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PRIVATIZATION OF $ECURITY

THE OUTSOURCING OF POWER AND VIOLENCE

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Contents

1 Introduction

The recent wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been subject for a great deal of debates in political and public arenas, as well as academic circles concerning the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The two wars made visible the extended and rapidly evolving use of PMSCs in and around the conflict zones. Both conflicts showcased an unprecedented number of PMSCs involved in a conflict in modern times, which meant that up to 100,000 privately contracted personnel were operating in Iraq in 2006 (Merle 2006). To compare, the United States' armed forces had 140,000 troops stationed in Iraq at the time (White & Ricks 2006). The kind of tasks that these private military companies carry out varies greatly and covers almost all kinds of tasks involved with conducting a large-scale, modern day military operation, ranging from logistics and maintenance of equipment to surveillance and protection-team operations (Singer 2008).

Many tasks formerly thought of as tasks for the governmental military have also been outsourced to private companies. For example, the task of keeping safe the former Afghani president, Hamid Karzai, was outsourced to the American security company DynCorp who employed a group of former U.S. special forces troops for the job (ibid:17). The notion of former troops from both special forces and regular forces being utilized and hired by private companies is nothing unusual in the world of private military and security companies where many former soldiers have taken the leap from government to private companies. Another thing worth noting regarding the Iraq war and the use of private military companies is, that compared to the first war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the war in 2003, and its subsequent peace-keeping mission, saw a 10-fold increase in the use of private military companies (Merle 2006), and it is in this time period the world first saw a change in the use of private military companies.

The cold war era was a time of standing armies in huge numbers on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Singer 2008:49f). But when the Cold War ended in 1989, the demand for conventional armed forces fell dramatically, creating an exodus of soldiers whose service no longer was needed by their state apparatus. Other than an influx of unemployed soldiers, the end of the Cold War also created a change in the global political landscape where the neoliberal reform agenda became prevalent focusing on down-sizing the state, outsourcing of tasks and the application of cost-benefit calculations on all public services. At the core of neoliberal thinking lays the idea of privatization and outsourcing of what is traditionally regarded as responsibilities

of the state to the private sector. Examples of privatization are many and vary from privatizing entire sectors, such as healthcare or transportation, to outsourcing of smaller tasks, such as maintenance of public spaces.

Practicing privatization has been accepted in varying degrees across the world and most governments rely on some kind of private company for an increasing number of their tasks. One sector of government, which in the public eye has never really been thought of as a potential for privatization, is the military. The military has, in a classic Westphalian-sense, been thought of as a profession radically different from other professions since it deals with organized violence, and is an embodiment of the state's monopoly on violence, and the right to decide on life and death – all of which are deeply rooted in the foundation of the Westphalian-state. This distinction between the military and other sectors of government was summarized by the political scientist, Samuel Huntington, in the following quote:

> "Society has a direct, continuing, and general interest in the employment of this skill for the enhancement of its own military security. While all professions are to some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the state" (Huntington 1957:37).

In this sense, the military is not only a unique profession and government sector, but also an image of the state's monopoly on violence, and the idea of outsourcing this monopoly seemed irrelevant and even preposterous a few years back. But in the post-cold war era, however, the idea of the military sector crossing into the realm of private corporations has become a reality and a new, global industry has emerged (Singer 2008:9).

The aforementioned cases with Afghanistan and Iraq exemplify a use of private military companies as an extension of the state's armed forces, but there are several examples of PMSCs working as an army of their own or participate in training of regular government troops. A famous example of this is the role of the South African-based private military company, Executive Outcomes, in the civil-war in Sierra Leone where the revolutionary group RUF (Revolutionary United Front) spread havoc and terror across the country. And when everything seemed hopeless for the government of Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes was hired, and in a matter of a few months they had practically eliminated the 4-year long uprising (Singer 2008:4). In the Angolan civil war, PMSCs also played a major role where more than 80 different

companies participated on both sides of the conflict (ibid:9). The Sierra Leone case illustrates how weaker states can be drastically influenced by the availability of PMSCs, and the case of Angola exemplify how it is not only states that hire private military companies. In both cases, PMSCs have played a defining role in the shaping of governments and ultimately in shaping of countries as well. However, it is also important to keep in mind, that some of these PMSCs have also been accused of corruption and other scandals, as in Iraq in 2007, where 17 civilians were shot and killed by Blackwater contractors (Scahill 2007).

When private companies, whose core objective is to turn a profit, become powerful enough to participate in, and conduct, warfare on an even level with state-armies, it alters the perception of what states are and how the relation between the state and civil society is constructed. The introduction of PMSCs shakes up the traditional understanding of civil-military relations and thus has the potential to alter our understanding of the state at a foundational level. A fundamental part of our understanding of the state is the boundaries of authority, and the growth of private military companies seems to reshape these boundaries. And if the boundaries of authority are changed, what happens to the rights of the civil society within these boundaries? Furthermore, the increased use of PMSCs is seemingly of global proportions which raises questions on whether it is part of a greater norm change within the state system, and if it might mean a change in our normative views on the state.

1.1. Overall research question

How does the use of PMSCs influence the civil-military relations, and can this be seen as a global norm change in the state's monopoly on violence, and if so, what are the possible consequences of such changes?

This will be answered through the following working questions. These questions help us to structure the project.

1.2. Working questions

Chapter 4:

1. *How have PMSCs been used historically and how are they used today?*
2. *How has the concept of state monopoly on violence historically been constituted vis-à-vis PMSCs?*
3. *How has the negative connotations of mercenaries affected the use of PMSCs?*
4. *How is the neoliberal world order today influencing the expansion and way that PMSCs are used?*

Chapters 5, 6, and 7:

1. *How can we understand the role PMSCs play in civil-military relations?*
2. *What issues are raised in regards to civil-military relations in the use of PMSCs?*
3. *What type of control is being exerted and how? (functional, political, and social)*

Chapter 8:

1. *Can the use of PMSCs (and the general privatization of security) be seen as a natural extension in neoliberal politics into the security field?*
2. *What type of norm entrepreneurs are present in each case, and how do they affect norm change in terms of state monopoly on violence?*
3. *Does the use of PMSCs imply a change in norms related to the Westphalian state project?*
4. *How can states' use of PMSCs be seen as part of a global norm change?*
5. *What are the consequences of this norm change in regards to a change in the authority of the state?*

1.3. Outline of project

Chapter 2

In this chapter we start out by going through the limitations and delimitations of the project. We then present our ontological and epistemological reflections. Additionally, we will go through our considerations in terms of collecting data, and source criticism. We will then systemize our understanding of civil-military relations, and how the concept will be applied in the project.

Chapter 3

In this chapter, we will develop our theoretical framework, which we will use for analyzing the changing civil-military relations. We start with looking at Pierre Bourdieu's idea of fields, and particularly how we can operationalize the theory for examining how the security field has developed, with the (re)introduction of private agents within the security field. We will derive the theoretical concepts from Bourdieu's theory, which can help us answer our research questions. We will then look at Saskia Sassen's notion of a reconfiguration of the state, through globalization, as well as the idea of assemblages, specifically the assemblage of territory, authority and rights. Lastly, we look at Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's theory of norm change, to understand how we can view potential changes in civil-military relations as such. We look at their system of three stages of norm change, and how these can be utilized to examine our research questions.

Chapter 4

In this chapter, we will go through the history of PMSCs, starting with a short presentation of the concept of mercenaries and how their history, image, and negative connotations have impacted the view on PMSCs. We look at the relations between PMSCs and the concept of state monopoly on violence, and the origins of the monopoly on violence in order to understand how PMSCs can be seen as an outsourcing of this monopoly. We then examine how the neoliberal world order has affected the use of PMSCs, particularly with a focus on privatization, and how the neoliberal approach to security has influenced the rise of PMSCs. Lastly, we round off with a macro-level discussion of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power, which we need in order to clarify the implications of conducting a Bourdieu-inspired field analysis on different levels.

Chapter 5

In this chapter, we move on to our analysis of the first case, the private level, where we look at private oil and gas companies and their use of PMSCs for extraction sites in Nigeria. We start out by shortly introducing the case and outlining the conflict i.e. identifying the different agents and their roles. After this, we look at the types of control that the Nigerian state exerts over these private agents, and the possible complications and consequences hereof. On this foundation, we then start our field-analysis with a focus on doxic battles and authority/legitimacy. We end this chapter with a sub-conclusion that sums up how this analysis can help us to answer or main research question.

Chapter 6

In this chapter, we zoom in on the case of Iraq and the United States' use of PMSCs here. The analysis is structured in the exact same way as in chapter 5.

Chapter 7

In this chapter, we look at the case of the UN's use of PMSCs in East Timor. Once again, this analysis is structured in the exact same way as the two previous ones.

Chapter 8

Finally, in this chapter, we will relate our findings from the previous chapters to our main research question and expand upon this. We will look at the use of PMSCs in relations to a neoliberal doxa within the security field, to understand whether the use of PMSCs shows a natural extension of this. We will also look at how the changes caused by PMSCs can be seen as a global norm change, and particularly a norm change in the Westphalian state project. Last, we will explore what the consequences such changes might produce, such as changes in the relationship between territory, authority, and rights.

2 Methodological Considerations

2.1. Limitations

Our limitations in this project are important to reflect upon, because they affect empirical findings, data collection, as well as the theoretical framework used to answer the research question. We have little to no influence on these limitations, but they have still played an important role in the direction we have eventually taken, and are important to consider in order to understand any possible weaknesses of the project. This includes aspects that have not been possible to incorporate, due to lack of access, time constrains, and page restrictions. The main concern of this project is how the use of PMSCs influences the civil-military relations, and if this can be seen as a global norm change in the state's monopoly on violence.

In the applied literature, there are inherent limitations, in terms of the predominant use of secondary sources throughout the project. Incorporating primary empirical sources could have helped strengthen the main arguments of the project, but as mentioned, this was unfortunately not an option since most of this information is classified. Furthermore, we wanted to investigate what exact tasks the PMSCs in each case had been in charge of, with a special interest in armed provision. However, it also proved very difficult to obtain any reliable empirical data on this, which is most likely due to the legal aspect and classification of some of these tasks, which often seem to operate in legal grey-zones that neither the PMSC nor their employees wish to bring attention to.

In our case studies, empirical data and trustworthy sources have been hard to come by, which also means that in the private case, we had to rely on *WikiLeaks* documents from a secret source, posted by an activist group, which can be a questionable source for this type of material. However, we have used it scarcely, and made sure to back up the major claims with a country report on Nigeria, by Professor Rita Abrahamsen and professor Michael Williams, to establish credibility to the claims made in the case.

2.2. Delimitations

When writing a project, it is given that certain related ideas will be excluded in terms of keeping with the objective of answering a specific research question and developing a strong and cohesive argument. These ideas have all been considered, but in some cases, they stray too far from the main focus and are entirely different projects in their own right.

We attended several lectures with former Executive Outcomes' founder Eeben Barlow, which was very useful in terms of gaining inside knowledge of how South African private contractors and PMSCs think and operate. However, since we are primarily concerned with British and US PMSCs as these are the main actors in our cases, we were not able to find relevance for this in our projects.

Additionally, we have not concerned ourselves much with the debate over regulation and the legal aspects, such as the 2009 Montreux Document, which addresses PMSCs accountability and obligations under humanitarian law. As relevant and important as this aspects is, in regards to PMSCs way of conduct, incorporating this aspect into the project, would take up too many pages, and shift focus from the main research question. Examples of this are: PMSCs operating as (illegal) mercenaries; human rights abuses; scandals/corruption/regime change (Sandline, Excecutive Outcomes, Blackwater); and prosecution of both companies and individual contractors.

In this project we focus on civil-military relations, meaning the relations between the civil power and the military institutions. We see civil power as consisting of both state and citizens, which is in line with the notion in Calhoun, of society as an object of analysis which is not reducible to just state or citizen (Calhoun 2001:1898). We do, however, see the civil society as being connected to the political, the two being overlapping spheres, which somewhat contradicts the understanding described by Islamogul, which implies that the civil society exists in a sphere outside the political domain (Islamogul 2001:1892).

Another aspect, which has intentionally been left out, is how PMSCs differ from one another, in terms of expertise area, services offered, operational history and size/capacity. We have deemed these factors somewhat irrelevant in regards to answering our research question, which is concerned with a more overall analysis of where and in what situations private military and security companies are used, and how this privatization and outsourcing of security can be seen as a global norm change. Furthermore, we do not focus much on what qualifications people must have to get employed by PMSCs, and also what kind of background check is conducted and how this differs

from company to company and state to state. This is of course an interesting aspect to investigate, because it concerns the morals and ethics of each PMSC. Additionally, we do not use much time on analyzing what kind of contracts and fees that are involved, when a PMSC is employed by a private company, a state or an international organization. This is mostly due to lack of access, this is not irrelevant in terms of civil-military relations, but unfortunately rather accessible.

2.3. Ontological and epistemological reflections

In this project, we research how the use of private military and security companies affects civil-military relations, as well as if this can be seen as a global norm change, and if so, what the consequences of this is. The foundation of our analysis builds on the idea of civil-military relations, which is based on the notion of a social construction of the civil power and the military institutions, and the relations between those two, as well as the concept of the monopoly on violence. In the following, we will reflect on how utilizing an ontological and epistemological social constructivist approach has influenced the development of our theoretical framework.

Using an ontological social constructivist approach implies viewing society in terms of institutions, states, etc., as being imagined and conceptualized by social actors (Galbin 2014:82). This also means that there is no static, objective version of sovereignty, territory, authority and rights, but that understandings hereof are socially constructed (and re-constructed). The main concepts researched in this project are civil-military relations and state monopoly on violence. We view these concepts as social constructions, which receive their meanings through social and historical contexts. Civil-military relations are built on the concepts of the civil-power and the military institution. We see the civil-power as an amalgamation of the civilians and the state, wherein the civilians have the higher hierarchical status over the state. Hereunder, we view the military institution as a construction, created to protect the civil-power. Additionally, we see the state monopoly on violence as a socially constructed concept wherein the state hold the right to, and control over, force. This construction serves the purpose of maintaining the state's sovereignty and power.

Our epistemological reflections concern how we approach researching. As we understand our concepts as social constructs, we then also seek to understand where the power to define these constructs lay. In order to investigate our research question surrounding changes in civil-military relations, we develop a theoretical framework from Bourdieu's theory of fields and Finnemore and Sikkink's theory of norm change, as well as Sassen's concept of assemblages, with relations to the assemblage of territory, authority, and rights.

In terms of ontology and epistemology, Bourdieu characterizes his work as 'structuralist constructivism' (Bourdieu 1989:14). When using Bourdieu in our theoretical framework, we understand his concepts of field, doxa, and capital as socially constructed, meaning that the definitions of a specific field, and the doxa and legitimations of capital within, all are constructs.

