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Beyond duality

Danes' views on Denmark and the European Union 2001

By Kim Christian Schröder and Søren Esben Hansen¹

(Note to readers: This article reports from the Danish part of a comparative study of national and supranational identity done in eight European countries, organized by Professor Richard Robyn, Kent State University, Ohio, USA. The findings from all eight studies will be reported in the book, Richard Robyn, ed., *The Changing Face of European Identity: An Eight-Nation Q Study of (Supra)National Attachments*, Lynne Rienner Publishers (in press). The studies attempt to explain how the European Union, as the most visible experiment in mass national identity change in the contemporary world, influences how Europeans think about their political affiliations.

Q Methodology is utilized as the basic approach for all of the studies, and will be presented in an introductory chapter as a way to overcome the traditional divide between quantitative and qualitative approaches to empirical social research. Together with the Appendices to this article the sections from page 8-11 provide glimpses into the mechanics of the Q-methodology as used in the study).

The relationship between Denmark and the rest of Europe has enjoyed a permanent prominent presence on the public agenda in Denmark for more than thirty years. And the issue has probably been more controversial than in most other countries.

This controversiality can largely be ascribed to the structure of our constitutional system, which requires that all issues to do with the giving up of national sovereignty must be decided by the people through a referendum. This constitutional practice has had the effect of polarizing the issue, as six consecutive referenda since 1972 have required the Danes to submit to the curse of duality that follows from perpetually having to decide for or against, first the question of entry into the then Common Market, later the successive stages towards the building of an economic and political European Union, with increased integration between the EU member countries (for referendum results, see below).

However, all the referenda have had a tendency – in spite of the specific economic and political measures to be voted on (such as the Maastricht Treaty, The Edinburgh Agreement, The Common Currency) – to develop into general votes of confidence for the EU project as a whole: whether we want our membership to continue at all. This perspective has been kept alive as a real possibility for many citizens, because Danish EU resistance, particularly at the right and left ends of the political spectrum, has succeeded in preserving a strong institutional platform, consisting of several well-organized popular movements across party-lines (The Popular Movement Against the EU, The June Movement), with an institutional

superstructure and the public visibility resulting from having elected members of the European Parliament. The existence of these party-like movements has further has the effect of also to some extent forcing the yes/no duality on to the agenda of European Parliament elections, with an ‘opponent block’ consisting of these two movements and the extreme right and left parties pitted against an ‘adherent block’ of more centrist political parties.

In a sense, Denmark has been the *enfant terrible* of the EU, both because the perennial referenda have caused a permanent uncertainty in the EU institution as a whole about the advancement of the integration process, and because the sometimes negative, sometimes positive outcomes of the referenda have imposed a stop/go effect on the more visionary, increasingly impatient supranationalists in the higher echelons of the EU system.

Moreover, the example of Denmark has served as a sometimes unwelcome reminder to the political leaders of other, ostensibly more pro-European countries that the EU resistance that is manifest in Denmark may well lie dormant in theirs! It therefore remains an urgent political question in several other countries just how much ‘noise’ it takes for this dormant segment of the population to wake up and develop into a not-so-silent majority of the electorate. It is perhaps in this light that one should see recent political developments in a number of European countries after 2000, sometimes labelled a swing to the right, which harbour increasingly nationalist, anti-multicultural voices that are generally concerned about, if not outright against, the consequences of the complex processes of globalization and migration. These developments are often, and not without warrant, equated with the parallel process of Europeanization.

The present study was conducted in Denmark just after a parliamentary election in November 2001 that caused a swing of the pendulum from a centre/left coalition government to a moderately rightwing coalition government, whose parliamentary majority depends on the support of a more extreme nationalist, anti-immigration, and anti-EU party.

Previous studies of national and European identity in Denmark

The changing Danish attitudes to EU membership and increased economic and political integration have been most conspicuously registered in the 6 referenda,

which have all (except for 1972) showed a division of opinion with only a slight deviation from a complete equilibrium of those in favour and those against.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>% For</i>	<i>% Against</i>
1972	EC membership	63.4	36.6
1986	The EC Package	56.2	43.8
1992	The Maastricht Treaty	49.3	50.7
1993	The Edinburgh Agreement	56.7	43.3
1998	The Amsterdam Treaty	55.1	44.9
2000	The European Currency	46.8	53.2

The Eurobarometer

Another monitoring device has been the continuous Eurobarometer polls that have followed EU sentiments in all member states each spring and autumn since 1973, polling the population aged fifteen years and over through national samples of one thousand in most countries. It is the declared aim of the Eurobarometer to provide “an overview of how European citizens feel about the European Union, its policies and institutions” (*Eurobarometer 56:1*).

The autumn 2001 poll was conducted in October-November 2001, i.e. one month after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and one week after the start of the war in Afghanistan. This is deemed to have had a significant effect on the views of European citizens on EU matters, and to “have substantially altered public opinion in many ways” (*Eurobarometer 56:1*), in the direction of more widespread public support for the EU and its institutions. For instance, in the EU as a whole 54% of the citizens now regard their country’s membership of the EU as a good thing (up 6 percentage points from the spring poll of the same year), and 53% trust the European Union (up 12 percentage points). This shift is something that should also be borne in mind when we proceed to the results of the Q-study below, the data for which were also collected in November 2001 – in other words, the Eurobarometer poll and the Q study have been carried out as snapshots of flux at a non-ordinary historical moment when increased existential anxiety may have led citizens in the direction of more hope and support for the kind of powerful agent that the EU can be perceived to be.

From the plethora of findings about Denmark in the Eurobarometer poll we have selected those which are most directly comparable to areas covered in the Q-study; in some cases the percentages do not add up to a hundred because ‘Don’t know’s’ are not shown:

European and national identity: 41% of the Danes see themselves as only Danes, 54% see themselves as first Danes, secondly as Europeans, while a mere 5% see themselves as primarily or only European.

National pride: 90% of the Danes feel very or fairly proud to be Danish, while 10% feel not very proud or not proud at all.

Pride in being European: 73% of the Danes feel very or fairly proud to be European, while 21% do not.

Support for EU membership: 62% regard Danish EU membership as a good thing, while 15% see it as a bad thing. Compared with the spring 2001 poll, the 62% are up from 49%, one of the probable effects of the events of September 11.

Benefit from EU membership: Similarly, showing an increase of 11 percentage points, 72% believe that Denmark has benefited from its EU membership, while 19% disagree.

Speed of European integration: Comparing people’s perception of the ‘current speed’ of the integration process with the ‘desired speed’, Denmark is one of only two EU countries where the current perceived speed is faster than the desired speed. In other words, on average Danes want the integration process to slow down.

Support for a European constitution: Denmark ranks lowest of the 15 member countries on the issue of whether a common constitution is desirable or necessary, with a support rate of 50% (as against support rates of 80% for Spain at the top and 76% for Sweden in third place).

