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The EU’s normative power in changing world politics

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The future of world politics is defined by four catastrophic failures – the failure of the neoliberal economic system; the failure to keep global warming below a 2 degree Celsius increase in mean temperatures; the failure to reach any of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals; and the failure to develop any meaningful form of global governance capable of addressing these, and other failures. Numerous national, European and global ‘security strategies’ / ‘risk assessments’ identify proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction; terrorism, state failure, organised crime and cyber security; energy security, climate change, and changing demographics as the greatest challenges of the post-cold war era. Undoubtedly all of these are important, but they are mainly symptoms rather than causes of global failures. If the notion of changing world politics is to bring any global governance at all, rather than simply reverting to 19th century ‘great power’ politics, then addressing the root causes of 21st century crises – the economic system, global warming, development goals, and global justice needs to be rethought.

This chapter sets out what role the European Union (EU) could and should play in this changing world politics, with an emphasis on the concept of ‘normative power’. To do this the chapter addresses five interrelated questions regarding the normative power and external politics of the EU in any new global order: 1. what is the concept of normative power in world politics? 2. what is an effective EU toolbox for tackling new challenges? 3. How does the EU go beyond self-perception and rhetoric? 4. what is the raison d’être of the EU?, and 5. How might normative power in EU external policies lead to a more just global order?

Normative power is understood in this chapter in its ‘ideal or purest form’, that is in the absence of other forms of power such as material incentives or physical force. Clearly, in

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practical realities normative power and normative justification co-exist alongside other forms of influence and power in world politics and in EU external actions. The question then becomes how ideal or pure forms of normative power are best conceived and practiced in the presence of material incentives and/or physical force. It is obviously not possible to address this question in any comprehensive way in this brief chapter, but it is suggested that understanding and prioritising normative power may help ensure that any subsequent or simultaneous use of material incentives and/or physical force is practiced in a more justifiable and reflexive way.

This chapter focuses on justification in EU external actions rather than explanation, interests or incentives. Normative political theorists such as Andreas Føllesdal or Molly Cochran place an emphasis on justification as providing criteria or means of overcoming distinctions between self and self-less interest and concerns (see Manners 2010). Føllesdal has identified justifiability as one of the fundamental conceptions of what legitimacy is about in normative political theory. He argues for a concern ‘about the normative legitimacy of the EU, often expressed in terms of justifiability among political equals’ (Føllesdal 2006: 156, emphasis in original). Similarly, Cochran argues that it is ‘a task of normative IR theory to inquire into the value invested in this norm [respect for state sovereignty] and to determine whether it is justifiable’ (Cochran 1999: 10). Thus in this chapter the term ‘justifiable’ is used as a means of capturing the way in which moral claims are put forward rather than their universal or particular scope (Cochran 1999: 14). Such means involves attempting to ensure that EU relations and policies with the rest of the world are explicable and justifiable to first, second and third parties – the EU, its citizens and other non-EU parties.

1. The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics

The social sciences have many different understandings of ‘normative power’. The purpose of this section is to help clarify the concept of normative power in world politics as developed in European Union (EU) studies over the last ten years. The section uses a five-point conceptualisation of normative power as being ideational; involving principles, actions, and impact; as well as having broader consequences in world politics. For each point both a general observation about world politics and a specific comment about the EU is made (see Keene 2008; Forsberg 2009).

The past two decades have seen rapid and radical transformations of global economy, society, environment, conflict, and politics. During this period three events in particular seem to capture these notions of global transformation – the 1989 collapse of communism, the 2001 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 global financial crisis. The beliefs of eastern Europeans in 1989, al-Qaida terrorists in 2001, and financial investors in 2008 all contributed, in very different ways, to a transformation of international order and the
emergence of new global agendas. These events and the transformations they led to say something about the power of ideas and ideation in world politics.

**Ideational**

The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly the use of normative justification implies a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics. In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively sustainable’ – i.e. ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; ‘sustainable’ into the next generation. To capture the sea change in global thinking that the concept of normative power implies, it is useful to juxtapose two visual metaphors (borrowed from Jonathan Power’s *Story of Amnesty International* and from Francis Ford Coppola’s *Apocalypse Now* respectively) - normative power works like ‘water on stone’, not like ‘napalm in the morning’.