Our analysis aims to understand who holds the power of definition, meaning the power to legitimize certain forms of capital, and the power to define the doxa within a specific field.

When utilizing Finnemore and Sikkink's conceptualization of norm change, we do so with the view that norms are socially constructed, and through the stages of norm change, norms can be re-constructed. As we try to understand changes in civil-military through the lens of norm changes, we view these as new constructions of norms and of state monopoly on violence, within the institutions related to sovereignty. We also seek to understand who holds the power to define these norms, and thereby construct and re-construct them, which in this theory is described as norm entrepreneurs.

We utilize Sassen's understanding of assemblages, specifically the configuration of territory, authority, and rights. We understand an assemblage as a socially constructed congregation of concepts, including territory, authority, and rights, which are all constructs.

2.4. Selection of Empirical Data and Source Criticism

The data collection for this project has been focussed on finding data which helps to understand the use of PMSCs, including theoretical approaches, and empirical data on each of our cases as well as an overall understanding of PMSCs. It is important to note that due to the nature of the area, data concerning specific logistics and operations, as well as business contracts, have not been publicly available. As a result, our data is largely made up of secondary data. We have been aware that using secondary data has several disadvantages in regards to the control over quality. The type of data, and the origins of the data play a role in the quality hereof. In the following section we outline our reflections on the quality of our data.

In the project, we utilize several academic articles, dealing with PMSCs, in order to find historical information in the use of PMSCs in addition to data on our cases. When collecting this data, we have reflected on the recognition of these journals as well as the authors.

The project uses articles from several different media outlets. When selecting these articles, we have had certain reflections on which outlets to choose. We have assessed that the mediums we use are sufficiently reliable, though we maintain awareness of the fact that any journalistic article employs a journalistic method, meaning that there is a certain direction of story and some opinions or aspects might have been edited out. For this reason, we have tried to have critical selection when using articles and the information herein.

Some of our data has been collected from official US and UN websites, as well as the PMSCs' official websites. We have collected data from these sites concerning the use of PMSCs and the PMSCs own description of their services. We are aware that this data might not give the whole picture, which is why we have supplemented with data from academic analyses of our cases, in order to create a more detailed picture.

Additionally, because of the limited public access to some of the specific case details, we have used data from a websites which has a specific activist agenda, such as Platform London, who has posted what they claim, are leaked (WikiLeaks) documents on Shell's security spending and budget in Nigeria, and worldwide from 2007-2009. We unfortunately have no way of confirming if this data is authentic, but have primarily analyzed data, which at least one other source has confirmed.

2.5. Using Civil-Military Relations to Develop a Theoretical Framework

In the following section, we will outline the concept of civil-military relations, and delineate how private military and security companies differ from state military. To understand how the use of PMSCs affects civil-military relations, we will utilize Joakim Berndtsson's list of factors that influence civil-military relations when using PMSCs to understand the specifics of each of our cases. We will then look at the three types of control that Deborah Avant describes, to understand how the state enforces oversight over PMSCs operating within their borders. This will be explained and operationalized in the following section. It is on the foundation of these concepts that we develop our theoretical framework for analyzing changes in civil-military relations.

2.5.1. The Civil Power and the Military Institution

Our project deals with the relations between the civil power and the military institutions. The military as an institution has been created with the purpose of defending the state and its citizens. Essentially, the military functions as an extension of the social contract between the state and its citizens, which dictates that the state must provide security for the citizens. When speaking of civil-military relations, we view the civil as the civil power, referring to the state and its citizens. Peter Feaver argues that the relationship between the military and the state is a paradoxical one, where "the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver 1996:149). He argues, that it is problematic that the military as an institution has to be powerful enough to do anything the civil power requests, while being subordinate enough to only do so (Berndtsson 2012:110). This also means that there is a hierarchy in the relation between the military and the civil power, where the civil power has the higher position, controlling the military (ibid.).

Huntington argues that the military is constructed through two forces. First, a functional imperative, which he says pertains to defending the security of the society. Second, a societal imperative from social forces that is dominant in the society (Huntington 2002:2). These two imperatives must be balanced, as a military that is only guided by social values might not be able to perform its function properly, while a military lead purely by its functional imperative might be impossible to contain (ibid.). He also argues that, in regards to the American military, the main focus has gone from finding the best pattern of civil-military relations that fit with the liberal democratic values, to being

what pattern will best maintain national security (ibid.). We will look at how these imperatives come into play in regards to the use of PMSCs in the discussion chapter.

2.5.2. Our Use of Civil-Military Relations

Our research question pertains to whether PMSCs changes anything in civil-military relations, and if so, what they change. As we have outlined above, PMSCs have distinctly different characteristics and operate differently from the public military institutions. Accordingly, using PMSCs in place of public military will affect civil-military, by adding a new, corporate component to the relationship. This changes the constellation of the civil-power and the state military institutions from a binary relation to a ternary relation. This change can be seen in the figure below:



Figure 1 - Adapted from Berndtsson 2012 by the authors

As is evident from the figure above, adding a third component also creates new relations, meaning there is now civil-military, as well as PMSC-military and PMSC-civil relations.

Berndtsson argues that introducing a third component in civil-military relations can have varying effects on the civil-military relations. These effects depend on a number of different elements that also make up the structure for each specific case. It is through these, inter alia, we can understand why the introduction of a new component in civil-military relations has stabilizing or destabilizing effects on the civil-military relationship. In each case, we will look at all these aspects, to understand the specifics of the case, and the structure of the civil-military-PMSC constellations.

Berndtsson describes these as follows:

- The type of company (military, security, or both)
- The nature of the contract (what services will the company have to deliver)

- The type of client (is it a public or private client, a weak or a strong state)
- The context in which the services are delivered (in war or peace, or as post-conflict reconstruction) (Berndtsson 2012:114).

To understand the complexities of each case, we will look at the context that the PMSCs work within. We do this through the aspects listed above, in order to understand the elements that play into the changes that PMSCs creates in civil-military relations.

First, we look at the type of client that is hiring the company. This is what differentiates the three cases, as each case concerns a private company, a state, or an international organization. We will also look at whether the state where the company is operating is a strong or a weak state. These two elements tell us something about the terms that the company is operating under, and the existing civil-military relations. Second, we look at the type of company or companies used, whether it is purely a security company, military company or a combination of the two. Third, we look at what services the company is contracted to provide, and what means of force they are allowed to use. Last, we look at the context in which the company has to operate, seeing whether it is in a peaceful country, a war-zone, or in a post-conflict area. All of these aspects, combined with concepts presented later by Bourdieu, Sassen, and Finnemore and Sikkink, will help us analyze the existing civil-military relations, and thus help our understanding of how these might change when a corporate actor is introduced.

2.5.3. Types of Control

Deborah Avant has identified three different dimensions of control of force, that can be used in relation to the instruments and use of force as well as the relationship between state actors and PMSCs: functional, political, and social control (Avant 2005:40). The functional control of force refers to the military's ability to effectively defend the state's interests through the use of force (ibid.:40f). The political control concerns acting within the boundaries of the dominant political structure, meaning that the military institutions allegiance to the civil-power is imperative- Meanwhile, shifts in the power structure will vary the political control (ibid.:41). Finally, social control of force relies on a certain fidelity to social values. Avant describes how the tools of force should then reflect the societal views on democracy, human rights, international laws, etc. Thus, social control of force varies in extent that the performance of security tasks reflects the dominant social values (ibid.:42).

In each of our cases, we will look at these dimensions of control, and how they are applied to the PMSCs, in order to understand how states deal with hiring and controlling PMSCs. Each dimension of control will tell us something about how the state controls the use of PMSCs, which in turn can reveal something about effects on civil-military relations.

In terms of the functional control, we will to look at how the PMSCs in each case work together with the state military (or UN military). We do this, in order to understand the relationship between the two agents. If there is a lack of functional control, it affects the military-PMSC relations, which in turn affects the civil-military relations (Berndtsson 2012:120). The political and social control relate specifically to the civil-PMSC relations, and consequently the civil-military relations. To examine political control, we will look at how political oversight is being carried out, specifically in the hiring of contractors for the PMSCs, and in some cases the Rules of Engagement for the relevant country. This will help us understand how the civil power is regulating the PMSCs, and thus how their use is affecting the relations between the military and the civil power. Lastly, the social control pertains to how social norms and values are upheld. Specifically, it relates to whether the contractors are living up to the international social standards while carrying out their job. Lack of social control will affect the civil-PMSC relations, as well as the civil-military relations.

Through these different aspects, we will be able to identify what challenges to the civil-military relations arise, when a third component is added to the relationship of civil-power and the institution of the military. We then utilize these findings to understand what changes in the civil-military relations has taken place in each case, and whether or not these changes have been problematic.

3 Theoretical framework

In our research of the privatization of security, we seek to understand the way that civil-military relations might change, when introducing a third party – a corporate actor – private military security companies. In this chapter, we will introduce a theoretical framework, which we feel is needed in order to look at civil-military relations, and specifically, to look at how civil-military relations works together with a corporate actor. In order to do so, we will look at three different theoretical components: Bourdieu's theory of fields, Sassen's theory of assemblages, and Finnemore and Sikkink's theory of norm change. First, we will go through each theoretical component and operationalize them, before operationalizing them together, in order to create our framework for the analysis and discussion.

3.1. A Field of Forces and Struggles over Capital

In the following part, we introduce the concepts of field, illusio, doxa, symbolic capital and power. These concepts are all explained theoretically and then operationalized to show how they are useful in our context. In the end of this part of the chapter, we summarize how the terms play together and how we will use them for answering our research question.

3.1.1. Field

In order to understand and analyze a field, we need to understand the relationship between the four elements that are key to Pierre Bourdieu's field analysis: illusio, doxa, capital and symbolic power. Each of these elements together structure a field, and the nature of these elements vary from field to field. Therefore, each field is a relatively autonomous independent microcosm (Bourdieu 1994:4f). Each of the elements that structure the field is presented and explained below. The Bourdieusian understanding of a field is applicable both on a micro, meso and macro level, which means that there is more overriding fields on the lowest levels, and the number of overriding fields decrease at the higher levels. This means that there is a hierarchical structuring of fields altogether, while there is also a hierarchy within each field. This hierarchy is organized through volumes of (legitimate) capital (which we will return to later).

As pointed out by Assem & Drent, Bourdieu's understanding of a field also means that, because agents within the field are interconnected and hierarchically organized (on the basis of accumulated capital that is legitimized within the specific field), a 'power shift' within the field will result in a change for the field as a whole because the field is ultimately made up by its agents, their habitus, doxa etc. (Assem & Drent 2012:3).

Our application of the notion of a field is twofold: We look at the macro level – the field of international security – and investigate the power struggles that occur in here. Furthermore, in our case analysis, we treat each case as a field. In particular, we look at private companies' use of PMSCs in Nigeria, the United States' use of PMSCs in Iraq, and finally the UN's use of PMCs in East Timor. These cases are different in the way that the agents (PMSCs) are working under the authority of different instances of legitimate symbolic 'power-wielders'. This is interesting as these different authorities (private, state and international) are potentially changing the civil-military relations.

The field is structured by the common idea, within the field, that there is something at stake, something over which power struggles are worthwhile. This is what Bourdieu calls *illusio* (Bourdieu 1991:8). As pointed out by Villumsen: "In general terms, what is at stake in any field is "the right to monopolize the exercise of 'symbolic violence'" (Villumsen 2011:8). However, the specific nature of the illusio is field-specific. In the field of international security, the *illusio* would be the objective of an agent (be it private or non-private) to be in control of an event that calls for intervention. This also means to be in control over legitimizing that agent's specific forms of capital (which is to exercise symbolic power).

Illusio relates to field in the way that it is the center around which the field is structured. As noted above, illusio also relates to symbolic power, which in turn relates to doxa and symbolic capital.

3.1.2. Doxa, (symbolic) capital and symbolic power

Each field is also shaped by, and operating with, its unique *doxa* that is the common-sense belief system within the field that set out certain 'rule for the game' (Bourdieu 1991:9). Doxa is often metaphorically visualized as the set of rules of a game that shape the agents' agency in the way that doxa is what distinguishes the legitimate from the illegitimate, the normal from the abnormal, the just from the unjust, the included from the excluded etc. (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:359). At this point it is crucial to emphasize that doxa is not static but holds an element of dynamics (which can also be said about the field as a whole). It is dynamic because the agents within the field are constantly participating in (power) struggles. This does not mean, however, that the fields and doxa are in a constant flux – rather they evolve slowly over time. These power struggles are primarily about being (or becoming) dominant within the field, which means to be/become the agent that possesses the greatest overall volume of the type of capital that are valorized within the field (Bourdieu 1989:17).

The forms of capital that are legitimate on the field are also a matter of struggle (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:360). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as *doxic battles* (Villumsen 2011:4). Doxic battles are most commonly taking place between the established, dominant agent on one side and the challengers of the doxa on the other side (Mérand 2010:52). These two (types of) agents are fighting for orthodoxy (the established) and heterodoxy (the challengers of doxa) (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:360).

These doxic battles are primarily discursive in their form, which means that the challengers will make their own strategic discursive ways of 'securitizing' a subject within the field, in a way that the challenging agent highlights the necessity of their particular form(s) of capital, be it economic, political or something else. The established agent(s) on the other side will fight these doxic battles by taking on a defensive discursive strategy that allows them to maintain their positions as the dominant agent on the field. Because the dominant is only dominant because they possess the highest volume of legitimate capital, their interest is in keeping that exact capital the most legitimate, whereby the dominant position can be upheld (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:359). As Villumsen points out, capital is determining an agent's hierarchical position within the field and therefore capital and the doxic battles are of utmost importance: "Capital is a 'weapon' or a 'power-base' which can be used in struggles in a particular field." (Villumsen 2011:3) Overall, doxic battles, in the field of international security, are battles over defining security through "communication and praxis" (Assem & Drent 2012:5).

One could say that the agent, who comes out successful of this doxic battle, has won the right to exercise symbolic power, meaning they will have the monopoly over legitimizing symbolic capital. This is true on a micro, meso and macro level.

We will specifically look into the way that these doxic battles take place in each of the fields stated above. Which agents are struggling over which forms of capital, and what are the consequences of such doxic battles? What happens to the civil-military relations when the doxa is changed as an outcome of doxic battles? Who is ultimately in control over the field (and doxa) with the introduction of private agents in a field (the international security field) historically dominated by state agents? These are questions that we will address in our analysis. In order to do so, we will

need a framework for analyzing what is at stake in these battles. This is where symbolic capital and power comes in play.

When the different forms of capital, be it social, economic, cultural etc. are "perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1989:17), they take the form of symbolic capital (ibid). The state plays a crucial role in this legitimization of capital: for example the economic capital, which only has a value because the (national) monetary system is controlled by the state, which functions as a guarantor of its legitimacy (Bourdieu 1994:5f). Bourdieu explains how symbolic capital and symbolic power work in this quote:

> "[…] [S]ymbolic capital is the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species of capital. It follows that the state, which possesses the means of imposition and inculcation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power" (Bourdieu 1994:9).

