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
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The Securitization of Good Governance?

An Exploration of the Good Governance Agenda's Enlistment in the Security Domain



June 2016

Master Thesis: Global Studies

Roskilde University

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Abstract

Promoting good governance has, since the 1990s, been a central component towards envisaging development assistance. However, good governance contemporarily configures in the security domain as well, which can be attributed to the current foreign political emphasis of combining civil-military efforts and the notion that development and security are intertwined. Using the Copenhagen School's Securitization Framework and aspects of Thierry Balzacq's and Rita Floyd's "sociological approach" to securitization, this thesis charts discursively and non-discursively good governance's transition into the security domain. On the basis of considering power, context and practice towards securitization, it is demonstrated that good governance has successfully been securitized.

Keywords: Good Governance, Development Assistance, Security, Security-Development Nexus, Fragile States, Comprehensive Approach Strategies, Securitization, Copenhagen School

*Front page pictures: Danish PRT Units in Helmand Province, Afghanistan
Source: Danish Defense Photo Database, 2008*

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Abbreviations

CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace and Research Institute
CS	Copenhagen School
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPM	New Public Management
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Units
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Problem Area

Spearheaded by the World Bank in the late 1980s, good governance emerged as an institutional economic development agenda. Yet, by the 1990s it had transpired into a value-based agenda, where the international donor community coupled its promotion with conditions of democratization and human rights (Kjær, 2004). Accordingly, the agenda became synonymous with a wide array of qualities associated with Western ideals concerning state configuration (Grindle, 2016: 1). Despite the Western bias that epitomizes the agenda; good governance nevertheless seems like a good idea. It is difficult to argue against the premise that citizens in the Global South would be better off if public life was conducted by democratic institutions that are fair, transparent, accountable, participatory, and efficient. As noted by Grindle (2010: 1), “who, after all, can reasonably *defend* bad governance?”

Ironically, currently it appears that the Global North finds it necessary to defend itself against bad governance in the Global South. This is tied to an altered threat perception in the post-9/11 world; where state strength had characterized security concerns during the Cold War, currently the weakness of states has emerged as a security priority for Western policy makers (Holsti, 1996). As noted by the Bush administrations’ National Security Strategy of September 2002, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (US DOD, 2002). This conviction stems from the observation that transnational terrorism, which has a concrete bearing on the well-being of citizens in the West, is fostered by state fragility (Patrick, 2006: 27). Bad governance, in the form of an inability to provide basic goods for society, undermines the authority of *fragile states*, in turn creating the basis for the potential development of hotbeds for terrorism (Rotberg, 2003).

To this end, the West has become aware of development assistance’s value as a means of addressing root-causes of state failure, asserted through the impression that development and security are interlinked (Buur et al, 2007: 9). The *security-development nexus* builds on the notion that the malaise of development, poverty, and weak state capacity are sources of

insecurity in the Global South (Duffield, 2001). It is argued in this respect, that conflicts in the developing world are driven by domestic factors of political instability and deficiencies in development, which pose a regional threat and influence the security in the Global North (Williams, 2008).

Moreover, since the early stages of the war in Afghanistan, it became increasingly common to hear politicians speak of development and security as a joint task. Per Stig Møller, former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in this regard that, “development assistance is an integrated part of the Danish foreign security policy” (Møller, 2003). A number of policies have since been issued in accordance to this statement, accentuating the importance of civil-military cooperation and the merging of security and development efforts towards a common objective of peace and prosperity (MFA, 2010; MFA, 2013). *Comprehensive approach strategies* (samtækningsstrategier) are a testament to this “new” political priority. They build on the premise that an integrated development of strategies, coordination, implementation and evaluation across ministries, enables the West to build stable nations and achieve lasting democratic peace (Jakobsen, 2014). By this token, the notion of development and security being interlinked has been further enforced by civil and military efforts being contemporarily combined.

Based on these aspects, it could be argued that development is being tasked with the responsibility of ensuring safety, security and peace, in supplement to its traditional objectives of socio-economic growth, poverty alleviation, and promoting democratic liberal values. This new role has led to scholars to note that a *securitization* of development has occurred.

In essence, Securitization Theory “involves an investigation into the ways in which issues, processes and events become seen as matters of security” (Williams, 2008: 3). Introduced in the 1990s by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the securitization framework was instrumental for broadening the conceptualization of security itself. The nature of conflicts and security concerns in the post-Cold War era brought to question, whether the strict adherence and focus on state-survival within security studies, was sufficient for explaining what security entailed. This expansion of sectors that could be connected to security, gave leeway to the interpretation, that security and development were interlinked (Rothstein, 1986), forming the

basis for the argument that development had been securitized.

While the securitization of development is commonly accepted amongst scholars within security studies and international development studies (Fisher & Anderson, 2015), investigating the components of development assistance, which have been subject to securitization, has gone relatively unnoticed. This is witnessed in a gap in the literature regarding the securitization of good governance. An examination of this research topic is warranted due to the securitization of development assistance broadly speaking, as well as considering how bad governance is perceived to be at the crux of state fragility. Moreover, there are several signs that good governance configures in a security setting, which is seen in good governance being listed as a measure in policy papers concerning fragile states (MFA, 2010: 17), comprehensive approach strategies (MFA, 2013: 17-19), and security sector reforms in Afghanistan (MFA, 2008: 17-22).

I propose the following problem formulation in accordance to the problem area outlined above.

1.2 Problem Formulation

How has the good governance agenda been linked to security and has good governance been securitized? Moreover, if such a securitization can be confirmed, how has it taken place discursively and in practice?

The global dimensions of this problem will be addressed by examining good governance's usage and role in a Danish foreign political context. As I will highlight throughout this thesis, the way Denmark has been applying good governance lends itself to how other major global players operate with the term. The specific *case* of Denmark's good governance agenda serves as a gateway to understand: 1) securitization at the *theoretical* level, and; 2) the broadened objectives and new roles of security and development in the 21st century, which hence concern the *abstract* and *general* levels of researching. I will in greater detail discuss the global aspect of Denmark as a case in **Section 2.4**.

1.3 Thesis Structure & Working Questions

This thesis is broken down into two overarching parts, which each consist of three chapters.

1.3.1 Part One: Methodology, Theory and Context

Part one consists of an introduction to the methodology used for this research, the theoretical tools, and the context of good governance's origins within development assistance.

In **Chapter 2** I discuss this thesis' methodological considerations, highlighting my choice in theory and giving an overview of my empirical sources. It also discusses the selections and exclusions I have made and underlines the limitations to my research method.

In **Chapter 3** I address the working question: *how can Securitization Theory be used to analyze the transition of good governance into the security domain and what are the limitations of the theory in this regard?* This chapter thus elaborates upon the key aspects of the Copenhagen School's securitization framework, and how I intend to apply it in relation to this research area. In addressing the theory's limitations, additional views on securitization, provided by Floyd (2015) and Balcazq (2005) will be adopted.

In **Chapter 4** I will be exploring: *how has good governance been construed within the development assistance scene, and to this end, what has been the Danish prioritization regarding this field?* This chapter provides the foundation to understanding how good governance configures within development assistance, whilst highlighting how Denmark has applied this notion.

1.3.2 Part Two: Analysis and Discussion

Part two concerns my securitization analysis of good governance, which is done by examining both discursive and non-discursive elements. This lastly will enable me to discuss the potential successful securitization of good governance.

In **Chapter 5** I will be addressing the working question: *what has discursively been represented as a threat, by Danish securitizing actors, and what are the possible links to good governance?* This chapter examines speech acts presented by Danish Ministers, which concern development and good governance in relation to security concerns. I will demonstrate that terrorism is the

exalted existential threat presented by these securitizing actors, but over time underdevelopment and fragile states emerged as a threat.

In **Chapter 6** I will explore, *in a Danish context, how has good governance from a non-discursive perspective been enlisted in the security domain?* This chapter is devoted to examining non-discursively the construction of security. This is done primarily by looking at the *policy arena*, which demonstrates more explicitly, how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain in accordance to the threat identified in Chapter 5. I will demonstrate that good governance's enlistment in the security domain can be shown in three manners: 1) the narrow conception and the fragile state agenda, 2) the broad conception, primarily linked to the engagement in Afghanistan, and 3) the notion's role in a military context.

In **Chapter 7** I will explore, *if good governance has been successfully securitized in a Danish context?* To this end, I will be looking at extraordinary measures and the audience's accept, which according to Emmers (2013) unveils a successful securitization. This chapter serves as a concluding discussion of the analysis, supplementing my assessment of good governance securitization with the views of Floyd (2015) and Balzacq (2005). Lastly, in my conclusion I revert to my problem formulation and the global scale of this research topic.

Part One

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological considerations of this thesis. It serves to justify my approach of using Denmark's good governance agenda as a case, whilst indicating some of the limitations that are inherent to my research method. In this chapter I will discuss my choice of theory, highlight the sources I used to conduct my research, and touch upon my research strategy.

2.2 Choice of Theory

The theoretical framework chosen for this thesis is the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory. From a philosophy of science standpoint, the securitization framework is often referred to as a social constructivist approach because it emphasizes how discourses can bring about security concerns. Securitization Theory entails the uncovering of how certain issues -which might not have traditionally been associated with security - are able to become matters of international security, thereby becoming 'real' concerns. The real effects of security concerns thus not only reside as social constructs, but also have objective implications; hence the Copenhagen School's securitization framework can also be construed from a realist perspective. For a more detailed account regarding this paper's philosophy of science see: **Appendix A**.

The Copenhagen School's framework aligns with the interests of this paper, namely to uncover whether good governance as a politicized issue has transitioned into the security domain. However, this framework does have limitations, particularly when it comes to the question of the successful securitization of a subject.

Several scholars have debated the Copenhagen School's approach because it relies heavily on extraordinary measures and the audience's accept to indicate the successful securitization without clearly stipulating how measures and accept are identified. This critique has been made due to the fact that successful securitization is contingent on arbitrary and subjective conclusions from the analyzer. The theoretical deficits inherent to this approach will be elaborated upon in

Section **3.4.3**; for now it is just important to introduce in which manner I will be adopting supplementary views of securitization.

Firstly, it is not always clearly presented via speech acts, how good governance configures in the security domain; it is typically articulated in extension to several other facets (e.g. terrorism, underdevelopment and state fragility). Therefore, as a supplement to speech acts, I will also examine non-discursive factors that unveil the semantics behind good governance's enlistment in the security domain. This will be done through the use of Danish foreign policy papers. My examination of non-discursive elements lends itself to how Emmers (2010) and McDonald (2008) construe a successful securitization also based on material in the form of policy papers, images, and bureaucratic practices.

When it comes to extraordinary measures, it is typically difficult to identify them along the lines of exceptional characteristics, since liberal democracies seldom adopt exceptional measures when dealing with a threat (Floyd, 2015: 5). Floyd argues that measures should instead be determined by what security practitioners (e.g. policy formulators in the form of civil servants) identify as being appropriate measures in dealing with a threat (ibid: 3). To this end, the policy papers will serve as indicators of what measures the security practitioners saw necessary to deploy in dealing with the threats of terrorism, underdevelopment and fragile states.

Lastly, when examining the audience's accept I will consider the importance of context (Balzacq, 2005). In doing so, I will demonstrate that good governance's "contextual value" has played a vital role in terms of legitimizing the discourse.

2.3 Choice of Sources

This thesis consists of both primary and secondary data that have been collected from a range of sources, including: policy papers, legislation, interviews, speeches, books, journal articles and website articles.

2.3.1 Primary Sources

2.3.1.1 Speeches

Due to securitization theory's roots in constructivism and the framework's emphasis on discourses, I relied on qualitative sources for this thesis. As Balzacq (2011: 39) notes, "discourse analysis helps students to map the emergence and evolution of patterns of representations which are constitutive of a threat". Much of my primary data was obtained by conducting discourse analyses of speeches enabling me to identify patterns in relation to the threat.

As noted by Emmers (2013: 134) "securitization tends to be a process dominated by powerful actors that benefit from privileged positions". This has been the case for the speech acts used for this paper, as I primarily identified Danish ministers that made remarks regarding this research area. I have relied on various speeches, parliamentary inquiries and op-eds presented by Danish ministers, ranging from 2001 to present. When selecting these speeches, the criteria applied was that the topic of the speech act had to relate to security directly or indirectly; hence speeches, which exclusively dealt with development assistance, were not selected. It is important to note that good governance was seldom articulated directly in relation to threats. Typically, its articulation was in extension or in correlation to broader security concerns, which in the immediate post-9/11 period was terrorism, though the discourse transitioned towards underdevelopment and fragile states later on. Some of the speeches found were in English while others were translated from Danish to English.

2.3.1.2 Interviews

Some of my primary data was obtained through interviewing individuals that currently are or previously were employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. A total of seven interviews were conducted primarily with civil servants/government officials that are advisers to good governance work. I selected such interviewees due to their

relevance in accordance to Floyd's position on security practitioners determining the appropriate measures.

However, it should be noted that the information obtained from these interviews represents certain views. Firstly, it is likely that these individuals are embedded with an institutional culture from the ministries, and thus also adhere and support the political views, areas of prioritization, and norms of the ministries. Therefore, different views regarding Danish foreign policy would have been retrieved if interviews were conducted with individuals at higher or lower levels (e.g. a Permanent Secretary might have had a deeper understanding of Danish strategies).

Four of my interviewees were affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and primarily had worked with good governance in relation to development assistance; typically with good governance program reviews and appraisals. Two interviewees from the Danish Ministry of Defense had worked as Chief Governance Planners (2010) in Afghanistan for ISAF. One of them wished to remain anonymous and will hereon simply be referred to as "anonymous". A list of the interviewees can be found in **Appendix B**.

The interviewees affiliated with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were seminal in providing me with an understanding of what good governance meant from a Danish developmental context. The two interviews with the Chief Governance Planners were the most useful in that they could concretely reflect on how good governance was implemented in Afghanistan and also highlighted the concepts' significance in a military context.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, which allowed me to use probing questions that were not previously formulated in my interview guide. It should be noted that I have translated these interviews into English from Danish. The interviews are available upon request at: thomaskieler@hotmail.com.

2.3.2 Secondary Sources

Given that my research area covers good governance in relation to security and development, I have also relied on an array of books and articles. The conceptual and academic discussions, which underpin my interpretation of 1) governance, 2) the security-development nexus 3) fragile states, and 4) COIN, can be found in **Appendices D, E, F and G**. The underpinnings of these respective issues serve as gateways to understanding how Danish foreign policy formulation has

been influenced by the academic scene. However, I chose to place these sections in the appendix, so as not to interrupt the flow of my analysis.

2.3.2.1 Books

Several books were used to gain an understanding of good governance from a development assistance perspective. Firstly, Anne Mette Kjær's *Governance* (2004), and Guy Peters' *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (1999) were used as main sources for the examination of governance as a concept within the political sciences. To additionally gain an understanding of good governance from a Danish development assistance perspective, the books used were: Klavs Hede's *Menneskerettigheder, Demokratisering og Good Governance i Dansk Udviklingspolitik* (2006), and Friis Bach et al.'s *Idealer og Realiteter* (2008).

To specifically gain an understanding of the ways the security-development nexus could be construed, I relied on Mark Duffield's *Global Governance and the New Wars* (2001), and Buur et al.'s *The Security Development Nexus* (2007). Additionally, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen's *Den Gode Krig?* (2011), shed light upon the Danish war efforts in Afghanistan and some of the governance struggles of this engagement.

2.3.2.2 Policy Papers

As mentioned above, there are certain limitations if solely focusing on speech acts in the case of good governance. Good governance's significance in a security context is more explicitly highlighted when looking at policy papers; hence I also examined key documents regarding Danish foreign policy, which incorporate good governance elements. Moreover, I also relied on policy papers that dealt with good governance's significance from a traditional Danish development assistance perspective to understand how it has been dealt with in respect to the politicized domain. A full list of the policy papers can be found in **Appendix C**.

2.3.2.3 Reports and Manuals

I mainly used reports and manuals to gain an understanding of (COIN) and Comprehensive Approach Strategies. The U.S. COIN manuals (2006; 2009), as well as the RAND organization's report regarding NATO's COIN efforts (2008), served as my main sources. Moreover, in 2009 a series of reports were issued by DIIS, which laid the foundation to the current thinking behind Danish civil-military cooperation and comprehensive approach strategies. These reports are not

directly included in my thesis, but the policy papers used on these subjects can be said to be a product of these DIIS reports.

2.3.2.4 Journal Articles

Conceptualizing good governance, within development assistance is a contested subject. Grindle (2011) served as an overarching article, which laid the groundwork to my understanding of the agenda. I used North (1990), to gain an understanding of good governance's roots in institutional literature whereas Andrews (2008) highlighted good governance as a value-based agenda, according to Western ideals.

Grasping the fragile states agenda proved to be a more challenging task. Unfortunately, a discussion regarding this agenda was omitted. Therefore, I relied primarily on traditional (institutional) views of state-building and state fragility, utilizing the works of Rotberg (2002), Holsti (1996), and Fukuyama (2004). Concerning Danish comprehensive approach strategies I used a series of articles published by Danish scholars, including Jakobsen (2014), Breintenbauch (2014) and Rasmussen (2013). Lastly, I do not think I would have been able to complete this thesis without Kühn (2008), which guided my discussion.

2.3.2.5 Exclusions

There were certain trade-offs I had to consider in selecting/excluding my sources, because it would have been an immense task to cover all the literature within the boundaries of this paper's research area. To this end, my primary criterion of selection was whether the literature furthered my analysis of good governance's securitization. Beneath I highlight some of the prominent works excluded based on their irrelevance to my analysis.

A detailed account of the basic underpinnings of what governance entails was initially included (March and Olsen, 1995; Ostrom, 1991), but ultimately excluded because the literature on good governance captured the essence of what was necessary to highlight. Rhodes (1996) uses the term in relation to the public administration, and the wave of public sector reforms during the 1980s; an element covered by highlighting the World Bank's public sector management component. Rosenau's (1995) account of governance concerns global governance and IR, but I mainly focused on state governance in this paper, which can be interpreted as the main analytical level regarding good governance, state fragility and the war efforts in Afghanistan.

