

Standard front page for projects, subject module projects and master theses

Compulsory use for all projects and master theses on the following subjects:

- International Studies
- International Development Studies
- Global Studies
- Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective
- Public Administration
- Social Science
- EU studies
- Public Administration, MPA

Project title:		
Framing realities - An analysis of the constructed global drug issue		
Project seminar		
IS FM2		
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number):	Kind of project:	Module:
Betül Akdemir - 50536	Subject module project	2 in International Studies
Rachel Jeanette Zozula Jensen - 50005	Subject module project	2 in International Studies
Name of Supervisor:		
Caroline de la Porte		
Submission date:		
18th December 2014		
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces (Please look at the next page):		
44.920 characters including spaces.		
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at the next page):		
48.000 characters including spaces		

FRAMING REALITIES

An analysis of the constructed drug issue

Roskilde University



50536 - Betül Akdemir

50005 - Rachel Jeanette Zozula Jensen

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

ABSTRACT	3
INTRODUCTION	4
PROBLEM AREA	4
PROBLEM FORMULATION	5
WORKING QUESTIONS	5
METHODS	6
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH	6
THEORETICAL APPROACH	6
THEORY	7
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS IDEATIONAL CONSTRUCTS	7
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY AS POLICY ACTORS	9
ANALYSIS	10
THE UN DRUG CONTROL SYSTEM	10
A WORLD FREE OF DRUGS	11
POLICY WATCHDOGS	14
CONFLICTING REALITIES	17
CONCLUSION	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21



Abstract

The global drug problem has been identified as one of the greatest threats to society. The problem is however diagnosed distinctively and the measures to counter it are thus disagreed upon. In this project the ways in which respectively UN agencies and civil society networks have framed the problem are analyzed. Main documents of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are scrutinized and contrasted to the International Drug Policy Consortium's main advocacy paper. Constructivist theories about international organizations are used to understand how the self-identity of the UN determines its interests and behavior, and how it influences policies by the power of its ideas and expertise. Theories of transnational advocacy networks explain how these make use of complex techniques of pressuring to gain influence on the interests and moral ideas of the UN as well as its member states. On the basis of the key documents and the chosen theories, it is argued that the drug issue is framed in ways that legitimize the authority of each actor and broadens the spectrum of their influence. Their interests and behaviors are thus determined by their ideas and self-identities.

Introduction

The impact and significance of globalization has been debated intensely. Few scholars would however deny the changes to world politics following the radical technological developments and communications revolutions of the 20th century. Not only did states grow interdependent economically, also environmental, political and cultural events from one part of the world would increasingly manifest themselves in others (Heywood, 2014). Globalization thus contributed to blur national boundaries, since communications, cultures, issues and ideas would flow increasingly across these. This opened up for state cooperation on a number of issues and a rapid proliferation of international organizations (IOs) followed (ibid.). IOs were created by states to deal with complex issues that they could not handle themselves. Furthermore important threats would gain transnational character and states saw themselves forced to cooperate with non-state and private actors to broaden interventions beyond nation territory (Mathews, 1997). The degree to which these changes have led states' to lose sovereignty is contested, but both IOs as well as private and nongovernmental actors seem to influence international and domestic matters increasingly. One of the significant threats on which states have been forced to cooperate is the global drug problem (ibid.).

Problem Area

In the 17th and 18th century drugs comprised an important commodity on the global marketplace, together with other psychoactive commodities such as coffee, alcohol and tobacco. Opium grew particularly popular in China and western nations took active part in the production and trade of what was regarded a lucrative commodity (McAllister, 2000). The widespread opium abuse led the Chinese government to implement regulations on the trade. Rapid technological and scientific developments of the 19th century broadened the range of euphoriant substances and facilitated the wide distribution of these. The widespread drug trade and abuse became gradually more of a concern for nation-states and in 1907 Britain, China and India signed a ten-year agreement to end opium exports to China. This is where the international efforts to drug control began and within the next few years there would be several international meetings to end the East Asian opium traffic (ibid.). In 1912 states agreed on the first Opium Convention, which marked the beginning of the international drug control system. The convention was later adopted by the League of Nations that would provide for a true venue for international interaction



(McAllister, 2000). In the following years, industrialized states would work on establishing an effective system based on supply control and several treaties came into force (Collins, 2012). The negotiations of an international supply control arrangement were however interrupted by WWII and by the end of this, the United Nations (UN) became the new custodian for the administration of drug related treaties.

