater detail, including a perspective on what socio-economic segment of society my informants belong to. Thereby their status is related to a broader societal perspective on socio-economic structures in Zanzibar, which are realized as gatekeepers limiting my access to less resourceful individuals.

2.1 Presenting the informants

I sought to interview informants of different age groups, as I was interested in whether people with different personal experiences of (post-)revolutionary times, and the various developments that altered Zanzibari society, related their accounts to comparable narratives and discourses. Age was, however, not a factor that excluded any potential informants from participating.

At the time of the interviews in 2011 the eight informants were between 25 and 65 years old. Born in 1946 only one of the informants is a time-witness of Zanzibar's independence in 1963 and the revolution in 1964. All other accounts rely on stories the informants heard, either in school, in the Mosque or among their families and friends. As far as this study is concerned, this means that the analytical work relies primarily on accounts detached from actual experience of independence and revolution. However, as these accounts draw on social structures of narratives and discourses of pre- and post-revolutionary times, they are not less meaningful and important for the purpose of this study.

The informants are: Jaali (age 25), Naasir (age 25), Rubanza (age 26), Jamal (age 31), Kigoma (age 36), Marzuku (about age 46), Kheri (age 47) and Adili (age 65). Jaali, Rubanza and Kigoma were interviewed both in 2011 and 2012. In order to maintain anonymity all names have been changed.

The following presents the informants individually according to their place of birth, education,[13] occupation, and other social factors relevant for their participation in this study. These presentations include brief comments on their stated perspective on being Zanzibari and their stance towards the union of Tanzania, as these are two major topics in all the interviews, which shall be elaborate in the analysis in chapter 6.

Jaali is 25 years old and born in Paje. He completed senior secondary education, and has since then worked as a receptionist and affiliated tour guide in several hotels in Paje. Here he lives in his own house with his wife. Jaali got married in the months between the first and second interview. He considers himself a believing Muslim, which he sees as the most important characteristic of being Zanzibari. He tells that people say the union causes problems, but he personally knows little about the nature of these problems.

Naasir, age 25, was born in Stone Town, where he has completed secondary education.

13 The present education system in Zanzibar comprises a pre-primary (3 years), a primary (7 years), a lower secondary (3 years), a senior secondary (2 years), and an advanced level (2 years). Completing the advanced level is a prerequisite for entering higher education. This has been the basic structure of the post-revolutionary education system, although the duration of the different levels have been altered slightly over the years (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 2012).

He works as a hotel receptionist in Paje, is unmarried and has no children. He claims Arab descent, stating that his one grandfather – from his mother's side – is from Yemen, while the other – from his father's side – is from Oman. He differentiates these Arabic roots from 'being Shirazi', which to him means being 'indigenous', non-educated and non-Arabic.[14] Naasir is a believing Muslim. For him being Zanzibari means being Shirazi, Omani, or a mixture of both, like himself. He understands Zanzibar as a national entity different from the mainland. Hence, he is critical of the union, from which he wants Zanzibar to separate.

Rubanza is 26 years old and is originally from Wete, Pemba. He completed advanced secondary education with, what he calls, good results. Once he is able to support himself, he wishes to study Swahili and educational studies at university level. He has taught Swahili to American expatriates in Stone Town, and now teaches Swahili at an international school. Rubanza is unmarried and has no children. He is a believing Muslim, and links being Zanzibari to a specific culture and to Islam, differentiating both from tourists and mainlanders. He is critical of the union, which he describes as having caused many problems in Zanzibar.

Jamal, age 31, was born in Dar Es Salaam, where his parents used to work. He has completed secondary education, now working as a tour guide. When he was seven he came to Kidichi, where he now lives with his wife and daughter. Although he tells that his grandparents were mainlanders who came to Zanzibar before the revolution, he feels completely Zanzibari. He links this feeling to being Muslim, which differentiates him and the rest of the islands' population from the mainland. He is critical of the structure of the union, describing an unequal distribution of jurisdictions and resources between Zanzibar and the mainland.

Kigoma is 36 years old and originally from Stone Town. He has lived in Scotland for seven years, where he studied carpentry. He used to work as a carpenter in Paje, but is now the manager of a nearby hotel. He was married to, and is now separated from, a Scottish woman, with whom he has a daughter. He lives in their mutually owned house in Paje. Kigoma is a Rastafarian. He does not believe in Islam, although he states he is a non-believing Muslim, as he was born a Muslim by Muslim parents. Accordingly he does not connect Islamic faith to Zanzibari identity. Instead being Zanzibari is to him a distinct essential category that he partly connects to biological features. As already mentioned, he states he can tell who is Zanzibari by appearance, which differentiate them from mainlanders, as well as from anybody else. Like Jamal, he is critical of what he describes as

14 Chapter 5 elaborates on the notion of 'being Shirazi'.

an unequal partnership in the union between Zanzibar and mainland.

Marzuku is about 46 years old and born on Pemba. He began his primary education in Pemba, but later moved to Stone Town, where he finished secondary education. After finishing school, he moved to Tanga on the mainland for three years, where he worked in his families' trading business. He later married an Australian, lived in Australia and returned to Stone Town in 2003. Here he and his wife opened two restaurants which they manage together. They have no children. Marzuku states that the authorities consider him to belong to the Arab clan of Al-Aufi, although he feels Zanzibari. To him being Zanzibari is a feeling of belonging together, despite one's race. But, he states the government after 1964 has hurt this feeling by dividing people along racial lines, which it will still take some time to overcome. He is very critical of the government and the union, from which he wants Zanzibar to separate.

Kheri is 47 years old and born in Paje. He lives in Stone Town with his family, where he manages their cloth and textile shop. He is a believing Muslim and connects being Zanzibari to following the rules of religion and the revolutionary government. The former is key according to him to Zanzibari culture, which he sees as being under siege from cultural influences of tourism. Kheri renders Zanzibari culture as being inclusive of different cloths, and foods of mainly Arab and Indian influence. He considers himself being of Indian descent, a good Muslim – as a Hajj he has journeyed to Mecca – and thus a good Zanzibari. Although he states his parents were even more Zanzibari, as the islands' culture is today in a process of decay influenced by tourist culture. While he is critical of what he calls Western influence, he is not critical of the union, which he describes as keeping Zanzibar safe.

The last of the informants, Adili, is 65 years old, and was born outside Zanzibar City. He completed his education during the British colonial period. After the revolution he worked 35 years for the revolutionary government. He resigned his job when he, as a supporter of the opposition party, felt harassed during his work. Today he is a taxi driver in Stone Town, where he lives with his wife and children. He is a believing Muslim and understands Islamic faith as the key to being Zanzibari. By equaling Zanzibari and Muslim culture he excludes people of other religions – including Christian mainlanders – from being Zanzibari. He wants Zanzibar to be detached from the union.

All the informants are men whose occupation is somehow related to the tourist sector. They are all used to interacting with English speaking foreigners, and must be seen as

having experiences of articulating their knowledge about (certain aspects of) the islands in English. Moreover, two of the informants (Kigoma and Marzuku) have lived abroad in English speaking countries. This has potentially enhanced their experience of telling about themselves and their Zanzibari origins, as well as increased their English proficiency. All this means that the informants' narratives are presumably comparable in many aspects; they express the perspectives of men, who have a certain social and economic capital in Zanzibari society (cf. appendix 2).

However, by far not all the informants' narratives are mutually supportive. As we shall see in Chapter 6 the narrative traces found in the interviews thus correspond to what Roman Loimeier calls contested memories in Zanzibar (cf. section 4.4.2); some narratives support official interpretations of the past while others challenge them in various ways. Furthermore, there seems to be a variation between those informants originally from Unguja and those originally from Pemba; Rubanza and Marzuku, who are both originally from Pemba, are two of the informants most critical of the revolutionary government and the union of Tanzania. As we shall see in Chapter 5 there is a history of political and spatial divide between Unguja and Pemba.

The following section describes the method I employed to approach the informants.

2.2 Encountering the informants: Snowball method

In finding informants I employed a "*snowball method*" (Horsdal 2012: 77). This means I let my informants direct me to further persons, who they thought would be interesting for me to talk to. The following briefly comments on this method, while appendix 3 describes and illustrates how it was employed.

As Horsdal states, the snowball method is generally used to gain access to relatively closed communities, where people are unwilling to talk to strangers. Here one informant's recommendation of another ensures the potential participants of the interviewer's "*integrity and respect*" (Ibid.). This method implies that I by gaining access to one person of a 'Zanzibari community' would most probably be led to further informants. Figuratively speaking, the ideal of the snowball method is to initiate a chain reaction.

Besides social and material gatekeepers (cf. appendix 2) I did not experience Zanzibar as a substantially closed community. Though, still I encountered difficulties in getting in contact with some people even when other informants referred me to them. For instance a

tour guide in Stone Town did not want to talk to me after he found out that I was not particularly interested in participating in one of his tours. Here our respective expectations of meeting each other seemed discrepant. Most other people were willing to talk to me. The snowball method thus primarily served as a tool to find informants who knew sufficient English and were interesting to interview. Accordingly, in the fieldwork not one person originated a chain reaction. Instead several persons referred me to people they thought interesting to the study. These references from one informant to another additionally support the relative social and economic homogeneity of the informants.

3. Methodology

3.1 Presentation of methods

This section introduces the interview methods employed, including their investigational focus and modes of meaning production. My choice of interviews as a method is inspired by psychologists Svend Brinkmann & Steinar Kvale. In *InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing* (2009) they describe different perspectives on what they call the craft of interviewing, making practical suggestions about preparing, designing and conducting interviews, which inspired me to conduct semi-structured qualitative interviews. Although Marianne Horsdal employs a different interview type, her reflections on the art of conducting interviews – including ethical considerations – supplement Brinkmann & Kvale's perspectives in developing the method of this study.

Qualitative interviews are an adequate method for this study, investigating contested memories through a focus on oral practices. The focus could have been widened to include rituals of remembering, which as a method would have included observations of participants and symbolic representations. However, the focus on narrative interpretations of history seems in greater concordance with a focus on oral practices than on ritual practices (including its oral and other practices). Besides, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the rituals of remembering – such as the Liberation Day on January 12. – are primarily connoted to the revolutionary government's official narratives of the past. Although, a focus on such rituals of remembering would probably give critical insight into the government's public performance of its modes of interpretation, and thus its historical master narratives, the limited scope of this thesis does not allow for such broadening of its perspective. Therefore interviews are the preferred method of this study.

As Horsdal states, an interview is "*an interpersonal interaction that takes place in a cultural space between the interviewer and the interviewee*" (Horsdal 2012: 75). As such it is a cultural practice that besides oral expressions includes other aspects of interaction, mimics, gestures, etc. Svend Brinkmann & Steinar Kvale elaborate that a "*research interview is based on the conversations of daily life and is a professional conversation; it is an inter-view, where knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between the interviewer and the interviewee*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 2).[15] Like both Horsdal and

15 Arthur W. Frank makes a similar point, stressing the importance of realizing the informants as participants instead of research subjects: "*Participants* do things. *Specifically, they are not data for investigators; instead they co-construct*

Brinkmann & Kvale, and in accordance with this study's perspective on knowledge production (cf. section 1.3), the interviewer and interviewee are here understood as co-producers of meaning in the interview situation. As we shall see, both have their own pre-understandings of the interview situation, and thus perform different discursive positionings.

This chapter reflects on the choice of interview type, the interview design, the how of conducting interviews and the mutual positionings that are anchored in the interviewer's and interviewee's respective pre-understandings. In conclusion the chapter comments critically on my own merits as an interviewer.

3.2 Introducing and thematizing qualitative interviews

What Brinkmann and Kvale call a qualitative research interview is a specialized conversation, which they describe as having a "*structure and a purpose*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 3); according to his/her investigational focus the interviewer selected its topics in advance, asked the informant to participate and thus somewhat defines the scope of conversation. As we shall see, this planning of the interview renders the interviewer's expectations, which will not always concur with the interviewee's expectations.

When thematizing the interview Brinkmann & Kvale suggest the interviewer consider the "*why, what and how*" of interviewing, that is "*clarifying the purpose of the study [...] obtaining preknowledge of the subject matter to be investigated*" and "*becoming familiar with different techniques of interviewing and analyzing, and deciding which to apply*" (Ibid. 105).

While the introduction accounted for the purpose of this study, its preknowledge of the field of investigation will be introduced in the historical account in Chapter 5. However, learning about the field of study in advance also fosters pre-understandings about the topics of investigation.[16] In regard to the how of interviewing Kvale & Brinkmann inspired me to conduct what they call "*semi-structured life world interview[s]*" which have "*the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee in order to interpret*

whit investigators what count as data" (Frank 2010: 98).

16 The use of "*pre-understanding*" in this study is inspired by Horsdal, who writes that we rest our interpretations on "*the context of our own experiences*" (Horsdal 2012: 86). The term is preferred to Brinkmann & Kvale's term "*preknowledge*", which seems to have a hint of positivism, although they state "*we use the term* knowledge *in a comprehensive sense, covering both everyday knowing an systematically tested knowledge*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 2).

the meaning of the described phenomena" (Ibid. 3). This type of interview urges the informant to tell stories, while simultaneously allowing the interviewer to guide the interview in specific directions. Thus, it serves this study as a tool to make narrative accounts on Zanzibari history and identities unfold. The following section will introduce the techniques of semi-structured qualitative interviews, encouraging the articulation of narratives.[17]

3.3 Semi-structured qualitative interviews

In a semi-structured qualitative interview the interviewer asks topic relevant, but relatively open, questions to give interpretative space to the interviewee's account. The interviewer can then ask more specific questions to follow up on the interviewee's account. In the semi-structured interview there will thus be "*a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as some suggested questions*", but in the course of the interview "*there is openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up the specific answers given and the stories told by the subjects*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 124).

The semi-structured interview gives space for a multitude of accounts, but it does also limit the unfolding of the accounts, as it guides them in specific directions. Asking questions in semi-structured interviews is thus a balancing act between giving space and guiding the answers.

In this the semi-structured interview is different from the life-story interview that Horsdal describes. The latter is based on solely one question: "*Please, tell me about your life from the beginning until we are sitting here today*" (Hordal 2012: 76). The narrative that is given in answer to this question is not limited by anything else than the interviewee's willingness to tell.

This study's approach is different than Horsdal's. As it investigates contested memories in Zanzibar, it is less interested in life stories – which could unfold with little reference to the revolution – than in narratives interpreting the islands' recent past. The study focuses on traces of narratives on revolution that in social structures of meaning have detached themselves from their tellers. And, it is interested in how these narrative fragments draw on discourses about Zanzibari identities.

Thus, the semi-structured interview is an adequate method for this investigation, as it

17 I use 'semi-structured qualitative interviews' synonymous to 'semi-structured life world interviews'. I prefer the term 'qualitative' to 'life world', as it accentuates the character of the method.

gives room for the interviewees' accounts, while it simultaneously enables me to guide them in specific directions relevant to the study. The following section elaborates on important aspects of the interview method to keep in mind while planning and conducting interviews.

3.4 Planning and conducting interviews

In planning semi-structured interviews, Brinkmann & Kvale suggest the interviewer to script the interview through an interview guide. While preparing the interview guide it is useful for the interviewer to differentiate between thematic questions and interview questions. The latter should be easily comprehensible and dynamic, encouraging the interviewee to talk about his/her experiences (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 132f).

Inspired by this advice I had designed an interview guide before conducting the first interview. Inevitably the design of this guide was influenced by my pre-understanings, which in turn were inspired by my readings about Zanzibar. These pre-understandings were, however, altered as I learned more through my first interviews about narratives and discourses flourishing in Zanzibar. Thus in a dialogical process I continuously reflected on the questions I asked and the answers I got. Accordingly the interview guide was adapted throughout the course of the study.[18]

I sought to open the interviews with descriptive 'what' and 'how' questions. As suggested by Brinkmann & Kvale, these questions invite for individual interpretations (Ibid.). However, as I had a specific agenda, I also had to guide the unfolding of my informants' accounts through more specific follow up questions.

While conducting the interviews it was extremely important to be aware of my own role in the meaning construction, as my pre-understandings influence both the empirical material of the interviews, and the analysis. It is therefore especially important to be as open and reflective as possible. Throughout the investigation I sought a position equally reflective of myself and my object of study. In this I was attempting to be deliberately naive, exhibiting "*openness to new and unexpected phenomena*" (Ibid. 30). By referring to a previous interviewee's statement, I could sometimes state suggesting questions, while still limiting the influence of my own pre-understanding. For instance when posing this question to Jaali "*I heard that some people were saying that all Zanzibarians were family. Is that so?*" (Jaali 2011: 13:38). This made me able to confront my informants with

18 See appendix 4 for the various versions of the interview guide.

narrative traces that were not direct products of my pre-understandings; the answers to such questions could provoke reflections, and by the informant's dismissal or affirmation illustrate the contestation of memories.

As Brinkmann & Kvale state, "*[d]ifferent interviewers, using the same interview guide may produce different statements on the same themes*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 30f). This is so because different interviewers have individual knowledge about, and sensitivity towards, the theme of the interview (Ibid.). As the interviewer's sensitivity is also contingent on his/her pre-understandings, it is pivotal for him/her to reflect his/her position in the interview. Horsdal gives an inspirational guideline for the interviewers' positioning in the interview situation. She states:

> "*[W]e are, or should aim to be, confidence-inspiring, attentive, and responsive co-constructors of meaning, who, being very aware of our ethical obligations, are diligent in our efforts to minimize the possibility of any manipulation or distorting appropriation of the experiences of the other*" (Horsdal 2012: 76).

Linking the manipulative character of our pre-understandings to ethical considerations, Horsdal addresses the power relations between interviewer and interviewee. Her urge to be confidence-inspiring can be reflected on Brinkmann & Kvale's statement that the interview situation produces an asymmetric power relation between interviewer and interviewee, as it is the former who defines the scope of the interview (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 3). As we shall see in the following section, the interviewees can, however, challenge the positions offered in this power relation.

Brinkmann & Kvale suggest winning the interviewee's confidence by briefing him/her about the study and the interview he/she participates in (Ibid. 128). This too is a balancing act, as too much information about the study might inspire the interviewee's pre-understandings to reproduce the interviewer's account. Prior to the interviews I generally told my interviewees that I was interested in Zanzibari history.

While I sought to be confidence inspiring, I also tried to make the physical setting familiar to the informants. Although I often suggested a place, I always let the informants decide where to perform the interview. Several interviews were conducted outside, some in cafés and one in a taxi. The interviews in the settings chosen by the informants were sometimes exposed to considerable disturbances; during the interview with Marzuku we moved from one café to another, as this was convenient for his daily routine, while the

interview with Adili was interrupted by a ride with two costumers. Despite these disturbances, I believe that it was important to let the informants chose the settings.[19] The following section elaborates on the setting's influence on the mutual positioning between the interviewer and interviewee.

3.5 Positionings in the interview situations

The interviewer and interviewee might have very different expectations and pre-understandings towards the interview situation, the topics of the interview and each other. This may result in mutual positionings that are not always concordant.[20] The setting, the interviewer's briefing as well as the oral practice and physical appearance of both interviewer and interviewee are all crucial factors for this positioning. Positionings are not stable throughout an interview, they are an ongoing negotiation of the interviewer's and interviewee's respective standpoints. As Cecilie Rubow remarks, both interviewer and interviewee can in this negotiation modify their "footing" (Rubow 2003: 240), which is an alteration of their positions.

I experienced that several of the informants positioned me in relation to a prevalent tourist discourse. Similar to many tourist guidebooks, most Zanzibaris I spoke to have a tendency to describe their islands as a 'hakuna matata' – Swahili for having no problems – place, where people have nothing to worry about. Their pre-understanding of me as a tourist was influenced by my physical appearance; my white skin color and blond hair made them expect that I wanted to hear tourist-versions of stories about life in Zanzibar. On the one hand this accentuates an openness towards foreigners, resonating a well-known narrative of Zanzibar as a peaceful place to be, were tourists are welcome. On the other hand this positioning reflects a closure, foreclosing articulations of controversial narratives. Being positioned as a tourist does not invite for stories of contested memories and struggles about identity constructions.

In the interviews I therefore sought to challenge the positioning within a hakuna matata tourist discourse. By asking additional critical questions scrutinizing the given answers, I

19 Besides the point of a familiar setting being confidence inspiring, a predetermined setting could have precluded some interviews. Adili would for instance not have accepted any alternative place for the interview.

20 The here presented understanding of the term positioning is inspired by philosophers and psychologists Rom Harré & Luk van Langenhove, who write: "*Positioning is a discursive practice. […] [W]ithin a conversation each of the participants always positions the others while simultaneously positioning him or herself. Whenever somebody positions him/herself, this discursive act always implies a positioning of the one to whom it is addressed. And similarly, when somebody positions somebody else, that always implies a positioning of the person him/herself*" (Harré & van Langenhove 1998: 22).

made the informants realize that I too knew about struggles in Zanzibar. This strategy often resulted in my interviewee's modifying their footing, accepting my positioning as a critical student, which gave room for more complicated stories on the past than those suggested by tourist discourses.

The most apparent example of such mutual positioning was during my interview with Adili. He drove me to the spice plantations the day before the interview. For his convenience the interview was held in his taxi. This caused several interruptions. He was still driving people, and talking to people passing the taxi. Especially at the beginning he seemed very distracted by the happenings around the taxi, not taking much notice of me. Sometimes he was yawning, and seemed very disinterested in continuing the interview. All this contributed to him challenging my positioning as an interviewer.

When as an opening question I asked Adili to describe the current political atmosphere in Zanzibar, he immediately started talking to a person passing outside. As he returned to me, he asked whether I wanted him to answer in Swahili or English (Adili 2011a: 0:10). In this he not only questioned my interviewer-position, but also positioned me as an outsider, who does not understand (sufficient) Swahili. However, in the course of the interview I tried to challenge this position. When Adili finally did answer my question, he seemed to draw on a tourist discourse telling me about all the virtues of Zanzibaris – who he describes as "*polite*", "*honest*", "*kind*", "*cooperative*" and "*welcom[ing]*" – and their islands (Ibid. 1:44). As I did not immediately accept these answers, and kept asking him about his own experiences, he began to talk about drug addicts in the streets of Stone Town (Ibid. 6:40). When Adili finally stated that there is "*different kind of Zanzibar, especially nowadays*" (Ibid. 7:30), he seemed to begin accepting my positioning of being a student interested in social struggles. Later he even altered his footing and revised the picture of a hakuna mata island, telling me more about the hardships of the people, economic effects on daily life, and political struggles. In this he accepted my position as a student, while positioning himself as an informant supporting my investigations.

While I attempted to position myself as a student of Zanzibari history, I sought to position the informants as experts on their own perspectives on this history.[21] When an informant stated he knew nothing about history, I explained that I was interested in his own perspective only. Meanwhile, I sought to be confidence inspiring by encouraging code-shifts to Swahili whenever communication problems in English occurred. Even with my little knowledge of Swahili I was often able to decode the meaning of what had been said.

21 I sought to position them as participants. In Arthur W. Frank's words, a "participant is the expert *from whom the researcher hopes to learn*" (Frank 2010: 99).

Although limited, my Swahili proficiency thus helped me position myself as a student being serious about his study, while supporting a position of not being as much an outsider as my physical appearance suggested.

The measures described here of my positioning in the interviews helped me to encourage the informants to reflect on controversial narratives of the past. In some cases, though, there was little need for encouragement; Kigoma and Marzuku, for instance, were eager to position themselves in opposition to the government and their historical narratives. I assume that their willingness to articulate their perspectives is to a considerable degree influenced by their experiences of living abroad (cf. section 2.1).

In continuation of these reflections on the interview situation, I will now comment on my own merits as an interviewer.

3.6 Critical comments on the quality of the interviews

As Brinkmann & Kvale state "*the skills of interviewing are learned by practicing interviewing*". Therefore the interview is a craft that "*rests on the practical skills and the personal judgments of the interviewer*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 17). Hence, as an interviewer I am my "*own research tool*" (Ibid. 134). I will here reflect critically on my quality as an interviewer, commenting on my own interviewing experience.

I had little experience with qualitative interviewing before engaging in this study.[22] Thus, I still consider myself an apprentice when it comes to the craft of interviewing. This is partially detectable in the quality of the interviews.

For instance, a prerequisite for asking easily comprehensible and dynamic questions is to keep them simple (Ibid.). Several times I, however, accidentally asked double questions. When talking to Jaali about mainlanders, I asked: "*How would you describe them? So when they are from mainland, then they are not Zanzibaris, or?* (Jaali 2011: 17:23). Sometimes I also accidentally proposed an answer in the question itself, as when I asked Rubanza "*so you are what, you are Zanzibarian?*" (Rubanza 2011: 4:08). Moreover, I did not always live up to "*the main role of the narrative interviewer*", which according to Brinkmann & Kvale "*is to remain a listener, abstaining from interruptions*" (Brikmann &

22 Between 2006 and 2009 I participated in three group projects at Roskilde University that were based on qualitative interviewing. I was, however, solely one interviewer among groups of two to six students. This limits the actual interviews I had conducted, or participated in as a second interviewer, to about eight to ten. Furthermore, the interviews for the last of these three projects were conducted in April 2009, about two and a half years prior to the first interviews of the present study.

Kvale 2009: 155). Especially in the first interview with Kigoma (2011) I did not show enough sensitivity, and interrupted too frequently.

Although still being an apprentice in the craft of interviewing, I did encourage my interviewees to share their experiences with me. Despite my little experience, my interviews thus offer multiple interesting – and sometimes contradicting – perspectives on the field of study.

*

With the here developed *design* of the study in mind – including theoretical reflections on the knowledge production of the analysis and methodological considerations about the production of the empirical data – Part Two will now turn to present the *frame* of the study.