To elaborate on this, according to Bourdieu, the state's ability to assert its monopoly over symbolic power (which is made possible because of its accumulation of symbolic capital), is being manifested primarily through the institutions of the state, with the school system being the most crucial instance of this consolidation. This is so because it is through symbolic power that the state exercises its "[…] power to make groups […]" (Bourdieu 1989:23), the power to define the order of things, and the power to impose its citizens with general ideological and/or religious visions and beliefs (ibid.).

The state institutions make possible, through the constitution of grand ideas (both on paper and bodily), a general foundation of perception, the common ground from which we see others and ourselves. This is what Bourdieu calls 'the principles of vision and division' (Bourdieu 1994:13)

Overall this means that all forms of capital, even social capital, (and the legitimacy hereof) can be traced back to the state insofar as it is the state that provides its population with modes of

communication, especially that of the written language (which is also a necessity to obtaining cultural capital), that allows them to socialize and hence to accumulate social capital. Consequently, the state holds the monopoly on symbolic power (i.e. the power to legitimize forms of capital) within its territory, and as long as it does so, the state plays an important role in the power struggles that is taking places within any given field. Maintaining the state's monopoly on symbolic power is the illusio of the state as a field, and it is maintained through the institutions of the state, with these institutions essentially functioning as the indoctrinating system that makes people submit to a doxa, which leads to the people 'accepting' the established order of things (Bourdieu 1994:14). Doxic submission is taking place on a macro, meso and micro level, in all possible fields of practice, with the state (historically) being the highest instance of this capacity to exercise symbolic power.

Concretely, the notion of symbolic capital and power is useful to us because it provides us with the needed theorization for analyzing how and if the field of international security (which includes PMSCs) can be interpreted as 'norm-changing'. To analyze symbolic capital and power in our selected fields is also to analyze how and if a sovereign authority is challenged through doxic battles. What is particularly interesting for us here is what happens to the civil-military relations in the light of a potential power-shift within the field. It is also with a focus on this area, that Sassen's ideas on change of authority will be incorporated later in the project.

3.1.3. Summary and overall operationalization of Bourdieu's contribution to our framework

In general terms, then, symbolic capital, and the submission to a given doxa (orthodoxy) is essentially why people support governments, and support the big narratives and political ideas within a society, and why they become dominated. People even accept this domination, insofar as the people in general do not fight against the submissive force that have become so 'normal' that it has become unconscious for them to act according to the doxa in a more or less blindly manner. As Bourdieu puts it:

> "Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view - the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state" (Bourdieu 1994:5).

The role of the state is of great importance, as we have seen. However, these mechanisms of struggle over symbolic power also occur on lower levels than that of the state. In every field, on its appropriate level, these struggles are taking place.

To sum up, a field is a hierarchically structured space in which power struggles take place. The hierarchy of the field is determined by factors as volume of capital, and doxa, which defines the 'rules of the game' i.e. the field and hence what capital is legitimate in said field. The reason for the existence of such a field is the common belief that there is something at stake, which is what Bourdieu coins illusio. The state functions as the guarantor of the legitimacy of the different forms of capital, and is therefore vital for the structuring of fields, and the organization herein. This is so, because power within a field is obtained through the accumulation of a doxa-specific form of capital, and as we have seen above, all forms of capital are legitimized by the state. The forms of capital that are legitimized, and thus convertible into symbolic capital, are a matter of struggle between competing agents. This is what we call doxic battles, which are power struggles that evolve around obtaining or maintaining the monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power.

Bourdieu's theory is relational, meaning that each of his analytical terms i.e. field, doxa, illusio and capital cannot stand alone as they are intertwined and thus, to analyze a field such as the international security field to a degree where we are able to answer our primary research questions, we will have to include all of the terms explained in this chapter.

Our use of this framework is double. We start out by conducting a general discussion of the security field, by reflecting on doxa-making capacities of strong vs. weak actors. This is followed by the case-specific analyses, where we zoom in on three different fields, one for each case, and treat them separately. This leads us to an analysis of the doxa within the fields and to the possible changes (doxic battles) that are occurring herein. As explained above, doxa is tightly linked to capital. We therefore need to investigate what forms of capital are legitimate in the fields, and how they are being legitimized. This analysis should provide us with a foundation for further discussing the changing civil-military relations with some support from Saskia Sassens framework on the relation between territory, authority and rights. What happens to these relational 'concepts' if the authority is being changed?

3.2. Territory, Authority and Rights

For this project, we utilize Saskia Sassen's theory on territory, authority and rights. Specifically, her take on what constitutes globalization is relevant to our subject, and how something considered a national entity could become one of global proportions. Additionally, the notion on how very local entities traditionally confined to the nation-state, can interact with placeless entities and thus reconfigure, or even create, their own systems (Sassen 2008:62).

Our project design is structured around analyzing three different cases of outsourcing of security operations, each to its own degree in relation to the state. What is similar to all of the cases is that they all are regional specific but originate in trans-national structures. Common is also that the state plays a role in each of the cases, and how tasks previously naturally regarded as tasks of the state are being outsourced to private actors. However, Sassen does not see this as a weakening of the state but rather that the state plays a significant role in constituting a framework for what makes globalization possible. Sassen identifies three aspects of what constitutes the development of globalization: disassembly, development of capacities, and re-assembly. Disassembly regards the transfer of tasks previously accredited to the state, to private actors. The development of capacity-aspect relates to the development of the private actors that allows them to operate on a global level, and reassembly is where the new private actors become part of global assemblages that are embedded in the national but operate on a global level. Sassen argues that this kind of development is not something that replaces older orderings of state structure, but rather something that will coexist with older orderings, just as various interstate systems coexist with a traditional state system (Sassen 2008:63).

Nonetheless, the emergence of new orderings in systematic structuring of state and society implies rather tremendous consequences for the existing orderings (Sassen 2008: 63). The process of creating a system where new and old orderings can coexist is what constitutes a reconfiguration of the state does not necessarily mean a decline of the state, but it does mean a change of order for the state (Sassen 2008:71). Sassen, thus, argues that the state becomes a site for transformation of the relation between public and private, and reconfigures the global system in which the state functions (ibid.). This transformation is manifested through the relation between three aspects of society, which Sassen sees as essential and transhistoric: territory, authority, and rights (Sassen 2008:68). The three aspects become institutionalized, to a varying degree, through processes, struggles, and

competing interests (ibid.), and the formation of the three aspects varies depending on where they are located, i.e. public-private or national-transnational (ibid.).

3.2.1. Operationalization

All of our cases, each to their own degree, are examples of a disassembly of the state and a global assemblage wherein the state plays a significant role. Within this, an underlying idea of how global structures are founded in national structures is prevailing, and this is also relevant to our study of our cases.

Our operationalization of Sassen theory works well with including Bourdieu into our project. Sassen's notion of denationalization and the following reconfiguration of the state and the power structures within the state, relates to Bourdieu's idea of doxic battles and the power struggle it symbolizes. The transformation of the relation of public and private can be seen as a doxic battle, where the public would be the established doxa and the emerging private actors is the challengers. Furthermore, the very idea of privatizing and denationalization can also be regarded as a doxa in the political field. Bourdieu's concept of fields is also something that can be related to Sassen, in the way that assemblages can create their own prevalent orders that coexist with orders on a larger scale. Similarly, each field operates with its own doxa but exist in a larger, more general field with a potential different doxa.

Another way the concepts in Sassen theory will be utilized in this project is through the configuration of territory, authority, and rights. The formation of these three aspects is what can be defined, in our project, as the civil-military relations, and what we wish to examine is the impact on this very formation when private actors are introduced. Any alteration in the formation of territory, authority, and rights will have an impact on how civil-military relations are constructed. Especially the aspect of authority will play a significant role and how a changing authority alters the relation between the military and civil society and how this affects the rights in the civil society.

4 Norm Change

In this project we wish to examine how the emergence of PMSCs affects the state's normative monopoly on violence, with a focus on changes in territory, authority and rights. To do so, it is first necessary to provide a description of how (international) norms are constructed and become acknowledged and (re)defined by powerful actors. These definitions will be applied in our final discussion based on the three case analyses, which will provide leverage to the discussion on whether or not there has been a global norm change in the security field, and if so, what the possible consequences of this might be. We will primarily operationalize definitions by Finnemore & Sikkink.

There are different interpretations of a specific norm, on the private, national and international level, but common for all three levels is that norms basically refer to "appropriate standards of behavior" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:891). And it is these appropriate standards of behavior, which also relates to Bourdieu's definition of doxa, in terms of the security field and the global security sphere, that we wish to analyze.

Since 1648, the Westphalian sovereignty has been the dominant norm in international society and was established by the dominant European (state) actors, with the purpose of upholding order (and security) in the international society (Croxton 1999). Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink distinguished between the constructivist's political science definition of a 'norm' and the sociologist's definition of an 'institution', which is often seen as synonymous, but the terms refer to different degrees and types of behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink describe this, saying:

> "One difference between "norm" and "institution" (in the sociological sense) is aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and interrelate (a "collection of practices and rules")" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:891).

We emphasize both definitions, meaning that we see sovereignty as a long-standing dominant norm, with regards to the states' monopoly on violence. This means that: "only states and their armed forces may legitimately and legally exercise coercive force for purposes other than self-defense." (Krahman 2013:54).

Several scholarly disciplines have acknowledged different types or categories of norms and in regard to this, Finnemore and Sikkink writes:

> "The most common distinction is between regulative norms, which order and constrain behavior, and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or categories of action" (Finnemore& Sikkink 1998:891).

It is primarily the constitutive norms that we wish to examine further, in terms of how new private security actors (PMSCs) can be seen as adding a new angle of interest and action to the traditional civil-military relationship, when it comes to outsourcing of violence from the state to the private.

According to Krahman, norms are always in the process of being (re)defined by *norm entrepreneurs* (ibid.:895). When it comes to international security norms, these first movers have to be powerful actors that can lead the way for others to follow. This norm (re)defining has according to Finnemore and Sikkink, three stages, which starts with *norm emergence,* where the powerful actor, wanting to change an established norm, attempts to persuade other actors to adopt new norms, which leads to the *norm cascade* stage, where the norm cascade/norm entrepreneur seek to socialize other state actors into the new norm, the so called 'norm bandwagoning'. This involves a combination of pressure for conformity and a desire to enhance international legitimization (ibid.:). Finally, *norm internalization* takes place, which occurs when norms take on a taken-for-granted quality, and is no longer a matter of broad public debate, which means that the norm has become 'normalized' and integrated (Krahman 2013:56). Additionally, three factors encourage norm transformation: "Prominence, precedent and coherence" (ibid.). These are related to the idea that a new norm can gain international acceptance, if a significant number of powerful states support it. Furthermore, it is spread when "actors see others behaving in a certain way and copy those behaviors" (ibid.).

4.1.1. Operationalization

We will operationalize Finnemore and Sikkink's definitions of *norm emergence*, *norm cascade, (norm entrepreneurs)* and *norm internalization*. These will be used to discuss the origins and emergence of international security norms based on our case analyses. Furthermore, these will be used to discuss the processes through which new norms and norm entrepreneurs influence state and non-state behavior, and which security norms that seems to matter and under what type of conditions. Finally, we will use these definitions to gain an understanding of who the dominant *norm entrepreneurs* are on the private, national and international level, as well as understand their agenda of establishing global security norms, and also what the possible consequences of such establishment has been, and might become in the future. These findings will also be used to discuss

where the nation-state fits in within the neoliberal world system, and in what way the privatization of public goods has affected the state sovereignty and its normative monopoly on violence.

4.2. Summary of our Analytical Framework

Based on this chapter, we will now summarize our analytical framework. We combine each part of the framework and then formulate what the contribution of each part of the framework is, for answering our main research question.

All parts of the framework revolve around a change in civil-military relations. Each part then provides us with ways of understanding these changing relations. Furthermore, each part supplements each other.

We use the concepts of field, doxa, capital, symbolic power and the struggles over this, in order to be able to analyze changes within the fields that we are interested in. These fields are those of international security (macro), and inside of this field (meso), we treat each of our three cases as separate fields. This opens up for a discussion of authority and legitimacy, which provides us with a foundation for discussing possible changes in civil-military relations. In this way, the Bourdieusian part of our framework functions as the theoretical foundation for answering our main research question, which means that TAR and norm change supplement the Bourdieu part. This means that TAR and norm change primarily relates to civil-military relations through the Bourdieu part of the framework. Therefore, we turn to Sassen's operationalization of TAR in order to supplement the field analysis, specifically where our analysis leads us to the topic of authority (Bourdieu's symbolic capital and power) and the aforementioned possible changes within the field(s). Here we look at the relationship between territory, authority, and rights to add a consequence-perspective to our field analysis, as the Bourdieu-framework provides us with little capabilities of touching upon what the field-changes mean for the civil-military relations. In short, we use TAR to expand on our field analysis so that we can use this to answer our main research question. Finally, we then use the concept of norm change to analyze and discuss whether these changes in the field(s), caused by the introduction of private agents, can be seen as norm changing with regards to how authorities make use of PMSCs. Basically we use norm change to put together our different pieces of the analysis to discuss how and/or if these changes to civil-military relations can be seen as a norm change (on a global scale) and what this means for the civil-military relations and TAR. This perspective allows us to identify the agents that are capable of changing norms (which relates to doxic battles) and understand the roles of these agents in the reconfiguration of the field(s) that take place namely because of the introduction of a private component into civil-military relations.

5 Historical and Theoretical Context

This chapter is divided into two contextual parts: a historical one followed by a theoretical one. The historical context is base on a chronological description of mercenaries role in society since 1648 (and just prior to this), with a focus on the post Cold War period up until today. The purpose of providing a historical context of PMSCs, is to create a foundational knowledge of how society has used and viewed PMSCs (or mercenaries) in the past and now, and what role they have played in regards to state monopoly on violence. This section also focuses on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, which has had great impact on international norms since its establishment. After PMSCs historical context, we present and incorporate Bourdieu's theoretical perspective, which describes the macro-level system in which both public and private military operates. The purpose of presenting this is to apply this structural-framework as an overall macro-perspective from which we will approach our three cases, from the top and down to a meso-level. Together, the historical and theoretical contexts supplement each other, by providing a comprehensive structural context, which will be used as the foundation for the three analyses.