The question of measuring good governance and its role towards economic development is one of the key debates with regards to good governance in a developmental setting (Kaufmann et al. 1999; North et al., 2007; Moon & Prasad, 1994). However, the arguments presented were superfluous to my research area, considering this papers' purpose is not to examine whether good governance is conducive towards development.

With regard to the security-development nexus, I excluded some major works (Hurwitz & Peake, 2004; Gänzle, 2009; Stiglitz, 1998). I was mainly interested in providing a broad overview regarding this subject, serving as a bridge to understanding how underdevelopment emerged as a threat. This transition is mainly tied to the 1990s, where the merging of security and development is witnessed in a policy setting, due to the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War period. However, the historical origins of security and developments' effects on one another traces further back (Sørensen & Söderbaum, 2012). According to Hettne (2010), this can be traced back as far as 1750. Stern & Öjendal (2010) is an excellent article for a comprehensive overview of the nexus, mapping out the nexus and how it has been imbued with different meanings in different time-periods.

2.4 Denmark's Good Governance Agenda as a Case

One of the main criteria for a Master Thesis, written in junction with Global Studies, is the necessity of highlighting the global scope of one's research topic. To address this, I highlight throughout that the way in which the Danish good governance agenda has been configured, lends itself to how other major global players have used the concept. With regards to the development assistance scene, this is witnessed in how Denmark's good governance agenda initially was based on the World Bank's usage of the term and later evolved into a value-based agenda with its roots in the DAC's mandate.

Moreover, Denmark has not operated foreign politically in a vacuum and in isolation from its allies. This point is underscored, in the analysis of: 1) speech acts concerning terrorism and fragile states as a threat, where the Bush and Blair administrations set the international agenda regarding the war on terror; 2) the engagement in Afghanistan, which was operationally driven by NATO, and; 3) the formulation of comprehensive approach and COIN strategies, where the international coalition as a whole saw it necessary to address civil-military cooperation.

I do not have the scope to cover all the global players and how they apply good governance, hence I have chosen to use Denmark's good governance agenda as a case to cover the research area of this paper. However, conceptually, it might be helpful to clarify: of *what* is it a case?

A case represents only part of the whole empirical reality, of which, some features are highlighted and privileged while others recede into the background. A case therefore is a mental or analytical construct, which provides a way of organizing our understanding of reality, in turn allowing us to state something at the general, abstract and theoretical level (Lund, 2014: 224). Lund (ibid) provides an analytical matrix (shown below), to understand what the research is a case of. The two ends of the spectrum are cases that observe and gather empirical data, residing at the *specific* and *concrete* level, and cases that theorize, combining *abstract* and *general* levels.

Figure 1: Case Analytical Matrix

	Concrete	Abstract
Specific	Observations	Concepts
General	Patterns	Theories

However, seldom do cases reside in one particular category as noted by Lund, “most claims about our cases are a combination of the specific, general, concrete and abstract, and it is the *movement* between these dimensions, that make us conscious of what our work might be a case” (ibid: 225). Lund argues that to illuminate aspects at the abstract and general level; we apply concepts at the concrete and specific levels to understand what our empirical materials (observations and the patterns these form) are a sign of at the theoretical level.

Therefore, it is not a question of whether the Danish example serves as a case of whether good governance on a global scale has been securitized; rather it concerns, what the specific and concrete unveils regarding the general and abstract. In **Section 7.4** I revisit the analytical matrix, applying it to my case with the aim, “to say something about the inherent qualities and dynamics in contexts other than the ones studied” (ibid: 229).

2.5 Research Strategy

As underscored above, how good governance precisely configures in the security domain is often somewhat intricate. At times its implication towards security is in extension of other concepts, or requires an understanding of related academic fields. The concept of *logical equivalence* stems from mathematics and posits that two statements are equivalent if they have the same truth-value in every model (Mendelson 2015:56). This model is not directly applicable in the case of good governance and its equation with security, but it does provide inspiration to my arguments, built through a *chain of equivalence*¹. I have sought to visualize my analytical strategy with the table beneath, which provides a rough overview of this thesis. In the bottom of this table, I present my chain of equivalence through terms and concepts that collectively unveil how good governance has transitioned into the security domain. This chain represents my interpretation of how good governance configures in the security domain and it exemplifies my social construct regarding the subject matter of good governance’s securitization. I have sought to structure this thesis and demonstrate this chain in a chronological manner. For the most part, such a sequential structure can be traced through Chapters 4-7.

¹ The term ‘chain of equivalence’ was pioneered by Laclau & Mouffe (1985), whom use it in relation to movements made up of allied groups seeking broad transformation of existing power relations. This relates to the understanding “that if we are to pursue a model of agonistic struggle, existing power differences mean that marginalized and disadvantaged groups will need to assemble creative and deeply political strategies to undo the current hegemony” (Purcell, 2009). Laclau & Mouffe use the term in relation to actors, and how they can achieve a common goal in unison. I use this term in a different manner, mainly looking at concepts and terms associated with good governance and security, and how these in unison achieve a certain meaning.

2.5.1 Analytical Summary

Figure 2: Analytical Summary

Chapter	4	5	6	7
Purpose	To look at good governance from a traditional development assistance perspective, and highlight its conception within this domain.	Present the speech acts, by Danish ministers, which relate to good governance's potential securitization.	Present the non-discursive facets, which portray how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain.	To conclude the securitization analysis and highlight some of the deficits by using the traditional Copenhagen School approach towards my case.
Main Points in Relation to Working Questions	<p>Good Governance can be construed from a broad and narrow conception.</p> <p>The broad conception serves as a cross-cutting term related to democracy, legitimacy and human rights.</p> <p>The narrow conception concerns the effective provision of public goods related to the public administration and institutions.</p> <p>Denmark's usage is strategically based on the broad conception as a value-based agenda.</p>	<p>Terrorism was the initial presented threat, by Danish ministers.</p> <p>Via the security-development nexus, over time, underdevelopment and fragile states are presented as a threat as well.</p>	<p>Three broad examples will be made use of here:</p> <p>The agenda on Fragile states and how this relates to the narrow conception of good governance.</p> <p>Good governance enlisted from a broad conception, because it is synonymous with legitimacy, human rights and democracy; a liberal project.</p> <p>Good governance's direct usage in a military/security context.</p>	<p>Traditional extraordinary measures and the audience's accept cannot be identified using the Copenhagen School approach solely.</p> <p>Security practitioners determine the appropriate measures (Floyd).</p> <p>With its established context, good governance configured as a term to legitimize the efforts against the threat (Balzacq)</p>
Chain of Equivalence & Key Analytical Terms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Good governance & development ass. → Narrow conception → Broad conception → Value-based agenda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Terrorism → Security-development nexus → Underdevelopment → Fragile states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Fragile states and narrow conception → State building → Liberal project and broad conception → Civ-Mil coop. → Comprehensive app. → Developmentalization → Good governance in a security context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Extraordinary measures → Audience's accept → The securitization of good governance?

Chapter 3: Theory

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide the foundation to understanding, *how Securitization Theory can be used to analyze the transition of good governance into the security domain, and what the limitations are of the theory in this regard?*

To address this question, I provide an overview of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Framework and how I intend to use it with respect to my case. I argue that the Securitization Framework is a viable theoretical tool regarding my research area due to its broadened conceptualization of security. I also highlight some of the limitations inherent to the framework regarding the identification of a successful securitization. In addressing this deficit, I will be adopting a supplementary sociological approach to securitization, which stresses the importance of considering non-discursive elements and the process of constructing security.

3.2 Security from a Traditional Perspective

Before delving into the CS's Securitization Framework, a broader overview and elaboration of security studies is necessary, so as to provide a basic understanding of themes inherent to this academic field and the context regarding the CS's emergence.

Notions of state power and survival have always been at the heart of security studies from a geopolitical perspective, an influence that can be traced back to *Clausewitz's* military-politico contributions to the field of strategic war studies (Smith, 2006:47-48). In addition, *the Westphalian system*² has been instrumental in shaping our understanding of the state and its role in an international setting, where the concept of *anarchy*³ prevails. Focus is on the structure in this sense; how the international system of anarchy influences states, and the decisions that state-actors must take in accordance to this reality. This premise entails a security game between

² The Peace of Westphalia refers to a doctrine signed in 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years' War. During this conference, European states agreed to respect the sovereign and territorial integrity of one another, effectively entailing equality between states and their recognition as such (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 91).

³ In IR, anarchy is the notion of a leaderless world order, hence there is no entity entitled to i.e. resolve disputes and enforce law/order. Principally, there is no sovereign above the state, nor a hierarchy between states (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, s. 66).

states, with statesmen constructing power politics (e.g. alliance formation, counter threats, power balancing), seeking strategically to ensure the survival of the state in response to *objective military threats* (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 91).

These basic premises inherent to the *realist paradigm* cohered with the post-World War I period, where the discipline of security studies was established (Glaser, 2013). The anarchic setting had characterized the escalation period that led to World War I, where power balancing, military threats, nationalism, and state survival preoccupied the decision-making of statesmen and governments. And with the millions of lives lost in World War I, “security”, in relation to politico-military issues, became a cornerstone in the field of IR, so as not to replicate experiences from the war (Collins, 2013: 1).

Security, construed in relation to these traditional features, has complied with reality for much of the past century - a relevance that still persists. During the Cold War era, ensuring nuclear deterrence and state survival without the use of force, gave way to the ‘golden age of security studies’, cementing the importance of this academic field. However, with the conclusion of the Cold War and “the end of history”, as Fukuyama pronounced, a re-casting of security’s conceptualization took place (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162). How was security to be construed in a unipolar world and with the absence of great power politics? And was security’s conception solely confined to the state and military dimensions, considering that intrastate conflicts had a severe bearing on the individual? These questions pre-occupied scholars during the 1980s and 1990s, leading to a deepening and broadening of security from a conceptual standpoint. A scholarly apprehension though, was whether these new dimensions and concerns, risked losing the field’s academic coherence (Emmers, 2013: 132). Core notions linked to security came under scrutiny during this period, Wendt (1992: 391) famously noted for example, “anarchy is what states make of it”, thus tackling a subject that had been thought to be a given feature inherent to security studies. For Wendt, anarchy is not a predetermined feature of the world order; rather it is a social construction that slowly has formed our understanding of security. The Social Constructivist school, direct their attention to how actors shape the world (and vice versa), insisting that agents have identities that define their interests. These identities are formed, based on shared beliefs, ideas and cultures. An example in this regard, is how

democracy, as an idea, underpins the Western hemisphere and its identity; an identity, which has shaped the foreign policy of these nations⁴ (Agius, 2013: 88-93).

The Copenhagen School's social constructivist approach to security studies emerged against this backdrop, essentially with an intension to broaden security, whilst also preserving the coherence of the academic field.

3.3 The Copenhagen School


COPRI was established in 1985, with an aim to enhance multidisciplinary research on peace and security. The Copenhagen School emerged within COPRI, represented mainly by the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Arguably the school's 1998 book, *'Security: A New Framework for Analysis'*, is their most influential. The research agenda, behind the CS's approach, was to bring security in line with the broadening post-Cold War agenda (Buzan et al, 1998: vii). In response to this, the school adopted a *multisectoral approach*⁵ to security's conception, identifying five sectors, and corresponding referent objects, against which we can construe security: the military sector (the state), the political sector (ideology), the economic sector (trade and finance), the societal sector (the collective identity), the environmental sector (the biosphere) (ibid: 7). The premise behind the CS's approach is quite simple, namely to achieve an understanding of which issues are security concerns and how they transition into this domain. This is what we might deem a *further politicization* of an issue, or by using the Copenhagen School's term: a *securitization*.

The Copenhagen School has devised a securitization *spectrum* (shown below), which assists the analyzer in identifying whether an issue has been securitized. The chart is divided into three categories: the *non-politicized*, a realm where issues are not dealt with by the state; the *politicized*, where an issue is dealt with according to the normal realm of politics; and lastly the *securitized* domain, where issues are dealt with beyond standard political procedures.

⁴ Realists on the other hand find that states are identical units, with a similar goal to ensure their survival based on material interests.

⁵ With a strict focus on objective military threats, security studies, from a traditional perspective, has been viewed as a *monosectoral* approach.

Figure 3: The Securitization Spectrum



Source: Buzan et al., 1998: 23 in Emmers, 2013: 133

If we revert to the subject of good governance, then it is quite evident that the subject ordinarily has been placed within the politicized domain; an element which I elaborate upon in **Chapter 4**. While there is broad consensus that security and development are intertwined, and that development to a large extent has been securitized, it remains unanswered whether good governance has stepped into the extreme end of the spectrum above. Such an examination requires the use of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Framework.

3.4 The Securitization Framework

According to Emmers (2013: 132-136), securitization is a two-stage process, consisting of: 1) portraying an issue as a security concern, and 2) the successful securitization of the issue.

3.4.1 Stage One: Speech Acts and Existential Threats

The securitization process starts with the discursive representation, by a *securitizing actor* (e.g. politicians, lobbyists, etc.⁶), of an issue being existentially threatened, called a *speech act*. Analyzing speech acts requires a discursive outlook, whereby language plays an important role because in saying “security” or that “survival is at stake” we give the issue special privilege and priority (Buzan et al., 1998: vii).

The issue being securitized referred to as the *referent object*, is defined as “things that are seen to be *existentially threatened* and that have a legitimate claim to *survival*” (ibid: 36). The referent object has conventionally been construed in relation to the state (e.g. government, territory), but with the expansion of sectors, referent objects can take on a multitude of forms⁷ (ibid: 21). The CS argues that “survival” is a necessary criterion, because if anything and everything can be construed in respect to security, nothing in particular, ends up being a security concern (Emmers, 2013: 132)⁸.

According to the CS, when issues are linked to security, they are given supreme priority. In this sense, it becomes apparent that security is a social construction, or a *self-referential practice* existing within a discursive domain, “because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24).

In essence, the first stage of a securitization analysis entails examining speech acts, because these discourses are instrumental towards the identification of what securitizing actors perceive as threats. **Chapter 5** is devoted to this stage of the securitization analysis, and will accordingly

⁶ The CS argues that whilst non-state actors can take on the role of securitizing actors, it is usually state-actors that are most likely to succeed, as they are legitimate in the eyes of the audience (Emmers, Securitization, 2013, s. 134)

⁷ Whether this for instance may be the democratic ideology (political sector) or the biosphere threatened by global warming (environmental sector).

⁸ The CS argues that there has been a tendency within IR, where level analysis has reinforced state-centric thinking (ibid: 5-7). Nevertheless, the criterion of existentially threatened reinforces the traditional conception that security essentially concerns survival; this was a deliberate attempt by the CS not to distance itself from realists (Buzan et al, 1998: iiv).

examine the speech acts by Danish ministers, as securitizing actors, to identify the threat(s) and the referent object(s). However, the use of language in a security context does not solely portray a securitization, bringing us to the second stage of the securitization analysis.

3.4.2 Stage Two: Extraordinary Measures and the Audiences Accept

According to Emmers, the successful securitization of an issue requires the audience's accept and the deployment of extraordinary measures. A distinction is made between securitization and a *securitizing move* in this regard. Securitization only takes place when an *audience* accepts the existential threat towards the referent object. If only a discourse can be identified, and not consent from the audience, then it categorizes as a securitizing move (Emmers, 2013: 134-135). Securitizing can be directed at the general public and a limited elite audience (Kaunert & Le´onard, 2011: 61), although successful securitization cannot be completed without the political elite's consent since they are vital in granting the deployment of extraordinary measures (Emmers, 2013: 140; Roe, 2008: 615).

The CS argues that if it is established, that a referent object is *existentially threatened*, the securitizing actor will potentially be granted special privileges in dealing with this issue, outside the realm of ordinary politics; this is referred to as *extraordinary measures*. The extraordinary in this regard, is understood from the perspective of Carl Schmitt's *executive unilateralism*, which denotes the securitizing actor's authority to decide if there is an emergency and outlines the measures of response (Floyd, 2015: 2). Schmitt (1922) noted that "sovereign is he who decides on the exception" (Stanford, 2014), and was focused on examining, why a sovereign has the right to move an issue beyond the rule of law, whilst illuminating when these measures are employed in the public interest. The CS operates with a similar understanding of exceptionality, namely regarding the articulation of "security", and how state actors move issues beyond the realm of ordinary politics, because "by saying *security*, a state representative declares an emergency condition" (Buzan et al, 1998: 21). The types of measures adopted obviously depend on the context, though it usually involves injecting urgency into the matter to gain political support for the project (Emmers, 2013: 135). In the most severe cases, extraordinary measures refer to e.g. curtailing civil liberties, imposing martial law, detaining political opponents without trial (ibid). However, the CS notes that extraordinary measures need not always be adopted, to portray a securitization, though existential threats must "gain enough resonance for a platform to be made

from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al, 1998: 25).

3.4.3 Criticisms

The CS’s Securitization Framework was instrumental in validating the expansion of the security domain, but the objective to push the boundaries of security studies has attracted both considerable acclaim and criticism. Critics have pointed at the school’s narrow focus on discourse, its absence of context, and questioned the role of the audience and extraordinary measures towards a successful securitization.

As the CS note (1998: 177), “discourse analysis can uncover one thing: discourse”. Consequently the framework has been criticized for its emphasis on the speech act and its exclusion of non-discursive elements, such as bureaucratic practices, policy tools and images that play important roles in constructing and communicating what security might entail (Does 2013). Williams (2003) has noted for instance that media images of the 9/11 terrorist attack (e.g. TV pictures of planes colliding with the World Trade Centre) were momentous to the perceptions of terrorism as a threat. To this end, Williams argues that the role of images in a “media-saturated environment” must be taken into consideration (Williams 2003: 526).