In the post-Cold War period the power of ideas and ideation have been influential in the evolution of the European Community into the EU. Such ideas have helped create an EU which is concerned about more than economic policies, and which exercises more than material forms of influence and power (see Manners 2000, 2002). In this respect, the incorporation of normative power and exercise of normative justification can be increasingly found in much of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world including the external dimensions of internal policies; enlargement, trade, and development policies; and external relations more generally. Two examples of the power of ideas and ideation in post-Cold War EU relations with the world include the idea of ‘sustainable development’ and of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In both cases the ideas came from within the UN system, were adopted into the EU treaty base, and then eventually promoted and practiced in EU external relations.

**Principles**

Conceptualising normative power as ideational non-material justification involves a three-part understanding of its use and analysis linking principles, actions, and impact (Manners 2008a, 2009). Normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way. Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if these are important within the UN system. Coherence of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, can be seen to be sound and non-contradictory. Consistency of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, are uniform both within and without the promoting entity, and are applied uniformly.
Principles in the EU and its relations with the rest of the world draw upon the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on Human Rights. In practical terms such principles can be differentiated into the prime principle of sustainable peace; core principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law (as set out in article 6 of the Treaty on European Union); as well as the objectives and tasks of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance (as set out in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). Coherence and consistency in the international promotion of these principles is intended to come from the role of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty.

Actions
Normative power should secondly be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multi- and pluri-lateral dialogue between participants. Within these international and domestic venues for dialogue, debate and argumentation can involve reference to international principles as well as encouraging understanding and agreement (although also misunderstanding and disagreement). Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of prestige or shame by participants. The attribution of prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning.

EU actions in the promotion of principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, encouraging a more holistic, or comprehensive approach to the many challenges of world politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges through development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement. In the past decade the gradual evolution of conflict prevention and crisis management policies has helped improve EU ability to deal with more immediate challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction. This combination of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy where the EU is able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the EU’s inclination in the promotion of principles is not structural capacity or crisis ability, but its encouragement of processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entails initiating and institutionalising regular patterns of communication or partnership, for example through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the
European Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Strategic Partnerships.

Alternative approaches to the promotion of principles might include more extensive use of material incentives such as positive conditionality or negative conditionality and robust sanctions. But concerns regarding efficacy and ethicacy of applying sanctions, or withdrawing trade preferences, to some of the world’s poorest peoples raises questions about more extensive use of material incentives (Manners 2009c: 794-5; Financial Times 2009). Clara Portela suggests that EU sanctions have geographical priorities, involve only ‘targeted sanctions’, and involve new ‘modes of operation’ involving mutual accommodation (Council 2004; Portela 2005; Portela 2009). Portela’s research illustrates the way in which EU use of material incentives such as sanctions policy also appears increasingly shaped by the need to encourage processes of engagement and dialogue.

Impact
Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socialising in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must be involve socialisation, partnership, and ownership. Socialisation as an impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be seen as being part of an open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. Ownership as an impact of the promotion of principles involves practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. However, such impacts of normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic socialisation is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational, and international support for international principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative justification conceived here. An example of longer-term socialisation impact can be seen in Alexander Warkotsch’s work on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia in which he argues for ‘a more long-term approach that concentrates on the break-up of authoritarian structures by emphasising certain equality rights and government accountability…. With the overall aim of restructuring socialisation efforts along the criteria of target accessibility and programme appreciation’ (Warkotsch 2009: 269).

EU impact in promoting principles can be extraordinarily difficult to judge (see Manners 2009b, 2009c). Clarity of principle is important in ensuring others understand what the EU is trying to promote, as with the idea of ‘never again’ in the post-Yugoslav space. Simplicity of action space is important when the EU, albeit very rarely, is the only or predominant actor, as with the pre-accession processes of the 1990s. Consistency of promotion is crucial to ensure the EU avoids claims of ‘double standards’, as is often the case in state recognition (such as Kosovo) or UN resolutions (such as the Middle East). Holistic, ‘joined-up’ thinking is
important in the broader promotion of principles through the multilateral system, such as the many challenges of the Doha Round of trade liberalisation, the Millennium Development Goals, and addressing climate change at the Copenhagen CoP15. Partnership, not EU unilateralism is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral institutions. Finally, timescale is important when attempting to judge EU principles, actions and impact in any normatively sustainable way.