5.1. Historical Background on the Use of Private Military and Security Actors

To be able to understand, analyze, and discuss PMSCs influence on civil-military relations and normative changes, one must first take a step back and reflect upon the historical background associated with PMSCs. Firstly, this section starts by presenting the concepts of mercenaries and how PMSCs relate to the concept of state monopoly on violence. Secondly, we will look at the origins of the monopoly on violence in order to understand how the use of PMSCs can be understood as outsourcing of this monopoly. Thirdly, we will look closer at how the history, image, and negative connotations of mercenaries have influenced the view on PMSC-use. Fourthly, we will look at how the neoliberal world order affects PMSC, especially with focus on privatization in general and how the neoliberal approach to security has influenced the rise of PMSCs. From this, we will argue that private security and military actors has always played an important role in states' power and authority, and that re-appearance of PMSCs is neither coincidental nor surprising given their history. However, what is particularly interesting is how the spread of neoliberalism, which started in the 1970s (Harvey 2005:2f), but especially since the mid-1980s and the end of the Cold War, has acted as a foundational structure for the rise and re-shaping of private security and military actors in contemporary peace- and conflict zones. And lastly, we will account for the theoretical approach surrounding the historic development, thus defining how we will approach our different

case analyses. This will be done by examining the macro-level system that private and public military are a part of in the light of our theoretical background.

5.1.1. The Rise and Fall of Mercenaries Prior to 1648

The idea of soldiers for hire is not one that only belongs in modern warfare, but rather has a long and somewhat dark history. It highlights the fact that the state has not always had the sole monopoly on violence, but rather states and rulers have relied heavily on private actors as components of building societies, empires, and states (Mandrup 2012:9). P.W. Singer describes, that prior to 1648 "[…] the conduct of violence was a capitalist enterprise […] war became the biggest industry in Europe" (Singer 2008: 28). This meant that during the Thirty Years Wars (1618-1648) most of the countries in the world had military made up entirely of mercenaries (ibid.: 29). The dictionary describes a mercenary as "a soldier hired into foreign service" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2015), however, this is a somewhat broad definition and Singer argues that the Geneva Conventions provides the most accurate definition of a mercenary:

> "[…]a foreign person who, despite not being a member of the armed forces in the conflict, is specifically recruited in order to fight and is motivated essentially by private gain" (Singer 2008: 41).

A mercenary's loyalty is based on a contract, and therefore differs from soldiers, who fight for their country, families and homes. A distinction Berndtsson also makes in his definition of soldiers and private military contractors (see chapter 2). Another important distinction that has given mercenaries a bad reputation, is as Singer describes it, the fact that "soldiers often serve to prevent wars, mercenaries *require* wars" (Singer 2008:41) to make a living which means abandoning all morals in war. This is also one of the strongest critiques of today's modern mercenaries, which PMSCs are often described as.

Later in this chapter, we will discuss the definition of modern day mercenaries, but to do so, we have to take a step back in history, and provide a description of the dominant international paradigm since 1648, based on state sovereignty. This is an essential key in the analysis of the global normative development that arguably has taken place within the past three decades.

5.1.2. The Significance of the Peace of Westphalia

The Thirty Years Wars ended with the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where state sovereignty won out against that of empire, and has since been accepted as the core principle/norm in the international society (Singer 2008:29). This new world system relied on a system of independent states abstaining from interfering in each other's domestic affairs and checking one another's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power (Kissinger 2014:3). Additionally, this meant that "[i]n assuming control over its territory, the state undertook to protect its lands and people with public forces" (Buzatu & Buckland 2015:7), which was the beginning of states developing what Max Weber refers to as the "[…] monopoly on the legitimate means of violence" (Andersen et al. 2007:8). It was in the wake of the sovereign establishment, that the state began a takeover of the military market, and the hired foreign armies started to be replaced by standing state armies made up of citizens (Singer 2008:29). This meant that mass state armies overtook the security field, and was therefore both the reason and outcome of the organizational form of the state. The size of the army started to matter more than expertise knowledge, because having a large army meant that it was possible to take more land by force, and therefore symbolized a greater power of the state (Singer 2008:30). Additionally, the invention of gun powder and muskets meant that the special skills of the mercenaries were no longer needed, because any person could pull the trigger, which therefore resulted in a decline in the use of specialized private military actors (Singer 2008:29).

During the centuries that followed the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the dominant normative framework of the international system, has regarded

> "[…] the legitimate use of violence as being the domain of the modern state, which, as a natural consequence, delegitimizes non-state providers of security. Legitimacy is, therefore, tied to the formal state" (Mandrup 2012:8).

Therefore, when referring to the states monopoly on violence or rightful use of force it means that this is seen as an inherent function of the state, and therefore also as an expression of state authority and right. The idea of the state's monopoly on violence is therefore strongly tied to the concept of sovereignty, and implies that the military as a state institution is responsible for the practical provision of national security as portrayed in traditional civil-military relations. However, it is

important to keep in mind that looking back at history, the state is a rather new construct of governance, which drew its public power from the private market of violence (Singer 2008:20). This argument can also be found in Charles Tilly's claim that there is an analogue between war and state-making, meaning that wars are the makers of states (Tilly 1985:185).
Therefore, when looking closer at the history of PMSCs, it becomes clear that these private military and security actors seem to thrive in periods of systemic transformation, or fragile-states. According to Singer, this was evident when:

> "Governments were weakened, powerful military capabilities … were available on the open market, and transnational companies were often the most efficiently organized actors" (Singer 2008:20).

Furthermore, Singer emphasizes other factors in history which has given rise to mercenaries such as when quality matters more than quantity, meaning a demand for specialized tasks as well as "the complimentary relationship of mass military demobilization in one zone to new wars in other weaker state zones" (ibid.:38). When comparing these historical components to the post-Cold War period, many of the factors are found repeated and it can therefore be argued that this has created an ideal international system for modern day mercenaries to reemerge and thrive.

5.1.3. The Rise of Neoliberalism – The End of the Cold War

During the Cold War, there was a focus on great power status and nuclear competition between the US and the USSR, and the security order was strongly tied to the idea of state sovereignty, which Anna Leander writes:

> "[…] made (international) security appear as a quintessentially public responsibility to be provided through practices as the arms race, diplomacy, alliance-building, containment, border control and policing. With the end of the Cold War this changed" (Leander & Munster 2006:6).

As Bjørn Thomassen writes, "a regime change took place around the globe with the end of the Cold War and Communism" (Thomassen 2012:681), giving further impetus to neoliberal processes of privatization and outsourcing, which accelerated processes of globalization. This development continued to expand during the 1990's where "[T]he capitalist marketplace had been proclaimed

with the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and enthusiasm ran high for national economic deregulation and privatization […]" (Tsing 2000:331). Therefore, security order and sovereignty could no longer be considered fully inseparable from one another, and on a global scale states started outsourcing public-owned institutions to the private sector which were areas that had previously associated with the welfare state (Berndtsson 2012:116). As Michael Lang points out, the image of globalization made "neoliberals praise its free markets, social democrats bemoan its undermining of the welfare state, [and] Marxists critique its capitalist dominance" (Lang 2006).

Berndtsson argues that the state outsourcing of public to private is a reasonable and logical step in the direction of states wanting to attain more effectiveness by downsizing the public sector (Berndtsson 2012:116). Furthermore, this re-appearance and expansion of private military and security actors has been highly influenced by a growing demand for military skills since the end of the Cold War – demands from different sides, such as states that had formerly depended on Cold War consumers. After the Cold War, these patrons started looking to PMSCs in the attempt to facilitate internal stability and security. Additionally, those states that incorporated the neoliberal discourse in terms of down-sizing the public goods wanted to restructure and optimize the little military they had left, and therefore sought out private military experts to carry out this agenda (Avant 2005:31). All these factors combined, (re)opened a *market of violence* with a re-invention, rebranding, and commercializing mercenaries as private military and security contractors. As Singer describes it:

> "In the wake of globalization and the end of the Cold War, the private military market has expanded in a way not seen since the 1700s. It has also been relegitimized to an extent, or, at least, opened back up to allow a nearly public trade" (Singer 2008:40).

This follows Raewyn Conell's arguments that as globalization spread, so did its (privatizing) business discourse with claim about the declining power of the national state and the rising power of the neoliberal market (Conell 2007:375).

5.1.4. Modern Day Mercenaries

The Geneva Conventions essentially criminalized mercenaries, and removed the legal protection of soldiers in war (Krahman 2013:7), which led to the prosecution of many "[…] freewheeling mercenaries and filibusters" (Singer 2008:43), who had previously enjoyed operating under the

same license as soldiers. However, this did not mean the end of the hired soldier, but rather a need for renewal and rebranding. The old fashioned mercenary-trade went underground and transferred to an individual level, and still operate in areas where the legal system and governance is weak or broken, such as the Kosovo war, where many mercenaries were hired into rebel groups (Singer 2008:43).

Contrary to these traditional mercenary ways, PMSCs have chosen to embrace the global neoliberal development, and has become mainstream in a sense, as commercial enterprises "[…] that trade and compete openly (for most parts) and are vertically integrated into the wider global marketplace" (Singer 2008:45).
This also means that PMSCs are a profit business, much like mercenaries, but in a much more sophisticated (and legal) way by functioning as registered trade units, and can make use of intra-firm trade. Whereas mercenaries operate on the black-market for individual gain, only trusts cash payments, and cannot be trusted or held accountable for anything more than short-time agreements (ibid.:46), PMSCs operate in foreign countries under contracts of legally registered companies, and that way operate in a legal vacuum. However, there is still much debate on what exactly sets PMSCs apart from mercenaries. Despite PMSCs going mainstream they are often still hard to tell apart from traditional mercenaries, especially when it comes to issues of prosecution and accountability, which is a very heated topic that has been debates since the 1990s.

Especially PMSCs such as Blackwater, Sandline, and Executive Outcomes have caused an international stir in terms of the legitimacy and legality of private contractors use of arms (Krahman 2013:53). Additionally, there have been a lot of concerns about accountability, especially putting private contractors on trial, which has been very difficult in the past. As an example, it was not until 2015 that the first private contractors were convicted for the Blackwater scandal in Iraq in 2007, where 17 civilians were killed by private contractors (Hsu & Martin 2015). Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah, director of Political Affairs at the Economic Community of West African States, has made the following claim about modern day PMSCs "[…] private military companies are nothing but the old poison of vagabond mercenaries in new designer bottles" (Singer 2008:44). Whether this claim is true or not, PMSCs have not been able to detach themselves from association with mercenaries, which has also caused much international suspicion and media prosecution. Despite this, PMSCs

seem to thrive in a globalized world, driven by a neoliberal dogma where outsourcing of public goods to the private sector has started to become the rule rather than the exception.

5.2. Theoretical Context

At this point, we will turn to our theoretical background in order to further our approach to our case analyses. While the historical background above accounts for what has led to the point in history that is today, the following part will, through our theoretical background, investigate the macro-level system in which both public and private military operates. As such, the operationalization of our chosen theories will come into play here, helping us to setup our macro-perspective on our case analyses. This perspective serves as an overall perspective from which we will approach our three cases, down onto a meso-level.

It is important to reflect on the relationship between level of the field and degree of autonomy/relativity: while fields on the lower level might hold the conditions for being more autonomous than their superior counterpart, the power struggles within fields at the lower level are much less likely to be able to influence the doxa of a field on a higher level. This is important in conjunction with our different scopes throughout this analysis. When we operate on a macro-level, we treat the state as the agent that exercises symbolic power – the power of doxa making. However, on the macro-level the state and its doxa is also more directly threatened or challenged by other agents who operate at the same level. This means that the higher we move towards the sovereign – be it a transnational or state agent – the more is at stake. However, fields on the higher levels might be more bound to the universal doxa (of the state for instance) while having greater influence hereon. This can be thought of as 'doxic spillover effect' that decreases the further we move towards a micro-level (with the state (macro) being the source hereof). The volume of accumulated legitimate capital determines the impact of power struggles/doxic battles. The total volume of capital within a field is somewhat coherent with the size of the field which is why the ability to challenge higher fields' doxa, is greater on higher levels and less on the lower levels, because the ability to do so *is* to hold symbolic power, which can only be done through possession of symbolic capital. This also applies to inter-state relations, where 'stronger states' i.e. states who possess greater volumes of legitimate forms of capital and thus has a 'stronger' symbolic power in the way that it can more easily affect weaker states. Because we live in the age of neoliberalism, it is important to see the rise of this system as a doxic battle that is taking place on a supra-national level.

However, the relationship between volumes of capital and the degree of impact of symbolic power exercitation is why the impact of doxic battles decreases alongside with the decrease in the size of

the field. Following this line of thinking, an agent needs to possess a great volume of capital in order to challenge the established order of things – the doxa of the state. This has historically been prohibited by the state that has been operating with a clear distinction of public and private, which means clearly defined boundaries of the state and the private actor. However, with the emergence of neoliberalism, private actors are gaining increasingly more terrain and hence they are becoming a still stronger challenger of the states' doxa and thus the state is losing its monopoly over symbolic power that is the power to shape doxa, which includes the control over defining legitimate forms of capital. If the doxa is changed, the field as a whole is changed, which in this case means that the state itself will be changed by this de-monopolization of symbolic power. Holding *the capital of physical force* is a key in maintaining the symbolic power, as long as it is legitimate and thus convertible to symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1994:5). This means, that by partly privatizing functions of the military, one also de-monopolizes the symbolic power and thus allows challengers of the established doxa to gain greater influence on the order of things.

This analysis is also in line with the argument that there is coherence between weak or fragile states and the rise of PMSCs (Singer 2008:20). Herein lies a serious threat to the states monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power. When the state is weak, i.e. holds little amounts of economic and symbolic capital, its symbolic power is equally weak and thus it seeks to (re)gain symbolic power by hiring PMSCs. This is no solution to that problem, though, because by doing this, the state actually loses its monopoly on symbolic power and hence become weaker in regards to symbolic power and doxa-making.

Furthermore, an increasing privatization within weaker states threatens its ability to impose symbolic power over its citizens. This is especially prevalent when the legislative branch is weak, which is somewhat defining of a weak state, and the executive branch becomes privatized and stronger (Sassen 2008:72). When a key part of the executive branch, such as the military, becomes privatized it not only has the potential to alter the state's monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power but also the rights of citizens. A privatization of the executive branch moves authority from the public to the private, which threatens the capability of citizens to demand accountability through the state's legislative branch (ibid.). Thus, when a weak legislative branch is outsourcing the executive branch, the rights of citizens change as their legislative connection to the executive authority erodes.

6 Private Corporations Hiring PMSCs

In the following section, we will examine how privately owned (foreign) oil and gas companies, operating in Nigeria utilize PMSCs. Specifically, our case concerns extraction of oil in the Niger Delta and the different companies who profit off this extraction. According to Abrahamsen and Williams, security ranks as the second largest source of profit in Nigeria after oil and gas (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:3). Additionally, the area is plagued by several high security risks, for instance kidnapping, oil theft, sabotage of pipelines, etc. (African Business Magazine 2012). This makes this case a relevant and favorable example of private companies using PMSCs, as there is a high need for security measures to be taken and the private security industry is prevalent in the area.