Support for the Euro: As on the previous issue Denmark is at the bottom of the list, with 47% for (but 7 points up since the previous poll) and 48% against the adoption of the Euro.

Apart from the Eurobarometer studies, the Danish contribution to *The European Value Survey* has explored issues of national and European identity (in a fairly peripheral manner), with results that confirm the tendency of the Eurobarometer findings. On the issue of people's feeling of attachment to different geographical entities this survey finds that the attachment to one's local area is up from 47% in 1981 to 77% in 1999, whereas attachment to one's country is down from 36% to 20%, and EU attachment remains low with a decrease from 3% to 1% in the period (Gundelach 2002a:49). Commenting on these figures, Gundelach concludes that nothing appears to indicate that the project of creating a common European identity has been or will be successful in the foreseeable future.

The study finds a considerable increase in national pride, with an increase from 33% of Danish men in 1981 to 49% in 1999 who say they are 'very proud' to be Danish, the figures for women being almost identical (Gundelach 2002b).

A third kind of EU poll are those carried out at regular intervals by various newspapers and TV-stations in order to closely monitor developments in Danes' attitudes to specific EU issues and to questions to do with immigration and multiculturalism. As examples of the former, the Sunday newspaper *Søndagsavisen* asked people (February 2002) about their attitude to the repeal of the Danish 'exception' to the common EU defence policy, finding 56% Yes, 31% No, and 13% Don't Know. On immigration, the daily *Berlingske Tidende* found 65% agreeing and 29% disagreeing that "If the 'new Danes' got employment, the integration problems in Denmark would be insignificant" (March 2002).

These statistical measurements of opinions and values to do with nation and the EU are valuable indicators of public opinion, especially because they provide comparability when conducted at regular intervals over a long period of time. However, as Gundelach himself observes, "questionnaire-based studies of this kind provide a fairly superficial picture, but their strength lies in their representativeness" (Gundelach 2002b).

To this we may add the limited explanatory power of the survey approach, which originates in the fact that each question produces a statistical mapping of

opinion that remains an isolated fragment, one piece of a giant jigsaw puzzle whose pieces will collectively never be able to produce a meaningful picture, because the relationships between each opinion and concrete individuals, and the relationships between the ensemble of opinions held by different individuals, remains obscure as long as the researcher is constrained by the survey methodology. Qualitative methodologies constitute one way of complementing and providing depth to the “superficial” picture of survey findings.

Qualitative studies of national and European identity

The European Commission has itself initiated a qualitative study of European citizens' views on the EU, publishing the report *Perceptions of the European Union. A qualitative study of the public's attitudes to and expectations of the European Union in the 15 member states and in 9 candidate countries* in June 2001 (*Perceptions...* 2001).

The objective of the study was to identify and describe perceptions of the European Union, for instance for what reasons, and to what extent, people embrace the idea of the European Union, and what fears, reservations and objections they may have to the European project. Focus group discussions were carried out in all member and candidate countries, two in small countries, four in big countries. In the case of Denmark, two interviews were carried out in a major provincial city.

Generally the study found, as a background to people's perceptions of the EU, that many citizens in the European countries are pessimistic about the situation in their country and express concern about the future (p.3). On the theme of 'belonging' it was found that a stark contrast exists between 'the South' and 'the North', with the southern populations (i.e. all countries except the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) being strongly aware of the existence of cultural ties between people who may well be very diverse, but who nevertheless share common roots, and who may be an important oppositional force to the dominance of the USA on the world scene. Conversely, in the 'northern' countries, Denmark among them,

“the sense of common historical and cultural ties is much less present in people's minds (...). In these countries there is a deep-seated conviction of the superiority or specificity of the model of society that the country has

developed with its own values, and a weak propensity to share with others, who tend to be seen as a threat.” (*Perceptions* p. 5)

More specifically on the question of the role of the European Union, these countries (as represented by the four or two focus groups) do not favour the building of a strong, federal Europe, there is rather

“a strong distrust of the European Union and a desire to contain its scope for action. It can be seen, rationally and pragmatically, that belonging to the European Union is useful for the economic interests of the country (...), but in all other fields it appears to be more of a threat (...) any harmonization tends to be perceived as a downward harmonization, to the lowest common denominator, or as contrary to the interests of the country. It is these countries that have the most widespread caricatures of the Community being only concerned with pointless, absurd, even freedom-infringing measures (...) a perception of a sprawling, inefficient, spendthrift bureaucracy, and a general suspicion of the existence of illegal benefits and payments, and corruption” (*Perceptions* p. 8).

Interestingly, the study finds that “the citizens of the ‘North’” are “particularly resistant to enlargement (...) seeing almost exclusively negative effects for themselves; many of them are clearly impervious to considerations of solidarity beyond their own borders” (*Perceptions* p. 15). However, this finding is in strong opposition to the findings of the latest Eurobarometer, where the Danes come out in third place on the question of being for enlargement, 69% supporting the admission of new member states (*Eurobarometer 56:72*), and 79% holding the view that the EU should be open to countries wishing to join (*Eurobarometer 56:73*).

The strongly negative views about the EU found in this qualitative study can certainly be found in a ‘northern’ country like Denmark. However, it would seem that many nuances are lost when just two focus groups are taken as representatives of ‘the Danish view’, and when the economy of reporting the findings leads the analyst to generalize not just about each country in turn, but to pool together the wide-ranging views of four countries into one over-arching identity profile. As a (Danish) reader, who knows better than this mono-dimensional picture, it is tempting to conclude that the picture painted here is itself a caricature.

There is therefore a great need for a study in Denmark of national and European identity, which avoids the dual pitfalls of quantitative superficiality and qualitative over-generalization. The Q study reported below makes it possible to

probe into the diversity of opinions and perceptions within a country, while holding on the ambition of being able to discern distinct patterns of identity that together characterize the population of a country.

THE Q STUDY OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN DENMARK

The purpose of the q study is thus to look beyond the duality of ‘for or against’, through a hybrid research method that unites the best of the opinion poll and the qualitative depth interview. In the following, it is taken for granted that the reader is generally familiar with the foundations and procedures of the Q-methodological approach, from previous experience with the method, or from the presentation provided at the beginning of this book.

The statements

In the interviews, participants were handed 36 cards, one at a time, with statements spanning the continuum from nationalism, through national pluralism, to supra-nationalist sentiment in a proportional manner. Among the issues raised on the cards were those mentioned above in connection with the Eurobarometer – feeling European and/or Danish, national pride, the perceived benefits of EU membership, the speed of European integration – as well as several other issues relevant for one’s sense of identity: globalization, aspects of Danishness, sovereignty, the role of the Danish language, etc. (see Appendix 1). The statements from the French study (described in Chapter xx) were also used for the Danish study, due to the comparative ambition of the cross-national project. However, the translations were rarely verbatim, as we wanted all wordings to sound unequivocally Danish. In other words, we tried to reach a compromise between, on the one hand, comparability across the national studies, and linguistic genuineness and cultural affinity on the other.