Even though UN drug control system was a multilateral construct, its shape and operation was dominated by the American prohibitionist norm (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Geopolitical changes at the end of the Cold War and the exacerbation of drug related issues however led to a significant number of member states questioning this norm. In 1998 the UN General Assembly convened its first Special Session on drugs, in which the international community committed itself to eradicating illicit drug use and supply within ten years. In the next decade the drug control regime would undergo changes from within, as some countries began favoring a harm-reducing approach, thus clashing with prohibitionist-oriented states (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Several states would experiment with alternative domestic drug policies and deviated from the prohibitionist norm while complying with the legal boundaries of UN drug treaties (Ibid.). This has led to heated debates and tensions during negotiations. The disagreements opened up for new ideas in the policy debate and civil society networks began to pressure for influencing these. History shows how individuals and movements have influenced the drug control system and how this has been constructed socially (McAllister, 2012). The aim with this project is thus, to understand the ways in which different actors have framed the global drug issue as a field for them to operate as important players.

Problem formulation

How do respectively the UNODC and transnational civil society networks frame the international drug issue and how does this contribute to constructing them as actors?

Working questions

- How does the UNODC frame the international drug issue as a way of reinforcing its legitimacy as an actor?
- How do transnational civil society networks seek to influence the drug control system through persuasion and pressure?



Methods

Qualitative Research

The investigation seeks to explain the processes through which IOs and civil society actors engage themselves in debating international drug policies. The project utilizes a qualitative research method, as it enables scrutiny of values, identities and behavior of the actors, subjected to the analysis. This method facilitates the understanding of relationships between actors (Nack & Woodsong, 2005).

In the analysis of the UN drug agencies' framing of the global drug issue, the UNODC was chosen as the subject of analysis. Even though the UN drug system consists of several bodies, the UNODC functions as the 'public face' and the operating, rather than monitoring, body of the system. The Political Declaration and Plan of Action of 2009 was picked out for the analysis, as it represents the multilateral efforts, facilitated by the UN drug agencies, aimed at countering the world drug problem. It evaluates the progress made towards the common goals established at the first UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs in 1998. It thus identifies future priorities and goals towards the second UNGASS on drugs to be convened in 2016. The second part of the analysis, in which civil society's framing of the issue is covered, The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC), a global network of 129 NGOs from all regions of the world, was singled out. This network was specifically selected due to its wide membership and engagement in the drug policy debate. Their Drug Policy Guide is the main object of analysis, as it is the IDPC's keynote publication and one of its main advocacy tools.

Theoretical approach

The constructivist approach perceives the social and political world to be coherent and not separate phenomena (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). Central to constructivism is the belief that human experience of the world and social phenomena is socially constructed (Hacking, 1999:6). The ontological position of constructivism therefore emphasizes that science cannot reach one objective explanation of reality. Thus, social reality does not exist outside the relationships that constitute it. Social phenomena will always be experienced through a lens of social forces, ideology and values. Constructivism favors interpretation of historical and social events that



become intersubjective through social interaction. Through this process, knowledge, significance and meaning become intersubjectively shared truths. Meaning is therefore assigned and not natural nor universal. They however do have consequences for social meaning, action and power. These are determined through social agreements, which evolve dynamically across time and space. Language, discourse and interactions are crucial in order to study how reality is constructed (Hacking, 1999).

The social constructivist approach contributes to establish a transformative perspective of how the UNODC and global civil society networks can influence the drug policy debate. Moreover it highlights the ways in which truth is viewed and how reality is understood through human interactions. This means that reality is constructed by actors' knowledge and practices (Fuglsang & Olsen, 2004).

Theory

In this section, the chosen theories will be outlined with their basic assumptions about different actors' behavior in international policy-making. These theories explain how ideas shape the interests and behaviors of actors internationally. This gives an understanding of how intersubjective identities are created through social interactions. This process entails the collective activity of shaping ideas, meanings and understandings, co-existing among actors (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013).