Part Two: Frame

This part contextualizes the study's answers to the research question and working questions, presenting what Svend Brinkmann & Steinar Kvale have termed the study's preknowledge in its systematically tested form (cf. section 3.3). Hence, the focus of this part is to develop a *frame* for the analysis of contemporary narratives on Zanzibari history and identity. This frame comprises theoretical and historical perspectives, presenting the study's theoretical understanding of the identity parameters it investigates, and its historical perspective on the development of identity categories in Zanzibar. The theoretical conceptualization of identities make possible the analysis' enactment of third and following orders of interpretation, according to Cecilie Rubow's understanding (cf. section 1.2). Meanwhile, the historical account interprets interpretations of third and following orders, presented in a number of academic sources. This means that the frame here presented is based on systematically tested knowledge.

Chapter 4 elaborates the social constructivist understanding of identity (cf. section 1.3), including the concepts' applicability, and presents theoretical perspectives on the categories of ethnic, racial, religious and national identities. Furthermore, the chapter describes perspectives on collective memory and history, both being central topics of this study. Chapter 5 is a historical account on Zanzibari history, focusing in particular on historical constructions of various identities.

4. Theory

4.1 Presentation of theories

This chapter's presentation of identity and identification is based on Stuart Hall, who in *Questions of Cultural Identity* (1996a) conceptualizes both as indistinguishable. The chapter exposes Hall's conceptualization to historian and sociologist Frederick Cooper & Rogers Brubaker's critique of the concept of identity. In "Beyond 'Identity'" (2000) the two authors split up the concept of identity in a series of sub-concepts to avoid reifications of essentialized perspectives, and instead advance constructivist understandings of identity. Reflecting this critique the chapter discusses the question of why identity. Drawing on Hall it argues that identity is not only applicable, but crucial for the analysis of this study.

The concept of identity serves as an overall theoretical foundation for the sub-categories of ethnic, racial, national and religious identities. The conceptualization of these concepts draws on various perspectives, which are all in concordance with the presented constructivist understanding of identity, and with the study's perspective on knowledge production (cf. section 1.3). This means that they present ways to understand identity categories as suspended between human agency and social structures of knowledge.

The chapter's conceptualization of ethnicity is based on social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen's article "The Cultural Contexts of Ethnic Differences" (1991). Here he conceptualizes ethnicity as a mode of communicating cultural distinctiveness described as fixated in practices and symbols, which are tied to social structures of knowledge. To conceptualize race the chapter draws on Stuart Hall's video-lecture *Race, the Floating Signifier* (1996b), in which he describes the human body as a text encoded with meaning that denotes race. The presentation of national identity is introduced with reference to Thomas Hylland Eriksen, who in "Nationalism, Mauritian Style: Cultural Unity and Ethnic Diversity" (1994) argues that nationalism is a supra-ethnic ideology. The supra-ethnic nation is then conceptualized drawing on researcher in international studies Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition* (2006).[23] Here he describes the nation as an imagined community contingent on a national narrative rendering sameness across space and time. National identity is here understood as the individual's identification with this community. This definition is broadened with reference to post-colonial theoretician Homie K. Bhabha,

23 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* was originally published in 1983. The revised edition from 2006 includes new material.

who in "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" (1990) argues how nations are always contingent on multiple, and sometimes antagonistic, narratives. Finally, the study's understanding of religious identity as a specific mode of ethnic identification is presented with reference to Hent de Vries' *Religion: Beyond a Concept* (2008).

The concluding section's understanding of memory and history is inspired by the constructivist perspectives brought forward by sociologist Paul Connerton and egyptologist Jan Assmann. In *How Societies Remember* (1989) Connerton develops a theory of non-inscribed collective memory anchored in everyday practices and institutionalized in rituals, while Assmann in *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis – Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (1992) focuses on inscribed forms of collective memory, including institutionalized cultural memory. The focus of this thesis on memory and history is situated between these perspectives. In conclusion the chapter presents Roman Loimeier's analysis of contested memories in Zanzibar (Loimeier 2006a).

4.2 Identity and identification

This section elaborates theoretically on the conception of identity and identification presented in Chapter 1.

Hall describes identity and identification as almost synonymous concepts. Both are understood as "*a construction, a process never completed – always 'in process'*." Furthermore both concepts occur in "*the relationship between subjects and discursive practice*" (Hall 1996a: 2). They are as such contingent on theoretical influences of both psychoanalysis and concepts of discourse. Identification semantically emphasizes the in-process character of both concepts (Ibid.).

The concept of identification furthermore emphasizes the discursive production of subjectivities; the being spoken or hailed into a discourse position (Ibid. 5f). When identification is the process, identity is the imagined halt that crystallizes meaning. An identity renders an "*internal homogeneity*", which is "*a constructed form of closure*" that is built on exclusion. As Hall argues "*identities can function as points of identification and attachment only* because *of their capacity to exclude, leave out, to render 'outside'*" (Ibid. 5). Thus, both concepts are inseparably interrelated. An identification is always *with* an identity, and an identity always includes specific modes of identification, while excluding

others.

Similar to Hall I understand the term identity as implying identification, and vice versa. Both identity and identification include the process and the attempt to halt the flux of meaning, even when this process is rendered unconsciously. Identity, as Hall states, arises at the intersection of "*the rudimentary levels of physic identity and the drives*" and "*the level of the discursive formation and practices which constitute the social field*" (Ibid. 7). Identity is contingent on both mental and social representations, which are in turn contingent on the physical environment that surrounds, and permeates, them (cf. Chapter 1).

4.2.1 Why identity?

Identity, Hall writes, has simultaneously experienced a boom of articulation and has been subjected to immense critique. He rhetorically poses the question, identity "*[w]ho needs it?*" (Hall 1996a: 1). As we shall see, he answers this question pointing at the political necessity of identities. Hence as categories, feelings and fantasies they have materialized societal effects of in- and exclusions, we cannot disregard them analytically. For the purpose of theoretical analysis Hall suggests re-conceptualizing the concept of identity, reading it "*against the grain*", which is contrary to *"that which fixes the play of difference in a point of origin and stability"* (Ibid. 5).

Brubaker & Cooper criticize such re-conceptualization of identity, suggesting instead terminology that goes "*beyond "identity"*" (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 36).[24] They describe the concept of identity as covering a too broad and fragmented field of meaning, including both what they call soft – constructivist – and hard – essentialist – meanings. The former refers to the analytical, and the latter to the practical level of the concept. While the analytical level renders various theoretical concepts of identity, the practical level includes both everyday usage of the word and most identity politics, which seek mutual positioning of groups grounded on the rendering of sameness. For Brubaker & Cooper both the broadness of the concept and the antagonist meanings of soft and hard conceptions cause

24 Alternatively to identity Brubaker & Cooper present three concepts focusing on different aspects of the processes and mechanisms that the notion of identity covers in their opinion: "*identification*", "*self-understanding*" and "*groupness*" (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 14-21). They employ identification, as it connotes process instead of stability. They differentiate between "relational *and* categorical *modes of identification*", where the former refers to a relational web – e.g. kinship –, while the latter refers to a categorical attribute, i.e. ethnicity, race, language, citizenship etc., or class (Ibid. 15). They describe self-understanding as subjectivity situated in a given social context (Ibid. 17). Groupness is their alternative term to collective identity. It is constituted by another three sub-concepts; "*categorical communality*", "*relational connectedness*" and "*a feeling of belonging together*". While commonality "*denotes the sharing of some common attribute*", connectedness is the social ties in a relational web (Ibid. 20).

analytical confusion, as identity "*tends to mean either too much or too little*" (Ibid. 10). This confusion becomes in their opinion particularly evident when academics attempt to be both analysts and protagonists of identity politics. In this case the hard and soft meanings become inseparably intertwined. While analysts surrender to the everyday language and reproduce the reification of its semantics, they reinforce the notion "*that people "have" a "nationality," a "race," an "identity"*", in short that identities "*exist*" (Ibid. 6).

In regard to the above discussion, Brubaker & Cooper's critique seems to disregard the role of both the physical environment and of human practices in identity constructions (cf. section 1.5). The environment that influences identity constructions includes the human body, which every individual *has*. Solely because analysts do not regard them as naturally givens, bodies do function as markers of identity that condenses in temporary halts of meaning. In the construction of the halt of identity, Hall argues, "*the body has served* to function as the signifier of the condensation of subjectivities in the individual *and this function cannot simply be dismissed because [...] it is not true*" (Hall 1996a: 11). Similar to the body, also identity practices *exist*. As Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff argue, "*far from being primordial, "ethnicity," "tribalism," and other forms of identity reside in tangible practices*" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992: 44), and are thus potentially 'real' no matter how analysts might regard them.[25]

Brubaker & Cooper's question of the existence of identities thus somewhat becomes redundant. Identity concepts – how constructed they might be – do shape peoples' imaginations, practices and lives. Hence, I do not regard it as a question of the 'truth' of such identities, but as a question of whether people think, feel and believe that these identities exist. Instead of overcoming theoretical difficulties by abandoning the concept of identity, Brubaker & Cooper in my opinion discard the political potential of social analysis, as they somewhat deprive analysts of a language that has the potential to change social practice.[26]

As long as terminology is invested in everyday narratives and discourses it cannot be

25 African studies specialists Jan-Georg Deutsch, Peter Probst & Heike Schmidt make a similar point in 2002. They state it is important to remember that "*despite the manifold efforts to deconstruct them, terms like 'tribe', 'nation' and 'tradition' [...] continue to mark an observable reality in the sense that both in and outside Africa they persist in shaping people's actions and attracting people's imagination, no matter how one might regard their ontological status*" (Deutsch et al. 2002: 2).

26 I find that Brubaker & Cooper make a somewhat circular argument, reintroducing a problem of delimitation *and* a blurry distinction between hard and soft conceptions. Their conceptual splitting thus calls further questions to mind. What does it for instance mean to have common attributes? Are these social or physical denominators, or both? And how do we understand these attributes' ontological status when they become analytically detached from feelings? A discussion of these questions would re-imply a blurry distinction between soft and hard conceptions of physical bodily features.

analytically denied. For instance, as I found that the terminology of race, nationalism and religion was utilized by the informants, I cannot merely overlook such categories. Instead I have to engage these categories analytically, while remaining aware of my encounter with essentialized fields of meaning. This is precisely why it is important to continue to use the terminology identity concepts offer.

The following section comments on the theoretical and political applicability of identity concepts.

4.2.2 The theoretical and political applicability of identity concepts

Clearly, when engaging identities theoretically, and especially when engaging in identity politics, there is still the risk, described by Brubaker & Cooper, of unintentionally merging hard and soft conceptions in blurry analytical concepts. However, this risk does not minimize the necessity of employing cultural analysis for political purposes, and thus "*taking the representations of ordinary 'lay' agents seriously*" (Eriksen 1991: 130).

In order to become political agents analysts must engage in the flow of meaning of the social field. It is not enough to take an 'ivory tower' position, from which critical arguments are made, detached from the meanings of the field. Therefore, analysts must employ terms that render meanings, lives and realities in the social spheres of investigation. But, and this is critical, in order to enact social change the semantics of the everyday terminology must be altered. In other words, terms like race, nation and religion should be deconstructed to reveal their 'constructedness', that is the processes and mechanisms that produce them. When subsequently re-constructed the terms themselves should imply these processes and mechanisms. Thus, in accordance with Hall, the aim of social analysis should not be to abandon certain terminology, but to alter the terminology both in the realm of analysis and practice.[27]

On an ethical level I thus agree with Arthur W. Frank, who writes that it is his "*belief that analysis ought to contribute something to humans' understanding of how to live – not just how living is done, but how it ought to be done*" (Frank 2010: 19).[28] However, this

27 Contrary to Brubaker & Cooper's splitting of the concept of identity I find it analytically more rewarding to differ between theoretical and practical orders of interpretation, discussed with reference to Rubow (cf. section 1.2).

28 My ethical stance is, in short, attempting to make it possible for people to life as freely as possible without their freedom enacting too much constraint on the freedom of others. How this is to be realized is a tricky question. Because, as anthropologist Talal Asad argues in 2008, "*[s]ocial constraint (and as Freud has made us aware, even psychological constraint) lies at the heart of individual choice*" (Asad 2008: 13). Inevitably this opens a broad discussion on ethics and moral stances, for which there unfortunately is no room here.

does not mean that this study is to be regarded as a blueprint for a way of life. It is rather an invitation to reflect on the various ways identities work.

Before presenting the identity concepts employed in this study, the following section reflects on their interrelatedness.

4.2.3 The interrelatedness of identity concepts

As Hall argues, "*identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions*" (Hall 1996a: 4). This means that identities are never *One*, neither as subjectivities nor collectives; identities are always produced in ambiguous multiplicity, they are constructed through otherness.[29] Moreover, it means that identities are always constructed not within, but across various categories of identification.

Hence, it seems crucial to consider whether the distinction between identity categories stated in the research question of this study reproduces what Jonathon Glassman calls "*an unexamined acceptance of the categorical divide between nationalism and ethnicity*", which could diminish the focus on the interrelatedness of these modes of thought (Glassman 2011: 15). They are both, he states, contingent on the same two "*core elements*": First, they represent "*modes of groupness*"[30] – the assumption that the population of the world can be split into a given number of mutually exclusionary homogeneous cultural groups of people – and second, they emphasize the "*metaphor of decent*", which binds groups together by consanguinity. The distinction between such categories, he argues, is thus "*one of degree, not kind*" (Ibid. 11). To some extent I agree with Glassman on this point, as different identity categories intersect. However, although it can be difficult to differentiate them, I will argue below that nationalism and ethnicity enact particular modes of rendering distinctiveness. This distinction is important in analyzing what role these categories of identification play in contemporary narratives in Zanzibar.

With these reflections on identity and identification in mind, the following section

29 Philosopher Jacques Derrida has in *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (1996) described this as modes of otherness. He states "*every other is every other other, is altogether other*". Thus we are all other in sum; everyone is other to somebody else, while everyone is also other "*in oneself*", which is partly due to the unconscious (Derrida 1996: 77).

30 Glassman borrows this term from Brubaker who in *Ethnicity without Groups* (2004) employs it similar to the usage cited above (Brubaker 2004: 47).

presents the theoretical concepts of the identity categories employed in the analysis of this study.

4.3 Ethnic, racial, national and religious identities

Drawing on various perspectives this section presents the identity concepts employed in the analysis.[31]

4.3.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity is probably the broadest of the analytical concepts of identity I employ. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen preliminary writes, it is "*acts of communicating cultural distinctiveness which we call ethnicity*" (Eriksen 1991: 130). Thus, in short ethnicity can be defined as collective cultural identification. As such the concept of ethnicity can incorporate other forms of collective identities, including the concepts of racial and religious identities, and to some degree also nationalism, as presented in the following sections.

The concept of ethnicity primarily focuses on notions of cultural distinctiveness, that is visible distinctiveness rooted in everyday practices.[32] As culture is here realized as "*a way of life*" (Ibid. 131), ethnicity becomes a concept able to incorporate both broad and narrow definitions of distinctiveness, which can be linked to, but also disintegrated from, other identity concepts.

Eriksen elaborates the above definition, stating that there are two important aspects of ethnicity: "*First, ethnicity is a property of a social formation and an aspect of interaction; both systemic levels must be understood simultaneously. Secondly, ethnic differences entail cultural differences which have variable impact cross-culturally, intra-culturally and intra- personally, on the nature of social relations*" (Ibid.). By situating ethnicity between social formations and interaction, Eriksen expands formalist theorizing that focuses primarily on the *form* of constructing cultural distinctiveness,

31 As introduced above (cf. section 4.1), these perspectives are all in concordance with this study's constructivist understanding of identity and identification. Hence, the identity concepts are not employed to describe who the informants are, or what groups they construct. Instead they are sought employed as a means to identify the role of identity in narratives and discourses. They are thus sectional perspectives of the analysis. As the categories in the everyday practice of identity constructions and negotiations often intersect, the theoretical strings also intersect to some degree.

32 For instance clothing can be an important denominator for ethnic differentiations (Eriksen 1994: 560).

i.e. the communication of distinctiveness in interpersonal interaction. In addition to the formalist perspective he emphasizes the *context* of ethnic distinctiveness, that is the historic contingency and social settings of ethnic social formations. He thus emphasizes what I in Chapter 1 have termed structures of social knowledge, recognizing that "*ethnic signs refer to systematic distinctiveness which is in part being reproduced outside of the acts of communicating distinctiveness*" (Ibid.). By subsequently stressing the distinctiveness of cultural traits, Eriksen accentuates the influence of the context on the form, while simultaneously underlining the ambiguous character of ethnicity; that ethnicity is, as identity, contingent to otherness.

In analyzing ethnicity as communication of distinctiveness, we must thus remember that "*the context of interaction is constituted prior to the interaction itself and must therefore form part of the explanation of interpersonal processes.*" Therefore, "*we ought to investigate the historical and social circumstances in which a particular ethnic configuration has developed*" (Ibid. 128). In this way the analysis can show "*how ethnic signifiers may change due to changes in context, thereby indicating that the signifiers themselves are really arbitrary*" (Ibid. 129). The context becomes especially important when analyzing how "*cultural differences shape or prevent meaningful interaction,*" or how "*power asymmetry distorts discourse*" (Ibid.).[33]

4.3.2 Race

Bodies are the primary signifiers of racial identity. Like ethnicity, race is a "*floating signifier*" (Hall 1996b: 46:00). Unlike ethnicity race is primarily denominated by physical characteristics, e.g. skin color, hair and bone (Ibid.). While a racial identity can be represented as denominating ethnic identity, and both can be represented as markers of national identity, such representational linkage is not necessarily convertible. Contrary to ethnicity, and also to national and religious identities, the notion of racial identity is culturally rooted in the material world.[34] This is not because of any 'true' racial

33 In such analysis, Rogers Brubaker suggests a focus on institutionalized ethnicity. In 2004 he states "*that organizations, not ethnic groups as such, are the chief protagonists of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence*". But, the individual should not be overlooked, as "*the relationship between organizations and the groups they claim to represent is often deeply ambiguous*" (Brubaker 2004: 16). As we shall see, Chapter 5 frames the social and historical context of the development of ethnic distinctiveness in Zanzibar. This frame emphasizes the importance of organizations and political parties claiming to represent groups, represented as sharing certain ethnic, and racial, distinctiveness.

34 As we shall see in the following section , also national identity can be realized as rooted in the geography of the borders of a national homeland. However, these border are not always fixed. Neither are these borders as visible as bodily differences; in contrast to bodily signifiers – such as skin color, hair and bone –, national borders are

categorization, but because certain bodily differences historically have been encoded with meaning, manifested in discursive formations. "*The very obviousness of the visibility of race*", Hall states, "*is what persuades me that it functions because it is signifying something, it is a text, which we can read*" (Ibid. 52:06).

The meaning of racial categories is often based on modes of stereotyping. To recall the discussion in Chapter 1, being stereotyped, means being "*reduced to a few essentials, fixed in Nature by a few, simplified characteristics"* (Hall 1997: 249). "*The important point*", Hall adds, "*is that stereotypes refer as much to what is imagined in fantasy as to what is perceived as 'real'"* (Ibid. 263). Thus race is closely linked to the imaginative; what a person looks like – in the logic of race – becomes linked to their cultural distinctiveness (Hall 1996b: 44:38). As Hall states, in this sense "*seeing is believing*" (Ibid. 47:10).

Racial identities have a history of meaning as their meanings are manifested in discourses. Similar to ethnic identities, the negotiations of meanings of race are thus contingent on the social and historical contexts that they emerge in.[35]

4.3.3 Nation, nationalism and national identity

Different from racial identity, national identity does not directly rely on the body as a 'text' in which national affiliation can be encoded. However, national identity is closely linked to ethnic, and subsequently to racial, distinctiveness. As Eriksen writes about nationalism:[36] "*Virtually all the nationalisms studied systematically thus far by anthropologists and other social scientists have been ethnic in character: These nationalisms justify their state-building projects by postulating a shared past and shared culture on behalf of the citizens or potential citizens encompassed by a particular conceptualisation of the nation*" (Eriksen 1994: 549).

However, as Eriksen further argues: "*nations may emerge from very diverse "cultural materials" which need not postulate shared origins and which need not, therefore, be ideologies of metaphoric kinship or ethnicity*" (Ibid. 551). National identity (or nationhood, as Eriksen terms it) is thus a "*supra-ethnic ideology*" (Ibid. 561). The concepts

imaginary, requiring signification through symbols such as border posts or maps.

35 As we shall see in Chapter 5, the British administrated their colonies and protectorates drawing on the logic of racial discourses, but they were not solely responsible for the construction of racial categories and the eruptions of the racial violence in the 1960's in Zanzibar; notions of racial identities had been prominent on the islands long before the archipelago fell under British domination. The analysis in Chapter 6 focuses on how race is represented in narratives today, and how these representations draw on historical narratives and discourses.

36 I understand the relation between nationalism and national identity, similar to the relation between identification and identity. But, nationalism is linked to a specific ideological discourse that hails people into place in 'a shared nation'.

of ethnic and national identity can be antagonistic, as Eriksen describes a problematic relationship between the *homogeneous* ideology of a national community, and the ethnic *plurality* of its members. Eriksen writes in this regard that "*nationalism is essentially a political doctrine about "the same people living in the same place" and their relationship to the state"*. This concept "*can be highly problematic*", however, as both the "*same place*" and "*the same people*" are not always easily defined (Ibid. 551). In conclusion Eriksen describes the problematic relationship between "*the supra-ethnic ideology of nationhood*" and "*the ideology of multiculturalism*". While the former can be understood as "*a threat against ethnic distinctiveness*", the latter is "*a threat against national unity*", as it "*tends to freeze ethnic distinctions and prevent their ultimate transcendence*" (Ibid. 561f).

In the following focus on how the supra-ethnic ideology of nationalism is capable of rendering nations and national identity despite its conceptual difficulties, nations are conceptualized as 'cultural artifacts', constructed in the imaginary realms of narratives.

Benedict Anderson defines the nation as "*an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign*" (Anderson 2006: 6). It is imagined, because any member of even the smallest nation will only know a fraction of his/her fellow members, and yet be confident of their existence. The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest nations have "*finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations*", and as sovereign because the idea of the nation originated when notions of enlightenment superseded "*the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm*". Finally, "*it is imagined as a* community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship*" (Ibid. 7).

This description of the nation is in agreement with Brubaker & Cooper stating that "*a diffuse self-understanding as a member of a particular nation [...] is likely to depend not on relational connectedness, but rather on powerfully imagined and strongly felt commonality*" (Brubaker & Cooper 2000: 20). Employing these sub-categories, it becomes clear that national identity oscillates between individual imaginations and feelings – what in Brubaker & Cooper's terminology is termed self-understanding – and an abstract commonality. National identity is – like all collective identities – an individual and a collective denominator. But, what then inspires these imaginations of commonality?

Anderson describes the commonalities of nationality and nationalism as "*cultural artefacts of a particular kind*", the historical origins of which he seeks to investigate (Anderson 2006: 4). He traces the historical origins of nations back to the development of

print capitalism – in the form of literature and newspapers –, which in order to spread demanded linguistic homogenization of its markets. The nation thus became imaginable in the "*interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity*" (Ibid. 42f).

In furthermore tying the upcoming of nations to the upcoming of print media, Anderson ties the imagined community to the spread of homogenized narrative structures, which inform peoples' perceptions and imaginations. He thus emphasizes the contingency of the imagined national commonality on different narratives techniques enabled in novels and newspapers, which render imagined stable commonality across time (Ibid. 22ff; 33ff). In merging narrated time into a homogeneous entity of time these narrative techniques thus render the nation as a "*sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time*" (Ibid. 26).

Parallel to being imagined through narrative techniques, the nation is also deliberately told. Besides novels and newspapers, also monuments, films, cultural and scientific narratives and myths, censuses, maps and museums etc. contribute to the imaginations of nations (Ibid. 9ff; 83ff; 163ff). The narrative of the nation is thus constituted through the 'readings' of narrative fragments of these cultural artifacts.[37]

Homie K. Bhabha criticizes Anderson's conception of the nation to be monolithic. He adds to Anderson's argument that nations are never solely contingent on one single narrative, but must be understood as constituted by a multiplicity of narratives. This multiplicity includes narratives enacted from subject positions normally rendered as outsiders to the nation, for instance minority groups. This is also a political argument, as Bhabha writes that a multiplicity of narratives "*makes untenable any supremacist, or nationalist claims to cultural mastery, for the position of narrative control is neither monocular or monologic*" (Bhabha 1990: 301). In psychoanalytical terms, he explicates, these other narratives are the uncanny in the notion of a homogeneous national homeland (Ibid. 315). Bhabha here touches upon Eriksen's description of the problematic relationship between the national ideology's rendering of homogeneity and the ethnic plurality of a nation's members, which suggests an analytical focus on narrative variations.

The notion of the nation as an imagined community – derived from narrative structures and cultural practice – is helpful, not only to understand national identity, but also to investigate it through narrative analysis. Inspired by Eriksen, Anderson and Bhabha this

37 In present times we can arguably add the internet as a source of narrative fragments inspiring the imaginations of nations.

study understands the nation as a supra-ethnically imagined community based on a multiplicity of narratives, which can be antagonistic in character. This understanding is key to the analysis of contested memories of national identities, as it opens various narrative perspectives. Accordingly, this concept implies that the members of a nation – and outsiders – constantly struggle about the meanings of nations.[38]

4.3.4 Religion and religious identity

Conceptualizing religious identity, requires a concept of religion, which seems difficult to define. This section conceptualizes religious identities as specific modes of ethnic identifications which to a considerable extend are based on self-understandings and notions of piety. As a majority of Zanzibaris consider themselves Muslim, this study's focuses on identifications with forms of Islam.[39]

Contrary to a definition of religion as "*a set of beliefs*", Hent de Vries suggests that the term has never described any specific concept, neither in a historical nor in scientific terms (de Vries 2008: 2f; 5). According to de Vries, religion is one of the most frustrating objects of research in the humanities and social sciences (Ibid. 8). Despite the difficulties of its definition in peoples' lives religion still "*continues to claim a prominent role in attempts to understand the past, to grapple with the present, and to anticipate, if not to prophesy, the future*" (Ibid. 1). Therefore, according to de Vries, studies should not abandon attempts to understand, or conceptualize, religion. Studies should focus on how religion is articulated, both in scientific questioning and in everyday discourse.