In this chapter we will first go over the aspects identified in chapter 2 that are relevant for understanding civil-military relations when private companies become involved. We will be looking at the type of company, the services provided, the type of client they work for, and the context that the company operates under. We will then, based on Avant's framework, try to understand the types of control exerted over the companies. Hereafter, we will look at the relationship between the PMSCs and authority in order to identify whether there has been a change in the symbolic capital, which would signify a change in the doxa within the field of civil-military relations. We will examine what forms of capital that are seen as legitimate, who legitimizes them, and why. We do this, in order to understand whether there has been a change in the doxa within the field of civil-military relations, creating a de-monopolization of symbolic power possibly leading to norm change.

6.1. Insecurity and Security Provisions

There are several PMSCs operating in Nigeria, providing security for oil and gas companies, which are constantly under threat. The state of Nigeria has been unable to provide sufficient security for many of these extraction companies, and one might say that a security void has appeared in specific areas, and that the PMSCs have stepped in to fulfill a need, which has traditionally been seen as the states area of responsibility. The severity of the high security risk situation, which extraction companies operate under in the Niger Delta area, becomes apparent when looking at Shell, who in 2009 experienced a kidnapping of 62 employees, while three other workers were killed (Amunwa 2012). Additionally, this shows that the state of Nigeria cannot provide sufficiently secure locations for gas and oil companies, which then creates a need for the companies to hire

someone to uphold security. It can be argued that it is in the interest of the Nigerian state to protect the foreign gas and oil companies extracting in the country, as the tax these companies pay, as well as the profit from derivatives from the oil companies, are some of the state's major income sources, and therefore the state depends on PMSCs coming in and securing its economic interest.

Shell spent at least one billion US dollars on security in 2007 and 2009, and almost 40% of the one billion was spent in Nigeria (Amunwa 2012). In 2008 alone, Shell spent more on security in the Delta than they did in North and South America, EU and Russia combined (ibid.). Abrahamsen and Williams writes that:

> "In recent years, these dynamics have been intensified by illegal oil bunkering. This has become a huge enterprise, with Shell alone estimating a loss of 2.6 million barrels a year, the equivalent of $441 million a year in future revenues" (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:12).

This loss might have been the cause behind an increase in Shell's 'other' expenses in 2008, which can be seen in the leaked document. These 'other' expenses represent expenses which also cover PMSCs, which accounts for over 40% of Shell's global security spending. Figures from 2009 indicate that Shell spent $75 million on 'other' security costs in Nigeria, which is $10 million more than it spent on 'third parties' that year (government forces in Nigeria and internal police force). And generally, figures show that: "Shell's provision of $35 million for security contractors was a substantial 10% of its global security budget in 2008" (Amunwa 2012).

Private security has become a major part of the Nigerian economy, and according to estimates from 2006, there was between 1,500 and 2,000 PMSCs operating in Nigeria, who in total were employing around 100,000 people (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006:3). In 2011 this estimate had risen to 2,500 PMSCs operating in Nigeria (Purpura 2011:206). Due to the increased instability in the area today, it is plausible to estimate that this number has further increased within the past four years. Krahman argues that: "[t]he more widespread the [...] use of armed security contractors, the more likely it is that it will be considered normal" (Krahman 2013: 56). This creates a situation where the PMSCs might be seen as a normal and integrated part of the country's daily life, giving way for them to interact more easily with citizens.

As the oil extraction sites are at the Niger Delta, this is where the PMSCs primarily operate. Apart from the security services provided at the Niger Delta, the PMSCs are also hired for logistics and training. According to Abrahamsen & Williams, this unarmed part of the private security:

> "[…] exercises a fundamental impact on the security situation in the Niger Delta, providing technology, expertise, and expatriate personnel that substantially influence the practices of public security forces, as well as providing capabilities that would otherwise be absent" (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:12).

This shows that the services provided lie within several types of security services, including security and protection at the Delta, supplying new technological resources, personnel, and expertise and training for these tasks. Even though we have no means of examining the specific contract between Shell and a PMSC, we can conclude that a contract would list these services, for the PMSC to supply.

Platform London[1] argues that as security contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq became fewer, Western PMSCs quickly saw new prosperous opportunities in the oil fields of the Niger Delta (Amunwa 2012). Control Risks Group, Erinys, G4S, and Saladin Security are among the UK-based security companies that have prospered from contracts in the Niger Delta. According to Abrahamsen and Williams, G4S' contract with Chevron Nigeria was one of the most expensive contracts for PMSCs in the Nigerian oil industry, and one of the company's biggest contracts in Africa (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:10).
According to their websites, these companies all classify themselves as some form of a security company. Control Risk Group writes that they are a global risk consultancy, which deals with security risks (Control Risk Group n.d.). Erinys are a security company with specialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Erinys n.d.). G4S has a specific subsidiary for their operations in Nigeria called 'G4S Secure Solutions Nigeria Limited', and defines themselves as a security solutions company (G4S Nigeria n.d. a), while lastly, Saladin Security writes that they are a security and risk management company (Saladin Security 2015).

[1] Platform London is a company doing research on especially oil companies. They combine art, activism and research (Platform London n.d.).

Providing security in Nigeria can be a controversial issue due the fact that the Nigerian law only allows for state police and military to carry arms. According to the Private Guard Companies Act (1986), 9, PSMCs are prohibited from carrying firearms (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:10). Nevertheless, due to high level of violence and insecurity in the state, many private security contractors, need the legal means to provide armed response to be able to provide sufficient security, in case of emergency or attack (ibid.).
According to G4S Nigeria's website, they have created a partnership with a Nigerian owned company, who has special permission from the government to carry guns, and who then provide guards for G4S Nigeria, who in turn provides expertise and technology (G4S Nigeria n.d. b).

For some companies, this has been solved through cooperation with the Nigerian Police. Members of the police, who are armed with fully automatic weapons, are paired with the PMSCs, and integrated into their operations (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:10). These police officers take orders from their own commanders, but get an extra salary, paid by the companies, and are therefore also supervised by the PMSC commanders, which leads to a significant blend of public/state and private authority and responsibility. Additionally, the troops who are guarding the oil facilities get their instructions from the oil companies as well as the PMSCs, while also taking orders from their commanders. In regards to this, Ben Amunwa writes: "It is unclear where corporate responsibility ends and government control begins" (Amunwa 2012). This can be seen as a step towards a change in the monopoly to exercise both violence and, as we turn to later, symbolic power. Here an erosion of a private-public division is happening, which alters rights through a shift of authority.

Even though the PMSCs provide security services, it is necessary for them to partner up with other companies or the government in order to provide this service. This creates close ties between the state and the PMSCs and might even make it difficult for a regular citizen to differentiate between the two, as the guards at the Niger Delta can be both government and private security guards. This configuration of security brings with it a set of new and extended rights, only obtainable to those who can afford the protection of a PMSC. This is a development of great threat to those who cannot pay the required fees needed to guarantee some degree of protection of rights, whether it regards private property rights or something else. The problem arises if this kind of private security becomes so widespread that the Nigerian state deprioritizes the provision of security for its citizens

when the PMSCs seems to be doing their job well. What happens to the non-paying citizens and their rights, if essentially the Nigerian state has economic interest in caring for the oil companies who generates revenue for the benefit of the state? Another aspect of this problem arises with regards to the protection of Nigerian citizens, if the PMSCs is more or less given carte blanche to secure the oil extraction sites and property – who, then, is on the side of the Nigerians who might be seen as a threat by these PMSCs hired by Shell and Chevron?

This fusion of public/state actors with the private security actors is necessary for the PMSCs, as it is unlikely that the PMSCs hired by the private oil and gas companies for protection, would be willing to provide unarmed security services in such a dangerous area as the Niger Delta. Despite confusion about corporate and government responsibility, the two parties are dependent on each other. Without the police, the PMSCs would not be able to legally provide armed protection for the oil companies. Vice versa, without the PMSCs, the state would be unable to provide sufficient security to the private oil and gas companies, on which it depends economically. Therefore, the state is 'forced' to outsource violence to private security contractors. Despite this mutually beneficial bond between the state and the PMSCs, it might not benefit the state as a sovereign entity, as Abrahamsen and Williams says: "[…] while global security assemblages may enhance the state's economic and security capacities, this does not necessarily mean that they strengthen the state in a broader sense." (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:15).

The privatization of security, especially in relation to civil-military relations, poses problems and begs the question: "[…] if security becomes a private service, what happens to the idea that it is a public good?" (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:17). As mentioned above, this is an especially relevant question in regards to Nigeria where the police fuses with the PMSCs and are being used to provide security for those who can afford to pay for it, which then moves focus away from other needs for security in society. This means that the corporate component, in terms of civil-military relations, is almost absorbed by the military institutions as they must merge in order to function.

6.2. Types of Control

When examining civil-military relations, it is relevant to look at the state in question and its ability to oversee the companies operating within its borders and ensure that they comply with the rules of the given state. Therefore, we examine how the functional, political, and social dimensions of state

control over armed forces, to understand how the corporate component works together with the civil power and military institutions in the Nigerian state.

As mentioned above, the PMSCs who operate in Nigeria have to cooperate with the government or Nigerian companies regulated by the government in order to provide their services. In relation to functional control, this means that the government of Nigeria has some functional control over the PMSCs as they need licenses and cooperation to operate. According to Berndtsson, some friction can arise between government workers and private contractors if there is animosity between the two due to jealousy over pay or other (Berndtsson 2012:120). Additionally, as the PMSCs are business enterprises, they must compete with each other for contracts, which might create frictions between the companies, causing problems of functional control when the companies have to cooperate. Nevertheless, the state of Nigeria, at times in collaboration with the gas and oil companies, has the means to exert functional control over the PMSCs in Nigeria.

The political dimension of control of PMSCs in Nigeria can be argued to be a weak legislative branch. Political control in practice is usually related to activities like screening employees of PMSCs and making sure that they live up to the standard of the state. As the clients of the PMSCs are private companies, the business contract between the two companies might contain some agreement of how each individual security contractor is vetted and selected. However, there is no public access to this contract, thus there is no way of knowing what goes into or who is in charge of selection and vetting of employees of the PMSCs. It could be assumed that the PMSC itself is in charge of this control, which then reduces the state authority over the company. In practice, this can cause problems for the state authority as the mechanisms for oversight goes through the companies and not the state. However, the Nigerian state forbids PMSCs to carry arms, leading them to work closely together with state police or military. This is the only kind of security measure the Nigerian state takes to keep control over the PMSCs, which it does in order to being able to exert political control within its territory. However, Nigeria is a weak state and its law officers are more susceptible to bribery, which creates a risk of undermining this security measure.

Lastly, the social dimension of control of force pertains to the social values of the state. In terms of the Nigeria case, this might apply to both the Nigerian state but also the client who hires the PMSC as they are interested in upholding an image as a company that follows the social values of either

their own country or international community. Of course, just because the security personnel comes from a private company does not mean that they will not adhere to social values and norms. As Berndtsson writes: "[…] adherence to international values – even among highly trained professionals from Western militaries – cannot be taken for granted" (Berndtsson 2012:121). There is some incentive for security contractors to adhere to the social norms and values of the country they operate in, as a good relationship with local government could help their operations, and good relations with the locals might ease some unrest. In Nigeria, the PMSCs often work closely together with state police, or nationally owned companies, who can assist with conforming to the social values of the state. Additionally, companies like Chevron and Shell, though multinational, are both headquartered in and originate from western countries. On those grounds, it could be argued that the companies would want to adhere to the social values of western companies and/or countries.

6.3. Change and Continuity

In the following section, we will examine the potential change in symbolic capital in the relationship between PMSCs and authority. We look at the legitimate forms of capital, and where this legitimacy comes from. We seek to understand whether there has been a change in the balance of the monopoly on violence and economics within the Nigerian state, which then has created a de-monopolization of symbolic power.

One can argue that a type of doxic battle is taking place between the state, and the challenger to the doxa of the state, being PMSCs on the other side. The state stands for the established orthodoxy. The PMSCs stand for the heterodoxy – the challenger of the doxa, who 'fights' for access to the state's violence and authority. As in any doxic struggle, what is at stake is ultimately the right to exercise symbolic power (see 3.2.3). The doxic battle that take place between the Nigerian state and the private agents, however, is not a struggle over the absolute monopoly on symbolic power, rather it is a struggle over de-monopolization hereof.

The state still holds the symbolic power as it is the state that legitimizes all forms of capital. It is in the state's interest to maintain this symbolic power, as this is ultimately what makes possible the structuring of the state and thus, without symbolic power, there would be no state. However, by focusing solely on economic capital, as the Nigerian state seems to do, other forms of capital, be it social or cultural, become secondary forms of capital, even though they often will influence the

agents capacity to accumulate economical capital. When the Nigerian state, as is evident in this case, legitimizes Shell and Chevron because they possess, accumulate, and generate great volumes of economic capital, it is in fact submitting to a (global) capitalist doxa that legitimizes economic capital above all other forms of capital. When legitimized, it is convertible into symbolic capital, and possession of symbolic capital is what leads to symbolic power. Shell, Chevron, and the PMSCs they hire are challenging the Nigerian state's doxa by advocating that profit is everyone's interest. It is also challenging the part of the doxa that legitimizes 'the capital of physical force' (Bourdieu 1994:5), as this has previously been under monopoly by state agents, but now it is possible for private agents to gain symbolic capital through the capital of physical force. The private agents in this case all participate in a doxic battle, in which they try to challenge the orthodoxy by claiming that their specific forms of capital i.e. economic and physical force are legitimate. When these are recognized by the state as being legitimate, it gives the private agents symbolic power, and has *already* changed doxa.

However, it is not simply one authority challenging another, but rather the state that chooses, in the lack of better options, to outsource its power to PMSCs, which serves its own interest in terms of the income revenue and internal order that the state has been unable to uphold on its own. However, seeing this from the perspective of the framework we have developed, gaining economic capital is not sufficient for maintaining a monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power. In the case of Nigeria, the state might gain economic capital by allowing PMSCs to operate within its territory, but this means that there is a 'capital-tradeoff' where PMSCs essentially gain influence on the state doxa by selling their services. Services that, when bought by Shell and Chevron, makes the PMSCs legitimate holders of the capital of physical force, though it is crucial remember that this legitimization is made by the Nigerian state. Therefore, one cannot argue that the Nigerian state is fighting for orthodoxy, rather it compromises its symbolic power because it seems like the only option in order to maintain some degree of political and economic stability, which is needed in order to obtain economic capital and ultimately to uphold the state as such. One can say, though, that both the oil companies and the PMSCs they hire are challengers of the doxa and are in fact gaining influence hereon because of the Nigerian state's emphasize on economic capital, which is regarded as more important than maintaining a monopoly on symbolic power.

The oil companies buy the services from the PMSCs in order to secure a stable environment in which they can gain economic capital by extracting oil. The Nigerian state makes money from this

too, which is why it allows this to happen. In other words, the state allows and legitimates the use of PMSCs because it also seeks the economic capital obtainable through Shell's and Chevron's work.

