

## APPENDIX TWO

1 *Following is a transcript of President Obama's speech on U.S. drone and*  
2 *counterterror policy, as provided by the White House:*

3 PRESIDENT OBAMA: Good afternoon, everybody. Please be seated.

4 It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here, at Fort  
5 McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791 — standing guard in the  
6 earliest days of the Republic, and contemplating the future of warfare here in the  
7 21st century.

8 For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding  
9 documents that defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass  
10 through every type of change. Matters of war and peace are no different.  
11 Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our  
12 independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to  
13 our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War,  
14 battlefields have changed and technology has evolved. But our commitment to  
15 constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an  
16 end.

17 With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad,  
18 and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home. And for a moment, it  
19 seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then, on September 11,  
20 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as  
21 clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a  
22 different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the  
23 principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they  
24 could.

25 And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I  
26 won't review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al Qaeda out of  
27 Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this  
28 carried significant consequences for our fight against al Qaeda, our standing in the  
29 world, and — to this day — our interests in a vital region.

30 Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses — hardening targets, tightening  
31 transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of  
32 these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded  
33 surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our  
34 interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we

## APPENDIX TWO

35 compromised our basic values — by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and  
36 detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.

37 So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but we also sought to  
38 change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda's leadership. We ended the  
39 war in Iraq, and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy  
40 in Afghanistan, and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally  
41 banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our  
42 policies with the rule of law, and expanded our consultations with Congress.

43 Today, Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have  
44 been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure.  
45 Fewer of our troops are in harm's way, and over the next 19 months they will  
46 continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the  
47 world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.

48 Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi  
49 to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we have to recognize  
50 that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on  
51 9/11. With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask  
52 ourselves hard questions — about the nature of today's threats and how we should  
53 confront them.

54 And these questions matter to every American.

55 For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war,  
56 helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at  
57 home. Our servicemembers and their families have sacrificed far more on our  
58 behalf. Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have  
59 left a part of themselves on the battlefield, or brought the shadows of battle back  
60 home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions  
61 that we are making now will define the type of nation — and world — that we leave  
62 to our children.

63 So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle,  
64 or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison's warning that  
65 "No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Neither I,  
66 nor any President, can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the  
67 evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our  
68 open society. But what we can do — what we must do — is dismantle networks that

## APPENDIX TWO

69 pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold,  
70 all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define  
71 that strategy, we have to make decisions based not on fear, but on hard-earned  
72 wisdom. That begins with understanding the current threat that we face.

73 Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat.  
74 Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than  
75 plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They've  
76 not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.

77 Instead, what we've seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From  
78 Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with  
79 Al Qaeda's affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula — AQAP — the most active in plotting  
80 against our homeland. And while none of AQAP's efforts approach the scale of 9/11,  
81 they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on  
82 Christmas Day in 2009.

83 Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries  
84 like Libya and Syria. But here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases,  
85 we continue to confront state-sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in  
86 acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections  
87 of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are  
88 vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are  
89 focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that  
90 means we'll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil  
91 facility in Algeria, in which local operatives — perhaps in loose affiliation with  
92 regional networks — launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies,  
93 and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to  
94 fund their operations.

95 And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United  
96 States. Whether it's a shooter at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a  
97 building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in  
98 Oklahoma City, America has confronted many forms of violent extremism in our  
99 history. Deranged or alienated individuals — often U.S. citizens or legal residents —  
100 can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent  
101 jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort  
102 Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.

## APPENDIX TWO

103 So that's the current threat — lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to  
104 diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the  
105 future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously, and do all that we can  
106 to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale  
107 of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.

108 In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our  
109 Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on a  
110 Pan Am flight — Flight 103 — over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to  
111 terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and  
112 at our Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were all brutal; they were all deadly; and  
113 we learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly  
114 and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of  
115 9/11.

116 Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don't arise in a vacuum. Most,  
117 though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a common ideology — a belief  
118 by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West,  
119 and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit  
120 of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is  
121 not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims,  
122 who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks.