In some cases the original statements presupposed knowledge of history and historical attitudes that were distinctively French (#15, #30) and had to be replanted in Danish soil. A couple of statements were found in a pilot interview with a low-educated participant to be close to obscure, due to their origin non-recent in academic treatises, and had to be colloquialized while preserving their political essence as

‘nationalist’ and ‘supra-nationalist’, respectively (#33, #35). We believe that this process of colloquialization of the statements, which was a guiding principle in the translation process, contributes significantly to the validity of the Danish study.

The respondents

The principle of diversity guided our recruiting of participants. Aiming for an equal representation of the genders, of high and low educational backgrounds, of young and older adults, and people with metropolitan and more provincial backgrounds, we were reasonably successful with respect to gender and urbanicity, less so with age and education:

Gender:	Female 16	Male 14
Urbanicity:	Metropolitan 16	Provincial 14
Education:	High 18	Low 12
Age:	20-30: 8	30-45: 15 45+: 7

Due to practical considerations we defined urbanicity as the distinction between participants living in central Copenhagen and those living in the provincial town of Roskilde, 35 kilometers west of Copenhagen. The more rural areas of Denmark were thus not represented in the study. Contrary to some of the other national studies in this book, we deliberately excluded participants who work for the EU and people with occupations in the world of humanistic or social science university scholarship. Our study thus tried to be as naturalistic as possible, recruiting participants who can all be classified as ‘ordinary people’.

The interviews

While we see q-methodology as inherently situated squarely between qualitative and quantitative approaches, our concrete implementation of q-methodology attempted to stretch it as far as possible in the qualitative direction while holding on to its quantitative potential. The interviews were constituted as a dialogical speech event, by having the interviewer read aloud each statement before handing it to the participant, who had been directed in the interview instruction to think aloud while negotiating its meaning and its proper place in the q-grid from most agree to most disagree. In many cases this negotiation lasted up to a minute or more, and involved a

dialogic exchange in which the participant tried to negotiate his/her position and the interviewer tried to assist the process through a facilitating and probing stance.

The preliminary placement of the card was often accompanied by the participant's explaining why the card was placed in a specific column, or why it was placed in a cross-column area for later precise placement. The interview tapes thus hold a plethora of brief explanations as well as lengthier reflections about the cultural and political issues articulated on the cards. The taped interviews can therefore be used much in the same way that re-interviews are sometimes used in q-analysis, i.e. to put flesh and blood on the skeleton delivered by the factor analysis, enabling us to offer our reader at the same time quantitative generalization and thick description of the verbalized cultural identities of the participants at the same time.

On the whole, participants felt that the puzzle-like character of the q-exercise was good fun. Some objected, understandably, that the q-grid, with its forced distributions of cards in the nine columns, was a strait-jacket that prevented them from representing their true attitudes to the various statements, as they would have liked to disagree or agree more strongly with certain statements, or to disagree or agree with more statements than the grid made possible. While this must be seen as a limitation of the study with respect to capturing the subjectively felt attitudes of the participants, on the other hand we agree with the Swedish study that "this forced technique actually shaped the respondents' arguments and they began to rethink their opinion, which also opened up for more informative reflections (Silander, Wallin and Bryder, in this volume). All participants acquiesced without further ado when it was explained to them that the factor analysis of the individual national study as well as the requirements of the cross-national comparison made compliance with the grid unavoidable.²

In the following, we present the findings from the factor analysis of the Danish participants' card placements, reflecting their own relational mapping of their cultural identities as Danes and Europeans at this point in time. We proceed by, first, briefly summarizing the four factors that each represents one grouping in Danish society on the issue of national and supra-national identity. We then go on to provide a detailed characterization of each grouping in turn, based both on their ranking of the statements, which expresses their cultural-political identity, and on the qualitative data from the taped interviews, enabling us to deepen our understanding of the subjective realities underlying the card placements. In other words, the factor analysis

has value in its own right, by producing a patterned representation of a discursive terrain characterized by ambivalences. But just as importantly, it functions also as a starting point and foundation for the deep description made possible by the qualitative reflections produced by the participants during the sorting task.

The 4 identity groupings in the Danish study

The factor analysis of the participants' card placements resulted in four factors significant at the .01 level. This means that the participants we used in our fieldwork formed into four groupings that are statistically significant, in reaction to the statements that they were given (Appendix 2). This reveals that there are at least four possible groupings in Danish society on these issues of national/supra-national identity. Although we constructed the set of participants to cast as wide a net as possible into Danish society, it is possible that we would have found more factors by enlarging it. As mentioned above, our sample of participants does not do full justice to the geographical variation between more and less urbanized areas of Denmark, and to some extent over-represents younger individuals with high education. On the other hand, the factor analysis enables us to say that there are no fewer than four groupings in the Danish population on the issue of national and supra-national identity.

We have decided to present and characterize further the four groupings under the following labels:

- the whole-hearted European (Factor 1)
- the pragmatic European (Factor 3)
- the Euro-sceptical Dane (Factor 2)
- the Danish Dane (Factor 4)

Although the four types appear at first sight to divide themselves neatly into two superordinate groups of 'Europeans' and 'Danes', we wish to stress at the outset that there is no indication in the interviews that there is a simple correlation between the 'Europeans' and the 'Danes' of this study and the Yes-sayers and No-sayers, respectively, of the EU referenda of recent years.

The thirty participants divide themselves between the groupings in the following manner: 13 whole-hearted Europeans, 11 pragmatic Europeans, 7 Euro-sceptical Danes, and 3 Danish Danes. It must be stressed that these proportions are not representative of the likely distribution of the four types among the Danish population at large. With a more representative sample, including more low-educated and older people, we would probably have approached a more equal distribution among the four types.

We did not systematically ask participants about their voting record in EU referenda, but many volunteered this information, enabling us to say with confidence that while the first and last groupings do seem to correspond to the duality of the referenda, the two middle groupings consist of people who voted either way, and who may already (i.e. approx. one year after the referendum) have regretted the way they voted. With all thirty participants, their cultural identity is the product of an ongoing signifying process full of ambivalences and contradictions, fluctuating along sections of the continuum from strong nationalism to strong globalism. Here is an example of a participant reflecting on her attitude to Denmark adopting the European currency:

“It’s also to some extent this feeling that Denmark should continue to be Denmark, and then something about, well, I somehow do think we should keep our own money, and I just see a kind of charm about, well, our monar..., well, the royal family and all that, but at the same time I sometimes waver a little bit, because obviously I do realize the advantages of it, but nevertheless I cast a clear no-vote last year, I didn’t hesitate for a second (...). But things are moving all the time, one has to open the door a little, I would say”. (23:040)

In spite of such ambivalences, however, we believe that it is possible to ‘freeze the picture’ and thereby hold each participant ‘accountable’ for an analytical positioning of their identity at a particular point in time, and also to claim a relative degree of permanence for this position. In the case of the participant just quoted, our analysis of the ensemble of her card placements and her spoken views clearly justifies a categorization of her under our label of ‘the Danish Dane’.