Another major criticism concerns the notion of the audience. The CS stress the importance of the audience in the securitization process, because they grant the extraordinary measures in tackling a threat, however, their role can be considered somewhat under-theorized. Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 57) have highlighted the contradiction that on the one hand, the CS argues that the audience are essential towards a successful securitization (Buzan et al 1998: 30). However, this idea is later negated when the CS argues that “it is the actor who decides whether something is handled as an existential threat” (ibid: 34). This incongruity is highlighted by Balzacq (2005: 179), who questions whether the securitization process should be considered a self-referential practice or an intersubjective one.

Other scholars have noted that the audience can likely consist of more than one party. Roe (2008) argues that the audience comprises of both the general public, who offer moral support on an issue, responsible for rendering it a security issue and policy makers who formally approve of extraordinary measures to deal with the threat.

Criticism has also pointed at the exclusion of context. As McDonald (2008: 564) argues “the potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed” by the framework, it places a focus on the moment of the speech act⁹.

3.4.4 The Sociological Approach to Securitization

The CS’s emphasis on the power of language, “by saying security - something is done” (Wæver, 1995: 55), has been deemed a philosophical approach to securitization; equating security with the speech act (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2014: 3). A sociological variant to securitization, pioneered by Belgian political scientist, Thierry Balzacq, has emerged, which stands in contrast to the self-referential and discursive outlook of the CS. Balzacq brings forth a pragmatic angle to securitization, building his argument around three interlinked points:

“1) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; 2) that securitization is context-dependent; 3) that an effective securitization is power-laden.” (Balzacq, 2005: 171)

To understand Balzacq’s points, an elaboration of the linguistics behind speech acts is necessary. Securitization theory adheres to a linguistic formula, based on John L. Austin’s *Theory of Speech Act*, which demonstrates that certain utterances can realize specific actions; words can performatively “do” things. A speech act consists of three types of acts:

“1) locutionary, the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; 2) illocutionary, the act performed in articulating a locution; 3) perlocutionary, which is the ‘consequential effects’ or ‘sequels’ that are aimed at evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience.” (ibid: 175)¹⁰.

Balzacq posits, that for securitization to be solely a discursive and self-referential, all the three abovementioned acts must be taken seriously in their concise and formal meaning. The Copenhagen School’s framework hinges on the perlocutionary effect, which according to Balzacq cannot be denounced to solely being self-referential (Balzacq, 2005: 177). For a

⁹ Other criticisms of the CS’s approach include: Aradau (2004), whom highlights the consequences and objective of de-securitizing issues; Booth (2007) and Hansen (2000) whom highlight that securitization is elitist, claiming those outside the discourse are silenced.

¹⁰ Put more simply, “the act of saying something, to act in saying something, and to bring about something through acting in saying something” (ibid).

successful perlocutionary effect to take place and, gaining the crucial acceptance from the audience, a certain context is needed. Balzacq argues that the audience is only likely to accept a speech act, when *feelings, beliefs, thoughts* or *actions* are evoked, based on their preconceptions of the referent object and the threat (ibid: 175). External realities and objective circumstances are necessary in providing this context, or as Balzacq notes, “the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience” (ibid: 184). Thus, if external realities and a certain context is necessary for the audience, security cannot be confined to the self-referential speech act domain. Instead, a broader spectrum of practices based on real-life contexts must be considered when analyzing the securitization process, according to Balzacq.

In essence, the sociological variant, offers a non-linguistic approach to securitization, where several forms of representing a securitization can come into play (e.g. images, material, bureaucratic practices). These factors play an equally important role in conveying and constructing security concerns, but do not solely reside within the speech act domain (McDonald, 2008). In contrast to the internal CS approach, Balzacq argues in favor of a *pragmatic* angle to understanding securitization (Balzacq, 2011), emphasizing the importance of comprehending how security is *constructed*. The argument proceeds that policy papers, as a tool, are essential to understanding how securitizing actors tackle a threat, because they define the measures for dealing with it. Security is constructed herein, due to the real implications and effects that such policy papers bring to the world, which is witnessed in how these documents bring about new security *practices*. Speech acts might bring security concerns to the public attention, but the real life implementation of methods and the concrete dealing with a threat, is to be found in practices and security policies.

This is linked to the restrictions of the audience’s accept and extraordinary measures integral to a successful securitization, which make its identification notoriously difficult. Pinpointing the audience’s accept for instance, can be an ambiguous task prone to subjective interpretation from the analyzer’s perspective (Kaunert & Le´onard, 2011). Even public polls lack the necessary depth of highlighting a broad general accept. Moreover, Floyd argues that the suspension of law altogether, does not always define extraordinary measures, as advocated from a Schmittian perspective, because Western democracies seldom adopt extraordinary measures from the severe Schmittian perspective. However, if extraordinary measures can take on the form of non-

exceptionality, it is unclear where the line is to be drawn regarding issues that have been securitized or not (Floyd, 2015: 16).

One of the more fundamental issues with extraordinary measures is the *constructivist deficit* identified by Ciută (2009), whom notes that scholars and not actors decide when securitization is ‘successful’, which in essence undermines the CS’s claim that “our securitization approach is radically constructivist regarding security [...] Security issues are made security issues by acts of securitization” (Buzan et al, 0998: 204).

As further elaborated by Floyd (2015), securitization from a CS perspective relies on arbitrary benchmarks concerning the audience’s accept and the deployment of extraordinary measures, “but should look instead at what practitioners of security do when they securitize” (Floyd, 2015: 3). Floyd proposes that the practitioners whom securitize issues, rather than scholars, should be the ones to determine if a securitization has taken place; “let practitioners decide when something is successfully securitized, as opposed to advancing a fixed view of when this is the case” (Floyd, 2015: 5). The *security practitioner* refers in this instance to an individual, whom has been involved in formulating, making and delivering security policy. The measure, from Floyd’s perspective, should rather be determined by what the practitioners see as the proper measure in response to a threat. As she notes, “In the end, the exception here may be whatever most reasonable persons would agree constitutes exceptional measures, mainly in terms of the harm, risked, caused or intended and/or the level of violence employed” (ibid: 2). With their ability to influence the securitization process, the role of security practitioners is hence important to consider with regard to the question of who has the *power* to securitize.

To summarize, the sociological approach calls for the necessity of considering non-discursive elements towards a securitization, whilst also questioning how a successful securitization is conducted. In supplement to analyzing speech acts, I will in **Chapter 6** examine non-discursive factors, by looking at Danish foreign policy papers, wherein according to Balzacq *security is constructed*. The second stage of a securitization analysis traditionally revolves around the identification of extraordinary measures and the audience’s accept. However, in **Chapter 7** I will be addressing the constructivist deficit by considering the view of security practitioners (Floyd), and highlight the importance of good governance’s *contextual value*, enabling the audience’s accept (Balzacq).

3.5 Sub-conclusion

The securitization framework is a viable theoretical approach to examining good governance's transition into the security domain, not least due to the fact that the CS calls for a broadened conceptualization of security, including non-military factors. Good governance's role in the security domain does not relate to objective military threats, hence a multi-sectorial approach to security must be considered. The intensions behind the CS's theoretical framework align with the interests inherent to this paper; understanding how non-military issues can be interpreted as security concerns. Breaking securitization into Emmer's two-stage process - portraying an issue as a security concern, and the successful securitization of the issue - is helpful to understanding how I will conduct my analysis.

Regarding the first stage, the CS's approach dictates that securitization revolves around a discourse in the form of threats presented by securitizing actors. I will be examining speech acts by Danish ministers, to which end I argue that "terrorism", "underdevelopment" and "fragile states" are the presented threats by these securitizing actors. However, this is where my adherence to the CS's approach ends because the theory is limited when considering how a certain entity is framed as a threat, not taking into account the context and/or practices. In the case of good governance, the term itself seldom configures in the speech acts and it is not presented directly as a threat.

By incorporating elements from the sociological approach to my analysis, will enable me to demonstrate that good governance configures in the security domain, via the concept's enlistment in Danish foreign policy papers. In the analysis I argue that good governance's enlistment can be identified in three manners: 1) the narrow conception of good governance and the fragile state agenda, 2) the broad conception of good governance, primarily linked to the engagement in Afghanistan, and 3) with regards to the notion's role in a military context.

Adopting Floyd and Balzacq's views on securitization facilitates a discussion, whether a successful securitization of good governance has occurred. To this end, I will highlight how: 1) security practitioners have viewed good governance as the proper measure in dealing with the threat, and; 2) that good governance has played a vital role in legitimizing the efforts against the threats, because of the concept's "contextual values". Drawing upon the securitization

spectrum's stages towards a securitization, the table below outlines how I apply securitization theory to my analysis.

Figure 4: Application of Securitization to Analysis

Good Governance in the Politicized Domain	
Chapter 4	Here I lay the foundation to understanding good governance within the realm of ordinary politics, which illuminates the background and preconceptions surrounding this subject. This chapter is key in respect to understanding good governance's context, as advocated by Balzacq.
Good Governance's Transition to the Securitized Domain	
Chapter 5	This chapter concerns stage one of the securitization process, which will entail examining speech acts and discourse presented by Danish ministers as securitizing actors, with the goal to uncover the threat and referent object.
Chapter 6	This chapter examines non-discursive elements, which portray how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain. This part is important towards an examination of how security is constructed outside the discursive realm (Balzacq), whilst it also highlights the security practitioner's perspective (Floyd).
Good Governance's Successful Securitization?	
Chapter 7	This chapter discusses stage two of the securitization process, where I apply the sociological approach to understanding whether good governance's securitization has been successful. This will entail forming an understanding of what constitutes extraordinary measures in the case of good governance, and what role the audience's accept has played towards the securitization process.

Chapter 4: Context

Good Governance in the Politicized Domain

4.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the working question, *how has good governance been construed within the development assistance scene, and to this end, what has been the Danish prioritization regarding this field?*

As advocated by Balzacq, considering *context* is key towards a securitization analysis because the audience's accept is evoked based on preconceptions surrounding the issue being securitized. To shed light on good governance's context, I will in this chapter highlight the concept's role within the politicized domain. I demonstrate that good governance can be construed in relation to two overarching conceptions, which have taken the form of a broad and narrow agenda, both of which, in their respective manners, imbue a sense of the Western ideal state. I argue that the Danish prioritization regarding the application of good governance has taken the form of a value-based agenda founded on the broad conception of good governance.

4.2 What is Good Governance?

Good governance¹¹ is an indeterminate concept, applied by international institutions and donors with regard to international development schemes. Through good governance programs, the development community seeks to promote the effective and proper provision of public goods in the Third World. What constitutes the promotion of good governance can take on a variety of forms, whereby its agenda has a reputation of being broad encompassing, notoriously difficult to define, and challenging to measure and evaluate (Grindle, 2016: 1). An example of this is the World Development Report, which identifies 116 items relating to promoting good governance; indicative of how difficult the notion is to coherently conceptualize (World Bank, 2000). As stated by the World Bank, the ambiguity of good governance's application is due to the fact that it "is defined in terms of the *mechanisms* thought to be needed to promote it" (World Bank,

¹¹ For a more thorough account of *governance* see **Appendix D**.

2009). Fundamentally, good governance is subject to individual and subjective interpretations and at its core, is a normative term (Hede, 2006: 199-203).

This comes to show regarding the lacking clarity, of whether the notion is to be construed as a *means*, an *ends*, or both at the same time (Grindle, 2011: 1-2). Donors use it as a tool towards socio-economic development and democratization (ibid). However, good governance can also be understood as desired goal to be achieved; “a one-best-way model, ostensibly of an idyllic, developed country government: Sweden or Denmark on a good day, perhaps” (Andrews, 2008: 379). Accordingly, the good governance agenda represents a Western ideal of the good government, and imbues a teleological narrative of how this status is achieved (Rodrik, 2008: 17-18).

With this in mind – good governance is an ideal and a normative concept - it is thus important to be precise in which context one understands the concept. As noted by Thomsen (2016: 18), good governance “can broadly speaking be divided into two parts, one which concerns public sector management and decentralization, and one which has more to do with the field of human rights and democracy”. As such, while many approaches to the abovementioned *mechanisms* can be identified, two overarching categories stand out: a narrow and broad sense.

- The narrow sense revolves around the actual content of the processes, by which the steering and management of governance is implemented and administered.
- The broad sense focuses on the formal and institutional layout concerning the form of government, whereby good governance has come to serve as an umbrella term regarding crosscutting issues of human rights and democratization.

To summarize, the broad sense is occupied with the general question of which form of government is “good”, and the narrow sense addresses which principals and processes a particular form of government should govern, manage, respond to and act according to (Hede, 2006: 201-203). A common theme these conceptions share is a focus on the relationship between the *duty-bearers* and *rights-holders*, and their respective obligations. As noted by Jensen (2016: 5), “good governance can be understood as a supply side, where the state is obligated as a duty-bearer to provide its citizens with basic public good, while the demand side of the citizens have the right to claim these goods”. Let us now take a closer look at the narrow and broad

conception, so as to fully understand the mechanisms and conceptual underpinnings attached to these.

4.3 The Narrow Sense of the Term

The narrow sense is linked to a wide literature on comparative politics in relation to the state and economic development (Kjær, 2004: 123-147). More specifically, this interpretation deals with the public administration's capacity to implement policies and strategies that are relevant and effective in relation to development (Hede, 2006: 226-227). A typical definition from this perspective would be the World Bank's, which states that good governance is:

“Epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.” (World Bank, 1992)

The academic underpinnings of this definition, can be traced to how North (1990) makes use of governance, whom notes that development trajectories are an effect of a long term evolution of *rules of the game* and specific institutional configurations. Accordingly, the interplay between political and economic institutions is essential to understanding the basis of economic growth. In this respect, North makes note of two distinct state institutional setups that of a *limited access order society* and *open access order societies* (North, 1990). Limited access order societies are characterized by a political stability founded upon the brokering between the ruling elites, whom are granted “privileged control over parts of the economy, each getting some share of the rents” (North et al, 2011). Open access order societies, are based upon multi-party systems and a secure governmental monopoly over violence, because an open access and competition towards rents prevails (North, 2007: 3-4).

These facets have been the foundation regarding the World Bank's application of good governance within the development scene. The Bank introduced the good governance development agenda in the early 1990s, “because it needed to explain why a number of countries failed to develop, in spite of the fact that they had adopted the neo-liberal adjustment policies imposed on them by the World Bank” (Kjær, 2004: 138). The World Bank's Structural

Adjustment Programs entailed strict oversight and regulation, effectively putting the Bank in the driver's seat with regard to the economy of loan receivers. Little had thus been achieved in building institutional capacity within the state apparatus of loan receivers, while the political elite "served their own interests without fear of being called to account" (World Bank, 1989: 60). Factors of nepotism, corruption, and clientelism had undermined the progress of the SAPs according to the World Bank (Kjær, 2004: 173; Friis Bach et al, 2008: 472). As such, the Bank's sense of "bad" governance fed into the terminology on limited access order societies; the lack of transparency and accountability within the public sector, was the obstacle, which hindered economic growth.

4.3.1 The World Bank's Good Governance Agenda

The World Bank's mandate, according to its Articles of Agreement, does not cover interfering with *the form of political regime* of a given country. According to Article 1, this purpose is limited to economic development, precluding the Bank from taking into account non-economic factors (IBRD, 2012: 3).

The World Bank argues in their 1992 report, 'Governance and Development' that their mandate concerns primarily the promotion of good governance via:

- The processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources; and
- The capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies, and, in general to discharge government functions. (World Bank, 1992: 1)

These two aspects closely relate to the narrow conception of the term, centering on the steering and management of governance and how policy is implemented and administered. The narrow conception basically concerns the provision of public goods in an effective and transparent manner. In its application within development assistance, the narrow good governance agenda is mainly tied to four components: Public Sector Management, Accountability, Legal Framework for Development, and Transparency & Information. As such, the public administration and state institutions are the focal points. These components are elaborated as follows:

1. Promoting *public sector management* relates to the public sector's capacity and its obligations for formulating and implementing policies that strengthen public programs, the effective

management of the public sectors resources, monies and personnel. This typically revolves around reforming the public sector according to Western public administrative standards of e.g. privatization, cut-backs, capacity training of government employees, tax collection, introducing new technologies, restructuring, etc. (Heywood, 2007: 391). One might say that the background to this component stems from a conviction, that effective governance is sine qua non sustainable development (Hede, 2006: 207).

2. Promoting *accountability* concerns the administrative accountability of the public sector and its civil servants, whilst it also revolves around strengthening the rights holder institutions, which hold the government accountable (i.e. ombudsman, the Auditor General, etc.). As such, accountability is seen as vital component towards anti-corruption and altering circumstances, which give way to corrosive practices within the public administration. In essence, accountability seeks to ensure compliance between public policies and their actual implementation, and to guarantee the effective distribution and use of public resources (Hede, 2006: 207-208).

3. *Legal Framework for Development*, the legal system's enforcement of *rule of law*, which is seen as conducive for socio-economic development. It concerns regulating and enforcing rules that make a market efficiently work, for example through private property and contract rights. This feeds into the notion of inclusive institutional setups, wherein the rule of law is seen as a necessary provider of safety for private actors, so as to ensure that the state does not indiscriminately intervene (ibid: 208).

4. *Transparency and Information*, builds on the notion that for a competitive market-economy to flourish, economic actors need access to relevant and trustworthy information (e.g. transparency regarding legal procedures; access to the state's budgets, economy and statistics; the existence of a free and independent media) (Hede, 2006: 206-210).

In synthesis, these four components reflect how the World Bank has focused on good governance in relation to economic factors; the Bank sees an effective and accountable state apparatus as an enabler for a stable, secure and predictable economic development.