International organizations as ideational constructs

Barnett and Finnemore explain that states delegate critical assignments to IOs, since they can provide fundamental functions (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). Among other things, IOs contribute to the collection of information and to arrange agreements wherein commitments are established. They regard IOs as significant actors who are not exclusively under the authority of states. Rather, IOs are autonomous actors with capacity to exercise power on their own premises and influence global issues. IOs achieve their authority from social relations, which grants them their autonomy (ibid).

The principal-agent approach, in which IOs are seen as servants of states, is thus rejected (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). They consider IOs as bureaucracies that function distinctive from



states interests, and which are set up to carry out complex tasks. IOs behavior is thus shaped by the four central bureaucratic features: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Even though these features make bureaucracies the most efficient form of organization, dysfunctionalities are an inherent part of these. Dysfunctionalities can both be ascribed to material or cultural forces located either inside or outside the organization. Behavior will however never be dysfunctional in itself, as it will usually benefit someone. It can thus only be characterized as dysfunctional for something or somebody (ibid).

The authority of IOs, consists in creating interests for actors and defining shared tasks and categories. Authority is a social construction and does not exist independently of the social relations that constitute and legitimate it (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). It requires consent from others and gives power to actors by conferring legitimacy to their opinions. IOs often seek authority by presenting themselves as impersonal and neutral actors serving others. They are however not neutral since they serve a social purpose and cultural values, which in essence makes them authoritative. IOs therefore use discursive and institutional resources to get consent from other actors. IOs enjoy delegated, moral and expert authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:21). With this important role of functions, IOs contribute to constructing the reality of world politics, while constructing the social world as well (ibid.).

In the article *International Organizations as Policy Actors*, Béland and Orenstein adopt an ideational approach to the understanding of IOs structure and behavior. They perceive IOs as open systems with shifting ideas and interests. Thus, they do not hold fixed preferences of politics and “*tend to navigate a route between complex and shifting ideas and interests, rather than adhere to a consistent, single path*” (Béland & Orenstein, 2013:126). Ideas are identified as the main factor to shape the meanings that underpin political action and the principles and goals of organizations (Béland & Orenstein, 2013:127). The flux of ideas shift according to expert knowledge. IOs thus function as both an instrument of implementing policy of powerful actors, and a sphere where the content of a specific policy is contested (Béland & Orenstein, 2013).

IOs interests are not only shaped by changing circumstances, but by a changing interpretation of circumstances (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Since IOs lack formal power these ideational processes are the most powerful means through which they can influence policies (ibid.). Their flexibility and ability to adapt is thus what sustains their expert legitimacy (ibid.). The source of



ideas derives from individual policy entrepreneurs and not from governments, which grants them their expert legitimacy. The expert legitimacy of IOs is recognized since updated policy advices are in demand (ibid).

Transnational civil society as policy actors

Theories of global civil society rest on the belief that an increasing number of issues are global and thus require transnational solutions (Edwards, 2014:105). Civil society is commonly referred to as associational life, as the public sphere of contestation, or as a metaphor for the “good” society (Edwards, 2014). It is however necessary to link these dimensions in order to understand the full complexity of citizen engagement in public affairs.

Keck and Sikkink emphasize the structuring functions of transnational civil society movements by referring to them as transnational advocacy networks. They combine Edwards’ three dimensions of civil society in their outline of the political spaces in which actors negotiate meanings, ideas and values motivating their joint association. Domestic civil society actors engage in transnational networks to amplify the voices to which governments are deaf by allying with actors outside domestic states around particular issues. Transnational civil society has been criticized for lacking accountability and representation, as the strongest voices tend to be the ones to be heard. The virtue in civil society however lies in adding its voices to the public debate. They thus contribute with their voices and not with their votes (Edwards, 2014). Transnational networks bring new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates. Among other things these networks are characterized by “*the centrality of values or principled ideas*” and “*the belief that individuals can make a difference*” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:2).

Despite their lack of formal power, they are able to persuade and pressure powerful organizations and governments by transforming the terms of the political debate. They use the power of their information, ideas and strategies to influence the information and contexts states refer to in the process of policymaking. By promoting the implementation of certain norms, these networks “*contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions and ultimately to changing procedures policies and behavior*” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:3). Through



their interactions, individuals and groups might influence the interests and identities of groups and states elsewhere, through a combination of persuasion and socialization (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:214). They do this effectively by framing “*issues in ways that make them fit into particular institutional venues and that make them resonate with broader publics, use information and symbols to reinforce their claims, identify appropriate targets, and try to make institutions accountable in their practices to the norms they claim to uphold*” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:201).