123 Nevertheless, this ideology persists, and in an age when ideas and images can travel  
124 the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can't depend on military or law  
125 enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a  
126 battle of ideas. So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a  
127 comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

128 First, we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces.

129 In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that  
130 country's security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to  
131 an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and  
132 sustain a counterterrorism force, which ensures that al Qaeda can never again  
133 establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.

134 Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless "global war on  
135 terror," but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific  
136 networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will

## APPENDIX TWO

137 involve partnerships with other countries. Already, thousands of Pakistani soldiers  
138 have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security  
139 forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition  
140 of African nations push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we're providing  
141 military aid to French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and  
142 help the people of Mali reclaim their future.

143 Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing  
144 of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. And that's how a Somali  
145 terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in a prison in New York. That's  
146 how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to  
147 the United Kingdom. That's how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us  
148 stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work.

149 But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists,  
150 sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain  
151 foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth. They take  
152 refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They  
153 train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.

154 In some of these places — such as parts of Somalia and Yemen — the state only has  
155 the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity  
156 or will to take action. And it's also not possible for America to simply deploy a team  
157 of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be  
158 possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local  
159 civilians — where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a  
160 firefight with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to  
161 us; times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international  
162 crisis.

163 To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot  
164 be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture,  
165 although that was our preference, was remote given the certainty that our folks  
166 would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with  
167 civilian casualties, or embroiled in an extended firefight, was a testament to the  
168 meticulous planning and professionalism of our Special Forces, but it also  
169 depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in  
170 Afghanistan.

171

## APPENDIX TWO

172 And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan — and the  
173 backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory  
174 — was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important  
175 partnership.

176 So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted  
177 action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely  
178 piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.

179 As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises  
180 profound questions — about who is targeted, and why; about civilian  
181 casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such  
182 strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and  
183 morality. So let me address these questions.

184 To begin with, our actions are effective. Don't take my word for it. In the  
185 intelligence gathered at bin Laden's compound, we found that he wrote,  
186 "We could lose the reserves to enemy's air strikes. We cannot fight air  
187 strikes with explosives." Other communications from al Qaeda operatives  
188 confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders,  
189 trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield.  
190 Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation,  
191 U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan.  
192 Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.

193 Moreover, America's actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a  
194 week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under  
195 domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war with al  
196 Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an  
197 organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if  
198 we did not stop them first. So this is a just war — a war waged  
199 proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.

200 And yet, as our fight enters a new phase, America's legitimate claim of self-  
201 defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is  
202 legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance.  
203 For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a  
204 world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power — or risk  
205 abusing it. And that's why, over the last four years, my administration has

## APPENDIX TWO

206 worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force  
207 against terrorists -- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and  
208 accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance that I  
209 signed yesterday.

210 In the Afghan war theater, we must — and will — continue to support our  
211 troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means  
212 we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also  
213 against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. But  
214 by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force  
215 protection, and the progress we've made against core al Qaeda will reduce  
216 the need for unmanned strikes.

217 Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated  
218 forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America  
219 does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual  
220 terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute.  
221 America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by  
222 consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.

223 America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against  
224 terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American  
225 people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively  
226 addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-  
227 certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard  
228 we can set.

229 Now, this last point is critical, because much of the criticism about drone  
230 strikes — both here at home and abroad — understandably centers on  
231 reports of civilian casualties. There's a wide gap between U.S. assessments  
232 of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard  
233 fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in  
234 every war. And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal  
235 construct can justify their loss. For me, and those in my chain of  
236 command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are  
237 haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout  
238 conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

239

## APPENDIX TWO

240 But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the  
241 alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more  
242 civilian casualties — not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also  
243 in the very places like Sana'a and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a  
244 foothold. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death  
245 toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian  
246 casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.

247 Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their  
248 territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of  
249 conventional military options. As I've already said, even small special operations  
250 carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than  
251 drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. And  
252 invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a  
253 torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to contain, result in large numbers  
254 of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict.

255 So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in  
256 civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results  
257 would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with  
258 local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that  
259 could easily escalate into new wars.

260 Yes, the conflict with al Qaeda, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by  
261 narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people  
262 they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the  
263 loss of innocent life.