Consequences
A belief in, and practice of, normative power has three broader consequences concerning the possibility of more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable world politics. The concept of normative power invites more holistic thinking, ‘outside the box’, about the purposes of agency, power, and policy in world politics. Such holistic thinking demands more thorough consideration of the rationale/principles, practices/actions, and consequences/impact of actors/agents in world politics. The concept of normative power is conceived here in its ideal or purest form, but in practical terms it is often used together with material incentives and/or physical force. However, the prioritising of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilised in a more justifiable way. Finally, the concept of normative power with its emphasis on holistic thinking and justifiable practices raises the possibility that a more sustainable world politics embraces both the power of ideas, the ‘thinkable’, and physical power, the ‘material’.

The European Union has a history of, and capacity for, the practice of normative power in world politics, but three challenges remain. The evolution of EU politics and policies over the past decade has occasionally copied some of the technologies and habits of other actors in world politics, for instance in the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘securitisation’ of ordinary life, or in trying to rival other ‘great powers’ in international relations. Such technologies and habits tend to involve copying other ‘boxes’, not inviting more holistic thinking ‘outside the box’. In this respect, the development and use of EU material incentives and/or physical force has tended to follow the patterns and practices of ‘great powers’ instead of thinking about and using normative power in a more justifiable way. To address these tendencies and better prepare for the challenges of the 21st century the EU should return to making creative efforts to ensure that global challenges, as with endemic war in Europe, become ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ through the exercise of normative power in world politics.

2. An effective toolbox for tackling new challenges?

Having clarified the concept of normative power in world politics, it is worth asking what an effective EU toolbox for tackling the new challenges identified in the opening paragraph
would look like. To what extent and under what conditions may normative power offer the EU an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities taking into account new challenges? The first response to this question is to seek to further identify what, exactly, these new challenges are – here it may be possible to differentiate between international and transnational challenges. New international challenges tend to focus anew on ‘great power’ relations relating to the rise of ‘new powers’, a shift of wealth and economic capabilities from the west to the east, and questions of coming multipolarity from the G8 to the G20. In contrast, new transnational challenges are of a much greater magnitude, including economic globalisation and the crisis of the global economic system; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global terrorism, organised crime and cyber security; energy security, food security and climate change; changing patterns of migration; and the role of non-state actors in all of these challenges. Both international and transnational challenges are amplified by the inability to address growing inequality within and between societies, as well as the inability to reform a UN system created for a long-passed world.

The second response is to try to discern the conditions which characterise this rapidly emerging era of new challenges – here conditions of complexity and interconnectedness are especially relevant. The evolving EU consensus on new challenges and foreign policy appears to recognise these conditions, with the 2008 Council ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (RIESS) arguing that ‘globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected’ (Solana 2008: 1). The 2003 ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) contended that in the post-cold war world ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’, with the RIESS observing that ‘five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex’ and concluding that ‘twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges’ (Solana 2008: 3 and 1). The ESS and RIESS suggest that complexity is greatest in three areas – counter-terrorism, Mediterranean relations, and ESDP. The 2003 acknowledgement in the ESS that terrorism arose out of ‘complex causes’, including ‘the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’ (Solana 2003: 3), appeared to recognise the complexity of addressing new transnational challenges in the post-cold war world. Five years later, the RIESS suggested that the Mediterranean still posed ‘complex challenges’ for the EU, including ‘insufficient political reform and illegal migration’ (Solana 2008: 7). The RIESS also acknowledged the difficulties for the ESDP in answering the demand for assistance and arguing that ‘the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be’ (Solana 2008: 9).