Analysis

The UN drug control system

The UN drug control system is based on three conventions. The Single Convention of 1961 - which unified the conventions pre-dating the UN system into one, and limits the production, supply and use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 - which added a range of synthetic drugs to the legislation, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 - which provided measures against drug related crime and trafficking (McAllister, 2000). The system is furthermore comprised by several bodies. The highest ranged of these is the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) mandated by the three drug conventions (‘the Conventions’ in the following) to consider all issues related to the objectives of these. The CND gives policy guidance and monitors the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC is responsible for assisting Member States (‘MS’ in the following) in their efforts against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. Its work comprises research and analytical work, field-based technical cooperation and normative work to advocate implementation of UN treaties. Lastly the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which was established by the 1961 Convention, a quasi-judicial body with the function of monitoring the implementation of the Conventions.

A world free of drugs

Ideas are central for actors to shape the meanings that establish their interests and purposes (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). These evolve within organizations through a constantly changing interpretation of material conditions. Since IOs lack formal power, these ideational processes are the strongest ways in which they can influence policies (Ibid). The UN thus impacts domestic policies through persuasion by ideas and expertise.

In the Political Declaration, adopted at the High-level segment of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2009 ('PD' in the following), a range of concerns regarding the drug issue are proclaimed. The MS declare their determination to promote a society free of drugs as the ultimate goal of their joint efforts (UNODC, 2009:8). Reducing the drug demand and supply is thus recognized as a central factor to fulfilling this goal. One of the biggest concerns is therefore the continuous large illicit drug market, which threatens the security, health and welfare of the population. It is reasoned, that due to the severe consequences of drug abuse for individuals and society, efforts should be centered on demand and supply reducing efforts. Nevertheless, the drug control efforts have unintentionally resulted in a large criminal drug market with increasing links to corruption and organized crime. This makes it possible for drug cartels to buy their way into powerful positions within and across borders, posing a threat to elements such as security and development. Year 2019 is established as the target date to eliminate the illicit cultivation, demand, production, manufacture, marketing, distribution and trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (UNODC, 2009:14).

Through this reasoning, the UNODC frames the international drug issue to be one of demand (drug abuse) and supply (criminal markets). MS are therefore encouraged to implement measures to reduce these. The common goal of eliminating drug markets entirely, which traces back to the first UNGASS in 1998 with the slogan "a drug free world - we can do it" (Collins, 2012), implies the assumption that this *is* possible to achieve. At the same time large illicit markets are seen as a consequence of drug control measures. As explained by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, "*the world is afflicted with drug addiction (the disease), and the drug control system (the cure) has had a dramatic side effect (a huge criminal market)*" (UNODC, 2009:3). According to him, the way out of this is designing drug control measures that address all aspects of supply, promote law enforcement in vulnerable



areas through socio-economic measures, and adopt legal instruments provided by the UN (UNODC, 2009:4).

The PD clarifies that the UN and its MS must take a shared responsibility. Since it is a continuously common problem, there is a need to “[...] *tackle those global challenges [...] in accordance with principles of a common and shared responsibility*” (UNODC, 2009:10). By framing the problem in this sense of collectivity, the UNODC seeks to create interests for actors - in this case, for MS, to cooperate internationally on the issue of drugs as well as implementing the legal instruments provided for this purpose by the UN. It is reiterated that the implementation of legal instruments created by the UN would ease the struggle with criminal markets. Through this, MS are encouraged to believe, it is in their best interest to cooperate with and confer authority to the UN drug agencies. This is a central feature to IOs, as they tend to frame problems and solutions in ways that legitimate or require their expanded action (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:43).