The consequence of this is ultimately that the PMSCs have brought with them a slippery slope of de-monopolization of symbolic power, which is the doxa-making power. This is a development towards an oligarchy or plutocracy, which is changing the civil-military relations and becomes problematic at two crucial points: First, this power struggle within Nigeria creates a relation between holders of economical capital and security. It simply makes coherence between being resourceful and being able to provide oneself with security (see also Wagner 2001: 9951-9952). Second, a ripple effect could evolve as the PMSCs might hold the potential for essentially making the state security branches obsolete. This raises the question of whether PMSCs at some point will supersede the national armed forces, which then is a serious disruption for the civil-military relations and thus the relationship between territory, authority and rights.

When we remember that doxa is 'the rules of the game', what distinguishes the legitimate from the illegitimate, the just from the unjust, and ultimately the rich from the poor, and that symbolic power is the power to shape doxa (see 3.2.3), symbolic power is also political power. Therefore, the outsourcing of symbolic power means a reconfiguration of the state and a complication of the civil-military relations.

One can argue that the state of Nigeria's sovereignty has not been changed when it comes to outsourcing *hard* violence, meaning allowing PMSCs to carry and use firearms, which is still only legally permitted for state soldiers and police. However, there are certain loopholes in this law, which enables PMSCs to carry arms if they 'officially' are under the command of Nigerian state officers. However, it is still possible to argue that the states *soft* violence has been challenged and changed by the neoliberal world regime with regards to down-sizing and privatization of public goods, which PMSCs are a direct product of. Therefore, the Nigerian state no longer has monopoly on violence in every sense. In the perspective of our framework, this does in fact weaken the (already weak) state, because the state needs more than economic capital in order to be strong. Without the monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power, the state 'has sold out' and has opened up for obtaining symbolic power through the possession of economic capital.

6.4. Sub-conclusion

Throughout this chapter we have seen that the Nigerian state, by allowing private companies to provide security for themselves with help from PMSCs, has set in motion a series of implications for the civil-military relations. By outsourcing its monopoly on violence, the state has cornered itself because it has settled with a profit-oriented approach to decision-making concerning security politics. This leads to complications in the civil-military relations because the rupture of the state's monopoly on violence and symbolic power has created a link between holders of economic capital and security measures, and more specifically between holders of economic capital and rights. This creates a reshaping of the relationship between territory, authority, and rights because the legitimization of a new and private agent as an authority, who has the right to exercise violence, is working for a private company that seeks only its own interest. By legitimizing the PMSCs, it can be argued that the Nigerian state neglects its responsibility to protect its own citizens by securing their rights, because this is the most profitable in terms of economic capital. Ultimately, this means that the Nigerian state is selling out on its monopoly on violence, which is more pivotal than it seems at first glance, when viewed through the lens of our framework. This is so because the state's legitimization of the PMSCs means that the companies can in fact buy influence in political matters.

Traditionally within the Westphalian system, the state has been the sovereign within its territory, but the introduction of private agents into the security field has changed this. The PMSCs has broken the monopoly on violence and with it also the states monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power. Since Nigeria is a weak state, its symbolic power is not as powerful as that of a strong state, but nonetheless by legitimizing PMSCs it has compromised its symbolic power. The reason for this has to do with the doxic submission to the global capitalist doxa that values economic capital above anything else. This option seems like the only option when the state's interest is in creating a stable environment for the oil companies, whose operations are generating economic growth within the state. However, because of the state's submission to a capitalist doxa, advocated for by the oil companies and PMSCs, the private agents have succeeded in making their specific forms of capital legitimate. In this way the private agents have influenced and shaped the doxa of the Nigerian state, which can only be done through the possession of symbolic capital (legitimized economic capital and capital of physical force in this example). And with symbolic capital follows symbolic power – that is the power to shape doxa and thus to define the great order of things. Overall, because the Nigerian state is weak, it has started a de-monopolization of symbolic power, which is a slippery slope and ultimately raises questions of who is in charge of the country's political affairs.

7 States Hiring PMSCs for Armed Conflict

In the following chapter, we will examine how the United States have utilized PMSCs in their war in Iraq. We will start out by outlining the context of the case, looking at the type of companies, services, and the situation that the PMSCs operate within. Additionally, we will examine the three dimensions of control, to understand how the US is keeping oversight over the private contractors. Then we look at the relationship between the PMSCs and the US in terms of authority, where we will identify if a change in the doxa and field has occurred. Once again we look at the forms of legitimate capital, who legitimizes them, and lastly if this has changed. All this is needed to get us closer to an understanding of a possible de-monopolization of symbolic power and norm change.

7.1. Security Provisions in an Armed Conflict

The history of Iraq has been full of turmoil and war. Several times, Iraq has found itself subject to sanctions, embargos and inspections (BBC 02.04.2015). This all culminated in 2003, when the US decided to invade the country, based in suspicions of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), which also put an end to the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein (BBC 02.04.2015). Since 2003, the United States and its allies have lead a war in Iraq, fighting first Saddam Hussein and his supporters, then an insurgency, and recently Islamic State, meanwhile trying to establish a democratic government in the country. Since the very beginning of the war, PMSCs have been present, working for both state and non-state clients, and providing a variety of services (Berndtsson 2012:115). Estimates say that in 2006 there were around 50,000-100,000 private contractors operating in Iraq, of which half were delivering armed tactical services (Berndtsson 2012:115;Merle 05.12.2006). The use of PMSCs in Iraq has also been widely debated, due to both the large number of private contractors, and the worth of their contracts, and due to the number of violent episodes, most prominently with the Nisour Square massacre in 2007, where 4 private contractors from Blackwater shot 17 Iraqis (Berndtsson 2012:116).

The PMSCs operating in Iraq obviously work in a very high-risk environment, as the country has been a conflict-zone since the invasion in 2003. As Berndtsson writes, if the insurgents in Iraq view the PMSCs as being part of the coalition, they are then part of the 'threat', which creates a highly insecure situation for the PMSCs (Berndtsson 2012:122). According to the website iCasualties, an independent website which tracks the deaths of military in Iraq by compiling information from Multi-National Force and the US Department of Defence, among others, 468 private contractors have been killed in the Iraq war, compared to 4491 American soldiers (iCasualties n.d. a;

iCasualties n.d. b). This shows that PMSCs still do not experience as big of a risk as the public army, though they still endure the risk of attacks and ultimately fatalities.

There are several PMSCs operating in Iraq, and as mentioned some work for state and others for non-state actors. There are several constellations of states hiring PMSCs, both the US themselves, the Iraqi state and multinational forces like the Joint Contracting Command, as well as private companies hiring other PMSCs with funding from the US (Krahman 2013:62;Berndtsson 2012:116). For example, the US State Department has contracts with the companies Triple Canopy and DynCorp International to provide protective services (Berndtsson 2012:116). DynCorp International refer to themselves as a 'services company', listing among their services: aviation, intelligence and security, ITS training, logistics and contingency operations, operations and maintenance, and training (DynCorp International 2015).

As another example of one of these constellations, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, which is a US Army program that employs corporations to provide logistics support for the army, had a subcontract with the company Regency Hotel and Hospitality, who in turn hired Blackwater for security services (Berndtsson 2012:116;COGR 12.03.2004). Though this contract is not directly between the American state and the PMSC, Blackwater still worked under the oversight of the US, as their contract with Regency Hotel and Hospitality in effect was under the US Army.
Other companies operating in Iraq have been hired through the Joint Contracting Command in Baghdad (Krahman 2013:62). Several other PMSCs have operated in Iraq, in some way or other hired by the American state, but as mentioned, the list is extensive, and several smaller companies will not be mentioned in this analysis.

Like the list of companies, the range of services provided in Iraq by private contractors has been comprehensive. According to Berndtsson, these services included armed tactical services, like guarding individuals or convoys, as well as:

> "[…] logistics, maintenance of weapons systems, military/police training, security-sector reform (SSR), risk assessment, intelligence services, interrogators/translators, static guards and bodyguards, as well as armed convoy escorts or close protection teams" (Berndtsson 2012:116).

Merle writes that DynCorp International provided around 700 contractors to train the Iraqi police force, while L-3 Communications' companies worked with strategic planning, budgeting, establishing a public affairs office, and providing linguists for various tasks (Merle 05.12.2006). Leander writes specifically that some of the private contractors worked with maintenance and loading of bombers and helicopters, as well as operating the US Army's missile batteries and missile defense system (Leander 2005:810).

The introduction of PMSCs into the Iraqi conflict traces back to political decisions made post-invasion. P.W. Singer argues that the planning and everything that went before the invasion and war itself, was riddled with mistakes and bad political decisions (Singer, 2008:243f). Arguments made on the insufficiency in the planning of the invasion, and particular what should be done afterwards, was publicly disregarded as unsubstantiated critique (ibid.). However, pride come before a fall, and the 135,000 troops originally planned, proved too few (ibid:244). The obvious option to send in more troops, though, would have imposed a loss of face for the Bush administration, as it would both acknowledge the bad planning of the already unpopular war and put more troops at risk. Though, PMSCs seemed a viable solution to the overly burdened troops in Iraq. Not only did hiring PMSCs improve on the functionality of the forces in Iraq but also alleviate the public pressure on the President and his administration. In civil-military relation terms, this means a strengthening of the functional imperative but without compromising the societal imperative, and such, try to accomplish the mission in a manner that will not further infuriate the public.

7.2. Types of Control

To understand how the US has kept oversight with the many PMSCs working for and with them in Iraq, we look at the three dimensions of control: functional, political and social.

As mentioned in the section above, though many of the companies work for the US in some form, most of them are not directly controlled by the US Army, especially as several of the private contractors work for other companies working for the US. This has meant some friction on the functional level, as there is a huge lack of information and communications between the private contractors and the public army (Berndtsson 2012:118). Specifically, this has lead to so-called blue on white incidents, where the military and private contractors fire at each other. At one point, "[…] twenty such instances of blue and white violence […]" occurred in a five-month period (ibid.:119). Though several different initiatives have been taken to improve military-PMSC cooperation, the

problems continue due to both differences in organization and negative perceptions of the PMSCs (ibid.:120). This low quality in PMSC-military relations affects the functional control insofar that the state's control over PMSCs is severely decreased in comparison to their control over the public military (ibid.).

Looking at the political control, this reduced direct state control over organization and deployment of forces that the privatization leads to, causes several problems with respect to political control of force. The American state has attempted to keep some oversight over the contracting in Iraq, with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, created in 2004, which has inspected hundreds of issues with private contractors in Iraq (Perry 2012:46). Despite having this congressional oversight, in 2007 no US government agency was keeping any record of the number of PMSCs active in Iraq (Debusmann 03.07.2007). Additionally, functions of political control, like screening and selecting personnel and enforcing rules and policies, in addition to the oversight of these functions, have all been carried out by the PMSCs themselves (Berndtsson 2012:122). Another tool of the political control over force is the Rules of Engagement (ROE). These rules "[…] restrict military autonomy, proscribe certain behaviour and require that the military report up the chain of command and inform civilian principals about operations thus indicating when rules need to be changed" (ibid.:123f). ROE functions as a sort of leash on the military and on the PMSCs. But with frequent problems of information, especially in the feedback mechanisms as many violent incidents go unreported, ROE cannot perform its function, and thus will not work as an instrument of political control (ibid.:124).

Finally, in terms of social control over PMSCs in Iraq, some have argued that because many PMSCs hire personnel who have background in elite forces of Western militaries, it can be assumed that these will bring with them the adherence to social values that has been expected of them before (ibid.:121). However, even among highly trained Western military, the adherence of international values cannot always be expected, which has been argued to be the case in Iraq (ibid.). According to an interview with a PMSC employee, private contractors in Iraq ranges from "[…] people with incredibly solid military education to fortune-seekers and mythomaniacs" (ibid.). This can create situations where private contractors acts in a way that does not observe social values, which could be due to a lack of oversight. However, Avant argues that this could also be due to the US intentionally employing companies that are willing to take on tasks of a more hazardous nature (Avant 2005:227). She argues that some US officials have admitted that they seek PMSCs that

"[…] act like soldiers not businessmen" (Avant 2005:228). In effect, there might have been a trade-off between functional and social control, so that the functional level works, but compromising social values.

7.3. Change and Continuity

In this section we will follow our framework, and look at the legitimate forms of capital in this case, as well as where this legitimacy comes from. Similarly to the previous case-analysis of the private level, we seek to understand whether there has been a change in the doxa of the security field on a state level. This is held up against the civil-military relations, and the change herein, described above. In this way, we examine how the case of the US' use of PMSCs in Iraq relates to the civil-military relations and whether this shows a change in authority.

One can argue that there are two types of doxic battles going on in this case. On one side is the doxa shaped by the Iraqi political system, which is challenged by the heterodoxy political US agenda, in terms of implementation of democracy. However, this doxic battle is not the main interest of this case-analysis, but nevertheless important to keep in mind, because it places the US in a dual position. This is due to the other doxic battle, and the one that this project focuses on, which is the doxic battle between the US and the US-hired PMSCs operating in Iraq. Here, the US stands for the established orthodoxy, with focus on its rightful use of force, with the PMSCs representing the heterodoxy, the challenger to this position. The point of interest in this doxic battle is how the US' use of PMSCs, instead of solely relying of US military in Iraq, affects the US's monopoly on violence and what that means to their monopoly on symbolic power.

One could argue that the US maintains the symbolic power as it is the state that legitimizes all forms of capital. It is in the US' interest to maintain its established doxa, in terms of its monopoly on violence (symbolic power), as this is ultimately what makes the structuring of the state possible, meaning that without symbolic power, there would be no state.

This is also one of the reasons why outsourcing violence to PMSCs, from this point of departure, can potentially, be seen as the beginning of the demise of the nation-state (as in the case of Nigeria). This is so because the US gives up its symbolic capital to the private sector, who, if not controlled properly, has the potential to overtake the state as a new type of private ruler replacing a sovereign (or with sovereignty depending solely on the accumulation of economic capital, which makes it

dynamic). However, as we shall see, this does in fact not seem to be happening, as both sides of agents (the US and the PMSCs) exist and thrive in a symbiotic relationship.