In the following characterization of the four factors we rely especially on the Top-6 and Bottom-6 of the respective informants’ ranking of the 36 statements that cover the discursive terrain of Danish and European cultural identity, i.e. those statements with which the informants most agreed and most disagreed. However we also include a consideration of other statements and their relative positionings,

because it is obviously the factor landscape as a whole that characterizes the identity of the group in question.

The whole-hearted European (Factor 1)

The thirteen informants who belong to this grouping share a very positive attitude to the EU, believing that in today's world one country cannot control its future on its own, and that on the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership (#6, #32). For instance, as one typical participant expresses it, we will have to join the European currency at some point, because

“we are so dependent on exports that we cannot afford to remain outside. (...) This is also related to the fact that if Denmark is to survive in Europe, then we must have a voice and we only get a voice in one way and that's by participating in it (27:250). (...) There is only so much that the Danish government can do, we have to be part of a stronger community in order to have a say” (27:810).

They envisage a future in which Danes must be bilingual in Danish and English (#33) in order to cope in a Europe characterized by diversity, as reflected in their agreement with the view that you can be a citizen of a united Europe without all Europeans having to be the same (#31) – “by God a united Europe would be boring if everybody was the same” (27:357). Similarly they don't see any problem with supporting both a united Europe and preserving Danishness at the same time (#34).

“Obviously when people start to feel more like Europeans this must work to supersede some of that Danishness. (...) But I don't know if our identity will become 'blurred', rather we will get a feeling of 'We live in Europe *and* we live in Denmark', instead of just 'We live in Denmark'. (...) In some areas we will begin to feel more like Europeans, but in other areas we will begin to feel more Danish” (27:375).

An important reason for their unequivocal EU support may be that a more integrated Europe will be able to better handle the sub-national problems that are conflictual in some countries (fx Corsica, the Basque provinces), believing that a united Europe is more capable of handling such differences (#36).

They distance themselves unequivocally from any vestige of nationalism. For instance, they disagree strongly that one's sense of belonging to one's country comes before anything else, and that nations constitute a natural entity (#7, #3):

“Card number 3 about ‘dividing the globe’s population naturally into nations each with its special characteristics’ – I don’t believe that. And relating this to Card number 7 about ‘your sense of belonging to your country coming before anything else’ – I don’t believe that at all” (11:136).

“I don’t feel any of that arch-Danishness, I probably feel more as a European than as a Dane, but I also feel more as a citizen of the world than as a European (27:353). (...) It is quite true that globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture, but then I don’t have anything against that” (27:107).

Similarly, on the personal level they disagree that their parents would object to their not marrying a Dane, and to the claim that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity (#9, #5). Nor would they feel personally insulted if someone said something negative about being Danish (#28).

They are quite critical of traditional manifestations of Danishness, finding, for instance, that Danes are often too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements (#30):

“One example is Denmark’s phenomenal achievements during the Second World War, strongly exaggerated. (...) If you consider the means we have at our disposal I think we’re doing alright. But we don’t have any reason to be excessively proud, because we’re accomplishing less than we could, (...) we have the resources to do more than we actually do” (27:184).

Along these lines they are hesitant about the view that Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world (#27). They are not prepared to strip themselves completely of their national allegiance and think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes, but on the other hand they agree that they do feel firmly connected to Europe as such (#12, #14).

They support further integration between the EU countries (#26), although they hold an agnostic position on the view that the integration process ought to proceed at a faster pace than has been the case until now (#21).

“In the longer term I support a fully integrated EU. (...) Perhaps it would be a bit too radical to say ‘Abolish the national borders’, but I really wouldn’t mind if that came to be. (...) I don’t hope that we will become The United States of Europe in my own lifetime because I simply find we’re not ready for that, this would mean moving much too fast, and then we have the situation where Mr and Mrs Hansen are left behind, and then we will have frictions of one kind or another. The process must be a slow and deliberate one, finding its own pace.” (27:820)

Altogether these thirteen informants embrace the prospect of further European integration, and a diminishing role for Danishness, as ‘whole-hearted Europeans’.

The pragmatic European (Factor 3)

Eleven of the 30 informants are categorized as pragmatic Europeans, a label chosen because they appear to see Europeanization essentially as an inevitable process, which they regard with caution but not without awareness of its benefits – for Denmark. In the words of a typical member of this grouping,

“I should think that we have... benefited from being in. I think that when the times are bad, then there will be some support of Denmark. In good times we don’t need any assistance, but in bad times then the other countries would... For instance Sweden, when their economy has been under pressure <i.e. before they joined the EU> they were left to their own devices, their krone are lower than the Danish krone, so I should think that we have benefited.” (29:135)

They believe that – irrespective of the no- majority in the 2000 referendum about the common currency - one day it will “become necessary” for Denmark to join the Euro (#8).

“I voted for the Euro (...). I am not one hundred per cent aware of exactly what it entails, but it is more, well, I mean we will get the Euro no matter what. In say two years when people come here wanting to pay with Euros then we cannot say ‘Sorry, we only accept Danish money’, that’s a joke, so there’s really nothing to discuss here.” (29:070)

They see increased Europeanization not as the product of a supranationalist vision, but as a consequence of the mere passing of time, whereby national differences will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grow up (#23). They find that integration

between the EU countries has not gone as far as it possibly can (#26), but on the other hand, as the other three groupings, they resist the idea that the process should be accelerated (#21).

As we interpret this group's cultural identity with respect to the EU ideal of 'unity in diversity', they appear to embrace the 'diversity' aspect more emphatically than the whole-hearted Europeans, as they agree that Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark, France be France, England be England, each with its customs, traditions and identity (#19):

“Obviously Europe should become as interconnected as...but still in such a way that you have the different countries each by itself, so that for instance in the field of transport Europe should be linked together as much as possible (...) but still <American and Japanese tourists> should come to Denmark in order to experience something Danish, and then Italy that's something entirely different.” (29:225)

They disagree that the European Union has meant a homogenisation of the cultures of Europe (#20, also #31), and in contrast to the Euro-Sceptical Danes they don't believe that Europe is headed for superpower status (#16):

“I don't think so! Of course you never know, but I don't think that the countries will accept having some kind of president of the EU in the foreseeable future, I don't think so. (...) The current leader cannot suddenly say, 'Now Europe is going to war!' he doesn't have the power to do that. (...) It will continue to be each country to itself in this respect. A superpower would be like the USA, where he can just say, Bush I mean, 'Send the troops!' and likewise in a lot of other areas. (...) And that's because the countries are so special somehow, each in itself.” (29:332)

They see this diversity as being compatible with cooperative efficiency, disagreeing with the view that the European countries are so different that the European Union will never be able to function properly (#22).