From the onset of the Bank's inception in the post-World War II era, it has been seen as an institution professionally bound to advise on technical economic matters. In reality, this has been difficult to maintain since its member states have been able to influence its decision-making

processes (Toussaint & Millet, 2010). Several authors have highlighted how the Bank has not been completely objective in its prescriptions and the technical advice it has given (Evans, 1995; Khan, 2012). As noted by Moore (1993) and Chang (2003), the World Bank's good governance agenda does not empirically recognize the success of the East Asian economies and their development trajectories. For instance, the Washington Consensus'¹² recommendation of complete trade liberalization did not take into account how protectionist policies had led to economic growth in East Asia.

Most importantly it is necessary to recognize that the processes and mechanism that the World Bank has tied to promoting good governance, have been imbued with a Western sense of an effective public administration. As such, the Bank's "politicized" promotion of good governance is not based within its legal framework, but through the ideological underpinnings that have embodied the Bank's promotion of good governance.

Firstly, the World Bank's good governance agenda is characterized by a set of policies that adhere to New Public Management (NPM) standards¹³ (Kjær, 2004: 25), based on a rationale that expenditure reduction, privatization and public sector reform meant not only less government, but also better government. In essence, NPM standards carried over private sector management principals to the public sector, stressing elements of hands-on professional management, explicit standards of measures of performance, managing by results, and "value for money" (Rhodes, 1996: 93). These set of prescriptions and their application by the WB in the Global South, were coupled with the Washington Consensus, which underscored global economic (market) integration in contrast to isolationist state developmental policies.

Moreover, the Bank aims to enforce a professional public administration and bureaucracy with an ethos according to *Weberian* ideals¹⁴. Cornerstone to the Bank's prescriptions, are a

¹² The Washington Consensus was first coined 1989, and addresses the neo-liberal macro-economic prescriptions promoted by the IMF and WB from the 80s and onward. Ten general neo-liberal policies were identified, encompassing the consensus, ranging from privatization of state enterprises, to trade liberalization, to broader fiscal policies.

¹³ Which were a set of neo-conservative public sector reform principals that swept across the West during the 1980s. The main proponents and initial first-movers regarding this agenda were the Thatcher and Reagan administrations—but the West has broadly followed suit and developed similar policies since then.

¹⁴ Webers sense of the effective bureaucracy covers many themes, and he has stipulated a list of features, which define it, to name a few: meritocratic processes of recruitment, training, and career promotion; hierarchical and centralized decision making authority within large scale organizational structures; public officials are full time salaried career professionals with job security (Kjær, 2004: 127).

separation of public and private interests within the public administration and its bureaucracy. By this, the ideal form of governance with respect to the processes of steering society, are based on Weber's principals regarding the modern bureaucracy, embedded with the sense that, "public moneys and equipment are divorced from the private property of the official" (Weber, 1978: 957). For this reason, factors of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption play an important role in the WB's good governance agenda.

The World Bank's mandate might not be politically bound, but the processes by which good governance is promoted have their roots in Western ideals of how an effective state apparatus is configured. This is an important point to bring across, because the narrow good governance conception is very technical in its application, and could essentially be misinterpreted as a de-politicized agenda. The economic focus and the technical approach to good governance, can give the impression that the narrow conception is based on objective economic sciences¹⁵.

The international community of donors has been more direct in their "political" promotion of good governance, and has tied several normative notions of democracy and human rights to their conception of good governance. As noted by Ole Therkildsen (DIIS), "no country has ever practiced a donor-agenda, where good governance has come prior to socio-economic growth" (Information, 2012). Therkildsen addresses in this instance, his critique of good governance as a means towards economic development, which in essence is what the narrow conception and the World Bank agenda concerns. However, donors promote good governance, not only because of economic factors. Former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Friis Bach, responded to Therkildsen's comment that "Good governance entails, that we do not solely wish to see countries with economic growth, but also governance where people are not imprisoned for voicing their opinions, are not tortured, and women's rights are not violated. Hence I am intent on keeping these fundamental values, which we base our development assistance upon" (ibid). Friis Bach thus argues that good governance, not only should be promoted because of its developmental effects but also because the agenda covers a certain set of values.

¹⁵ The World Governance Indicators and various other governance measuring projects, are arguably the most profound example of seeking to objectify good governance.

4.4 The Broad Sense of the Term

The broad sense of good governance serves as an umbrella term capturing the components a given donor wishes to promote. There is to a certain extent a common acceptance that good governance from this perspective:

“Promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring. In translating these principles into practice, we see the holding of free, fair and frequent elections, representative legislatures that make laws and provides oversight, and an independent judiciary to interpret those laws.” (UN)

The UN’s definition underscores (to higher degree than the World Bank) democratic aspects, touching upon multiple elements of value-based agendas. Apart from the Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC)¹⁶ guidelines, the promotion of good governance, from a bilateral perspective, is not constrained by the mandate of an overarching multilateral entity. As such, the individual donor country’s promotion of good governance can take on many forms within the limits of national legislation. Therefore, the promotion of good governance by donors can emphasize and assert politicized features to a higher degree. To examine the traits of this broad conception, let us look at how Denmark has dealt with its political and crosscutting nature.

4.4.1 The Danish Good Governance Agenda within Development Assistance

The Danish International Development Agency (Danida)¹⁷ does not operate with a single definition of good governance; it applies good governance with an emphasis on the broad conception from a strategic policy perspective, with narrow dimensions also being identified at program level.

¹⁶ The DAC is a sub-committee within the OECD, which effectively serves as a forum wherein issues of aid, development and poverty reduction are discussed and coordinated amongst its members; with a goal to establish a common political framework surrounding these subjects (DAC, 2010: 3). According to Article 1 of the OECD’s mandate, its primary purpose is to promote cooperation regarding economic and social development (OECD, 1960: 1).

¹⁷ It should be mentioned, that in the 1990s an administrative restructuring took place within the Danish foreign services, where Danida went from being an independent unit to entity under the auspices of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida, as an expression of Danish development assistance has been withheld, not least because of the value attached to the word as a “brand”. In this paper, I will interchangeably use the terms Danish development assistance and Danida, because of their synonymic value.

4.4.1.1 Sector-Led Programs and Conditionalities

Danida introduced good governance principles in the 1994 strategy, 'En Verden I Udvikling', coupled with a new focus on *sector-led programs* rather than *project-based schemes*; a reconfiguration known as, 'Strategy 2000' (MFA, 1994). Denmark's development assistance had been subject to project-led failures, with local capacities failing in continuing projects and incoordination between donors leading to duplication of projects in some instances (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 423). Sector-led programs entail that aid recipients have an increased responsibility in applying and controlling development funds towards whole sectors (agriculture, health, education, etc.) (Hede, 2006, s. 218-219). To this extent, "state capacity", in terms of effective public administration became a central theme to Danida's 'Strategy 2000' and the consecutive 1996 paper, 'Poverty' (MFA, 1996). Multiple Danida advisors were hired during this period and placed in the central administration of aid recipient countries. Development assistance was therefore lifted up to the politico-administrative hierarchies, due to the new involvement of different government officials that traditionally were not tied to this arena (e.g. permanent secretaries, state auditors, ombudsmen). In other words, development cooperation moved deeply into government corridors, at local and central levels. While the initial intention behind sector-led programs was envisaged in how the World Bank operated, it had somewhat unintentional political consequences. The meddling of affairs with central administrations in recipient countries produced an active interference with development policies. So, paradoxically as sector-led programming was being heralded with building local and state capacity, in reality, interference from Danida was immense (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 473).

As remarked by Friis Bach et al (2008), this marked a new phase for Danish development assistance. To a higher degree, requirements and demands came to define Danish development priorities: "It was no longer enough to give from rich to poor. Now, conditionalities were being imposed" (ibid: 472). These conditionalities were mainly characterized by a demand for countries to promote respect for human rights, good governance, political pluralism, and democracy. The same that were ascribed to the stipulated criteria of aid-guidelines discussed at the high-level DAC meeting of Paris in 1991. Moreover, at the global conference on human rights in Vienna 1993, it was established for the first time that it was the legitimate duty of the international society to protect human rights in all UN member countries (ibid).

These conditionalities should also be read in the context of the Cold War's conclusion, whereby the geopolitical and security agenda rationale, behind development assistance, had become obsolete. During this period, aid recipients were competing for a smaller pool of Official Development Assistance (ODAs), hence the new "donor-darlings", were those whom adhered to Western ideology.

The DAC has identified four primary political agendas, which its members since have coordinated their promotion of: Participatory Development, Democratization, Good Governance and Human Rights. These agendas are described as closely related to one another, by which is meant, that each of them are mutually supportive and affect one another. Good governance's coupling with human rights, democracy and participatory development had the effect that good governance became part of a value-based "package". These aspects were linked together, which Lindkvist noted (2016: 8) "with the underlying assumption that if you have good governance in the form of an effective and functioning democracy, then you have better conditions for human rights and meeting basic needs."

4.4.1.2 The Right to a Better Life

In a Danish policy context, since the 1993 policy paper, 'Human Rights and Democracy in Danish Development Assistance', good governance has been coupled with a focus on *human rights* and the public administration's *democratic* legitimacy. The understanding of good governance as a vital element towards democratic processes, was also expressed in the policy papers 'Partnership 2000' (MFA, 2001) and 'En Verden til Forskel' (MFA, 2003). This concept also became a central element regarding the framework of the Danish Democracy Fund, whose purpose was to promote and consolidate democratization processes (Hede, 2006: 228-229).

'The Right to a Better Life', issued in 2012, is currently the main strategic document for Danish development assistance. It is a *Human Rights Based Approach* (HRBA), which is composed of four key principles: *participation, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency*. Here, good governance is a crosscutting issue that has a bearing on all of the principals. Accordingly, this approach blends themes of democratization, human rights and good governance, tying these aspects to (human) development.

With the introduction of this policy paper, the Danish Law on International Development Cooperation was revised. The previous legal framework listed economic growth as an imperative priority (Retsinformation, 1998), however when ‘The Right to a Better Life’ was issued, the promotion of human rights and democracy became main priorities:

“The goal with Denmark's development cooperation is to combat poverty and promote human rights, democracy, sustainable development, peace and stability in accordance with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN conventions on human rights.” (Retsinformation, 2012)

From a legislative perspective, an emphasis on values came to define Danish development assistance. Danish politicians have since emphasized the importance of promoting human rights, good governance and democracy, not only because of the developmental logic but because development assistance should be based on this set of values. As former Minister of Development, Ulla Tørnæs remarked,

“We must not reduce democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights to 'tools' that can only be justified if it can be unequivocally proven that they lead to development. These are fundamental values, which is a justification in itself” (Information, 2006)

In a Danish context, the promotion of good governance is mainly construed in relation to the broad conception and as a value-based agenda. Denmark has had a history, since the early 1990s, of basing its development assistance with regards to values, which can be attributed to the how development assistance increasingly became politicized during this period.

4.5 Sub-Conclusion

Good governance is essentially a normative notion, and the promotion of it presents a Western ideal of how the state should operate. The agenda covers many themes related to a narrow and broad approach. The broad, value-based agenda uses good governance as an umbrella term concerning the “good” government according to aspects of democratization and human rights. In contrast, the narrow approach primarily concerns the capacity of public administrations and institutions and their ability to implement policies that benefit society broadly.

International donors view “bad” governance as a challenge that hinders socio-economic development; to this end the promotion of good governance is viewed as a measure that fosters development. Nonetheless, it can be questioned if this is the sole driver towards implementing good governance programs. In a Danish context, it is important to promote good governance, since it entails spreading values of human rights and democracy to ‘un-democratic’ regimes. The politicization of development assistance in the 1990s, through conditionalities, shifted the strategic purpose with development assistance towards a value-based agenda. ‘The Right to a Better Life’ and the alteration of legislation has further cemented the role of the value-based agenda, with Danish politicians also articulating good governance in this regard.

Within the Danish politicized domain, good governance is epitomized by representing Western values, whose features constitute the preconceptions and context the audience associates with it. The following chapters will examine whether good governance has transitioned from the politicized domain to the far end of the securitized spectrum.

Part Two: Analysis

Chapter 5: Discourse

Speech Acts, Threats and Referent Objects

5.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to address the working question: *what has discursively been represented as a threat, by Danish securitizing actors, when it comes to the field of good governance?*

A securitization analysis begins with the discursive representation, by a securitizing actor, of a referent object being existentially threatened. Accordingly, this chapter examines speech acts by Danish ministers, where I demonstrate that “terrorism” in the immediate post-9/11 period was articulated as a threat towards the Danish state (military sector) and Western values (political sector) as referent objects. Focusing on addressing the root-causes of terrorism by incorporating development assistance in the security domain, “underdevelopment” and “fragile states” emerged as perceived threats.

5.2 The War on Terror

The events of 9/11 shook the West, inducing a fear that similar attacks would soon be replicated. In the rubble of the World Trade Center, George Bush officially declared a global *war on terror* (Bush, 2001a); as remarked in his speech: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”. The U.S. has tradition of declaring “wars” against specific issues (e.g. war on drugs under the Reagan administration), yet despite this tradition, the significance of declaring war should not be downplayed. As noted by Møller (2009: 6): “It signifies that the *gloves come off* and that normal rules and behavioral constraints no longer apply”. For these gloves to come off, so to speak, essentially two dimensions were inherent to the threat perception and were presented regarding the war on terror.

The war on terror was about safety and security in its most basic form. It concerned the lives and well-being of U.S. citizens, which Bush later stated in a State of the Union address that there were “thousands of dangerous killers (terrorists), schooled in the methods of murder, often

supported by outlaw regimes, spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Bush, 2001b).

Global terrorism was perceived as a concrete threat that could target citizens of the Global North, though it also concerned the *values* that the West stood for; “they (terrorists) hate our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” (Bush, 2001a). To use the terms provided by the Copenhagen School, the threat perception of terrorism was two-fold, concerning lives of American citizens, relating to the military sector, and the political sector of Western values and ideology.

To address this threat, a broad coalition was formed after 9/11, and Afghanistan was invaded. The NATO coalition’s aim in the beginning was to remove Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, which had sheltered the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Denmark, as a close ally to United States could not stand idle; after all, 9/11 was not only an attack on the United States, but also on freedom, democracy and the Western way of life. Since January 2002, Denmark contributed militarily to both Operation Enduring Freedom (the US military action against al-Qaeda) and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Danish Parliament’s (Folketinget) resolution regarding the invasion of Afghanistan stressed that the engagement in the country was based on combatting terrorism¹⁸:

“Parliament communicates its consent that the Danish military forces made available to the US-led international efforts to combat terrorist networks in Afghanistan.”
(Retsinformation, 2001a)

The rhetoric by Danish ministers during this period, more or less replicated Bush’s statements, conceiving the terrorist threat in a similar manner. Firstly, the Danish liberal government sought to cement that Danish security was a top-policy priority and that terrorism could threaten

¹⁸ Denmark supported from the beginning the US invasion of Afghanistan, which not only denotes to the fact that terrorism posed a serious international threat, but should also be read in the context of Denmark leading an activist foreign policy since the 1990s, seeking to achieve greater international power and influence (Jakobsen, 2015; Jakobsen & Ringmose, 2015). One of main the principles behind this foreign policy was, that Denmark needed to align itself with the U.S. and Brits, not only because it was the “right thing to do”, but also because it would benefit Denmark in achieving her foreign political objectives, through our great allies and their superior military capacity (Rasmussen, 2011).

Denmark. For instance, at a 2003 parliament inquiry, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Per Stig Møller stated:

“Terrorism constitutes a serious threat towards international peace and *our* security” (Møller, 2003a).

Møller was in this instance articulating terrorism as an existential threat to Denmark as a referent object, which concerned the military sector of international peace and *our* security. Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s first New Year’s speech as Danish Prime Minister, touched upon the notion that 9/11 was an attack on Western and Danish values, thus speaking of the threat in regards to the political sector:

“The United States represents, what all religious fanatics and domineering tyrants fear and despise. American society is built on the ideas of personal freedom, democracy, human rights and religious tolerance. Throughout the Western world, we have built our societies upon corresponding values [...] It is these *values* that we should cherish and *defend*” (Rasmussen, 2003)¹⁹.

The threat perception was initially quite clear regarding global terrorism. It concerned concretely the lives of citizens²⁰ in the West, and Western values. However, as the international coalition completed their initial objective of invading Afghanistan and removing the Taliban regime, the complex question arose: what was the long-term objective in Afghanistan?

In 2005, NATO took over the central security responsibilities in Afghanistan. This was partly due to the American military having to respond to the civil war in Iraq, leaving the European coalition members with the main responsibility in Afghanistan. The American focus initially concerned ridding the country of the Taliban and affiliated terrorist groups. However, the Europeans did not only want to wage war, as noted by Rasmussen (2011:13), “they wanted to

¹⁹ The notion that terrorism, post-9/11, has become a primary Danish foreign political priority, is not per se a controversial statement; the securitization of the war on terror is well-established, and most scholars agree on this conviction (Vultee, 2010; Sinaga, 2014). Proving a successful securitization of terrorism is not as such a primary focus of this paper, hence I will not go into too much detail concerning extraordinary measures and the audience’s accept regarding this subject.

²⁰ Which the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London assisted in confirming.

wage the good war”; a war that not only revolved around defeating the Taliban, but also entailed building a better, stable and peaceful Afghan society. In a Danish context this meant providing “the proper and secure environment for the political transition process, the relief effort and the reconstruction of Afghanistan” (Retsinformation, 2002).

What constitutes a “good war” is debatable, but there is little doubt that the characteristics of it are rooted in how Denmark previously understood its foreign political strategic objectives. From a social constructivist standpoint, it is important to keep in mind, what Denmark’s foreign political *identity* and *strategic culture* has been tied to. To chart some of the major traits of Denmark’s recent foreign policy: firstly, Denmark is a relatively young war faring nation in the modern era, secondly; Denmark’s foreign political influence has predominantly happened through strong support and adherence to the UN, multilateral institutions and via Nordic partnerships, thirdly; development assistance and peacekeeping missions have governed foreign engagements and are considered her “areas of expertise”, while fourthly; as highlighted in Chapter 4, Denmark has since the 1990s promoted values of democracy, human rights and good governance (Jakobsen, 2014; Landmark, 2012).