Hence, he suggests questions of the empirical possibilities of investigating religious collectives, and asks "*[w]here and how, in whose name, for what purpose, and with what consequence, is this concept of "religion," if it is one, still invoked, advocated, abrogated, or derogated?*" (Ibid. 3). To engage in such questioning he suggests to analyze the "*grammar*" of the everyday religious phenomena, including religious practices and artifacts (Ibid. 17).

What relates religion to identity in this thesis is de Vries' focus on religion as an

38 How this struggle is played out in Zanzibar is the focus of the analysis of contested memories in chapter 6.

39 Lecturer in comparative religion Malise Ruthven presents a rudimentary analysis of Muslim identity. He states that Muslim identity, and also notions of Islam, is widely contested, among persons who understand themselves as Muslims, but also in public and in scientific debates. Nevertheless he argues that there are two general conceptions of being Muslim; while Islam in Arabic means to self-surrender to God, as depicted in the scriptures of the Quran and other texts – the word Muslim has two meanings. The first meaning derives from the related verb 'aslama', meaning to surrender oneself, while the second employs Muslim as a denominator for consanguinity. The first of these to definitions, Ruthven argues, describes an identity of believe in Islam, while the latter can also produce a secular notion of confessional identity (Ruthven 1997: 1-4).

explanatory mode of relating past, present and future, and constructing collectives. Hence we can understand religion as a means of sense-making through narrative emplotment. This study's aim is then not to investigate the 'grammar' of Muslim identities in Zanzibar.[40] Instead of focusing on how Islam is performed in various ways in Zanzibar and how these performances construct identities, this study focuses on religion as a denominator of difference; a narrative enactment of who the religious 'we' is, where this notion of 'we' comes from, and what future it pursues. This is how I focus on religious identities as modes of ethnic identifications.[41]

*

All the concepts of identity presented here contribute to the analysis with theoretical understandings of the phenomena that are investigated. Before turning to the historical frame, the following section will comment on theoretical conceptions of memory.

4.4 Reflections on memory and history

Since the end of the last century considerable theoretical attention has been given to notions of collective, cultural and societal memory. As in other theory building – including social constructivism as discussed in Chapter 1 – this attention includes a leap of perspective from the individual subject as the source of meaning to the social practices of collectives. As introduced above, both Connerton's and Assmann's theories undertake this leap, although they both focus on different aspects of memory as a social phenomenon (cf. section 4.1). Their respective focuses inspire the approach of this study. This section presents their concepts of collective memory, and discusses how they relate to, and inspire, the focus on contested narrative memories in Zanzibar.

40 Although also the performances of Islam in Zanzibar seem to be contingent on contested structures of social knowledge (cf. Loimeier 2011; Turner 2009), a thorough investigation of Muslim religious identity lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

41 What then interests the analysis is how religion is articulated in the construction of cultural distinctiveness. This is in this case the distinctiveness of being Zanzibari, which in the interviews is tied to notions of being Muslim, including notions of Muslim culture.Religious identification can be articulated in various, and sometimes antagonistic, ways. Notions of being Muslim in Zanzibar are often opposed to the primarily Christian mainland, Tanzania. Also different notions of Muslim identity clash in Zanzibar, where since the 1970s an Islamic revival has developed (cf. Loimeier 2011; Turner 2009). Section 5.9 will elaborate on the Islamic revival in Zanzibar.

4.4.1 Collective memory and history

Connerton states that "*the production of informally told narrative histories is [...] a feature of all social memory*", but he focuses on "*commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices*", as he argues that memory is "*conveyed and sustained by (more or less ritual) performances*" (Connerton 1989: 40). However, this focus narrows the scope of memory to the institutionalized memory of ceremonies and to the memory of actions and behavior incorporated into our everyday practices (Ibid. 79ff). Contrary to this concept of memory, Assmann focuses on memory inscribed in what he calls canonical texts, which are strategic means to institutionalize and thus stabilize the meanings of memories, or in other words the past (Assmann 1992: 96). Assmann differentiates between institutionalized memory, what he calls *cultural* memory, and the *communicative* memory of everyday experiences. Analytically he focuses on inscribed representations of the former, while he describes the latter as resting on everyday and biographic experiences and narratives, told by witnesses of their time. As such communicative memory is more open to negotiation and change than institutionalized cultural memory; it focuses on memories of the recent past, which are fluently constructed and reconstructed through interaction in everyday life. Assmann argues that the time span that is memorized through communicative memory covers approximately three to four generations, while the cultural memory memorizes an absolute past – a past of origin myths – which consolidates present collective identity (Ibid. 50ff).[42]

Between these two modes of memory there is what Assmann calls a "floating gap" (Ibid. 48). Communicative memories diminish after about 80-100 years, while the cultural memory points towards archaic origins that lose their historicism in timeless myths. The two modes of collective memory are connected through what Assmann calls genealogy, which he defines as an imagination of continuity that bridges the gaps between communicative and cultural memory and thereby legitimizes cultural claims. This could for instance be claims to the right of a homeland (Ibid. 50ff).

This terminology helps to specify this study's focus on memory. It focuses on communicative memory, which differentiates its approach from both Connerton and Assmann. To Assmann's definition of communicative memory I add that memory is also contingent on narrative experience. As discussed in section 1.4, people retell stories, similar to how they create narratives about witnessed events. With regards to the theory of narratives presented above, the study thus focuses on how "*[w]e evoke and supply*

42 Such a mythical past could for instance be the imagined continuity stretching back to a founding mythical time of national origin (Assmann 1992: 133). This notion is similar to Benedict Anderson's description of homogeneous, empty time discussed above (cf. section 4.3.3).

memories in interpersonal interaction and create, simultaneously, a common history and collective version of the past" (Horsdal 2012: 51). This is in Assmann's terminology a focus on the 'floating gab' and 'genealogy'. Moreover, this study focuses on what Horsdal terms "*explicit memory*" that is consciously interpreted and encoded memory, which she differentiates from "*implicit memory*", including both memories of behavior and bodily practice (what Connerton focuses on) and unconscious assumptions about the state of the environment people inhabit (Ibid. 48f).

4.4.2 Contested memories

As Assmann states, only important past is remembered, which makes memory a signifying act (Assmann 1992: 77). And reciprocally, only the past that is implicitly and explicitly remembered becomes important. While implicit memory can be linked to the discursive unconscious production of subjectivities discussed above (cf. section 1.3; section 4.2), Loimeier's term 'contested memories' is based on explicit memory, as it describes a struggle within a hegemony of interpretation that (in turn) is shaped in societal debates and symbolism (Loimeier 2006a: 189).[43]

Accordingly, it becomes crucial, what *kind of past* we relate the present to. As Connerton argues "*we will experience our present differently in accordance with the different pasts to which we are able to connect that present*" (Connerton 1989: 2). Thereby it is important to keep in mind "*that control of a society's memory largely conditions the hierarchy of power*" and memory thus is "*a crucial political issue*" (Ibid.).

4.4.3 Contested interpretations of revolution in Zanzibar

Loimeier's theoretical approach to memory is partly informed by Assmann's conception of communicative and cultural memory (Loimeier 2006a: 190). In regards to the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar, Loimeier describes different modes of interpretation of the violent events. He differentiates between three modes of interpretation that became prominent in

43 As we shall see, explicit memories inform identity constructions in a crucial way. For instance, in a society where discourses render ethnicity as a prominent denominator of collective identities, ethnicity becomes a resonant part of historic narratives. Rogers Brubaker writes in this regard, that "*[v]iolence becomes "ethnic" (or "racial" or "nationalist") through the meanings attributed to it by perpetrators, victims, politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers, and others. Such acts of framing and narrative encoding do not simply* interpret *the violence; they* constitute *it* as ethnic" (Brubaker 2004: 16). When relating this to the concept of structures of narrative social knowledge, we can understand such encoding as modes of constructing ethnic distinctiveness and exclusion in a historical context.

academic literature after the revolution: a) a nationalistic interpretation, which explains the revolution as a reaction to British colonialism and the societal structures of the sultanate; b) a socialist interpretation of the revolution as class struggle overthrowing the feudal sultanate; and c) an ethnic interpretation, which understands the revolution as a ethnic conflict that was fostered by the racial politics of the British colonial administration. Besides these three modes of interpretation two new arguments have been voiced since the 1990s: d) that the revolution must be understood as a civil war; and e) that the revolution was an overthrow or invasion initiated from mainland (Ibid. 182f). These contested modes of interpretation can be labeled 'communicative memory'.

However, the revolutionary government sought in the aftermath of the revolution to establish a hegemony of memory and of interpreting history. The government's modes of interpretation were favored, while all other voices were silenced, at least in public spheres. An official interpretation was formed, cutting across the different modes of interpretation described by Loimeier. The official interpretation can be understood as an attempt by the government to produce a common, legitimized cultural memory. As communicative memory about the recent events of violence still fluctuates, such attempt to halt memory in institutional forms and official master narratives has failed, as we shall see in the analysis.

With this theoretical frame in mind, the following chapter describes the government's interpretation in the historical context of its emergence.

5. Zanzibar: The historical context

5.1 Presentation of academic texts

This chapter is an outline of Zanzibari history from the beginning of the Omani presence in East Africa until present times. Its focus is on social processes, including struggles about ethnic, racial, national and religious identities, which primarily took place in Zanzibari national awakening in the first half of the 20th century. The given account is extremely selective, excluding numerous events with importance for the archipelago's social, economic, and cultural developments for which there is no space here. Still, the aim is to let the outline include sufficient history to provide a frame of reference for the analysis of the informants' accounts.

The historical account draws primarily on texts by ethnologist Roman Loimeier (2006; 2011; 2012), historian Jonathon Glassman (2000; 2011) and historian Abdul Sheriff (1994; 2000), which analyze the archipelago's history from different, but mutually supportive perspectives.

Loimeier focuses mainly on how the revolutionary government's hegemony of interpretation was, and is, supported and challenged. In "Memories of Revolution: Zur Deutungsgeschichte einer Revolution (Sansibar 1964)" (2006a) he describes how memories have been, and still are, contested in Zanzibar, and how the government silences oppositional voices, which occasionally leads to violent demonstrations. His article "Zanzibar's Geography of Evil: The Moral Discourse of the Anṣār al-sunna in Contemporary Zanzibar" (2011) analyzes how the government's hegemony of interpretation in recent years has been challenged by a growing religious opposition, while his most recent work *Eine Zeitlandschaft in der Globalisierung: Das islamische Sansibar im 19. und 20. Jarhundert* (2012) focuses on the contestation of different conceptions of time from pre-revolutionary times to the globalized present. Loimeier's works thus provides the historical account with perspectives on the contestation of memories in Zanzibar since the revolution in 1964.

As Loimeier solely pays peripheral attention to the making and function ethnic, racial, religious and national identity categories, the account furthermore draws on Glassman's perspectives on the historical development of these categories, and the tensions that permeate them. In *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in*

Colonial Zanzibar (2011) Glassman analyzes the making of racial and ethnic categories in Zanzibar prior to the ethno national violence of the early 1960s. In "Sorting out the Tribes: The Creation of Racial Identities in Colonial Zanzibar's Newspaper Wars" (2000) he focuses in particular on the race-making of the Zanzibari newspaper debates in the early-mid 20th century. His approach in both texts intertwines notions of race, ethnicity and nationalism as socially and historically constructed discourses. The focus of his research is to reconstruct enactment of discourses. Instead of answering *why* ethno-national violence emerged, Glassman is attempting to answer *how* it happened.

The last primary contributor to the historical account, Sheriff, describes the work he and others did in *Zanzibar under Colonial Rule* (1991) as taking offset in "*the method of historical materialism*" (Sheriff 1991: 2). Thus he is devoted to a Marxist historical theory, showing particular interest in class formations and their conditions. In his later writings from 1994 and 2000 the focus remains on class struggles. Here he investigates the question of *why* the revolution happened. He explores what social and economic factors shaped the splitting of society that resulted in the ethno national violence of 1964, and what parameters created and fueled the tensions surrounding the union of Tanzania. Sheriff's analysis is describing structural factors of societal development, which are central contributions to a broader understanding of the historical context. His texts thus provide the historical account with insights into the development of societal tensions.

Besides these primary sources the account employs a wide range of secondary literature (Bakari 2011; Bissel 2005; Bromber 2002; Brown 2010; Burgess 1999; Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005; Harding & Wimmelbücker 2003; Hirschler 2003; Price & Stremlau 2009; Triplett 1971; Turner 2009; Wimmelbücker 2003), and news articles (BBC News Africa 2012; Bundegaard 2001; Said 2012). These texts either support points made by the primary sources, or supplements the account with historical perspectives that the primary sources focus less on. Some news articles furthermore describe the most recent riots of 2012.

5.2 Omani and British domination in Zanzibar

Since the first millennium the Monsoon winds had brought Arab traders, but also war ships, to the East African coast. By initiating processes of creolization through intermarriages with local women, and by preferring to trade with people of their own belief, the Arab traders spread Islam where they arrived (Glassman 2011: 38f). This was

long before the sultan of Oman, Said bin Sultan, moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1840. By then his East African empire already prospered; his extensive fleet of war and trade ships controlled the harbors between Mombasa and Kilwa on the so-called Swahili Coast (Loimeier 2012: 23f).[44]

The introduction of the lucrative cloves on Zanzibar from the 1820s had become one of the most important pillars of the sultanate's economy, which later was extended to slave and ivory trade (Ibid.). The slave trade, and the slave based plantation economy that evolved throughout the sultan's empire, had enormous proportions. Slaves became one of the empires most vital resources. As many slaves suffered an early death in the labor-intensive clove cropping in Zanzibar, the sultanate's demand for slaves urged independent slave traders to create routes on which man hunters pursued local people on the African continent (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005: 498ff).

When Sultan Said died in 1856 the Omani empire was divided between his sons; one son ruled Muscat, the other Zanzibar. Said's successor ruled in Zanzibar until 1870. The East African sultanate prospered during his rule. The empire's capital – Zanzibar City – developed into a cosmopolitan society, characterized by Omani plantation owners, Indian traders, bankers and craftsmen, religious scholars from Comoros and Brawa, soldiers, plantation workers and slaves from the African continent (Loimeier 2012: 24ff).[45]

In 1872 a cyclone destroyed most of the sultan's fleet as well as 85 percent of Unguja's clove plants. Both where considerable parts of the sultanate's military and economic backbone. This natural catastrophe initiated a restructuring of Zanzibar. After the cyclone the sultan had little military options to counter the British expansions, which had put pressure on his empire for a considerable period. Thus in 1890 most of the sultanate, except major parts of Tanganyika which became a German colony, fell under British rule. The archipelago of Zanzibar officially stayed under the sultan's rule, but was as a protectorate in practice subordinated British colonial administration, the highest authority being the British colonial administrator (Ibid. 28ff).

The island of Pemba was spared by the cyclone. It later became Zanzibar's new center for clove production. Pemba was almost entirely covered by plantations, and here "*indigenous people were fully involved in clove production from the beginning*"

44 Swahili denotes both *"the language and culture practiced along almost 2,000 miles of the Indian Ocean littoral*". It is a bantu language influenced by Arabic, which has been spoken – and developed – along this coast for centuries (Glassman 2011: 4).

45 Zanzibar city developed tremendously these years, but this development was marked by economical discrepancies (Loimeier 2012: 24ff); while the imposing stone structures in the city center reflected the empire's wealth, the suburban district Ng'ambo accommodated laborers from primarily mainland African origin (Bissel 2005: 218).

(Glassman 2011: 33f). This made Pemba's social development different from Unguja's. In Unguja only parts of the island were adequate for crops. Hence, plantation workers and owners lived separated. Omani settlers seized the fertile areas for their plantations, while the 'indigenous' workers were expelled to the infertile areas of coral-land. In contrast to Unguja, Pemba's topography did not allow for such regional divide between plantation owners and workers, as almost all land was fertile. The proximity of everyday life acquainted plantation owners and workers, strengthening their relations, for instance, in mutual religious practicing. Furthermore, locals who helped the settlers establish plantations were often given parts of the estates in return (Ibid. 32ff). This development made the 20th century constructions of ethnic and racial identities distinct in the two islands of Zanzibar.

5.2.1 Arab hegemony and Arabization

Along the Swahili Coast and in Zanzibar there had been a long tradition for "*Arabization*", that is 'becoming Arab'. Arab was at this point not a "*clearly bound racial category*". Rather it was a permeable category in which Middle Eastern decent was linked to social and economic status. 'Being Arab' embodied notions of Islam and Islamic civilization. The denomination was also linked to economic wealth; possessing an estates and slaves was the easiest way to cement claims of Arab decent (Glassman 2011: 38).

The tradition of becoming Arab was rooted in the processes of creolization that took place where Arab traders and seafarers reached the East African coast. These processes spread discourses of "*Arabocentric cultural hegemony*" (Ibid.), which rendered Islam and Arab civilization, as bringing enlightenment to the benighted "*land of the blacks*".[46] As part of such processes the rapid spread of Islam became a primary reason for the coastal peoples' orientation towards the Indian Ocean, and the "*Islamic-heartland*" (Ibid. 24f).[47]

Arab elites claimed to descend from Arab clans from different parts of the Islamic Middle East. In Zanzibar such claims often referred to the Persian town Shiraz. This fostered "*legends of Shirazi origin*" (Ibid. 25). Being Shirazi thus became a synonym for elite Arab descent. However, until the beginning of British domination "*ethnic identities, though part of people's everyday subjectivities, rarely interfered with more general*

46 The name 'Zanzibar' might even derive from 'Zanj', a word used by Arab geographers, meaning 'land of the blacks' (Glassman 2011: 24).

47 Besides the huge impact of Islam on processes of creolization, many local women married Arab seafarers. The children of such marriages were considered Arabs even though most solely spoke Swahili (Glassman 2011: 39).

notions of community and common humanity" (Ibid. 59).

Both on Unguja and Pemba people made efforts to become Arab and Shirazi. Yet, it was easier to make such claims on Pemba, where Arabs and indigenous people, due to the spatial proximity of their settlements, were more integrated than on Unguja, where a strict spatial division between Arab settlers and indigenous workers had been enforced.

While Zanzibaris continue claiming Arab descent – as for instance Naasir (cf. section 2.1) –, the concept of Shirazi altered during the period of British domination. At that time Shirazi came to denote being indigenous Zanzibari. Those who in the first half of the 20th century claimed being Shirazi thus demarcated themselves from mainlanders – including descendants of slaves – and Arabs (Glassman 2011: 55).[48]

5.2.2 Colonial racialized policies under British rule

As already mentioned, Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890. Since then the name 'Zanzibar' denotes the archipelago of Unguja, Pemba and the surrounding isles (Harding & Wimmelbücker 2003: 12). The sultanate's last effort to regain independence from Britain was crushed in the British bombardments of Zanzibar city in 1896 (Loimeier 2012: 29).

Under British rule all Zanzibaris became subjected to British colonial policies, which operated with notions of distinct hierarchically ordered racial categories, "*built on the assumption that Arabs were the islands' indigenous ruling race*" (Glassman 2011: 43). Thus, understanding "*Zanzibar as a multi-racial bastion of arabo-centered 'civilization' was official British policy during most of the colonial period*" (Glassman 2000: 426). British rule's raison d'être was "*a paternalist ideology that claimed to be saving all Zanzibaris, masters and slaves, from the brutalizing effects of the slave trade*" (Glassman 2011: 39). Slavery was abolished in East Africa during the end of the 19th century, years later than in other parts of the British Empire.[49]

British administrators continued to reproduce the racial divides that were constructions of Arab hegemony. Thus most Zanzibaris experienced life in the protectorate as "*a routinized form of Arab supremacy*" (Ibid. 42). But, while Omani rule was build on

48 As will be elaborated below, the notion of Shirazis being indigenous to the island played an important role in the national awakening prior to Zanzibar's independence in 1963.

49 Despite Britain's official abolition policy, slavery on the East African coast was tolerated for decades under British rule. Until 1897 Britain did not officially intervene in local slave trade, and tolerated forms of local slavery until 1911 (see Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005: 511f, also for Britain's economic and imperial interest in the continuation of the slave trade).

patrimonial relations between the sultan and his "*Arab, Indian, and Shirazi vassals*", British administrators built up a vast governmental bureaucracy, which contributed extensively to 'race-making' in Zanzibar. The recruitment of professionals into the administration, for instance, was to a great extend based on race, which meant that Arabs primarily became government officials (Ibid.).

In the wake of the 20th century Zanzibari society was thus divided along social and economic lines, which in the logic of the British administrators became tied to notions of racial divide. Society's top was made out of a few Omani plantation owners and some Indian merchants, its middle of small estate owners, traders and government officials, while impoverished farmers and seasonal workers constituted its bottom. After the abolition of slavery plantation workers and urban laborers were recruited from the mainland (Loimeier 2012: 29ff). However, the social divide of this time cannot be restricted to ethnic divisions between Omanis, Indians, native islanders and mainland Africans, as represented by British policies. Many Omani and Indian immigrants of poor origins were working in Zanzibar as small shopkeepers in the countryside or as urban laborers. Meanwhile the 'indigenous' Zanzibaris had never been enslaved. Some individuals on Pemba had even been plantation and slave owners themselves (Sheriff 2001: 302).

Ethnic and racial identity categories were still permeable at this time, but became successively politicized, and thus fixated. This especially in the national awakening that both opposed British domination and split society in representing different notions of Zanzibari identity. Incentives for claiming Arab descent still had a social character, but through British colonial policies – e.g. the link between racial identity and career opportunities – material factors also became important. Thus "*identity shifts had a multiplicity of motivations*". Besides material factors these included "*the effects of political mobilization*" (Glassman 2011: 50).

Precursors for Zanzibari political parties – the Indian, Arab, Shirazi and African ethnic associations – already emerged early in the 20th century (Sheriff 2001: 308), but ethnic, racial and political identification became especially excessive in the political mobilization of the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, where nationalists' rhetoric constructed distinct identity categories in Zanzibari national awakening. Hence, although British colonial administrators were eager to label their subjects in racial terms they cannot be solely made responsible for the emergence of the racial discourses that so violently split Zanzibari society in the dawn of independence.

5.3 Time of politics: National awakening and racial divide

In the first half of the 20th century a debate on diverging forms of Zanzibari nationalism arose. Instead of providing a uniting imagination of a nation independent from colonialism, this debate split society along ethnic and racial lines. The newspapers – which since the late 1930s were widely distributed on the islands – ignited a "*debate on citizenship, identity and who 'truly' belongs to the island*" (Bromber 2002: 87), which was mediated in the social forums of the barazas.[50] The primary ethnic categories that became objects of this debate were 'Shirazi,' 'mainland Africans' and 'Arabs' (Glassman 2011: 55). These categories became in this period increasingly polarized, as ethnicity was imagined to be corresponding to political stance (Sheriff 2001: 307ff).

On a political spectrum the ethnic divisions were institutionalized in parties that partly emerged out of the earlier formed ethnic associations. The main parties were the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) that in 1955 emerged out of the Arab Association, and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), founded in 1957 as a fragile coalition between the African Association and the Shirazi Association. While ZNP claimed to represent the interests of both landowners and peasants, especially in Pemba, as well as shopkeepers and civil servants, ASP sought support by the "*African working class and the Shirazi poor pessantry*", primarily in Unguja. When in 1959 the Pemba branch of the Shirazi Association broke away from the ASP-coalition, its members founded the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP) sharing interests with ZNP (Ibid. 310).[51]

The nationalist debate intensified in the so-called 'time of politics' during the years of 1957-1963, which led up to Zanzibari independence.[52] In these years the first democratic elections were held. After 1961 two opposing political blocks campaigned in the elections; ASP was now opposed by the ZNP-ZPPP coalition, formed on the background of representing mutual interest in Unguja and Pemba in "*a broad national coalition*" (Ibid.).

In the debate on belonging, ASP leaders and propagandists drew on discourses of pan-African nationalism to construct a narrative of an African majority – including Shirazis –, in Zanzibar oppressed by a ruling Arab minority. The narrative they enacted represented Zanzibar as being naturally tied to the African continent by its geography. On the other

50 A baraza is a social, and in most cases public, space, where men discuss relevant societal and family issues. These spaces can be everything from street corners to meeting rooms (Loimeier 2012: 155ff).

51 See appendix 5 for an overview of political parties in Zanzibar from the period of politics until today.

52 There is a slight inconsistency between my primary sources in determining the actual duration of the time of politics. While Glassman and Sheriff limit the period to the years of 1957-1963 (Glassman 2000: 427; Sheriff 2001: 310), Loimeier extends it to the years of 1955-1963 (Loimeier 2006a: 176; Loimeier 2011: 7). I take this as indicating that the politicization of civil society has developed processional over a longer period in the 1950s (see also Glassman 2000: 400), and has been rapidly intensified during the first democratic elections from 1957 up until the violent overthrow of the government in 1964.

side ZNP, a party loyal to the sultan, Islam and Middle Eastern culture, argued for a non-racial Zanzibari nation, demarcated from the 'barbaric' African mainland in the name of civilization derived from its Arabic roots. This narrative thus rendered the islands as belonging to the Arabic influenced Indian Ocean seascape (Glassman 2000: 406ff).

The two opposing political blocks each represented about half the population of Zanzibar, the ZNP-ZPPP coalition being strongest in Pemba, while the ASP held the majority of votes in Unguja.[53] However, the support for political parties could not as easily be attached to ethnic or racial affiliation, as the propaganda of opposing images of Zanzibari nationalism proposed. Descendants of slaves, seasonal workers from the mainland, Shirazis, impoverished Omanis and Comoros all shared common interests, "*and developed [...] political outlook that cut across ethnic lines*" (Sheriff 2001: 303). A distinction between an oppressing Arab minority and an oppressed African majority is thus not an adequate explanation of the ethno-national tensions in Zanzibari society that erupted in the revolution of 1964 (Loimeier 2012: 38).