264 Our efforts must be measured against the history of putting American troops in  
265 distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of  
266 civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and  
267 Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops,  
268 thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action nor  
269 waiting for attacks to occur offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole  
270 reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or  
271 security services — and indeed, have no functioning law.

272 Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign  
273 lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover,

## APPENDIX TWO

274 our laws constrain the power of the President even during wartime, and I have  
275 taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of  
276 drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up  
277 shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites.  
278 It can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for  
279 terrorism.

280 And for this reason, I've insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took  
281 office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan  
282 to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did  
283 Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes.  
284 Every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen  
285 — Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.

286 This week, I authorized the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three  
287 other Americans in drone strikes, to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue  
288 and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made. For the  
289 record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and  
290 kill any U.S. citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun — without due process, nor  
291 should any President deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.

292 But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively  
293 plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our partners  
294 are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should  
295 no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should  
296 be protected from a SWAT team.

297 That's who Anwar Awlaki was — he was continuously trying to kill people. He  
298 helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo  
299 planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk  
300 Abdulmutallab — the Christmas Day bomber — went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki  
301 hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video to  
302 be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane  
303 when it was over American soil. I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we  
304 captured him before he carried out a plot, but we couldn't. And as President, I  
305 would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him  
306 out.

## APPENDIX TWO

307 Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not  
308 present in other strikes — which is why my administration submitted information  
309 about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed, and  
310 briefed the Congress before this strike as well. But the high threshold that we've set  
311 for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of  
312 whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent  
313 dignity of every human life. Alongside the decision to put our men and women in  
314 uniform in harm's way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups —  
315 even against a sworn enemy of the United States — is the hardest thing I do as  
316 President. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the  
317 American people.

318 Going forward, I've asked my administration to review proposals to extend  
319 oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to  
320 Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For  
321 example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action  
322 has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises  
323 serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea  
324 that's been suggested — the establishment of an independent oversight board in the  
325 executive branch — avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of  
326 bureaucracy into national security decision-making, without inspiring additional  
327 public confidence in the process. But despite these challenges, I look forward to  
328 actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased  
329 oversight.

330 I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion  
331 we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy — because for all  
332 the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force  
333 everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that  
334 reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war — through drones or Special  
335 Forces or troop deployments — will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in  
336 troubling ways.

337 So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances  
338 and conflicts that feed extremism — from North Africa to South Asia. As we've  
339 learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be  
340 humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like  
341 poverty and sectarian hatred. Moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will

## APPENDIX TWO

342 undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values  
343 demand that we make the effort.

344 This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and  
345 Tunisia and Libya — because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will  
346 serve as a rebuke to violent extremists. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria,  
347 while isolating extremist elements — because the end of a tyrant must not give way  
348 to the tyranny of terrorism. We are actively working to promote peace between  
349 Israelis and Palestinians — because it is right and because such a peace could help  
350 reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies,  
351 upgrade education, and encourage entrepreneurship — because American  
352 leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people's hopes,  
353 and not simply their fears.

354 And success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will  
355 also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular  
356 expenditures that there is. That's true for Democrats and Republicans —  
357 I've seen the polling — even though it amounts to less than one percent of  
358 the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it's 25 percent, if you ask  
359 people on the streets. Less than one percent — still wildly unpopular. But  
360 foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our  
361 national security. And it's fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy  
362 to battle extremism.

363 Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting  
364 wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a  
365 month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces  
366 in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors,  
367 feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan, and creating  
368 reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize extremists. That has to be part of  
369 our strategy.

370 Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don't have diplomats  
371 serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have  
372 strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every  
373 recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found  
374 unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I've called on Congress to fully fund  
375 these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence,  
376 and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.

## APPENDIX TWO

377 But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats  
378 will remain. This is the price of being the world's most powerful nation,  
379 particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab World. And in  
380 balancing the trade-offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly  
381 believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the  
382 dangers that we face in the long run. And that's why we should be grateful  
383 to those diplomats who are willing to serve.