As such, the Danish basis for “a good war” entails dimensions that are broader than military engagement. This is why Denmark stressed that the international engagement in Afghanistan had to be tied to UN resolutions. To paraphrase, the UN resolutions called the international community to assist the Afghan government in creating and maintaining security, to extend its authority throughout the country, to promote peace and stability in the region and globally, and contribute to improving the living conditions of the Afghan people (UN, 2001). Hence, the Danish criterion of “success” in Afghanistan was not only tied to combatting terrorism, but also to the complex challenge of restoring peace, stability, and rebuilding Afghanistan. However, this was a difficult task considering the country had been at war for more than two decades. According to the United Nations Development Program, 70% of the country's citizens were undernourished with a life expectancy of 40, and the majority of the population was illiterate (DIIS, 2016: 31). In supplement to combatting the Taliban, the international coalition thus faced a major development challenge to pave the way for stability and peace.

Therefore, both developmental and military efforts were required in Afghanistan. The link between security and development is most commonly referred to as *the security-development nexus* in policy papers and by the academic community. In short, the nexus builds on the notion that the malaise of development, poverty and weak state capacity are interpreted by donors and international organizations, as themes that are sources to insecurity (Griffith, 1993; Duffield, 2001: 37-39). In **Appendix E I** provide a review of this nexus and how it rose to prominence in the 1990s, whilst highlighting how Denmark has operated with this notion in combining civil and military efforts.

5.3 A Transition from Terrorism to Underdevelopment as a Threat

Since the 1990s, Denmark had the instruments of development and security combined in praxis. However, with the war on terror and Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan, the security-development nexus became a central element in the rhetoric presented by the top-political hierarchies (Baell et al, 2006: 57). This was in part due to on-the-ground experiences in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban regime had fallen, their influence and power was still present. The international coalition began an extensive counter-insurgency warfare against armed Taliban insurgents, their al-Qaeda allies, and other terrorist networks. Yet, providing security in the entirety of Afghanistan, especially the rural areas, proved to be a major challenge during the war. As such, the Taliban were constantly able to destabilize and disrupt the progress made by the international coalition²¹. At the height of the war, approximately 100,000 foreign and 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police were present in Afghanistan (DR, 2013), yet the Taliban's influence was still not suppressed. The generally accepted rule of thumb from counter-insurgency manuals stipulates a ratio of 20 soldiers per 1000 civilians should garner the ability to withhold a meaningful presence (British Defense, 2009: 1-2; Krause, 2007). With Afghanistan's population of approximately 30 million, this would have required a force of nearly 500,000 soldiers. However, the bulk of the presence consisted of Afghan forces whose capabilities were questionable, thereby undermining the military presence as a whole. The lack of military

²¹ In a Danish context, this was most prominently witnessed with regard to the support of the education sector. Supporting education and the building of schools was one of Denmark's key areas of priority. The Taliban strongly opposed the building of new schools, firstly because it undermined their recruitment capabilities, and also due to the fact that the Taliban deprived girls above 8 years the right to education. As such, schools became an important symbolic battleground (Rasmussen, 2011: 77).

manpower in Afghanistan was one reason why the coalition sought to strategically re-think how the objectives with the engagement could be achieved. To this end, the international coalition, including Denmark, became aware of the necessity to combine civil and military efforts.

The emphasis on civil-military efforts that emerged in the mid-2000s was in sync with the rhetoric of Danish ministers that increasingly began speaking of security and development in unison; “Development assistance is an integrated part of Danish foreign security policy” (Møller, 2003a). Interestingly though, it was not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs that addressed this issue. The Minister of Development, Bertel Haarder, more or less replicated Møller’s statement; “Development cannot be achieved without security. Security cannot be achieved without development” (Haarder, 2004). It was not common that the Minister of Development addressed security concerns, but this changed with the liberal government during the period.

Haarder and Møller were arguably the first to present, in a Danish foreign political context, that for Afghanistan’s intervention to be successful would require an effort from the development assistance arena too. Danish ministers increasingly began speaking of development assistance as a viable tool for combatting terrorism; a point that was conveyed in 2003 by Per Stig Møller. He remarked:


“Terror in both rich and poor countries has reminded us that a new foreign and security policy situation has arrived [...] Development assistance should contribute in addressing the basis for radicalization and extremism [...] In other words, development assistance can play a crucial role in addressing future threats” (Møller, 2003b)

The emphasis on development assistance as a tool against terrorism unsurprisingly coincided with large amounts of ODAs being disbursed to Afghanistan during this period²². In 2004, international aid to Afghanistan and Iraq rose by USD 1.5 billion, and gross debt relief fell by USD 2.1 billion (OECD, 2005). During the height of the war, Afghanistan was the single largest recipient of Danish development assistance with nearly 3.8 billion DKK being dispersed between

²² This was naturally also tied to the shifting nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime had fallen, and as the intensive military efforts of the initial invasion started to decline.

2001-2012 (MFA, 2012). As the graph below shows, Danish development assistance to Afghanistan began increasing from 2001, still continuing to rise.

Figure 5: Danish Development Assistance to Afghanistan from 2012-2017



Source: MFA, 2012

Danish development assistance played a key role, partly in the reconstruction of the Afghan society but also due to the necessity of addressing the root-causes of terrorism, as noted by Ulla Tørnæs, Minister of Development in 2005:

“Development policy is also used actively in the fight against extreme fundamentalism and terrorism. Here, development assistance can help combat some of the international terrorism's *root causes*. The new terror attempts deliberately to exploit *poverty, social problems* and *political marginalization* to build sympathy and secure a future recruitment“(Tørnæs, 2005)

The root causes of terrorism were perceived as stemming from poverty, social problems, and political marginalization. In other words, *underdevelopment* was a key priority in Afghanistan.

A shift in the rhetoric concerning the threat came in the way of attention broadening to underdevelopment as a whole, which was not exclusive to Afghanistan. Other regions and countries afflicted by similar conditions were now being discussed. This was reflected in aid

disbursement, with countries like Sudan and Somalia seeing an increase in aid during this period. In parallel, Denmark had increasingly been closing embassies since the new millennia with a goal to “focus” Denmark’s development assistance²³. Large development programs in Zambia and Zimbabwe were for instance closed so countries that were more impactful on Danish security could be prioritized.

The Danish government therefore not only focused on development assistance regarding its engagement in Afghanistan, but also thought of development assistance broadly in regards to security concerns. As Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated bluntly, “for many years there has been a development socialist romance mixed into Danida's work.” (Politiken, 2005)²⁴. Such a prioritization and focus was witnessed in Denmark’s development engagement in Africa, where the security rationale increasingly became an object of reference. As noted by Tørnæs in 2005:

“(Denmark) believes in the necessity of development as a precondition for security and stability [...] As the poorest continent in the world, with more than its fair share of violent conflicts, I believe that Africa needs more attention than it gets.” (Tørnæs, 2005)

The focus on Africa was not a priority exclusive to Denmark; Abrahamsen (2005) argued that Britain’s rhetoric regarding Africa shifted from “development/humanitarianism” towards a category of “risk/fear/threat”. As such, she argues that the New Labor government securitized Africa, speaking of it being a pressing security concern. Following Abrahamsen’s thoughts, Tørnæs presented Africa in a similar fashion:

“The active Danish profile in terms of aid opportunities to contribute to peace, security and stability - emphasizes that development assistance is an integral part of Danish

²³ It should be noted, that there also was a prioritization of development funds towards commercialization and business programs during this period. As such, the closing of these embassies should not only be read in the context of the security rationale, but also a foreign political interest to strengthen Denmark’s private sector.

²⁴ Paradoxically, with respect to Rasmussen’s quote above, even when a new Social Democratic government was elected in 2011, the notion of the security-development nexus was actually carried over, hence not being a foreign political priority exclusive to the Danish Liberal government. Even the “champion” of Danish development assistance, Christian Friis Bach, had changed his opinion regarding development’s value towards ensuring peace and stability. “Earlier, I did not adhere to the belief, that security and development should be mixed. I believe the exact opposite today” (Politiken, 2014).

foreign policy [...] war and conflict were some of the main reasons why it has been so difficult for Africa to rise out of poverty. Fast, coordinated and targeted development aid is often quite central in connection with conflict prevention.” (Tørnæs, 2005)

The emphasis on security concerns stemming from Africa was likely due to observations of deteriorating situations in Somalia and Sudan during this period. For instance, the long civil war in Somalia gave rise to al-Shabaab emerging as a terrorist organization and piracy became an issue that affected commercial sea-passage in the Gulf of Aden.

5.4 Fragile States as a Threat

With these cases in mind (Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia), a trend has begun based on the observation that the countries all lacked the traditional characteristics of a well-functioning state²⁵. To this end, the Western discourse in the mid-2000s started to present *failed*²⁶ and *fragile states* as security concerns. The Blair administration was arguably the first to bring fragile states to the international security agenda noting, “We know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals” (Blair, 2004). The U.S. soon followed suit, with Condoleezza Rice, former US Secretary of State stating: “Weak and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.” (Rice, 2005). The U.S. and Britain hence viewed state fragility as the crux of the terrorist threat.

In Denmark, the focus on fragile states emerged when Søren Pind was Minister of Development in 2010. In his new agenda, he stated:

²⁵ E.g. lacking a centralized state apparatus; warlordism and clan structures dictated governance-mechanisms; they failed to deliver fundamental basic goods (e.g. security), and; the ruling circle benefited the most from the economic ventures in the countries. I will in the next chapter more thoroughly cover this topic.

²⁶ Failed states can be defined as: “If a government can’t physically control its territory, has no, or only a limited, monopoly on the legitimate use of force, cannot adopt and enforce decision binding for the whole country is unable to provide basic public services and cannot represent the whole country in the international community, that state is a failed state.” (Djavadi, 2009)

“Earlier we feared the strength of great powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, today, paradoxically, we fear the most powerless states. Fragile states have a real bearing on regional security and even on our *own* security” (Pind, 2010b)

Essentially, the attention towards fragile states in the mid-2000s broadened the threat perception to include states with similar characteristics; Afghanistan was no longer the sole object of attention. This is not to say that terrorism faded out as a perceived threat. This “new” focus placed attention on how underdevelopment, in the form of weak state structures, was a root cause of terrorism and thus likewise posed a security concern.

5.5 Sub-Conclusion

Discursively over time, the perceived threat has shifted from terrorism to include underdevelopment and fragile states as well. Danish Ministers presented the threat in relation to the Danish state (military sector) and Danish values (political sector). This perception emerged due to several factors.

Firstly, the changing nature of conflicts in the 1990s gave rise to the security-development nexus playing an important role in how the international community saw threats could derive from the Global South (See: Appendix E). Secondly, after Afghanistan’s invasion the international coalition, including Denmark, became aware that the objective of combatting terrorism also required development assistance. Related, the complex criterion of “success” in Afghanistan highlighted that the objective relied on development assistance to pave the way for peace and stability. Then, during the mid-2000s underdevelopment and fragile states were broadly beginning to be discussed as security concerns. It is probable that this conviction stemmed from observations in Afghanistan where underdevelopment was viewed as a driver of terrorism and that comparable characteristics would replicate in other parts of the world.

However, examining these speech acts only provides part of the picture regarding the securitization process. As I will be highlighting in the next section, much of the “security construction” happens through policy papers, which outline the measures that are appropriate in

dealing with these threats, thereby potentially giving these constructions real life consequences that not solely reside in the socially constructed and discursive domain.

Chapter 6: Practice

Good Governance's Non-Discursive Enlistment in the Security Domain

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I explore, *in a Danish context, how good governance from a non-discursive perspective has been enlisted in the security domain.*

As noted by Emmers (2004), “a complete act of securitization really consists of and demands both discursive (speech act) and non-discursive (policy implementation) dimensions”. This chapter is devoted to exploring the non-discursive dimensions. This was done through looking at the *policy arena*, which demonstrates explicitly how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain. As advocated by Balzacq, policy formulation serves as a gateway towards how securitizing actors tackle threats, or how security is constructed. I will argue that good governance's enlistment can be identified in three manners: 1) In the context of good governance and the narrow conception, this is witnessed in respect to state-building and the fragile states agenda; 2) In the context of good governance and the broad conception, which is tied to the objective of establishing democratization and human rights, and lastly; 3) with regards to the notion's role in a civil-military context. Each example of good governance's enlistment will be analyzed in this chapter, starting with the narrow conception and fragile states.

6.2 Example One: Fragile States and the Narrow Conception

USAID launched in 2005 its first official policy paper on fragile states. Countries like Australia, Canada, Britain and Denmark soon followed. The Danish fragile states policy paper, ‘Peace and Stabilization’, notes that, “practically all of them (fragile states) are afflicted by, or emerging from conflict” (MFA, 2010: 2). Moreover, it is mentioned that the conflicts inherent to these states pose a security threat, because:

“These are conflicts that spread instability to other countries and regions, and which in the worst case can become breeding grounds for global threats, as witnessed in Somalia and Afghanistan. Fragile states thus constitute one of the most significant challenges to peace and security in the world.” (ibid: 2)

The threat perception is two-fold: conflicts can spread across borders, thus impacting regional security; and state fragility fosters terrorism, thus impacting international security²⁷. As highlighted in the policy paper there are two dimensions to state fragility. Firstly, these states lack *infrastructural capacity* (Rotberg, 2002: 85), which refers to the effectiveness of state institutions in providing public goods to the society. This is expressed in the form of:

“weak governmental structures, weak internal cohesion and a high degree of inequality, with massive challenges arising from extreme poverty, armed conflict and instability” (MFA, 2010: 2-3)

As such, Denmark perceives fragile states epitomized by “*bad*” *governance* in the form of weak governmental structures, weak institutional capacity and corruption. Lacking infrastructural power has the consequence of potentially undermining a state’s *coercive capacity*. This capacity concerns a state’s ability to execute force with retention and maintain a monopoly on violence (Rotberg, 2002: 87). As mentioned in the policy paper:

“Fragility can take many forms. It could be that a state has collapsed and cannot protect its population, or that it does not have the monopoly on legitimate use of force, and lacks the capacity to exercise authority vis-à-vis the factions – rebel groups, for example – that challenge that authority.” (MFA, 2010: 2).

²⁷ Within the IR discipline there has been a long academic tradition of assessing state strength and measuring military capabilities, which has been imperative in the threat assessment of rivaling great powers. However, with the fragile states literature interested is diverted to assessing state weakness, and which form of threat such characteristics pose. For a review of the fragile states literature and how the academic scene has approached this topic see **Appendix F**.

A state's lacking coercive capacity might lead to a contest of power, whereby terrorist organizations can contest the authority of fragile states. Providing security is arguably the most essential public good that a state must ensure to provide.

The main issue regarding fragile states thus concerns the provision of public goods, undermined by two forms of weak capacity: infrastructural and coercive. In dealing with this fragility, Denmark sees *State-Building* as a key tool that can curb these lacking capacities. The policy paper defines state building as:

“STATEBUILDING in fragile states is a long-term political process aiming at establishing a community with *inclusive political processes*, common *norms* and *rules* and stable, *legitimate institutions* that enjoy the trust of the population, and which can *supply justice*, security and *basic services* to all citizens and facilitate economic and social development. As an external actor, Denmark can help these local processes on their way by building up the *capacity* of central and local *institutions*.” (MFA, 2010: 10)

Interestingly, this definition of state building emphasizes features associated with the narrow conception of good governance. The definition above highlights the importance of inclusive political processes and legitimate institutions that in essence relate to the North's notion of open access order societies. The definition also underscores the importance of coercive capacity, via the emphasis on institutions that can provide security and basic services. The focus on institutions and their capacity to provide public goods relates to the four components (identified in Section 4.3.1) of the World Bank's good governance agenda. It is therefore alluded that Denmark sees state building as a narrow good governance tool that can curb “bad” governance as a threat²⁸.

²⁸ The policy paper goes on to note, why the promotion of good governance, in relation to narrow facets is important. Firstly it notes that the rule of law is necessary via “strengthening financial administration, and capacity building for supplying social services at local level”, so as to curb corruption and the clientelism of limited access order societies (UM, 2010: 17). Political participation at all levels and ownership of the political processes, “generates support for peace processes” (ibid). For this reason, supporting the civil society and free and fair media are also listed as vital factors. The paper also mentions the importance of holding individuals accountable, namely in respect to crimes committed; “Unresolved tensions, violations or a sense of injustice can lead to instability and new conflicts.” (ibid).

6.2.2 Implementing the Narrow Conception

Looking at the concrete state building tasks in Afghanistan unveils a great deal concerning the implementation of the narrow good governance agenda. Creating infrastructural capacity was the primary task after the invasion of Afghanistan,

“Regarding the discussion about what comes first, democratization or institutions. Definitely institutions. It was important for us to initially get the institutions in place [...] Promoting governance is always “good”, but under these circumstances (Afghanistan), we could not afford to think of good governance from a traditional development perspective. As such, the “good” governance (from a broad perspective) ambitions were not always the most important, but governance in its simplest form was highlighted. Firstly, with regard to institutions and thereafter on governance-processes.” (Kværnø, 2016: 3-6)

As noted by Holsti (1996), the first critical step in state building primarily focuses on the security apparatus and state institutions. Hence before good governance from the perspective of democracy and human rights could be implemented, creating an institutional foundation was necessary. Buzan (1991) conceptualizes the state and its basic elements according to three pillars: the idea of the state, the physical basis of the state, and the institutional expression of the state. The way in which Denmark and the international community could create the basis of a state in Afghanistan, was to support the institutional expression of the state through state-building and implementing good governance from a narrow conception. It can be stated that the focus in volatile and very fragile states concerns the essentials of what governance entails, namely institutions and basic governance structures.