5.4 Independence and revolution

Although the ASP gained the majority of votes in all elections between 1957 and 1963, due to a British electoral system the ZNP-ZPPP coalition came into power in the new Zanzibari government inaugurated after the night of independence on December 12. 1963 (Loimeier 2012: 32). The sultanate that had prevailed under British domination now became a constitutional monarchy. This arrangement was the result of the British decolonization policies. However, in the night of January 11./12. 1964, one month after independence, the new government was violently overthrown "*by the ASP Youth League and former policemen whom the ZNP government had dismissed because they were mainlanders*" (Glassman 2011: 64).[54]

The dismissal of the police force was one of many measures that the newly elected ZNP-ZPPP government enacted to cut expenses and marginalize the opposition, as many policemen were ASP supporters. Although the ASP Youth League played a major role in

53 In the January 1963 election ASP gained 62 percent of Ungujan and 43 percent of Pemban votes. The ZNP-ZPPP coalition gained 36 percent of Ungujan and 54 percent of Pemban votes (Sheriff 2001: 316). On an individual party basis 31 percent of Ungujans and 28 percent of Pembans voted for ZNP, while the votes for ZPPP made out 5 and 28 percent respectively. In total 164.644 Zanzibaris voted, which solely corresponds to little more than half the population at that time (Ibid. 312, my own calculations).

54 The ASP Youth League was the youth branch of the ASP (see Burgess 1999, also for the league's role in the revolution).

planning and executing the overthrow, and furthermore served as a disciplining force in the post-revolution years, it was the party elders who seized power after the revolution. Abeid Amani Karume[55] – an uneducated man of mainland origins with a wide popular appeal especially among young people in Ng'ambo – became the president of the new socialist revolutionary government in the newly formed one-party state (Burgess 1999: 34ff).

Thousands were killed in the overthrow. In Unguja the killings were most excessive in the first days of the revolution. Meanwhile there was no local outburst of violence in Pemba, as different ethnic groups had here been more integrated. However, later the "*violence was exported there from Unguja*", resulting in less killings but more brutality than on the main island (Sheriff 2001: 314). Estimates of casualties for all of Zanzibar range between a death toll of 3.000 and 13.000. The majority of casualties were considered Arabs. Due to Zanzibar's small population of about 326.000 at that time (Brown 2010: 616), "*anything up to a quarter of the Arab population may have been affected, and it can be fairly described as genocide in proportions*" (Sheriff 2001: 314f). Furthermore thousands were driven into exile or migrated to escape the violence. These were the former elite, i.e. rich Indian and Arab urban residents, but also included poor people considered Arabs (Ibid.).

Although the revolutionaries lead by Karume described the revolution as an legitimate overthrow of the Arab feudal class, as Sheriff states, "*[t]hose killed [...] were not the large Arab landowners most of whom were absentees living in Zanzibar town, but whole families of poor Manga Arab shopkeepers in the rural areas where they were wiped out, some of them burnt alive in their copra ovens where they tried to hide*" (Sheriff 2001: 314). Accordingly, class struggle is not an adequate explanation of the killings.

55 While Abeid Amani Karume was the first president of the revolutionary government from 1964-1972, his son Amani Abeid Karume was president from 2000-2010. When solely writing the family name 'Karume', I refer to the first president Karume.

5.5 The regime of the revolutionary government

The revolution introduced a new political era in Zanzibar, where the newly formed revolutionary government established a socialist regime. Under Karume's rule former elites were killed or forced to migrate, oppositional parties were banned, land and the economy monopolized, traveling restricted and the island society was closed of from non-socialist outside influences (Sheriff 2001: 315).

Karume's socialist regime fought a war on Zanzibar's influential religious establishment. Due to their status in society, Islamic scholars were some of the last persons who could morally challenge the government's regime. After 1964 practically all Islamic scholars were forced into exile, as Karume saw them "*as a lingering threat to his position of power*". By 1970 the religious establishment of Zanzibar was "*practically smashed*" (Loimeier 2011: 7).

In the islands' schools the subjects of religion and local history were discontinued from the curricula immediately after the revolution. While religion was re-introduced after Karume's death in 1972 (Ibid.), history lessons were not re-introduced until the late 1990s (Glassman 2011: 5). Instead of history and religion, the schools now taught politics and science. The regime sought to further discipline its subjects through a socialist restructuring of the working day and work conditions, while institutionalizing memories of revolution in different symbolic forms, e.g. in memorials, dressing of public servants and official holidays, such as the Liberation Day on January 12. Traces of such symbols are still detectable today (Loimier 2012: 35f; 41; 178; 185). Most of the former elites had at this point already fled the islands. As these were the most educated groups, revolutionary Zanzibar experienced a virtual brain-drain.

In "Engaging Colonial Nostalgia" (2005) William Cunningham Bissel gives a concise account of the post-revolutionary situation:

> "*The revolution was animated by a distinct authoritarian sense of political order. The sole party brooked little dissent, enforcing social discipline through its security apparatus and ten-house cell committees. Citizens were forbidden to trade, travel, or talk freely. Movement in and out of the islands was sharply restricted. Outside sources of information, imported commodities, and investment capital were nonexistent*" (Bissel 2005: 219).

Following the revolution, Zanzibar developed into a socialist state inspired and supported by the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and China (Loimeier

2006a: 185). All land was nationalized, while the mansions of the former elite and even the sultan's palace were turned into public housing or social service buildings. The import-export business was monopolized by the state. Meanwhile the regime sought to gain popular legitimation by offering free school, housing and medical treatment. However, these initiatives extensively weakened the already poor economy. By the early 1980s even the clove economy had collapsed (Bissel 2005: 218ff). Instead of obtaining social benefits, due to the economic difficulties the majority of the population was confronted by a lack of housing and medicine. Meanwhile the rulers enjoyed extensive privileges.[56]

5.6 The regime's narratives of historical interpretation

To legitimize its rule the revolutionary government engaged in rather authoritarian memory politics that, as discussed in section 4.3, also imply identity politics. The regime simultaneously seemed to follow two narrative strategies, traces of which to some extent still prevail today. One could be characterized as an enforced forgetting, the other is the enactment of official historical narratives interpreting the revolution in the government's perspective as an legitimate overthrow of Arab oppressors. The forgetting is on the one hand an attempt to obliterate history by silencing all voices critical of the government's narratives, while it on the other hand is a proposed forgetting of ethnic differences, rendered as an obsolete colonial invention.

Outcomes of the strategy of collective forgetting are the above described war on the religious establishment, the discontinued instruction of religion and history in the islands' schools, and the continual silencing of political opponents.[57] Furthermore, Karume sought to reconcile the scattered Zanzibari society, rendering ethnic and racial differences obliterated. Already in March 1964 he forbid all ethnic associations, which he explained through a narrative that made the British colonial rulers responsible for the pre-revolutionary ethnic divisions. According to this narrative they had used these categories as a means to divide their colonial subjects (Glassman 2011: 5f). This narrative can be

56 For a contemporary perspective on these inequalities see political officer Charles O. Cecil's article (published under the pseudonym George W. Triplett) "The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality" (1971). Here he states that "*the revolution […] seems to have produced a system of 'revolutionary inequality'*", were "*[b]ig houses, official cars, favoured medical treatment, assured places in schools, freedom to travel […] are the perquisites of the Zanzibar rulers"* (Triplett 1971: 617).

57 Through the forgetting of history, Karume might have wanted to blur his own role in the creation of those fixed identity paradigms that so violently tore society apart; that in the time of politics "*he and his party propagated fiery rhetoric, including inflammatory historical narratives that urged people to identify their loyalties and enmities on the basis of ancestry and skin color*" (Glassman 2011: 5f).

understood as an ethnic mode of interpretation, as discussed in section 4.3.3.

However, what can be termed the official master narrative somewhat conflicts both the forgetting and the ethnic mode of interpretation. It is a master narrative, as it both explains the revolutionary violence and *legitimizes* the rule of the ASP regime, while Karume's narrative of ethnic interpretation solely explains the violence by making the British responsible. The official master narrative operates with notions of distinguishable categories of race and class, and with a concept of political stance that directly corresponds to these categories. In this narrative a majority of African peasants rebelled against a small minority of Arab elites, who are rendered as alien oppressors and exploiters. The revolution is thus represented as a necessary outcome of the process of decolonization; as an overthrow of powers inserted by the leaving colonial forces (Wimmelbücker 2003: 483). Those killed and exiled are in the logic of this narrative the feudal Arabs, rendered as puppets of the British. Accordingly, the official narrative merges nationalistic and socialistic modes of interpretation, as discussed in section 4.3.3, while in intertwining notions of class with representations of race, it resonates with the racialized rhetoric of the pre-revolutionary newspaper debate. The official narrative is thus somewhat incongruous with both Karume's narrative of making the British responsible for the revolutionary violence and with the strategy of collective forgetting, which is also a forgetting of ethnic and racial differences. Thus the revolutionary discourses not only "*were far from being hegemonic*" (Loimeier 2009: 462), they were in some cases also mutually conflicting.[58]

5.7 Forming The United Republic of Tanzania

In April 1964, only few months after the revolution, Karume agreed with the Tanganyikan president Julius Nyerere on forming The United Republic of Tanzania.[59] The formation of this union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika can be understood as a strategy through which the newly formed revolutionary government sought to consolidate its power (Loimeier 2006a: 177; 184; Sheriff 1994: 152). In April 1977 the regime strengthened its position by tying the union with the mainland tighter. Here the ASP merged with Nyerere's mainland party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 'the Party of the Revolution' that now ruled both the union and

58 My informants' accounts also render inconsistencies between official interpretations of the revolution, which will be discussed in chapter 6.

59 Tanganyika had gained independence from Britain in 1962. British colonial rule had succeeded German colony rule, when Germany lost World War I in 1918.

Zanzibar (Wimmelbücker 2003: 487). The union with the large – and primarily Christian – neighbor, dramatically changed Zanzibar's political topography.

The union's political structure is built on two pillars. The first pillar consists of Tanzania's parliament, government and president. It simultaneously governs the mainland – the former Tanganyika – and the union itself. The other pillar consists of Zanzibar's semi-autonomous parliament, government and president, governing Zanzibar with limited jurisdictions (Hirschler 2001: 321). This structure has de facto obviated both Tanganyika's and Zanzibar's statuses as independent states. *The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania* states that "*Tanzania is one State and is a sovereign United Republic*", the territory of which "*consists of the area of Mainland Tanzania and the whole of the area of Tanzania Zanzibar*" (The Constitution [...] 1998: 14, chapter 1, part 1, article 1 and 2).

Through the formation of the union, Zanzibar has relinquished major parts of its former political autonomy. The constitution of the union prescribes 22 union matters, 11 from the 1964 original version, and an additional 11 added in 1977. These are policy fields for which the Tanzanian Government holds the executive rights. Besides foreign affairs, defense and police matters, the list includes "*currency, banks, foreign exchange, higher education, civil aviation, mineral and oil resources, the Court of Appeal, security, etc.*" (Sheriff 1994: 155).[60]

5.8 Openings of the society towards outside influences

Karume was assassinated in 1972. In the years following his death, the revolutionary government slowly turned towards neo-liberal economic politics, while Zanzibari society experienced some openings. The opening of the economy to foreign investments in the 1980s was a major leap in this general opening of society. When the old buildings of Stone Town began to collapse due to neglected maintenance, non-socialist foreign assets, including donations from UNESCO, were brought in to fund the refurbishment. Thereby the regime adapted the perspective of "*neoliberal [...] Western aid policy*", seeing privatization of buildings as the only way to save the city (Bissel 2005: 220).[61]

60 Among Zanzibaris this loss of political autonomy seems to have fostered resentments against the union, but also against the socialist regime of the revolutionary government. As Sheriff states in this regard, in 1964 "*nearly half the population was disenfranchised by the formation of a single party-state, [...] and even the other half was not consulted about the fundamental change in their political future*" that was the result of the formation of the union (Sheriff 1994: 154). In chapter 6 the informants' accounts will give perspectives on present forms of these resentments.

61 After the islands' economy was opened to foreign investors, many old buildings were renovated, and then turned into hotels, which successively replaced the residential buildings of Stone Town (Bissel 2005: 218ff).

This economic re-orientation led in the following years to a general opening of Zanzibari society. The opening brought foreigners of non-socialist countries to the islands. They came as development workers, investors and subsequently as tourists. This contact with persons from abroad resulted in an increasing access to external sources of information, and can in some instances be understood as a possible challenge to the government's official master narrative of revolution. Zanzibari society had since the political awakening of the turn of the century been split down the middle in questions of political stance (Loimeier 2012: 38). The opening of society now gave rise to a boom of remembering; new stories were told of which some contest the official narrative of interpreting the revolution, while others fortified it (Loimeier 2006a: 181; 190f). Another more recent opening occurred when the formation of opposition parties was allowed in Zanzibar in 1992, following Tanzania's introduction of a multiple-party system. Here the Civil United Front (CUF) was established as the major opposition party (Hirschler 2001: 320).

5.9 Islamic revitalization

Most Zanzibaris are Muslims, but Karume fought a war on the Islamic religious establishment of Zanzibar, which he saw as the prolonged arm of his political enemies, and a moral threat to his regime. In contrast to Karume, until the time of politics, the British colonial administrators had cooperated "*rather harmonious*" with both the political and religious elites "*in many fields such as education, legislation or 'popular culture'*" (Loimeier 2011: 6). As a means of exerting the regime's "*hegemonic power over all aspects of everyday life, including religion*" Karume's successor, Abeid Jumbe (r. 1972-1984), sought "*to establish a state controlled religious sector*", which could "*control public religion*" and "*present at least some state policies as 'Islamic' in order to pre-empt religious opposition*" (Ibid. 8). He re-introduced religious instructions by employing uneducated and regime friendly peasant scholars and imported reformist scholars from Sudan and Egypt. Government obliging Muslim functionaries and scholars were appointed to formal positions of Islamic education in schools and colleges, in courts and in the newly established office of the Mufti. Instead of cementing the regime' position, these measures have, however, incited the development of Islamic opposition groups since the 1970s (Ibid. 7f).

Besides "*Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar*" (JUMAZA), 'the Council of Imams in

Zanzibar', "*Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislamu*" (JUMIKI), 'the Organization for Islamic Awareness and Propagation' is one of the most influential religious and political activist movements (Turner 2009: 250; 259f). In everyday language JUMIKI is mostly called "*Uamsho*", 'Awareness' (Loimeier 2011: 7). The Muslim organizations argue their "*believe that the government is breaking Article 19 in the constitution, which [...] stipulates that matters of worship are an individual choice*" (Ibid. 249f).[62] Besides defending the right for religious practicing the religious opposition also criticized Amani Abeid Karume's (r. 2000-2010) administration "*as a government that tolerates moral decay, Christian influence, the demise of Islam, the selling out to the mainland, to international finance and to tourism*" (Loimeier 2011: 26).

Islamic revitalization in Zanzibar thus seems to be played out within "*religio-political dynamics*". However, "*Muslim activist in Zanzibar have so far failed to become a successful religious (and political) mass movement*" (Loimeier 2011: 5). Local forms of Islamic practice are still preferred to those suggested by the religio-political movements, as *"a majority of Zanzibaris is (so far) not willing to abandon cherished socio-religious practices that are seen as perfectly 'Islamic' as grounded in an older and respected tradition of Islamic learning*" (Ibid. 28). Thus neither the government nor the religious oppositions are thus far able to monopolize religious practice in Zanzibar.

5.10 Zanzibar in a civil war on memories

Instead of obviating the official strategy of forgetting through the enforced silencing of critical voices, the boom of remembering turned into a 'civil war of remembering' (Loimeier 2006a: 192), as different perspectives on Zanzibar's history of revolution are 'fought out' in a war on memories.[63] This form of a civil war is enacting the symbolic

62 Both groups criticize the government for interfering in religious practices through the Mufti's office. For the last decade one matter of conflict between the government and these groups has been the dispute about whether the sighting of the moon at the end of Ramadan should accord to the local or the Mecca sighting, that is whether the Islamic holiday should follow the local or the Mecca time. While the Mufti's office sought to institutionalize the local moon sighting as the end of Ramadan, Uamsho argued to follow the Mecca sighting, as their interpretation of Islam is highly influenced by Islamic teachings from the Gulf States. The conflict intensified when in 2001 twenty members of Uamsho were arrested for praying according to the Mecca moon sighting (Loimeier 2011: 13f), and culminated when security forces in 2005 entered a Mosque and dispersed the congregation that according to the Mufti was praying too early (Turner 2009: 249).

63 Perspectives that challenge the official narrative of revolution are in many instances still oppressed in recent times. In September 2005, for instance, the Ministry of Education suddenly dismissed Abdul Sheriff as head of the Bait al-Ajab museum, the House of Wonders national museum of Zanzibar. Sheriff, who is Zanzibari, a history professor at the University of Dar Es Salaam and considered an expert on Zanzibari history, was at this point planning an exhibition about the revolution and the islands' post-revolutionary history (Loimeier 2006a: 192; Sheriff 2005). The ministry has never officially explained the termination of his engagement, but I assume that the planned exhibition

violence of restricted representations. It is, as Loimeier states a 'cold war on words', but the symbolic violence materializes from time to time in outbreaks of physical violence, which makes the civil war turn 'hot' (Ibid. 185).

These outbreaks of violence have taken place in political rallies during general elections, which have taken place every fifth year from 1995-2010. While all elections have been manipulated to sustain the regime's power (Loimeier 2012: 183), all but the last election were accompanied by spontaneous outbreaks of violence in demonstrations or riots that turned against the electoral process, the union with the mainland or the regime's politics in general. The general elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 have led to several casualties, as the regime responded to the outbreaks with brutal force (Price & Stremlau 2009: 34).[64]

Thus the discursive struggles of the cold civil war on memories from time to time violently materialize. Due to the fact that a major part of the police – and especially the heavily armed riot police – are Christian "*Tanzanian 'field force units'*" inserted from mainland (Loimeier 2011: 14), such incidents further seem to intensify any resentments Zanzibaris have towards the revolutionary government and the union.

5.11 The continuation of struggles in the global now

Since 2010 the political tensions between CCM and CUF seem to have been eased to some degree. The two parties have formed a coalition government with CCM's Ali Mohamed Shein as the seventh president of post-revolutionary Zanzibar. There were no riots following the election of 2010, and between the election of 2005 and October 2012 there have been no casualties during riots evolving around political demonstrations. Accordingly Loimeier expresses hope that the coalition will end the political blockade of Zanzibar, which the authoritarian politics of the last decades have produced. He argues that the tensions of the period of politics have widely been forgotten today (Loimeier 2012: 39f). Furthermore he states that people using modern means of communication, such as the Internet, have established important connections to the outside world, including the

may have challenged the government's narrative or the strategy of enforced forgetting. I myself encountered traces of the strategy of forgetting, or rather the silencing of voices, in my fieldwork. After interviewing him in 2011, Rubanza remarked that I might not tell anyone about his statements criticizing the government. This example indicates how the silencing of critical voices can be understood as a mode of power that restricts peoples' articulation of memories that differ from the official interpretation.

64 Often fightings emerged when members of the political opposition challenged the police's or military's violent restriction of their right to assemble. An editor for instance noted in *The New York Times* that in January 2001, while "*breaking up an opposition rally […] the police fired on fleeing demonstrators and more than 100 people were killed*" (Bundegaard 2001).

Zanzibari diaspora. This communicative opening of society, which he terms the "*global now*" (Ibid. 53), has over recent years weakened political and religious hegemonic discourses in Zanzibar. It gives access to a multitude of different perspectives, and diverging narratives about the islands' history (Ibid. 183).

The openings of society, however, have not diminished political tensions. Significant tensions between CCM and CUF still exist today. Furthermore, the resentments towards the union seem in recent years to have grown in strength. CUF, and especially Islamic groups, such as Uamsho, take critical stances towards the union. Notions of nationalism and narratives critical of the union seem to make many Zanzibaris – including almost all of my informants – question the legitimacy of the union, at least in its present version.

This questioning is supported by narratives representing the mainly Christian mainland as Zanzibar's religious other. Islamic activists argue that the freedom of movement within the union enacts a threat of Christian domination in Zanzibar. Furthermore, the Zanzibari government is being accused of facilitating Christian immigration to enhance the number of their voters. Christian immigrants are seen as a threat to Islamic piety, as they for instance do not follow the Zanzibari Muslim dress codes (Loimeier 2011: 18f). As we shall see, several of the informants stress the importance of Islam, which is linked to notions of cultural behavior, such as what clothes are worn.[65]

Such resentments towards the union add to the civil war on memories. The political struggle about the status of the union turns violent from time to time, most recently in May and October 2012. On May 27. 2012 a demonstration against the union organized by Uamsho, turned into a riot, were several people were injured, and two churches and a car were burned. A journalist remarks in *The Citizen* that a massive police force was patrolling the streets (Said 2012). One of the informants said the group was demonstrating against the imprisonment of their leader, the cleric Sheik Farid Hadi (Rubanza 2012).[66] Following the sudden disappearance of Sheik Farid Hadi, further riots broke out on October 18. 2012. As a policeman was killed, these riots caused the first casualties for years in Zanzibari political struggles (BBC News Africa 2012).

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65 Resentments towards the union are furthermore based on mainland politicians' sometimes condescending attitude towards Zanzibar. For instance, Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda (r. since 2008) remarked in 2008 that "*Zanzibar is not a country*" (Bakari 2011: 341), a statement referred to by one of my informants (Rubanza 2011: 1:35:25).

66 When the demonstration escalated into riots, I was on my way from Dar Es Salaam to Zanzibar City, where I arrived on May 28. Stone Town, the normally lively city center, was abandoned. Some torched streets were still guarded by heavily armed policemen, giving me the impression of a war zone.

The historical account presented in this chapter is meant to describe the background of the struggle about stories, memories and the interpretation of history. This is also a struggle about identity, and about what can possibly be imagined as a Zanzibari nation state. The absence of common historical references lays the foundation for continual emergence of stories enacting rhetoric of ethnic, political, religious and national demarcations. For that reason struggles about Zanzibari identity are continually (re-)introduced. The tensions of these struggles frame the analysis of traces of historical narratives that emerge in Zanzibar today. Using this historical account for background, and keeping in mind the theoretical conceptions of the identity parameters which roles are here investigated, the final part now turns to the *argument* of this thesis.

Part Three: Argument

This final part presents the *argument* of this thesis through an analysis and a discussion of the research question and the working questions (cf. the introduction). Accordingly, the analysis of Chapter 6 describes the traces of narratives found in the interviews, and argues how they employ ethnic, racial, national and religious modes of identification, while drawing on respective discourses. Chapter 7 then discusses how these local narratives and discourses are entangled in, and nourished by, broader discursive formations in a global perspective.

6. Analysis

6.1 Presenting the focuses of the analysis

This introduction describes the different interpretational orders employed in the analysis, taking departure in Rubow's description of different orders of interpretation (cf. section 1.2). Besides, it briefly presents analytical focuses helpful for the analysis of narratives and discourses, with reference to Arthur W. Frank, Marianne Horsdal and Svend Brinkmann & Steinar Kvale.

The empirical materials of this study are second order interpretations, produced in the interviews. In their accounts the informants interpret either their own experiences of historical events, or their experiences of, and participation in, the social practices of storytelling. In this study's perspective, these interpretations of narratives are qualified as second order interpretations, which is a minor modification of Rubow's terminology, adapting it to the analytical focus on narratives. The second order accounts are produced as narratives in the interviews, which "*are naturally discursive and imply different discourses*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 155). Thus narratives and discourses intertwine in the informants' interpretations.

Focusing on the roles of narratives and discourses in the informants' interpretations, the analysis employs the theoretical terminology introduced in Chapter 4 to engage in third and following order interpretations. Thus, applying the theoretical understandings of identity concepts, one interpretational order is the analysis of the forms of ethnic representations in the narrative fragments of the interviews. Another order is the enactment of racial discourses, while the following orders are multiple narrative fragments rendering national commonality, and the rendering of religious distinctiveness.

As the different concepts of identity intersect in the informants' narratives, separating them analytically seems forced. Therefore, this analysis rather classifies the topics at play in, and across, the informants' narratives. Through an intersectional perspective on identity categories, the analysis thus focuses on the following topics: 'contested memories of revolution', 'stories of the union' and 'narratives of 'being Zanzibari' in the global now'.

The first topic includes traces of official narratives of colonization and revolution, as well as traces of multiple counter narratives. The interpretational orders here focus on how these narratives represent ethnic and racial distinctiveness, are intertwined with

narrations of national unity, and contest each other.

The second topic concerns the narratives about the union of Tanzania, its historical origin and role and the differences between Zanzibar and the mainland. The analysis here enacts ethnic, racial and religious orders of interpretation to theoretically localize the narrative communications of distinctiveness. Furthermore, some stories of the union echo narratives of colonization and of revolution. This linkage is analyzed on an interpretational order focusing on national identity.

The last topic engages ethnic, and especially religious, orders of interpretation, analyzing how 'being Zanzibari' is represented in the globalized present. Here the analysis focuses on narrative fragments communicating Zanzibari culture's historical distinctiveness, often in opposition to a foreign outside world that through processes of globalization enters, and contests, the practices of everyday live in Zanzibar.

Throughout the topics of analysis the different orders of interpretation, and the shifts between these orders, will be explicated with references to the theoretical concepts they employ.