In order to reach a solution to these problems diagnosticated above, the Plan of Action (‘POA’ in the following), is set out for member states to adopt. The POA is constituted by three parts addressing respectively measures of demand reduction, supply reduction, judicial cooperation and countering money-laundry. All actions that member states are encouraged to adopt suggest the strengthening of UN treaties and agencies. Not only does this, again, reinforce its legitimacy, it also reflects the way in which the UNODC regards itself as an actor. It therefore promotes the cooperation with multilateral agencies (of which, the UN is the most important) since it regards itself vital in the development of an effective and objective drug control system. Here, emphasis is put on its legitimacy as an ‘impartial’ actor able to focus on moral concerns and refrain from ideology. Meaning that it depersonalizes decision-making. IOs will often seek legitimization by pointing themselves out as objective actors (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). This is in part in order to underpin their moral authority as servants to a widely shared of moral principles. The UNODC thus identifies itself as a key actor in assisting domestic governments with relevant expertise and legal frameworks, which these do not have the resources to develop themselves. IOs also function as spheres in which expertise is debated and meaning negotiated (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). It is therefore stated that member states should:



“[p]rovide the United Nations entities having pertinent expertise with resources for the collection of data and the provision of technical and financial assistance to States with a view to enhancing their ability to address trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; coordination with and among United Nations entities and various multilateral entities should be strengthened;”(UNODC, 2009:29)

The last phrase referring to the coordination among UN entities refers to the bureaucratic compartmentalization which is challenged in cases where bureaucracies are given huge complex tasks (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004), like that of the drug market. It challenges the boxes and divisions in which international bureaucracies try to categorize the world (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This is reaffirmed by Antonio Costa with the stated failure of the compartmentalization through which drug control measures have been designed (UNODC, 2009:3). Compartmentalization is the central constitutive feature in which modern bureaucracies divide labor and allow for specialization (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). This is part of what grants bureaucracies their efficiency over other systems of organization (ibid.). It is however simultaneously a virtue and a vice, as specialization can limit the field of vision of compartments. These might develop as subcultures with distinct cognitive frameworks and different interests (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:39).

The UN system is a bureaucracy and its behavior is therefore shaped by the four central features: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Bureaucracies promote expertise in different ways; one is the division of labor in which officials are allocated to acquire specialized expertise, and become trained for their functions (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:18). The UNODC emphasizes this in its pillar work programmes, which are expertise-orientated, one is defined as following; *“field-based technical cooperation to counteract illicit drugs, crime and terrorism”* (UNODC, 2014). As the office is legitimized by its expertise, it commits itself to present specialized knowledge. The UNODC argues to do this in POA, as its approach is based on scientific evidence and measures (UNODC, 2009:11). Moreover the last pillar explains the aim to impact policy decisions; *“Research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understandings of drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions”* (UNODC, 2014). Expertise shape the ways in which IOs will behave in regards to important matters, along with creating an authoritative feature (Barnett &



Finnemore, 2005). By emphasizing its expertise, the UNODC seeks to underpin its expert authority in order to encourage states to grant their consent.

Policy Watchdogs

The construction of frames is an essential strategy of advocacy networks. By creating and framing issues, networks can influence the interests and self-identities of other actors (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). “*An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions*” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998:19).

In their Drug Policy Guide (‘the Guide’ in the following) the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) presents a diagnostics of the problems associated with the production, supply and consumption of drugs, which the IDPC regards as one of the most important issues facing the world currently (IDPC, 2014). In the Guide a range of facts, events and cases are used to argue for the failure of the current drug control system. In their line of arguments they adopt what Keck and Sikkink (1998) dubbed *information politics*. Advocacy networks interpret facts to frame issues in terms of right and wrong to persuade people and stimulate them to act (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). A central technique of information politics is the use of language that dramatizes the network’s concerns (ibid.). This is seen throughout the Guide, for example with the use of the term ‘*war on drugs*’ as a reference to the current drug control system, even though the term stems from the repressive ‘zero-tolerance’ drug control measures introduced in the United States by President Nixon. This rhetorical technique is used in the Guide to promote certain feelings of the reader in relation to prevailing drug policies. The use of value-loaded terminology sustains a kind of binary opposition, reinforced throughout the report in relation to prevalent drug policies on one side and alternative policies on the other.