The duties of my interviewees that were Chief Governance Planners for Regional Command South (ISAF) entailed creating basic structures of governance in regard to local governance structures and mechanisms (Kværnø, 2016: 3-10; Anonymous, 2016: 6-8).

“On the ground in Helmand, good governance was practical governance, and entailed getting the local institutions to make decisions. It concerned the basics of political

science. Making decisions about the public goods of society and how these should be distributed, either in respect to the local tribal elders, at the local governor level, and in the various councils [...] Hence, governance in Afghanistan entailed giving the local institutions decision-making competences” (Anonymous, 2016: 6-8)

The tasks in Afghanistan also reflect that the primary task was to get basic structures in place, defined as effective governance. Moreover, the Afghan government lacked a military and police force capable of providing security in the country revealing the states’ lack of coercive capacity. This led to the capacity training of military and police officers becoming a central element in Afghanistan (MFA, 2015: 16). This has latterly become a central theme for the Danish fragile states’ agenda as a whole²⁹, where the capacity training of military and police forces is carried out in several countries (MFA, 2010: 15).

The task on the ground is to establish institutional capacity, state legitimacy and accountability in its most basic forms. This often entails establishing the rule of law (by building legal institutions from scratch) and creating and training public administration that is capable of providing basic services³⁰. The task might not be economically focused but it resembles the features that are associated with the narrow dimension. Moreover, with a focus on strengthening coercive capacity, military and police personnel are trained and equipped in fragile states; military force and security capabilities are as such created and enhanced. Therefore, introducing the good governance principals of “capacity training” in fragile states has effects on security; in other words, security is constructed.

In summary, good governance configures in security setting through *implication* and via a *chain of equivalence*. In short, this chain builds on the understanding that the state building task in fragile states, boils down to tasks which we associate with the narrow good governance agenda. Enhancing coercive and infrastructural capacity in fragile states is perceived as a central tool to curb the threat of terrorism.

²⁹ E.g. in Kenya, Denmark is engaged with the training of the country’s navy, so as to control the waters of the Gulf of Aden and piracy from Somalia.

³⁰ An example to this end, was the training of local elders in Afghanistan, so they were capable of carrying out the duties of local administrations. “Express-courses” were made, where Afghans could achieve a political science degree within a few weeks (Anonymous, 2016: 19-21)

6.3 Example Two: The Broad Conception, Democracy and Legitimacy

According to Article 1 regarding the Danish Defense Law (Forsvarsloven), “The military defense shall help to promote peace and security” (Retsinformation, 2001b). The main purposes of Danish Defense are to, “1) to prevent conflict and war; 2) to assert Danish sovereignty and ensure the country's continued existence and integrity, and; 3) to promote the peaceful development of the world with respect for human rights.” (ibid)

It is legally stipulated that the purpose of Danish Defense is to contribute to a peaceful development based on human rights. As stated in the Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012, reaching such an objective required the following;

“Consolidating democracy in Afghanistan by supporting the holding of free elections; Strengthening the public sector’s ability to deliver results through promoting good governance at centralized and decentralized level; Enhancing the Afghan Government’s ability to reach out to the population – both men and women – through the process of decentralizing tasks and powers from central to local level as well as strengthening capacity in all provinces; Strengthening respect for human rights in Afghanistan, in particular by supporting the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC); Improving women’s access to the judicial system; Creating a strong and pluralistic civil society as an essential building block of a sustainable Afghan democracy“(MFA, 2008)

These tasks resemble good governance from a broad conception, touching upon issues of human rights, public participation and democratization. This thematic area was stressed in the necessity of formulating and supporting a new constitution, holding new elections and providing support for establishing new democratic institutions (ibid: 6). Human rights conditions were hard-pressed during this stage also. Particularly women experienced this as they faced discrimination in participating in the political processes (ibid: 8). In the most recent policy paper from Afghanistan spanning from 2014-2017 (MFA, 2014), ODA contributions amounted to a total of 1085 million DKK. Regarding the thematic program on good governance, democracy and human rights 317 million DKK will be disbursed over a three-year period.

The focus on these elements was underpinned by an objective to create a legitimate state in the eye of the Afghan people. The emphasis was placed mainly on elections and the democratization processes, reflecting the goal of creating a legitimate Afghan government (MFA, 2008: 17). Based on the conviction that state failure stems from a lack of state legitimacy (Pegg, 1998), the objective in Afghanistan was to enforce the *idea of the state*³¹, which needed to be legitimately democratically bound. As stated by Buzan, “without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving” (Buzan, 1991). State legitimacy is a vital component in state building, because without legitimacy, democratic authority is undermined (Holsti, 2004: 56-57).

The international coalition was resolute on emphasizing these themes because the international mission as whole was based on defending these values (as reflected in Chapter 5). However, it was also viewed that the promotion of these values - a legitimate and democratic Afghan government - was a necessary enabler towards peaceful development. As noted by Collier & Rohner (2008: 531),

“The rationale for this strategy, over and above the intrinsic desirability of democracy, is that by making the government more accountable, citizens will have less cause for violent opposition”

By this token, on the basis of Denmark’s foreign political identity and strategic culture (see Section 5.2), there is a liberal ideological³² rationale behind Denmark’s intervention, which in essence equates legitimacy and democracy with peace. This notion of peace and democracies being correlated is referred to as *democratic peace theory* (Rosato, 2003; Doyle, 1986). Statistically, it has been demonstrated that democracies less frequently engage in war with one

³¹ Arguably, this was one of the conceptual flaws with promoting good governance in Afghanistan, considering that the Afghan citizens to a higher degree associated themselves with local clan structures, which undermined the basis to form a democratic Afghan regime.

³² Kant’s notion of *perpetual peace* is arguably the starting point for most liberal thinkers, which in essence concerns the idea, that peace, permanently can be established over a certain area.

another, while non-democracies are more inclined to do so³³. The Clinton Doctrine is one of the more expressive examples of such a conviction. However, it appears that Denmark has too been influenced by this line of thought due to its emphasis on good governance from a broad conception, via the promotion of democracy and legitimacy in Afghanistan.

Such a conviction, should also be interpreted in the light that the reason of going to war has altered in the post-Cold War era. The moral and legitimate justification of going to war was arguably simpler during this era; it was a *war of existence* and concerned state survival in its purest form. The collapse of the Soviet Union paved the way for a new way to use, threaten and legitimizing force. While Western use of force during the Cold War was essentially legitimized with reference to national security, the need to prevent (great power) war and to counter the spread of communism, the dominant rationale after the fall of the wall was the need to protect human rights and spread democracy and market economy. The Danish engagement concerning the civil war in Libya (2011) and the recent engagements in Mali (2015-) and Iraq/Syria (2014-) have in the contrary been labelled *wars of choice*, which are political projects that do not concern Danish survival. It is difficult to label the war in Afghanistan as either. Despite the discursive representation of terrorism, underdevelopment and fragile states as threats, the war necessitated some sort of political legitimacy that did not only rest upon Danish survival in its primal form. One way, in which this war was legitimated, was tying its reason to development. I will return to this point in Chapter 7 regarding good governance's legitimizing and contextual values.

The promotion of good governance from a broad conception has been withheld in Danish foreign policy. In Chapter 4, concerning traditional development assistance, the promotion of good governance was seen as a value-based agenda and as a political project. Regarding the war in Afghanistan, good governance has been promoted in a similar manner because of its affiliation of representing certain democratic values. As such, good governance from the broad perspective has also been enlisted in the security domain: firstly because of the goal to create a democratic

³³ There are several explanations to this end, which the academic scene has highlighted: for instance, that democracies have the ability to get along without fighting, due to the fact, that democracies are legitimately elected, and thus deserves respect and trust; they are able to resolving political issues through compromise; and that democracies have developed a wide array of interactions amongst another, and are thus interdependent on each other (Morgan, 2013: 35).

and legitimate Afghan government, which would pave the way for peace; but also because of the moral and political legitimacy it brings to the Danish domestic context.

6.4 Example Three: Good Governance in a Military Context

Up until now, I have in this chapter highlighted how good governance in a developmental setting has been enlisted in the security domain. This section takes this aspect one step further, demonstrating how good governance concretely is applied by the military. A brief introduction to good governance's role with regard to COIN is provided in **Appendix G**.

6.4.1 Comprehensive Approach Strategies

Denmark uses the term 'samtækningsstrategier', the Brits prefer the term 'Whole of Government Approach', and NATO uses a Comprehensive Approach. These strategies build on a premise that integrated development of strategies, coordination, implementation and evaluation across ministries (and the military-civil sphere), better enables the West in achieving lasting democratic peace and build stable nations (Jakobsen, 2014). Comprehensive approach strategies are perceived in Danish policy papers, as a term which encompasses much more than just civil-military coordination; in essence it is a stabilization effort, which also is designed to fulfill political and military objectives. As such, the comprehensive approach can be interpreted as the latest branch and tool in seeking to address the security-development nexus, whilst also being the epitome of a strategic instrument in achieving foreign political objectives.

In a Danish context, the comprehensive approach was formally introduced in the Defense Agreement of 2005-2009, with reference to the engagement in Afghanistan. Up to 750 Danish troops, including combat and transport aircraft, infantry, tanks, special operations forces, and others were present in Afghanistan. Additionally, several diplomats, technical assistants, and a defense attaché were attached to the Danish Embassy in Kabul.

One of the results from the Defense Agreement was the establishment of a steering committee comprised of the State Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice. The steering committee serves as the main coordinating forum, wherein the strategic level of planning across ministries is discussed. Moreover, The Peace and

Stabilization Fund (PSF) was established under the 2010-2014 Danish Defense Agreement, allocating 941 million DKK between 2010 and 2014. Half of this funding is considered official development assistance (ODA), while the other half is non-ODA resources from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As noted, the PSF serves, “as a cross-government funding pool to support stabilization and conflict prevention initiatives at the nexus of security and development” (MFA, 2013: 24), thus directly addressing the nexus between security and development.

There has been a comprehensive coordination on the top-political and strategic levels, which the steering committee and the PSF for instance are indicative of. When looking at the Danish policy for comprehensive approach strategies, good governance is listed herein. Firstly, good governance is listed in accord with the narrow dimension, touching upon the elements from a state-building and stabilization effort, thus replicating many of the same themes from the failed states agenda (MFA, 2013). Capacity building in the way of institutions is for instance listed as priority area (ibid: 4); “capacity and institution building is the key to long-term stability” (ibid: 35). Moreover, the comprehensive approach strategy policy paper also enlists good governance according to the broad agenda, touching upon elements of legitimacy, democracy and human rights (ibid). For instance, the promotion of human rights according to the Right to a Better Life is mentioned in the policy paper as a key priority (ibid: 39).

Nevertheless, the Danish comprehensive approach strategy does not bring anything new in the way of thinking about good governance in the policy arena; focus is still on the narrow state-building agenda and broad conception according to traditional standards of development assistance. However, the comprehensive approach is arguably the most profound example of how good governance has been brought into the security domain, which comes to show regarding on-the-ground thinking in Afghanistan.

At the tactical level, civilian stabilization advisers were attached to the PRT’s in the Afghan provinces Badakhshan and Helmand. A PRT is a unit composed of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction advisers and experts. Their main task is to support reconstruction efforts and

are a further development of the CIMIC³⁴ teams introduced in the 1990s. The PRT was first introduced by the Brits and the U.S. in Iraq, with Denmark likewise supporting the NATO coalitions PRTs. According to the Danish Ministry of Defense, their main task is to:

“coordinate the international stabilization efforts and assist the Afghan government in expanding its exercise of *authority* and *legitimacy* in Helmand province. The objective is to create a local management that will help to improve the security situation and to ensure that the Afghans themselves can manage *governance*, economic development and delivery of service.” (Danish Defense, 2014).

As such, one of the main purposes with the PRT is to empower local governments to govern their constituents more effectively. The emphasis on local authority and legitimacy relates to how COIN manuals stressed the importance of legitimacy deriving from the indigenous population.

However, it can be questioned whether good governance has been able to fulfill a military duty on the tactical level and on the ground in for instance Afghanistan. Comprehensive approaches have met critique due to a disparity between means and ends, while there also has been incongruence between the tactical and strategic levels (Jakobsen, 2014). The PRT configuration appeared viable on paper, but this was not always the case in real terms. One particular example of this was how the military (and not the special stabilization advisers) increasingly had to carry out the good governance tasks on the ground, which they were not properly equipped to do. As such, we might say there has been a counter-effect of securitization, namely a *developmentalization* of the military.

6.4.2 The Developmentalization of the Military?

In respect to the good governance centered tasks, it was civilian stabilization advisers and experts (mainly from the Danish embassy in Kabul) that needed to carry out these responsibilities in Afghanistan. However, one of the repercussions of working in a volatile milieu, is that it might not always be possible to get these advisers into the field. Thus, in instances when the security was deemed too dangerous, officers and individuals with a military

³⁴ See Appendix E for an introduction to CIMIC.

background were sent to carry out the good governance tasks. This entailed sending out CIMIC officers³⁵ that were not equipped to carry out stabilization tasks at local levels.

“In situations where the civilians could not get out into the field, the task was moved over to the military. And the military is simply not good at that. We are not good at solving these tasks, because our focus is on safety above else. And we saw numerous examples, when stabilization advisers from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, could not get out of the camps, due to the security situation, hence they asked the military CIMIC officers and junior officers to perform their duties. This created a confusion of responsibility regarding the rollout of stabilization projects. Military personnel are per definition not good at doing development in respect to good governance. Yes, they can dig wells, build schools and so on. But the complex process planning associated with good governance is something completely different. In essence, we took on some roles that we were not equipped to carry out.”(Kværnø, 2016: 25-30)

The situation of Danish military officers then needing to carry out civilian tasks subsequently arose. This is one example of the implications of combining the civil-military efforts. Until now, I have touched upon the consequences that security has had in development, but this example shows the contra-effect, where development is imposed on security. Nonetheless, it serves as one of the more vivid examples of how good governance has been enlisted in the security domain, namely in respect to how the military is assigned to carry out good governance tasks.

Generally speaking though, the war in Afghanistan provides various examples of how the military increasingly became aware of good governance’s necessity, mainly because it was perceived as a vital tool which garnered stability. An example to this end is witnessed in respect to how military operations started to incorporate governance into its planning of operations and its institutional configuration. Firstly, Chief Governance Planners were placed within the military institutions, typically with a civilian background, but whom had worked for instance with the

³⁵ Essentially, a CIMIC officer serves as the military commander’s capability of reaching out to the locals, a military friendly face to the public one might say. This helps in establishing the needs of the locals, whether this may be in relation to building wells or addressing certain grievances, moreover it is also a vital source of gathering the necessary intel on the ground. Thus, the CIMIC officer’s mindset is strictly according to military necessity, and not development oriented for the long run.

Ministry of Defense. It was necessary to have individuals, whom could carry out governance tasks, but also “spoke the military language”, and knew how to attune the governance task, so it could fit in with the complex planning of a military operation.

“Given that, at the time, the military planning was the main driver of everything in Afghanistan, then you need someone whom can speak that language. That is, you need someone who can speak with the civil component and translate into military planning.”
(Anonymous, 2016: 30)

The international coalition’s *clear-hold-build* strategy, which entailed clearing an area where the Taliban were present, hold the position, so lastly development could take place (build), was not initially very successful. This was primarily due to a void of power and leadership, which followed the clear phase, hence after a period of time the Taliban, would reemerge. As a consequence the military brought in good governance advisers several months before the military operation, so as to identify potential new political figures and train and equip new government officials; hence these could fill the power vacuum after operations (Anonymous, 2016: 14-17).

These are but a few examples of the military engagement in Afghanistan incorporating good governance into its planning. It was mainly denoted in the realization that security could not be achieved without stability, and that stability rested upon governance structures.

6.5 Sub Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted good governance’s enlistment in the security domain in three interlinked manners. Firstly, good governance from a narrow perspective has been a cornerstone to the formulation of the fragile states agenda. Good governance is viewed as a measure that is capable of curbing deficits of “bad” governance, which underpin the weak infrastructural and coercive capacity of fragile states. Secondly, promoting good governance from the broad and crosscutting perspective was a key objective in Afghanistan. This is denoted in the conviction that state legitimacy, from a democratic perspective, paves the way for peace and stability; an agenda that has ties to a foreign interventionist liberal mindset. Lastly, the merging of civil and military dimensions, prominently expressed by comprehensive approaches, has directly brought

good governance into a security domain with the military being tasked in carrying out governance tasks.

This chapter has demonstrated that an exclusive focus on speech acts does not provide the full picture. Policy papers serve as important gateways to comprehensively understand the scope of the security concern and how security is constructed. The incorporation of good governance in the policy setting has brought about real security effects in practice. Enhancing the coercive capacity of fragile states has led to the military and police personnel being better equipped and more capable in their conduct via training. There has also been a counter-effect of incorporating good governance in a civil-military setting where *development has been constructed*, due to the military's increased awareness of good governance and how these actors increasingly carried out its tasks.

Chapter 7: Concluding Discussion

Stage Two: Extraordinary Measures and the Audience's Accept

7.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to discuss *if good governance has been successfully securitized in a Danish context?*

I will discuss the traits of a successful securitization from the positions of the Copenhagen School and the sociological approach represented by Balzacq and Floyd. As mentioned in Chapter 3, identifying a successful securitization entails examining extraordinary measures and the audience's accept (Emmers, 2013: 132-136). I will reflect on whether good governance's enlistment in the security domain categorizes as extraordinary measures. Moreover, I will examine good governance's role regarding the audience's accept of the threats.