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The analysis is inspired by Arthur W. Frank's description of a "*dialogical narrative analysis*" that "*studies how stories give people the resources to figure out who they are, and how stories both connect and disconnect people [...] and how stories make life dangerous, often by casting other people as suitable objects of aggression*" (Frank 2010: 71). The focus of dialogical narrative analysis is on the capacities of stories, which can include their characters, actors – which are characters with agency –, point of view, inherent morality, resonance of other stories, shape-shifting ability, performativity, telling "*truths that have been enacted elsewhere*", and imaginations that arouse emotions (Ibid. 27-42). Similar to the characters and point of view, Marianne Horsdal suggests narrative analysis to focus on voices, persons and relations "*in order to clarify who is speaking and from which perspective*" (Horsdal 2012: 93). She also finds it important to focus on metaphors, as they "*inform us of significant elements in the interpretation of existence*" (Ibid. 98). The analysis will focus on these capacities of narratives.

As for the focus on discourses, the analysis is inspired by Svend Brinkmann & Steinar Kvale's suggestion of both in the interview situation and in the analysis being "*attentive to, and in some cases stimulate, confrontations between the different discourses in play*" (Brinkmann & Kvale 2009: 156). My analysis will thus focus on how power is in play in the construction of identities in the narrative fragments of the interviews.

6.2 Contested memories of revolution

The interviews show that struggles about memories persist in present day Zanzibar. Several of the informants tell stories of revolution that are part of such contested memories. As Rubanza states, "*everyone has got his own way to express about the revolution*" (Rubanza 2011: 8:52), and Kigoma explains "*nobody really say this what happened*" (Kigoma 2011: 28:32). Despite this stated plurality of voices, and the formulated uncertainty of the history of revolution, some distinct narrative traces – and struggles – seem to crystallize in the informants' narratives. When interpreting them through the lenses of identity concepts, the accounts show traces of official master narratives of revolution which are closely tied to an official interpretation of colonization, including racialized representations of the Arab colonizers. As we shall see, this indicates that some racial discourses – produced in colonial times and enforced in the time of politics – are still prevailing. But simultaneously, these discourses and the official narratives that employ them, are far from hegemonic. A wide variety of counter narratives are performed in opposition to the government's official interpretation, and in opposition to one another. Meanwhile, under close investigation it becomes clear that the government's hegemony of interpretation suffers from internal contradictions.

Several of the informants interpret the revolutionary government's role as having sought to perform its hegemony of interpretation in post-revolutionary Zanzibar through the institutional structures of the islands' school system, public celebration days and mediums of mass communication – including the government's television broadcasts, introduced in Zanzibar in the 1970s. Rubanza's statement that "*those who are of that time they knew what happening during revolution and after revolution*" (Rubanza 2011: 10:01), though, indicates that also the youngest informants were brought up with different sources of narratives of the past. Hence, drawing on counter narratives and on their own experiences of life in Zanzibar, the informants' interpretations contest, but partly also support, the official narratives in various, and diverging, ways. The following section focuses on the informants' representations of traces of two versions of official narratives: One version focuses on the times of colonization, the other on post-revolutionary times.

6.2.1 Traces of official narratives of colonization and revolution

Similar to the account of official narratives in section 5.6 the informants interpret narratives of revolution as intertwined with narratives of colonization. The narrative of a

majority of oppressed Africans who revolted against a colonial elite of Arab oppressors is thereby somewhat reproduced by stories that reenact the point of view of the revolutionary government.

However, as we shall see, the official interpretation is not only widely contested, it is also internally divided, as two incongruous narratives crystallize in its frame. The first official narrative focuses on times of colonization. Its inherent morality seeks to justify the revolutionary violence, enacting a racial logic of Arabs as hostile colonizers, and Africans as pacified victims. The second narrative focuses on post-revolutionary times. It seeks to legitimate the revolutionary government's regime, rendering a united Zanzibari nation in opposition to an ejected Arab other. Racial distinctions among Zanzibaris are here rendered obviated. Africans – and other 'natives' – are enacted as actors of history, who united to overthrow and expel the Arabs colonizers.

Both official narratives will be presented below. The subsequent argument shows how they render discrepant notions of Zanzibar's recent past.

Stories of colonization: Arab colonizers and African victims

The fragments presented here of a narrative of colonization echo the racial discourse that was enforced by the ASP in the time of politics. This discourse differentiates between natives – i.e. Shirazis and Africans – and the Arab other (cf. section 5.3). In the following this differentiation will be described through the informants' second order interpretations, and analyzed through the perspective of an interpretational order applying the theoretical understanding of race described by Stuart Hall (cf. section 4.3.2).

When asked if he had heard about the revolution in school, Jamal answers that in school "*there they teach us many things. How the people were living before revolution and after revolution. Before revolution it was a terrible life, because all the people who are under the Arabs, they just do activity for the Arabs, not for themselves*" (Jamal 2011: 37:24). Resonating this distinction of Arabs and 'the people who are under the Arabs', Rubanza explains the reasons for revolution, stating that those who "*decided to make revolution*" did so "*because of the evil things they [the Arabs] were doing for the native people of Zanzibar*" (Rubanza 2011: 13:10). Both second order interpretations enact a distinction, which similar to the racial discourse of the time of politics links the classifications of 'Arabs' and 'native people' – who were colonized – to stereotypical behavioral traits. When calling Hall's description of stereotypes to mind, this distinction can be described as

enacting racial classifications.

To elaborate the analysis of how the official narrative enacts racial stereotypes, we can turn to a specific story of Arab brutality Jamal read in schoolbooks during history lessons: "*When you read in the books, you'll find maybe if the wife of the sultan he talk: "I want to see how kid staying in the stomach" […]. They find the African woman, who have pregnant, and there they hitch [cut open] to look the baby inside*" (Jamal 2011: 42:49). In this story the sultan and his wife are actors – that is they have agency – while the African victim of their brutality is merely a character, subjected to their will. The story thus again tells a similar truth to that of the discourse of racial stereotypes; Arabs – here symbolized by the sultan as head of the Arab state – are actively, and in most brutal ways, restricting Africans' rights in Zanzibar.[67]

When analyzing additional traces of the official narrative of colonization, it becomes evident that its distinction between 'Arabs' and 'Africans' is of a racial kind. This is in the sense of Hall's conception of race being a 'text' readable from the physical appearance of the human body. This racial logic is seen in Jamal's explanation about marriage rules before the revolution. He tells that as an "*African you are not allowed to marry Arabs, and the Arabs will not like you. Because they say, they look the skin, they say "no, I cannot be married with the black people*"" (Ibid. 38:57). Hence, through the lense of Hall's conception, the classification of 'Arabs' and 'Africans' is clearly racial, as it enacts skin color as the primary marker of difference. Moreover, in accordance with Hall's statement that when it comes to race seeing is believing, the physical appearances is linked to behavioral characteristics. Thereby the brutal behavior rendered in the fragments of the official narrative of colonization is tied to the racially stereotyped Arab. In the narrative fragments analyzed so far, though, 'the brutal Arab' is enacted as a historical stereotype linked to pre-revolutionary times. As such 'the Arab' is not part of present-day Zanzibar.

This rendering of Arabs is obviously problematic, as the revolution did not rule out self-understandings of being, and feeling, Arab. Furthermore, Marzuku's interpretations indicate that the government's performance of both its narrative of colonization and its administrative politics, did not allow the Arab stereotype to be deployed in the narrative as a merely historical character. Instead the government performed deliberate race-making in

67 The inherent morality of these traces of an official narrative found in Jamal's and Rubanza's second order interpretations, corresponds directly to the discourse of racial stereotypes enforced in the time of politics. The official narrative of colonization can thus be said to enact a racial logic that sees Arabs as categorical guilty of (inhuman) crimes, and Africans, or 'natives', as innocent victims of these crimes. This is so, because in the logic of narratives, people who have no agency cannot be made responsible for any actions. As the category of 'being native' is rendered incongruous with 'being Arab', native Africans are thus described as innocent.

narrative and administrative ways.

Marzuku interprets his experience of encountering the official narrative of Arab colonization in school, were the pupils had to repeat what they learned: "*when the question comes "who was Arab?" [...] Then you say "Arab was people from this side of the world." "And why they came here?" "They came here because of slave business." "And what did they do when they were here?" "Oh, they were ... mhh they were very bad.*"" Marzuku explains that he had to repeat these answers not only to pass exams, but also "*to fit in the whole society*" (Marzuku 2011: 38:05). His interpretation employs the revolutionary government as an actor, who manipulated the school children's perceptions of 'being Arab'.

Marzuku's version of the official narrative re-enacts the historical Arab stereotype, whose distinctiveness of being a brutal other that exploited Zanzibar is spatially located somewhere outside the Zanzibari homeland, and relegated to the annals of historical imaginations. Moreover, when interpreted through the perspective of how compelling this narrative plot renders different character-positions (cf. section 1.4.1), due to its enactment of the negative racial stereotype it seems to rule out any possible identification with 'being Arab'.

Yet, Marzuku tells that the government continued to classify its subjects according to race. He thus interprets the racial distinctions prevailing in Zanzibar, as resulting from the revolutionary government's – and especially Karume's – deliberate attempt to mark people in racial terms. He states, "*I think that government [...] they push things, [...] if you want to feel you're Arab, if you don't want it you have to, because they will say: "you are this"; "no I'm not"; "no you are because your hair, because your, a little bit, your color*"" (Marzuku 2011: 33:03). In thus describing the revolutionary government as deliberately classifying its subjects in accordance to a discourse that links race to physical appearance, Marzuku's second order interpretation questions the official narrative of colonization that renders race as having been overcome with the expulsion of the Arab colonizers.

Moreover, contrary to the official narrative's hard conception of the Arab stereotype, Marzuku's interpretation resonates a softer conception of 'being Arab', which he links to feelings. On a corresponding order of interpretation this soft conception can be analyzed as being ethnic more than racial in character, which makes it similar to the historic discourse of Arabization (cf. section 5.2.1). While race is based on the linkage between seeing and believing, ethnicity, as discussed by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, is exclusively based on believing, which means that the denominators for ethnic distinctiveness – such as cultural

behavior and clothes – are individually alterable (cf. section 4.3.1). The soft conception of Marzuku's interpretation and the hard conception promoted by the government are in many ways antagonistic. For those Zanzibaris whom the government classified as Arabs, and especially for those *feeling* Arab, it is difficult to identify with the subject positions offered by the official narrative. For instance, Marzuku's possibility for identifying with the official narrative of colonization was highly problematic. One the one hand he was told who he was in racial terms, while on the other hand he was told about the negative characteristics of the racial category to which he 'belonged'.

When calling to mind the historical context of the early 1970s (cf. section 5.5), when Marzuku was going to school, we can understand the enactment of the official narrative of colonization as a product of the regime's attempt to legitimize its power. According to Benedict Anderson's conception, and Hall's general understanding of identity, the imagination of national unity requires a border beyond which the nation's 'other' lies (cf. section 4.2; section 4.3.3). As such, the Arab stereotype is constructed in contrast to a Zanzibari identity.

Marzuku elaborates on how the government publicly performed this opposition in a television kids program that he saw when he was little. He tells that in the program a *"group of kids [...] they're coming out of school [...] they saw one old man over sixty sitting next to the school with a newspaper, but upside down [...]. This man pretend he was reading newspaper, and this kid they came "ah babu babu, why you turn the newspaper upside down?" And he fold the newspaper, say "oh my grandchild. I have to tell you, when I was a kid like you I didn't had a chance, I didn't have a chance to study. Because only people who could study, they had to have, ehm, Arab blood, and I'm African you can see. I didn't have a chance to study. So I don't know how to read. That's why you saw me, I have newspaper, but upside down. Lucky today, you kids you have a chance to study""* (Marzuku 2011: 1:22:27). In racial terms of blood, this narrative enacts 'the African' as a character without agency. It then clarifies that the old illiterate man is a relic of pre-revolutionary times, a symbol of what the new nation freed itself from. This rendering of a Zanzibari national independence, which is also a justification of the revolution, pays the price of reproducing the discourse of racial stereotypes, rendering Arabs in negative terms.

As a kid, Marzuku states, he and others believed this narrative of the oppressed Africans, to whom the revolution gave rights. But, growing up he began to question this explanation. His – and other of the informants' – questioning of the official narrative

resonate various stories contesting the official narrative.

Before turning to such counter narratives, the following section comments on the official narrative of revolutionary times. Focusing on the enactment of national unity through a forgetting of the revolutionary ethno-racial violence, it seems incongruous with the narrative of colonization's representation of Arab colonizers and African victims.

Stories of revolutionary times: Performing national unity and forgetting

In order to effectively render Zanzibari national unity, the official interpretation supplements its narrative of colonization with a narrative of revolutionary times. This narrative turns its focus from Arab colonization to the time of the revolutionary government's rule, stretching from the revolution until the present. While the truth enacted in the official narrative of colonization is primarily a legitimation of the revolutionary violence, the narrative of revolutionary times attempts to render national unity in post-revolutionary Zanzibar. With reference to Anderson, the latter narrative can thus be seen as a national master narrative, which the government attempted to establish as what Jan Assmann terms cultural memory (cf. section 4.3.3; section 4.4.1). In combination, both official narratives render the official interpretation of how 'native' Zanzibaris united in opposition to a hostile Arab other. The concept of national unity thus presented is highly problematic, as the official interpretation paradoxically seeks to cut across lines of difference (ruling out racial terminology), while rendering the national community in opposition to a hostile Arab other (defined in racial terms). As argued, this attempt is further problematized by Zanzibaris who after the revolution still feel Arab, and by the government's own administration of racial classifications. In the following the official narrative of revolutionary times will be interpreted with regards to the theoretical perspectives on national disharmony discussed with reference to Homie K. Bhabha (cf. section 4.3.3), and with reference to the concepts of ethnicity and race (cf. section 4.3.1; section 4.3.2). The concluding argument of this section elaborates how the two narratives of the official interpretation conflict.

Instead of remembering Arab wickedness, the official narrative of revolutionary times represents a notion of national unity that seeks to render the revolutionary conflicts forgotten. Rubanza articulates this official narrative, stating that "*after revolution it means all people are together so no one called himself Shirazi, because they joined together in order to overthrow Arabs, who were here, so after that one, so all people are*

Zanzibaris" (Rubanza 2011: 8:24). Besides the shift of temporal focus, we can here notice at least two alterations between the perspectives of the two official narratives. The narrative of revolutionary times enables a different perspective on its character-actors relations and on its inherent morality. First, while 'the natives' in the narrative of colonization were merely characters, they have here become agents, who are actively opposing Arab domination.[68] Secondly, this version of the official narrative precludes internal distinctiveness in what we with reference to Eriksen can understand as ethnic terms. It is the distinctiveness of 'being Shirazi' and of 'being African', which in the logic of the official interpretation, belong to the same racial category, in the sense of Hall's conception of race. The official interpretation here draws on the pan-African discourse of Zanzibar being geographically, and by blood, tied to the African mainland (cf. section 5.3). In racial terms, this reconstructs the category of 'Shirazi' as 'natives', or in other words 'Zanzibari-Africans'. As both categories originate from 'Africa', the racial metaphor of descent is thereby ruled out as a marker of internal difference, making Shirazis differ from mainland Africans in ethnic terms only. While the narrative's morality thus seeks to rule out ethnic differentiations that in its perspective remain between mainland Africans and Shirazis, it inscribes the revolution as a new beginning. The revolution is here a mythical origin of the multi-ethnic Zanzibari nation.

However, in order to incorporate all Zanzibaris – including those feeling Arab –, this national narrative of revolutionary times also needs to rule out the negative distinctiveness of the Arab stereotype. This is difficult. While the narrative's multi-ethnic focus on ruling out the distinction between Shirazis and mainlanders finds backing in the ASP supported pan-African discourse, the ZNP supported discourse of Arab civilization seems to be the only historic discourse rendering a multi-racial Zanzibar (cf. section 5.3). This limits the government's options of narrative strategies to rule out race in order to narrate a unified nation. As such 'being Arab' could with reference to Bhabha be called the uncanny of the official interpretation. It is this category – that in Zanzibar in different ways crystallizes as a 'racial text' and a category of feeling –, and its complex context, that makes the two official narratives incongruous.

The official narrative of revolutionary times thus encounters the problem of seeking to render national unity across ethnic and racial lines, without being able to draw on other narrative or discursive truths supporting this endeavor. Thus, as an alternate strategy to

68 As will be elaborated in section 6.3.3, this hints at a self-positioning of the revolutionary government as an active defender of Zanzibari independence, whose own interpretation employs a self-understanding of being an important part of the revolution.

rule out the category of race, the narrative renders the ethno-racial conflicts forgotten. Jamal resonates this version of the official narrative telling how performances of national unity – seeking to rule out notions of descent and race – were official ASP, and later CCM, policy. He states that "*after revolution, all the Arabs, CCM they say now there is no Arabs, there is no African. All we are the same. So although if you are Arab, in the class you don't feel better. They say all we are the same. And there you can marry Arab or you can marry African. The past we have to forget. Now we have to make the future*" (Jamal 2011: 47:40). Jamal's account echoes what in section 5.6 has been described as the revolutionary government's strategy of collective forgetting. It is a forgetting of the splitting of society in the time of politics, but somewhat also a forgetting of revolution. This forgetting fuels the paradox within the official interpretation. Because, without the narrative that represents the respectively ascribed distinctiveness of the oppressors and the oppressed, the revolution cannot be imagined as a struggle for freedom, let alone as a mythical origin of the Zanzibari nation. Meanwhile, in forgetting the revolution the national narrative of revolutionary times is deprived its plot. In other words, when remembering Arab wickedness in pre-revolutionary times becomes crucial for the narrative of national origin, forgetting of racial division is rendered impossible. This seems to be the paradox of the two official narratives, which will be elaborated in the following section.

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Marzuku's interpretation of the official politics as deliberate 'race making' completely contradicts Jamal's description of the official policy of unmaking race. This contradiction reflects the conflict between the two official narratives; the narrative of colonization that seeks to justify the revolutionary violence is incongruous with the narrative of revolutionary times attempting to legitimize the government's rule in a united Zanzibari nation.

In conclusion, the two modes of official interpretation – one referring to the past, the other pointing toward the future – render different inherent moralities. While the pre-revolutionary focus renders Arabs as evil oppressors – who for the freedom of the Zanzibari people had to be overthrown and expelled – the post-revolutionary focus seeks to include Arabs as characters and actors of the national narrative of the imagined community of Zanzibar. They are depicted as partaking in what is with regard to Anderson above described as the national members' steady simultaneous activity in homogeneous, empty time. These two official narratives are incongruous precisely because they resonate

each other, and paradoxically they *need* to resonate each other. In order to become an effective historical narrative – that is to become cultural memory – the official national narrative must emplot a past, a present and a future, which is compelling for Zanzibaris to identify with. Here the narrative seems to conflict with the social reality of Zanzibar. On the one hand, it seems impossible through the lens of narratology (cf. section 1.4.1) to imagine a compelling present, let alone a future, without reference to the past. On the other hand the story of revolution is difficult to justify without rendering ethnic and/or racial distinctiveness. As we shall see in the following section, counter narratives seem to further complicate the official interpretation's attempt to combine narratives of colonization, revolution and forgetting.

6.2.2 Counter narratives and opposing memories of revolution

While the official narratives here analyzed – although in paradoxical ways – seek to produce institutionalized cultural memory, this endeavor is problematized by the flourishing existence of various communicative memories, both terms used with reference to Assmann (cf. section 4.4.1). As already mentioned, notions of racial and ethnic belonging were not eradicated by the revolution, and neither were memories of pre-revolutionary life. Thus, as Marzuku for instance states, official representations of the hardships of pre-revolutionary life were contradicted by how his "*parent, grandparent and even older people who are genuine, they all talking about good life they had*" (Marzuku 2011: 1:25:38). Moreover, due to the excessive killings and expulsions most people were related to victims of the revolution by kin- or friendship. Therefore, communicative memories seem to make the government's attempt of producing an official cultural memory of revolution impossible.

Marzuku tells a story that exemplifies the contestation of memories: "*When I was kid, school is about […] they talk about we kick these bad people out, we kill them […] the Arabs, but then in same class, you see these people, some people they in class, they lost father grandfather, as part of Arab* (Ibid. 1:28:08). The experiences of having lost relatives seem to complicate – if not make impossible – both the official attempt of racially categorizing the revolution's victims *and* of forgetting its violence. While the narrative of colonization enacts the racial logic to stereotype Arabs as the hostile other, Marzuku's interpretation shows how the racial metaphor of consanguinity positions this other in the midst of the Zanzibari school children. Accordingly Marzuku – who understands himself as

being of mixed Arab and African descent – experienced difficulties in identifying with the narrative plot provided by the governmental schools. As he states, when feeling partly Arab "*the education is a divide you. […] In school […] the subject say its like a straight away divide me*", and elaborates "*I was mixed, and the subject would come and say oh Arab they were killer, they were very bad*" (Ibid. 36:45). Hence, on an interpretational order concerning narratives' ability to enable identity positions (cf. section 1.4.1) , Marzuku's self-understanding of 'being mixed' is seen as incompatible with the identity position offered to him in the official narrative's plot.[69]

Rubanza's account illustrates the impossibility of forgetting revolutionary violence in post-revolutionary Zanzibar. He tells about the Liberation Day on January 12. stating how "*old men who were present at that time [of revolution]*" question the government's celebrations: "*They say: "You know what you are celebrating for? Your sisters and your brother, your friends were killed during this revolution. So you are celebrating the killing of your brothers and sisters during that revolution." So they are telling us the truth of revolution. But the government say they make revolution in order to be free*" (Rubanza 2011: 11:17). Rubanza's interpretation complicates the narrative of colonization's racial categorization of oppressed Africans and oppressing Arabs. It thus raises the question of who was actually killed, as a counter question to the official narratives racial explanation. The usage of the term 'sisters and brothers' here seems to render notions of pre-revolutionary communal cohesion (cf. section 5.2), more than actual kinship. In questioning the legitimation of the official narrative's racial explanation, Rubanza's second order interpretation in general complicates the official interpretation's racial distinction between Zanzibaris and Arabs, as in- and outsiders of the Zanzibari nation.

When race – in the sense of 'seeing is believing' – is contested as an explanation of revolution, the distinction between hostile Arab colonizers and 'ordinary' Zanzibaris – or 'natives' – becomes blurry. The revolution is then deprived its legitimacy. Without an oppressing other, the revolution cannot be envisioned as a battle for freedom. What is left when the main antagonist is excluded from the story is merely killings, and an illegitimate overthrow of a democratically elected government. As Kigoma puts it, in revolution "*they kill each other, they kill people. Because was ready in a government. People they vote, they choose the government, it was like a […] election* (Kigoma 2011: 27:09). In memorizing the election of the first independent government of Zanzibar, Kigoma refers to an alternative notion of Zanzibari independence, which makes out a counter narrative to

69 While Marzuku's interpretation of the government's race-making politics seems to enable a soft conception of race, he here again draws on a racial discourse understanding race through the hard terminology of descent.

the official interpretation.

It is interesting to notice how the official narrative does not seem to make any distinction between colonial times and the one-month of Zanzibari independence prior to the revolution. In the perspective of the revolutionary government the latter period is rendered as a continuation of the former. The official narrative thus denies any notion of independence prior to the revolution. But, what is here rendered forgotten is brought back to mind by Zanzibaris' communicative memories. Adili tells about his own experience of independence, which he describes as a major celebration: "*Twelve and one minute to the midnight the flag of Union Jack is come down, and the clove, Clove Flag*[70] *was coming up. […] I got happy and everything [-laughs-] and joy and hope, like that. And everything was free at that day*" (Adili 2011b: 7:20). Such experiences seem too important to forget. Hence, told by elders, and re-told by younger generations, also stories of independence – and of democratic elections – question the official interpretation's point of view, and the authoritarian regime's rule.[71]

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Despite the revolutionary government's attempts to institutionalize cultural memory of the revolution as racial (counter) violence, my interviews suggest that these memories are widely contested in present day Zanzibar. The government's interpretation of history is thus far from being hegemonic. Several of the informants relativize the official narrative of colonization. For instance, as Jamal puts it, Arab colonizers where not good, but they were not as bad as the schoolbooks say. The revolutionary government, he adds, "*just put salt in order to feel Arabs are not good*" (Jamal 2011: 43:30). In such counter narratives then, the revolutionary government is ascribed the role as the antagonist of Zanzibari unity. As we shall see, in narratives about the union this role is ascribed to both the revolutionary government and the union government.

70 The Clove Flag was the flag of Zanzibar during the one-month of independence prior to the revolution.

71 Not all stories that question the official narratives do this in concordant ways. Naasir for instance tells a story of colonization and revolution quite different from the above cited counter narratives. About the Arab colonizers he states that "*they decided to come here to fulfill their dream, because this is the peace island*" (Naasir 2011: 3:20). Through the metaphor of 'a peace island' he renders both the period of colonization and the revolution as ('hakuna mata') violence-free historical events. While stating that "*in school they teach us the history like Arabic and Shirazi they fight here to make, they kill each other. A lot of blood in this island*" (Ibid. 9:47), Naasir's account resonates experience of an official narrative similar to the other informants'. Although he states that also his counter knowledge derives from his grandfather's stories, his story contradicts all other counter narrative.

6.3 Stories of the union

All of the informants', except Kheri, are critical of the union. Some – Jamal and Kigoma – want the structure of the union to be reformed, ensuring a more equal distribution of jurisdictions and resources. Other – Naasir, Rubanza, Masaoud and Adili – want Zanzibar to be independent from the mainland. Jaali, who has no opinion on political aspects of the union, is still suspicious of the non-Muslim mainlanders. The following section presents stories that describe the union as an unequal relation of states, in fact as a colonial exploitation of Zanzibar. On an interpretational order concerned with ethnicity, especially in religious terms (cf. section 4.3.4), the analysis will show how mainlanders are represented as Zanzibaris' 'cultural' other. These representations crystallize in a story of the development of the union, which is a counter narrative to both the union and the revolutionary government.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that the interviews reveal few traces of a self-contained official narrative in favor of the union.[72] Most traces of official representations – such as memories about Karume's description of the union – are critical of the union. Therefore it might be more precise to argue that the story of the development of the union, described at the end of this section, is not as much a counter narrative to any official legitimation of the union, as it is a counter narrative to the official narrative claim of African birthright to Zanzibar, which again draws on a discourse of pan-Africanism. It was this claim that materialized in the revolutionary overthrow of the ZNP-ZPPP government in 1964 (cf. section 5.3).