In parallel the evolving EU foreign policy consensus also appears to recognise the second condition of the interconnectedness of new challenges. While the ESS and RIESS tend to refer to interconnectedness and interdependency in terms of terrorist threats and energy
security, the 2006 ‘European Consensus on Development’ (ECD) talks in terms of globalisation and poverty eradication. These conditions of interdependency and interconnectedness are illustrated by the ESS’s reference to the new global challenges that ‘have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields’ (Solana 2003: 2). In this context, the ESS identified the new challenges of global terrorism as ‘increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties’ (Solana 2003: 3). In addition, the ESS and RIESS placed increasingly emphasis on the new challenge of energy security and interdependence - ‘energy dependence is a special concern for Europe’ and ‘concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years’ (Solana 2003: 3; 2008: 5). The ECD went beyond talking in terms of threat and security to discuss ‘The context within which poverty eradication is pursued is an increasingly globalised and interdependent world; this situation has created new opportunities but also new challenges’ (European Parliament, Council, Commission [EPCC] 2006: 1). The ECD appeared to recognise that ‘combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries’ (EPCC 2006: 1). The ECD also suggested that EU responses to new challenges must involve the promotion of ‘understanding of interdependence and encourage North-South solidarity’ and involve providing agricultural resources to assist developing countries ‘dependent on commodities’ (EPCC 2006: 9 and 13).

The acknowledgement of conditions of complexity and connectedness in tackling new international and transnational challenges leads to the question of whether, and to what extent, normative power provides the EU with an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. Coming to terms with such conditions and challenges demands the clear and coherent fusion of the EU’s acquis communautaire to its external strategy. While the acquis holds the principles which might provide an effective box, it has not yet been strategically filled and organised with EU foreign policy tools. The Lisbon Treaty intends to take a step in this direction by linking together the promotion of values and principles from the acquis with its ‘action on the international scene’ through external actions and CFSP. With or without the Lisbon Treaty efforts to promote principles of the UN Charter and international law, as well as the identified values and principles, are likely to fail unless the means of promotion is more systematic and sustainable than the current treaties suggest. Such systematic promotion would require that any reforms ensured consistency and coherence within and between the different areas of EU external actions as policies are developed and implemented. Such sustainable promotion would require, as suggested above, the prioritising of normative power over material incentives and/or physical force to ensure that the EU is equipped with an effective, normatively sustainable, toolbox for tackling new global challenges.
Beyond problems of the Lisbon Treaty, its implementation, and its sustainable promotion, remains very big questions over the role of member states and the readiness of the EU for the catastrophic failures outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Even if the EU were willing and able to implement reforms, and engage in systematic and sustainable promotion, would the EU then have an effective foreign policy toolbox for tackling new global challenges? Possibly not, as it is likely that in the short and narrow term most member states are incapable of taking the steps needed to deal with, for example, systemic economic crises, global sea-level rises, pandemic poverty, and the realisation of structures of global governance. This endemic structural problem means that most member states have too short, narrow and inward views to be able to adapt quick enough to the new global challenges in order to avoid fast encroaching crises. Added to these problems association with the role of member states, is the simple observation that even implemented, the Lisbon Treaty is ‘a pre-crisis treaty for a post-crisis world’ (Münchau 2009). Wolfgang Münchau argues that the institutional and legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty do not address what he sees as the EU’s three main defects: ‘its ability to co-ordinate during a crisis, its failure to enact policies to strengthen its potential growth, and its failure to project itself effectively at a global level’. Clearly, even with the Lisbon Treaty enacted, Münchau believes that ‘the treaty’s institutional and legal changes offer little comfort’ for the EU’s inability to co-ordinate. In many respects this is problematic, but not unexpected – its hybrid polity consisting of extensive intergovernmental practices in the external relations arena ensures ongoing difficulties of co-ordination, implementation and effectiveness. In sum, even if foreign policy reforms were implemented, it is highly likely that problems within member states and weaknesses within the EU configuration itself would not provide an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. Fusing together acquis with strategy with the use of normative power would represent one step towards more normatively sustainable EU external actions, but this alone is unlikely to be enough to tackle new global challenges under conditions of complexity and connectedness.

3. Going beyond self-perception and rhetoric?

Alongside the empirical question of effectiveness is the normative question of whether the concept of normative power takes the EU beyond self-perception and rhetoric. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss notions of ‘beyond’, ‘perception’, and ‘rhetoric’. Firstly, there is the question of going beyond perception and discourse in order to objectively assess the EU for evidence of convenient self-perception and discourses of political rhetoric. The alchemic quest for a means of going beyond perception and discourse has long been the aim of empiricist and positivist approaches which seek objectivity in the subjective social world. The difficulties of going beyond can be seen in the attempts to quantitatively measure the gap between capabilities and expectations in EU foreign policy, as well as the attempts to qualitatively judge how normative the EU is compared to other
foreign policy actors. In both these examples the analytical difficulties of objectively assessing gaps and normativity render such studies problematic. Ultimately, as most critical scholars observe, ‘those engaged in positivist approaches ... cannot avoid normative assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in articulating why such research is significant’ (Cochran, 1999: 1).