7.2 Extraordinary Measures

As highlighted in the chapter on theory, extraordinary measures refer to special privileges in dealing with a threat, outside the realm of ordinary politics. Nonetheless, the Copenhagen School does not clarify how these are identified, apart from the most controversial circumstance, where extraordinary measures come in the form of curtailing civil liberties, imposing martial law, political opponents and terrorists are detained without proper trial, or military budgets are increased (Anthony et al., 2006)³⁶. Arguably, Denmark's invasion of Afghanistan portrays some sort of exception. This is because Denmark has never actively engaged in a war on such a scale, quickly supporting the invasion (expressing urgency). The 'Anti-Terror Package' was approved in 2002 by the Danish parliament and involved a comprehensive review of the legislation on terrorism. This was furthermore followed by a large increase in funding for the police and the Danish Military Intelligence Service (Retsinformation, 2002). Prior to 2002, terrorism had been under the jurisdiction of the Danish Police and Justice System. Currently it is the Danish Defense Ministry that steers groups on this matter.

³⁶ To this end, the Copenhagen School advocate for a *desecuritization*, which brings the issue back into the politicized sphere, where it is dealt within the standards boundaries of politics.

The Danish extraordinary measures are less apparent when compared to the American context. The Patriot Act of 2001 introduced unlawful combatant status. This would eliminate protection by the Geneva Conventions; enhance interrogation techniques, NSA electronic surveillance programs, and prisoner status at Guantanamo Bay (Abraham, 2007). Arguing that measures, according to these “exceptional” characteristics can be identified regarding underdevelopment and fragile states as threats, would stretch the term as developed by the Copenhagen School. Comprehensive approach strategies are a new phenomenon within Danish foreign policy and have more or less brought development into a military context. However, these strategies do not portray exceptionality from a Schmittian perspective.

Many scholars have taken issue with the term ‘extraordinary measures’ and the Copenhagen School’s position that it constitutes a successful securitization, because in liberal democracies “securitizing actors do not always revert to exceptional security when they address a threat” (Floyd, 2015: 5). The Copenhagen School has also reverted on this position (Floyd, 2015: 2), claiming that, “we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted” (Buzan et al, 1998: 25). As noted in Section 3.4.3, on the basis of the *constructivist deficit* identified by Ciută (2009), Floyd (2015) rather sees it necessary to examine security practitioners as the key actor in defining extraordinary measures.

Based on Floyd’s criteria, it becomes clearer how good governance, via the policy arena, configures as a measure towards underdevelopment and fragile states as security threats. Government officials and civil servants have formulated the policy papers on the basis of what politicians have demanded, but it must also be expected, that they have influenced the policy formulation. Important, is the necessity to recognize, that they have been the main actors in identifying the response. It is no coincidence that good governance has been selected, by these security practitioners, as the proper measure; within the Danish MFA, good governance has been applied since the 1990s in dealing with underdevelopment, wherefore it is only natural, that this tool was the preferred measure from the practitioner’s perspective. This was also expressed in my interview with Berg (2016: 11) :

“If you do not introduce good governance and democratic principles, conflict will entail”
(Berg, 2016: 11)

The conviction that underdevelopment and fragile states pose a threat is not only seen in the discursive arena; it is also shared by the Danish Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The security practitioners have seen good governance as the measure in dealing with this threat, which good governance's enlistment in the security domain is indicative of. In summary, it can be stated that good governance has served as measure in dealing with underdevelopment and fragile states as threats, because the practitioners have regarded it to be the appropriate measure.

7.3 The Audience's Accept

The last step in a securitization analysis revolves around the audience's accept. The Copenhagen School argues that the discourse regarding the existential threat towards a referent object has to be articulated so it convinces the audience. As previously highlighted, this is notoriously difficult on general and public levels, where even public polls lack the necessary depth. However, there are a few indicators that we can draw upon; breaking it into two categories might be useful in this regard, looking at the security and development dimensions separately.

Firstly, Danish public support towards the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted throughout the 2000s (Jørgensen, 2011), but had frequently been more positive compared to European allies (Jakobsen & Ringsmose, 2015). Even after 10 years of engagement in Afghanistan, there was still a dominant public support towards the Danish efforts in this regard; indicating that some level of legitimacy in the public eye was maintained throughout (Schøtt, 2013). Jakobsen (2015), from the Danish Defense College, argues that there has been an atypical acceptance and Danish support towards these wars, despite the losses within them. Despite the losses, broad parliamentary and public support remained. These factors could arguably portray a public consent towards the security dimensions.

In terms of development, the Danish public support towards aid assistance signifies if there is public consent towards development assistance's usage. To this end, it is quite evident that

Denmark has consistently prioritized aid assistance. Danish aid contributions are rather high, when measured in GNI, and have been maintained above the 0.7% United Nations recommended threshold (Klarskov & Thobo-Carlsen, 2015)³⁷. These aspects indicate that the public supports development assistance broadly, viewing this field as an important policy-priority.

However, a successful securitization cannot be completed without the political elite's consent, because these actors are vital to granting the employment of extraordinary measures (Emmers, 2013: 140; Roe, 2008: 615). One of the indicators that the political elite accepted terrorism as a threat was when the Danish parliament approved both the war in Afghanistan and the 'Anti-Terror Package' (Retsinformation, 2002).

But the parliamentary acceptance of terrorism as a threat and the general public's acceptance of Denmark's military and development engagements tell us little about underdevelopment and fragile states being accepted threats. A major pitfall of the Copenhagen School's use of the audience's acceptance is that there are no stipulated guidelines to assess how and when it is identified. Therefore, scholars might reach different conclusions regarding successful securitization, resembling the abovementioned constructivist deficit. Moreover, good governance as a measure, did not require the acceptance from the audience because it already existed as a "non-exceptional" measure in dealing with development assistance.

Because of this ambiguity, the far more interesting task, is trying to identify, which "buttons" the securitizing actors have pushed in their pursuit of gaining the audience's accept. As argued by Balzacq, for the audience to accept the threat and measure in response, a certain context is necessary for this consent to happen. In this vein, the audience is only likely to accept a speech act, when *feelings, beliefs, thoughts* or *actions* are evoked, based on the audience's preconceptions surrounding the referent object and the threat as such (ibid: 175), or as Balzacq notes, "the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience's experience" (ibid: 184).

³⁷ The most recent cutbacks regarding Danish development assistance, garnered less than 50% support (Kaasgaard, 2015).

Good governance has played a key role from such a contextual perspective. Denmark has been applying the concept since the 1990s promoted good governance, primarily from a broad perspective, which has been interpreted as a value-based agenda associated with themes of human rights and democracy. Danish politicians and the general population have thus had a preconception of what the concept entailed, it is thus no coincidence, that good governance has been articulated by the securitizing actors, when addressing the security concern. Reverting to Møller's representation of the terrorist threat, we actually witness good governance being mentioned alongside human rights and democracy:

“The poorest (in this world) will face difficult and worse conditions, if terrorist groups manage to collapse already fragile states. For this reason we will be supporting development, the promotion of *human rights, democracy and good governance*” (Møller, 2003a).

Likewise, when Søren Pind ushered in the fragile states agenda, he similarly relied on good governance, democracy and human rights in his speech acts:

“The rationale regarding the engagement in fragile states is based on security as well as the moral obligation. Everyone has the right to live in freedom, wherefore the promotion of *good governance, democracy and human rights* is necessary” (Pind, 2010c)

To legitimize Denmark's efforts against the threat, Danish ministers (as securitizing actors) have relied on good governance's contextual meaning, which represents Western values, evoking the audience's preconceptions concerning this subject. In other words, the securitizing actors have in this instance tuned their language by using the term good governance, so as to legitimize the threat and the measures in response. As such, it appears that Danish ministers have based their justification of dealing with a threat, which goes beyond the military rationale.

This is also tied to the notion that wars in the post-Cold War era needing a political legitimacy behind them. A war of choice, which is not bound to our existence as a nation, configures

equally with any other domestic Danish political projects (Rasmussen, 2011:12). This point is captured from an excerpt of my interview with Kværnø, when he notes that:

“When the war is a political project, legitimacy is needed, like all other political projects. Denmark’s wars of choice vs. the car toll/ payment ring around Copenhagen - there is no difference between the two political projects. This means that the Danish government needs to provide political legitimacy, to explain to voters what we do and why we do it. In the Cold War, there was no need to explain how or why. Now we go to war on a wide scale of violence, ranging from hyper intensive violence attacks to peacekeeping operations. In respect to stabilization efforts, governance becomes an important part of the legitimacy of trying to buy support for this political project.”(Kværnø, 2016: 12-13)

It makes perfect sense to incorporate good governance into the legitimization because it serves as an emblem of the Western democratic state, and the stability associated with it. Earlier I mentioned the notion of developmentalization with respect to contra-effects on the military at the tactical and practical level, but the concept’s effects can also be traced in a broader context. Kühn (2008: 1) uses the term and states that “a developmentalization of security has taken place, as a certain – not specified – level of societal stability, welfare state and individual (e.g. economic) opportunity structures have become a benchmark for security policy”. In the case of good governance and the security domain, this argument is too strengthened. Good governance’s promotion in fragile states and in Afghanistan is a cornerstone that has become a benchmark for the security objective. Kühn goes on to note that,

“Corresponding to the concept of securitization as a speech act, developmentalization is assumed to be produced in the same way. On the background of a liberal-democratic mindset, Western policy makers can easily draw on their audiences’ understanding of how state, society, economic system, political procedures and fundamental freedoms ought to look like in an ideal case.” (ibid: 2)

Good governance represents and encompasses exactly these dimensions of how a state, society, economic system, political procedures and fundamental freedoms ought to look in an ideal case.

It is thus only natural that the securitizing actors have relied on good governance in their discourse. It is quite clear that “good governance” has served as a button that the securitizing actors have pushed to evoke feelings and thoughts about a peaceful, stable and democratic world.

Good governance’s significance in a security setting is exposed, when the chain of equivalence as a whole is illuminated. To summarize, this chain is tied to good governance’s enlistment in the security domain, which has occurred on two levels: 1) as a *means*, good governance is seen as a tool in dealing with the threats of underdevelopment, fragile states and the root-causes of terrorism; and 2) as an *end*, good governance symbolizes the Western state ideal, and states that live up to such characteristics, are perceived as to ensure global peace and prosperity.

7.4 Towards a Conclusion

This Master Thesis set out to answer the question: *How has the good governance agenda been linked to security and has good governance been securitized? Moreover, if such a securitization can be confirmed, how has this taken place discursively and in practice?*

The answer to this problem formulation is contingent on one’s view of how a securitization analysis is conducted. It is quite evident that the purpose with applying good governance has shifted in a Danish context, from solely being related to development assistance, to contemporarily also being used in a security setting. However, whilst I argue that good governance has been enlisted in the security domain, this does not portray a securitization alone.

From a Copenhagen School perspective, this case lacks exceptionality in the form of extraordinary measures deployed in dealing with underdevelopment and fragile states as a threat, and the audience’s accept on this matter is difficult to identify. To this end, the simple answer is: *no* – good governance has not been securitized.

However, this paper has demonstrated that by adopting supplementary angles to securitization, through an adherence to Balzacq’s emphasis on *power*, *context* and *practices*, puts the case of

good governance's securitization in a different light. Firstly, policy papers serve as important objects of analysis in unveiling how good governance has been enlisted in a security setting. Discourse in the form of speech acts might bring security issues to the public attention, but they only go half the way in explaining the configuration of a threat. Policy papers unveil a chain of equivalence³⁸, which highlight how good governance by implication configures in a security setting. Moreover, these documents affect the construction of security, expressed by how good governance's enlistment herein has real effects on *practices* within the security domain (e.g. strengthening coercive capacity and developmentalization). On the basis that security practitioners define the appropriate measures (e.g. good governance as measure in dealing with fragile states), unveils that the *power* tied to the securitization process, not only resides at the top-political hierarchies, but also at the bureaucratic administrative levels. The *context* is important in this regard because these practitioners have operated with good governance previously, in a development assistance setting. Considering that the issue of addressing the root-causes of the threat primarily was a developmental task, the practitioners saw value in carrying this agenda over to the security domain as well. Good governance as a measure has been applied since the 1990s in a development assistance context, and lacks "exceptional" characteristics, wherefore there has been little reason for the audience to object its deployment in a security setting; as such these factors negate the necessity of identifying the audience's accept. However, the term itself has played a role in a contextual sense, whereby its utterance has assisted in legitimizing the efforts against the threat.

This thesis has thus demonstrated that the securitization process likewise takes place in the non-discursive domain, whereby it is an intersubjective process. On the basis of examining: 1) the security practitioner's role; 2) non-exceptional measures, and; 3) the context behind the audience's accept - it is necessary to consider the sociological approach in the case of good governance's securitization. **From this perspective it can be concluded that: yes - a securitization of good governance has taken place.**

³⁸ The chain can be broken down into the following steps: terrorism → security-development nexus/ civil military cooperation → underdevelopment → fragile states → state building → good governance.

In relation to the global scope of this study, let us look at the question: of *what* is good governance's securitization a case? The case highlights how patterns have formed in the understanding of security and development as intertwined, expressed by an effort to combine civil and military dimensions. At the *theoretical* level, this thesis has demonstrated that a securitization takes place beyond the discursive domain and that the construction of security via policy papers has real effects on practices and security issues. Moreover, this case serves as an example of how Western policy security formulators do not merely conceive security in relation to military force and objective threats, as advocated by the traditional school of security studies. There is awareness amongst these actors, that the root-causes of security concerns in the Global South are driven by e.g. the malaise of development and governance deficiencies. To address the underpinnings of these security issues, the Global North views non-traditional security measures (e.g. good governance) as the appropriate and most effective means in dealing with these "new" threats in the post-Cold War. As such, at the *general* and *abstract* level, the securitization of good governance thus serves as an example of how the conception of "security" itself has broadened. Revisiting the Case Analytical Matrix from Section 2.4, following observations, concepts, patterns and theories can be plotted into the matrix.

Figure 6: Analytical Matrix Revisited

	Concrete	Abstract
Specific	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Terrorism as a Threat - Underdevelopment and Fragile States as Threats - War in Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - War on Terror - Good Governance
General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security-Development Nexus - Civil-Military Cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Securitization - Broadening of Security and Development's "New" Role in the Security Domain

Moreover, it appears that this study is relevant with respect to contemporary discussions concerning Danish foreign policy. Several reports have been issued this year related to this research area. In June, a synthesis of lessons learned regarding the Danish Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan 2001-2014 was released. The report underlines several aspects that Denmark could have done "better" including: the necessity of considering the local context regarding implementing good governance and state-building in fragile states, and whether these states have the capacity of adopting complex "modern" institutional structures (DIIS, 2016).

Norway has also released a similar report this year, where a main conclusion recommended that Norway should steer away from state building and stabilization tasks in its future foreign political endeavors.

This does not seem to be the case for future Danish foreign policy. After the 2015 Danish general elections, the newly elected liberal government appointed the former Danish ambassador to Washington, Peter Taksøe-Jensen, to investigate the strategic framework and outline the core purpose of Danish foreign policy. Taksøe-Jensen's report was released in May 2016, which, to paraphrase, highlighted the necessity of an *interest-based* approach to Danish foreign policy. The effects of this approach imply that development policy requires a logic and purpose beyond development, coming to resemble "normal" foreign policy. The report suggests a focus on fragile states, strengthening of civil-military cooperation, and the necessity of enhancing comprehensive approach thinking at the tactical levels; factors, which are indicative of a persistent focus on the merging of security and development (Taksøe-Jensen, 2016).

The Danish Foreign Minister, Kristian Jensen, in his expanded synopsis regarding the future of Danish development strategy lifted the veil on good governance's role in the future. Regarding the UN's Global Goals for 2030, Jensen sees Goal 16 as the premise for the future of Danish development. Goal 16 concerns the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (MFA, 2016). Andersen (2016) notes that Goal 16 came as a "reaction to the old 2015 targets and their lack of insight regarding the importance and connection between good governance and violent conflict". To this end, it is quite evident that Denmark will continue to prioritize good governance in her new interest-based foreign policy.

Denmark's foreign political objective of bringing good governance in to the security domain, and addressing the security-development nexus, is a relatively new phenomenon in Denmark's foreign policy. However, the merging of security and development instruments is not a new phenomenon. Major players have long considered development's role in achieving security objectives. This had for instance been one the rationales and main pillars of development during the Cold War, arguably it even traces further back considering COIN objectives in the colonial

era. As such, the Danish securitization of good governance serves as an example of Denmark's foreign policy maturing and the quest to become on par with what the great international players are doing within this field.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Philosophy of Science

Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge, the rationality of belief, and justification (Stroud 2011: 495). Constructivism, as a way of looking at epistemology, views all of our knowledge as constructed, because it is reliant on convention, human perception and social experience (Campbell, 2014: 377). For instance, a constructivist would posit, that the international system does not objectively exist (in contrast to e.g. the solar system), but only exists as an inter-subjective awareness among people (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162). By this token, (social) constructivists argue that knowledge and reality are actively created by social relationships and interactions (Bryman, 2012: 33). The constructivist approach stands in contrast to objectivism, which argues that social phenomena and their meanings are not influenced by social actors, whereby these phenomena in essence are seen as external facts that are beyond the influence of social actors (ibid). Within IR, the traditional schools (e.g. realism) have typically represented an objective understanding of social phenomena, mainly because they view the international system as anarchical and structurally binding.

Securitization theory is predominantly labeled as a constructivist approach to understanding security, because it emphasizes how discourses, which rely on “security language”, can bring about security concerns. Nevertheless, one of the main criteria of the Copenhagen School’s approach, underscores that securitization must entail the “survival” of a referent object, because if anything can become matters of security, then nothing in the end signifies security. This was a deliberate criteria set up by the CS approach, which resonated with the traditional schools of security studies. To this end, securitization falls somewhere in between a constructivist and realist approach to understanding security, which also is tied to the notion that the effects of securitization have ‘real’ life implications.