384 Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic  
385 engagement and assistance — through such a comprehensive strategy we  
386 can significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland  
387 and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against  
388 dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of  
389 terrorism from within our borders.

390 As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet  
391 increase its frequency and in some cases its lethality. Today, a person can  
392 consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda, and  
393 learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two  
394 years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with  
395 law enforcement.

396 And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists  
397 is to work with the Muslim American community — which has consistently  
398 rejected terrorism — to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law  
399 enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence. And these  
400 partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a  
401 fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American  
402 Muslims and our determination to guard against any encroachments on  
403 their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we're at war  
404 with Islam.

405 Thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because  
406 of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home.  
407 That's why, in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to  
408 strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and  
409 preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means  
410 reviewing the authorities of law enforcement, so we can intercept new

## APPENDIX TWO

411 types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent  
412 abuse.

413 That means that — even after Boston — we do not deport someone or throw  
414 somebody in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful  
415 constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such  
416 as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong Privacy and  
417 Civil Liberties Board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and  
418 our values may come into tension.

419 The Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent  
420 example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our  
421 security and our open society. As Commander-in-Chief, I believe we must keep  
422 information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do  
423 so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their  
424 commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for  
425 our democracy. That’s who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak  
426 investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government  
427 accountable.

428 Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on  
429 those who break the law. And that’s why I’ve called on Congress to pass a media  
430 shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with  
431 the Attorney General, who shares my concerns. So he has agreed to review existing  
432 Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters,  
433 and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of  
434 that review. And I’ve directed the Attorney General to report back to me by July  
435 12th.

436 Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact — in  
437 sometimes unintended ways — the openness and freedom on which our way of life  
438 depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing  
439 Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue  
440 to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.

441 The AUMF is now nearly 12 years old. The Afghan war is coming to an end. Core al  
442 Qaeda is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the  
443 years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will  
444 pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our

## APPENDIX TWO

445 definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don't need to fight, or  
446 continue to grant Presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed  
447 conflicts between nation states.

448 So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine,  
449 and ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to  
450 expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist  
451 organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That's what  
452 history advises. That's what our democracy demands.

453 And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects. I'm going  
454 to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States  
455 is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them.  
456 And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian  
457 court or a military commission.

458 During the past decade, the vast majority of those detained by our military were  
459 captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we  
460 ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the  
461 Afghans, as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law of  
462 war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists wherever  
463 we can.

464 The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at  
465 Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening GTMO — that detainees would  
466 not be able to challenge their detention — was found unconstitutional five years  
467 ago. In the meantime, GTMO has become a symbol around the world for an  
468 America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won't cooperate with us if they think a  
469 terrorist will end up at GTMO.

470 During a time of budget cuts, we spend \$150 million each year to imprison 166  
471 people — almost \$1 million per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates  
472 that we must spend another \$200 million to keep GTMO open at a time when we're  
473 cutting investments in education and research here at home, and when the  
474 Pentagon is struggling with sequester and budget cuts.

475 As President, I have tried to close GTMO. I transferred 67 detainees to other  
476 countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either  
477 transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in the United  
478 States.

## APPENDIX TWO

479 These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530  
480 detainees were transferred from GTMO with Congress's support. When I ran for  
481 President the first time, John McCain supported closing GTMO — this was a  
482 bipartisan issue. No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military  
483 prisons here in the United States — ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds of  
484 people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are  
485 more dangerous than most GTMO detainees. They're in our prisons.

486 And given my administration's relentless pursuit of al Qaeda's leadership, there is  
487 no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility  
488 that should have never have been opened. (Applause.)