The pragmatic Europeans are firmly rooted in their Danish identity, disagreeing emphatically that they could ever think of themselves as first Europeans, then Danes (#12): “I definitely think of myself as a Dane” (21:050). But compared with the Euro-Sceptical Danes, they feel considerably more connected to Europe (#14), and they are more neutral on the view that aliens in Denmark dilute our

national identity (#5), accepting that in an increasingly globalized world some measure of identity change is inevitable:

“It is clear that Denmark and all other countries will change a little when all these other cultures are coming in, look at England for example, they’re just ten or twenty years ahead of us and if you’re walking around in London you see all these ethnicities, but then they have also had their problems with it. But I don’t feel that they ‘dilute’ it, but on the other hand we have to hold on to it ourselves, and in the longer term all countries *will* become more and more international. No, I don’t feel that they dilute our culture, I don’t think they do.” (29:402)

They show no hesitation in agreeing that Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world (#27), and deny that Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements (#30).

The pragmatic stance of this group towards the EU is also evident in their expressed ambivalence that while overall the EU will serve Denmark as a force for good (#10), on the other hand they are rather neutral on the claim that on the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership (#32). Thus they come out as a bit reluctant supporters of increased EU cooperation, on condition that our national identity is not jeopardized.

The Euro-sceptical Dane (Factor 2)

The seven informants in this category can be characterized through their strong and paradoxical attitudes to the future status of the Danish language in Europe. On the one hand the Euro-sceptical Danes believe that Danes must open up to the rest of Europe and acquire English as a lingua franca that will enable them to communicate across borders (#33).

On the other hand, however, they demand respect for our national language by requiring that in the future all EU documents should continue to be translated into Danish (#35). The paradox is indexical of a general ambivalence in the cultural and political identity of this grouping.

Most support is expressed for the need to maintain Danish values in an increasingly Americanized world (#18), not least with respect to language and the media:

“I believe we have started to Americanize our language far too much. (...) In situations when there is absolutely no need for it there is a tendency for us to use more and more English words and that annoys me (...) they do this even in Parliament, and what the hell’s that supposed to mean! But the Queen hasn’t started, she speaks Danish” (30:378).

“And I really think that all that shit on TV... there I really agree with Statement number 18 that Danish and European values should be an alternative to American ones. Because the American programs have a presence that is not at all justified by its quality” (7:017).

The accusation of cultural homogenisation is also levelled against the EU, as a strong point of disapproval (#20). But on the other hand, as a warning against national self-aggrandizement, while we need to preserve our Danish values, we should not delude ourselves about our historical achievements (#30):

“(...) since we are such a small country we’re *so* proud of the things we *have* done, and it’s not until you get things turned around a little that you... For instance, until I read a bit more about the Vikings I thought, ‘what a bunch of marvellous guys!’ But then when I was in England the guide told us how the Vikings besieged the town, raped the women, killed the men, and took the children as slaves! Then I thought, oh is that what they did! That’s not a reason to proud, is it!” (30:189).

On the issues that specifically touch on relations between Denmark and the EU, Danish sovereignty should be maintained at all costs (#17):

“Well, I think we have some national values that may easily drown if we’re drawn into... like some northern French province, you know. Then we would just be – and don’t get me wrong politically on this – a second-rate nation under some kind of centralized government from Luxemburg or Brussels and so on and so on. That’s where I think that we do have so many values, which means that we must have a sovereign state” (7:153).

The sceptical stance to the European project may also have to do with a fundamental lack of clarity about what the ‘European future’ may have in store. Reflecting on her no vote in the latest referendum (about the European currency, fall 2000) one participant says, “For me it was very difficult to distinguish between what a yes and a no vote would entail, and then because on the whole I’ve been against the EU, then I

thought that I was just not going to say yes to it when I was I doubt about its implications” (30:155).

One of the typical members of this group prefaces her response to the question whether Denmark on the whole has benefited from its membership of the EU (#32) with a fifteen second silence, ended by the declaration that “this is a difficult one”. She explains her hesitation by referring to the tendency for relations between the EU and member countries to be characterized by inconsistency and double standards:

“Well, I’ll readily admit that I’ve voted no to the EU all along, especially because later it has turned out that all the talk about everything having to be homogenized, everything having to be the same, ... but you see I pay three times as much for a car than a German does, where’s the logic in that? But at the same time, in the area of agriculture things must be identical, there they don’t differentiate, it’s as if, you know, everybody has to be equal but some are more equal than others (...).

(Interviewer: Then you seem to tend towards disagreeing with this statement (#32)?)

Well, yes, I, I, I believe, I don’t, no, no, but at the same time I’m also in doubt, but you want it to be *my* opinion, don’t you?” (30:48)

It is clear from everything else she says that she’s not in favour of the EU’s homogenizing efforts. What she’s pointing out here is merely that in an area where *she* would have benefited from such homogenisation, i.e. in the area of car prices, the EU apparently serves other interests, not hers. Along similar lines, the general verdict of another sceptic on Danish benefits from EU membership is a cool lukewarm, characterized linguistically by reverse negatives rather than by (un)conditional positives:

“If you look at the statistics, then you have to say that *Denmark has at least not been the great loser* in EU affairs. But you have to graduate what you think are the good things about the EU, but economically and in other ways, then I do think that we have had *some benefits* from it (emphases added) (7:026).

The grouping’s emphasis on national sovereignty should not be confused with isolationism and self-sufficiency. Several participants (and some in the other groups) revive the lost prospect of a union between the Nordic countries, which was the subject of serious negotiations between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1960s:

It was stupid that we didn't form a common Scandinavia instead, like if we'd said, we have a little group of countries up here, which could also be a part of Europe, but I think we would have achieved more by forming a common Scandinavia, a sort of Nordic EU or something. (...) In relation to the EU, I think we'd have had a better deal, with Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroes, we should have strengthened our cooperation there rather than with the EU. We're so small we just drown, I feel like we're this little pug dog who's always biting the big ones in their trousers, and they just go (waves her hand dismissively) 'Stop that, will you!'" (30:59)

These participants also think that the European countries are so different that the European Union will never come to function properly (#22). At least they do not hope so, since for them what the EU project is all about is the creation of a European superpower (#16). Therefore, they disagree strongly with the view that European integration ought to move faster than it already does (#21):

Well, that's because you have to think through properly what the consequences are of the different decisions you take. I mean if you suddenly make some Romano Prodi <Chairman of the European Commission> solutions where everything is forced down over people's heads, then... a lot of dissatisfaction will arise in many places, and that will have a reverse effect in my opinion" (7:084).