6.3.1 Stories of the union as a colonial relationship

Naasir describes the unequal relation between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar through the metaphor of a wedding. He states in this wedding, "*we are woman. So in our religion, woman normally, even if you have money, you are nothing for your man. Because man normally he's the rulers for anything. So that Tanzania is a man, we are woman. So we are like nothing. He just plot, if he decide give us a water all the time, he just give us the water* (Naasir 2011: 30:24). What the informants in accordance with this metaphor describe as problematic is that mainland Tanzania demands its matrimonial rights,

72 The most prominent official narratives might be that the union keeps Zanzibar safe – which Kheri for instance refers to, although he does not state exactly safe from what (Kheri 2011b: 1:11) – and, as Jaali states, that Tanzania is a nation and Julius Nyerere – the first president of Tanganyika, and later president of Tanzania – is the father of this nation (Jaali 2011: 53:50).

without giving much in return, other than brutality sometimes.

Rubanza resonates this relationship when he tells how the mainland is collecting taxes in Zanzibar, but what Zanzibaris see of the union in return is mostly the aggressive behavior of its armed forces. He states: "*Especially I see the problems of union during general, general election. Soldiers from Tanganyika come here, and during the general election we are not safe. Yeah sometimes you can see tanks on the road*" (Rubanza 2011: 46:19). When focusing the interpretation on narratives' shape-shifting ability, we can see how Rubanza's story of mainland soldiers resonates the above-described narrative of colonization in a reshaped form. As an analogy to how Arab colonizers in the official narrative restricted Zanzibaris' freedom, mainland soldiers are here rendered as actors who subject Zanzibaris to the will of the union government. Rubanza also directly makes this comparison, stating "*they [the Tanganyikans] make Zanzibar their colony*" (Ibid. 1:17:16).

When Adili is asked whether he recognizes this image of Zanzibar being a colony, he agrees after describing his own interpretation of the union: "*It is indirect. That is for colony. When you see the flag. […] There is a part on top of the flag. […] A sign of the Tanganyika flag. And the other whole of the government, of the flag was for Zaznibar. Like you see Australia. You see Australia's flag? […] That was colony of the British. Up to now. […] And like Zanzibar. Because we are under Tanganyika now. […] We can't do anything here except to make it ordered from Tanganyika to do it. […] If we are free here we can do it ourselves. […] But they can say that, we are the colony, the people, I can say that, we are colony of mainland* (Adili 2011b: 34:30). Similar to Rubanza, Adili here represents the union as a colonial relationship. This, he states, is observable through the government's flag. When the flag is realized as a symbolic part of the national narrative, in Anderson's conception of the term (cf. section 4.3.3), it is here introduced as part of the official national narrative of revolutionary times. As will be elaborated below, this connection indicates that the official national narrative does not render a Zanzibari nation independent from the mainland.

Similar to Rubanza's account, Adili's narrative also echoes actor-character relations similar to the official narrative of colonization; Zanzibaris are oppressed by outsiders, whose description has shifted from 'being Arab' to 'being mainlanders'. While Adili explicitly compares the union to the British colonization of Australia, though, he names neither Arab colonization nor British domination of Zanzibar. Accounts on British domination are absent in both traces of official and counter narratives in the interviews.

As we shall see in section 6.3.3, the story of mainland domination is closely linked to a story of the union's foundation in which both Karume and Nyerere play decisive roles. Before turning to the traces of this story, the following describes how mainlanders are represented, in terms of negative stereotypes. These images of the mainland other are also enacted in the narrative of the development of the union.

6.3.2 Stereotypes of the mainland other

Similar to how the stories of the union as a colonial relationship resonate the official narrative of colonization's actor-character relations, mainlanders are in several second order interpretations negatively stereotyped. This somewhat echoes the negative stereotyping of Arabs. But, it is important to here make an analytical distinction: While the Arab stereotype is linked to race, in the sense of seeing is believing, the mainland stereotype is linked to ethnicity, understood with reference to Eriksen as cultural and thus behavioral distinctiveness, and especially to religion (cf. section 4.3).

The respective ethnic distinctiveness of mainlanders and Zanzibaris is in several second order interpretations represented as modes of behavior and moral, tightly connected to a discourse of a Zanzibari culture shaped by Islamic virtues. As will be elaborated on in section 6.4, this discourse that inseparably intertwines culture with religio dominates the informants' notions of Zanzibari culture.

Jaali and Jamal tell stories that render differences between Zanzibaris and mainlanders in binary terms. While Zanzibaris are honest and helpful, mainlanders are represented as insidious and dishonest. Jaali states that when you have a problem and ask a Zanzibari for help, "*he tell you straight. Or he can tell you truth. But in Dar [Es Salaam], sometimes they can lying you*". In Jaali's perspective this is so because Zanzibari "*people are Muslim*", which to him means they have a certain behavior and a certain morality (Jaali 2011: 16:15). Jamal tells that Zanzibaris are friendlier than mainlanders. When asked why, he tells a story that resonates Jaali's representation of Zanzibari culture: "*because of the culture. […] If I go somewhere. I want to go somewhere. If I ask someone here in Zanzibar he will take me from that place where we meet, and he will take me to the place where I want to go. Without a problem. But in Dar Es Salaam sometimes […] if you ask someone […] he will try to take you wrong way and sometime he will [-gesticulates pickpocketing-] to take the money. Sometimes it happens like that. But here in the island,*

no, not like that (Jamal 2011: 23:20). Although Jamal emphasizes that mainlanders will solely diddle you sometimes, his story links their behavior to a general notion of culture. In the story's point of view mainlanders thus seem reduced to a negative cultural stereotype of being cheaters and thieves.

Jamal's story thus resonates Jaali's representation of mainlanders as being dishonest. Jaali elaborates that the difference of culture is made visible in the ways Zanzibaris and mainlanders dress. As he states, "*in Dar and in Zanzibar [...] I can say like culturing, there is very very different. Because in here in our village is very very difficult to see the woman go around without [...] headscarf, and also with like a small [...] skirt. [...] But from the mainland is like normal*" (Jaali 2011: 18:40). Mainlanders are thus represented as being easily detectable by their clothes leaving major parts of their bodies uncovered, while Zanzibari women's covering of their bodies is again linked to notions of religious virtues. On an interpretational order of ethnicity, we can thus see how the narrative communicates intertwined cultural and religious distinctiveness. Although this distinctiveness is not communicated in racial terms, it is as a stereotype rendered as *fixed* in the nature of mainlanders' behavior, according to Hall's conception of the terms (cf. section 4.3.2). This image is similar to how other outsiders, including tourists, are described by the informants. Before elaborating on this similarity, the following section turns to how the stereotype of mainlanders as liars and thieves resonates in a narrative that renders the development of the union.

6.3.3 Stories of the origin and development of the union

In the narrative traces of the interviews, a narrative of the development of the union crystallizes which ascribes different roles to the mainland and Zanzibar. The former is rendered as an actor, whose will the latter is subjected to. As already mentioned, this actor-character relation resonates a reshaped version of the actor-character relation of the official narrative of colonization. But, while the official narrative of colonization describes the Arabs as dominating Zanzibaris through brutal force, the mainlanders are in addition ascribed an ability to cheat and trick. Moreover, the mainland government's perspective is here paralleled to the revolutionary government's, both being CCM. As Kigoma puts it, CCM they "*squeeze you, your mind*" (Kigoma 2011: 32:08), or in Rubanza's words "*they blindfold us*" (Rubanza 2011: 51:35).

The story of the development of the union is intertwined with narratives of colonization.

Due to the temporal proximity of the revolution and the formation of the union, some of the same actors and characters appear in both, e.g. Karume. Thus, when Marzuku states that besides the union "*revolution itself was coming, it came from mainland as well. Because it wasn't like the really typical Zanzibaris who decide to fight and kill on Zanzibaris, very few*" (Marzuku 2011: 1:04:45), the narrative of the union is not only countering the union, but is also connected to a counter narrative of revolution. This also further complicates the official interpretation's notion of 'being Zanzibari', as the narrative implicitly questions the discourse of pan-Africanism, which is the main justification of the revolutionaries right to the islands.

Stories of tricks and struggles about Zanzibari independence

Like all other narratives described here, the story of the development of the union is also told in various versions, with sometimes differing shapes of characters and inherent moralities. The stereotype described above of cheating mainlanders, however, resonates in most interpretations. 'The mainlander's' negative attributes are especially ascribed to Nyerere, who has a leading part in the narrative of the union. He is represented as well-educated and intelligent, employing these abilities to trick the uneducated Karume into forming the union. While the story unfolds, the mainland as a whole is rendered synonymous with Nyerere's leading part. Thus Nyerere's dishonesty is parallel ascribed to the mainland in general. As the leading actors of the story both Nyerere and the mainland are represented as the primary antagonists of Zanzibari independence and self-governance. Furthermore, when Karume is also linked to the mainland in some accounts, this narrative turns into a counter narrative to the official interpretation of the revolution.

Rubanza states for instance, "*Nyerere was intelligent, and he wanted to control us*". To the question, whether "*he [Nyerere] wanted part of Zanzibars wealth*", Rubanza responds: "*Yes, he wanted Zanzibar to be his colony. Something like that. So now it is a colony of Tanganyika*" (Rubanza 2011: 1:13:00). Naasir resonates this representation, stating "*Nyerere […] that is someone is very cheating. Cheat and win, and also have a good education*" (Naasir 2011: 24:20). Naasir further describes that Nyerere could cheat Karume, "*because he [Nyerere] know you [Karume] don't have a education, so if the time you come here [Tanganyika], we just talk talk talk and we decide, because he know how to write, so you don't know how to read and know to write*" (Ibid. 24:31). When the "*physically strong*" Karume found out he was cheated, Naasir states, he wanted to leave

the union. Naasir represents him as the only one able to put an end to the union, and thus able to counter mainland domination of Zanzibar.[73] Therefore, Nyerere was happy when Karume died: "*So the time Karume is died, he's laughing, because he know, I'm already win everything*" (Ibid. 25:52). Rubanza tells a similar story. He states, "*Karume said union is like a coat you can take off at any time. So after saying this, few days later [...] Karume disappeared. I don't know why*" (Rubanza 2011: 53:50). Both Naasir and Rubanza seem to imply that Nyerere played a part in Karume's assassination, though none of them states this clearly. As a representative of the mainland, Nyerere is here ascribed the role of an exploiting and cheating colonizer.

The mainland's role of tricking Zanzibar into being ruled has resonance in stories about the present political situation. Rubanza for instance states that Zanzibar's role as a colony became clear, when "*ten month ago the prime minister of Tanganyika, is called Pinda, said Zanzibar is not an independent country, it's just a part of Tanzania*" (Ibid. 1:13:27). But, in this narrative of present-day union politics the actor-character relations have changed. In the present-day narrative it is not solely the mainland that cheats Zanzibaris; now the union as a whole is rendered as the antagonist of Zanzibari freedom, which includes the Zanzibari government. In other words, CCM has become the antagonist of Zanzibari independence in this narrative. As Rubanza states, "*here we have CCM and there [on the mainland] is CCM, so one party can't rule two countries*" (Ibid. 1:14:53).

In his second interview Rubanza tells, how the riots on May 27. 2012 were started by a group calling themselves "*Awareness*" (the English name for Uamsho), which is "*making people aware of the problems that are caused by the union*" (Rubanza 2012: 0:25).[74] This group of Muslim activists in opposition to the government has especially since the formation of the CCM-CUF coalition in 2010 enacted a strong narrative that calls for Zanzibari independence and thus opposes the union (cf. section 5.9). Although Rubanza does not agree with the group's use of force – that is starting riots, burning cars, throwing stones – he agrees with their opinions, as they have "*very strong reasons*" (Rubanza 2012: 6:03). Rubanza interprets these reasons, stating that "*both governments, the government of Tanganyika and the government of Zanzibar, they don't really tell the people the truth. Because people they don't see any kind of benefit or advantages of union. What they see*

73 Naasir elaborates that the cheated Karume got angry: "*so that time Karume he's angry, because he's strong, and he can do anything*" (Naasir 2011: 25:37). In the point of view of Naasir's interpretation, 'anything' also includes leaving the union. Due to Karume's death, however, history developed differently. Naasir continues: "*So our president here [Karume], he cut it out all the decision they make. So after that Nyerere he know this gentlemen is very strong, if he's not died, I don't get anything in Zanzibar to share*" (Ibid. 26:16).

74 Both Kigoma and Jaali describe the riots similar in their second interviews (Kigoma 2012; Jaali 2012).

is disadvantages. For example when the police come and shoot teargas" (Ibid. 6:48). This story enacts the same truth as the story about the unfair distribution of wealth and jurisdictions, or in Naasir's metaphor the story about mainland as the groom and Zanzibar as the bride. But furthermore it renders the Zanzibari government as taking part in keeping Zanzibar from becoming independent, and in being dishonest to its people.

The mainland as the origin of revolution

When remembering Marzuku's statement that the revolution came from mainland, and that only few ordinary Zanzibaris participated in the killings, another narrative seems to crystallize. Resonating the truth of the pan-African discourse, this narrative suggests that ASP/CCM from the very beginning sought a political connection to mainland Tanzania, as the revolutionaries already realized Zanzibar as being tied to the African continent by blood and geography. The narrative thus enacts the Zanzibari ASP/CCM government – and implicitly the revolution – as the main obstacles to the archipelago's independence. Hence, it implies that between Arab/British and mainland/ASP/CCM domination Zanzibar has only experienced one month of actual independence.

In this narrative Karume's role has shifted. From being the strong man protecting Zanzibari interests, he has here become a mainlander, who – in ethnic terms – is implicitly ascribed similar attributes to the mainland stereotype of being a liar and cheater. Adili states that Karume is not a real Zanzibari, because "*all Zanzibari origin for those who are coming here, say they are African Shirazi, African Shirazi, African Shirazi. Mapinduzi,*[75] *Karume was not African Shirazi. […] He was mainlander. Was coming from Malawi*" (Adili 2011b: 13:20). Adili's interpretation counters the official interpretation, and its attempt to rule out the distinction between 'mainland-Africans' and Zanzibari 'African Shirazi'. In reenacting the opposition between mainlanders and Zanzibaris, Adili's narrative categorizes 'true Zanzibaris' different from the official interpretation. But, similar to the official interpretation, the narrative draws the demarcating line between rightful Zanzibaris and non-Zanzibaris through the midst of Zanzibari society. This divide between 'real' Zanzibaris and those of mainland origin, can through other narrative fragments be interpreted as having both ethnic and racial traits.

Marzuku states accordingly "*in Zanzibar again, in Unguja, this island, you have people who mix with the mainlanders' background. And this is the people who really don't want*

75 Mapinduzi means revolution in Swahili.

Zanzibar to be, first of all separated from the mainland government" (Marzuku 2011: 1:03:00). This interpretation re-introduces a strong metaphor of ethnic distinctiveness (the stance towards the union) based on racial metaphors of descent and kinship (the mixing). As described above, ethnic and racial identity constructions often intertwine (cf. section 4.3). In thus linking mainland descent to Unguja Marzuku's interpretation furthermore indicates the spatial and political divides between the two main islands of Zanzibar. Simultaneously it echoes the discourses that render ethnicity and race as denominators for political stance, which ruled the political perceptions during the time of politics (cf. section 5.3).

Divide and rule

Several informants – Adili, Rubanza, Marzuku and Naasir – link the narrative of the development of the union to stories of the spatial division between Unguja and Pemba. They render how both the mainland and the revolutionary government performed narratives and politics that separated the two main islands of Zanzibar. The informant's interpretations thus function as counter narratives to the division they describe. Similar to the narrative of the development of the union, in these accounts also, both Nyerere/the mainland and the revolutionary government are enacted as antagonists of Zanzibari independence, which in the perspectives presented here can only be achieved through national unity. Therefore the stories again raise questions of the CCM government's legitimacy. With Bhabha in mind (cf. section 4.3.3), we can understand these stories as rendering alternate national narratives, questioning the official national narrative of revolutionary times.

These counter narratives seem to reflect another division in Zanzibari society, the political divide between CCM and CUF. Similar to the official narrative of colonization, this division renders allegations of injustice – now turned towards CCM –, which can be interpreted as partly represented in ethnic and partly in racial terms. Furthermore – and again parallel to the narrative of colonization –, these stories render an image of an oppressed majority and an oppressing minority. But, hence CCM's – and thus the revolutionary government's – role has shifted from being representatives of the oppressed majority to being the oppressing minority in Zanzibar, the inherent morality of these stories becomes a reversed version of the official narrative of colonization. All this shows that counter narratives of division also seem to render unity through oppositions; that also

they require images of antagonists,[76] which according to Hall's notion that identities are always constructed in opposition, is a general characteristic of identities (cf. section 4.2). Although the demarcating lines theoretically could be rendered differently, none of these narratives are suggesting forms of national unity that include all people claiming to be Zanzibaris.

Rubanza tells a counter narrative of division, stating that "*there was a kind of separation [...] Unguja and Pemba, and the source of this, the one who planted this kind seed of separation was Nyerere*" (Rubanza 2011: 56:38). The time of separation that Rubanza refers to are the years between the death of the first Karume in 1972 and the inauguration of the second Karume in 2000, who "*helped much to unite again people after being separated*" (Ibid. 1:04:48). This narrative of separation is entangled with the narrative of mainland colonization of Zanzibar. Also here Nyerere is rendered negatively, and synonymous with the mainland. Rubanza elaborates that the seed of separation was planted "*because they [the mainland] wanted to rule us. So divide and rule. So when they divided us it was easier for them to come and rule us. You see? Until now everything is from there, because they divided us from the beginning. So if it was together at the beginning they couldn't be able to come and rule us easily*" (Ibid. 59:12). Here it is the internal division between Unguja and Pemba that is rendered as the main obstacle to Zanzibari independence, and the reason for the archipelago still being under mainland domination. Although this narrative renders the division between Unguja and Pemba as overcome, it still enacts it as the origin of the prevailing mainland domination of Zanzibar.

Even though it was Nyerere who planted the seed of separation, according to this narrative it was the Zanzibari ASP/CCM-administration that enforced the division through symbolic violence. Rubanza remembers a speech by president Salmin Amour (r. 1990-2000), who stated "*Pembans are dogs*" (Ibid. 57:54). Furthermore, Rubanza remembers, that at this time "*if you are from Pemba you have no right. For example if you go to the office to apply for a job, then people know that your background from Pemba, they say: "No job. You can't be employed"*" (Ibid. 57:27). Rubanza's explanation of this marginalization can be interpreted in ethnic terms: Distinctiveness is here based on a positive categorization of Pembans' characteristics, as he states Pembans were at that time "*more educated* ", "*very hard working*", had "*more wealth*", and were thus able to create a life "*better than those Ungujans here*" (Ibid. 57:00). Furthermore, Rubanza's second order

76 In 2003 historians Leonhard Harding & Ludger Wimmelbücker stated that memories of the ASP and Nyerere became antagonistic images in the life story narratives of prominent (and mostly exiled) Zanzibaris (Harding & Wimmelbücker 2003: 18).

interpretation parallels the division between Ungujans and Pembans to the political division between CCM and CUF: "*at that time, if you are from Pemba they [the authorities] completely know you are CUF […] it means if you go to the office to apply for a job, they still don't give you, because they say CUF. So CUF was like a poison*" (Ibid. 1:03:35).

The story of division that Marzuku tells, resonates this linkage between a political and spatial divide. He tells that CCM marginalized Pembans, because they were afraid of loosing their dominance in Zanzibar. He states "*they [CCM] were scared you know, almost the whole island [of Pemba] is favor CUF, and they where thinking, okay if they don't divide it, these two island, the people from Zanzibar, they would think CUF and Pemba people they are right. So they have to bring memory of before [19]64. They have to bring the memory to say "ah don't worry about these CUF people, they paid from sultan, they want to bring sultan back to our country, they have the Arab financial""* (Marzuku 2011: 1:00:24). According to this story CCM rendered a linkage between Pembans and the official narrative of colonization's negative Arab stereotype in order to manipulate Zanzibaris to marginalize Pembans. As Marzuku states, to a degree the manipulation "*was making sense, because most of people who are Arab background, they go CUF, they love CUF*". But, the government's allegations of Pembans being in favor of Arab rule were not true (Ibid. 1:01:32). This narrative, although employed as a counter narrative to stories of division, reproduces the notion that in Zanzibar political stance equals descent, which can be ethnically or – as it is here – racially denominated.

While in the logic of this counter narrative Pembans are described as CUF supporters, Ungujans are not directly rendered as supporting CCM. Instead it is those who are of mixed mainland and Zanzibari origin who are (implicitly) rendered as CCM supporters. As Marzuku states, those of mixed origin "*don't like people from Pemba. Because people from Pemba and people originally from Zanzibar they one, one people. But the people who have background from mainland, but born in Zanzibar, this is the people who enjoy to separate people from Pemba and Unguja*" (Ibid. 1:03:24).

The counter narrative of spatial division thus represents Zanzibaris as those *originally* from Pemba *and* Unguja, and politically opposes this position of 'being Zanzibari' (and supporting CUF) to the position of 'having mainland descent' (and supporting CCM). Thereby it becomes a national counter narrative to the official national narrative of revolutionary times. This counter narrative opposes the official interpretation's ambiguous attempt to render the revolution as uniting Zanzibaris across ethnic (and racial) lines,

while it simultaneously inscribes a spatial divide between Zanzibar and the African continent. Naasir resonates this national counter narrative, when stating: "*People in Unguja and Pemba. We are the one, why you still, why you tell us, we are not the one. And even the people they know Zanzibar, Unguja and Pemba are the same thing. Because this is a two lovely island, so the people in here and in here are the same [-knocks on the table-]*" (Naasir 2011: 50:00). This sameness of Ungujans and Pembans he relates to their descent from Oman, as he states that "*people in this island and Oman are the same blood*" (Ibid. 12:04). Enabling blood-ties as a strong metaphor for the physical characteristics of a hard conception of race, this narrative enacts racial terminology to exclude people with mainland descent from 'being Zanzibari'. Instead it accuses mainlanders of wanting to divide Zanzibaris. This indicates how entangled the counter narrative of division is with the narrative of mainland colonization, and how in turn the narrative of mainland colonization can take shape of a narrative countering the legitimacy of the Zanzibari CCM government.

Precisely because it is entangled with narratives countering the union – rendered as mainland colonization – *and* narratives countering the revolutionary government – represented as the mainland government's extension – this counter narrative of division questions the present political reality in Zanzibar, where CCM is still in government, although in a coalition with CUF (cf. section 5.11). The counter narrative of division suggests that CCM's continued rule is not democratically legitimized. In its point of view CCM can solely hold its position because it still manipulates and divides people. This, Adili states, happens through brutal force, meaning that CCM employs the state apparatus of the union. As he states, "*CCM they harassing CUF. Purposely they are doing that. For the benefit of them. When you harass them they can't go to vote. When you harass them they can't go to vote. Like that. They are doing like that. Because they know that they can't get any seat, even here in Zanzibar*" (Adili 2011b: 21:18).[77] According to this CCM is actually a minority in present day Zanzibar, for whom it would be impossible to stay in power, if the vast majority – of CUF supporters – were allowed to vote. Hence, CCM stays in power, because its manipulation is supported by its mainland branch. As Adili states, CUF supporters are restrained from voting by the Tanzanian police force and army. During general elections, sometimes "*police are standing on the queue. Armies are standing on the queue*" (Ibid. 21:54). The introduction of the multi-party system in 1992 is thus rendered as not having altered the CCM regime's position. As Rubanza states, this is

77 Adili here uses Zanzibar as synonymous to Unguja. The name Zanzibar island is widely used when referring to Unguja (see for instance appendix 6).

because the "*only one ruling party*" makes sure that "*revolution is every day*" (Rubanza 2011: 49:40). This renders the revolution as an illegitimate act of gaining, and a process of continuously cementing, the government's ruling position.

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The narrative traces of the interviews suggest that Zanzibari society still suffers from major divisions, which can be interpreted as being represented along ethnic and racial lines. Such divisions are often at odds with the official narrative of a Zanzibari nation. While various narratives counter the CCM government's official interpretation, and the notion of the union as a national entity, there are no traces of a supra-ethnic and supra-racial national narrative rendering an independent Zanzibari nation. The informants do not seem to refer to any narrative that renders the divisions as completely overcome, which in recent history have torn Zanzibari society so violently apart. What comes closest to a supra-ethnic uniting narrative seems to be rendered through traces of narratives representing cultural unity in Zanzibar. Culture is here religiously defined, as based on Islam. The following section analyzes such stories of Zanzibari culture in the global now.

6.4 Narratives of 'being Zanzibari' in the global now

In all stories of what it means to be Zanzibari today, the notion of 'being Zanzibari' is rendered as inseparable from 'being Muslim'. All the informants state they believe in Islam, except Kigoma, who draws on a secular confessional notion of 'being Muslim'. The narrative of 'being Muslim' is linked to cultural practices based on dressing and behavioral codes, which it is depicted as inseparable from. As argued above, ethnic (cultural) and religious identifications thus intertwine. Thereby the narrative of 'being Muslim' renders a notion of Zanzibari identity that is supra-ethnic, as being Muslim is rendered more important than other ethnic differences. However, ethnic distinctiveness is not completely ruled out by this narrative, as Zanzibari culture is – with reference to the history of the archipelago as a multicultural melting pot – simultaneously represented as what could be called a 'creole culture'; a mixed culture characterized by traders and settlers from various parts of the world (cf. section 5.2).[78] Present day Zanzibari culture is then represented as utmost fragile, as in the global now Zanzibaris' ways of life are altered by processes of

78 As described in section 5.9 there are also different prevailing, and contested, notions of 'being Muslim' in Zanzibar, which the informants, however, do not comment on.

creolization, being produced by macro structures, such as flows of communication, commodities, capital, migration, tourists, aid-workers etc. (cf. section 5.11).