Throughout the Guide, the IDPC advocate the universality and interdependency of human rights. Under the headline “*Violations of human rights in the name of drug control*” (IDPC, 2012:5) a list of certain human rights, that MS of the UN are obliged to protect, are presented together with the ways in which these are violated as a consequence of drug policies. The responsible to these violations are thus domestic governments that due to badly designed drug policies neglect



international obligations. Through this exposal they seek moral leverage over governments. This works by jeopardizing a targets credit enough to motivate a change in policy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The human rights supposedly violated through drug policies are: the right to life, the right to be free from torture, cruel and inhuman punishment, the right to be free from slavery, the right to health, social and economic rights, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to privacy, and the right to be protected from illicit drug use (IDPC, 2012:5-6). By insisting on this, the targeted reader is thus encouraged to resonate that since these human rights are universal and natural, and the drug control system is violating these, the latter must thus be unnatural and *wrong*.

The IDPC argues that the drug control strategy so far has been centralized around “*suppression of supply through controls on production and distribution, and suppression of demand through punishment and deterrence*” (IDPC, 2012:17), which once more builds an understanding of the current drug control system around negatively loaded terminology. This claim is however also used for accountability politics. This is a method of pressuring policy change by exposing the distance between discourse and practice. Parts of UN drug conventions advocating ideals of protecting the health and wellbeing of mankind are set in contrast to the functioning model, which in practice has been based on the principle of deterrence. The objective of this method is to create an ‘embarrassing situation’, which should lead the actor to close this distance (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) – in this case, reform the functioning drug control system for it to live up to the ideals promoted in the Conventions. The dysfunctionalities of the UN are furthermore exposed, as the drug control bodies have advocated a strategy that does not comply with ideals and recommendations promoted by its other bodies.

Since the primary concern of the Conventions is “*improving the health and welfare of mankind*” (IDPC, 2012:19), the wrongly designed system is nothing more than a misinterpretation of these. The Guide therefore presents an interpretation of the Conventions, which does not hamper a reform of the drug control system.

The reform advocated by the IDPC is focused on the decriminalization of drug possession and the treatment rather than punishment of drug-addicts. Furthermore a regulated drug market is suggested as a viable alternative. The central claim is that drug policies should focus on high-level drug traffickers in order to make dealing networks less violent, less public and less harmful



to communities (IDPC, 2012:23). In this claim rests the assumption that dealing networks will always exist to some degree and that it is therefore impossible to diminish and control the drug market entirely. Due to this assumption, the measures of policy success – *“the numbers of drug seizures, the numbers of traffickers and users arrested, and the severity of punishments”* (IDPC, 2012:9), have been wrong. Instead this should be measured with *“indicators of actual harm, such as levels of violent crime and corruption associated with drug trafficking, social and economic development indicators for communities in drug-growing areas, and improvements in health and social-economic welfare in consumer markets.”*(IDPC, 2012:10).

The real drivers of drug dependence, it is explained, are social inequalities and poverty. Drug dependence is usually concentrated among marginalized groups and drug policies further stigmatize and exclude these. A solution to this problem is the inclusion of civil society in the formulation of drug policies (IDPC, 2014). Civil society networks are thus representative of these marginalized and vulnerable groups. This legitimizes their existence and influence in drug policy decisions.

Domestic civil society groups ally and become part of transnational networks on issues ignored by domestic governments (ibid.). On an international scale, large transnational advocacy networks however tend to have a problem of legitimacy. The IDPC legitimizes its action by its wide membership. This way advocacy networks broaden their legitimacy and save on resources, as partners provide them with information and data from their regions and help to mobilize and disseminate information (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). This reflects their self-identity as policy watchdogs protecting citizens against governmentally occasioned harm. They seek to assist policy makers in the development of effective drug policies. Advocacy networks seek influence by the use of various techniques, including information politics, leverage politics and accountability politics (ibid.)

Essentially goal of the IDPC is to assure the global implementation of progressive drug policies (IDPC, 2014). Domestic drug policies are however under strong influence of the UN drug control system in which changes depend on consensus agreements. System changes are thus restrained by disagreements among member states. The IDPC explains that drug policies have therefore been controlled on a basis of ideology rather than facts (IDPC, 2012). One of its self-proclaimed goals is therefore to provide evidence-based expertise to governments and UN



agencies (IDPC, 2014). The IDPC therefore seeks partnerships and collaboration with states that have a propensity to question the current regime, as these are easier targets to influence. By influencing just one actor, new voices are added to the policy debate and the possibility of more states questioning the governing discourse increases. Therefore their short-term objectives are influencing chosen key-countries in order to reforming the entire UN drug control system eventually (ibid.). Part of their long-term goal is thus to gain economic leverage over states by making them reprioritize their expenditures and make these focus on health and harm-reducing measures rather than criminal proceedings and repressive measures.