At the personal level of cultural identity these informants do not automatically identify with all things Danish, for instance they distance themselves clearly from the view that they would feel personally insulted if someone said something negative about being Danish (#28). Nor do they feel at all that our national culture is endangered by other cultural species entering the country (#5), and they don't see why parents should have a problem with their offspring marrying non-Danes (#9):

"I think it's okay to say that you're proud to be Danish, because it would be a bit pitiful if you couldn't say that, wouldn't it, but on the other hand I just won't be like those who say 'Denmark for the Danes', you see, there is a clear difference there, I am not so afraid of the aliens, I happen to believe that the aliens who have come here have enriched our culture, but I think that some of the fear is due to lack of knowledge, people don't understand that the Moslem living around the corner he is not dangerous for me just because he prays to whoever he prays to, and I go to church." (30:613)

Least support is expressed in this group for the apparently preposterous idea that they should think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes (#12). In this respect the

Euro-sceptical Dane responds just like the Pragmatic European. On feeling attached to Europe as such (#14) they express considerably more distance than this group, but less distance than the Danish Danes.

Altogether, therefore, they can be described as firmly rooted in Danish national culture, sceptical towards the idea of European integration, but open-minded about the receptiveness of Danish culture towards other cultures.

The Danish Dane (Factor 4)

The staunch Danishness of this grouping, consisting of three participants, is evident in the fact that four of the Top-6 statements, and eight of the Top-14, have a distinctive nationalist orientation. As one typical participant expresses it, “I do feel very strongly that I am Danish” (23:003) and “I *am* actually quite proud to be Danish, I really am” (23:093).

Their strong national identity is composed on the one hand of an abstract political conviction that national sovereignty and independence comes before anything else (#17). On the other hand they express a personal, deep-felt Danishness in everyday life contexts, as seen in their strong agreement that should they choose an intercultural marriage, this would be met with parental disapproval:

“Well, I don’t think they would stand up for... a Turk or... I do think they could accept, well, a... European or a Frenchman or thereabouts... but not any further out. That’s where this old girl may be getting just a little bit racist” (1:149).

They also believe that the Danish language must prevail as a lasting presence in EU proceedings (#9, #35) – “if there’s one thing that really matters to me, that is that we keep our own language” (23:228).

One’s Danishness lies in one’s blood, so to speak (#9, #5, #28), but in spite of this, they do not see belonging to one’s country as coming before anything else (#7). The interview transcripts do not enable us to explain this, as these participants are on the whole fairly taciturn³; drawing on comments made to this statement by the members of the other groupings, the most likely explanation is that attachment to one’s family is rated more highly than attachment to nation.

The Danish Danes feel a strong attachment to Denmark's historical past (#15) and believe that our historically inherited values are under threat, not only from the EU, as an almost unstoppable Europeanization process (#26), but also from the overall globalization process and from the immigration of increasing numbers of aliens to Denmark (#4, #5).

Like the Euro-sceptical Danes they express a moderate optimism that Denmark will never have to abandon its age-old national currency (#8):

"I'm against the Euro. I am so fond of our little "Danes' Crown". It would annoy me if we were to lose it, so therefore I don't want the Euro in, that's why it had to go" (1:046).

But they have no great faith that these plans can be averted, as they appear to view the external encroachments from a position of fatalism and impotence, having no great confidence in the ability of the Danish government to deal with the challenges of globalization, and being on the whole pessimistic about Denmark's ability to assert itself in economic and technological affairs worldwide (#11, #2). Nor do they think that Denmark should assert itself in the world:

"We are such a small country, and I somehow believe we should mind our own business, so I am a bit ambivalent about all these things.

(Interviewer) So you don't think we should stick our nose out more than we already do?)

No, I'm sure that will only lead to a lot of trouble, if we get involved in too many things.

(Interviewer: What are you thinking of?)

Well, all those wars and all that, (...) I think eventually it will hurt 'little us', and then we'll simply be..., how can you say this, then there won't be anything called Denmark any more, that's the kind of thing I'm afraid of" (23:072).

Their resistance to Europeanization is due to their belief that its hidden agenda is really about creating a new super-power (#16), which will make the EU more likely to interfere, against the principle of subsidiarity, in affairs that should properly be dealt with at the national level (#34, #19), thus undermining the Danish democracy: "That's where I get afraid that in the long run people in our little country will have to ask Brussels for permission to breathe – I know this is a bit exaggerated okay? – and I don't want it to be like that, you see" (1:0121).

With respect to the explicit expression of cultural allegiance they agree with the Euro-sceptical Danes that the very idea of perceiving oneself as first a European then a Dane is preposterous, and they are more dismissive of the suggestion that they should feel closely connected to Europe as such (#12, #14).

The Danish Danes have several points in common with the Euro-sceptical Danes, both groups expressing strong agreement with statements 17, 19, and 35, and strong disagreement with statement 12, that is on issues that deal explicitly with national sovereignty and identity. Where they differ is especially on the attitudes to cultural ‘others’ and the degree of personal attachment to national values, as expressed in statements 5, 9 and 28, where the Danish Danes are more easily insulted in their national pride and considerably less inclined to accept cultural innovation. This is how one participant comments on the claim that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity:

I can only agree strongly on that one (...) there are so many things in connection with jobs and women’s scarves, and all those traditions, as a matter of fact I believe we have to tolerate too much, actually. I can tell how the old people <i.e. in the old people’s home where she works>, when they see someone with a scarf it’s really hard on them, and personally I also think it is a little difficult when you’re shopping in Ikea or another store and they sit there <at the cash register> with their scarves, but that’s just my attitude, you see. (23:153)

For this participant, her deep-felt, instinctive reaction to Islamic scarves is unaffected by her positive impression of ‘these women’ as colleagues: “Well, those I have worked with have been incredibly good and very nice, there’s nothing with them at all, so it’s only my first impulse, but the old people don’t like it.”

Also when compared with the Euro-sceptical Danes, the fatalism of the Danish Danes is considerably more pronounced (#11, #2), as they seem to have little confidence that their defensive stance is likely to prevail against the overwhelming external forces in the long run. One could tentatively label this group as ‘culturally cornered’, as they seem to have no viable alternatives to choose between for the future itinerary of the national cultural values they feel so very attached to.

REFLECTIONS

The most significant contribution of this study to the ongoing portrayal of the national and European identities of Danish citizens lies in the complexification of the otherwise polarized picture of Danish EU sentiment. From a radical perspective of diversity emanating from the differently patterned card placements of each participant, we could say that the inner discursive landscapes of these thirty individuals is characterized by ambivalent and fluctuating cultural and political identities, which mirror, in many individual minds, the close to fifty-fifty situation that has been the outcome of all referenda about Denmark/EU relations over the last 30 years.