With reference to Eriksen's description of the problematic relationship between a supra-ethnic ideology of nationhood and an ideology of multiculturalism (cf. section 4.3.3), the following elaborates on how notions of Zanzibari culture are represented as oscillating between supra-ethnic and multicultural modes of interpretation. The final section then analyzes how present Zanzibari culture is represented as being under siege from global influences. Such influences of the global now question discourses of religious instructions in Zanzibar, which, as we shall see, also questions the interpretations of elders.

6.4.1 'Being Zanzibari': Stories of cultural differences and unity

Adili connects Zanzibari culture to 'being Muslim'. He states that "*the culture of Zanzibar is very difference here. Here are Muslim. We are Muslim. Mostly. Ninety-five percent is Muslim in Zanzibar* (Adili 2011b: 36:16). Although he does not state what culturally defines the remaining five percent of Zanzibaris, he makes clear that a "*Zanzibarian guy, he can't be a Christian*". He here makes a slight distinction between culture and religion, explaining that "*there is several culture, because Comorian they have their culture, Arabian they have their culture, and African they have their culture. But their all goals equal. They are all in Muslim culture*" (Ibid. 38:40). This renders Zanzibar as multicultural in terms of sub-cultures, which are linked to a superjacent culture that can be described as a supra-ethnic Zanzibari Muslim culture. Thus, notions of religion and culture are here represented as inseparable. But, the mode of explanation, which is ethnic in character, is somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand it *freezes* the distinctiveness of the sub-cultures it describes, which according to Eriksen is the danger of multiculturalism, while it on the other hand rules out their distinctiveness, which is the danger of a supra-ethnic ideology.

Kheri resonates this narrative of a superjacent religious culture, which can be described in supra-ethnic terms. He links it to notions of cultural virtues when stating that in Zanzibar "*everyone respect to each other, and that was making one culture of Zanzibar. Inside of this culture ninety-five percent is in my opinion, in Muslim culture. Like that. Even we have here Christianity, we have Hindu, we have other religion, but they looking for our culture, Zanzibar culture* (Kheri 2011b: 27:40). He initially defines respect as a trait of Zanzibari culture, which also includes other religions. However, in conclusively

defining Zanzibari culture as 'our culture' – that is Muslim culture – he primarily ties the notion of respect to being Muslim.[79]

But, what we can now state that the supra-ethnic notion of 'being Muslim' is not all there is to Zanzibari culture. Like Adili, Kheri also enacts a multicultural mode of explanation, stating that "*Zanzibar culture is mix culture*" (Ibid. 27:25). This he explains through a story of migration that creolized Zanzibari culture, telling that "*our parents come from real Zanzibar, but the parents of our parents […] they come from the India roots. So that is will be Indian. So coming here and change the culture, come up to this our last generation. Our parents generation, this is Zanzibari* (Ibid. 18:20). Kheri thus links the 'real' Zanzibari culture to his parents' generation, as he perceives the present day culture as being in decay. This narrative does not render Zanzibari culture as something that *is*, but rather in a softer conception as something that *has become* through the influence of immigrants, including Kheris' ancestors from India. Thereby the cultural stability becomes in this narrative rooted in cultural diversity (multiculturalism). Cultures imagined as stable (frozen) – i.e. Indian, Arab etc. cultures – have in the perspective of this narrative merged to create Zanzibar's culture. According to Kheri's interpretation this merging is primarily influenced by Arabic and Indian cultures, which for instance have brought certain dishes and clothes to the islands (Ibid. 30:30). Although Kheri interprets Zanzibar culture in soft terms, he also seeks to freeze this culture at the stage of becoming, imagined as most 'real' Zanzibari. This is a supra-ethnic mode of explanation that rules out further cultural influences. Thus, similar to Adili, Kheri also enacts an interpretation ambivalently oscillating between the two poles of the problematic relationship between supra-ethnic and multicultural explanations.

Jamal tells a story of a merging of cultures similar to Kheri, but emphasizes what he sees as the cultural hegemony of Islam. He states that "*people they had different culture, because they were brought from different area. But when they came here, then they find only one culture* (Jamal 2011: 1:09:07). The culture he refers to is Muslim culture that was brought to Zanzibar by Arab colonizers. Zanzibaris were not Muslim before the Arabs came, "*because the people of the island from country of East Africa*" (Ibid. 6:19). Contrary to Kheri's narrative version of a creolized Zanzibari culture, Jamal's narrative seems situated somewhere between the pan-African discourse that by kinship and geography links Zanzibar to the African continent and the discourse that renders Zanzibar as part of

79 Also Jaali's account echoes these intertwined notions of 'being Muslim' linked to behavioral traits. As he states, "*we can say that because for all, for our rule Muslim, we know that all Muslim are like friendly*" (Jaali 2011: 14:47). As we have seen above, this religious, supra-ethnic mode of explanation, renders behavioral traits as what differentiates Zanzibaris from the non-Muslim mainlanders (cf. section 6.3.2).

an Arab civilization (cf. section 5.3). This narrative thus argues that the Arab colonizers through Islam positively influenced Zanzibar and its East-African population. Although this narrative enacts a supra-ethnic notion of Muslim culture, it also echoes the pan-African discourse's racial categorizations of Africans and Arabs.

Echoing racial categorizations, Naasir describes Zanzibari unity in multicultural and multiracial terms. He states that "*in this island people are mixture like … like you know if you dealing with the salad […] all the vegetables they mix*" (Naasir 2011: 50:38). Naasir thus narrates Zanzibari unity through the merging of ethnic and racial differences. In his interpretation of Zanzibari unity, differences are transcended through creolization, including mixed marriages and mixed offspring, like himself. This narrative thus utilizes racial and ethnic categorizations, while simultaneously disregarding their importance, as all Zanzibaris are 'mixed', and thus equal.

Naasir's narrative seems to be the strongest counter narrative proponent for a united, independent Zanzibari nation. However, as argued, nations need demarcating boundaries (cf. section 4.3.3), and as we have seen, this narrative only becomes effective, when the Zanzibari nation is demarcated from the mainland. As Naasir furthermore stresses Zanzibar's relation to the Omani heartland (cf. section 6.3.3), this narrative seems to draw heavily on the ZNP narrative of the time of politics, and thus on the discourse of Arab civilization (cf. section 5.3).

Furthermore, as argued in section 6.3.3, the role of the mainland – as being the main antagonist of Zanzibari national unity and independence – is in several stories paralleled to the role of the CCM government. This also in Marzuku's account on Zanzibari cultural unity. When asked whether he agrees with the metaphor describing Zanzibar as a bowl of salad, Marzuku states that Zanzibaris are the same "*in feeling*", but "*the government since [19]64 they hurt this feeling. They hurt this feeling, and because they hurt this feeling, would take probably another ten years to make this people mix in this, what you are talking about, bowl of salad. […] We can be very close, very friendly, but when you come inside like a married, still there is partition*" (Marzuku 2011: 1:15:00). Hence, this narrative does not seem to provide a position of 'being Zanzibari' detached from any other ethnic or racial adjectives.

These examples show that notions of 'being Zanzibari' oscillate between representations of differences and unity – between multiculturalism and supra-ethnic nationalism – which cannot be detached from historical narratives, including those discussed in the preceding sections of this analysis.

6.4.2 Outside influences and hegemonies of interpretation

Despite the diverging narratives on Zanzibari national unity, representations of Muslim culture seem to remain constant parts of attempts to define Zanzibari culture. However, present-day Zanzibari, Muslim culture is by several of the informants described as being altered by outside influences. In this case the primary source of outside influence is tourism. But, also the television, the Internet and Zanzibaris' increased mobility contribute to what Kheri describes as the decay of Zanzibari culture. The outside influences show alternative ways of life, which the young generations copy, thus no longer following the elder's instructions on how to live in a Zanzibari, Muslim way. This final section of the analysis present stories of tourist influences, which is primarily rendered in ethnic terms, as cultural distinctiveness (cf. section 4.3.1), while subsequently arguing how outside influences question the elder's modes of interpreting Zanzibari culture.

Influences of tourism and foreign investments

The narratives of tourist influence render a clear distinction between 'tourist times', and 'times prior to tourism'. The main interpretation that is resonated in these narratives represents Zanzibari culture as being in order before tourists came and then being disordered through the influence they enacted. There is no exact date that demarcates these two periods, but as we have seen above, Zanzibar society began to open itself after Karume's assassination in 1972, while during the 1980s allowing foreign investments and greater numbers of tourists to enter the islands (cf. section 5.8).[80]

Regarding the influence of tourists, Jamal states that "*now days is Zanzibarian people they try to change dressing. Because they look how people from other countries wearing. […] I can say in that time they [ladies] covered like this good dressing. But now they change* (Jamal 2011: 2:34). Rubanza tells a story of sexual behavior that resonates this image of how tourism influences Zanzibari society negatively. He states, "*at that time in Zanzibar the number of prostitution was very low, but now, and number of gays, there was no gays but now many gays. You see? So maybe gays from Italy, because Italy are dangerous [-laughs-]*" (Rubanza 2011: 1:39:00). In naming homosexuality, Rubanza here resonates one theme of a counter narrative of tourism that, with reference to Roman Loimeier, could be described as "*an effort to discredit the rather liberal tourist policies of*

80 Roman Loimeier points out that Karume enacted strict regulations for tourism and tourists, e.g. allowances to run hotels and bars, sell alcohol, dress-codes etc. These rules were loosened after his death (Loimeier 2011: 24ff). Thus, the 'times prior to tourism' might be regarded as the period of Karume's rule.

the revolutionary government" (Loimeier 2011: 20). Other themes of this narrative are drugs and alcohol.[81] In the counter narrative of tourism neither uncovered women nor homosexuals correspond to the notion of decent cultural and religious behavior that Jamal and Rubanza refer to; both stories draw on a discourse of Zanzibari culture that links culture to religious instructions.

Furthermore, foreign investments are influencing Zanzibari culture. As Kigoma tells, "*I remember, when I come first time, I come to Paje, Bwejuu,*[82] *I used to go on the beach. I wait for fishermen coming, they sell us, you know, fish and octopus. Was very cheap. But now is no easy. When you go beach, they don't sell for you. If they know you very well they can sell, but expensive. Some people they buy big hotel, so big money. No can no afford to buy the fish*" (Kigoma 2011: 17:17). According to this story, the capitalist ideology of supply and demand has altered the way of life in Paje and Bwejuu. Kheri also remembers life in Paje while he grew up. He states, at "*that times Paje is very friendly for everyone. And it was good life that time. Not commercial like that. Now everyone looking for commercial. […] That times no hotel. Only one restaurant to drink the village chai, only. And one Arab people who's serving kahava, coffee.* (Kheri 2011b: 26:18). In these stories the capitalist influence that came with the economic neo-liberal era, is depicted as having altered the culture, as a way of life (cf. section 1.3), but also in terms of cultural attributes of behavior (which links it to ethnicity); while people before where friendly and generous to each other, they are now depicted as more selfishly following the capitalist rules of supply and demand.

Stories contesting the elder's interpretations

As argued at the beginning of this analysis, almost all my informants refer to elders as the source of their counter narratives of revolution, and post-revolutionary times (cf. section 6.1). Moreover, they refer to elders as the source of knowledge about a righteous Muslim, Zanzibari way of life. Several state that Muslim ways of life are the most important values to teach their own children (Kheri 2011b: 11:00; Jamal 2011: 16:06). Again linking culture to religion, Rubanza states that "*everyone is proud of his or her own culture. And he wants it to persist much longer for the new generation to come and copy*" (Rubanza 2011: 1:39:27). However, the elders' positions as role models for the righteous way of life, is

81 Loimeier also remarks that Italian tourists have "*acquired an extremely bad reputation*" for their behavior, which is seen as disrespectful (Loimeier 2011: 20).

82 The villages of Paje and Bwejuu are approximately 1,5 kilometers apart.

in the global now contested by the outside influences of tourism, television, internet etc. Here stories are told that render alternative ways of life. So, as the narrative of cultural decay seems to state – here articulated by Rubanza – maybe soon all Zanzibaris "*are completely tourists*" (Ibid. 1:39:46).

The narrative of cultural decay is also a counter narrative that seeks to conserve Zanzibari culture *as it is*. As Kheri states, "*to save the culture, first you need to educate this young generation. To follow straight way, instead to follow the wrong way. […] that means religion way, our cultures it be like this, not like this*" (Kheri 2011b: 8:47). He sees the protection of culture as a task for the government, as it is very hard for individuals to do anything about the outside influences. That is, "*because of this entertainment of television, you see, Internet, now mobile phones, you can find everything in mobile phones. You can find anywhere this Internet café, and television to watch, and magazine, and then it is free zone, is not like before. Before it was very, even the government before is very strict for that things. But now it is a free zone* (Ibid. 5:39). Kheri here again establishes a temporal opposition between now and then, before the opening of society. He further tells, how he instructs the youngsters "*if you watch TV, just watch don't follow*" (Ibid. 12:12). But, Kheri adds that the young generation does not listen to such instructions, "*they're going to follow everything, even the cloth. They're looking for what stile there in the world now*" (Ibid. 13:33). Because of this, he depicts Zanzibari culture as being in decay.

Kigoma's account counters Kheri's interpretation of the decay of culture. Although he also states how life was easier in the times before tourist influences, he represents another notion of Zanzibari culture in the global now. Kigoma's representation of Zanzibari culture renders it as open to outside influences. He rests this on his own experience, as he states "*I live Europe, I live here, I know both*" (Kigoma 2011: 3:43). He has experienced alternative ways of life, which he prefers to instruction bound notions of a Zanzibari, Muslim way of life: "*The old people, they mix up with religion and stuff like that, it's no good it's bad*" (Ibid. 5:37). He thus questions Kheri's interpretation of a linkage between instructions of Islam and Zanzibari culture, i.e. the above discussed notion that "*if you going to follow the rule of Muslim's culture, straightly you come in Zanzibar culture*" (Kheri 2011b: 10:50).

In this, however, Kigoma does not dismiss the linkage between Muslim and Zanzibari identity, instead he presents an alternate narrative of what it means to be Muslim and Zanzibari. About this version of a Zanzibari cultural narrative he states, "*we are Muslim, we say we are Muslim, but we are free. The woman they're free. If they want, they cover,*

if they don't want they don't" (Kigoma 2011: 47:43). This narrative thus counters the interpretations of a Zanzibari way of life as a righteous Muslim way of life, and thereby also the elders' interpretation of how to life.

*

How the narratives described here draw on discourses, and how these are nourished, and contested in discursive formations, will be the topic of the following discussion.

7. Discussion

7.1 The focus of the discussion

The previous chapter analyzed how the informants' interpretations of Zanzibar's recent past employ stories to render identity constructions. In order to analyze the roles constructions of ethnic, racial, national and religious identities play in these interpretations, the narrative traces of the interviews were interpreted as fragments of social narratives drawing on discursive structures of meaning. While the previous chapter has primarily analyzed the eight informants' interpretations, this final chapter will now discuss how the discourses, which the employed narratives draw on, are nourished in contemporary times by global flows of meaning.

The discussion will be based on the interrelation of narratives and discourses, described in section 1.4. Accordingly, the question is here, what discursive macro structures seem to fortify the relatively localized counter narratives in Zanzibar. Or, when the question is stated calling Hall's terminology to mind (cf. section 1.4.1): How are the discourses that the counter narratives draw on attempting to make themselves true in present-day Zanzibar?

As the analysis of contested memories has shown, discourses of Zanzibar's recent past have not been able to form any discursive formations that come close to Hall's definition of a regime of truth. A truth regime would make other discursive formations unthinkable in Zanzibar. Both the official interpretations and various counter narratives are articulated in the interviews, and as long as they can possibly be articulated they are *thinkable*, and thus part of contesting discursive formations. This section then discusses the discourses that are drawn on in relation to discursive formations that nourish, but also contest, them.

7.2 A religious discursive formation countering the union

Most of the informants state that since *muafaka* – the formation of the CCM-CUF coalition in 2010 – the historical struggles they describe have been eased. But, as primarily the 2012 interviews suggest, one of the strongest proponent of contemporary counter narratives is the religio-political activist group Uamsho (Jaali 2012; Rubanza 2012; Kigoma 2012). Motivated by religion and nationalism, the counter narratives promoted by this group challenge the revolutionary government – especially its interpretation of Islam

– and the union of Tanzania. The group's Islamic revivalism is influenced by teachings from the Gulf States (cf. section 5.9; section 5.11).

Uamsho's counter narrative seems to draw on discourses that render a 'right' interpretation of Islam, while linking Zanzibari religious distinctiveness to nationalism. These discourses influence both the informants' critical stances towards the union of Tanzania and Kheri's nostalgic memorization of a moral-religious way of Zanzibari life, which he positions in contrast to the secular government's tolerance of contemporary cultural decay (cf. section 6.4.3). In a global perspective, these localized discourses can be understood as entangled in a religious discursive formation that comprises discourses of various local and global influences.

Remaining in this global perspective, the religious discursive formation that inspires the religio-political nationalist counter narratives in Zanzibar is confronted by what could be called a discursive formation of 'the global fear of radical Islam', which since September 11. 2001, and the terror bombings of 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London, has been fueled by media coverage and political debates in the US, Europe and elsewhere.[83] A recent example of how UK media coverage links Zanzibari Islamic revival to this discursive formation of the global fear of radical Islam is provided by the December 29. 2012 *Financial Times* article "Radical Islam puts Zanzibar's relaxed way of life in jeopardy".[84] The article reports a spread of Wahhabi madrassas in Zanzibar, which are founded by Saudi Arabia. It relates this to a supposed spread of radical Islam, as "*Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations draw their thinking from Wahhabism*" (Manson 2012). The revolutionary government draws on this global discursive formation of fear, when stating that groups like Uamsho are terrorists (Turner 2009: 242).[85]

However, although the religious discursive formation that fuels Zanzibari Islamic revival is influenced by the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, it seems rash to simply identify it as promoting the doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism, or Salafism.[86] The majority of

83 In 2007 Talal Asad writes about this fear in the US, Europe and Israel, stating that "*our media and our political potboilers remain obsessed with the ruthlessness of jihadists and the dangers of an unreformed Islam*" (Asad 2007: 95). In this discursive formation "*the suicide bomber*" is "*the icon of an Islamic "culture of death."*" (Ibid. 1).

84 It is interesting how this article builds on the tourist discourse notion of a "relaxed way of life" in Zanzibar, without taking any notice of neither the continuous rule of an authoritarian regime, nor the struggles and hardships of everyday life, which the informants account for (Manson 2012).

85 Researcher in international development studies Simon Turner states that the Islamic revivalist scholars are primarily young people. Thus, "*by construing young people as easily manipulated the government is able to establish that revivalism is an exogenous problem, implying that it is the Wahabis from Saudi Arabia who are using the vulnerable and susceptible young scholars to promote their fundamentalist Islam in Zanzibar rather than a problem emanating from within Zanzibar society itself*" (Turner 2009: 254).

86 As political scientist Stephane Lacroix notes, "*one has to be very careful when using the word "Wahhabism," which in recent decades has become more of a political anathema than a suitable tool for the social scientist*" He defines "*"Wahhabism"as the religious tradition developed over the centuries by the 'ulama' of the official Saudi religious*

Zanzibaris so far prefer localized forms of Islamic practice (cf. section 5.9), and none of the informants consulted in this study identified themselves as Salafis. Neither did they mention rigid religious orthodoxy as an ideal for a Zanzibari, Muslim way of life. In fact, all informants stressed freedom of religion, and tolerance between religions as an integral characteristic of Zanzibari culture. When the informants stress the observance of Islamic rules, they link this to localized notions of religious piety, which are pivotal to their interpretations of such Zanzibari culture.

Clearly the question remains, whether interviews with other Zanzibaris would have revealed traces of orthodox Salafi thinking, which might be the case. But, the important point here is that the informants' narratives in various ways, but similar to Uamsho, counter the revolutionary government's rule and/or the union through communications of Zanzibari religious distinctiveness (cf. section 6.4.1). Thus, the informants and Uamsho draw on a similar religious discursive formation, rendering Zanzibar as a righteous Muslim nation independent from the mainland. Both the piety in the narratives of a Muslim Zanzibar and their rendering of the mainland as a religious 'other' might partly be inspired by Salafi orthodoxy. But this is by far the only discursive influence that these narratives draw on. As Jaali's and Jamal's interpretations of the stereotyped mainlanders show (cf. section 6.3.2), the counter narratives of the union are heavily influenced by discourses rendering religion as an distinctive ethnic form. Besides notions of piety, this distinctiveness is thus linked to cultural, behavioral traits – as for instance dishonesty – which have only indirect relation to religious rules.

These observations make it possible to argue that counter narratives of the union are nurtured by a religious discursive formation that in the global now is partly influenced by outside interpretations of Islam, including Salafism,[87] and likewise by various local discourses on religious piety, including Sufism.[88] But, the discursive formation also to a considerable extent includes discourses rendering cultural, behavioral codes, both primarily described in what can be called ethnic terms (cf. section 6.3.2). The truth claim of this discursive formation is contested by the government's interpretation of the religious revival, which is linked to the discursive formation of the global fear of radical Islam. Thus,

establishment founded by the heirs of Muhammad' Abda l-Wahhab", and notes that "*the Wahhabis never refer to themselves as such*", instead they "*use the terms* Salafi *(with reference to* al-salaf al-salih *or pious ancestors) or* Ahl al-Tawhid *(People professing the absolute unity of God)* (Lacroix 2004: 345).

87 It is here important to remember that besides the religious establishment, and "*Salafi-Jihadi*" hardliners, there are in Saudi Arabia also reformist who over the last decades have been "*expressing unprecedented criticism of the Wahhabi religious orthodoxy*" (Lacroix 2004: 346).

88 The majority of Tanzanian Muslims, including the majority of Zanzibaris, practice various versions of Sufi-Islam (Lodhi & Westerlund 1999).

"*[t]oday Islam is linked to only one of Zanzibar's political competitors, CUF, and this serves to further associate CCM with mainland Tanzania*" (Brown 2010: 624). This has resulted in a deepened political divide between CCM and CUF, as well as between Zanzibar and the mainland.

While the religious discursive formation gains effectiveness on a local scale in Zanzibar, the discursive formation of the fear of radical Islam has since September 11. 2001 proven to be highly effective in its rendering of truth on a global scale. In some spheres it might even have become a regime of truth.[89]

The following section elaborates the religious discursive formation's merging with national discourses.

7.3 National discourses and discursive formations

As the analysis has shown, the discourses that the official national narrative draws on render the revolution as both a legitimate overthrow of the Arab dominance and the origin of the Zanzibari nation. These discourses are too discrepant to merge in a concurrent discursive formation, rendering a national narrative in what Benedict Anderson calls homogeneous, empty time (cf. section 4.3.3).

Instead of enacting the revolution as the origin of a Zanzibari nation, the national counter narratives draw on various discourses rendering national traces in history. For instance, there is the discourse that Naasir draws on, representing Zanzibar as a racial and ethnically mixed nation that sprang from times of peaceful coexistence between a (somewhat mythical) native population and Arab seafarers. Another discourse, drawn on by Adili and Kigoma, renders the independence in 1963 as the origin of a liberated Zanzibari nation (cf. section 6.2.2). This origin is mythical in as far as it renders a long national history in which the foreign domination of an indigenous nation found a *peaceful* end. Parallel to the liberation processes in other parts of East Africa – e.g. in Tanganyika –, the liberation of Zanzibar does in this discourse not imply a negative relationship to former rulers. This is seen in Adili's account, as he states that on the day of independence prominent British officials were present: "*Duke of Edinburgh was coming [...] from England. He come here. And Sir George Mooring, the governor of Zaznibar*" (Adili 2011b:

89 In regards to Zanzibar the influences of the discursive formation of a fear of radical Islam could historically be paralleled to the fear of communism. Accordingly, professor of development studies Haroub Othman remarks that especially the US was anxious that the revolution might in Zanzibar lead to communism, and thus pushed towards the formation of the union of Tanzania in order to contain communism (Othman 1995: 173).

6:56).[90] Meanwhile, this discourse suggests that considerable parts of the Zanzibari population accepted the continued presence of the sultan as a constitutional monarch. As the sultanate somewhat marks an era of a Zanzibari empire, this can be linked to a discourse of "*colonial nostalgia in Zanzibar*" (Bissell 2005: 215).

This discourse of nostalgia can be seen to merge with other national and historic discourses, forming a discursive formation that links pre-revolutionary, and also pre-independence, times to the discursive formation of religious piety, describing a mythical past of what Kehri terms a 'real' Zanzibari culture (cf. section 6.4.1). This nostalgic-national-religious discursive formation renders a Zanzibari nation that was strong, independent, and built on Muslim ideals.

Similar to the official interpretation, this discursive formation can only be effective when it renders parts of Zanzibari history forgotten, namely both the colonial violence – including slavery – and the marginalization of political opponents (primarily the ASP) in the one-month of independence (cf. section 5.2). Its truth claim might, however, prove more effective than the official interpretation, as it is not marked by a single violent rupture, such as the revolution. Instead it describes a rather harmonious process that was abruptly ended by the violent illegitimate revolution, which is linked to outside influences from the mainland.

Furthermore, contrary to the official narrative of colonization the nostalgic-national-religious discursive formation does not draw on racial categorization as a marker of Zanzibari identity. But, as it is partly inspired by the discourse that renders Zanzibar as part of an Arab Indian Ocean civilization, it draws some ethnically denominated lines between islanders and mainlanders, which have the potential to excessively problematize the imagination of an independent Zanzibari national community.