Conflicting realities

IOs are ideational constructs that influence domestic policies through discursive and agenda setting functions (Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Transnational advocacy networks are also centered on ideas and influence policy debates by introducing new ideas and discourses (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The way both actors frame the drug issue thus reflects their self-understanding and ideational justification of their existence. While the UNODC emphasizes the large transnational criminal markets, and the need to address these multilaterally, the IDPC draws attention to local harm reducing measures. This is related to their self-understood legitimacy and role as actors. For the case of the UNODC, it justifies its authority as an expert being able to provide MS with neutral and specialized knowledge about effective drug control measures as well as provide the framework for international cooperation. The UNODC thus seeks legitimacy through recognition from MS. The IDPC in contrast justifies its existence and advocate its influence as being the representative of the civil population affected by the ‘actual harm’ of the drug problem. It seeks legitimacy through moral principles, as an actor protecting vulnerable groups and representing the interests of citizens. When the IDPC criticizes the measures and policies advocated by the UNODC, it thus reflects its sought to legitimize their further influence.

The UN is in essence a bureaucracy, a “*collection of rules that define complex social tasks and establish a division of labor to accomplish them*” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:18) and is therefore prone to dysfunctional behavior. Antonio Costa acknowledges this when he refers to the problem of a lacking coherence in between drug control measures of different UN



departments (UNODC, 2009:3-4). IDPC emphasize this dysfunctionality when it criticizes the UN drug control agencies for not acting in accordance with recommendations of other UN bodies as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the High Commissioner of Human Rights (HCHR). The crystallization of the drug control system around dysfunctional modes of thinking and failed policies (Collins, 2012) can lead one to doubt the impartiality and authority of the UNODC. No behavior is however dysfunctional in itself as it will usually serve something or somebody (Barnett & Finnemore). The behavior of the UNODC can thus only be dysfunctional *for* something else. The IDPC thus emphasizes the dysfunctionality of drug control behavior *for* the Human Rights ideals, as a way to gain influence through the use of accountability politics.

Another dysfunctionality pointed out by the IDPC is regarding the bureaucratic set-up of the UN drug control system. The UN General Assembly has generally been criticized for being over-representative and working as a propaganda arena rather than a policy-making organ (Heywood, 2014). Since it represents all MS equally, all decisions rely on consensus agreements. The system developed upon the two fundamental beliefs; *“that the best way to reduce problems caused by illicit drug use is to minimize the scale of the illicit drug market; and that this can be achieved through a reliance on prohibition-oriented supply-side measures”* (Bewley-Taylor, 2012:49). Even though it is widely accepted that the prohibitionist drug regime has worsened the global drug problems, the system continues to pursue this same approach (Spillane, 2000). The IDPC points out, that even though many member states, and the UN to a certain degree, are aware of the ineffectiveness of the drug control system, reform is impeded by reliance on consensus agreements (IDPC, 2012). This dysfunctionality is thus *“attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goals”* (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:8).

Conclusion

The international drug control system is comprised by several UN bodies, which seek to influence drug policies by persuasion of ideas and expertise, since they lack formal power. This is to a large extent carried out through the framing of the drug issue. The UNODC frames the main issue of drugs to be the large illicit drug market. It advocates this to be addressed by measures seeking to reduce demand and supply of drugs. The drug issue is furthermore emphasized to be a shared problem that requires international cooperation. In regards to this, the UNODC points towards the framework provided by the UN as a facilitator of this cooperation. Through this it seeks to legitimize its influence. MS are thus urged to believe it to be in their own interests to cooperate with UN drug agencies and implement its instruments. Furthermore they pose the assumption that a drug-free world is possible, if it is countered with evidence-based knowledge. Again, the UN bodies are pointed out as the appropriate actors to develop this, due to its ability to stand outside ideology and operate objectively (UNODC, 2009). Through this the UNODC seeks to emphasize its expert authority and persuade MS to comply with its recommendations. Its expertise stems in part from its compartmental structure, which is an inherent feature of bureaucracies (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). The bureaucratic nature of the UN however also implies dysfunctional behavior.