When looking at the US as an agent in the field of international politics, it is clear that the US holds a dominant position because of its total volumes of accumulated forms of legitimate capital. The US, in fact, holds a monopoly-like symbolic power that allows it to legitimate said forms of capital, and because of the strength of the US as an agent, its doxa-making capacities stretch far beyond its home territory and reach out across the entire globe. In other words, the US holds a global monopoly on symbolic power, and has a powerfully manifested doxa that resides in a capitalist and neoliberal dogmatic vision. One can say that this doxa has evolved over time, through the doxic battles that have taken place throughout the nation's entire history. The minimal-state, advocated for by politicians and notable parts of civil-society, has a build-in conviction towards privatization, which make the use of PMSCs not as doxic-changing as in other states. However, it is new (in recent history) that the privatization of physical force takes place and this reflects a doxic battle of compromise. It is a battle of compromise or balance, because the state cannot fully outsources its monopoly on symbolic power and the corporate agents cannot dissolve the state entirely (assuming that there is no state without a state military), because they live off of each other. The way that the US needs the PMSCs in relation to civil-military relations is, as pointed in the beginning of this chapter, to get the job done faster and without sending more national troops to Iraq in order to do so, because the conflict had caused public distrust against the administration. The PMSCs need the state because they hold the symbolic power, so the PMSCs are only relevant because they are legitimized by the state. However, because the capital of physical force is such a crucial part of maintaining a monopoly on symbolic power, there is a limit as to how much violence can be outsourced. It seems that the US is aware of this, but because the US is such a powerful player, i.e. has a vast volume of accumulated forms of capital, they can still afford to outsource great deals of the capital of physical force (that is to legitimize PMSCs use hereof).

This is so, once again, because the US ultimately is the player who has the symbolic power on a global scale, that is they define the orthodoxy (which is a neoliberal doxa). This means that the US in general terms defines what forms of capital are legitimate and convertible into symbolic capital, and when it legitimizes PMSCs use of violence, it gives them symbolic power. There is a natural limit as to how far the US can go with this outsourcing of violence, and it seems as it is in the

interest of both PMSCs and the US to maintain a balance in the degree of outsourcing of violence because of the interdependent relationship that is between these two (types of) agents.

7.4. Sub-conclusion

As the case of Iraq shows, the US has seen a prosperous scene in Iraq for using PMSCs, with the number of private contractors in Iraq topping at around 100,000. Politically, the use of PMSCs has removed some pressure on the US state, as the political implications of casualties, inter alia, are not as dire as with the state military. In some regard, the functional imperative has gained something by hiring PMSCs, as the state military did not seem fit to take on the task alone. But in other regards, problems with functional control of the PMSCs have meant that the state does not always have complete control over the PMSCs, though Avant argues that this might have been by design. The state has had some form of functioning political control over the PMSCs, and though they have strived to exert social control, this might have been compromised in some instances, for a functional imperative.

In terms of a neoliberal agenda, it makes sense for the US to 'practice what they preach' which makes it very natural and in accordance with the US neoliberal doxa, to take this step towards a partly privatization of the military. It is somewhat unclear, however, what the role of the PMSCs has actually played in doxa-changing, namely because there is this consistency between the grand political ideas (of privatization) and the praxis of the US. However, as stated before, the outsourcing of violence is fairly new (at least in the time of neoliberalism) and therefore, this can be credited to the PMSCs who have been able to convince the US of their eligibility, which is what has led to their legitimization and hence putting their stamp on the US doxa. This should be seen as a modification of a latent US neoliberal orthodoxy rather than as a heterodoxy victory. In short: the doxic battle that takes place between the US state and the PMSCs is not antagonistic in nature, rather it is 'battle' over balancing a mutually desired optimal degree of privatization. This is optimal balance is a requirement for the US (and the PMSCs) who, like every agent in any field, is interested in maintaining its dominant position and its monopoly on symbolic power, which at this level is the power over (cultural) hegemony.

8 International Organizations Hiring PMSCs

In this chapter, we zoom in on East Timor, a country that for years has gone through a humanitarian crisis. We specifically look into the types of private military and security companies and the tasks they have been assigned by the United Nations, and more generally we look into the role these PMSCs have had in carrying out the transition from a non-self-governing territory to becoming an independent state. Through examples of PMSCs operating under UN mandate in East Timor, we will investigate what the possible impact of this has been, in relation to civil-military relations.

East Timor was colonized by Portugal for more than 400 years (Stephens 2005:6). In 1975, however, a shift occurred so it was now under the control of Indonesia, who invaded the country. Since then, there have been ongoing accusations of violations of human rights, caused by Indonesian forces, and East Timor has been regarded by the General Assembly of the UN, as a territory that was not self-governing. Therefore, in 1999, the UN assisted East Timor in conducting a ballot so that the people of East Timor could "exercise their right to self-determination" (Stephens 2005:6). The result was overwhelming: with a turnout of almost 99 % of eligible voters, 78.5 % was in favor of a 'no' to upholding the country's administrative ties to Indonesia (ibid.:13). For more than two years from this time, East Timor was plagued by violence and political turmoil, until finally achieving independency as a sovereign nation in May 2002 (Stephens 2005:5). Before the independency, the UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (UN 2006). UNTAET was solely in charge of the political administration of the country from 1999-2002. This included the mandate

> "[…] to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development" (ibid.).

After the establishment of an East Timorese parliament in 2002, a new UN operation was mandated which was known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). UNMISET

was launched to help East Timor in the time of its post-independence. UNMISET was being carried out with the mandate

> "to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; to provide interim law enforcement and public Security and to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service (ETPS); and contribute to the maintenance of the new country's external and internal security" (ibid.).

During the time of UNTAET and UNMISET, a number of UN peacekeeping missions were being carried out in East Timor (Stephens 2005:14). There is very limited transparency when it comes to these tasks performed by private contractors. However, there are plenty of examples of PMSCs mandated by the UN to operate in peace operations in East Timor.

The private company Performance Agility Experience (PAE) was assigned to help the UN with operating airfields in East Timor (PAE n.d.:5). PAE describes itself as a provider of mission services. This includes aviation, logistics, training, and national security solutions, among others (PAE 2015). Other examples of UN's use of PMSCs in peace operations in East Timor include a contract made with DynCorp to supply helicopter transport and satellite network communications (Østensen 2011:16). Defence Systems Limited (DSL) provided the UN with intelligence and logistical support (Østensen 2011:16;Bellamy & Williams 2004:191). DSL changed name to ArmorGroup in 1997, before being bought up by G4S in 2008. G4S describes ArmorGroup as a provider of defensive and protective security services (G4S 07.05.2008). Furthermore, the UN has used forces from different South African companies, like KZN Security, who was contracted to provide the UN with local intelligence (Singer 2003:183). KZN Security describes themselves as a provider of security services (KZN Security 2011).

In comparison with the other cases, the case of East Timor is a completely different issue as the civil-military relations are much more complex. This is because in this case the UN functions as the authority in the place of a sovereign state. The internal security is controlled by the UN which means that the UN's use of PMSCs cannot be said to threaten a sovereign state or even political stability, as there has been no such things in the wake of this conflict. However, the UN control of

the territory does not mean that there are no threats in regards to violating right. As pointed out by Richemond, there has been examples of UN staff not respecting human rights and there has even been incidents where UN staff has been involved in sexual violations and murder (Richemond 2007:11). This is a clear example of lack of supervision and control over its forces from the UN.

However, these incidents do not evidently relate to the PMSCs that has been contracted to support the UN, but they have played a part in helping to do the job. Generally, we have witnessed a change in the nature of the UN peacekeeping operations. A change towards so-called 'robust' peacekeeping operations has occurred, especially since the case of East Timor (Pingeot 2012:37). The UN has gone from peacekeeping operations which rested on principles of impartiality, consent, and exclusion of the use of force for anything else than self-defense to a more war-fighting approach. This shift was possible because the Security Council broadened the circumstances under which the UN forces were allowed to use force. In East Timor, the UN forces were mandated to use force "[…] for the "protection of civilians" and the maintenance of public order" (ibid.).

8.1. Civil-Military Relations and the UN

In regards to civil-military relations, the United Nations is a rather special case. The way that the UN is constituted allows for a constructing of a supra-national civil power composed of numerous national civil powers, taking into account the vast differences that exist between the multiple societies. This means that the civil-military relation, in the auspices of the UN, is somewhat arbitrary in the sense that it is consisting of a variety of versions. Additionally, the UN military forces are generally composed of troops from different nations, compiled under the UN to undertake a certain mission. This makes the military part, in the civil-military sense, unique to the mission it is supposed to complete, creating a 'new military' for each specific mission. The civil part, however, is more static. Even though it is quite debatable whether or not the UN actually constitutes a supra-national civil power, the way that the UN is constructed, one could argue, is enough to regard it as a civil society in regards to civil-military relation theory. If we take into account the two forces constructing the military, as presented by Samuel Huntington (1957), the functional imperative and the societal imperative, a civil power is evident within the UN - albeit perhaps a simple version. The constitution of the UN Charter, together with the titanic amount of UN treaties, documents, agreements, and resolutions, is what constitutes the civil in the auspices of the UN. All the obligations, normative rights, and guidelines that are required for a membership of

the UN make out the social norms that are the societal imperative in civil-military relations. The functional imperative, on the other hand, is the military missions that are meant to uphold and enforce the societal norms of the UN. Each mission is uniquely structured according to the purpose of the mission which leads to the creation of unique institutions to each mission. The civil-military relation in the auspices of the UN, then, becomes a relation between the mission-specific institutions and the societal imperative in the UN.

8.2. Types of Control

When returning to the three dimensions of control, functional, political, and social, we can see yet another set of differences compared to the two other cases in how these terms can be applied to the case. The unique way that the UN is put together and how it sets out to accomplish its missions makes for different approaches to the three types of control. As discussed in the section above, the civil-military relation in the UN is quite different from the other cases, as it is no one state that controls the military or makes out the civil part. It is, then, the unique configuration of each mission that defines the three dimensions of control.

In this case, the mission is one of state-building, making it difficult to relate any of the types of control to the state in question. Since East Timor did not achieve independence until 2002, and the following years were a time of state-building, there was no real government to reflect the types of control on. However, this case pertains to the UN and PMSCs role in carrying out UN missions. As such, when looking at the three types of control we need to look internally in the UN to see how these concepts pertain to the case. Even still, the functional control takes a different role than the one explained in chapter 2, as it cannot be said that the function of the UN forces in East Timor was to defend the country's interests through force. Rather, the military function was a question of keeping the peace. Thus, the functional control in this case pertains to the control over the PMSCs in accordance to the objective of the mission, and is a question of the UN controlling the PMSCs that they themselves have hired. As such, the UN has legal control over the hired PMSCs in form of their contract. Even though we have had no opportunity to review the actual contracts between the UN and the PMSCs, one could think that it would be possible for the UN to terminate the contracts if the PMSCs violate any of the UN regulations or international law. Though, as mentioned earlier in the case, there had been some cases of crimes committed by UN personnel in East Timor, which could lead to question the quality of the control that the UN impose on its personnel. But to extend that skepticism to PMSCs is a bit unwarranted, and the legal bindings in a business contract may even incite a more thorough control.

The political control, in this case, concerns the legislative decisions regarding the mission in East Timor. As previously mentioned, the UN shifted towards what is referred to as a robust peacekeeping operation which meant a shift in the rules regarding the use of force. In East Timor, this meant that a mandate to use force, in order to protect civilians and to upkeep the public order, was enacted. However, the examples of the use of PMSCs in the East Timor operation only apply to non-combat aspects of the operation, making the use of force rather irrelevant for the involved PMSCs. However, the East Timor operation was from 1999 to 2002 a matter of peacekeeping as well as acting as a temporary government, and shifted to state-building operation after 2002, which means that the PMSCs played an active role in the forming of the nation of East Timor. Hence, the PMSCs had to work under the normative ideals of the UN, found in their Charter, resolutions, and so on. The political control, thus, pertains to the mission's objective to create a stable political environment in order to build a nation.

The wish to create a stable and democratic nation in East Timor relates back to the societal imperative of the UN, which is also the foundation of the social control imposed on the parties involved in the operation. The social values and norms within the East Timor operation is easy to spot: they build on democracy and notions of human rights. Any company or other form of actor involved in the operation is, thus, being imposed by these values and norms in regards to how they perform their tasks. Again, the tasks carried out by PMSCs in the East Timor operation can be regarded as supportive tasks in the building of the state, and therefore, the contact with the local populous is rather limited. The social norms and values thus becomes of less importance for the involved PMSCs when performing their given tasks.

8.3. Change and Continuity

We now turn to the Bourdieu-inspired field analysis. Here we want to examine a possible changing doxa

Because the UN is a rather powerful authority, in regards to the functional and societal imperative of their military, it does not have to outsource violence. Because of UNs relative power, manifested through different forms of capital, it is a very powerful agent in the international security field. Because the UN is a supra-national authority, it does not make sense to talk of a state doxa. Rather we here speak of a supra-national doxa of the international security field. In this field, the UN is, as pointed out, a powerful player. It is so because its total volumes of legitimate forms of capital i.e. symbolic capital, surpasses most nation states (of which it is composed) and even other supra-

national bodies. This means, as shown in chapter 4.2., that the UN has great impact on the grand doxa – the doxa of the (Western) world and thereby it has great power to affect the doxa of subordinate fields. This means that the UN, in the field of international security, stand for a strong orthodoxic praxis in terms of peacekeeping and nation-building, and therefore the PMSCs are very weak in comparison, when it comes to total volumes of legitimate capital. The PMSCs are thus a small threat to the UNs monopoly on symbolic power.

The PMSCs do however challenge the UN's orthodoxy by simply advocating for the eligibility of their services. The UN has contracted these PMSCs and thus legitimized them, which gives them symbolic capital that inevitable gives them a taste of symbolic power. However, the part of the doxa that concerns the legitimacy of the capital of physical force is not being challenged by the PMSCs used in East Timor. This is crucial because the kind of power relinquished to the private agents is very limited as a result of this.

In the field of international security, the capital of physical force is valorized above most other forms of capital (although economic capital is always highly valorized), which means that by only outsourcing 'non-physical force-demanding' tasks, the UN more or less maintains its monopoly on symbolic power. However, there is slightly more to it. For example, the companies DSL and KZN Security has both been contracted by the UN to supply local intelligence, which means that they have the power of production of knowledge that affects the ways in which the UN staff interacts with the locals in accordance with local norms, culture, etc. In other words, the UN has legitimized these companies cultural capital. By doing this, these companies gain symbolic power because they gain the power over 'the principles of vision and division' (Bourdieu 1994:13), which is symbolic power in the sense that the PMSCs in charge of this intelligence can in theory define what is right and wrong, or even what is a target and what is not.

When assuming that the UN has made use of the provided intelligence, they legitimize the companies' cultural capital, as said before, and this gives them symbolic power, which is also the power to affect doxa. It affects the UN orthodoxy in the way that the UN previously only legitimized its own knowledge production, but now it has changed to accept intelligence reports from external sources.

The same is the case when PAE and DynCorp are providing the UN with logistical support such as helicopter transportation to the UN troops. The PMSCs economic (material resources) and cultural

capital (knowledge on operation of aircrafts etc.) is legitimized by the UN, legitimizing the role that these companies play in the state-building.

Because of the indirect nature of the PMSCs influence on the UNs praxis (the UN has to act and have the agency to do so freely – they are not bound to act according to the PMSC-provided intelligence) the symbolic power given to the PMSCs is not threatening the UNs authority.