By admitting that normative assumptions are unavoidable, a step may be taken towards understanding the importance of perception and discourse in the construction of the EU as an actor in world politics. Perception, discourse and identity construction are deeply implicated in the study of the EU in world politics, and require analytical techniques appropriate to understanding their role. Whether using social constructivist, critical theoretical or post-structural approaches, the examination of EU perception and discourse requires an interpretive understanding of how subjects see their world. Understanding the role of perception and discourse in the concept of normative power necessitates the use of ‘longitudinal interpretation’. The practice of longitudinal interpretation is important for a normative power analysis as it suggests that time and technique are factors that could improve our understanding of the EU in world politics. A long analytical time frame ensures that analysis captures generational change rather than momentary fluctuation – ideally any study would include at least the origins of principles, their translation into actions, and the impact and consequences of these actions. This is important because the normative power approach ‘works interpretively’ in that it is ‘interested in the level of meaning and believes that social science is about providing various phenomena with content and meaning. Interpretations contain elements of both understanding and explanation’ in this approach (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 136).

By using the analytical practice of longitudinal interpretation, the method of ‘tripartite analysis’ facilitates the study of rhetoric, perception, discourse and identity in EU external actions. Tripartite analysis involves interpreting the construction of principles, actions and impact as EU policies are created and recreated. The analysis requires looking at how all three parts of the actions shape and feed into each other over long time frames, as well as applying normative critiques. Such critiques require comparing the EU with other examples at all three stages within the method of the tripartite analysis, as well as comparing claims of principles against the aims of actions and the consequences of impact. In this way the construction of ‘convenient self-perceptions’ and ‘political rhetoric’ can be analysed and critiqued for the longer-term power and inconvenience of such perceptions and rhetorical techniques.

Undoubtedly the processes of constructing self-perceptions and discursive rhetorical practices of ‘normative power’ have been important over the past 15 years. The inclusion of references to principles such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law during the 1990s has contributed to an evolving EU foreign policy consensus over much deeper international
principles such as human security, sustainable peace, and effective multilateralism. From a short-term, one-dimensional understanding of power the constructions and discourses advocating promotion and adherence to such principles may appear as convenient and ‘mere’ rhetoric. But it is equally likely that such perceptions and rhetoric may prove inconvenient and persuasive over the longer term and with a more multi-dimensional understanding of power. The rising importance of human security within the discursive construction of EU external relations and security strategy has accelerated over the past decade (see discussions of human security in Manners 2006a, 2006b). As the RIESS acknowledged in 2008, ‘we have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity.... We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security’ (Solana 2008: 2 and 10).

Similarly, the increasing importance of the principle of sustainable peace can also be seen in the RIESS: ‘As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (Solana 2008: 8; see also discussions of sustainable peace in Manners 2006c, 2008b). Finally, the RIESS also suggests the discursive importance of the principle of effective multilateralism: ‘The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world.... [But] the international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts.... This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions’ (Solana 2008: 11-12). While the EU profession of adherence to all three of these central UN principles is a fairly recent, 21st century phenomena, the significance of such discursive practices is likely to prove distinctly inconvenient in EU external actions. As suggested elsewhere, public pronouncement, discursive deployment, and inclusion into strategies and policies have ‘the effect of reconstituting the EU ‘habitus’ by changing the way in which socially acquired and embodied systems of cultural reproduction adapt to innovation and advocacy’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 210). Furthermore, UN principles of human security and sustainable peace have large constituencies of support from international NGOs and global civil society, making it unlikely that such principles are easily forgotten from the public memory. Ultimately, the construction of EU normative power will likely prove inconvenient for EU foreign policy manoeuvrability in the longer term.