These dysfunctions are pointed out by the IDPC as a method of influencing the drug policy debate. Even though its main goal is to gain moral and economic leverage over domestic governments, it targets the UN drug control system in order to influence the nature of the policy debate. Advocacy networks construct frames to influence interests of other actors. The IDPC frame the drug issue by the use of information and symbolic language to wake disapproval of the current state of affairs. By advocating human rights they take advantage of a morally accepted norm to promote the distance between discourse and practice of domestic and international politics. In difference from the UNODC, the IDPC frames the issue with the assumption that a complete eradication of drugs in society would be impossible. It is therefore reasoned that the focus should be put on harm reduction rather than the criminal market. The IDPC is thus more concerned with making drug policies comply with and protect human rights rather than diminishing the illicit drug abuse and production. Through this the IDPC seeks legitimacy as the



representatives of citizens and the protectors of the vulnerable. By gaining this recognition, UN drug agencies will regard it beneficial to include the IDPC in the policy debate, in order to live up to its moral authority. The way both actors frame the drug issue therefore reflects their inherent ideas and self-identities as actors, which are reinforced through the frameworks they create.

Bibliography

- Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M., 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
- Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M., 2005. *The Power of Liberal International Institutions*. in M. Barnett & R. Duvall Eds. 2005. *Power and Global Governance*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161-84
- Béland, D. & Orenstein, M. A., 2013. International Organizations as Policy Actors: An Ideational Approach. *Sage: Global Social Policy*, Vol. 13 (2), pp. 125-143
- Bewley-Taylor, D. R., 2012. *The United Nations* in N. Kitchen, ed. 2012. *Governing the Global Drug Wars*. [PDF] LSE Ideas. Available at:
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf>, pp. 49-55
- Collins, C., 2012. *Executive Summary*. in N. Kitchen, ed. 2012. *Governing the Global Drug Wars*. [PDF] LSE Ideas. Available at:
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf>, pp. 4-7
- Edwards, M. 3rd ed. 2014. *Civil Society*. Cambridge: Polity
- Fuglsang, L. & Olsen, B. O. 2004. *Videnskabsteori i samfundsvidenskaberne*. Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag
- Heywood, Andrew. 3rd ed. 2007. *Politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Ch. 7
- Heywood, Andrew. 2nd ed. 2014. *Global Politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan



- IDPC, 2012. *Drug Policy Guide*, 2nd ed. [pdf] International Drug Policy Consortium.
Available at: <http://idpc.net/publications/2012/03/idpc-drug-policy-guide-2nd-edition>
[Accessed 10 December 2014].
- IDPC, 2014. *Progress Report 2013-2014* [pdf] International Drug Policy Consortium.
Available at: <http://idpc.net/publications/2014/09/idpc-progress-report-2013-2014>
[Accessed 10 December 2014].
- Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. 5th ed. 2013. *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch. 3
- Matthews, J. T., 1997. *Power Shift*. Council on Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 50-66
- McAllister, W. B., 2000. *Drug Diplomacy in Twentieth Century : International History*. London: Routledge
- McAllister, W. B., *Reflections On a Century of International Drug Control* in N. Kitchen, ed. 2012. *Governing the Global Drug Wars*. [PDF] LSE Ideas. Available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf>, pp. 10-16
- Miszlivetz, F., 2012. 'Lost in Transformation': The Crisis of democracy and Civil Society. In: W. Kaldor, H. L. Moore and S. Selchow, ed. 2012. *Global Civil Society 2012: Ten Years of Critical Reflection*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ch 4.
- Nack, N. & Woodson, C., 2005. *Qualitative Research Methods*. North Carolina: Family Health International



- Spillane, J. F., 2012. *Appraising the Consequences of Policy*. in N. Kitchen, ed. 2012. *Governing the Global Drug Wars*. [PDF] LSE Ideas. Available at:
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR014/SR-014-FULL-Lo-Res.pdf>,
pp. 31-36

- UNODC, 2009. *Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem* [pdf]. United Nations: New York. Available at:
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/V0984963-English.pdf> [Accessed 10 December 2014]

- UNODC, 20014. *About UNODC*. [online]. Available at:
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop> [Accessed 10 December 2014]