The question then remains, what future the counter narrative suggests, drawing on this discursive formation. If the recently began negotiations about a reform of the Tanzanian constitution – allowing Zanzibar more autonomy (Enonchong 2012) – do not make progress in such a degree that it meets the opposition's demands, one possible future could be a new revolution. In case a future counter narrative would ever materialize in a new revolution – violently or not – it would then most probably be told as a legitimate overthrow of the mainland domination in Zanzibar. In the global discursive formation of fear, it would surely be interpreted as another country falling into the hands of radical Islam.

90 Sir Arthur George Rixson Mooring was the official British resident in Zanzibar from 1959-1963 (Cook & LSE Library 2006: 141).

Conclusion

In this thesis I have analyzed the role of ethnic, racial, national and religious identity constructions in contemporary narratives on Zanzibar's recent past. Based on my informants' accounts I have traced narratives that render various images of Zanzibari identity. Some of these narratives support, and others contest, official interpretations of the revolution of 1964, and of pre- and post-revolutionary times. I understand the official narratives as the revolutionary government's attempts to establish institutionalized history as cultural memory, e.g. through teachings in schools, television programs, celebrating public holidays etc. In my informants' articulations of Zanzibari identity various narratives enact identity constructions that often draw on discourses nourished in the times of colonization and the time of politics leading up to the revolution.

With reference to my informants' accounts I argue that Zanzibar is a *de facto* multicultural society and that both official and counter narratives often draw lines of difference through the middle of this society in order to establish notions of Zanzibari identity. In this the narratives reconstruct old conflicts and foster new ones, while their *effects* materialize in actions of violence and counter violence in contemporary Zanzibar.

As for the traces of the official interpretations, two official narratives crystallize in my informants' accounts. The first is a *narrative of colonization* that legitimates the revolutionary violence by stereotyping Arabs in ethnic and racial terms as brutal oppressors of an African majority. The second is a *national narrative* that seeks to establish a collective forgetting of revolutionary violence in order to narrate a Zanzibari nation united across ethno-racial lines.

However, while attempting to establish a national history, the official interpretation of revolution draws on discourses that are too incongruous to be merged in a roughly concurrent discursive formation. The official interpretation is thus problematic due to its simultaneous attempt to render revolutionary violence forgotten *and* to establish the

revolution as a mythical origin of the nation. Both attempts are furthermore contested by communicative memories of revolution. The ASP/CCM government's attempts at silencing oppositional voices – including both Zanzibaris who feel like and identify as Arabs, and witnesses of revolution and revolutionary times – have proven especially problematic. As revolutionary times endure, every Zanzibari potentially becomes a contemporary witness producing communicative counter memories. The considerable extent of the production of counter memory is arguably linked to the fact that many Zanzibaris are connected to the revolution's victims by kin- or friendship. This is so due to the proportion of the revolution's violence, killings and expulsions. After almost fifty years the ethno-racial violence of revolutionary times has thus proven too *remembered* to be established as the origin of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial nation. Or in other words, the revolution has proven too important to be *forgotten*.

I encountered counter narratives that conflict with the official narratives in various, and sometimes discrepant, ways. Nonetheless some relatively consistent counter narratives crystallize in and across the interviews. When focusing on contemporary times, these narratives challenge not only the revolutionary government, but also the political structure of the United Republic of Tanzania, a union formed between Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964. I found traces of particularly three intertwined narratives that I term *counter narratives of the union*. They all somewhat resonate the official narrative of colonization, but they redefine its character-actor relationships, point of view, and thus its inherent morality. The first of these counter narratives is a *narrative of the union as a colonial relationship*, in which Zanzibar is understood as colonized by mainland Tanzania. The second is a *narrative of the origin of the union*, which renders Tanganyika as having tricked Zanzibar into forming the union. The third is a *narrative of the mainland as the origin of revolution*, describing the revolution as a means of the mainland to dominate Zanzibar. All these narratives negatively stereotype a 'mainland other' as opposed to Zanzibari independence. Meanwhile, they link 'being Zanzibari' to 'being Muslim', which is described in ethnic terms of cultural distinctiveness. Although other *narratives of Zanzibari culture* often stress Zanzibar's multicultural and multi-religious character – including the mutual respect of the others' ways of life – the counter narratives of the union draw demarcating lines between 'indigenous' Zanzibaris and those of mainland, or in racial terms 'mixed mainland', origins. Thus, I argue that constructions of otherness in Zanzibar are in various ways based on the logics of ethnic, racial, national and religious categorizations, which play distinct, but intersecting, roles in rendering Zanzibari

identities.

On a political scale the counter narratives find support in the main opposition party, CUF, and the Islamic opposition in Zanzibar, which consists of revivalist activist groups, including one named Uamsho. During the latest couple of months Uamsho has demonstrated extensively against what the group describes as the secular government and the illegitimate union. In December 2012 these demonstrations have caused the first casualty of a political gathering since the CCM government decided to form a coalition with CUF in 2010. The cold civil war that has prevailed in Zanzibar since the 1980s thus recently turned hot again.

To paraphrase my introductory quotation (cf. page 4) I understand these recent events as material effects of both official and counter narratives that have informed Zanzibari lives in dangerous ways, as they are focusing on ex- rather than inclusion. In contrast to these narratives I also witnessed how Zanzibaris both articulate and *live* narratives of cultural inclusion, respect and openness towards each other, and towards mainlanders. Such narratives could serve as an important tool in producing Zanzibari identities that include all members of society.

Suggestions for further investigations

Paraphrasing Arthur W. Frank (2010), my intention with this thesis is to let stories breathe that interpret Zanzibar's recent past. Such an effort obviously produces as many questions as it answers, as well as leaving many aspects open. Furthermore, the scope of this study has been limited in various ways, including the small number of informants consulted, and interviewing men only. Accordingly, there is much room for further investigations on contemporary contested memories in Zanzibar. Deriving from the insights I got working with this thesis, I will in this final section give some suggestions for further studies.

The first suggestions are of a methodological kind, extending my analytical scope. They concern the question what I would include if I were to do another investigation of the theme. The latter suggestion is of a thematic kind, proposing a possible field of study that is related to the approach of this thesis.

The questions of contested memories in Zanzibar could be investigated through multiple perspectives besides those already employed. As indicated, commemorative rituals are an important aspect of how societies remember, and serve as a means to institutionalize history (cf. section 4.4.1). It might therefore be analytically beneficial to include an analysis of how rituals perform memory, e.g. focusing on the Liberation Day on January 12. Such an analytical focus could emphasize the *techniques of power* through which the official interpretation seeks to make itself 'true', and how these techniques are contested by counter practices. The results of such an analysis could be compared with the narratives I found in order to show how they resonate and contest each other. Methodologically such an investigation would include participant observations, a method that is an integrated part of the practice theoretical approach (cf. Rubow 2003).

When investigating the power at play in contested memories in Zanzibar, it would be helpful to utilize discourse analysis as a method, for instance critical discourse analysis (cf.

Jäger 2001). Through inductive reasoning I have investigated traces of discourses found in narratives, but a critical discourse analysis could provide a methodological toolbox for analyzing discourses in their 'entirety', serving as a somewhat deductive method. A critical discourse analysis of contested memories could be based on media products, schoolbooks, the oppositions' information pamphlets and other texts that circulate in Zanzibar. It would provide a detailed schema of prevailing discourses and discursive formations about Zanzibari identity and history, which would also supplement this thesis' findings with more detailed understandings of the modes of power at play in the narratives.

As for the thematic focus, I suggest further studies to investigate the role of tourism in relation to identity constructions in Zanzibar. Tourists, and especially problems deriving from tourism, have been widely addressed in my interviews, and have been discussed peripherally in this study as well as in other studies (Bissell 2005; Loimeier 2006b; Loimeier 2011; Loimeier 2012). These studies and my interviews indicate that there is a problematic relationship between Zanzibar's economic dependency on tourism and a fear of cultural decay through outside influences. While notions of, and stances towards, tourism might thus make identity constructions in Zanzibar problematic, there is to my knowledge no study so far that focuses primarily on the role of tourism in regard to identity constructions. Several questions remain unanswered. For instance, there is no study analyzing how people position themselves within the conflicting narratives and discourses of Zanzibar being a hakuna matata island welcoming tourists and of Zanzibar being a society based on Muslim piety.[91] Or, it remains unanswered how the narratives of the tourist otherness relate to other representations of outsiders, e.g. mainlanders' otherness. Especially the questions remain what futures narratives critical of tourism suggest, and how these recently constructed narratives influence the political, cultural and socio-economic developments of Zanzibar.

My suggestions given here are meant to inspire further investigations, and do not intend to exclude any other perspectives on Zanzibari identities and memories. I hope that studies, which similar to my thesis address these issues, open Zanzibari history to further interpretations. Such studies not only produce knowledge, they also invite their participants to articulate – and thus reflect on – their past, present and future. Thus they are a step towards greater narrative and interpretational openness in Zanzibar, and elsewhere.

91 Roman Loimeier (2011) is peripherally concerned with the question of tourism and Muslim piety, but he focuses on the Islamic revivalist groups exclusively.

Appendix

Abstracts

Danish abstract

Specialet undersøger med udgangspunkt i relevante teoridannelser, hvilken rolle etniske (Eriksen 1991), racemæssige (Hall 1996b), nationale (Anderson 2006; Bhabha 1990; Eriksen 1994) og religiøse (de Vries 2008) identitetskonstruktioner spiller i nutidige narrativer (Frank 2010; Horsdal 2012) om Zanzibars nyere historie. Undersøgelsen er baseret på spor af narrativer, der er fundet i kvalitative interviews (Brinkmann & Kvale), i hvilke otte Zanzibariske mænd fortolker deres øgruppes historie.

Zanzibars historie har i århundreder været præget af fremmed dominans, kolonisering og slavehandel. Forud for uafhængigheden i 1963 havde landet oplevet en periode af national vækkelse, der var præget af debatter om tilhørsforhold. Øernes befolkning blev her af forskellige nationalistiske grupperinger beskrevet som opdelt i etnicitets- og racekategorier, der blev sat lig med politisk tilhørsforhold i et stadig mere splittet politisk spektrum. En måned efter uafhængigheden blev den nyligt dannede regering væltet i en voldelig opstand, der, kendt som revolutionen i 1964, ledte til optøjer hvor tusinder blev dræbt. De revolutionære anklagede regeringen for at sikre den arabiske sultans fortsatte styre og dermed i deres øjne også undertrykkelsen af en afrikansk majoritet, som blev fornægtet deres fødselsret til øerne. Umiddelbart efter revolutionen indgik den revolutionære regering aftale om at forene Zanzibar og Tanganyika i den Forenede Republik Tanzania (Glassman 2000; 2011; Loimeier 2006a; 2011; 2012; Sheriff 1994; 2001).

Dette speciale undersøger erindringer, der er artikuleret i officielle narrativer om disse begivenheder, og i narrativer, der udfordrer de officielle fortællinger. Regeringen har siden

1964 med magt forsøgt at bringe fortællinger til tavshed, der går imod den officielle historiefortolkning. Kampe mod oppositionen har af flere omgange medført massive dødstal. Både de officielle historiefortællinger og modfortællingerne konstruerer forskellige etniske, racemæssige, nationale og religiøse identiteter, der inkluderer dele af Zanzibars befolkning mens andre dele udelukkes. Således analyseres, hvordan identitetskonstruktioner performes i omkæmpede erindringer, og der argumenteres for, hvordan disse skaber splid i nutidens Zanzibar.

Specialet konkluderer, at forholdet til den Tanzaniske union aktuelt danner rammen om nogle af de mest omkæmpede fortolkninger af Zanzibariske identiteter, hvor divergerende synsvinkler fremføres af hhv. regeringen og en islamisk opposition. I oktober 2012 har demonstrationer mod unionen medført atter et dødsfald i politiske magtkampe på Zanzibar

English abstract

Drawing on relevant theories, this thesis analyzes the role of ethnic (Eriksen 1991), racial (Hall 1996b), national (Anderson 2006; Bhabha 1990; Eriksen 1994) and religious (de Vries 2008) identity constructions in contemporary narratives on Zanzibar's recent past. This analysis is based on traces of narratives found in qualitative interviews (Brinkmann & Kvale) with eight Zanzibari men interpreting their islands' history.

For centuries Zanzibar's history has been marked by foreign domination, colonization and slave trade. When the country in 1963 achieved its independence, it had experienced a period of national awakening that fostered debates resulting in a political divide in which ethnic and racial identification became linked to political stance. One month after independence the newly inaugurated first democratically elected government was violently overthrown in what is known as the revolution of 1964. The revolutionaries accused the government of securing the prolonged rule of the Arabic sultan and thus in their opinion the oppression of an African majority, denying them their birthright to the islands. Shortly after the revolution the revolutionary government united Zanzibar with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania (Glassman 2000; 2011; Loimeier 2006a; 2011; 2012; Sheriff 1994; 2001).

This thesis investigates memories articulated in official and counter narratives about these events. It then analyzes how contested memories construct identities and argues how these cause divisions in contemporary Zanzibar.

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Miscellaneous appendixes

Appendix 1: Time line of Zanzibari history



Appendix 2: Social and economic factors as gatekeepers

In regard to this study, societal structures in Zanzibar somehow operated as gatekeepers, as they in several ways influenced with whom I could talk. Thus, remembering Horsdal's point on the relation between narrative voice and power (cf. section 1.3), I here comments on the social and material factors that produce Zanzibaris' possibility and capability to participate in the interviews. In other words the section sketches the social and material gatekeepers that limited the accessibility of the informants.

The most crucial gatekeepers in the fieldwork became English proficiency and gender, i.e. me being a man. Other factors that somewhat influenced the selection of informants were their education, occupation and economic and social status. In the following these factors will be related to the question of accessibility, and referred to a broader perspective on Zanzibari society. As it is difficult to find statistical information on Zanzibar, most of the data here presented is based on the 2010 survey *Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey 2010* (National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro 2011).[92]

English proficiency

Due to my insufficient Swahili proficiency all the interviews had to be conducted in English.[93] This made the informants' proficiency in English a prerequisite for participation that already excludes a considerable part of Zanzibar's population. Zanzibaris lack English skills especially in rural parts of the islands, where fewer people attend schools and the population is less influenced by tourism than in Zanzibar City or the tourist regions of Kendwa and Nungwi in the north of Unguja.

In Zanzibar the general level of schooling is poor. 18.6 percent of women and 9.5 percent of men are completely illiterate (National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro 2011: 34ff). English is primarily learned in schools, or in occupations that require interaction with tourists. Wera, a Canadian Anthropologist working in the Zanzibari educational sector for a Canadian development agency, explained that even those who complete secondary education often do lack English proficiency.

92 The survey was conducted by the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro. Among other factors it gives statistical information on education, literacy and occupation. Its accuracy is questionable, especially when considering the little numbers of participating Zanzibaris (58-75 men and 191-326 women in the age of 15-49 years) (National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro 2011: 34-46). However, the results indicate social circumstances in regard to schooling and occupation that I also recognized in my observations and interviews.

93 I learned some Swahili during my stays in Zanzibar. In the autumn of 2011 I completed a two-weeks intensive language course, which I followed up by two three-hour lessons twice a week for four month. But, I learned only enough to make everyday conversations.

My experience was that men were generally more proficient in English than women, which was due to their interaction with tourists and their often more advanced level of education.[94] Thus English proficiency played a considerable role in my interviewing of men only.

Gender inequalities

Being a man became a decisive factor for the selection of informants, because I had greater access to men than to women, who are generally less visible in Zanzibari public life, are less educated and more rarely employed.

There seems to be a prominent discourse in Zanzibar relating the virtue of women to notions of Islamic instructions, prescribing behavioral codes between the sexes; women are excluded from many instances of public social life, which limits their voices in society. For instance Jade, Marzuku's Australian wife, told me her experiences of how Zanzibari "*community is very based on relationships of men*". Women are excluded from certain social settings, such as the barazas, where "*the men talk to each other every night*" (Jade 2011: 5:00). Roman Loimeier describes the barazas as the focal points of Zanzibari public life, exclusively for men (Loimeier 2012: 155ff).

Moreover, men are more directly exposed to tourists than women. Employed as hotel attendants, guides, shopkeepers, taxi drivers etc., they are the majority of primary workers in the tourist industry, while women are often employed backstage, e.g. as jewelry and crafts producers. This can also be related to a discourse of Muslim female virtue. In the first interview Rubanza for instance states that there is a conflict between the Muslim Zanzibari and the international hotels' dress codes, since the latter often prescribes skirts and uncovered heads (Rubanza 2011: 1:37:53). Only 5.6 percent of all employed Zanzibari women work in "*[s]ales and services*", while more than every third employed woman works in "*[u]nskilled manual*" production (National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro 2011: 45f).

For me – being a man lacking Swahili proficiency – women were thus less accessible than men. In consequence, by focusing exclusively on empirical data produced by men, this study excludes women's perspectives on the every-day gendered life in Zanzibar.

94 While men and woman participate somewhat equally in primary education, there are in "*higher secondary and technical education […] remarkable gender disparities*" (Ziddy 2008: 224). This is, according to language professor Issa Ziddy, supported by the fact that boys "*are generally favoured within households while girls are prepared in their future roles as mothers and housewives*" (Ibid. 226).

Social and economic status, education and occupation

As the archipelago's economy depends heavily on tourism,[95] knowing English is in Zanzibar a social capital important to producing income. It is furthermore in many contexts a symbolic capital, as it provides job and career opportunities. Many Zanzibaris told me how important it is for them to learn English.

All the informants have completed at least one level of secondary education and are due to their occupations exposed to English in their everyday lives. This differentiates them from a significant number of illiterate or uneducated Zanzibaris. Besides their symbolic capital of knowing English, the informants also seem to produce economic capital that exceeds an average Zanzibari income. Most of the informants thus have material possessions. As we have seen one owns two restaurants, another a house, one owns a cloth and textile shop, and yet another a taxi. Only two of the informants have no material possessions of this kind. But, contrary to a considerable part of the population also they are employed in a job that pays their living expenses.

Thus the informants cannot be seen as representing the class-spectrum of Zanzibari society. Although they have different occupations – e.g. teacher, clerk, driver, guide, manager etc. – they are all somehow related to the tourist/expatriate industry. Symbolically and economically the informants thus all seem to belong to the middle class. Although some are self-employed they are not part of the upper class, which primarily consists of government officials and rich investors.

The social and economic factors described here were gatekeepers in the sense that they limited the accessibility of potential informants. In combination these factors have major influence on social and economic status in Zanzibar. According to this, all the informants have above average symbolic and economic capital. This means that this study is limited to perspectives of relatively resourceful individuals, and this resourcefulness can in turn be seen as influencing their willingness and ability to reflect on the past.

95 In 2010 political scientist Andrea Brown writes that tourism accounts for 20 percent of Zanzibar's GDP, while clove cropping is the economically most significant sector, accounting for almost 45 percent of GDP (Brown 2010: 616). These numbers must, however, be seen in the light of major differences between Unguja and Pemba. While most cloves are produced in Pemba, Unguja remains the primary tourist destination. Furthermore, the non-official part of the tourist industry is not accounted for in the GDP-values, which total importance thus might be considerably larger than this official indication.

Appendix 3: Interrelations between the informants

Paje

I made Paje my point of departure for finding informants. I lived close to an international boarding school that is connected to a hotel. Here I met Rubanza, and Naasir who directed me to Jaali. Through a schoolteacher I met Kigoma to whose hotel the school planed excursions for their students. The following figure illustrates how I encountered the informants:



Figure illustrating how I encountered my informants in Paje

Stone Town

My encounters of people in Stone Town were more random. I did not stay in Stone Town more than a couple of days at a time, mostly taking the bus to the city for day-trips. On one of these trips I met Wera in a café. She referred me to her friends Marzuku and Jade. On a taxi ride I met the driver Adili, who directed me to Jamal. I met the last of my informants, Kheri, by chance. He was not acquainted with the other informants. The following figure illustrates how I encountered the informants:



Figure illustrating how I encountered my informants in Stone Town

Appendix 4: Interview guides

Interview guide 1

Research question	Interview question
How do Zanzibaris create narratives about their national affiliation?	
General introduction	• Please tell me a little about yourself. (What do you do? Where do you come from? What is your highest level of education? Where does your family come from?) • What do you see as the most important goal for your life?
Education	• What does education mean to you? • What kind of education is the most important? Why?
Religion	• What does religion mean to you? • Do you consider yourself religious? • Do you live by religious commands? • How do you practice your religion?
Political engagement	• Do you usually vote? For which party? Why? • What do you think is the greatest challenge to Zanzibari society? • What is its greatest opportunity/potential?
What is their view on Zanzibari society?	• How is life in your community/in Zanzibar? • Have there been any incidents (e.g. political) influencing life in your community lately? • How would you characterize Zanzibari society? • Is religion important to Zanzibari society? (is your background?) • What are the characteristics of being Zanzibari? • How do you think people feel about the Union of Tanzania between Zanzibar and Tanganyika? • (How do you feel about the union?)
Engaging the past	• Do you have any personal heroes? Who and why? • Who do you think is the most important person for Zanzibari society? Why? • What doe Mwalimu Nyere mean to you? • What does Karume mean to you? • Can you explain the incidents taking place in 1964?
	• What does it mean for Zanzibar that it

	has been under foreign rule (Arabic/British)?
Feelings towards national affiliation	🕐 What do these flags mean to you (Zanzibar and Tanzania)? 🕐 What do you think they mean to others (e.g. mainlanders)?

Interview guide 2

Research question	**Interview question**
What roles do memories of the 1964 revolution and its aftermath play in contemporary representations of Zanzibar and life on the archipelago?	
General introduction: What is their view on contemporary Zanzibari society?	🕐 How would you describe the current political atmosphere in Zanzibar? Has it changed over time? (please exemplify) 🕐 How is life in your community/in Zanzibar? Has it changed? (please exemplify?) 🕐 Have there been any specific incidents (e.g. political) influencing life in your community? How? 🕐 How do you feel about the Union of Tanzania between Zanzibar and Tanganyika? 🕐 How do you think other people feel? Why/where do you know this from? 🕐 What do you think has been the greatest challenge to Zanzibari society? 🕐 What is the greatest challenge now? 🕐 What is its greatest opportunity/potential?
What importance did the events of 1964 have for Zanzibari society?	🕐 Can you explain the incidents taking place in 1964? 🕐 What do these incidents mean to you? 🕐 How do you think they affected life in Zanzibar today? 🕐 Where do you have your knowledge from (what sources do you personally trust the most)? 🕐 What do you think of Mwalimu Nyere? 🕐 And what about Karume?
Do people define a Zanzibari culture? And how?	🕐 Is there a Zanzibari culture? → Yes: how would you describe it? Are you part of that culture? How?/Why not? Do you talk to friends/family about it? Do you define it differently, according to who you speak to? (please exemplify) → No: why not? What culture(s) do people on the islands have? How would you define your cultural background? 🕐 Is religion important to you? How? 🕐 Does gender matter? How? 🕐 Does it matter which Island you come from? How? 🕐 Has any of this changed over time? (please exemplify)
What importance did foreign influences have for life in Zanzibar?	🕐 What does it mean for Zanzibar that it has been under foreign rule (Arabic/British)? 🕐 Is it still under foreign rule (e.g. Tanganyika)?

	🕐 What values did the British/Arabic/Mainlanders (3 questions) bring to Zanzibar? 🕐 What negative influences did they the British/Arabic/Mainland have? 🕐 How do these values influence your life (please exemplify)? 🕐 How do they shape Zanzibar('s culture)? 🕐 What influences does tourism have on Zanzibari culture? (please exemplify) 🕐 How does tourism influence your life? (exemplify)
Future perspective	🕐 What values would you want to give to your children? 🕐 What a culture would you like them to grow up in? 🕐 What a society?

Appendix 5: Overview of Zanzibari political parties

Historical parties

ASP: The Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) was founded in 1957 as a coalition between the African Association and the Shirazi Association. It sought to represent the interests of the African working class and poor Shirazi pessants, primarily in Unguja. After the revolution in 1964 the ASP leaders formed the socialist revolutionary government under Abeid Amani Karume (r. 1964-1972).

ASP Youth League: The Youth League was the youth branch of the ASP. It played an important role in the execution of the revolution.

ZNP: The Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) emerged in 1955 out of the Arab Association. It sought to represent the interests of landowners, peasants, shopkeepers and civil servants, especially in Pemba. In 1963 ZNP formed the first independent Zanzibari government in a coalition with ZPPP lead by prime minister Muhammad Shamte Hamadi (r. 1963-1964).

ZPPP: The Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples' Party (ZPPP) was formed in 1959 when the Pemba branch of the Shirazi Association broke away from the ASP. The ZPPP shared interests with the ZNP.

Umma Party: The Umma Party was a radical youth branch of the ZNP.

Contemporary parties

CCM: The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was formed when in 1977 the ASP merged with the mainland Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). CCM understands itself as a socialist party. It has ruled both the union government and the revolutionary government of Zanzibar since 1977.

CUF: The Civic United Front (CUF) is the main opposition party formed when Tanzania introduced a multi-party system in 1992. The party also has a mainland branch, whit little support. The party is critical of the government and the union of Tanzania. Although it has no official religious profile (which is forbidden in Tanzania politics), many realize the party as representing Muslim values.

List of ASP/CCM presidents: Abeid Amani Karume (r. 1964-1972), Abeid Jumbe (r. 1972-1984), Ali Hassan Mwinyi (r. 1984-1985), Idrissa Abdul Wakil (r. 1985-1990), Salmin Amour (r. 1990-2000), Amani Abeid Karume (r. 2000-2010) and Ali Mohamed Shein (r. since 2010).

Appendix 6: Map of Zanzibar

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/zanzibar_77.jpg (accessed January 10. 2013).

Note: The name Zanzibar is here used synonymous with Unguja.

Appendix 7: The interviews as audio files

Audio files of the interviews are to be found on the CD.