In addition to these comments on going beyond and perception, is the question of the role of rhetoric in EU external actions. While ‘rhetoric is broadly acknowledged as an important feature of the political process’ with rhetoric having ‘the normative power of the argument’, it is still popular to discuss rhetoric as ‘empty’ in political studies. (Gottweis 2007: 240; Dimitrakopoulos 2008: 321). Rhetoric is best understood in its Aristotelian meaning as the
art of persuasion encompassing ethos (morality), logos (logic) and pathos (emotion) in argumentation (Leith 2009). All three elements are to found in EU rhetoric and persuasion, and should be considered important to the understanding of the power in ‘normative power’. The ethos of an argument refers to the morality of the speaker, to their character claim to be moral and ethical. In the concept of normative power, ethos can be seen in the need to legitimise principles through reference to previously established moral credentials such as international law or the UN Charter. The logos of an argument is the logic used by the speaker to appeal to reason. In the concept of normative power, logos can be seen in the need to act persuasively through argumentation suggesting the pros and cons of a line of reasoning. In EU external actions emphasising previously legitimated principles, the argumentative logic often refers to both the pros and cons of, for example, acting in line with international law or the UN Charter. The pathos of an argument is the appeal to emotion used by the speaker. In the concept of normative power, pathos can be seen in the extent to which the EU can have a socialising impact in the form of a greater social understanding between the EU and its partners.

4. What is the raison d’être of the European Union?

So far the discussions of the concept of normative power, the new challenges facing the EU, and the role of perception and rhetoric have all suggested how the EU might deploy normative power in changing world politics, but they have not necessarily spelt out ‘why’? To answer that question it is necessary to take a step backwards - to ask what the EU is for. What is the raison d’être of the EU??

While Europe may never have been so prosperous, so secure or so free, it does not feel this way to most of its citizens, its third-country residents, or those on its borders. For EU citizens and near-citizens, as well as most of the rest of the world, the EU seems like a foreign country: an unintelligible, remote, neo-liberal place where they do things differently to the world of first-hand experience. European unification has made peace and prosperity possible within Europe, but in that moment of achievement the EU has lost its way, lost its meaning. For EU citizens and beyond, the EU has no meaningful raison d’être, no clear mission 20 years after European unification, 50 years after its creation.

At exactly the same time the EU has never been more needed, more called upon to act, more important in global politics. As the opening paragraph of the chapter spelt out, the immediate future of the world in the next two decades will be defined by the four catastrophic failures. The EU could contribute to addressing these failures if it were able to find a meaningful role in the world – to find a means of linking its institutional ‘acquis’ with its global ‘strategy’ in a normatively sustainable way, as discussed in section two of the chapter. Taking this step to finding a raison d’être, a mission, does not need and must not
focus on institutional or treaty reform. EU citizens and near-citizens, as well as the rest of the world, need and deserve more than slogans and platitudes, more than decision-making diagrams and unintelligible treaties.

Finding the EU’s *raison d’être* in world politics involves an intellectual return to the creative efforts that lay at the origins of the EU. The recognition that the touchstone of the EU, of its acquis, holds the key to its mission and role can only be achieved by returning to the lost treasures of the Schuman Declaration. In the 1950s the making of creative efforts in the ECSC involved pooling basic production and instituting a new high authority; making war materially impossible and unthinkable; raising living standards and promoting peaceful achievements. This fusion of interests and ideas provided the intellectual origins of the EU as we know it – and should provide the EU’s *raison d’être* in world politics.

The creative efforts needed in the 21st century must also be proportionate to the dangers that new global threats and challenges hold for the EU. The recognition of the fusion of interests and ideas within the EU is captured in the EU’s prime aim of promoting peace, values and well-being. It is here that clarity is needed in linking *raison d’être* and mission with the EU’s acquis and strategy in world politics. The emphasis on material interests through the pooling of production, making war materially impossible, and raising of living standards leads to the aim of promoting well-being, in other words, prosperity in Europe and beyond. In parallel, the emphasis on normative ideas through instituting a new high authority, making war unthinkable, and promoting peaceful achievements leads to the aim of promoting values, in other words, progress in Europe and beyond. This aim and mission of promoting peace, prosperity and progress inside and outside the Union provides the EU with a much clearer *raison d’être* in world politics, but it does not necessarily help provide a means of promotion.

The fusion of interests and ideas in EU *raison d’être* is matched by the fusion of aims and means in promoting peace, prosperity and progress. In other words, the EU’s role, its perception, its strategies, and external actions are not separable – aims and means, words and actions, co-constitute the EU in world politics. But it is useful to think in new ways about EU interests and ideas in world politics by differentiating between material policies/instruments and normative ideas. Material interests and material/physical policies and instruments are central to conventional thinking about the EU as a global actor. As discussed in section one of the chapter, normative ideas and normative justification have not been considered as important, but their role and deployment as normative power is critical if the EU’s role, perception, strategies and actions are to become more meaningful and more normatively sustainable in changing world politics.