489 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excuse me, President Obama —

490 MR. OBAMA: So — let me finish, ma'am. So today, once again —

491 AUDIENCE MEMBER: There are 102 people on a hunger strike. These are  
492 desperate people.

493 MR. OBAMA: I'm about to address it, ma'am, but you've got to let me speak. I'm  
494 about to address it.

495 AUDIENCE MEMBER: You're our Commander-In-Chief —

496 MR. OBAMA: Let me address it.

497 AUDIENCE MEMBER: — you an close Guantanamo Bay.

498 MR. OBAMA: Why don't you let me address it, ma'am.

499 AUDIENCE MEMBER: There's still prisoners —

500 MR. OBAMA: Why don't you sit down and I will tell you exactly what I'm going to  
501 do.

502 AUDIENCE MEMBER: That includes 57 Yemenis.

503 MR. OBAMA: Thank you, ma'am. Thank you. (Applause.) Ma'am, thank you. You  
504 should let me finish my sentence.

505 Today, I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers  
506 from GTMO. (Applause.)

## APPENDIX TWO

507 I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States  
508 where we can hold military commissions. I'm appointing a new senior envoy at the  
509 State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to  
510 achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries.

511 I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review them  
512 on a case-by-case basis. To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees  
513 who have been cleared to go to other countries.

514 AUDIENCE MEMBER: — prisoners already. Release them today.

515 MR. OBAMA: Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts  
516 and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available  
517 for every detainee.

518 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It needs to be —

519 THE PRESIDENT: Now, ma'am, let me finish. Let me finish, ma'am. Part of free  
520 speech is you being able to speak, but also, you listening and me being able to  
521 speak. (Applause.)

522 Now, even after we take these steps one issue will remain — just how to deal with  
523 those GTMO detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or  
524 attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against  
525 them has been compromised or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we  
526 commit to a process of closing GTMO, I am confident that this legacy problem can  
527 be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.

528 I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of  
529 our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future — 10  
530 years from now or 20 years from now — when the United States of America is still  
531 holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not  
532 part of our country. Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding  
533 detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I'm willing to cut the young lady  
534 who interrupted me some slack because it's worth being passionate about. Is this  
535 who we are? Is that something our Founders foresaw? Is that the America we want  
536 to leave our children? Our sense of justice is stronger than that.

537 We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk  
538 Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit; and Faisal Shahzad,

## APPENDIX TWO

539 who put a car bomb in Times Square. It's in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar  
540 Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon. Richard Reid, the shoe  
541 bomber, is, as we speak, serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here  
542 in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, "The way  
543 we treat you...is the measure of our own liberties."

544 AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about Abdulmutallab — locking up a 16-year-old — is  
545 that the way we treat a 16-year old? (Inaudible) — can you take the drones out of  
546 the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes killing people on the basis  
547 of suspicious activities?

548 MR. OBAMA: We're addressing that, ma'am.

549 AUDIENCE MEMBER: — thousands of Muslims that got killed — will you  
550 compensate the innocent families — that will make us safer here at home. I love my  
551 country. I love (inaudible) —

552 MR. OBAMA: I think that — and I'm going off script, as you might expect here.  
553 (Laughter and applause.) The voice of that woman is worth paying attention to.  
554 (Applause.) Obviously, I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviously  
555 she wasn't listening to me in much of what I said. But these are tough issues, and  
556 the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong.

557 When that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the  
558 American flag that flew in the courtroom. "That flag," he said, "will fly there long  
559 after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom."

560 So, America, we've faced down dangers far greater than al Qaeda. By staying true to  
561 the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have  
562 overcome slavery and Civil War and fascism and communism. In just these last few  
563 years as President, I've watched the American people bounce back from painful  
564 recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated  
565 Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the  
566 core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not  
567 come close to breaking us.

568 I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent  
569 of her body, who said, "That's my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I  
570 move on."

## APPENDIX TWO

571 I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car  
572 bomb as if nothing had happened.

573 I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the  
574 White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream  
575 big and never give up because it does pay off.”

576 I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives, and helping other vets to  
577 find jobs.

578 I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said, “Next  
579 year, you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something  
580 to be messed with.”

581 That’s who the American people are — determined, and not to be messed with. And  
582 now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit.

583 Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a  
584 battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in  
585 parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our shores; fans taking in  
586 a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street; a citizen shouting  
587 her concerns at a President.

588 The quiet determination; that strength of character and bond of fellowship; that  
589 refutation of fear — that is both our sword and our shield. And long after the  
590 current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the  
591 brutal despots, and deranged madmen, and ruthless demagogues who litter history  
592 — the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries to  
593 national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for  
594 freedom.

595 Thank you very, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of  
596 America.

597