Appendix B: Interviewees

My interviewees were:

- Anonymous: Chief Governance Planner, Afghanistan ISAF, 2010. Currently with the Danish Ministry of Defense.
Date of interview: 14/04/2016
- Nina Berg: Chief Adviser, Security and Stabilization Team, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Works with reviews, appraisals and quality insurance of Danida programs. Has worked with rule of law and democratic governance as a former employee at UNDP.
Date of interview: 04/05/2016
- Ole Kværnø: Chief Governance Planner, Afghanistan ISAF, 2010. Currently the Dean at the Danish Defense College – was recently involved in issuing the lessons-learned report concerning the Danish engagement in Afghanistan (DIIS, 2016)
Date of interview: 11/05/2016
- Peter Marinus Jensen: Director, International Development Partners. As a consultant he has carried out several appraisals and reviews of Danish good governance programs.
Date of interview: 28/04/2016
- Thomas Juel Thomsen: Team leader, Global Development Issues, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010-2013. Has worked with the formulation of Danida's aid management guidelines. Currently self-employed as a consultant to the MFA.
Date of interview: 07/04/2016
- Torben Lindqvist: Chief Adviser, Technical Advisory Services, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chief adviser on good governance and public financial management.
Date of interview: 29/04/2016

Appendix C: Policy Papers

Regarding good governance from a development assistance perspective I relied on the following policy papers:

- Human Rights and Democracy (1993)
- En Verden I Udvikling: Strategy 2000 (1994)
- Poverty (1996)
- Partnership 2000 (2001)
- En Verden til Forskel (2003)
- The Right to a Better Life (2012)

When it came to examining good governance's role and importance regarding the security domain, I studied a broad range of policy papers since 2001 issued by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The Helman Plans and the specific program documents regarding Denmark's engagement in Afghanistan were important documents in my research, but ultimately I did not include these in the thesis, considering, that the broader policy papers captured the most essential aspects of promoting good governance in the country. The primary policy papers that I relied on, which tackled good governance's role in a security setting, vis-à-vis the security-development nexus and civil-military cooperation were:

- Security, Growth – Development (2004)
- The Afghanistan-Denmark Partnership (2005)
- The Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2008-2012 (2008)
- The Danish Afghanistan Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)
- Peace and Stabilization: Denmark's Policy Towards Fragile States (2010)
- Denmark's Integrated Stabilization Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World (2013)

Appendix D: What is Governance?

In its most basic form, governance (as opposed to “good” governance) concerns the rule of the rulers, or in other words “the action, manner, or function of governing a state, organization, etc.” (Oxford Dictionary). How authority is exercised through control and management (of the state) is a central theme within the governance literature, wherefore governance is a key concept, when examining how societies are steered, as noted by Pierre & Peters: “governance is the capacity of a government to make and implement policy, in other words, to steer society” (Pierre & Peters, 2000:1). According to Pierre & Peters, the (state) capacity to implement and make policies is thus analogous to steering, wherefore state institutions, in the form of the public administration and the bureaucratic system, are important objects of analysis, when studying governance.

As stated by the World Bank, governance also involves the process “by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make the rules, and by which those rules are enforced and modified” (World Bank, 2009). By this token, governance accordingly covers a certain judicial aspect, and can also be coupled with state legitimacy, the rule of law and the civil sphere’s acceptance of state authority (Kjær, 2004: 12). Moreover, governance also concerns what is called the *rules of the game*, which regulate and determine the capacity to steer a society; these not always take on the form of formal rules (i.e. legislation), but can also be informally bound (i.e. norms and values) (ibid: 10).

That said, governance is used in a variety of contexts, which need not necessarily be confined to the government and state-level; government is but one institution involved in governance, and in its widest sense, governance refers to the “various ways through which social life is coordinated” (Heywood, 2007: 6). It is thus possible to think of “governance without government” (Rhodes, 1996)

In its most abstract form, governance revolves around how actions and processes form stable practices and *institutions* over time (Hufty, 2011). So, while there are different interpretations of governance, they all grow out of focus on institutions; as Kjær points out, governance is key to understanding, how institutions emerge and change (Kjær, 2004: 8-9).

From an informal perspective, institutions refer to customs, norms or behavioral patterns important to a given society (e.g. money and marriage), while the formal aspect of institutions

concerns the organizations of government and the public services (e.g. parliament and the public administration). A broad definition of institutions refers quite simply to “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” (Huntington, 1965: 394). Governance is central to fully understand the role of institutions in a political setting, which mainly denotes to how the governance of institutions affects political behavior. Single-handedly, *institutionalism* tells us little about, how institutions are formed or altered; governance theory plays an important role to this extent, inferring how policy implementation, as an act of governance, alters institutions or creates new ones (Kjær, 2004: 9).

In summary, governance concerns both the act of governing and the processes tied to this, and it revolves around themes of authority, steering the society, rules of the game, state capacity and institutions. Moreover, it is a central term, when examining the state and its public administration’s capacity in steering society, but can encompass much more than so.

The World Bank notes, that “governance is the institutional capacity of public organizations to provide the public and other goods demanded by a country’s citizens or their representatives in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner” (World Bank, 2000: 48). Suggesting that a country’s citizens have the right to demand certain goods, while the provision of such goods must be effective, transparent and impartial, implies that the World Bank finds governance to be democratically bound and a value-laden term. There is hence an ideal form of governance, or in other words, there is “good” governance and there is “bad” governance.

Appendix E: The Security-Development Nexus

The link between security and development is most commonly referred to as *the security-development nexus* in policy papers and by the academic community. In short, the nexus builds on the notion that the malaise of development, poverty and weak state capacity, are now interpreted, by donors and international organizations, as themes that are sources to insecurity (Griffith, 1993; Duffield, 2001: 37-39)³⁹. To this end, it is argued that this source of insecurity, which threatens the Global South, originates from domestic sources, including: violent transfers of power, insurgency, secession, rebellion, genocide, warlordism, etc. The observation that development and security have an effect on one another and converge is not per se a new phenomenon (Hettne, 2010), though earlier “none of this was carried out in the name of a nexus, that is, an explicit articulation of the connections between the two” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010: 10)

Duffield (2001) gives an account of how the notion of the security-development nexus emerged, which he ties to the shifting nature of conflicts and the emergence of the *new wars*⁴⁰ in the 1990s. As intra-state conflicts increasingly rose during the 1990s⁴¹, the international community saw an obligation to intervene through *humanitarian intervention*⁴² (Bellamy, 2013: 290). The military dimension to these interventions, were nonetheless perceived as failures (e.g. US intervention in Somalia (1993), Rwandan genocide (1994)), which questioned the objective with

³⁹ The merging of security and development, from a recent policy perspective, started with the term *Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, which was an expression that emerged during the 1990s in the wake of the crises in Eastern Europe. In policy circles, recognition arose that one of the drivers of instability, was the lacking provision of security by the state. Essentially SSR refers to a set of “policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.” (US DOD, 2009: 3). SSR and security-development nexus have in many ways come to encompass the same meaning, and are used interchangeably by donors, although it could be said that SSR to a higher degree refers to the policy papers themselves on the matter of addressing security and development in unison.

⁴⁰ As famously described by Kaldor (1999), in the new wars civilian deaths are a direct aim and not an unfortunate consequence. A series of conflicts in the 1990s in Africa gave rise to this notion, based on the observation, that in extension of warlordism, genocide and ethnic cleansing civilians were directly targeted.

⁴¹ To this end, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program has arguably been one of the most important projects, which has indicated the trend of rising intrastate conflicts (<http://ucdp.uu.se/>).

⁴² Humanitarian intervention is a military intervention based not on strategic objectives, but rather humanitarian ones, usually against the will of the host government. In the gross abuse of human rights (that might also afflict neighboring countries), humanitarian intervention is seen as a justifiable tool. In practice, it has not always been so easy to reach consensus on these blurry lines, which justify the intervention.

these interventions as a whole. As stated by Duffield, the failure of humanitarian intervention⁴³ led to a policy shift towards conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction, rather than interfering with conflicts while they were ongoing (Duffield, 2001). By this token, the drivers of conflict needed to be addressed, where policy-makers “came to see economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance at the root of armed conflict and crime” (Buur et al, 2007: 9)

Traditional development tools (e.g. agriculture, health, education), were in this case not seen as the main pillars, which would curb underdevelopment and conflict; rather it was the “new” development tools of the 1990s, which were enlisted (e.g. democratization, human rights and good governance). This was particularly reflected by the Clinton administration’s emphasis on *democratic enlargement*⁴⁴ (Brinkley, 1997), which saw the spreading of democracy, human rights and a market economy as the only viable means to combatting the suffering and instability, which the internal wars in the Global South gave rise to (Jakobsen, 2014)⁴⁵. To this end, addressing the security-development nexus, not only took the form of curbing poverty, but also in regards to aspects of lacking human rights and a deficit in democratization processes.

In parallel, the broadening conceptualization of security also took place during this era, as I previously explained in Chapter 3 on theory. Rothstein (1986) was arguably the first to recognize development’s role with regard to the shifting nature of the security complex, noting that the security of most states had little to do with anarchy and structural facets; rather security was tied to limited power capabilities, domestic order, and threat perception of small ruling elites. Identifying these new drivers of insecurity, Rothstein effectively coupled security with underdevelopment. In this sense, security is construed concerning the weakness of states, rather than the strength of states (i.e. a Cold War setting) (Breitenbauch, 2014: 34). Related, conflicts in the Global South exposed which effects internal war had on the world’s most impoverished. This sparked debates regarding *human security*, which stressed that the proper referent for security

⁴³ In this regard, it is worth mentioning that humanitarian intervention also served as a basis for moral cause, which is increasingly necessary, when looking at democratic support for warfare. Garnering such a consensus is not always practical in conflict situations, when time is of importance - the genocide in Rwanda was for instance a case of how support for the intervention was garnered too late.

⁴⁴ Commonly referred to as the Clinton Doctrine

⁴⁵ Duffield (2001) has called this the enlistment of *liberal peace* as a foreign security policy.

should be the individual, rather than solely construing security in relation to state and military threats. The multi-disciplinary research on this subject, which often combined international development studies with security studies, saw security and development in a new light, hinting that the two might be more interlinked, than previously understood.

Denmark and the Nexus

The first traces we see of security and development being merged in a Danish context also occurred during the 1990s, for instance when former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen noted in 1991 that, “The Gulf War has demonstrated, that our security increasingly has a North/South dimension to it” (Ellemann-Jensen, 1991). The conclusion of the Cold War, gave rise to the belief that the international order stood on the threshold of a new peaceful era. But that belief came to an abrupt end in 1990, when Iraqi tanks invaded Kuwait. As such, the threat towards the West no longer came from the East, but from the South. The idea that threats could stem from the South was also exacerbated by an increased spreading, in the 1990s, of advanced weapons and arms to the Global South (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 437).

The realization that events in the world's poorest countries could threaten Denmark was not only new and striking, but also had the effect, that Denmark started to allude that there was a connection between security and development. During the 1990s, Denmark became the largest contributor towards international peace operations (measured per capita), which the UN recognized as development assistance, if the contribution took place in a developing country (Holm, 2002: 28). Moreover, the Danish military budget was increased from 14 billion DKK (1988) to 15.5 billion DKK (1997) (Fischer, 1997: 118), while the Danish Defense Commission acknowledged in 1998, that several non-military factors posed security concerns (migration, catastrophes, pollution and international crime) (Danish Defense Commission, 1998: 68-71). Other examples, of how Denmark started to couple security and development during this period, included: supporting Benin and Burkina Faso's deployment of peace keeping missions in Liberia with development funds; support to a regional institute in Zimbabwe to train peace keeping units deployable in Southern Africa; supporting the de-armament program of Nicaragua, post the country's civil war; the attempt to use Danish aid funds to purchase arms from conflict zones for

destruction; and the purchase of armored vehicles for Danida advisors in Gaza (Friis Bach et al, 2008: 436-440).

Moreover, since the 1990s there has also been an attempt to combine Danish civil-military efforts. Given Denmark's limited resources in a foreign political context, it became evident, that combining the civil and military dimensions, would enhance capabilities in reaching her foreign political objectives. When military force came to play a central role in efforts to promote peace and democracy, it was above all tied to the Soviet Union's collapse, which created a situation where conventional military threats were absent. In the 1990s a clear division of labor between military and civilian organizations was laid out. The military would provide security for the civilian actors, so they had the necessary leeway to build infrastructure, create economic growth, rule of law, democracy, good governance and reconciliation. Moreover, the military set up during this period a special unit task-force for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) to carry out cooperation with civilian actors. CIMIC was viewed by the military as a useful instrument, which could be used to increase their own protection (force protection), create goodwill among the local population and to gather intelligence. The civil organizations also saw advantages with this system, which from their standpoint, was perceived as an opportunity to draw on the military's superior logistical resources (Jakobsen, 2014).

It was already clear in the 1990s that this division of labor did not always work in practice, which in large part was due to the civil actors not having sufficient capacity, why the military was increasingly imposed to carry out civilian tasks, which they had no desire or power to solve. The lack of civilian capacities in law and order and civil administration was a recurring problem, and it was particularly glaring in Kosovo, where NATO had to act as local administrators and maintain law and order in the first year, because the UN could not provide the necessary police officers, judges, prison guards and administrators.

The Danish international peacekeeping contribution to the UN-mission in Yugoslavia was the first time in recent Danish foreign political history when Danish soldier engaged in actual battle; also known as 'Operation Bøllebank' in 1993. Since then, the Danish Defense has had to learn

the hard way, that the Danish military effort is just one instrument in the Danish foreign political tool-box to achieve a political objective. As noted by Breitenbauch (2014),

“The paradox with Danish international utility of force, since the Cold War, is: that the Danish Defense, with good reasons, has had to relearn how to use military force in complex military operations, while the same complex military operations are deeply political in purpose and function”.

Combining military and civil practices is difficult in praxis, mainly because the two entities have, in a Danish context at least, been used to operating in silos and according to their own institutional configurations and purposes. The military abides to a completely different set of rules, and essentially the two entities have different interpretations of what constitutes “success”. To say the least, it has been a slow work, which is still in progress, for the Danish foreign political tools of the military and the civilian capacities to merge.

The joint planning and coordination of military and civilian Danish efforts for stabilization has been a key theme for the Danish international operations since 2004, not least with regard to Afghanistan. The EU, the UN, Britain and other players were already in the process of coordinating their efforts and instruments in relation to fragile states and armed conflict before September 11. Nonetheless, the coordinated effort - which emerged in response to strategic and logistical issues in Iraq and Afghanistan - was nothing radically new, but a further development of the experiences made in the 1990s (Jakobsen, 2014).

Appendix F: Fragile States

The causes and symptoms of ineffective states vary; hence state fragility is characterized by multiple aspects, but it is suggested by Torres & Anderson (2004: 5-6) that the features include the following: state collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict and repressive politics

Lemay-Hébert (2011) notes that one dominant school of thought has influenced this field, namely one which revolves around the Weberian ideal of state institutions and the notion of the state's monopoly on violence. Thomas (1987) was arguably one of the pioneering scholars to underscore that state weakness is associated with these Weberian founded aspects, highlighting the importance despotic power, which concerns a state's coercive abilities, and infrastructural power which refers to the effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions.

When it comes to the institutional dimension of state-failure, Rotberg (2003) has arguably been the most prominent contemporary scholar with this academic field, he notes that "it is according to their performances—according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods—that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed" (Rotberg, 2003). Rotberg thus finds that state failure stems directly from the state's lacking ability to provide public goods (Rotberg, 2002: 85). This implies that state fragility also concerns low administrative capacity, in the form of being unable to implement policies simply due to the lack of resources, staff, and administrative systems (Torres & Anderson, 2004: 5). Such conditions are exacerbated under circumstances where administrative systems are dominated by neo-patrimonial politics and extractive institutional setups; to this end, the state institutions may be unable to project sufficient administrative capacity to carry out even basic state functions (van de Walle, 2001; Bayart et al, 1998). In essence, the emphasis on clientelism and lacking institutional capacity, feeds into North's notion of limited access order societies (Section 4.3), which are characterized by a political stability founded upon the brokering between the ruling elites.

Moreover, under circumstances, where the public administration effectively has collapsed, and no longer has the ability fulfill its basic duties, state legitimacy is vulnerable and can be contested (Rotberg, 2002: 87). This touches upon the notion of the Weberian ideal, that a state

must have a secure monopoly on violence, which defines its sovereignty. As such, the state's legitimate use of physical force has to be executed with retention (coercive capacity). If such a monopoly is not present, other factions (e.g. in the form of terrorist organizations) will be able to contest state authority (Rotberg, 2014)⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ To this end, it has been cornerstone for the Danish engagement for instance in Afghanistan to build a coercive capacity, through the capacity building of the Afghan military and police forces (UM, 2008).

Appendix G: COIN

Counter-insurgency is one of the primary strategic and tactical concerns, when operating as an intervening foreign force in a milieu with guerilla warfare. Insurgency has been an issue, which foreign military forces long have had to deal with (e.g. British Empire's campaign in Malaya (1950); Dutch Empire's Campaign in the East Indies (1947); the French colonies in Indochina, West Africa and Algeria post-WWII). Nonetheless, it was also a major concern with regards to the intervention in Afghanistan, where the fight against the Taliban bore COIN traits. The US defines COIN as "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its *root causes*" (U.S. Army, 2009).

The manuals of COIN divide the task into several phases. The first phases are characterized by offensive military operation for dealing with the insurgents in conflict zones. When stability is founded, the focus shifts towards the stabilization tasks and population-centered COIN. During this phase, the focus is to "win the hearts and minds" of the indigenous population to gain trust, legitimacy and authority. COIN manuals have increasingly begun stressing the importance of strengthening the capacity of indigenous actors and the local government, since they will be viewed as more credible and legitimate in the population. Good governance plays a vital role to this extent, as one of the primary ways of establishing an institutional and state legitimacy (RAND, 2008: 78)

Governance is actually one of the primary concerns for the military counter-insurgency forces. However, this poses a challenge for the military because it increasingly has to think about non-military concerns. The military's deficit in knowledge and expertise with these "softer" dimensions of COIN is one of the main reasons why a combination of the civil military efforts has been necessary in conflict and instable zones.