8.4. Sub-conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the UN's use of PMSCs in East Timor. East Timor is a special case, as the country did not have a (sovereign) state, and the UN then stepped in as a supra-national entity, to establish a state. Therefore, the UN served as a substitute-sovereign in this period of instability. This also means that the UN holds symbolic power, and some sort of monopoly on violence in the area.

As mentioned in the chapter, the civil-military relations functions different in this case, compared to the other cases, insofar that the civil power in this case is constituted of the UN Charter, and the different agreements that the UN has entered into. From these comes social norms and values that the 'civil' must exert on the military institution of the UN. This military institution is also a different configuration than in our other cases, as each military for UN missions is formed for that specific mission. This does not fit in to the traditional idea of a state military institution, but instead becomes a supra-national military institution, which should be controlled by the civil power that is the UN Charter. Thus, the civil-military relations in this case should be seen as the relations between the UN as an institution, and the military that is formed for this specific mission.

As the UN is a different constellation than a normal sovereign state, or a private company, their control of force is also different. From what we have examined in the above section, the UN seems to have a tighter grip on the control of force than what we saw in Iraq, for example.

In terms of the doxic battles of this field, what is at stake is not the right to exercise violence in this case, as it has been in the other cases, but rather the right to challenge the way the UN operates. This means that what is being challenged, is the norms and practices of how the UN operates within a country, and the challengers of that orthodoxy in this case are the PMSCs, who have then succeed in making their resources, or forms of capital, legitimate. This, then, has changed the doxa to a more heterodoxic one, exemplifying that the PMSCs, in this case, possess symbolic power. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of capital and its strength in exercising symbolic power is making it difficult to

challenge the doxa of the UN, and the case of PMSCs in the East Timor operation is seemingly no exception. As such, the doxa of the UN is not necessarily being challenged by the rise of PMSCs, though, they are utilizing the new options that PMSCs bring with them regarding to carry out an operation like the one in East Timor. A major factor in this case, though, is the tasks the PMSCs carry out. The lack of use of force needed to carry out their given tasks, diminish the challenge PMSCs impose on the doxa of the UN.

9 Discussion

In the following section, we will combine the main points from each case-analysis, and discuss them in relation to our research question.

To discuss the second part of the question, we are going to incorporate ideas of norm change, based on the definitions presented in chapter 3 as part of the theoretical framework. We will then discuss these findings in terms of the possible consequences of change in territory, authority and rights. Furthermore, a combination of Finnemore & Sikkink's terms and Sassen's concepts leads to a discussion on states' new role in a normative perspective on monopoly on violence. Where Sassen would argue that a new ordering could coexist with existing orderings, Finnemore and Sikkink seem to suggest that a replacement of norms is happening. However, they both agree that a consequence of such change will have a great impact on civil-military relations, creating a more complex configuration of the civil, military, and corporate.

Common for all three case-analyses, is that they all take place in the post Cold War period, within *weak* states experiencing high levels of conflict and insecurity. In Nigeria, the state has very little control over the unrest in the country, creating a void in the security, which the PMSCs then fill. In Iraq, the US invasion brought with it a removal of the existing polity, creating a territory within which the PMSCs can operate only with oversight from the American state. In East Timor, the country did not have a state before the UN mission came to build one, or at least not one that was recognized by the UN. Another common trait of all three cases is that multiple PMSCs operate in these conflict zones, which have all been hired by outside entities, be it foreign private companies, an invading state or an international organization. These entities all seem to have some degree of interest in the conflicted territory, be it economical, cultural-political, humanitarian, or a mixture.

Despite these commonalities, each case differs significantly from one another in terms of how symbolic capital is obtained. In the private case, the Nigerian state is weak on all forms of capital – also the capital of physical force, which is the kind of circumstances where PMSCs seem to thrive under. This also entails that PMSCs have the potential to accumulate more symbolic power, and that way become more powerful than the Nigerian state, which one could argue has already happened. This means that the Nigerian state loses its symbolic monopoly on violence, by outsourcing security tasks to PMSCs. In the state case, the US also outsources violence to PMSCs, but because the US is a strong state, this has a different effect on the US' monopoly on violence and

symbolic power, where one could argue that the US can afford to outsource parts of this monopoly, as it has a very high degree of symbolic capital. In the international case there was no sovereign state that the UN could challenge when it went into East Timor, so the outsourcing of violence is from the UN, as a supra-sovereign, to the PMSCs it employed to assist UN troops. Because the UN has a high level of symbolic capital, its authority is not affected to the same degree as with states within the international financial system. Another important aspect is that the UN (in this case) only uses PMSCs for non-violent assignments, such as logistics, and therefore does not outsource violence in the traditional sense. The aspect of maintaining physical force is essential in holding on to symbolic power.

In regards to the first part of our research question, we see that in each case, there are differences in how and why civil-military relations are affected. In the private case, the Nigerian state, being a weak state, has had to outsource its monopoly on violence in order to keep companies in the country, which then has created a link between holders of economic capital and rights. Contrary, in the state case, we see how the American state, a strong state, has chosen to outsource its monopoly on violence, in line with its neoliberal agenda, and has in some terms shown to improve the military's functional imperative. These two cases showcase the difference of whether the state outsourcing its monopoly on violence is a weak or strong state, and whether the outsourcing comes as a result of willingness or of necessity. In the case of the UN, the outsourcing has not been of specifically monopoly on violence, and thus the doxa of the UN has not been challenged in the same way by PMSCs. In combination with the fact that the UN also is a strong actor, which can choose whether to outsource its monopoly on violence, the UN holds a strong position in a doxic battle with the PMSCs, whereas the Nigerian state is forced to accept the heterodoxy of the PMSCs.

With these main points in mind, we move on to discuss whether there has been a norm change, especially with focus on a neoliberal (doxic) development towards a global privatization of security. For this discussion, we return to Finnemore and Sikkinks definitions of norm change presented in chapter 3, with a focus on three essential levels: emergence, cascade, and internalization.

We see international and domestic norms as interrelated, so if a norm changes on one level, it affects the other. This idea also relates to Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power and the relationship between total volume of accumulated capital and doxic impact (see 4.2.), a phenomenon we have called doxic spillover-effect. Furthermore, this idea can also be linked to

Sassen, because she argues that globalization are interrelated at all levels, ranging from global to local. Still, the state plays a central role in the shaping of globalization since the state facilitates the transition from local to global. Thus, the state becomes the central agent when it comes to the spreading of new orderings. This makes sense as symbolic capital always leads back to the state, and thus without a state you cannot have symbolic power etc.

We look at regulative norms, which order and restrict behavior, and can be seen as a further development of the Bourdieusian concept of doxa and the doxic battles. These might lead to norm change, in the form of a shift in power and authority. One might argue that the states monopoly on violence, as part of its sovereignty, is a regulative norm, emphasizing how the use of force is bound to the state alone. However, Sassen argues that the emergence of new orderings does not necessarily replace existing orderings, but definitely creates normative challenges to existing orderings. When we compare the terminology of Sassen and norm change-theory, we do realize that there is a theoretical difference between 'orderings' and 'norms'. 'Orderings' can exist in multiplicity whereas 'norms', in its own sense of the word, cannot.

When applying the three stages of norm change (norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization) (see chapter 3.3) to the three case analyses, one must first identify a *norm emergence,* which common for all three cases can be related back to the rise of neoliberalism, with an emphasis on privatization of public goods since the end of the Cold War. This rise of neoliberal values is associated with the Western world, and especially the US, which then can be seen as a *norm entrepreneur* in this area. The US has, because of their dominant position within the field of international security and politics, succeeded in propagating its neoliberal doxa and is highly capable of making weak states submit to this doxa, which in the case of Nigeria is what the PMSCs fight for in the doxic battle (see also Lerner & Coleman 1968:387).

According to Krahman, norms are always in the process of being (re)defined by norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). When it comes to international security norms, these 'first movers' have been powerful states or actors that have lead the way for others to follow, like the US and the UN. The norm entrepreneurs' need symbolic power through symbolic capital, which both the US and the UN has a high level of.

One way, in which it can be argued that the US has acted as a norm entrepreneur, is the way it has created and promoted the neoliberal norm of privatizing security. The US' first-mover history in

terms of establishing, employing and promoting PMSCs externally by using these in especially Iraq as presented in the state case, is what makes the US norm entrepreneurs, in terms of being one of the strongest promoters of the use of PMSCs. This has also helped legitimize the use of PMSCs, due to the US' high status in the international society. In the private case, one can see how this tendency in privatization of security, has spread to other Western based companies, such as Shell, which employs primarily UK based PMSCs for security operations in Nigeria. This shows that the US has succeeded in 'socializing' other states into promoting the new norm. This statement is also confirmed by the state case, which shows how the US uses PMSCs in Iraq, which is a war fought by the Coalition of the Willing, meaning that many other states are involved in the insurgency of Iraq, and therefore intentionally or unintentionally approves of, and even uses, PMSCs, through alignment with the US.

In the international case, the UN (as a supra body of states), also acts as a promoter of this *norm emergence* as well as *norm entrepreneur*, as it employs PMSCs in its UN-peace keeping mission in East Timor. Despite the fact that they were primarily used for non-violent tasks, the UN still validates the role of PMSCs in international security. Because the UN consist of many member states, utilizing PMSCs in UN missions automatically makes all the UN members states norm 'bandwagoners', because what the UN does can be seen as an expression of their collective will. It can be said that the UN deploys the US doxa, which makes the member states forced into doxic submission.

The last criteria in norm change are *norm internalization*, which happens when the heterodoxic norm that challenges the orthodoxic norm triumphs and a doxic submission occurs. In this case the states' monopoly on violence submits to the neoliberal privatization of security. One could argue that such a global doxic submission is in the making, as the US, through their dominant position, has succeeded in establishing their neoliberal doxa as the orthodoxy.

To address the third part of our research question, regarding the consequences of it all, we will look closer at Sassen's theory as described in 3.2, and as well as in 4.2. The introduction of PMSCs in the global world of security seemingly has had an impact on the configuration of the public-private relation, and also on the civil-military relations. The impact can be measured on different levels, which is exemplified through our three cases. At the private level, the introduction of PMSCs has led to a shift in the balance of legitimate capital in the relation between the public and private. Furthermore, the fact that the Nigerian state cannot provide sufficient security, or even maintain a

sovereign authority, in some parts of the country tells us that the state is weak in terms of symbolic power. And when the international companies described in the private case demanded the provision of security in return of economic capital, the state accepted an outsourcing of its executive branch in form of acceptance of PMSCs. Thus, the fact that the private (and foreign) companies hold more economic capital facilitates an emergence of a new ordering in the Nigerian security sector. This new ordering challenges the old configuration of civil-military relations within Nigeria, though does not replace it. As discussed in 4.2, an outsourcing of the executive branch within a weak state (a weak legislative branch) not only reconfigures the civil-military relation but also alters the relation between authority and rights. This happens by creating a greater distance between the citizens and the executive branch of the government, formed by privatization of security. In the Nigerian case, this means that security suddenly becomes enhanced, and maybe even exclusive, for those who possess economic capital. Thusly, rights of the Nigerian citizens are changed as a new security order within the country is challenging the older ordering of security as a public good.

Weak state is not a connotation that you can apply to neither the United States nor the United Nations in the two other cases. However, as previously mentioned, we regard both as a form of norm-entrepreneurs which in turn also has had consequences for their respective civil-military relations. When we look at the US case, we see an example on the three aspects of globalization, in accordance with the theory outlined in 3.2. First, a disassembly of the state, enabled by the neoliberal agenda, has transferred parts of the tasks previously thought of as exclusive of the state to the private, in form of outsourcing of parts of the military to private companies. Second, the development of capacities, which relates to developing the private actors to become globalized, was facilitated by the war in Iraq, where the US found itself in a need of an infusion of troops without angering an already pessimistic public. Third, the reassembly created a new security field in which the use of PMSCs was accepted to carry out tasks on behalf of the military. The global norm change, that we argue has happened within the global security field, mirrors this reassembly. The UN case shows how the UN also helped this reassembly reach global proportions through their strength in symbolic capital.

As such, in terms of consequences, both the case of the US and the UN are quite different from the one in Nigeria. When talking about the United States, the reassembly of the security field has meant a reconfiguration of both public and private relations as well as civil-military relations, as the lines in both instances has been blurred. However, in contrast to the Nigerian case, the reconfiguration

happens on a national level and internally in the state-apparatus. Whilst the line between public and private has been blurred with a partly, and small, outsourcing of the executive branch that is the military, the authority still lies within the state as the PMSCs are incorporated into the US command structure, or at least that was the case in Iraq. This also pertains to the UN case. However, there is still created a greater distance between the citizens and the executive branch in terms of accountability, at least when it comes to PMSCs, which might have an influence on the rights of citizens. However, the American state holds a great deal of symbolic capital and as such is still holder of the monopoly on symbolic power, thus, there seems to be no real change in authority despite the outsourcing of violence. Therefore, the strength of the state seemingly has a great say in how the introduction of PMSCs have an influence on the consequence for the rights of citizens.

10 Conclusion

In this project we have answered the following research question:
How does the use of PMSCs influence the civil-military relations, and can this be seen as a global norm change in the state's monopoly on violence, and if so, what are the possible consequences of such changes?

Through our analysis of each of our cases, and based on our findings, we establish the argument that a global normative move towards privatization of security through outsourcing of the state's monopoly on violence has developed. Our three cases are used to build up this argument, based on different levels of securitization: private, state, and international. In terms of civil-military relations, we see how the control of force functions differently in the three cases, depending on the strength of the state.

We have found that weak states (with less symbolic power) are more heavily affected by normative changes, encouraged by strong actors such as the US and UN. We saw this in the first case, where a de-monopolization of symbolic power has begun, raising the question of who is in charge of the country's political affairs. Thus, these effects also influence the state's authority and the citizen's rights. In the second case, we saw how a strong state choosing to outsource their monopoly on violence had very different results. The doxic battle between the state and the PMSCs did not consist of a battle over symbolic power, but rather a 'battle' to balance the degree of privatization, so that the US could maintain a dominant position as the holder of monopoly on symbolic power, while following their neoliberal doxa of privatization. In the third case, we saw how the UN followed this same doxa, as well as how they, as a strong actor, were not affected in the same way as the Nigerian state, which was also linked to the fact that the UN did not outsource violence specifically.

Generally, it is this neoliberal doxa which is being spread globally, and which blurs the lines between public and private power. We see a general favoring of economic capital, which is then equal to power and political influence, meaning symbolic power (to shape the world).
But while this blurring does occur, the authority still lies with the state. We see this in how the PMSCs are incorporated into the command structure, like in the second case with the US. There is, however, a still greater distance between the citizens and the polity when it comes to accountability of the PMSCs, which might compromise the rights of citizens.

Conclusively, the strength of the state seems to play a large role in the reconfiguration of civil-military relations when PMSCs are introduced.

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