At the same time, the methodology used also enables us to distinguish meaningfully, amidst the flux and diversity of opinions, between four identity groupings, each consisting of individuals whose configurations of identity components have enough in common to distinguish them from the other groupings. But even at this level of the grouping, complexity asserts itself in the middle of orderliness, as the following selected ranking comparisons show (the Whole-hearted Europeans on average ranked Statement #8 in tenth place out of 36, the Pragmatic Europeans ranked it in first place, and so on):

<i>Statement #</i>	<i>F1 Whole-hearted</i>	<i>F3 Pragmatic</i>	<i>F2 Sceptical</i>	<i>F4 Danish</i>
#8	10	1	25	27
#10	20	2	29	22
#12	22	36	36	36
#13	9	12	16	9
#14	8	19	28	33
#16	13	8	31	30
#17	17	11	6	1
#19	15	2	4	3
#21	19	31	35	25
#32	3	13	17	19

We find the expected distribution between the groupings' rankings of #14, 17, and 32, for instance the increasing disagreement that one feels 'closely connected to Europe as such' (#14), and an increasing insistence that Denmark must keep its independence (#17).

In some cases, we find a situation of one group against the other three, as when F1 is considerably less adamant that they do not think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes (#12), and less insistent that Europe should let Denmark be Denmark (#19). In other cases we find a neat division between two more pro- and two more anti-European groups, as when F1 and F3 tend towards neutrality as regards the possible development of the EU into a superpower, whereas F2 and F4 believe that the EU project is a super-power oriented one (#16).

Complexity also shows itself in some unexpected deviations from the expected pattern, as when F3, against the other three groupings, express strong agreement that the EU is the best way to secure peace and stability for Denmark in the future (#10).

Of equal interest are the issues on which the positions of all four groupings converge. Thus, on #13, there is close agreement that the goal should be a Europe with politically and culturally very different countries, and agreement not to support the suggestion that integration between the EU countries ought to move faster (#21). On this point the findings of the Q-study corroborate the Eurobarometer poll reported above.

We believe that the relative orderliness of the findings of this study that the four groupings express makes the analysis potentially useful for the various agents on the Danish EU scene. For instance, campaigns – for or against increased integration – now have concrete groupings of people with complete identity profiles to 'aim for', instead of the representative but superficial 'attitudes' to the atomized issues on the EU agenda found by opinion polls.

For a moment taking the perspective of Europeanist campaigners and looking at the Euro-sceptical Danes, the identity profile of this grouping may be taken to indicate that the advocates of European integration have just not succeeded in answering in a convincing manner the ordinary Dane's mundane question of "What's in it for me?" People are generally not aware, for instance, that many aspects of gender equality and safety standards on the labour market, which they cherish, have come out not of our own 'unique' welfare ethos, but are products of 'homogenizing' EU directives.⁴ On the contrary, they point out how EU double standards have typically disadvantaged

them, as in the example, given by a Euro-sceptical Dane above, of non-harmonized Danish car prices.

The Q-methodological study would enable campaigners to address such concrete issues more accurately and efficiently on the Danish public agenda, as food for thought for a sizable group of Danish citizens, and in a manner that did not conflict with other views held by the group. In order to do that, one would need to devise another, similar Q-study, which related the social groupings discovered more accurately and representatively to the kind of demographic or psychographic parameters that would make the groupings identifiable in the social landscape. Such a study should also fine-tune its stimuli statements more towards a purely Danish horizon of experience than has been possible in a cross-national comparative study like the one reported here.

As we have pointed out at various points, our study is not without its shortcomings. However, we believe that it is a promising beginning of the development of an integrated qualitative-quantitative research method with high explanatory power in the area of national and supranational identity.

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APPENDIX 1

Danish Q study: Statements (Nationalist, PLuralism, Supra-Nationalist)

1. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred if Europeanness is promoted. (N)
2. The global development in economy and technology makes me optimistic on Denmark's behalf. (SN)
3. The globe's population can be naturally divided into nations, each with its special characteristics. (N)
4. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture. (N)
5. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity. (N)
6. One country cannot control its future on its own. (SN)
7. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anything else. (N)
8. One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the Euro (the common European currency). (PL)
9. It would be difficult for my parents if I was not married to/would not marry a Dane. (N)
10. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and stability for Denmark in the future. (PL)
11. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable of securing our interests in the globalized world. (PL)
12. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane. (SN)
13. I want a Europe with countries that are as politically and culturally different as they are different geographically. (PL)
14. I feel closely connected to Europe as such. (SN)
15. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existed for more than a thousand years. (N)
16. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to create a European super-power. It is merely a way to create change in Europe. (PL)
17. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in European cooperation. (N)

18. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an alternative to American ones. (PL)
19. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark, France be France, England be England, each with its customs, traditions and identity. It would be stupid to try to melt them together. (PL)
20. The European Union means a homogenization of the cultures of Europe that I dislike. (N)
21. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faster. (SN)
22. The European countries are so different that the European Union will never be able to function properly. (PL)
23. National differences will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grow up. (SN)
24. Denmark should play a more significant role internationally. (N)
25. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult by people who claim that one country can succeed on its own. (SN)
26. I believe that integration between the EU countries has gone as far as it possibly can. (PL)
27. Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world. (PL)
28. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I would feel that something negative had been said about me personally. (N)
29. I support the Danish democracy, but I don't feel particularly nationalistic. (SN)
30. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark's historical achievements. (SN)
31. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe without all Europeans having to be the same. (PL)
32. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership. (SN)
33. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish and English in order to cope in Europe. (SN)
34. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiarity it is possible to both support a united Europe and to preserve Danishness at the same time. (PL)
35. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents must be translated into Danish. (N)

36. There will be better room for national minorities (such as the Danes in Schleswig, the people in Corsica, etc.) in a united Europe, because a united Europe is more capable of handling such differences. (SN)

APPENDIX 2:

Factor profiles (based on ranked Statements)

Legend:

The top statement for each Factor (Grouping) is the one this grouping most agreed with, the bottom statement the one they least agreed with.

Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 1

Whole-hearted Europeans

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
31	31. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe without	31	2.058
6	6. One country cannot control its future on its own.	6	1.752
32	32. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership	32	1.352
33	33. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish	33	1.308
34	34. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiarity	34	1.302
36	36. There will be better room for national minorities (such	36	1.046
30	30. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark's	30	0.933
14	14. I feel closely connected to Europe as such.	14	0.884
13	13. I want a Europe with countries that are as politically a	13	0.782
8	8. One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the	8	0.711
24	24. Denmark should play a more significant role internationally	24	0.638
29	29. I support the Danish democracy, but I don't feel particularly	29	0.637
16	16. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to	16	0.470
25	25. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult	25	0.368
19	19. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark	19	0.193
18	18. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an a	18	0.153
17	17. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in	17	0.090
35	35. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents must	35	-0.029
21	21. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faster	21	-0.038
10	10. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and s	10	-0.044
2	2. The global development in economy and technology makes me	2	-0.140
12	12. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane.	12	-0.218
27	27. Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among	27	-0.307
4	4. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture.	4	-0.498
22	22. The European countries are so different that the European	22	-0.504
1	1. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred i	1	-0.654
23	23. National differences will disappear as a new generation	23	-0.696
11	11. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable o	11	-0.703
20	20. The European Union means a homogenization of the culture	20	-0.913
28	28. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I	28	-1.023
26	26. I believe that integration between the EU countries has	26	-1.295
3	3. The globe's population can be naturally divided into nati	3	-1.349
15	15. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existe	15	-1.375
5	5. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identit	5	-1.484
9	9. It would be difficult for my parents if I was not married	9	-1.610
7	7. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anyt	7	-1.797

Euro-Sceptical Danes

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
18	18. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an a	18	2.098
33	33. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish	33	1.464
35	35. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents mu	35	1.205
19	19. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denm	19	1.150
20	20. The European Union means a homogenization of the culture	20	1.121
17	17. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in	17	1.003
29	29. I support the Danish democracy, but I don't feel particu	29	0.977
22	22. The European countries are so different that the Europea	22	0.860
30	30. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark's	30	0.778
27	27. Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among	27	0.715
11	11. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable o	11	0.700
2	2. The global development in economy and technology makes me	2	0.692
23	23. National differences will disappear as a new generation	23	0.670
31	31. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe withou	31	0.484
26	26. I believe that integration between the EU countries has	26	0.383
13	13. I want a Europe with countries that are as poltiically a	13	0.347
32	32. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membershi	32	0.273
7	7. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anyt	7	-0.027
24	24. Denmark should play a more significant role internationa	24	-0.087
4	4. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture.	4	-0.113
34	34. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiari	34	-0.173
15	15. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existe	15	-0.294
1	1. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred i	1	-0.319
6	6. One country cannot control its future on its own.	6	-0.359
8	8. One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the	8	-0.382
25	25. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult	25	-0.570
3	3. The globe's population can be naturally divided into nati	3	-0.626
14	14. I feel closely connected to Europe as such.	14	-0.796
10	10. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and s	10	-0.917
28	28. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I	28	-0.969
16	16. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to	16	-1.003
5	5. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identit	5	-1.428
9	9. It would be dificult for my parents if I was not married	9	-1.466
36	36. There will be better room for national minorities (such	36	-1.586
21	21. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faste	21	-1.843
12	12. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane.	12	-1.965

Pragmatic Europeans

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
8	8. One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the	8	2.107
19	19. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denm	19	1.618
10	10. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and s	10	1.173
31	31. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe withou	31	1.053
23	23. National differences will disappear as a new generation	23	1.035
27	27. Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among	27	1.010
2	2. The global development in economy and technology makes me	2	0.862
16	16. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to	16	0.853
18	18. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an a	18	0.786
33	33. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish	33	0.769
17	17. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in	17	0.684
13	13. I want a Europe with countries that are as poltiically a	13	0.512
32	32. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membershi	32	0.477
6	6. One country cannot control its future on its own.	6	0.461
3	3. The globe's population can be naturally divided into nati	3	0.426
34	34. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiari	34	0.364
15	15. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existe	15	0.342
7	7. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anyt	7	0.336
14	14. I feel closely connected to Europe as such.	14	0.225
11	11. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable o	11	-0.054
28	28. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I	28	-0.081
5	5. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identit	5	-0.272
36	36. There will be better room for national minorities (such	36	-0.287
25	25. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult	25	-0.375
1	1. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred i	1	-0.388
35	35. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents mu	35	-0.707
30	30. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark's	30	-0.788
24	24. Denmark should play a more significant role internationa	24	-0.809
9	9. It would be dificult for my parents if I was not married	9	-1.088
29	29. I support the Danish democracy, but I don't feel particu	29	-1.163
21	21. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faste	21	-1.173
20	20. The European Union means a homogenization of the culture	20	-1.289
22	22. The European countries are so different that the Europea	22	-1.398
4	4. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture.	4	-1.579
26	26. I believe that integration between the EU countries has	26	-1.682
12	12. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane.	12	-1.957

Danish Danes

No.	Statement	No.	Z-SCORES
17	17. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in	17	1.575
9	9. It would be difficult for my parents if I was not married	9	1.573
19	19. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark	19	1.401
15	15. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existed	15	1.296
35	35. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents must	35	1.296
34	34. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiarity	34	1.219
31	31. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe without	31	1.213
3	3. The globe's population can be naturally divided into nations	3	1.135
13	13. I want a Europe with countries that are as politically as	13	0.871
4	4. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture.	4	0.699
30	30. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark's	30	0.600
6	6. One country cannot control its future on its own.	6	0.600
5	5. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity	5	0.522
28	28. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I	28	0.446
27	27. Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among	27	0.261
23	23. National differences will disappear as a new generation	23	0.259
36	36. There will be better room for national minorities (such	36	0.171
33	33. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish	33	0.021
32	32. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership	32	0.000
20	20. The European Union means a homogenization of the culture	20	-0.175
1	1. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred in	1	-0.252
10	10. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and s	10	-0.255
24	24. Denmark should play a more significant role internationally	24	-0.438
25	25. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult	25	-0.438
21	21. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faster	21	-0.522
18	18. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an a	18	-0.526
8	8. One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the	8	-0.783
22	22. The European countries are so different that the Europea	22	-0.786
29	29. I support the Danish democracy, but I don't feel particu	29	-1.053
16	16. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to	16	-1.143
7	7. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anyt	7	-1.216
2	2. The global development in economy and technology makes me	2	-1.225
14	14. I feel closely connected to Europe as such.	14	-1.474
26	26. I believe that integration between the EU countries has	26	-1.483
11	11. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable o	11	-1.567
12	12. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane.	12	-1.825

Notes

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² A possible solution that could have satisfied most participants in this respect would have been to change the polar opposition into one of 'most agree' to 'least agree', and to change the numerical scale accordingly to a 1-to-9 continuum). This change would probably have accommodated participants who felt forced by the grid scale to 'disagree' with statements they really wanted to agree moderately with.

³ Of the 3 interview recordings in this group one is unusable due to technical deficiency, the other two are brief on the majority of the statements

⁴ We are grateful to Mark Ørsten for suggesting this point.