In this respect, the EU’s raison d’être in world politics should aim to promote peace, prosperity and progress through the prioritisation of normative power. Only by clearly stating what the EU is for, its *raison d’être*, and how it intends to promote these aims in a normatively sustainable way can the EU take any step towards improving its perception.
from outside of Europe. The strategy of clear, coherent, consistent, and committed normative justification that guides any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force should be deployed in order to sustain any global influence if the EU is not to be rendered internationally invisible in next 10-20 years. Finally, with or without the Lisbon Treaty, the EU must refine and develop its array of policies and instruments to ensure it prioritises normative justification in the promotion of peace, prosperity and progress for its and other peoples in the changing world politics.

5. Normative power and EU external actions in changing world politics

This chapter has set out what role the EU could and should play in a changing world politics characterised by new global challenges under conditions of complexity and interconnectedness. It is suggested that these challenges and conditions are likely to be accelerated by four catastrophic failures in the next two decades, making the need for more sustainable thinking on EU external actions all the more imperative.

The chapter began by setting out the concept of normative power in world politics. It was argued that conceptualising normative power in this way helps the understanding of the need for the practice of normative justification in EU external actions. The chapter then asked what an effective EU toolbox for tackling new global challenges would need to look like. Here it was argued that the complexity and interconnectedness of new international, and more importantly, new transnational challenges demand a need for an EU external action toolbox that can engage in normatively sustainable mission and politics. Thirdly, the chapter examined how the EU might move beyond perception and rhetoric in its external actions. In this respect it was argued that perception, discourse and identity require a stronger means of understanding, and that the practice of rhetorical engagement is an important element of normative power. Fourthly, in order to understand why normative power might be important, the chapter asked what the raison d’être of the EU might be. The response was that the EU should return to making creative efforts to promote peace, prosperity and progress through the prioritisation of normative justification over material incentives and physical force.

So how might normative power in EU external actions help in changing world politics? As suggested at the outset, addressing the root causes of 21st century failures and crises requires a radical rethink of world politics, and the EU’s role within them. More sustainable global economics, a more sustainable global environment, more just human development, and more sustainable systems of democratic global justice require different thinking and a different direction in national, international and transnational politics. The EU may have a role to play in that new direction by helping to reinvent international relations, but equally it may have no new role to play by reproducing traditional international relations. It is
perfectly plausible for the EU to become a new pole in the emerging multipolar world, to reproduce the ‘great power’ politics of the 19th century. If that is to be the case then we are likely to continue to reproduce and accelerate the great wars, great famines, genocides, poverty and starvation, and impending eco-catastrophe that traditional international relations has cultivated.

Changing the direction of the development of EU external actions into more normative justificatory practices would lead to at least five expectations about attempting to address the root causes of 21st century global crises. The first expectation would be that more normative justificatory practices might bridge the gap between communitarian self-interested concerns and cosmopolitan other-interested concerns. Such a bridging may involve moving towards ‘cosmopolitical’ approaches that seek to disentangle ‘soft cosmopolitanism’ from neo-liberal capitalism as part of a commitment to ‘more discursive engagement across lines of difference, more commitment to reduction of material inequality, and more openness to radical change’ (Calhoun 2003: 111). Following this first commitment, the second expectation would be for greater attention to principles of equality and social solidarity as part of a commitment to reduction of material inequality and more sustainable social economics in order to address the failings of the neo-liberal economic system. On top of these two commitments, a third expectation would be for greater adherence to the principle of sustainable development in order to address the lifestyle choices at the roots of eco-catastrophic global warming. The fourth expectation would be for greater consideration of the expansion of freedom as development in order to improve injustices in human development. Finally, the fifth expectation would be for more openness to radical change in global governance in order to address these, and other failings of the 21st century. Ultimately, any commitment to normative power and EU external actions in changing world politics needs to ‘profess normative values and practice pragmatic principles’ at the same time as maintaining ‘a clear sense of long-term objectives’ but acknowledging the limits of the EU’s ‘day-to-day actions’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 214; Kay 2009: 11).
References


